This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-242 
entitled 'Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing 
Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional 
Actions Needed' which was released on November 24, 2003.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a 
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately.

Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

November 2003:

Aviation Security:

Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded 
Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed:

GAO-04-242:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-242, a report to congressional requesters

Why GAO Did This Study:

To help strengthen aviation security after the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, the Congress expanded the size and mission of the 
Federal Air Marshal Service (the Service) and located the Service 
within the newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 
Between November 2001 and July 1, 2002, the Service grew from fewer 
than 50 air marshals to thousands, and its mission expanded to include 
the protection of domestic as well as international flights. In March 
2003, the Service, with TSA, merged into the new Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS); and in November 2003, it was transferred from 
TSA and merged into DHS’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE). GAO looked at operational and management control 
issues that emerged during the rapid expansion of the Service, 
specifically addressing its (1) background check procedures and 
training; (2) management information, policies, and procedures; and 
(3) challenges likely to result from its mergers into DHS and ICE. 

What GAO Found:

To deploy its expanded workforce by July 1, 2002, a deadline set by 
the Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Service used expedited 
procedures to obtain interim secret security clearances for air 
marshal candidates and provided abbreviated training for them. These 
procedures allowed candidates with interim clearances to work until 
they received their final top-secret clearances. Because of a 
governmentwide demand for clearances, nearly a quarter of the active 
air marshals had not received their top-secret clearances as of July 
2003; but by October 2003, only about 3 percent were awaiting their 
top-secret clearances. To train its expanded workforce before the 
Deputy Secretary’s deployment deadline, the Service incrementally 
revised and abbreviated its curriculum. 

The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and 
procedures to support its expanded workforce and mission, but it has 
not yet completed this major effort. For example, it replaced a manual 
system for scheduling flight duty with an automated system, but it has 
not yet developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of 
its scheduling controls designed to prevent air marshals’ fatigue. In 
addition, it has gathered and used information on potential security 
incidents and on air marshals’ reasons for separation from the Service 
to improve its operations and workforce management. However, some of 
this information is not clear or detailed enough to facilitate follow-
up. Finally, the Service has implemented policies needed to support 
its expansion. 

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes 
resulting from its mergers into DHS and ICE, including changes to its 
roles, responsibilities, and training and to its procedures for 
coordinating with TSA’s security organizations, as well as 
administrative changes. GAO’s recent work on mergers and 
organizational transformations proposes several key practices—set 
implementation goals, establish a communication strategy, and involve 
employees to obtain their ideas—and associated implementation steps 
that could help the Service implement such changes. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is making recommendations designed to improve the Service’s data 
on flight duty and information on separations. DHS agreed with GAO’s 
recommendations and expressed a commitment to continuous improvement 
as the Service moves forward.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-242.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham 
at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service to Meet 
the Deputy Secretary's Deployment Deadline:

Management Information, Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept Pace 
with Expanded Operations:

Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger 
Implementation Challenges:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal Service:

Appendix III: Locations of the Federal Air Marshal Service's 21 Field 
Offices and Training Facility:

Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air Marshal Service, September 
2001 through October 2002:

Appendix V: Mission-Related Incidents Reported by Federal Air Marshals, 
by Broad Categories, September 15, 2001 --September 16, 2003:

Appendix VI: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and 
Organizational Transformations:

Appendix VII: Contacts and Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Acknowledgments:

Figures:

Figure 1: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Gender, by 
Percentage, as of August 2003.

Figure 2: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Age, by Percentage, 
as of August 2003.

Figure 3: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Race, by Percentage, 
as of August 2003.

Abbreviations:

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
DOT: Department of Transportation:  
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 
IG: Inspector General: 
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 
LEAP: law enforcement availability pay: 
OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 
PDA: personal digital assistants:  
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

November 19, 2003:

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and 
International Relations: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Diane E. Watson: 
House of Representatives:

Within 10 months of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the 
United States, the number of federal air marshals grew from fewer than 
50 to thousands;[Footnote 1] and within 2 years, the Federal Air 
Marshal Service (the Service) underwent three organizational transfers. 
More specifically, the Congress, through a provision of the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act, enacted on November 19, 2001,[Footnote 
2] authorized a dramatic expansion of the Service's mission and 
workforce and transferred authority over the Service from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) to the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA). Under this legislation, the Service's mission 
grew from preventing hijackings on international flights to protecting 
passengers, crews, and aircraft from terrorist activities on both 
domestic and international flights. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary 
of Transportation set a goal of hiring, training, and deploying 
thousands of new air marshals by July 1, 2002. After the passage of the 
Homeland Security Act, the Service moved with TSA from the Department 
of Transportation (DOT) to the newly created Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003. Finally, in September 2003, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security announced that the Service would be 
transferred from TSA to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), another law enforcement agency within the new 
department. Following this transfer, which was supposed to take place 
on November 2, 2003, the Secretary said that the Bureau's three law 
enforcement workforces--air marshals, immigration agents, and customs 
agents--would be cross-trained to create a "surge capacity" for 
responding to security threats.

The rapid expansion of the Service led to a number of operational and 
management control issues, which surfaced in national media reports of 
allegations that the Service conducted inadequate background checks on 
newly hired air marshals, slashed its training program to expedite the 
air marshals' deployment, and failed to meet the needs of its air 
marshal workforce. For example, the Service allegedly over-or 
underscheduled air marshals for flight duty and reneged on promises of 
transfers to alternative locations, thereby creating dissatisfaction 
with the Service that, according to some reports, led to a flood of air 
marshal resignations.

Within the context of these allegations, our objective was to look at 
operational and management control issues related to the Service's 
expansion. We also considered implications of the Service's 
organizational realignment. Specifically, as agreed with your offices, 
we addressed the following questions:

* What procedures for obtaining background checks and providing 
training did the Service use to expedite the deployment of its expanded 
workforce to meet the Deputy Secretary's July 2002 deadline?

* To what extent has the Service developed management information and 
policies and procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce?

* What challenges is the Service likely to face as a result of its 
recent mergers into DHS and ICE?

To answer these questions, we analyzed program data; interviewed 
Service and TSA officials; and reviewed documentation from the Service 
and TSA on background checks and training; scheduling, mission 
incidents, employee misconduct, and separations; and reviewed several 
workforce policies and procedures. We also visited several facilities 
to look at the Service's operational and management control practices 
and documents, including the Federal Air Marshal training facility and 
Human Resource Center in New Jersey, the Federal Air Marshal 
headquarters office in Virginia, the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center in New Mexico, and the Federal Air Marshal field office in 
Texas. To guide our assessment of the Service's training, management 
information, and policies and procedures, we reviewed key GAO documents 
on internal controls and human capital management. These include our 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-
21.3.1, November 1999), Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool 
(GAO-01-1008G, August 2001), Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing 
Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government 
(GAO-03-893G, July 2003), and Model of Strategic Human Capital 
Management (GAO-02-373SP, March 2002). In addition, we used our report, 
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 
Organizational Transformations (GAO-03-669, July 2003), to provide a 
framework for evaluating the Service's challenges in merging into DHS. 
We also reviewed a March 2003 report by the DOT Inspector General (IG), 
which evaluated the Service's selection and hiring process, training 
program, and scheduling process. Finally, we discussed the 
governmentwide background investigation process with the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM). Our analysis of the operational and 
management control issues related to the Service's expansion focuses 
primarily on the period from November 2001 through September 2003, when 
the Service was part of TSA; our assessment of the challenges related 
to the Service's mergers is, in part, prospective. We conducted our 
review from September 2002 through October 2003 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I for a 
more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief:

The Service used expedited procedures for obtaining background checks 
and abbreviated the training for air marshals so that it could deploy 
its expanded workforce by the Deputy Secretary's July 2002 deadline. 
Under the expedited background check procedures, which other federal 
agencies also often use, candidates who pass preliminary background 
checks are able, within about 24 hours, to obtain interim secret 
security clearances that allow them to work until their full background 
checks are completed. Thousands of candidates underwent preliminary 
background checks, and the majority of them obtained interim security 
clearances. Obtaining final top-secret clearances has taken longer--
sometimes up to a year--and as of July 2003, nearly a quarter of the 
active air marshals were still operating under interim clearances. By 
October 2003, about 3 percent of active air marshals were still 
awaiting their top-secret clearances. OPM attributed the delays to the 
governmentwide demand for security clearances after September 11, 2001. 
To deploy the necessary number of air marshal candidates by the Deputy 
Secretary's deadline, the Service identified the skills critical for 
initial deployment and incrementally revised and abbreviated its 
training curriculum between October 2001 and July 2002. Then, to ensure 
that all newly hired air marshals were provided with training in 
advanced skills, the Service established an additional 4-week course 
and required all candidates hired after October 2001 to complete the 
training by mid-2004. It is unclear how the Service's transfer to the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement will affect this 
requirement.

The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and 
procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce, but it has 
not yet completed this major effort. For example, it has replaced the 
manual system that it formerly used to schedule fewer than 50 air 
marshals for flight duty with an automated system that it can use to 
schedule thousands of air marshals on thousands of flights; however, it 
has not yet developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness 
of controls designed to prevent overscheduling so that air marshals do 
not become fatigued. Preventing fatigue is important because, if air 
marshals are not alert, their ability to carry out their mission may be 
diminished. The Service has made effective use of some management 
information--by, for example, establishing a liaison with the airlines 
after air marshals' mission reports indicated problems with 
coordination and communication. However, supervisors' summaries of air 
marshals' reasons for separating--as of July 2003, about 10 percent of 
newly hired marshals had separated--are not detailed enough for 
management to identify and respond to specific problems, such as 
dissatisfaction with the Service's transfer policy. The Service 
initially lacked a means of obtaining input from its employees for use 
in improving its operations and management, but it has started to 
implement such processes. Finally, the Service has implemented policies 
and procedures needed to support its expansion from a single office 
with a budget of about $4.4 million in fiscal year 2001 to an 
organization with 21 field offices and a budget of $545 million in 
fiscal year 2003. For example, it implemented a policy on transfers 
between field offices and issued a written dress code policy. We are 
recommending that the Service automate the comparison of actual hours 
worked with scheduled hours to monitor the effectiveness of its 
scheduling controls and develop improved information on air marshals' 
reasons for separation. The Department of Homeland Security agreed that 
information on actual hours worked should be automated and acknowledged 
a need to improve the quality of the information the Service collects 
from departing air marshals.

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes 
resulting from its mergers into the new Department of Homeland Security 
in March 2003 and into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement in November 2003. While the new department, within the 
context of guidance from the Congress and the administration, is 
primarily responsible for determining what changes will occur, the 
Service is responsible for implementing them. At this time, changes are 
likely in the roles, responsibilities, and training of air marshals, 
assuming that the Secretary of Homeland Security's plan to cross-train 
the Bureau's three law enforcement workforces is implemented so that 
each group can perform the others' responsibilities. Developing 
procedures for coordinating with TSA will also be important to help 
ensure a comprehensive, unified approach to aviation security, now that 
the Service is separated organizationally from the other groups with 
aviation security functions in TSA. Finally, changes will be needed to 
resolve differences in the pay systems and compensation of air 
marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents. Our recent work on 
mergers and organizational transformations proposes several key 
practices--setting implementation goals and a time line to build 
momentum and show progress from day one, establishing a communication 
strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress, and 
involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for 
the transformation--and associated implementation steps that can assist 
the Service as it addresses the challenges in merging into the 
department and the Bureau. In an earlier report, we recommended these 
and other key practices to the department.[Footnote 3]

Background:

FAA's Federal Air Marshal program expanded the Sky Marshal program, 
which was established as part of the Customs Service in the 1970s to 
deter hijackings to and from Cuba. Shortly after TWA Flight 847 was 
hijacked in Athens, Greece, in June 1985, then President Ronald Reagan 
called for an expansion of the Sky Marshal program. On August 8, 1985, 
the Congress enacted the International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act,[Footnote 4] which established the statutory basis for 
the program within DOT, which further delegated the responsibility to 
FAA.[Footnote 5] Since then, the Federal Air Marshal program has 
provided specially trained, armed teams of civil aviation security 
specialists for deployment worldwide on antihijacking missions.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the President and the 
Congress decided to rapidly expand the Service. On September 17, 2001, 
FAA began to develop a plan to recruit federal air marshals in 
unprecedented numbers. Accordingly, FAA designed a process and put 
together a team of specialists, incorporating resources from its Human 
Resource Management, Aviation Medical, Civil Aviation Security, and 
Federal Air Marshal Training organizations to implement the recruitment 
process. The process was designed to ensure that each air marshal 
candidate met the medical entry standards, passed DOT's drug-testing 
program, and was preliminarily judged suitable to obtain a top-secret 
clearance, which is required for permanent employment with the Service. 
As part of the assessment, each candidate was required to participate 
in a security interview with an investigator from FAA, OPM, or the U.S. 
Investigative Services (an OPM contractor[Footnote 6]), as well as 
interviews with representatives of FAA's Office of Human Resource 
Management and the Service. In October 2001, FAA implemented this 
recruitment process, and the Deputy Secretary of Transportation also 
set July 1, 2002, as the deadline for recruiting, hiring, and training 
enough federal air marshals to provide coverage on flights that posed 
high security risks. In November 2001, after the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act was passed, TSA assumed FAA's 
responsibilities for aviation security and supported FAA's recruitment 
effort through July 2002.

Between October 2001 and July 2002, TSA received nearly 200,000 
applications for federal air marshal positions. Thousands of applicants 
were assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full 
background investigations for top-secret clearances. Other federal 
agencies also made law enforcement officers available to augment the 
Service until TSA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes 
of new air marshals. See appendix II for a demographic profile of the 
Service's expanded workforce.

With expansion, the Service's annual budget grew from $4.4 million for 
fiscal year 2001 to $545 million for fiscal year 2003. Currently, the 
Service operates a headquarters office in Virginia, 21 field offices, 
and a specialized air marshal training and human resource facility in 
Atlantic City, New Jersey. Basic law enforcement training takes place 
at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico. 
See appendix III for a map of these facilities and appendix IV for a 
time line of the major organizational events affecting the Service 
since September 11, 2001.

DHS brings together some 23 federal agencies comprising over 100 
organizations, including the Federal Air Marshal Service, in what the 
department describes as the most significant transformation of the U.S. 
government since the merger in 1947 of the various branches of the 
armed forces into the Department of Defense. DHS is divided into five 
directorates, one of which, Border and Transportation Security, 
includes both TSA and ICE. Among other organizations, ICE includes a 
portion of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, now 
called the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services; the U.S. 
Customs Service now called Customs and Border Protection; and, as of 
November 2, 2003, the Federal Air Marshal Service.

Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service to Meet 
the Deputy Secretary's Deployment Deadline:

To expedite the deployment of thousands of air marshals, the Service 
obtained preliminary background checks and provided abbreviated 
training before deploying air marshal candidates on flights. As a 
result, the Service was able to meet the Deputy Secretary's deployment 
deadline and carry out its mission.

Initial Deployment Was Swift, but Completion of Final Background 
Investigations Has Been Slow:

To deploy its expanded workforce as quickly as possible between October 
2001 and June 2002, the Service followed the same expedited background 
check procedures that federal agencies have used since 1995, when 
Executive Order 12968 authorized the temporary use of interim security 
clearances.[Footnote 7] Under these procedures, candidates who require 
security clearances and pass preliminary background checks may, within 
about 24 hours, obtain interim security clearances that allow them to 
work until their full background checks have been completed and they 
obtain their final clearances. A preliminary background check consists 
of an interview with a security specialist; a review of an applicant's 
responses to a standard questionnaire for national security positions; 
a criminal history check, based on fingerprints and a review of 
biographical data from National Crime Information Center 
files;[Footnote 8] and credit reports. An interim security clearance 
may be revoked at any time if unfavorable information is identified 
during an investigation.

Between October 2001 and July 2002, thousands of candidates were 
assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full 
background investigations for top-secret clearances. According to TSA 
management, the majority of the candidates passed the preliminary 
background checks and obtained interim security clearances that allowed 
them to work while their full background checks were being completed. 
Less than a quarter of the candidates did not pass the preliminary 
checks because of bankruptcy, bad credit, or other problems. TSA placed 
these candidates on a "pending/ready" list and did not allow them to 
work as air marshals, but it pursued full background investigations for 
them because many of the issues identified during preliminary 
background checks are minor and are favorably resolved during full 
background investigations. Full background checks for thousands of 
candidates identified a small number as unsuitable. In June 2003, the 
Service placed 80 air marshal candidates on administrative leave while 
TSA resolved issues that surfaced during full background 
investigations. By August 2003, 47 of these candidates had received 
their top-secret clearances and have since been returned to flight 
status. Of the 33 remaining candidates, 19 have been denied clearances, 
and the Service is taking steps to terminate their employment; 4 have 
been approved for, but have not yet received, top-secret clearances; 7 
have resigned; and the remaining 3 are awaiting TSA's approval of their 
top-secret clearances. The Service said it has continued to identify 
some candidates as unsuitable, and as of October 2003, 14 air marshals 
were on administrative leave because of issues that surfaced during 
full background checks. When definitive information for each of these 
cases is obtained, the Service said, the air marshal would be returned 
to flight status or steps would be taken to terminate the air marshal's 
employment.

During our review, we found that the background investigations used to 
grant top-secret clearances for air marshals were not being expedited 
as requested. According to TSA, an expedited background investigation 
costs $3,195 and should be completed within 75 days, whereas a regular 
background check costs $2,700 and should be completed within 120 days. 
Consequently, for every 1,000 background investigations, the Service 
paid a premium of about $495,000. TSA paid the expedited fees to OPM up 
front, as required,[Footnote 9] but as of July 2003, about 23 percent 
of the air marshals were still operating under interim security 
clearances.[Footnote 10] Some candidates had been awaiting final 
clearances for up to a year. The Service told us in April 2003 that it 
had, on numerous occasions, raised concerns about the delays in 
processing final security clearances but had met with little success. 
Additionally, the Service said that its efforts to reclaim the 
difference in cost were unsuccessful. DHS said that TSA's Credentialing 
Office had taken steps since June 2003 to ensure that every active air 
marshal was operating under a top-secret clearance; and as of October 
2003, about 3 percent of the active air marshals were operating under 
interim security clearances.

According to OPM, the primary reason for these clearance-processing 
delays is that the agency has received an unprecedented number of 
requests for background investigations governmentwide since September 
2001.[Footnote 11] For fiscal year 2002, OPM's data indicated that the 
average processing time for 75-day expedited background checks was 96 
days. OPM said that the expedited requests received higher-priority 
processing than the regular (120-day) background checks, resulting in 
faster turnaround for services related to the expedited requests. OPM 
added that its contractor charges premiums for expedited requests 
because the costs for these requests are higher. Consequently, 
according to OPM, no price adjustments are made when overall deadlines 
are missed.

While the Service is not responsible for the delays in completing air 
marshals' full background investigations, we found that it could have 
provided OPM with information for scheduling the investigations more 
efficiently. As candidates applied for positions between October 2001 
and June 2002 and their preliminary background checks were completed, 
the Service offered conditional employment to some of the candidates 
and, as discussed, placed others on a "pending/ready" list. However, 
the Service did not make this information available to OPM. As a 
result, some potential employees received their top-secret clearances 
ahead of other candidates who were being trained or deployed on 
flights.[Footnote 12] We brought this issue to the attention of the 
Service in March 2003; and in May, the Service sent OPM a list of 
candidates and asked OPM to give highest priority to investigations of 
those who were already deployed on flights. In addition, the Service 
has asked OPM to schedule the investigations for senior managers first 
and then to schedule investigations for other applicants on a first-in, 
first-out basis. On May 28, 2003, the Service also detailed a liaison 
from its Office of Field Operations to assist TSA's Office of Security 
in setting priorities for reviewing and adjudicating the backlog of 
background investigations.

Changes to the Training Curriculum Helped Expedite Deployment:

To deploy the requisite number of air marshals by the Deputy 
Secretary's July 2002 deadline, the Service revised and abbreviated its 
training program. From October 2001 through July 2002, it modified the 
air marshal curriculum incrementally, eventually reducing the original 
14-week program to about 5 weeks for candidates without prior law 
enforcement experience and about 1 week for candidates with such 
experience. The revised curriculum was designed to provide candidates 
with the basic law enforcement knowledge, skills, and abilities needed 
to perform their duties as air marshals, including knowledge of the 
Service's rules and regulations, physical skills, and basic and 
advanced marksmanship. The curriculum no longer included certain 
elements of the original training program, such as driving skills and 
cockpit familiarization, because these were not deemed critical for air 
marshals to perform their duties. The curriculum also eliminated a 1-
week's visit to an airline and some instruction in the Service's 
policies and procedures, which was to be provided on the job. Moreover, 
although the curriculum retained instruction in both basic and advanced 
marksmanship, air marshal candidates no longer had to pass an advanced 
marksmanship test to qualify for employment. Candidates were still 
required to pass a basic test[Footnote 13] with a minimum score of 255 
out of a possible 300--the highest qualification standard for any 
federal law enforcement agency, according to the Service.

To provide all the newly hired air marshals with needed skills, beyond 
the basic abilities the Service determined were critical for immediate 
deployment, the Service instituted a new 4-week advanced training 
course in October 2002. All air marshals hired from October 2001 
through July 2002, regardless of their previous law enforcement 
experience, were required to complete the course by January 2004. This 
course includes some elements, such as emergency evacuation and flight 
simulator training, that the Service did not include in the 5-week 
course because, although it considered the elements important for air 
marshals to carry out their mission, it did not consider them critical 
for immediate deployment. In addition, the course provides further 
training in advanced marksmanship skills. Air marshals hired after 
August 2002 attend this advanced training course after completing their 
basic training. The Service has developed a centralized tracking system 
to ensure that all air marshals take this course.

Although the Service is now providing additional marksmanship training, 
its decision not to restore the advanced marksmanship test[Footnote 14] 
as a qualification standard for employment has proved controversial. 
Passing this test would require candidates to demonstrate their speed 
and accuracy in a confined environment similar to the environment on 
board an aircraft. The DOT IG's report suggested that the Service 
needed to adopt a firearms qualification standard that was more 
stringent and comprehensive than the basic firearms qualifying test. 
The Service disagreed, emphasizing that its minimum score is the most 
stringent in federal law enforcement and adding that its 4-week course 
provides further training in advanced firearms skills. Our review of 
the Service's documentation confirmed that instruction in advanced 
marksmanship is a critical part of this training, even though passing 
this element is no longer a condition of employment.

In August 2003, the Service reported that proposed cutbacks in its 
training funds would require it to extend the date for all air marshals 
hired from October 2001 through July 2002 to complete the 4-week 
advanced course from January 2004 to mid-2004. According to DHS, the 
Service's transfer to ICE will not adversely affect either the funding 
for air marshals' training or the schedule for newly hired air marshals 
to complete the 4-week training course, since a total of $626.4 million 
is being transferred from TSA to ICE. While this funding exceeds the 
$545 million that the Service received for fiscal year 2003, it is not 
clear how much of the funding will be allocated for training. Given the 
importance of training to ensure that air marshals are prepared to 
carry out their mission, we believe that maintaining adequate funding 
for training should remain a priority. Additionally, should reductions 
in the funding for training be required, our recent work on strategic 
training and development efforts provides alternatives that an agency 
can consider to across-the-board cuts--such as evaluating training 
needs, setting training priorities, developing alternative training 
requirement scenarios, and determining how much funding each of these 
scenarios would require.[Footnote 15] Our work further suggests that it 
is important for agencies to ensure that their training and development 
efforts are cost effective, given the anticipated benefits and to 
incorporate measures that can be used to demonstrate contributions that 
training and development programs make to improve results. These 
principles are applicable at all times, but especially when funds are 
limited. Determining whether air marshals with prior law enforcement 
experience have the same training needs as those without such 
experience could help set cost-effective training priorities.

We found that a cornerstone of human capital management is the ability 
to successfully acquire, develop, and retain talent. Investing in and 
enhancing the value of employees through training and development is a 
crucial part of addressing this challenge. This investment can include 
not only formal and on-the-job-training but also other opportunities, 
such as rotational assignments. Our work further specifies that 
agencies should link their training curriculum to the competencies 
needed for them to accomplish their mission. The Service has begun 
developing a formal training curriculum beyond the basic and advanced 
training courses described above. This curriculum requires air marshals 
to participate in 5 days of recurrent training each quarter that, in 
addition to the quarterly weapons qualification, includes training in 
advanced firearms, operational tactics, defensive tactics, 
surveillance detection, emergency medicine, physical fitness, and legal 
and administrative elements. Additionally, the Service is developing 
rotational assignments for air marshals that allow them to participate 
in law enforcement task forces, as well as fill a variety of 
operational and training positions in headquarters and the field. The 
Service recognizes that such opportunities can not only enhance 
professional development but also help to prevent problems such as 
boredom and burnout. According to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
one of the advantages of the Service's transfer to ICE is that it will 
enhance air marshals' professional development opportunities.

Management Information, Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept Pace 
with Expanded Operations:

As the Service grew from a small, centralized organization to an 
organization with 21 field offices and thousands of employees, its need 
for information, policies, and procedures to manage its expanded 
workforce and operations also grew. The Service collects several types 
of information that it can use to continually improve its operations 
and oversight and, in some instances, it has used the information to do 
so. In other instances, however, the Service lacks sufficiently 
detailed information for effective monitoring and oversight. The new, 
decentralized organization has also required new or written policies 
and procedures to cover new situations and ensure that the same 
guidance is available to air marshals in all locations. According to 
DHS, it recognized that the Service would need to revise its existing 
policies[Footnote 16] or draft new ones, and it has been working to do 
so since March 2002. Nonetheless, its policy-development efforts 
sometimes responded to problems, rather than anticipating and 
preventing them. DHS told us that it is committed to proactively 
addressing policy issues and developing procedures.

Management Information Is Not Sufficiently Detailed or Comprehensive 
for Effective Monitoring and Oversight:

The Service collects information on air marshals' work schedules and 
other issues, including potential security incidents documented in 
reports filed by air marshals after completing their missions, 
allegations of misconduct by air marshals, and reasons provided by air 
marshals for leaving the Service. Such information can be useful to 
managers in monitoring mission operations and retention. According to 
our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 
17] the information should be recorded and communicated to management 
and others within the agency who need it, and it should be provided in 
a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their 
responsibilities. For example, one way to do this would be to ensure 
that pertinent information is captured in sufficient detail to help 
management identify specific actions that need to be taken. Moreover, 
according to our human capital model, a fact-based, performance-
oriented approach to human capital management is a critical success 
factor for maximizing the value of human capital. In addition, high-
performing organizations use data to determine key performance 
objectives and goals, which enable them to evaluate the success of 
their human capital approaches. For example, obtaining employee input 
and suggestions can provide management with firsthand knowledge of the 
organization's operations, which management can use to ensure ongoing 
effectiveness and continuous improvement. The Service has analyzed and 
made effective use of its mission reports and conduct data, but other 
management information that it currently collects is not sufficiently 
well defined or detailed for monitoring and managing the workforce. 
Although the Service initially had no systematic means of obtaining 
regular input from its employees, it has recently put processes in 
place to solicit air marshals' opinions and suggestions. In addition, 
the Service is participating in an Office of Management and Budget 
program assessment project. As part of this effort, DHS said it has 
identified annual and long-term performance measures and related 
performance outcome targets to evaluate the Service's organizational 
effectiveness along key strategic goals and objectives. Through this 
project and other strategic planning initiatives, DHS says it expects 
to systematically measure and analyze the Service's organizational 
performance along human capital, mission scheduling, professional 
development, and quality of work-life dimensions.

Automated System Improved Scheduling, but More Information Is Needed 
for Monitoring:

When the Service was first directed to expand its mission and 
operations, it was using a manual system to schedule air marshals for 
flight duty. This system was quickly overwhelmed as the number of air 
marshals and flights grew, leading to the concern that air marshals 
were being scheduled inconsistently for flight duty. The Service 
acknowledged that during this period, some air marshals were overworked 
while others were underutilized. In June 2002, the Service replaced the 
manual system with an automated system, which, according to Service 
officials, improved the agency's ability to schedule and deploy its 
workforce.

While the automated system expanded the Service's scheduling 
capability, it did not provide the Service with all of the information 
it needed for effective monitoring. For example, it did not initially 
break down data on air marshals' use of leave into enough categories 
for the Service to assess whether some air marshals were abusing sick 
leave in order to get a day off. Specifically, an article in USA Today 
reported that about 1,250 air marshals called in sick over an 18-day 
period. Eventually, the Service determined that the article was based 
on a report generated by the automated scheduling system that 
overrepresented the number of air marshals who were on sick leave. 
Although the report was labeled "Sick Leave," it included data on all 
air marshals who were unavailable for flight duty, not only for 
sickness but also for other reasons such as administrative leave, and 
it listed each day of unavailability for flight duty as a separate 
incident, although the same air marshal might have been unavailable for 
several days in a row for the same reason.

In analyzing data from the scheduling system, we found that because the 
system reported all leave charges--sick, administrative, military, or 
other--as sick leave, the Service could not distinguish air marshals 
who were unavailable to fly because they were out sick from air 
marshals who were unavailable to fly because of injuries but were 
available for light field office duty. For example, an air marshal with 
an injured ankle might not be able to fly, but could perform 
administrative work in the field office. The Service has since modified 
the scheduling system to obtain better information on the type of 
leave--sick, military, or administrative--charged by air marshals who 
are unavailable to fly. The DOT IG also investigated cases concerning 
sick leave abuse and likewise found that it was based on a 
misunderstanding of the report's contents stemming from the report's 
label.

Although the automated scheduling system provides information for 
managers to monitor how many hours air marshals are scheduled for work, 
automated information is not available for comparing the number of 
hours actually worked with the number of hours initially scheduled. 
These numbers can differ when flights are delayed or cancelled because 
of bad weather or mechanical problems. Information on these differences 
is important for Service managers to consider because of their 
implications for both the Service's mission and air marshals' quality 
of life. For example, if air marshals work too many hours, they may 
become too tired to concentrate on their mission, or if they spend too 
much time away from home, they may become dissatisfied with their jobs.

Information on the number of hours flown will also be important for the 
Service to carry out a new long-term study, initiated by the Director 
in the summer of 2002, on the medical and physiological effects of 
flying. To date, the Service, in collaboration with FAA's Civil 
Aviation Medical Institute and the Air Force, has identified a 
methodology and objectives for the study and completed a literature 
review to identify trends, possible risks, and other pertinent 
information. As part of the study, the Service plans to collect and 
analyze data from recurrent air marshal physical examinations and to 
compare these data with physiological data from the Civil Aviation 
Medical Institute. Although the Service is still awaiting funding 
approval to conduct the physical examinations and develop the database, 
Service officials plan to begin both efforts in the first quarter of 
fiscal year 2004. The study team has also developed a training course 
on human physiology as it relates to the aviation environment. The 
Service expects this course to be available early in fiscal year 2004.

On the basis of some early findings from the study team's literature 
search, the Service set limits in its automated flight-scheduling 
system to address mission, quality-of-life, and health concerns. The 
system limits scheduled "duty time" to 10 hours a day or 50 hours a 
week.[Footnote 18] Our analysis of schedules from the automated system 
for 37 weeks found that about 92 percent of the schedules were 
consistent with these controls.[Footnote 19] The Service added that 
further guidance has been developed that results in scheduling air 
marshals to fly an average of 4.2 hours per day, 18 days per month. 
Thus, air marshals should fly about 75 hours per month, which the 
Service said was within the aviation and military standards for pilots-
-90 and 100 hours per month, respectively. As part of implementing this 
guidance, the Service is conducting a detailed analysis of individual 
flight schedules to determine if the goals are being met. The Service 
reported on the basis of this analysis that, as of September 2003, 
scheduled flight time averaged 76.5 hours per month. The Service's 
analysis, however, focuses on flight schedules and not on actual hours 
worked by the air marshals. Information on the hours air marshals 
actually work is not available for automated comparison with the hours 
they are scheduled to work because the actual work hours are recorded 
manually on time and attendance sheets and are not transferred to the 
automated system. Without an automated way to compare actual hours 
worked with scheduled hours, the Service lacks a tool needed to 
determine if the automated flight-scheduling system is meeting its 
objectives related to mission, quality-of life, and health concerns. 
DHS agreed that the information on actual hours should be automated and 
said that the Service intended to incorporate this capability via 
personal digital assistants (PDA) issued to all air marshals.

The Service Has Used Mission Reports to Improve Operations, but Some 
Coordination Issues Remain:

Between September 2001 and September 2003, air marshals submitted 
reports of almost 2,100 incidents that occurred during their missions. 
A little over 40 percent of these mission reports describe passengers 
that exhibited suspicious behavior to the air marshals. About 18 
percent of the reports discuss disagreements or conflicts between air 
marshals and airline or airport personnel over airport or airline 
procedures. The remaining mission reports cover a wide variety of 
incidents that the Service grouped into 17 other categories, as shown 
in appendix V.

The Service has taken some action to follow up on the air marshals' 
mission reports, but it has not addressed all of the issues the reports 
raise. For example, the Service established a liaison with the airlines 
in response to reports of disagreements and conflicts with the 
airlines. According to an official with the Air Transport 
Association,[Footnote 20] this action has improved relations between 
the air marshals and the airlines. Nevertheless, some coordination and 
communication issues remain. In October 2002, for instance, the Service 
purchased PDAs for distribution to all air marshals. Service officials 
told us that before making the purchase, they contacted FAA about 
obtaining approval to use the feature that would allow the air marshals 
to communicate with one another aboard aircraft. In August 2002, FAA 
advised the Service that it planned to approve this PDA feature for use 
by air marshals during flight. However, FAA's approval was never 
finalized, and the airlines have not allowed the air marshals to use 
the PDAs for this purpose because of concerns about interference with 
flight control or navigational signals. According to Service officials, 
air marshals have stopped using their PDAs' communication feature in 
flight until FAA approves its use, and the Service continues to work 
with FAA to obtain such approval. The Service reports that air marshals 
continue to use other features of the PDAs, such as their cell phone, 
pager, e-mail, surveillance, and photo-display capabilities.

The Service Has Used Reports of Misconduct to Improve Management 
Controls:

Between October 2001 and July 2003, the Service collected data on 
almost 600 reports of misconduct by air marshals, which it classified 
into over 40 categories. Among the categories with large numbers of 
reported cases were "insubordination or failure to follow orders," 
"loss of government property," and "abuse of government credit cards." 
According to Service officials, they have used the misconduct database 
to identify issues such as abuse of government credit cards and cell 
phones that need to be investigated.[Footnote 21] For example, during 
the Service's rapid expansion, management noted an unacceptable number 
of unauthorized charges and late payments associated with air marshals' 
use of the government-issued travel card. Further investigation 
revealed that the process of claiming reimbursement for travel was slow 
and burdensome and there were misunderstandings about what charges were 
proper. After corrective action, the delinquency rate dropped 
dramatically. Similarly, an analysis of the misconduct data indicated 
that a number of air marshals were accused of being abusive to airline 
personnel during the boarding process. A detailed review of the data 
pointed to differences in the Service's and the airlines procedures for 
boarding aircraft. Subsequently, the Service negotiated a mutually 
agreeable solution with the airlines to resolve these differences. In 
these instances, the Service used misconduct reports to effectively 
refine its management controls.

Information on Air Marshals' Reasons for Leaving the Service Is Not 
Detailed Enough to Target Retention Efforts:

The Service maintains data on the number of air marshals who leave the 
Service and categorizes their reason for leaving.[Footnote 22] However, 
these data are not detailed enough for management to identify and 
follow up on issues that could affect retention. Retention is important 
both to ensure the continued deployment of experienced personnel who 
can carry out the Service's security mission and to avoid the costs to 
recruit, train, and deploy new personnel, which, according to the 
Service, total about $40,275 per person.

Our analysis of the Service's data on separations indicates that from 
September 2001 through July 2003, about 10 percent of the thousands of 
newly hired air marshals left the Service. However, during August 2002, 
when the media reported a "flood" of resignations from the Service, our 
analysis indicated that slightly more than 4 percent of the newly hired 
air marshals had left.[Footnote 23] We found that the most frequently 
recorded reasons for air marshals separating from the Service were to 
take other jobs and personal reasons.[Footnote 24] Such reasons are not 
detailed enough for management to identify and target issues that may 
hinder retention.

To gain greater insight into the reasons for separation, we examined 
the Service's documentation for 95 selected cases.[Footnote 25] For 37 
of these cases, the departing air marshals cited multiple reasons for 
leaving the Service. For example, one departing air marshal cited 
personal reasons and going back to his previous job. Even with this 
additional information, we could not identify management issues that 
might have led to the separations because the reasons documented by the 
Service were too general and vague.

The Service's method of collecting data on air marshals' reasons for 
separation may be responsible, in part, for the generality and 
vagueness of the information. Specifically, the Service uses either an 
open-ended exit interview with the air marshal's first-line supervisor, 
the air marshal's resignation letter, or both to collect the 
data.[Footnote 26] The supervisor conducts and writes up the exit 
interview and an administrative official in the field forwards the 
interview write-up, resignation letter, or both to human resource 
officials in Service headquarters. A human resource specialist then 
reviews the documentation and determines which of the reasons cited is 
the primary reason for the separation. This method of collecting 
information has several limitations. First, the open-ended exit 
interview may not prompt responses that go beyond generalities, such as 
taking another job or personal reasons, to determine whether management 
issues, such as problems in transferring to a duty station closer to 
home or burdensome work schedules, contributed to the air marshal's 
resignation. Second, using the first-line supervisor to conduct the 
interview may discourage detailed responses, either because the air 
marshal may not want to reveal his or her concerns or reasons or 
because the supervisor may not want to report specific issues. Finally, 
using a human resource specialist to determine the primary reason for a 
separation means that the reason is filtered through another party 
rather than provided directly by the air marshal who is resigning. Our 
work on human capital has determined that feedback from exit interviews 
can guide workplace-planning efforts. If these exit interviews are 
constructed to collect valid and reliable data, they allow managers to 
spotlight areas for attention, such as employee retention.

According to the DOT report, air marshals interviewed by the IG's 
office were concerned about the way the air marshal program was being 
managed, which contributed to low morale in the Service. The air 
marshals the IG interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the 
Service's work schedules, aircraft boarding procedures, and dress code 
policy.[Footnote 27]

The Service Initially Lacked, but Has Recently Begun to Implement, 
Processes for Obtaining Employee Input:

During the early stages of its expansion, the Service did not have 
processes or mechanisms in place to gather input and suggestions from 
its employees. Such processes and mechanisms would not only allow the 
Service to monitor air marshals' concerns about management issues, as 
the DOT IG's report also noted, but it would also provide the Service 
with its employees' firsthand knowledge and insights that it could use 
to improve operations and policies. According to our work on human 
capital, leaders at agencies with effective human capital management 
seek out the views of employees at all levels and communication flows 
up, down, and across the organization, facilitating continuous 
improvement. Tools commonly used for obtaining employee input include 
employee satisfaction surveys, employee advisory councils, and employee 
focus groups.

Recently, the Service began putting processes and mechanisms in place 
to gather input from its employees. The Service reports that all field 
offices have methods, such as advisory committees, for air marshals to 
ask questions or express concerns to senior field office management. 
Additionally, question and answer sessions are held when the Director, 
Deputy Director, or Assistant Director visits a field office and during 
the basic and advanced training classes. To obtain further employee 
input, the Service participated in an ombudsman program that TSA 
sponsors to improve its operations and customer service. According to 
the Service, it is also developing a lessons learned and best practices 
intranet site that will allow substantive communication on issues of 
interest and concern to all air marshals.

Developing and Implementing Policies and Procedures for an Expanded 
Organization Took Time and Created Some Confusion:

Policies and procedures that were designed to support a small, 
centralized Service were not designed for and could not accommodate the 
needs of a vastly expanded and decentralized workforce. According to 
our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 
28] internal control should provide for an assessment of the risks an 
agency faces from both external and internal sources. For example, when 
an agency expands its operations to new geographic areas, it needs to 
give special attention to the risks that the expansion presents. In 
attempting to hire, train, and deploy its new workforce by the Deputy 
Secretary's deadline and establish a new field organization to support 
its new domestic mission, the Service had little time to systematically 
assess the risks of expansion and ensure that its policies and 
procedures were appropriate and adequate. Efforts to develop new 
policies or modify existing ones to accommodate new circumstances took 
time, and during the transition, some air marshals voiced concerns to 
the media. Delays in hiring supervisors and the discretion they were 
given in interpreting policies may have contributed to air marshals' 
confusion.

Policy on Transfers Was Not Implemented until May 2003:

Before its expansion, the Service was a centralized organization with 
one office and fewer than 50 air marshals. Because there were no field 
offices, the Service had no policy on transfers between field 
locations. The vacancy announcement used during the hiring process 
stated that field offices would be located in various major 
metropolitan areas, and a Service official stated that air marshal 
applicants were allowed to express their preferences for particular 
field locations. According to a media report, air marshals alleged that 
transfers to their preferred locations were promised but that those 
promises were not kept. Our review of a recruiting video and other 
documents related to the hiring process did not find any evidence that 
transfers were promised; however, the recruiting video indicated that 
opportunities for transfer existed. Service officials said that no 
transfers were promised and that as the Service hired air marshals and 
implemented its new field office structure, it assigned the newly hired 
marshals to the 21 field offices as needed. Service officials later 
added that except in hardship cases, the air marshals were expected to 
remain in the originally assigned field offices for 3 to 5 years. The 
DOT IG also investigated this issue and interviewed air marshals who 
alleged that promises of transfers made during the hiring process were 
not kept, but the IG did not determine whether there was a legitimate 
basis for the air marshals' concerns.

By June 2002, the Service had received over 500 applications for 
transfers. Until a policy was issued, the Service tried to respond to 
the air marshals' requests and to address quality-of-life issues by 
developing guidance that provided for transferring any air marshal (1) 
who owned a home within 100 miles of an established field office and 
(2) whose immediate family resided in that location--provided that both 
of these conditions existed before the air marshal's employment with 
the Service. While the Service communicated this guidance orally to 
field managers, some air marshals were reportedly confused about why 
their requests for transfers were denied.

In January 2003, the Service postponed further action on transfer 
requests, officials said, until applicable policies--on hardship and 
transfers--were finalized. On May 29, 2003, the Service implemented a 
hardship transfer policy that established processes and criteria for 
approving transfer requests when an air marshal or an immediate family 
member incurs a medical or child-custody hardship. In developing the 
policy, the Service said it looked into other law enforcement agencies' 
transfer programs to identify best practices.

Unwritten Policy on Dress Created Confusion:

During the early months of the Service's expansion, air marshals 
expressed confusion and dissatisfaction to the media about policies 
covering their attire. At that time, the Service had no written dress 
code policy. Instead, according to Service officials, the agency 
carried over an unwritten FAA policy that air marshals should dress 
appropriately for their missions and the air marshal in charge of a 
mission should determine what attire was appropriate for that mission. 
According to the Service, some airline personnel complained to the 
Service that marshals were not dressed to blend in with other 
passengers in the location of the air marshals' assigned seats. The 
Service said that the lack of a written policy might have created 
confusion for some newly hired air marshals whose initial training did 
not cover the Service's policy on dress and whose field office 
supervisors had discretion in interpreting the policy. In May 2002, the 
Service issued a policy that directed air marshals to dress so as to 
present a professional image and blend into their environment. The 
Service believes that this policy enables air marshals to perform their 
duties without drawing undue attention to themselves. For example, an 
air marshal might wear a business suit on a morning flight to New York 
and a sports shirt on an afternoon flight to Orlando. To explain and 
ensure consistent application of the policy, the Director of the 
Service discussed this policy with supervisors and staff during his 
visits to many field offices and to the Service's training center.

Air Marshals Expressed Concern about Reasons for Changes in Workweek 
Policy:

Air marshals also discussed concerns about the Service's workweek 
policy with the media. Some air marshals complained that they had been 
promised 4-day workweeks to compensate for the rigors of travel but 
were being required to work 5-day workweeks. Other air marshals 
reported being confused about the reasons for the change from a 4-day 
to a 5-day workweek and questioned whether this change was necessary.

According to Service officials, the change in workweek policy occurred 
on July 1, 2002, when the Director of the Service brought the air 
marshals into compliance with the requirements of law enforcement 
availability pay (LEAP), a pay premium for unscheduled duty equaling 25 
percent of a law enforcement officer's base salary. Under this pay 
computation method, air marshals are required to average 10 hours of 
overtime per week. LEAP became applicable to the Service with the 
passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act on November 19, 
2001, but the Service initially continued to compute air marshals' 
schedules according to the method it had previously used, called the 
"first forty" method. Under this method, the first 40 hours worked in a 
week constituted the basic workweek, and 4-day and even 3-day workweeks 
were allowed if air marshals accrued 40 hours within that time. 
However, Service officials determined, in consultation with TSA's legal 
department and human resources office, that a change to a 5-day 
workweek was necessary for the Service to comply with LEAP. 
Accordingly, the Director ordered a 5-day basic workweek, effective 
July 1, 2002.

The DOT IG reported that over 85 percent of the air marshals its staff 
interviewed expressed concern about working 5 consecutive 10-hour 
mission days (with 2 consecutive off-duty days), saying that it 
resulted in fatigue and illness.[Footnote 29] Service officials 
acknowledged that working 10-hour days can create fatigue,[Footnote 30] 
but said that such days are routine in the law enforcement community. 
Service officials also maintained that fatigue can be managed by 
applying scheduling controls and monitoring air marshals' schedules. 
However, as noted, the Service lacks the data to ensure that air 
marshals' actual work hours are consistent with the scheduling 
controls.

Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger 
Implementation Challenges:

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes 
resulting from its mergers into DHS in March 2003 and into ICE in 
November 2003. While changes in the size of its workforce could 
eventually occur in light of the many recent improvements to aviation 
security and federal budget constraints, the plans announced to date 
point to changes in the roles, responsibilities, and training of ICE's 
workforces; the Service's coordination with TSA and other 
organizations; and administrative matters. DHS reported looking forward 
to the opportunities accompanying the Service's pending merger into 
ICE. Our recent work on mergers and organizational transformations 
proposes several key practices and implementation steps that could 
assist the Service and other departmental organizations as they face 
these challenges.

The Service Is Likely to Face Challenges in Implementing Changes:

One challenge for the Service will be to implement any changes in the 
size or in the roles and responsibilities of its workforce that the 
department determines are warranted after the Service is transferred to 
ICE. The right size of a security organization's workforce appears to 
depend, among other things, on the nature and scope of the terrorist 
threat and on the totality of measures in place to protect against that 
threat. When the Service was first directed to expand, there were fewer 
protective measures in place than there are today. Over the past 2 
years, an entire "system of systems" has been established for aviation 
security alone. This system includes not only the expanded Federal Air 
Marshal Service, but also about 50,000 federal security screeners in 
the nation's airports, 158 airport security directors, explosives 
detection equipment for passengers and baggage, requirements for 
performing background checks on about 1 million airline and airport 
employees, reinforced cockpit doors on all passenger aircraft, and 
authorization for pilots to carry guns in the airplane cockpit. Now, as 
the department assesses the nation's homeland security risks, considers 
the constraints on federal resources, and sets priorities, it will need 
to determine its appropriate size. It has already begun to make changes 
in the federal security screener workforce by reducing the total number 
of full-time screeners by 6,000 in fiscal year 2003 and by planning a 
further reduction of 3,000 full-time screeners in fiscal year 2004 
together with the hiring of part-time screeners to meet daily and 
seasonal periods of higher demand.

In announcing the Service's merger into ICE, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security did not propose a change in the size of the Service's or of 
ICE's other two law enforcement workforces, but his statement pointed 
to an expansion of their roles and responsibilities that would give the 
department greater flexibility to adjust its law enforcement resources 
according to varying threats. Through cross-training, the Secretary 
said, thousands more law enforcement agents would be available for 
deployment on flights, providing a surge capacity during times of 
increased aviation security threats. At the same time, air marshals may 
be assigned to other law enforcement duties, as threat information 
dictates.

This planned expansion of the roles and responsibilities of air 
marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents will pose training 
challenges for ICE and its component organizations. According to the 
Secretary's announcement, the training will be centralized, which could 
eventually produce some cost efficiencies, but initially a needs 
assessment will have to be conducted to identify each law enforcement 
workforce's additional training requirements. Cross-training 
requirements and curriculums will also have to be established and 
approved. Finally, each component organization will have to coordinate 
the new training requirements with its other mission requirements and 
schedule its officers for the cross-training.

The Service is also likely to face coordination challenges following 
its transfer from TSA to ICE. In part, the transfer is designed to 
improve coordination by unifying DHS's law enforcement functions, but 
it also divides aviation security responsibilities that, for about 2 
years, were under TSA. According to the Secretary, the transfer will 
facilitate the coordination and sharing of law enforcement information, 
thereby enhancing aviation security. However, TSA has raised questions 
about how air marshals' flights will be scheduled, and the TSA 
Administrator has expressed a desire to influence the scheduling. 
Immigration agents have reportedly also wondered how ICE would juggle 
air marshal deployments with the bureau's current investigative work.

Finally, the Service's transfer to ICE poses administrative challenges 
for the three component organizations. For example, the planned changes 
in the roles and responsibilities of the federal law enforcement 
officers could have implications for their performance evaluations and 
compensation. Currently, the three groups of law enforcement officers 
are under different pay systems and are compensated at different rates. 
Efforts are under way to resolve these challenges.

Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help the Service Address 
Potential Merger Challenges:

On the basis of our work on mergers and organizational transformations, 
we identified nine key practices and 21 implementation steps that could 
assist DHS in successfully merging the roles, responsibilities, and 
cultures of the Service and the department's other component 
organizations.[Footnote 31] While these practices will ultimately be 
important to a successful merger and we have previously recommended 
them for the department,[Footnote 32] there are three, we believe, that 
are particularly applicable to the Service, given the concerns about 
communication and other allegations reported in the media. These three 
practices emphasize communicating with employees and obtaining and 
using their feedback to promote continuous improvement. See appendix VI 
for a complete listing of the practices and implementations steps.

One key practice in a merger or transformation is to set implementation 
goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day one. 
These goals and the time line are essential to pinpoint performance 
shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. Research 
indicates that people are at the heart of successful mergers and 
transformations. Thus, seeking and monitoring employee attitudes and 
taking appropriate follow-up actions is an implementation step that 
supports this practice. Our work suggests that obtaining employee input 
through pulse surveys, focus groups, or confidential hotlines can serve 
as a quick check of how employees are feeling about large-scale changes 
and the new organization. As discussed in this report, the Service did 
not initially have such tools in place--in large part because of the 
enormous demands it faced in recruiting, training, and deploying 
thousands of air marshals by the Deputy Secretary's deadline--and it 
was not monitoring employee attitudes. Furthermore, although monitoring 
provides good information, it is also important for agency management 
not only to listen to employees' concerns but also to take action. By 
not taking appropriate follow-up actions, negative attitudes may 
translate into actions such as employee departures--or, as was the case 
with the Service, complaints to the media. Identifying cultural 
features of merging organizations is another important step in setting 
implementation goals. Cultural similarities between the Service and the 
other organizations within ICE could facilitate the Service's merger 
into ICE. As the Director of the Service and others have noted, air 
marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents are all law 
enforcement officers and share a common culture. Moreover, as a 
spokesperson for ICE pointed out, many air marshals came to the Service 
from Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and some 
other agents served as air marshals temporarily after September 11.

Establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and 
report related progress is another key practice in implementing a 
merger or transformation. According to our work on transformations and 
mergers, communication is most effective when it occurs early, clearly, 
and often and when it is downward, upward, and lateral. Organizations 
have found that a key implementation step is to communicate information 
early and often to build trust among employees as well as an 
understanding of the purpose of planned changes. As the Service found 
when modifying its workweek policy to implement LEAP premium pay, the 
absence of ongoing communication can confuse employees. Two-way 
communication is also part of this strategy, facilitating a two-way 
honest exchange with, and allowing for feedback from, employees, 
customers, and stakeholders. Once this solicited employee feedback is 
received, it is important to consider and use it to make appropriate 
changes when implementing a merger or transformation.

Involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership is a 
third key practice for a successful transformation or merger. Employee 
involvement strengthens the transformation process by including 
frontline perspectives and experiences. A key implementation step in 
this practice is incorporating employee feedback into new policies and 
procedures. After obtaining sufficient input from key players, the 
organization needs to develop clear, documented, and transparent 
policies and procedures. Not having such policies and procedures was an 
impediment to the Service as it expanded, creating confusion about 
issues such as transfers and dress codes. DHS said that it fully 
recognizes the value and importance of communicating with employees and 
of obtaining and using their feedback to promote continuous 
improvement. It further noted that as the Service merges into ICE, it 
is committed to involving employees to obtain their opinions and gain 
their ownership.

Conclusions:

The rapid expansion of the Service's mission and workforce posed 
significant challenges, many of which the Service has begun to address. 
In the 2 years that have elapsed since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, the Service has deployed thousands of new air marshals on 
thousands of domestic and international flights. During this time, the 
Service has also established a decentralized organization and begun to 
integrate its operations with those of a new department. While these 
accomplishments initially came at some cost, as evidenced by air 
marshals' concerns with the Service's management, the Service has taken 
steps to provide advanced training, improve scheduling, obtain and use 
more detailed management information, develop and communicate policies 
and procedures, and obtain and respond to employee feedback.

Continuing these efforts will be important for the Service as it moves 
forward. Developing and analyzing information on the hours air marshals 
actually work is key to ensuring that the Service's scheduling controls 
are operating as intended. Flying for too many hours can cause fatigue, 
potentially diminishing air marshals' alertness and reducing their 
effectiveness. Capturing detailed, firsthand information on air 
marshals' reasons for separation is critical to developing cost-
effective strategies for promoting retention and would also allow the 
Service to identify and analyze the root causes of issues and to 
address vulnerabilities through changes to its policies, procedures, 
and training. While retention has not been an issue to date, the cost 
of recruiting, training, and deploying air marshals is too high to risk 
separations that could be avoided through better understanding of and 
attention to air marshals' concerns.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
direct the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security to 
support the Service's continued commitment to developing into a high-
performing organization by taking the following actions to improve 
management information and to implement key practices that contribute 
to successful mergers and organizational transformations:

* Develop an automated method to compare actual hours worked with 
scheduled hours so that the Service can monitor the effectiveness of 
its scheduling controls and support its planned long-term study of the 
effects of flying on air marshals and their aviation security mission.

* Seek and monitor employee attitudes by obtaining detailed, firsthand 
information on air marshals' reasons for separation, using such means 
as confidential, structured exit surveys, that will allow management to 
analyze and address issues that could affect retention and take 
appropriate follow-up actions, such as improving training, career 
development opportunities, and communication.

Agency Comments:

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. 
DHS agreed with our report's information and recommendations and said 
it welcomes our proposals for practices that it believes will 
ultimately maximize its ability to protect the American public, 
contribute to the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, 
and preserve the viability of the aviation industry. DHS also expressed 
a commitment to continuous improvement as it moves forward, including 
actions designed to build on the accomplishments the Service has 
already achieved in expanding its mission and workforce since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. According to DHS, the Service 
has ongoing activities in several areas, such as continuing to address 
policy issues and develop procedures and establishing field office 
mechanisms and groups to discuss employee issues and concerns. We 
included this information in the final report.

Additionally, DHS identified references in the draft report to 
"overscheduling" of air marshals, with an explicit suggestion that such 
"overscheduling" was among air marshals' reasons for separating from 
the Service. We revised the report to avoid this implication, since we 
had not intended to suggest that air marshals were being overscheduled. 
Our intent was to point out that without an automated method to compare 
actual hours worked with scheduled hours, the Service would not readily 
be able to monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls. We 
also agreed with DHS that there were no data in the Service's 
separation information to suggest that "overscheduling" was among air 
marshals' reasons for leaving the Service, and we modified the report 
accordingly. DHS agreed with our recommendation to automate air 
marshals' time and attendance data to facilitate comparisons of actual 
hours worked with scheduled hours and said that the Service was taking 
steps to implement the recommendation. DHS also agreed that there was a 
need to improve the quality of the Service's separation information.

In its comments, DHS also emphasized its belief that the Service's 
merger with ICE would have a number of significant benefits, 
particularly from cross-training personnel. DHS noted that after cross-
training, the air marshals, as well as personnel in the other ICE 
components, would have far more law enforcement capability and could 
supplement each other's functions during times of heightened threat. 
Additionally, DHS said that the aviation system would benefit from the 
concentration and coordination of DHS law enforcement personnel under 
the direction of a single Assistant Secretary. We discuss these changes 
in our report by examining them in the context of issues that may arise 
as the Service merges with other agencies. In addition, we discuss key 
practices and implementation steps that could be useful in dealing with 
the changes. We note, however, that it is too early to assess any 
possible benefits or repercussions of the changes.

Finally, DHS provided technical clarifications to the report, which we 
incorporated into the report as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days 
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of 
this report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 
Government Reform, other interested congressional committees, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Undersecretary for Border and 
Transportation Security, the Administrator of the Transportation 
Security Administration, and the Acting Assistant Secretary of the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This report is also 
available on GAO's home page at http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact Carol Anderson-Guthrie or me at (202) 512-2834 if you 
have any questions about the report. Key contributors to this report 
are listed in appendix VII.

Gerald L. Dillingham: 
Director, Civil Aviation Issues:

Signed by Gerald L. Dillingham: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To address each of our study objectives and research questions, we 
reviewed and analyzed data and documentation provided by the Federal 
Air Marshal Service (The Service) on background checks and training; 
scheduling, mission incidents, employee misconduct, and separation; and 
several workforce policies and procedures. We also interviewed 
officials responsible for implementing and operating the Service. 
Additionally, we used our Standards for Internal Controls in the 
Federal Government, Internal Control Management and Evaluation 
Tool,[Footnote 33] Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic 
Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government,[Footnote 
34] and Model of Strategic Human Capital Management,[Footnote 35] to 
help assess the Service's training, management information, and 
policies and procedures. We also reviewed an audit report by the 
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Inspector General (IG) on the 
Federal Air Marshal program.[Footnote 36] To guide our examination of 
the Service's future challenges, we used our Results-Oriented Cultures: 
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 
Transformations.[Footnote 37]

To compare the background check procedures for the newly hired air 
marshals with those used before September 2001, we obtained and 
reviewed Service documents that described the process and procedures 
used to apply for a top-secret clearance, as well as for an interim 
secret clearance waiver. We interviewed officials at the Service's 
Human Resource Center in New Jersey who were knowledgeable about the 
process and were coordinating the Service's requirements with the 
responsible Security Management Offices at both the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA). We also analyzed data provided by the Office of Personnel 
Management's (OPM) Investigative Service and had discussions with OPM 
personnel on the number of clearances processed and the procedures that 
are used.

To determine what changes were made in the training curriculum for the 
newly hired air marshals, we analyzed documents related to the air 
marshal training curriculum. In order to identify the curriculum in 
place before the changes were made, we interviewed air marshals who had 
been with the Service before September 2001. To understand the 
Service's curriculum from September 2001 through July 2003, we 
evaluated class schedules, training materials, and training data that 
tracked the completion of coursework and firearms qualification 
training. We visited the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in 
Artesia, New Mexico and the Service's training center in New Jersey, 
where we interviewed officials responsible for overseeing the air 
marshal training program. In addition, we interviewed representatives 
of the Air Line Pilots Association, the Air Transport Association, and 
current and former air marshals.

To determine what management information and policies and procedures 
the Service had developed to support its expanded mission and 
workforce, we examined the Service's automated scheduling system and 
management information on mission incidents, reported misconduct, and 
reasons for separation. We analyzed the automated scheduling system 
data to determine if the current system controls were operating as 
expected. Additionally, to determine the extent of sick leave use and 
to address allegations of excessive use, we analyzed the "sick calls" 
generated from the scheduling system between July and October 2002. We 
also reviewed and discussed with Service management its policies and 
procedures for air marshals' transfers between offices, dress code 
requirements, and work schedules.

To determine how many newly hired air marshals have left the Service 
and why, we used agency data on the number of air marshals on board, 
hired, and separated each month; supervisory memorandums summarizing 
exit interviews; resignation letters; personnel action forms; and the 
Service's summary database on separations. Using the summary database, 
we determined the number of air marshals who separated, by reason, and 
calculated the percentage of total employees that separated for a 
specific reason. We discussed the process for collecting these data 
with agency officials responsible for maintaining the Service's 
personnel data from the Service's Human Resource Center in New Jersey. 
The Service provided information on the processing and maintenance of 
its data and on the relationships among its data systems. When we had 
concerns about the consistency and validity of the data, we asked 
agency officials to address each concern. On the basis of the 
information provided by the agency and our review, we determined that 
the required data elements were adequate for the purpose of this work.

To gain a basic understanding of the issues surrounding staff decisions 
to leave the Service, we reviewed the agency's separation data. For 
each departed staff, these data capture only one predominant reason 
(for leaving). To supplement this analysis, we selected 95 cases (36 
percent of 264 separation cases) that had some form of documentation, 
had occurred at various times between January 2002 and March 2003, and 
had originated at various field offices. For each selected case, we 
reviewed any available resignation letters, exit interviews, and forms 
documenting personnel actions. This approach allowed us to conduct a 
limited quality check of the Service's data and determine whether 
reasons outside of those reported by the Service provided a broader 
view of air marshals' reasons for leaving the Service.

To get a better understanding of the types of misconduct that air 
marshals have been charged with, we reviewed the electronic 
spreadsheets that the Service uses to track the status of each case of 
reported misconduct. The spreadsheets included cases reported between 
October 2001 and July 2003. We sorted the cases of misconduct by 
category to determine if a particular category was prevalent. We also 
spoke with Service management about the adjudication of alleged 
misconduct and the issues related to the completeness and definition of 
misconduct measures.

To determine the types and frequency of the mission reports submitted 
by air marshals, we analyzed the database maintained by the Federal Air 
Marshals' Mission Operations Control Center. This database contained 
approximately 1,600 incidents that were reported by air marshals 
between September 11, 2001, and September 16, 2003. We then sorted the 
incidents into broad categories, including mission-related incidents 
and incidents that occurred between air marshals and airport or airline 
personnel. We also received information on the Service's use and 
dissemination of the incident data from the Special Agent in Charge of 
Field Operations.

We reviewed the DOT IG's report on the Federal Air Marshal program as 
an additional source of information about the Service. This report 
evaluated various aspects of the Service, including its selection and 
hiring process and its procedures for properly training and fully 
qualifying air marshals to respond to incidents aboard aircraft. For 
one aspect of the report, the IG interviewed 112 air marshals in a one-
on-one format at their field office duty stations. The air marshals 
were not selected for interview using structured or random selection 
methods. Information obtained through these interviews highlights 
employee concerns with the Service but is anecdotal and therefore 
cannot be projected to the universe of the Service's air marshal 
workforce.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal Service:

Figure 1: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Gender, by 
Percentage, as of August 2003:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 2: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Age, by Percentage, 
as of August 2003:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 3: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Race, by Percentage, 
as of August 2003:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Locations of the Federal Air Marshal Service's 21 Field 
Offices and Training Facility:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air Marshal Service, September 
2001 through October 2002:

[See PDF for image]

[A] The exact number of federal air marshals is classified.

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Mission-Related Incidents Reported by Federal Air Marshals, 
by Broad Categories, September 15, 2001 --September 16, 2003:

Table 1: 

Incident category: Suspicious person; Number of incidents reported: 
444; Percentage of total: 21.3.

Incident category: Suspicious activities by person; Number of incidents 
reported: 394; Percentage of total: 18.9.

Incident category: Issues with airport or airline personnel: 

Incident category: * Assigned seating and/or boarding procedures; 
Number of incidents reported: 159; Percentage of total: 7.6.

Incident category: * Screening and/or escort procedures; Number of 
incidents reported: 106; Percentage of total: 5.0.

Incident category: * Check-in procedures; Number of incidents reported: 
59; Percentage of total: 2.8.

Incident category: * Flight crew briefings; Number of incidents 
reported: 57; Percentage of total: 2.7.

Incident category: Subtotal: (Issues with airport or airline 
personnel); Number of incidents reported: 381; Percentage of total: 
18.3.

Incident category: Suspect items or objects; Number of incidents 
reported: 164; Percentage of total: 7.9.

Incident category: Third-party information reported to air marshal; 
Number of incidents reported: 129; Percentage of total: 6.2.

Incident category: Undercover status compromised; Number of incidents 
reported: 113; Percentage of total: 5.4.

Incident category: Disruptive/disorderly person; Number of incidents 
reported: 73; Percentage of total: 3.5.

Incident category: Security breeches; Number of incidents reported: 49; 
Percentage of total: 2.3.

Incident category: Medical problems; Number of incidents reported: 35; 
Percentage of total: 1.7.

Incident category: Arrest/detainment by or at request of air marshal; 
Number of incidents reported: 28; Percentage of total: 1.3.

Incident category: Interference with flight crew by passenger; Number 
of incidents reported: 20; Percentage of total: 1.

Incident category: Verbal threats or threatening behavior; Number of 
incidents reported: 19; Percentage of total: 0.9.

Incident category: Use of nonlethal force by an air marshal; Number of 
incidents reported: 16; Percentage of total: 0.8.

Incident category: Searches; Number of incidents reported: 12; 
Percentage of total: 0.5.

Incident category: Equipment retrieval/turn-in; Number of incidents 
reported: 7; Percentage of total: 0.3.

Incident category: Tampering with aircraft or aircraft equipment; 
Number of incidents reported: 4; Percentage of total: 0.2.

Incident category: Discharge of an air marshal firearm; Number of 
incidents reported: 3; Percentage of total: 0.2.

Incident category: To be determined; Number of incidents reported: 2; 
Percentage of total: .1.

Incident category: Not applicable; Number of incidents reported: 1; 
Percentage of total: 0.1.

Incident category: Other; Number of incidents reported: 189; Percentage 
of total: 9.

Incident category: Total; Number of incidents reported: 2,083; 
Percentage of total: 100.

Source: Federal Air Marshal Incident Reports Database, September 15, 
2001, through September 16, 2003.

Notes: Total includes some incidents counted more than once, because 
multiple codes for a reportable incident might have been reported 
(e.g., a suspicious person incident might also have been reported as a 
drunk and disorderly incident). The information above represents the 
major categories of information on incidents that air marshals report 
to the Service's Operations Center.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and 
Organizational Transformations:

Table 2: 

Practice: Ensure top leadership drives the transformation.; 
Implementation step: * Define and articulate a succinct and compelling 
reason for change.; * Balance continued delivery of services with 
merger and transformation activities..

Practice: Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals 
to guide the transformation.; Implementation step: * Adopt leading 
practices for results-oriented strategic planning and reporting..

Practice: Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset 
of the transformation.; Implementation step: * Embed core values in 
every aspect of the organization to reinforce the new culture..

Practice: Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and 
show progress from day one.; Implementation step: * Make public 
implementation goals and timeline.; * Seek and monitor employee 
attitudes and take appropriate follow-up actions.; * Identify cultural 
features of merging organizations to increase understanding of former 
work environments.; * Attract and retain key talent.; * Establish an 
organizationwide knowledge and skills inventory to allow knowledge 
exchange among merging organizations..

Practice: Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation 
process.; Implementation step: * Establish networks to support 
implementation team.; * Select high-performing team members..

Practice: Use the performance management system to define the 
responsibility and assure accountability for change.; Implementation 
step: * Adopt leading practices to implement effective performance 
management systems with adequate safeguards..

Practice: Establish a communication strategy to create shared 
expectations and report related progress.; Implementation step: * 
Communicate early and often to build trust.; * Ensure consistency of 
message.; * Encourage two-way communication.; * Provide information to 
meet specific needs of employees..

Practice: Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain ownership 
for the transformation.; Implementation step: * Use employee teams.; * 
Involve employees in planning and sharing performance information.; * 
Incorporate employee feedback into new policies and procedures.; * 
Delegate authority to appropriate organizational levels..

Practice: Build a world-class organization.; Implementation step: * 
Adopt leading practices to build a world-class organization..

Source: GAO-03-699.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VII: Contacts and Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Gerald Dillingham, (202) 512-2834 Carol Anderson-Guthrie, (214) 777-
5739:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to those named above, Bess Eisenstadt, David Hooper, Kevin 
Jackson, Maren McAvoy, Minette Richardson, Laura Shumway, Rick Smith, 
Gladys Toro, and Alwynne Wilber made key contributions to this report.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The exact number of federal air marshals is classified. 

[2] Public Law 107-71, November 19, 2001.

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management 
Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 20, 2002).

[4] Public Law 99-83, August 8, 1985.

[5] 49 C.F.R. Sec. 1.47(p)(1).

[6] OPM contracts primarily with U.S. Investigative Services to check 
the applicants' personal records and often to conduct face-to-face 
interview with friends, colleagues, and family.

[7] Executive Order 12968, dated August 2, 1995, authorizes agencies to 
grant employees temporary eligibility for access to classified 
information while the initial investigation is under way. When such 
eligibility is granted, the initial investigation shall be expedited.

[8] The National Crime Information Center is a computerized index of 
criminal justice information (i.e., information on criminal record 
histories, fugitives, stolen properties, missing persons) located at 
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Criminal Justice Information 
Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia. It is available to 
federal, state, and local law enforcement and other criminal justice 
agencies 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

[9] OPM bills an agency for the full amount of an investigation at the 
time the investigation is scheduled.

[10] TSA's Credentialing Program Office is responsible for adjudicating 
the results of air marshals' background investigations. This function 
was formerly under TSA's Office of Security.

[11] In his statement on June 3, 2003, before the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, House Committee on Appropriations, the Associate 
Director for Human Resources Products and Services, said that OPM was 
working to increase its capacity to provide background investigations 
for all federal customers and had streamlined its internal processes to 
make as much use as possible of automated systems.

[12] OPM told us in March that it had not received a prioritized list 
of clearances from the Service, but noted that it had occasionally 
received requests to expedite or check the status of particular 
investigations or to discontinue investigations that were no longer 
needed.

[13] The federal law enforcement Practical Pistol Course (PPC).

[14] The Aircraft Tactical Pistol Course (ATPC).

[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Guide for 
Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal 
Government, GAO-03-893G (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).

[16] Before being transfered to TSA in March 2002, the Service 
continued to follow standard operating procedures designed for a small 
organization with one facility.

[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in 
the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 
1999).

[18] According to an analysis done by the Service, air marshals spend 
an average of 4 hours and 25 minutes per workday in flight and use the 
remainder of the workday to prepare for flights or layovers. Air 
marshals must be at the airport 1.5 hours before their first flight and 
stay there 15 minutes after arrival. The combination of flight time and 
the aforementioned 1.5 hours and 15 minutes is referred to as "duty 
time."

[19] The remaining 8 percent, Service officials explained, could be due 
to inconsistencies that resulted when the Service overrode the controls 
to meet mission needs--to, for example, provide sufficient coverage for 
Super Bowl weekend. 

[20] The Air Transport Association is a trade association for 22 major 
U.S. airlines and five foreign carriers.

[21] Generally, Service staff members in headquarters investigate 
reports of misconduct, but for more serious cases, the Service has been 
coordinating its investigations with TSA's Office of Internal Affairs. 

[22] The Service selects and records one predominant reason for an air 
marshal's separation from the Service, although the air marshals may 
have cited more than one reason.

[23] Because TSA was a newly created agency without a workforce history 
(including, for example, information on deaths, retirements, transfers, 
and resignations), we were unable to meaningfully compare attrition 
data for the Service to other federal agencies during this period. 
Therefore we are not making a value judgment on the meaning of the 
number of persons leaving the Service or their rate of departure. 
However, these data are relevant to the resources that have to be 
expended to maintain a specified number of marshals in the Service.

[24] A small number of air marshals left because they could not pass 
training.

[25] The details of our selection process are provided in appendix I.

[26] This documentation included an exit information form that the 
Service began using in 2002 to gather data from separating air 
marshals.

[27] As discussed in appendix I, the DOT IG's sample results cannot be 
projected to the universe of the Service's air marshal workforce.

[28] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

[29] Between November 2002 and February 2003, 112 air marshals were 
interviewed. However, because of the methodology employed, the results 
are anecdotal and may not reflect the views or experiences of all 
Service employees.

[30] As previously discussed, the 10-hour workday includes the time 
that air marshals are required to be in the airport before and after a 
flight as well as the time they spend in flight.

[31] Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers 
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 
2, 2003).

[32] GAO-03-260.

[33] GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal 
government as required by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act 
of 1982. See 31 U.S.C. 3512©. GAO first issued the standards in 1983. 
GAO revised the standards and reissued them as Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1(Washington, 
D.C.: November 1999). These standards provide the overall framework for 
establishing and maintaining internal control and for identifying and 
addressing major performance challenges and areas at greatest risk for 
fraud, waste, and abuse, and mismanagement. GAO issued its Internal 
Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: 
August 2001) to assist agencies in maintaining or implementing 
effective internal control and, when needed, to help determine what, 
where, and how improvements can be implemented.

[34] GAO-03-893G.

[35] GAO/02-373SP.

[36] SC-2003-029.

[37] GAO/03-669.

GAO's Mission:

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading.

Order by Mail or Phone:

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street NW,

Room LM Washington,

D.C. 20548:

To order by Phone: 	

	Voice: (202) 512-6000:

	TDD: (202) 512-2537:

	Fax: (202) 512-6061:

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:

Public Affairs:

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.

General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.

20548: