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Performance and Accountability Series:
January 2003:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Department of Transportation:
GAO-03-108:
A Glance at the Agency Covered in This Report:
The Department of Transportation implements national transportation
policy
and administers federal transportation programs.Its responsibilities
are
considerable and reflect the extraordinary scale, use, and impacts of
the
nation’s transportation system. The department carries out multiple
transportation missions, including
* reducing deaths and injuries on our nation’s roads,in civilaviation,
in the
railroad industry, and on waterways;
* improving mobility on and the accessibility of our nation’s roads and
public
transportation systems;
* protecting the nation’s passenger and freight transportation systems;
* promoting the development of the railroad industry and the development
and
maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced merchantmarine; and
* providing law enforcement, humanitarian assistance,and emergency
response on
our nation’s waterways.
The Department of Transportation's Budgetary and Staff Resources
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[End of Figure]
This report is part of a special GAO series, first issued in 1999 and
updated in
2001, entitled the Performance and Accountability Series: Major
Management Challenges
and Program Risks. The 2003 Performance and Accountability Series
contains separate
reports covering each cabinet department, most major independent
agencies, and the
U.S. Postal Service. The series also includes a government-wide
perspective on
transforming the way the government does business in order to meet
21st century
challenges and address long-term fiscal needs. The companion 2003
High Risk Series:
An Update identifies areas at high risk due to either their
greater vulnerabilities
to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or major challenges
associated with their
economy, efficiency, or effectiveness. A list of all of the
reports in this series is
included at the end of this report.
GAo Higlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-108, a report to
Congress included as part of GAO’s
Performance and Accountability Series
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY SERIES
Department of Transportation
Why GAO Did This Report:
In its 2001 performance and accountability report on the
Department of Transportation
(the department), GAO identified important safety, security,
acquisition, financial
management, and other issues facing the department. The
information GAO presents in
this report is intended to help sustain congressional attention
and a departmental
focus on continuing to make progress in addressing these
challenges—and others that
have arisen since 2001—and ultimately overcoming them. This
report is part of a special
series of reports on governmentwide and agency-specific
issues.
What GAO Found:
The Department of Transportation has implemented a number
of actions to
improve its mission and management performance. Future
improvements
will increasingly demand effective partnerships and
consensus-building with
state, local, and private stakeholders.
• Improving transportation safety. Efforts to further
reduce 44,000
annual transportation fatalities have reached a plateau.
Since the
highest pay-off actions have occurred, future
improvements will be
difficult because they depend on influencing individuals’
behaviors and
state and local governments’ implementation of safety
laws.
• Transforming transportation security. Security is a
crucial and
growing responsibility. The department needed to
design and implement
effective security approaches that did not unduly
hinder passenger and
freight mobility. It created the Transportation
Security Administration
and staffed a federalized aviation screening
workforce of more than
60,000 people within just a few months. Despite
an impressive start,
extraordinary challenges remain. It now must
accomplish a smooth
transfer of security functions to the new Department
of Homeland
Security and work closely with the new agency on
transportation
security.
• Improving mobility and economic growth through
intermodal and
modal approaches. As transportation needs change,
mobility and
economic growth are affected. More travel crosses
transportation
modes and increasing congestion—particularly for
freight—affects
productivity. New strategies and policy decisions-
-especially about
Amtrak's role--are required to meet these challenges.
• Enhancing management of aviation and Coast Guard
acquisitions.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
Coast Guard face
major acquisition issues. Both agencies have
improved acquisition
management, but multibillion-dollar modernization
projects pose risks of
significant delays and cost increases. Specifically,
FAA’s Air Traffic
Control modernization efforts continue to be at
high risk.
• Building human capital strategies. The department
faces human
capital problems that are mirrored in the nation’s
transportation sector.
A shortfall of people and skills could compromise
the transportation
workforce and affect the economy, safety, and
mobility of our nation.
• Fostering improved financial management. The
department and
FAA have made significant progress in improving
the underlying causes
of weaknesses in their financial management
systems. Until new
systems that will soon be deployed are proven in
full operation, FAA’s
financial management systems remain at high risk.
What Remains to Be Done:
GAO believes the department should
• work with Congress and other transportation
stakeholders to
develop approaches that improve transportation
safety,
mobility through intermodal and modal planning
and investment approaches,
and human capital strategies;
• pursue strategies to address long-term security
challenges and ensure
a smooth transition to Department of Homeland
Security responsibility;
• continue to improve its acquisition and financial
management by addressing
root causes of problems.
To view the full report, click on the link above.
For more information, contact John H.
Anderson, Jr. at (202) 512-2834 or
andersonj@gao.gov.
Contents:
Transmittal Letter:
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
GAO Contacts:
Related GAO Products:
Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:
This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce
copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product.
Transmittal Letter January 2003:
The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives:
This report addresses the major management challenges facing the U.S.
Department of Transportation as it carries out its multiple and highly
diverse missions. The report discusses the actions that the department
has taken and that are under way to address the challenges GAO
identified in its Performance and Accountability Series 2 years ago,
and major events that have occurred that significantly influence the
environment in which the department carries out its mission. Also, GAO
summarizes the challenges that remain, new ones that have emerged, and
further actions that GAO believes are needed.
This analysis should help the new Congress and the administration carry
out their responsibilities and improve government for the benefit of
the American people. For additional information about this report,
please contact John H. Anderson, Jr., Managing Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, at (202) 512-2834 or at andersonj@gao.gov.
David M. Walker
Comptroller General
of the United States:
Signed by David M. Walker:
[End of section]
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
Our 2001 Performance and Accountability Series report described the
major challenges facing the Department of Transportation (the
department) as follows:
* Improving the safety and security of air, highway, and pipeline
transportation;
* Strengthening the financial condition of Amtrak;
* Enhancing competition and consumer protection in the aviation and
freight rail industries;
* Enhancing the management of aviation and Coast Guard acquisitions and
obsolete ship disposal;
* Increasing the accountability for financial management activities;
and:
* Improving the oversight of highway and transit projects.
We have reported that the department has made measurable progress in
carrying out its diverse missions and improving management of its
operations since our 2001 report. For example, the department has made
concentrated efforts to improve financial management of its accounting
and property management activities. However, we continue to designate
both the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) acquisition and
financial management as high risk areas. Both our reviews and the
department's own performance reports indicate that its performance has
been uneven. The department's fiscal year 2001 performance report (the
most recent data available), for example, indicates that it met only
slightly more than half
(59 percent) of the performance goals that it set for itself.
In addition, the intervening 2 years have resulted in dramatic changes
that have introduced complex new issues with no easy solutions into the
department's responsibilities. Newly critical concerns--transportation
security and human capital--are affecting the department's priorities
and the scope of these concerns is substantial. Security, always a
crucial issue, became paramount. An impending shortage of skilled
personnel may compromise transportation missions and services in the
department and throughout the transportation system. Also of concern is
the level of congestion, which is an increasingly pervasive problem in
the transportation system. Furthermore, the department's other missions
and management goals require continuing attention.
This 2003 Performance and Accountability Series report differs from our
2001 report in two important ways. First, our 2003 report recognizes
the need to frame some issues more broadly than we have done before.
Second, it provides attention to those issues, such as security, that
have arisen in the intervening 2 years and will challenge the
department for years to come. This report discusses six mission and
management challenges that require the department's sustained attention
and innovation.
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The department's pressing challenges are to:
* Improve transportation safety to reduce transportation-related
fatalities, a leading cause of death. We have framed this issue more
broadly than in the past so as to include highway safety. This broader
statement of the safety challenge facing the department recognizes that
it has not made substantial inroads into reducing transportation-
related fatalities in the last 2 years. We focused on safety on the
nation's highways because the overwhelming majority of fatalities occur
there. We are not focusing on pipeline safety as we did in 2001 because
the department's Office of Pipeline Safety has responded positively to
our recommendations aimed at (1) involving state pipeline safety
offices in the department's safety inspection of pipelines and (2)
using a fuller range of enforcement actions, such as monetary
penalties, when it finds safety violations.
* Transform transportation security to reduce the vulnerability of the
nation's surface and air transportation systems to terrorism and other
disruptions. While our 2001 report recognized that the department faced
aviation security concerns, these concerns have been greatly amplified
as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States in September
2001 and subsequent events. This 2003 report, therefore, presents
transportation security as a separate mission challenge. Under the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the department's major homeland security
functions, now housed in the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and the Coast Guard, are to be moved to the newly created
Department of Homeland Security by January 2004. Because there will be
a continued need for cooperation and communication between the
Department of Transportation and TSA to effectively protect borders and
ensure security of all modes of transportation and because the
department will be a key stakeholder in the future regarding
development and implementation of transportation security policy, we
continue to consider transportation security functions as challenges
for the department to address.
* Improve mobility and economic growth using intermodal and modal
approaches to meet changing passenger and freight travel needs, such as
ameliorating congestion. Our 2001 report recognized some aspects of
this challenge--addressing the financial condition of Amtrak, aviation
industry consolidation and its impacts on small communities, mass
transit funding, and oversight of federal highway and bridge
investments. However, this 2003 report presents this issue in a broader
perspective, recognizing that the challenge to fostering mobility is
more than just surmounting problems in individual modes of
transportation. Three issues included in our 2001 report are not
included in this report. First, the department has responded positively
to our recommendations regarding transit project oversight. Second, we
have presented Congress with options for determining the amount of
highway trust funds for distribution that it may wish to consider
during the reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the
21ST Century. Finally, regarding freight rail competition, the Surface
Transportation Board (the industry regulator) does not expect
additional applications for mergers of major railroads in the near
future.
* Build human capital strategies that will ensure that the department
and the transportation sector achieve missions and deliver services
effectively, efficiently, and economically. We identified the need to
revamp federal strategic human capital management as a governmentwide
challenge[Footnote 1] in 2001 and discussed aspects of this issue in
our 2001 report on the department. The need to address human capital
challenges has grown over the past 2 years and we have identified it as
a discrete challenge for the department in 2003.
* Enhance FAA and Coast Guard acquisition management to maximize
returns from investment of public funds in large, complex, high-cost
procurements. This is a continuing challenge in which the department
has made some progress, but still needs concentrated attention. This is
particularly true for aviation acquisition management, which we
designated as high risk in 1995. FAA acquisition remains a high risk
area in 2003 because critical systems are not yet in place and proven
in operation and because the agency has not completed efforts to
address root causes of prior modernization problems. As a result, key
reforms are not completed and could jeopardize major projects' costs,
schedule, and performance. Obsolete ship disposal--included in our 2001
report--is not discussed in this report because the department has made
progress in this area.
* Continue progress in improving financial management to provide
accurate, reliable financial information for decisionmakers. FAA's
financial management has been a high risk area since 1999 and, despite
significant progress made by the department, continues to be high risk
this year because critical systems are not yet in place and proven in
operation.
Selected GAO reports that address many of the department's performance
and accountability challenges and offer recommendations for improvement
are listed at the end of this report.
Improving Transportation Safety:
In the past decade, transportation accidents--particularly motor
vehicle accidents--were among the top 10 leading causes of death in the
United States and the leading cause of death for people from 6 through
27 years of age. In 2001, over 44,000 people were killed and over 3
million people were injured in highway, aviation, rail, and maritime
accidents. (See fig. 1.) To address this problem, improving
transportation safety is the department's highest priority.
Figure 1: Fatalities by Transportation Mode, 2001:
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Notes: GAO analysis of the department's data.
Aviation, rail, and maritime numbers are preliminary. Aviation
fatalities include the 265 persons killed in the four aircraft hijacked
on September 11, 2001, but do not include the 2,801 persons killed or
missing at the World Trade Center or 125 persons killed at the
Pentagon.
Over the past 4 decades, transportation safety has improved
considerably. However, in recent years, fatalities have plateaued. Of
particular concern is the limited progress in recent years in improving
safety on our nation's roads, where 94 percent of all fatalities occur;
in general aviation, where
87 percent of all aviation fatalities occur; and in commercial
aviation, where accidents have the potential for catastrophic loss of
life.
Improved Highway Safety Requires a Renewed Focus on Seat Belts and
Truck-related Fatalities:
Between 1960 and 1990, motor vehicle transportation fatality rates were
reduced by more than half. (See fig. 2.) However, since the mid-1990s,
the fatality rate and the number of fatalities from transportation-
related accidents on our nation's highways has not declined
substantially. Two areas for reducing motor vehicle fatalities--seat
belt use and large truck safety--continue to experience less progress
than other areas in meeting highway safety goals.
Figure 2: Motor Vehicle Fatality Rate and Number of Fatalities, 1960
through 2001:
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[End of figure] - graphic text:
Seat belts. The department's National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), leading highway organizations, and we have
reported that seat belts offer the most effective way to lower highway
fatalities.[Footnote 2] In 2000, NHTSA estimated that seat belts saved
almost 12,000 lives and could have saved an additional 9,200 lives that
year if all passenger vehicle occupants aged 4 and older had worn seat
belts. As a result of the passage of state seat belt laws and a
national effort of highly visible seat belt law enforcement and public
education, seat belt use increased considerably in the 1980s and early
1990s from 10 to 15 percent nationwide to 66 to 70 percent nationwide.
However, since the early 1990s, seat belt use rates have not increased
substantially. In 2001, front seat belt usage increased slightly to 73
percent but remained well below the department's target for the year of
86 percent. In 2002, front seat belt usage increased slightly again to
75 percent, saving an additional 500 lives. Nevertheless, small annual
percentage increases in front seat belt use do not put the department
on track to meet its goal of having 90 percent of front seat occupants
use seat belts by 2005.
One key factor in increasing seat belt use is the enactment of primary
enforcement seat belt laws. Primary enforcement allows police officers
to stop vehicles and write citations whenever they observe violations
of safety belt laws. (In contrast, secondary enforcement permits police
officers to write a citation only after a vehicle is stopped for some
other traffic violation.) As of September 2002, nearly every state has
enacted laws requiring the use of safety belts, but only about 40
percent of all states have primary enforcement laws. NHTSA estimates
that states with secondary enforcement laws could increase seat belt
use an estimated 14 percentage points from an average of 67 percent if
they enacted primary enforcement laws. This increase translates to
preventing around 1,750 fatalities, saving the federal government
around $300 million, saving states nearly $140 million, and saving $3
billion in total costs to society annually (1998 dollars).
The department's ability to implement safety-enhancing interventions
has been limited because it must rely heavily on individuals to modify
their behavior and state governments to implement laws that enhance
safety. To increase seat belt use, we have suggested that Congress
consider encouraging states to enact primary enforcement laws. The
department's recent campaign to encourage states to increase seat belt
use, "Click It or Ticket," is designed to resonate with hard-core non-
seat-belt-users in high-risk populations that have traditionally lower
than average seat belt use rates and higher fatality rates. The
department has received preliminary evidence that this campaign is
having some success. For example, some of the strongest gains in seat
belt use during the Memorial Day holiday in 2002 were in states
participating in the "Click It or Ticket" enforcement campaign.
Large commercial trucks. The department has made significantly less
progress in reducing commercial truck-related fatalities than it has in
improving highway safety overall.[Footnote 3] While commercial trucks
represent only 4 percent of all registered vehicles, they are involved
in 12 percent of all crashes resulting in fatalities. As a result,
around 5,000 people died on our nation's roads in 2001 from crashes
involving large trucks, a figure largely unchanged from a decade ago.
In 2001, 200 fewer people were killed in large truck-related accidents
than in 2000. This reduction was substantially in line with the
department's goal. (See fig. 3.) However, the department will have to
make significantly greater gains in the coming years to meet its goal
for reducing by half the number of large truck-related fatalities, from
about 5,300 in 1999 to about 2,600 in 2009.
Figure 3: Number of Fatalities from Crashes Involving Large Trucks,
1991 through 2001:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
[End of figure] - graphic text:
As we reported in 1999, efforts to determine how its actions will
reduce the number of large truck-related fatalities have been limited
because the department does not have a good understanding of the causes
of large truck crashes. At the direction of Congress, the department is
performing a multiyear large-scale study of the causes of large truck
crashes and expects to report its findings in 2004.
Improved Aviation Safety Will Require Improved Interventions and
Oversight:
In 2001, more than 1,100 people died in commercial and general aviation
accidents, almost 50 percent more than the nearly 750 people who died
in 2000.[Footnote 4] Despite the unusually large increase in aviation
fatalities in 2001, primarily caused by the September 11, 2001
terrorist events, commercial and general aviation safety has improved
considerably over the past 4 decades. In general and commercial
aviation, the fatality rate decreased considerably between 1960 and
1975. Between 1975 and 2000 (the most recent data available), the
fatality rate in general aviation has continued to decline
substantially (to about 2 fatalities per 100,000 flight hours). The
fatality rate in commercial aviation has remained relatively low since
1975, averaging around 2 fatalities per 100,000 aircraft departures. In
2002, there were no commercial aviation fatalities.
However, aviation experts are concerned that if air travel during the
next decade were to increase 37 percent over 1999 levels, as was
forecast before September 11, 2001, the number of fatalities from
aviation accidents would rise if the department did not make a
sustained effort to improve aviation safety. To address concerns about
safety, FAA and the aviation industry developed the Safer Skies
initiative in 1998. The initiative established the broad safety goal of
reducing the fatal aviation accident rate for commercial aviation by 80
percent by 2007. As we reported in 2000, to accomplish this, the
initiative is designing interventions to respond to key safety problems
that accounted for over three-quarters of the fatal accidents from 1988
through 1997, including pilots losing control of their aircraft, pilots
flying otherwise controllable aircraft into the ground or water, and
accidents during approach and landing.[Footnote 5]
For general aviation, the Safer Skies initiative did not adopt the 80
percent goal proposed by two aviation safety commissions. Instead, as
we reported in 2001, the Safer Skies initiative chose the goal of
reducing the number of fatal general aviation accidents to 350 by 2007,
which represents a 20-percent reduction (from 440) in the number of
fatal accidents that would be expected in 2007 given the expected
growth in the industry.[Footnote 6] Interim goals for 2000 through 2002
were actually higher than the fatalities seen in 1999 and did not
challenge the general aviation industry to continue improvements.
General aviation safety initiatives will focus on major:
causes of fatal accidents that include weather, loss of control, and
runway incursions.[Footnote 7]
Compounding our concern about improving aviation safety is the
impending wave of retirements among aviation professionals--and the
FAA's limited progress in addressing this problem, as we reported in
June 2002.[Footnote 8] In a recent survey of air traffic controllers,
about 5,000 of the approximately 20,000 controllers indicated that they
might leave in the next 5 years. However, FAA has not yet implemented
our recommendations to develop a comprehensive human capital strategy
to meet the impending need to hire and train new controllers. Instead,
it is hiring new controllers only when current, experienced controllers
leave--a strategy that might not provide enough well-qualified new
controllers when they are needed. Further, FAA has not addressed the
resources that may be needed at its training academy and for on-the-job
training at its control facilities in order to handle the large influx
of new controllers and to ensure that FAA's controller workforce will
continue to have the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to
perform its critical mission.
In addition to developing interventions that respond to significant
safety problems, a key to improving aviation safety will require that
FAA be able to effectively inspect the nation's airline operations. In
1998, FAA introduced a redesigned safety inspection system called the
Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), which shifted oversight of
airline operations beyond simply ensuring compliance to ensuring that
airlines have operating systems to control risks and prevent accidents.
However, in 1999, we reported that FAA's overly ambitious
implementation schedule has impaired its ability to successfully
implement several of the system's key elements.[Footnote 9] In 2002,
the department's Inspector General reported that FAA introduced the
system's new inspection system without fully developing several key
elements and without thoroughly testing the feasibility of ATOS as a
stand-alone surveillance system.[Footnote 10] Critical actions, such as
analyzing the system's inspection data and implementing actions to
correct identified weaknesses, are still being developed. Moreover,
while FAA has made some progress in addressing recommendations we made
in 1999 to improve inspection guidance, it still has not adequately
prepared inspectors with adequate training and inspection
tools.[Footnote 11] Lastly, ATOS has been inconsistently implemented
nationwide at FAA's field offices because FAA has not established
strong oversight and accountability procedures.
Transforming Transportation Security:
Since September 11, 2001, securing our nation's transportation system
from terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. In response, on
November 19, 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was
enacted. This act created TSA within the department and defined its
primary responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of
transportation. Since then, the department has worked to make security
improvements through its modal administrations while simultaneously
organizing a new agency to meet the longer-term challenge of
implementing security improvements that will not excessively inhibit
commerce and travel or interfere with other critical agency missions.
With the enactment of the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002,
the new Department of Homeland Security will assume overall
responsibility for transportation security and incorporate TSA and the
Coast Guard into its organization. The Department of Transportation
will need to forge a close working relationship with the new agency to
effectively protect borders and ensure security of all modes of
transportation because the department will be a key stakeholder in the
future regarding development and implementation of transportation
security policy.
Aviation security received most of the department's attention
immediately after September 11. More recently, officials have begun to
turn their attention to surface transportation security as well.
Balancing surface transportation security needs without unduly
inhibiting the movement of goods and people is complicated by the
nature and the vast scope of surface transportation in the United
States. For example, the volume of imported containers that pass
through more than 300 public and private U.S. seaports--in 2001, the
equivalent of six million containers were imported into the United
States--ensures that no one single shipment can be scrutinized too
carefully without significantly delaying delivery. (See fig. 4.) About
6,000 agencies provide transit services such as bus, subway, ferry, and
light rail to about 14 million Americans each weekday, and the open and
accessible nature of these services make it difficult to apply the
kinds of security measures that can be applied at airports. Despite an
impressive start in which the department simultaneously began to build
the infrastructure of a large organization as it focused on meeting the
nation's security needs, formidable short-and long-term challenges
remain.[Footnote 12]
Figure 4: Inspecting Millions of Containers that Arrive at U.S. Ports
Remains a Challenge:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Short-Term Challenges in Aviation Security Remain:
In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the department faced
several urgent aviation security challenges, including meeting
screening deadlines and addressing security gaps that we and others,
including the department's Inspector General, had identified. Prior to
September 11, 2001, airlines were responsible for screening passengers
and property. In November 2001, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act shifted this responsibility to TSA and established a
series of monumental requirements for the new agency, including
deadlines for hiring and deploying federal passenger screeners by
November 19, 2002, and screening all checked baggage using explosive
detection systems by December 31, 2002.[Footnote 13] In addition to
these screening deadlines, FAA established an April 2003 deadline for
designing, approving, and installing reinforced cockpit doors in over
6,000 passenger and cargo aircraft.
The department has made considerable progress in addressing aviation
security challenges. According to TSA, it met the November 2002
deadline by hiring and deploying over 40,000 passenger screeners to
screen passengers at 429 commercial airports. In addition, TSA reports
that it met the December 31, 2002, deadline to screen all checked
baggage. TSA reports that it hired and deployed more than 20,000 of an
estimated 22,000 baggage screeners as of mid December 2002 to screen
all checked baggage and that as of December 31, 2002, about 90 percent
of all checked baggage will be screened using explosive detection
systems or explosive trace detection equipment.[Footnote 14] The
remaining checked baggage will be screened using alternative means such
as canine teams, hand searches, and passenger-bag matching.
Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. TSA reports that as of mid
December 2002, it has installed only 239 of the estimated 1,100
explosive detection machines and 1,951 of the estimated 6,000 trace
detection machines they say they need to screen baggage to meet baggage
screening requirements contained in the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act. Finally, FAA has approved reinforced flightdeck doors for
5,150 of 6,000 commercial and cargo aircraft requiring newly reinforced
doors. However, these doors have been installed in only 19 percent of
these planes.
In addition to securing passenger carry-on luggage and checked luggage,
TSA faces other immediate challenges in securing cargo aboard
commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, requires
screening all cargo carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft and
requires TSA to have a system in place as soon as practicable to
screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of cargo on all cargo
aircraft. The "known shipper" program-which allows shippers that have
established business histories with air carriers or freight forwarders
to ship cargo on planes-is TSA's primary approach to ensuring air cargo
security and safety and complying with the cargo screening requirement
of the act.[Footnote 15] However, we and the department's Inspector
General have identified weaknesses in the known shipper program and
TSA's procedures for approving freight forwarders. In December 2002, we
reported that TSA lacks a comprehensive plan with long-term goals and
performance targets for cargo security, time frames for completing
security improvements, and risk-based criteria for prioritizing actions
to achieve those goals.[Footnote 16] We recommended that TSA develop a
comprehensive plan for air cargo security that incorporates a risk
management approach, includes a list of security priorities, and sets
deadlines for completing actions; TSA agreed with this recommendation.
With regard to dangerous goods shipped by air, in January 2003, we
reported that undeclared air shipments of dangerous goods can have
serious consequences, but TSA lacks statistically valid, generalizable
data to reliably estimate the nature and frequency of such
shipments and assess their risks.[Footnote 17] We recommended that the
Department of Transportation evaluate the need for additional
inspection authority to obtain statistically valid data on undeclared
air shipments of dangerous goods and document its penalty assessments
so that it can demonstrate that it is handling similar cases
consistently.
Long-Term Aviation and Surface Transportation Security Challenges:
The department and the Department of Homeland Security face long-term
transportation security challenges that include: (1) ensuring that
transportation security funding needs are identified and prioritized
and costs are controlled, (2) establishing effective coordination among
the many public and private entities responsible for transportation
security, (3) ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing
levels, (4) ensuring information systems security, and (5) implementing
national security standards.
Funding. Two key funding and accountability challenges will be (1)
paying for increased transportation security and (2) ensuring that
these costs are controlled. The costs associated with acquiring
equipment and personnel for improving aviation security alone are huge.
Although TSA estimates that it will need about $4.8 billion for
aviation security in fiscal year 2003, it estimates that revenues from
the new passenger security fee will pay for only around one-third ($1.7
billion) of that amount. As a result, TSA will need a major cash
infusion at a time when federal budget deficits are growing. Similarly,
many of the planned security improvements for surface transportation
facilities, such as seaports and mass transit, require costly outlays
for infrastructure, technology, and personnel at a time when weakening
local economies have reduced local transportation agencies' abilities
to fund security improvements. For example, even before September 11,
the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports
estimated that the costs to upgrade the security infrastructure at the
nation's 361 ports ranged from $10 million to $50 million per port. As
we reported in August 2002, although the federal government has already
stepped in with additional funding, demand has far outstripped the:
additional amounts made available.[Footnote 18] While Congress
appropriated $93 million to fund port security improvements in fiscal
year 2002, TSA has received applications for as much as $697 million
for these improvements. This puts pressure on the federal government to
make the best decisions about how to use the funds that it makes
available. As we also reported in August 2002, the Coast Guard's
efforts to develop port security standards that define what safeguards
a port should have in place will help identify and prioritize needs so
that limited funds can be better targeted to the highest risks at each
port.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2002,
requires the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is
operating to, among other things, promulgate regulations setting forth
standards for newly required vessel and facility security plans,
conduct vulnerability assessments for vessels and U.S. port facilities
and promulgate regulations to prevent individuals from entering secured
areas of vessels and port facilities through the use of a biometric
transportation security card. The act does not provide for a dedicated
source of funding for these new requirements, but does require that the
Secretary of Transportation report to Congress on proposals to fund
these new programs within 6 months after passage of the act.
In July 2002, we reported that long-term attention to cost and
accountability controls for acquisition and related business processes
will be critical both to ensuring TSA's success and maintaining its
integrity and accountability.[Footnote 19] According to the
department's Inspector General, although TSA has made progress in
addressing certain cost-related issues, it has not established an
infrastructure that provides effective controls to monitor contractors'
costs and performance. To ensure control over TSA contracts, the
department's Inspector General has recommended that Congress set aside
a specific amount of TSA's contracting budget for overseeing contractor
performance with respect to cost, schedule, and quality.[Footnote 20]
Furthermore, funding challenges have implications for the department's
other vital missions, requiring modal administrations to re-prioritize
functions. For example, as a result of new mission requirements, the
Coast Guard redirected its fiscal year 2002 resources from traditional,
nonsecurity missions to security-oriented functions. This doubled
projected spending for marine safety and security and reduced spending
in areas such as marine environmental protection. While some resources
have been redeployed to restore capabilities in key mission areas,
other resources, including district patrol boats and small boats, are
still being used primarily for security-related functions.
In considering the federal government's role in meeting long-term
funding challenges, several issues will need to be addressed beyond
determining who should pay for the security enhancements and how much
agency functions should be funded. An important consideration is
establishing appropriate criteria for distributing federal funds--the
most common of which have included ridership level, population,
identified vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets. Another
important consideration, as we reported in September 2002, is selecting
the appropriate federal policy instrument such as grants, loan
guarantees, tax incentives, and partnerships to motivate or mandate
other levels of government or the private sector to help address
security concerns.[Footnote 21] Finally, it will be important to
consider how to allocate funds between competing needs and measure
whether we are achieving increased security benefits envisioned.
Coordination. Since September 11, 2001, federal, state, and local
surface transportation agencies and the private sector have begun
rethinking roles and responsibilities for security. One challenge to
achieving national preparedness hinges on the federal government's
ability to form effective partnerships among entities that implement
security measures at the local level. Effective, well-coordinated
partnerships require identifying roles and responsibilities;
developing effective collaborative relationships with local and
regional transportation, emergency management, and law enforcement
agencies; agreeing on performance-based standards that describe desired
outcomes; testing procedures that implement roles and responsibilities;
and sharing intelligence information. Since its creation in November
2001, TSA has focused primarily on aviation security challenges and is
working toward defining the roles and responsibilities for surface
transportation security. Specifically, TSA is developing memorandums of
agreement with other modal administrations within the department that
are expected to delineate the lines of authority between the parties
and establish their specific responsibilities for transportation
security. TSA plans to complete the agreements by March 1, 2003.
Coordination challenges will continue for the department after TSA is
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security. The department
and the new Department of Homeland Security will have to work closely
to ensure the development of sound security policies and procedures and
effective implementation of those procedures by the many public and
private transportation system's stakeholders. A key coordination
challenge for TSA involves ensuring that terrorist and threat
information gathered and maintained by numerous law enforcement and
other agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Department of State, is quickly and efficiently
communicated among federal agencies and to state and local authorities,
as needed. In aviation security, timely information sharing among
agencies has been hampered by organizational cultures that make them
reluctant to share sensitive information and by outdated computer
systems that lack interoperability. In surface transportation, timely
information sharing has been hampered by the lack of standard protocols
to exchange information among federal, state, and local government
agencies and private entities. The department should have a critical
role in ensuring that information on best practices is shared with
local transportation agencies. Finally, as we reported in September
2002, intelligence sharing can be hampered if personnel in surface
transportation agencies have difficulty in obtaining the security
clearances necessary to obtain the critical intelligence information
that might be exchanged.[Footnote 22]
Human capital. A key challenge to ensuring the success of the
Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security in
protecting the nation's transportation system is recruiting, training,
and retaining a large workforce (currently TSA has more than 60,000
people). TSA is currently addressing some critical success factors in
managing human capital by hiring personnel, using a wide range of tools
available for hiring, and beginning to link individual performance to
organizational goals. However, concerns remain in areas of hiring,
training, and retention; developing an approach to compensation; and
setting up a performance management system.
TSA has encountered unexpected difficulty in hiring and training a
federal screener workforce. For example, at Baltimore-Washington
International Airport--the first of 429 airports to be staffed with
federal passenger screeners--TSA's hiring of screeners was delayed
because only about one-third of qualified applicants who were contacted
to schedule an assessment reported for the assessment. Of those that
reported, only about one-third passed the skills assessment. In
addition, while TSA is using a wide range of tools and flexibilities
available to meet its workforce needs, the department's Inspector
General has expressed concern about its approach to compensation. TSA
is basing its compensation system on FAA's pay banding approach, which
allows the agency to hire employees anywhere within broad pay bands for
their positions. In a report issued last summer, the department's
Inspector General has expressed concern about TSA's salary levels for
law enforcement and general and administrative positions, stating that
they are higher than for comparable positions in other
agencies.[Footnote 23] Finally, while TSA has made progress in setting
up the performance management system, the agency has not approved an
interim employee performance management system for 2002. Finalizing a
performance management system linked to organizational goals will be
critical to motivating and managing staff, ensuring the quality of
screeners' performance, and ultimately, restoring public confidence in
air travel.[Footnote 24]
Information systems security. Security at our nation's airports alone
does not ensure safe air travel. It is also critical to secure FAA's
air traffic control computer systems, which provide information to air
traffic controllers and aircraft flight crews to help ensure the safe
and expeditious movement of aircraft. Failure to adequately protect
these systems, as well as the facilities that house them, could cause a
nationwide disruption of air traffic or even a loss of life due to
collisions. In the area of information systems security, we made 39
recommendations to FAA between May 1998 and December 2000 to address
pervasive weaknesses in the agency's facilities' physical and
information systems security--both for currently operational and future
air traffic control systems, security management, and personnel
security. FAA has initiated numerous activities in response to our
recommendations. However, in several areas, including ensuring that
operational systems and facilities are secure, more must be done.
FAA has established an information systems security management
structure under its Chief Information Officer. In recent years, the
Chief Information Officer's information systems security office has
developed an information systems security strategy, security
architecture (i.e., overall blueprint), security policies and
directives, and a security awareness training campaign; managed FAA's
incident response center; and implemented a certification and
accreditation process to ensure that vulnerabilities in current and
future air traffic control systems are identified and weaknesses
addressed. Despite these improvements, the office faces continued
challenges in increasing its intrusion detection capabilities,
obtaining accreditation for systems that are already operational, and
managing information systems security throughout the agency. In
addition, according to senior security officials, FAA has completed
assessments of the physical security of its staffed facilities, but has
not yet accredited all of these air traffic control facilities as
secure in compliance with agency policy. Finally, in the area of
personnel security, FAA has worked aggressively over the past 2 years
to complete background investigations on numerous contractor employees.
However, ensuring that all new contractors are assessed to determine
which employees require background checks and that those checks are
completed in a timely manner will be a continuing challenge for the
agency. While FAA has made progress in each of these areas, more
remains to be done to better ensure that critical information systems
are not at risk of intrusion and attack.
National security standards for surface transportation. Standards
define the level of security that is needed and the safeguards that
should be in place to meet identified needs. Adequate standards,
consistently applied, are important to ensure that operators improve
their security practices in modes where lax security could make surface
transportation facilities attractive targets for terrorists. New
security standards are being developed in some modes and are being
considered in other modes. New port security standards are being
developed in areas such as preventing unauthorized persons from
accessing sensitive areas, detecting and intercepting intrusions,
checking backgrounds of those whose jobs require access to port
facilities, and screening travelers and other visitors to port
facilities. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, enacted
November 25, 2002, in fact, requires that port security standards for
access controls, background checks, and vessel and facility security
plans be developed by the Secretary of the department where the Coast
Guard is operating. The act also directs the Secretary of the
department where the Coast Guard is operating to develop performance
standards for seals and locks on shipping containers. In addition, in
the last session of Congress, legislation was proposed that would
require the department to prescribe standards for pipeline security
programs and approve or disapprove each pipeline operator's program on
the basis of their adherence to these standards.[Footnote 25] However,
industry representatives have told us that they prefer a nonregulatory
approach, citing concerns about the need for flexibility in designing
security programs suitable for each pipeline facility.
While progress has been made in developing security standards,
challenges remain in implementing them. There is little precedent for
how to enforce standards because the size, complexity, and diversity of
surface transportation facilities do not lend themselves to an
enforcement approach similar to the one adopted for airports after
September 11. Perhaps most importantly, implementing standards is
difficult because it requires consensus and compromises on the part of
stakeholders. To the degree that some stakeholders believe that
security actions are unnecessary or conflict with other goals and
interests, achieving consensus about what to do will be difficult.
Improving Mobility and Economic Growth through Intermodal and Modal
Approaches:
Ensuring that the nation's transportation system improves mobility and
supports economic growth are vital departmental goals that influence
our quality of life.[Footnote 26] Today, changing passenger and freight
travel needs and expectations are redefining what is needed to meet
these goals. Pervasive problems, such as congestion and inadequate
capacity in both the air and surface transportation systems, also are
making it increasingly difficult to improve mobility and economic
growth, as we reported in May 1999, October 2001, and August 2002. (See
table 1.) Moreover, budget constraints at all levels of government are
expected to reduce the resources that are available for transportation
solutions.
Table 1: Changing Transportation Needs:
Key change: Increasing travel demand; Elements of change: All modes
face surging travel demand by passengers, freight shippers, and the
military. Time lost to congestion delays is estimated from
$75 billion to $100 billion annually. Demand will continue to grow. By
calendar year 2020, the U.S. population is projected to grow by
50 million to 60 million people and 60 million to 70 million more
vehicles will be using the nation's transportation network..
Key change: Increasing; expectations; Elements of change: For the $8
trillion freight industry, efficient connections between modes and
efficient travel in each mode are essential to the competitive position
of U.S. products in global markets. For the public, better and more
reliable transportation services are expected..
Key change: Increasing intermodal travel; Elements of change:
Passengers and freight have more diverse mobility needs that
increasingly involve moving across modes--highways to airports, ports
to railroads, transit to highways--and through connections between
modes. Trip timeliness, cost, quality, and safety are becoming more
relevant than which mode is used..
[End of table]
Source: Congressional Research Service, Transportation Board, and
others.
Note: GAO's analysis of its reports on mobility and growth topics and
reports from the Congressional Research Service, Transportation
Research Board, and others.
Congestion has emerged as a prime yardstick of the immense pressure on
the nation's transportation system, as we reported in August 2002 and
in December 2001.[Footnote 27] Congestion has led to longer, less
predictable trips that translate into lost productivity, higher fuel
costs, and frustration. (See fig. 5.) Moreover, congestion and capacity
problems are expected to worsen in the future. We recommended that the
department develop a blueprint for effectively addressing capacity
issues in its strategic planning for airspace capacity--a
recommendation that remains open.
* The difficulty in moving freight efficiently and safely between the
highway system and ports, rail, airports, and truck terminals has long
been a major freight problem. Over the next 20 years, freight volumes
are expected to increase by about 70 percent. This suggests that
freight infrastructure--already straining to accommodate today's
volumes--will be pushed to the breaking point and generate more
gridlock. However, funds for connectors have been limited and might not
be a priority for local governments or for highway capital improvements
that tend to be passenger-oriented.
* For passengers, travel on roads is expected to increase by about
25 percent from 2000 through 2010. Furthermore, poor connections also
are a significant barrier to moving between cars, buses, trains, and
other means of transit. In many areas, infrastructure that could serve
as multimodal transfer points--passenger rail terminals, for example--
have been abandoned or demolished.
Figure 5: Congestion on Our Nation's Highways Reduces Mobility and
Results in Lost Productivity and Growth Opportunities:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
[End of figure] - graphic text:
In this increasingly complex environment, it is much less likely that
mobility and economic growth can be enhanced if major modes--air,
highway, transit, rail, and water--are not connected, no matter how
well each mode functions. Yet, intermodal connections, such as
multimodal passenger terminals and roads that link freight terminals
and major highways, are among the transportation system's weakest
links. The department's challenge is to leverage all of its
transportation resources--both intermodal and modal--to deal with these
problems and their increasingly ominous impacts on mobility and
economic growth.
Intermodal Planning and Investments Are Vital to Promoting Mobility and
Economic Growth:
Whether and how efficiently people and products move between modes has
become crucial to mobility and economic growth. (See fig. 6.)
Connections between modes now can mean success or failure for a
region's transportation network and economy. As we reported in May 1999
and October 2001, aligning transportation with changing needs is
vital.[Footnote 28] An intermodal approach can give passengers and
freight shippers more choices, greater convenience, and reduced costs
by making it possible for them to use whatever mode is best suited to
each portion of their trip. To deliver these potential benefits, an
intermodal planning and investment approach emphasizes coordinating
transportation policy and decisionmaking, connecting transportation
modes, and allowing passengers and freight to reach their destinations
efficiently through the use of multiple modes of transportation, if
necessary. An intermodal approach connotes a transportation system that
is more than the sum of its modal parts.
Figure 6: Intermodal Connections Are Crucial for Continued Growth and
Competitiveness in a Global Economy:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
[End of figure] - graphic text:
As early as March 1978, and again in July 1987, November 1988, December
1989, and August 2002, we reported that an intermodal approach was
vital to match the nation's modal infrastructure with its diverse
transportation needs. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991 made developing an intermodal transportation system that
connects all transportation modes a national policy. This policy goal
was reaffirmed in 1998 with the enactment of the Transportation Equity
Act for the 21ST Century.
The department is in a unique position to advocate an intermodal
approach to meet mobility and economic growth needs by encouraging
consensus and action by stakeholders inside and outside the department.
Yet, the reality is that the department's modally based funding and
organization limits its ability to promote intermodalism. Adopting an
intermodal approach will require addressing a number of fundamental
issues. (See table 2.) A key issue is ensuring that federal policies
support intermodal needs. Other issues include dealing with
institutional barriers--a critical transportation issue in 2002,
according to the Transportation Research Board--and matching funding to
intermodal needs. An intermodal approach also focuses on supporting
federal research that improves transportation stakeholders' ability to
plan and make cross-modal investment decisions.
Table 2: Intermodal Issues and Key Considerations:
Issues: Policies; Key considerations: Ensuring that federal policies
support intermodalism.
Issues: Strategies; Key considerations: Capturing the strengths of each
mode in a national intermodal system.
Issues: Priorities; Key considerations: Identifying critical actions to
promote intermodal passenger and freight transportation, relevant
performance measures, and methods for achieving measurable progress.
Issues: Institutional support; Key considerations: Agreeing on roles
and responsibilities for public and private stakeholders at all levels;
identifying institutional barriers to intermodal action--including the
department's modal structure--and tactics to minimize their impacts;
supporting entities that can promote intermodal planning and
investment.
Issues: Funding; Key considerations: Increasing federal and state
funding/flexibility for intermodal connectors--seen as the weakest
links in the transportation system--and supporting innovative public
and private partnerships and financing.
Issues: Research; Key considerations: Supporting research that can be
applied in making decisions about intermodal passenger and freight
policies, planning, investing, and technologies. Research also is
needed to explore interactions between passenger and freight travel.
Issues: Regulations; Key considerations: Streamlining federal
requirements for state and local planning and decisionmaking.
Issues: Safety standards; Key considerations: Identifying safety
standards needed for intermodal transportation.
[End of table]
Source: Congressional Research Service, Transportation Board, and
others.
Note: GAO's analysis of its reports on mobility and growth topics and
reports from the Congressional Research Service, Transportation
Research Board, and other sources.
Currently, the department is taking actions to promote intermodalism.
It expects to support intermodal financing, connectors, systems
management, and new technologies as Congress reauthorizes surface
transportation legislation. It also is developing a dialogue with the
freight industry, since there is considerable need for better public
sector understanding of freight and its needs. The Intelligent
Transportation System program is helping to improve intermodal
operations by using information and communication technology to
expedite shipments and improve safety and security. In addition, modal
agencies--such as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)--have assumed responsibility for
advocating intermodal passenger and freight programs with state,
regional, and local transportation agencies and with other agencies in
the department.
Intercity Passenger Rail Poses Critical Policy Decisions:
Amtrak's financial condition and ability to provide quality intercity
passenger rail service has been tenuous since it began operations in
1971. It was on the brink of having to shut down in 2002. While Amtrak
meets several of the criteria for designation as one of our high risk
areas, we have not done so because it is a private corporation, albeit
with significant federal funding.[Footnote 29] Amtrak's intractable
financial condition makes a congressional decision on intercity
passenger rail's future paramount, as we reported in April
2002.[Footnote 30] This decision poses significant mobility issues--if
and how intercity passenger rail fits into the nation's transportation
system and the appropriate balance between needed federal investments
and other competing national priorities.
As we also reported in April 2002, there is considerable agreement that
passenger rail's mission, funding, and approach of providing service
through Amtrak needs to be changed. Intercity passenger rail has the
potential to produce transportation benefits--more in some markets than
others--as projected increases in intercity passenger travel occur.
Currently, over half of Amtrak's 23 million passengers are in the
Washington, D.C., to Boston corridor. Where intercity passenger rail is
time and price competitive, it could potentially help reduce highway
and air travel congestion, pollution, energy dependence, and improve
safety. Nevertheless, federal development and operating support will be
needed.
The department has the opportunity to support a congressional decision
by providing a framework for determining the appropriate role and level
of investment for intercity passenger rail. This framework would help
establish clear, nonconflicting goals for federal support, government-
private sector roles, funding approaches that reward results and
accountability, and strategies that address stakeholders' interests and
limit unintended consequences. Although the department has developed
five general reform principles as its vision for the future, a more
detailed framework will be essential.
Addressing the Effects of Aviation Industry Consolidation and Reduced
Service to Small Communities:
Airline industry competition and service have mobility and economic
consequences for consumers, as we reported in October 2002.[Footnote
31] Airlines' restructuring and consolidation--whether through
marketing alliances among or mergers between carriers in the wake of
financial pressures--will significantly affect the industry's
competitive landscape. Consumers have fewer travel options and
generally face higher fares when carriers reduce the number of flights,
reduce aircraft size, or drop markets altogether. As we reported in
February and March 2001, industry consolidation also raises critical
public policy issues, such as greater potential barriers to carriers
that want to enter markets, less competition in key markets, and
greater risk of travel disruptions as a result of labor
disputes.[Footnote 32]
Small communities face higher fares and reduced service as airlines
continue to reduce their market presence. These actions will increase
pressure on the primary federal program that assists the smallest
communities, the Essential Air Service program. The number of
communities that qualify for subsidized service under this program has
grown over the last year, and there are clear indications that this
number and the program's costs will continue to grow. Federal awards
under the program have increased from just over $40 million in 1999 to
an estimated $97 million in fiscal year 2002. As carriers continue to
drop service in some markets, more communities will become eligible for
Essential Air Service funding, an issue that Congress and the
department will have to confront.
Current and Planned Commitments Could Constrain Future Spending for New
Mass Transit Projects:
FTA's New Starts program provides a large share of capital investment
in urban mass transportation systems, and demand for these funds is
extremely high. However, as we reported in June 2002, FTA is likely to
end the current authorization period with significantly limited ability
to fund future transit projects. This situation could occur if the
program is reauthorized at the currently authorized level of $6.1
billion because FTA (1) needs over $3 billion after 2003 for projects
that it has already approved and (2) will likely need $2.8 billion in
the next 2 years for five projects that it is close to approving for a
grant agreement.[Footnote 33] Limited funding for this program could
mean an even more competitive environment for future projects seeking
approval and funding. Although the administration has proposed to fund
more future projects by limiting federal funds to less than 80 percent
of a single project, the effect of such a reduction is unclear. A
federal funding limit would, in part, reflect a pattern that has
emerged in the program--few projects are asking for the maximum 80
percent federal share and many have already significantly increased the
local share to be competitive under the New Starts program. Local
transit officials also may modify or even terminate projects, be more
aggressive in containing project costs, or search for lower cost
transit options. To facilitate a clearer prioritization of projects
seeking limited funding, we recommended in March 2000 that the
department further prioritize the projects as "highly recommended" and
"recommended" for funding purposes. However, this recommendation has
not been implemented.
Oversight of Federal Highway and Bridge Investments Could Reduce Cost
Growth:
Federal grants to states and local governments for transportation
infrastructure promote mobility and economic growth. FHWA oversees
major highway and bridge projects to help ensure that federal funds are
spent appropriately and costs are contained to maximize transportation
services that are provided by the federal investment. Federal funds
often are used to pay for 80 percent of a project's costs that can
range from several million to several billion dollars.
FHWA's performance continues to be a concern, although it has taken
initiatives to improve its oversight of major projects. FHWA now
requires that projects costing over $1 billion submit annual financial
plans and has introduced greater risk-based oversight into its work.
Despite these initiatives, the department's Inspector General, state
agencies, and we have reported cost growth on large projects. As we
reported in May 2002, cost growth on large highway and bridge projects
intensifies the problem of limited federal and state funds that are
available for transportation.[Footnote 34] While the question of
whether more federal or state level oversight is needed to minimize
project cost growth ultimately is a policy decision, both federal and
state levels need to identify and share strategies to control costs and
improve oversight.
Building Human Capital Strategies:
The department and other federal agencies face a growing human capital
challenge that we have designated as a governmentwide high risk
concern. In addition, this challenge ripples throughout the state and
local transportation agencies that build, maintain, and operate the
vast preponderance of the nation's transportation system. The problem
is similar--finding enough people with the appropriate skills.
Both the department and transportation stakeholders face an impending
shortage of skilled people that threatens to have serious short-and
long-term consequences, according to the department and the
Transportation Research Board. As we have reported, the department's
air traffic control modernization and airport and coastal security
programs face human capital issues that are likely to impair mission
performance. All 50 state departments of transportation have singled
out recruiting and retaining staff as their greatest human resource
issues. The repercussions from these issues are considerable--a
compromised departmental and transportation sector workforce could
seriously impair the U.S. economy, public safety, and mobility. The
Transportation Research Board calls attracting, hiring, and retaining
personnel a critical transportation issue.
Public and private transportation entities are finding it difficult to
hire enough people with the right skills, according to the department
and independent experts. The gap between the skilled workforce and need
is expected to surge, as about 50 percent of the people who plan,
develop, and manage the nation's transportation system will become
eligible to retire in the next 5 years. As these retirements occur,
they will deplete the collective experience, knowledge, and skills of
organizations throughout the transportation sector. The growing demand
for human capital will collide with the reality of fewer people
entering transportation-related fields. Enrollments in such fields as
engineering are declining, creating fierce competition for these and
other technical graduates needed in transportation.
Other factors further complicate the transportation sector's human
capital challenge. Changes in intergovernmental responsibilities for
delivering transportation services, new travel patterns, different
business practices, advances in technology, and changed public
expectations are redefining the competencies and skills that are
needed. Increasingly, transportation will require more diverse,
sophisticated management and technical competencies than ever before.
(See table 3.):
Table 3: Changing Transportation Workforce Competencies:
Competency: Building and sustaining partnerships; Change: Public
agencies, private companies, and nonprofit organizations are partnering
to deliver transportation services.; New skills needed: Managing these
extensive networks and collaborating with diverse stakeholders.
Competency: Developing intermodal; approaches; Change: Transportation
agencies at all levels increasingly will be asked to develop intermodal
connections and solutions to passenger and freight transportation
problems as envisioned by the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 and the Transportation Equity Act for the 21[ST]
Century (1998) to connect travel modes to promote transportation system
integration.; New skills needed: Broad transportation knowledge,
financing expertise, and technical competence in applying complex
analytic tools--especially in freight planning.
Competency: Managing contractors; Change: Public agencies are using the
private sector to meet their growing workloads. For example, state
agencies' full-time employment has decreased about 5 percent as their
budgets increased over 50 percent in the past decade.; New skills
needed: Contract management.
Competency: Incorporating; technologies; Change: Information and
communications technologies are revolutionizing transportation.; New
skills needed: Strategic technology investing and incorporating
technology into operations.
Competency: Responding to public concerns; Change: The public
increasingly expects transportation decisions to consider concerns
about land use, air and water quality, and historic preservation.; New
skills needed: Public participation and communication.
[End of table]
Source: DOT and State transportation agencies.
Note: GAO's analysis of information from the department and state
transportation agencies.
The Department's Challenge: A Strategic Approach to Human Capital
Issues:
A consistent strategic approach to marshaling, managing, and
maintaining human capital is essential to deal with the human capital
shortfalls that are eroding many federal agencies' ability to perform
their missions, as we have reported.[Footnote 35] However, the
department faces persistent human capital problems that put its ability
to accomplish its own missions and performance at risk throughout the
department and key agencies such as FAA, TSA, and the Coast Guard. Its
human capital plan, published in September 2002, acknowledges that
accomplishing the department's missions depends on a strategic approach
to human capital and highlights workforce planning to meet its most
formidable organizational and management challenges. Although a number
of milestones have been met since workforce planning began in fiscal
year 1999, the plan provides limited information about how future
milestones will be accomplished. Other human capital initiatives also
are under way. For example, FHWA has taken the first steps in creating
a senior executive performance management system that holds managers
accountable for contributing to organizational results.
The National Challenge: A Collaborative Approach to Workforce
Development:
A nationwide shortfall in human capital with the requisite skills to
meet transportation's changing needs calls for a national response. The
department's leadership and active involvement are essential to
coordinate a strategic response by promoting:
* agreement among high-level stakeholders on successful performance by
transportation agencies and the competencies these agencies will need
to achieve this performance and:
* information sharing on best practices, lessons learned, human capital
research, and benchmarking against other industries and countries that
face issues related to an aging workforce.
To its credit, the department has taken several steps to address this
challenge confronting the transportation sector. For example, FHWA's:
Office of Professional Development recently organized the first
National Transportation Workforce Summit in Washington, D.C., for
representatives of state and local transportation agencies, the
transportation industry, and academic experts. The department's Deputy
Secretary and administrators of FTA, FHWA, the Research and Special
Projects Administration, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration participated. The summit focused on three critical
concerns: making a sustained commitment to attract people to
transportation careers, investing in employee skills development, and
institutionalizing workforce development initiatives. A committee of
attendees is expected to continue addressing these issues. FHWA also is
working with major national and state transportation organizations and
independent experts to identify human capital needs and innovative ways
to meet them.
Enhancing the Management of FAA and Coast Guard Acquisitions:
Aging and obsolete equipment has limited FAA's and the Coast Guard's
abilities to achieve their safety and security missions. In response,
FAA and the Coast Guard are undertaking costly, complex, and long-term
programs to modernize and replace aging equipment, putting them at
greater risk for significant schedule delays and cost increases.
Because of the size, complexity, cost, and problem-plagued past of
FAA's program designed to acquire systems needed to modernize air
traffic control, we designated it as high risk in 1995. FAA's air
traffic control modernization program remains at high risk in 2003.
Because of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent need
for a variety of security improvements that were neither planned nor
budgeted for, FAA and the Coast Guard have had to re-evaluate their
acquisition plans. As greater emphasis is placed on security, important
questions exist about how to move forward with acquisition projects and
at what pace.
FAA's Air Traffic Control Modernization:
Faced with rapidly growing air traffic and aging equipment, FAA
initiated an ambitious effort in 1981 to modernize air traffic control.
This modernization involved the acquisition of new air traffic control
facilities, as well as a vast network of radar, navigation, automated
data processing, and communications equipment. However, this
modernization effort has experienced cost overruns, schedule delays,
and performance shortfalls. Originally, FAA had planned to complete its
modernization in 10 years at a cost of $12 billion. Now, two decades
and $35 billion later, FAA estimates that modernization efforts are
still far from complete and that it will need nearly $16 billion more
through fiscal year 2007 to complete key projects, including the
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS), the Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS), and the Next-Generation Air/Ground
Communications System (NEXCOM). (All amounts are in nominal dollars.)
These projects continue to face challenges that might affect FAA's
ability to meet cost, schedule, and/or performance expectations. (See
table 4.):
Table 4: Selected Air Traffic Control Modernization Acquisition
Projects:
: : Estimated: [Empty]; : : Estimated: [Empty]; : : Estimated: [Empty].
Project: Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS),
designed to replace aging displays and processing systems used by air
traffic controllers; [Empty]; Estimated: cost: Original: $940 million;
Estimated: Current: $1.33 billion; [Empty]; Projected deployment
schedule: Original: Start: 1998;; Finish: 2005; Projected deployment
schedule: [Empty]; Projected deployment schedule: Current: Start:
2002;; Finish: 2005; [Empty]; FAA's latest cost and schedule for STARS
is based on deployment to 74 facilities as opposed to the original 172
facilities. In September 2002, we found that FAA's schedule for
deploying STARS to a large facility presents challenges in terms of
completing efforts to test the system, resolve problems, and train all
employees on the new system.[A].
Project: Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), designed to provide
satellite-based navigation for airspace users; [Empty]; Estimated:
cost: Original: $892 million; Estimated: Current: $2.9 billion;
[Empty]; Projected deployment schedule: Original: Start: 1998; Finish:
2001; Projected deployment schedule: [Empty]; Projected deployment
schedule: Current: Start: 2003;; Finish: to be determined; [Empty];
Integrity concerns have plagued WAAS' development. While the agency has
made progress in resolving these concerns, FAA must decide whether to
stop WAAS development in 2003 or continue to refine the technology to
provide an approach capability with greater precision..
Project: Next-Generation Air/Ground Communications (NEXCOM), designed
to replace existing communications systems and provide additional voice
channels; [Empty]; Estimated: cost: Original: $986 million (1[ST]
segment only); Estimated: Current: $986 million (1[ST]; segment only);
[Empty]; Projected deployment schedule: Original: Finish: 2009;
Projected deployment schedule: [Empty]; Projected deployment schedule:
Current: Finish: 2013; [Empty]; FAA is only in the early stages of
making a final decision to select the technology for NEXCOM and still
needs to address three major issues: (1) whether the preferred
technology is technically sound and will operate as intended, (2) if
the preferred technology and equipment it requires can be certified as
safe for use in the National Airspace System, and (3) whether it is
cost effective for users and the agency..
[End of table]
Source: FAA.
Notes: Dollars are nominal.
GAO analysis of the department's data.
[A] U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Status of
FAA's Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System, GAO-02-1071
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2002).
Since 1995, we have made over 30 recommendations to address the root
causes of FAA's modernization problems. Although FAA has made progress
in addressing these root causes, more remains to be done. For example:
Improve immature software capabilities. FAA developed an integrated
framework for improving its software acquisition, software development,
and systems engineering processes. Since our last high-risk update, FAA
has continued to expand the number of system development projects that
use this integrated framework. However, FAA still does not require all
systems to achieve a minimum level of progress within the framework
before being funded.
Need for a complete and enforced systems architecture. FAA has
developed a systems architecture, or overall blueprint, which clarifies
interdependencies and interrelationships among national airspace
systems and the technical standards to which systems must comply. In
November 2000, the Office of Management and Budget instructed agencies
to base investments in information technology on enterprise
architectures, which define (in both business and technology terms) how
an entity operates today and how it wants to operate in the future,
including a roadmap for transitioning to this future operational state.
In February 2002, we reported that FAA's enterprise architecture is at
a moderate level of maturity--that is, the agency has begun developing
architecture products such as policies and concepts, but has not yet
completed the architecture products or leveraged the architecture for
managing change.[Footnote 36]
Improve cost estimating and cost accounting practices. To improve cost
estimates, FAA developed a standard work breakdown structure and
established an historical database for tracking systems' estimated
costs and other information. Further, since our last high-risk update,
FAA has made significant progress in implementing its cost accounting
system. However, the agency has not yet fully instituted rigorous cost
estimating practices. That is, FAA is not yet incorporating actual
costs from related system development efforts in its processes for
estimating the costs of new projects.
Strengthen investment management processes. To improve its investment
management processes, FAA is now overseeing investment risks and
capturing key information from the investment selection process in a
management information system. Also, since our last high-risk update,
FAA has developed guidance for validating costs, benefits, and risks
and expects to finalize this guidance by early 2003. However, FAA has
not yet implemented processes for evaluating projects after
implementation in order to identify lessons learned and improve the
investment management process.
Change organizational culture. FAA issued an organizational culture
framework in 1997 and is working to implement it. However, in 2000, the
department's Inspector General reported that FAA's culture remains a
barrier to successful acquisition projects and that integrated teams, a
key mechanism to deliver more cost-effective and timely products, are
not working well because FAA's culture continues to operate in vertical
"stovepipes," which conflict with the horizontal structure of team
operations. In fact, our 2000 report on WAAS confirmed that the
integrated teams were not working as intended.[Footnote 37] We found
that competing priorities between two key organizations that are part
of WAAS' integrated team negated the effectiveness of the team's
approach for meeting the agency's goals for the system.
Clearly, FAA has undertaken numerous improvements to enhance its
ability to manage the air traffic control modernization, but its reform
efforts are not yet complete and thus remain at high risk. In the
meantime, major projects continue to face challenges that could affect
their cost, schedule, and performance. We will continue to evaluate
FAA's progress on selected system acquisition efforts.
The Coast Guard's Deepwater Project:
The Deepwater Capability Replacement Project involves replacing or
modernizing over 90 ships and 200 aircraft that are approaching the end
of their useful lives and are critical to missions that occur 50 miles
or more offshore ("deepwater"). These missions include search and
rescue activities and interdiction of illegal aliens and drugs. The
Coast Guard is addressing many of the concerns we reported in our 2001
Performance and Accountability Series report, but uncertainties still
exist in key areas such as (1) attaining stable, sustained funding; (2)
controlling costs, especially in the contract's later years; (3)
ensuring that procedures and personnel are in place for managing and
overseeing the contractor; and (4) minimizing potential problems using
unproven technology.
Stable, sustained funding. In 2002, the Coast Guard awarded a
$17 billion contract to a Lockheed-Northrop Grumman team, using
projections of sustained funding of $500 million a year (in 1998
dollars) over the next 2 to 3 decades to develop the Integrated
Deepwater System. However, the Office of Management and Budget
estimates a possible cumulative funding shortfall of about half a
billion dollars for the project's first 5 years. In response to our
concerns[Footnote 38] about the Coast Guard's ability to obtain
sustained funding of $500 million a year, the fiscal year 2002
appropriations act for the department prohibited the obligation and
expenditure of appropriated funds until the department and the Office
of Management and Budget jointly (1) certified that the Coast Guard's
deepwater funding was within the Office of Management and Budget's
projections and (2) approved a contingency procurement strategy for
assets and capabilities envisioned in the deepwater system. The 2002
fiscal year appropriation of $320 million for the deepwater system was
about $18 million below the planned level. The fiscal year 2003
transportation appropriations have not yet been signed into law;
however, the Senate appropriations committee has proposed $480 million
for Deepwater, about $20 million below the budget request and the House
appropriations committee proposed full funding for the $500 million
budget request. The Coast Guard is updating its baseline funding
projections for the deepwater project according to these lower funding
levels. Reductions in funding from amounts planned could result in
reduced operations, increased costs, and/or schedule delays.
Controlling costs. While the Coast Guard's management during the
planning phase of the deepwater project was among the best of the
federal agencies we have evaluated and provides a solid foundation for
the project, the next phase presents considerably tougher management
challenges. The next phase concentrates the responsibility for the
project's success with one systems integrator and its subcontractors
for a period of 20 or more years and starts the Coast Guard on a course
that is likely to be difficult and potentially expensive to alter once
funding has been committed and contracts have been executed. Moreover,
this approach has never been used on a procurement of this size or
complexity, and, as a result, there are no models in the federal
government to guide the Coast Guard in developing its acquisition
strategy. We and others have raised concerns about whether the Coast
Guard's planned contracting approach of relying on a single contracting
team will be able to control costs and still meet performance
requirements in later years in the absence of competition, particularly
since it was adopted without documentation of risks involved or the
degree to which this approach provided better value than other ones. In
response, the Coast Guard developed processes and policies to address
concerns about costs, including establishing prices for deliverables,
negotiating change order terms, and developing incentives. We will
continue to assess the department's actions in this area.
Contractor oversight. While the Coast Guard's overall management and
day-to-day administration of the deepwater contract during the planning
phase has generally been excellent, as the project moves into a
procurement phase that has a smaller scope of work and uses a
contracting approach that is unique and untried, the challenges in
managing and overseeing the contractor will become more difficult. To
address these challenges, the Coast Guard plans to require the systems
integrator to implement many management processes and procedures
according to best practices. Since our May 2001 report, the Coast Guard
has identified management processes and procedures based on best
practices for governance, peer review inside the federal government,
advisory boards outside the federal government, program self-
assessment, risk management, and technology readiness. According to the
Coast Guard, these best practices are assisting it to build out the
21st century Coast Guard using lessons learned, which it is
incorporating in its program management to build partnerships with
industry. While these practices are not yet in place, in May 2002, the
Coast Guard released its Phase 2 Program Management Plan, which
establishes processes to successfully manage, administer, monitor,
evaluate, and report contract performance.
Unproven technology. Our reviews of other acquisitions have shown that
reliance on unproven technology is a frequent contributor to escalated
costs, schedule delays, and compromised performance standards. While
the Coast Guard has successfully identified technologies that are
sufficiently mature, commercially available, and proven in similar
applications for use in the first 7 years of the project, it has had no
structured process to assess and monitor the potential risk of
technologies proposed for use in later years. Specifically, the Coast
Guard has lacked uniform and systematic criteria, such as those used by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to judge the level of
a technology's readiness, maturity, and risk. Such criteria are
important for monitoring continued development of the technologies that
will be used later in the project. However, in response to our 2001
recommendation, the Coast Guard is incorporating the technology
readiness level assessment in the deepwater program's risk management
process. Technology readiness level assessments are to be performed for
technologies identified in the design and proposal preparation and
procurement stages of the deepwater program.
Continuing Progress in Financial Management:
Since our 2001 Performance and Accountability Series report, the
department has made significant progress in addressing financial
accountability weaknesses. In 2001, as in 1999, we designated FAA's
financial management as high risk because of wide-ranging concerns
reported by the department's Inspector General and us, about the
department's ability to prepare accurate, reliable financial
information that its managers could use to make decisions. While the
department has begun installing a new departmentwide general accounting
system and FAA has installed a new interim property system and expects
to complete implementation of its cost accounting system in 2003, it is
too early to predict whether the new systems will completely remedy the
department's and FAA's financial management weaknesses. As a result, we
continue to designate FAA financial management as high risk in 2003.
Eliminating Financial Management Deficiencies Will Require
Successfully Implementing a New General Accounting System:
The department has continued to expand implementation of its new
general accounting system--Delphi--throughout the department.[Footnote
39] This new system is expected to correct many of the financial
management deficiencies that have plagued the department.
Problems with the department's current general accounting system have
been substantial. In its fiscal year 2001 financial statement audit
report, the Inspector General described the current general accounting
system as unable to produce auditable financial statements based on the
information in the system. This meant that the department needed to
make about 850 adjustments outside of its general accounting system
totaling about
$41 billion in order to prepare its financial statements. The need for
extensive adjustments, along with other general financial management
weaknesses, also has led to misstatements in the department's financial
reporting. For example, its fiscal year 2001 financial statements
included net prior period adjustments totaling approximately $2.1
billion. Prior period adjustments are required when financial statement
balances have been materially misstated in previously issued financial
statements. They confirm the existence of severe financial management
accountability problems. Prior period adjustments totaling $5.6 billion
and $330 million, respectively, also were reported in the department's
1999 and 2000 financial statements. Large numbers of adjustments also
mean that the department lacked reliable day-to-day data to make
management decisions and maintain ongoing accountability to the
taxpayers.
The new Delphi accounting system will allow the department and its
modal administrations to accumulate information at the detailed account
level necessary to prepare financial statements and other reports
without the extensive manual intervention presently required. It also
will accumulate costs by program. This presently is not possible, which
prevents the department from linking its costs with performance
information. The system was implemented in seven of the department's
smaller modal administrations by the end of fiscal year 2001. Full
departmentwide and FAA implementation is expected by the end of 2003.
The department also introduced a system module that facilitated the
preparation of its financial statements and related reports starting
with fiscal year 2001. This module automated many financial statement
preparation operations that had been done manually and is designed to
utilize the information provided by the Delphi general accounting
component. The department will realize additional efficiencies when
this component is fully implemented, including the consolidation of
modal administrations' financial information at the department level.
The system also is designed to receive and exchange financial data with
many other systems such as those for FAA's property and cost
accounting.
However, the reliability of the data produced and maintained by the new
systems will be unproven until they are operated in a fully integrated
manner and a subsequent audit of the department's financial statements
occurs. As such, it is too early to predict whether or not these new
systems will meet the department's financial management information
needs.
FAA Property Accountability Requires New Systems to Be Fully
Implemented and Successfully Operated:
FAA implemented its new property system module as a stand-alone interim
system in 2001. This module will be a component of the new Delphi
system when it is implemented by FAA. The property system module is
designed to account for FAA property from acquisition through disposal.
Along with related procedural and control changes, it is expected to
remedy FAA's long-standing inability to properly account for the cost
of its property.
FAA property accountability has been an issue since the Inspector
General's first audit of FAA financial statements in 1994. The
Inspector General and we have reported consistently that FAA lacked the
systems and related procedures to accurately and routinely account for
property that totaled $11.7 billion as of September 30, 2001. FAA
property accountability also has been cited as a material internal
control weakness for many years.
Although the Inspector General issued an unqualified audit opinion on
FAA's financial statements for fiscal year 1999, special FAA and
Inspector General efforts were required to produce this result, since
FAA's systems did not provide reliable data. For fiscal year 2000, when
these significant extra efforts were not made, the Inspector General
qualified its opinion because it was unable to determine the accuracy
of FAA's reported property amounts. In fiscal year 2001, FAA
centralized its accounting for property and implemented an interim
property system. After the Inspector General initially found prior year
property errors totaling $184 million during its audit, FAA hired an
independent certified public accounting firm to perform a complete
property financial audit. The auditors recommended additional
adjustments totaling $138 million. After those adjustments were made,
the Inspector General gave the 2001 FAA financial statements an
unqualified opinion, but continued to cite property accountability as a
material internal control weakness.
FAA expects to convert to its new Delphi system including the property
system and general accounting system modules by the end of 2003. These
systems components, which exchange data, will need to be proven in full
operation. Subsequently, FAA's financial statement audit will provide a
comprehensive test of the ability of these systems to function in the
complex FAA environment. That audit will include an assessment about
the reliability of reported property amounts and the related internal
controls.
More Complete FAA Cost Accounting Information Requires Additional
Systems Implementation:
FAA continues to make substantial progress in developing its cost
accounting information capabilities. It is completing the
implementation of its cost accounting system that it expects to have
fully operational by the end of 2003. This system is intended to
provide reliable information that has been lacking in the past about
the full cost of FAA's projects and services.
FAA's progress in this area is important because a cost accounting
system's objective is to accurately assign basic financial costs--such
as an agency's labor, overhead, and other costs--to program activities
and projects. Accurate cost information is essential for managing FAA's
programs in areas that include budgeting and cost control, determining
cost reimbursements and setting fees and prices, performance
measurement, program evaluations, and choosing among alternative
actions.[Footnote 40] The nature of its activities means that FAA has
many cost information needs. For example, labor and other costs are
incurred in the design, acquisition, and installation of air traffic
control and other systems. Such costs need to be identified and
accounted for as a part of systems acquired instead of being charged to
current operating costs. FAA also needs information about the cost of
services that it provides to the public.
We and others have reported that FAA lacked the systems necessary to
provide cost accounting information. This deficiency limits FAA's and
others' ability to make effective decisions about resource needs and to
adequately control major projects, such as its multibillion-dollar air
traffic control modernization program.
FAA began to implement portions of its cost accounting system in fiscal
year 1997. By the end of fiscal year 2001, FAA had completed the
implementation of its cost accounting system for its Air Traffic
Services, began to track labor cost by project in two FAA
organizations, and started to develop cost/performance models for its
enroute and flight services.[Footnote 41] During 2002, FAA focused on
implementing cost accounting systems in its remaining organizations
such as the Aeronautical Center and Civil Aviation Security and began
to use cost data to support fee and pricing activities. It also made
progress in developing financial measures that focus on cost trends by
service area, analyzing cost anomalies, and using cost per flight as a
financial indicator in relation to operational measures. FAA continues
to add to and enhance the comprehensiveness of its cost systems. For
example, it is integrating additional labor cost data into the system
from various FAA activities. Complete implementation of this system is
expected by the end of 2003.
As is the case with FAA's property system, the reliability of the data
produced and maintained by FAA's new cost accounting system will be
unproven until it is fully implemented and is subsequently subjected to
a financial statement audit.
[End of section]
GAO Contacts:
Subject covered in this report: Improving transportation safety; ;
Transforming transportation security; ; Improving mobility and economic
growth through intermodal and modal approaches; Contact person: John H.
Anderson, Jr., Managing Director; Physical Infrastructure Issues; (202)
512-2834; andersonj@gao.gov.
Subject covered in this report: Building human capital strategies;
Contact person: J.C. Mihm, Director; Strategic Issues; (202) 512-3236;
mihmj@gao.gov; ; Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director; Physical
Infrastructure Issues; (202) 512-2834; dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Subject covered in this report: Enhancing the management of FAA
acquisitions; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; Enhancing the management of Coast Guard
acquisitions; Contact person: Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director;
Physical Infrastructure Issues; (202) 512-2834; dillinghamg@gao.gov; ;
David A. Powner, Acting Director; Information Technology Issues; (202)
512-9286; pownerd@gao.gov; ; JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director; Physical
Infrastructure Issues; (202) 512-2834; heckerj@gao.gov.
Subject covered in this report: Continuing progress in financial
management; Contact person: Linda M. Calbom, Director; Financial
Management and Assurance Issues; (202) 512-9508; calboml@gao.gov.
[End of section]
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26, 2002.
Department of Transportation: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and
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Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000.
Mass Transit: Challenges in Evaluating, Overseeing, and Funding Major
Transit Projects. GAO/T-RCED-00-104. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2000.
Transportation Infrastructure: Better Data Needed to Rate the Nation's
Highway Conditions. GAO/RCED-99-263. Washington, D.C.: September 24,
1999.
Mass Transit: Status of New Starts Transit Projects with Full Funding
Grant Agreements. GAO/RCED-99-240. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 1999.
Aviation Competition: Information on the Department of Transportation's
Proposed Policy. GAO/RCED-99-225. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 1999.
Surface Transportation: Moving Into the 21ST Century. GAO/RCED-99-176.
Washington, D.C.: May 1999.
Human Capital:
A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP.
Washington, D.C.: March 2002.
Coast Guard Workforce Mix: Phased-In Conversion of Some Support Officer
Positions Would Produce Savings. GAO/RCED-00-60. Washington, D.C.:
March 1, 2000.
Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges in Modernizing the Agency.
GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-87. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2000.
Acquisition Management:
National Airspace System: Status of FAA's Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System. GAO-02-1071. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2002.
National Airspace System: FAA's Approach to Its New Communications
System Appears Prudent, but Challenges Remain. GAO-02-710. Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2002.
FAA Alaska: Weak Controls Resulted in Improper and Wasteful Purchases.
GAO-00-606. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2002.
Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond. GAO-
02-538T. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2002.
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks
Remain. GAO-01-564. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.
National Airspace System: Persistent Problems in FAA's New Navigation
System Highlight Need for Periodic Re-evaluation. GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-
130. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2000.
Financial Management:
Transportation Infrastructure: Cost and Oversight Issues on Major
Highway and Bridge Projects. GAO-02-702T. Washington, D.C.: May 1,
2002.
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority: Contracting Practices Do
Not Always Comply with Airport Lease Requirements. GAO-02-36.
Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2002.
Airport Infrastructure: Unresolved Issues Make It Difficult to
Determine the Cost to Serve New Large Aircraft. GAO-02-251. Washington,
D.C.: February 4, 2002.
Department of Transportation: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and
Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-824. Washington, D.C.:
June 22, 2001.
Port Infrastructure: Financing of Navigation Projects at Small and
Medium-Sized Ports. GAO/RCED-00-58. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2000.
Results Act: Information on Performance Goals and Measures Contained in
the Department of Transportation's Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan.
GAO/RCED-00-36, Washington, D.C.: November 15, 1999.
Commercial Maritime Industry: Updated Information on Federal
Assessments. GAO/T-RCED-00-36. Washington, D.C.: November 3, 1999.
[End of section]
Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO-03-95.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Agriculture. GAO-03-96.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce.
GAO-03-97.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense.
GAO-03-98.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education.
GAO-03-99.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy.
GAO-03-100.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and
Human Services. GAO-03-101.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO-03-102.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing
and Urban Development. GAO-03-103.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. GAO-03-104.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice.
GAO-03-105.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor.
GAO-03-106.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State.
GAO-03-107.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation. GAO-03-108.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Treasury. GAO-03-109.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
Affairs. GAO-03-110.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Agency for
International Development. GAO-03-111.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection
Agency. GAO-03-112.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency
Management Agency. GAO-03-113.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. GAO-03-114.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Office of Personnel
Management. GAO-03-115.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business
Administration. GAO-03-116.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration. GAO-03-117.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Postal Service.
GAO-03-118.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.
High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation's Critical Infrastructures. GAO-03-121.
High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-01-241 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2001).
[2] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General,
Progress in Implementing Strategies to Increase the Use of Seat Belts,
MH-2002-109 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2002) and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Motor Vehicle Safety: Comprehensive State Programs
Offer the Best Opportunity for Increasing Use of Safety Belts, GAO/
RCED-96-24 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 1996).
[3] Large trucks are those with a gross weight of more than 10,000
pounds.
[4] Aviation fatalities in 2001 include the 265 persons killed in the
four aircraft hijacked on September 11, 2001, but do not include the
2,801 persons killed at the World Trade Center or 125 persons killed at
the Pentagon.
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: Safer Skies
Initiative Has Taken Steps to Reduce Accident Rates by 2007, GAO/RCED-
00-111 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, General Aviation: Status of the
Industry, Related Infrastructure, and Safety Issues, GAO-01-916
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2001).
[7] Runway incursions are incidents on the runway that create a
collision hazard or result in aircraft being closer than allowed by air
traffic control requirements.
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to
Better Prepare for Impending Wave of Controller Attrition, GAO-02-591
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: FAA's New
Inspection System Offers Promise, but Problems Need to Be Addressed,
GAO/RCED-99-183 (Washington, D.C.:
June 28, 1999).
[10] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Report on the Air Transportation Oversight System: Federal Aviation
Administration, AV-2002-088 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2002).
[11] GAO/RCED-99-183.
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security
Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture,
GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003).
[13] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 amends this requirement.
According to the legislation, if, in his discretion or at the request
of an airport, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
determines that TSA is not able to deploy explosive detection systems
required in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act by December
31, 2002, then for each airport for which the Under Secretary makes
this determination, the Under Secretary shall submit to specific
congressional committees a detailed plan for the deployment of the
number of explosive detection systems at that airport necessary to meet
the requirements as soon as practicable at that airport but no later
than December 31, 2003; the Under Secretary shall take all necessary
action to ensure that alternative means of screening all checked
baggage are implemented until the requirements have been met.
[14] Explosive detection machines are used to screen baggage for
explosives and work by using CAT scan X-ray to take fundamental
measurements of materials in bags to recognize characteristic
signatures of threat explosives. Explosive trace detection systems
(trace detection machines) are used to screen baggage for explosives
and work by detecting vapors and residues of explosives.
[15] Freight forwarders consolidate shipments and deliver them to air
carriers and cargo facilities of passenger and all-cargo air carriers.
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities
and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air
Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's Enforcement Approach, GAO-03-22
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003).
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces
Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002).
[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation
Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-
02-971T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002).
[20] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Key Challenges Facing the Transportation Security Administration, CC-
2002-180 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002).
[21] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in
Securing Transit Systems, GAO-02-1075T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2002).
[22] GAO-02-1075T.
[23] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Progress in Implementing Provisions of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, CC-2002-203 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 7, 2002).
[24] To assist agencies in managing their human capital more
strategically, we have developed a model of strategic human capital
management that identifies cornerstones and related critical success
factors that agencies should apply and steps they can take. See U.S.
General Accounting Office, A Model of Human Capital Management, GAO-02-
373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
[25] Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety
Act, H.R. 3609, 107th Congress (2001).
[26] The department's performance plan for fiscal year 2003 and
performance report for fiscal year 2001 defines mobility as shaping an
accessible, affordable, reliable transportation system for all people,
goods, and regions and economic growth as supporting a transportation
system that sustains America's economic growth.
[27] U.S. General Accounting Office, Surface and Maritime
Transportation: Developing Strategies for Enhancing Mobility--A
National Challenge, GAO-02-775 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2002) and
National Airspace System: Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed Despite
Recent Reduction in Flight Delays, GAO-02-185 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
14, 2001).
[28] U.S. General Accounting Office, Surface Transportation: Moving
Into the 21ST Century, GAO/RCED-99-176 (Washington, D.C.: May 1999) and
Physical Infrastructure: Crosscutting Issues Planning Conference
Report, GAO-02-139 (Washington, D.C.: October 2001).
[29] From fiscal years 1998 through 2002, the federal government has
provided $1 billion per year on average to Amtrak to help meet the
railroad's capital and operating needs. The federal government also has
an ownership interest of over $17 billion in preferred stock and
cumulative unpaid dividends. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Intercity Passenger Rail: Potential Financial Issues in the Event That
Amtrak Undergoes Liquidation, GAO-02-871 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20,
2002).
[30] U.S. General Accounting Office, Intercity Passenger Rail: Congress
Faces Critical Decisions in Developing a National Policy, GAO-02-522T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).
[31] U.S. General Accounting Office, Commercial Aviation: Financial
Condition and Industry Responses Affect Competition, GAO-03-171T
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002).
[32] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Competition: Regional Jet
Service Yet to Reach Many Small Communities, GAO-01-344 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 14, 2001) and Aviation Competition: Challenges in Enhancing
Competition in Dominated Markets, GAO-01-518T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
13, 2001).
[33] According to FTA, as of early January 2003, none of these projects
have been approved.
[34] U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Infrastructure:
Cost and Oversight Issues on Major Highway and Bridge Projects, GAO-02-
702T (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2002).
[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management: Exposure Draft, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2002) and High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2001).
[36] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Enterprise
Architecture Use Across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO-02-
6 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2002).
[37] U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System:
Persistent Problems in FAA's New Navigation System Highlight Need for
Periodic Reevaluation, GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-130 (Washington, D.C.: June
12, 2000).
[38] U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Progress Being Made
on Deepwater Project, but Risks Remain, GAO-01-564 (Washington, D.C.:
May 21, 2001).
[39] Delphi consists of a number of integrated components, including
modules for general accounting and property.
[40] The Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 4,
Managerial Cost Accounting Standards, July 31, 1995, describes these
five areas for which cost information is essential in managing
government programs.
[41] Air Traffic Services is the FAA office responsible for operating
and maintaining the national airspace system.
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