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entitled 'Federal Reserve System: The Surplus Account' which was 
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Report to Congressional Requesters:



September 2002:



Federal Reserve System:



The Surplus Account:



GAO-02-939:



Contents: 



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



The Federal Reserve System Maintains a Capital Surplus Account to 

Cushion Against Losses:



Several Foreign Central Banks Maintain Accounts That Function Much Like 

the Federal Reserve Surplus Account:



Reserve Banks Occasionally Have Used Funds from Their Surplus Accounts 

to Absorb Losses:



Reducing the Surplus Account Provides One-Time Increase in Federal 

Receipts but Yields No New Resources for the Federal Government:



Conclusions:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



Appendix II: Comments from the Federal Reserve Board: 



Tables :



Table 1: Summary of “Surplus” Accounts Held at the European Central 

Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the Bundesbank:



Table 2: Eleven Reserve Banks’ Use of Surplus Account from 1989 to 
2001:



Abbreviations:



CBO: Congressional Budget Office:



ECB: European Central Bank:



FRBM: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis:



OMB: Office of Management and Budget:



Letter:



September 18, 2002:



The Honorable Byron Dorgan

The Honorable Harry Reid

United States Senate:



Our 1996 report to you[Footnote 1] recommended that the Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) review 

its policies regarding the size of the Federal Reserve Banks’ combined 

capital surplus account and determine if opportunities exist to 

decrease the amount held in the account. The consolidated capital 

surplus account is the aggregate of separate surplus accounts held at 

each of the 12 Reserve Banks, and the account represents cumulative 

retained net earnings for the Reserve Banks--that is, cumulative net 

earnings not paid to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). 

According to Board publications, the purpose of the surplus account, a 

capital account, is to ensure that adequate capital is available to 

absorb possible losses, such as losses in its foreign currency holdings 

when the dollar appreciates against foreign currencies. Since our 1996 

report, the surplus account has grown from $4.5 billion to $7.3 billion 

as of December 31, 2001.



The Federal Reserve System includes the Board of Governors, a federal 

agency, and 12 district banks (Reserve Banks) that are federally 

chartered corporations. The Reserve Banks fund their operations 

primarily through earnings on the Reserve Banks’ portfolios of Treasury 

securities. The bulk of Reserve Banks assets are in outright holdings 

of Treasury securities. As of December 31, 2001, these assets accounted 

for about 84 percent of Reserve Banks’ assets.



The Reserve Banks use earnings to pay operational expenses and 

dividends to member banks and to fund their capital surplus accounts. 

By practice, the Reserve Banks transfer excess net earnings averaging 

about $500 million to the Treasury weekly, usually every Wednesday. In 

2001, these transfers amounted to more than $27 billion. However, the 

amount and timing of the Reserve Banks’ payments to the Treasury are 

not regulated by law. The Federal Reserve Board has discretion over the 

amounts the Federal Reserve System transfers to the Treasury.



Each of the 12 Reserve Banks maintains two capital accounts--a paid-in 

capital account and a surplus account. The paid-in capital account 

represents the contributions by member banks of the Federal Reserve 

System. Under the Federal Reserve Act, members of the Federal Reserve 

System, which include state-chartered banks that apply for and have 

been granted membership and all national banks, must subscribe to the 

stock of their respective Reserve Bank. The subscription is 6 percent 

of each member bank’s capital and surplus. Half of the subscription 

amount is paid by the member banks to the Reserve Banks--and is 

reflected in the Reserve Banks’ paid-in capital--and half is on call by 

the Federal Reserve Board.[Footnote 2] The Reserve Banks’ paid-in 

capital changes frequently because member banks’ capital changes. 

Dividends paid by the Reserve Banks to the member banks are set by law 

at the rate of 6 percent on paid-in capital stock.



The Reserve Banks’ second capital account is the capital surplus 

account. According to Federal Reserve Board policy, this account is to 

be maintained at a level equal to the paid-in capital. The capital 

surplus account is funded from the Reserve Banks’ earnings after 

operating expenses and dividends are paid. In 2001, the value of the 

capital surplus account was just over 1 percent of the total assets of 

the 12 Reserve Banks. The capital surplus account is adjusted annually 

so that the target level is equal to the amount in the paid-in capital 

account at the time of the adjustment.



As agreed with your offices, the objectives of this report are to 

describe (1) the Federal Reserve Board’s rationale for maintaining the 

capital surplus account, (2) policies and practices of selected foreign 

central banks regarding accounts that serve similar functions, (3) the 

frequency and level of use by the Federal Reserve Banks of their 

surplus accounts from 1989 to 2001, and (4) the potential effects of 

reducing the capital surplus account on the federal budget and the 

economy.



To address these objectives, we interviewed officials from the Federal 

Reserve Board, the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB); we also spoke with officials from the Congressional Budget 

Office (CBO). We obtained information on the Bank of Canada, the Bank 

of England, the Bundesbank (Germany’s central bank), and the European 

Central Bank (ECB). We also analyzed Board data on the weekly losses 

that the 12 Reserve Banks incurred from 1989 through 2001 to determine 

the extent to which the Reserve Banks needed to draw down their capital 

surplus accounts. Our scope and methodology is discussed in more detail 

in appendix I. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., between April 

2002 and August 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards.



Results in Brief:



The Reserve Banks use their capital surplus accounts to act as a 

cushion to absorb losses. The Financial Accounting Manual for Federal 

Reserve Banks says that the primary purpose of the surplus account is 

to provide capital to supplement paid-in capital for use in the event 

of loss. Federal Reserve Board officials noted that the capital surplus 

account absorbs losses that a Reserve Bank may experience, for example, 

when its foreign currency holdings are revalued downward. Federal 

Reserve Board officials noted, however, that it could be argued that 

any central bank, including the Federal Reserve System, may not need to 

hold capital to absorb losses, mainly because a central bank can create 

additional domestic currency to meet any obligation denominated in that 

currency. On the other hand, it can also be argued that maintaining 

capital, including the surplus account, provides an assurance of a 

central bank’s strength and stability to investors and holders of its 

currency, including those abroad. The growth in the Reserve Banks’ 

capital surplus accounts can be attributed to growth in the size of the 

banking system together with the Federal Reserve Board’s policy of 

equating the amount in the surplus account with the amount in the paid-

in capital account. The level of the Federal Reserve capital surplus 

account is not based on any quantitative assessment of potential 

financial risk associated with the Federal Reserve System’s assets or 

liabilities. According to Federal Reserve officials, the current policy 

of setting levels of surplus through a formula reduces the potential 

for any misperception that the surplus is manipulated to serve some 

ulterior purpose. In response to our 1996 recommendation that the 

Federal Reserve Board review its policies regarding the capital surplus 

account, it conducted an internal study that did not lead to major 

changes in policy.



Selected major foreign central banks maintain accounts with functions 

similar to the Federal Reserve System’s capital surplus account. 

Although their accounts are not fully comparable with the Federal 

Reserve System capital surplus account, the Bank of England, the 

Bundesbank, and the ECB have capital surplus or reserve accounts in 

addition to their paid-in capital accounts that are used as cushions 

against loss. The Bank of Canada does not require an account to buffer 

the impact of foreign currency movements because it does not hold a 

significant amount of foreign currency on its balance sheet. According 

to central bank officials, the levels of these accounts were set by law 

for the Bundesbank and the ECB. In the United Kingdom, the level is 

negotiated between the Bank of England and Her Majesty’s Treasury 

(Treasury of the United Kingdom). The Bundesbank and the ECB have 

created additional accounts to cushion against financial risk.



The Federal Reserve System calculates earnings and transfers excess 

earnings to the Treasury on a weekly basis. Although the Federal 

Reserve System has not had an annual operating loss since 1915, the 

Reserve Banks recorded some weekly losses between 1989 through 2001, 

thus temporarily reducing their capital surplus accounts to cover these 

weekly losses.[Footnote 3] Individual Reserve Banks relied on their 

capital surplus accounts at least 158 times during 1989 to 2001 to 

absorb weekly losses, primarily from foreign revaluation losses, but 

the frequency of transferring surplus funds to absorb losses declined 

during this time frame.[Footnote 4] Although numerous factors can 

influence a Reserve Bank’s net earnings, in most cases, according to 

Federal Reserve Board officials, these losses can be attributed to 

increases in the U.S. dollar’s foreign currency value, leading to lower 

values for the Reserve Banks’ holdings of foreign currency. Until 2001, 

the Federal Reserve System recognized foreign currency revaluations at 

month’s end, a process that at times led to large downward revaluations 

of foreign currency assets that would exceed the Reserve Banks’ 

earnings for that week, resulting in a weekly loss. The capital surplus 

accounts were generally replenished from subsequent earnings. According 

to Federal Reserve Board officials, the Federal Reserve System now 

revalues its foreign currency holdings on a daily basis rather than a 

monthly basis. They note that daily revaluations, which began in July 

2001, generally lead to smaller revaluation losses than do monthly 

revaluations.



Reducing the Federal Reserve System capital surplus account would 

create a one-time increase in federal receipts, but the transfer by 

itself would have no significant long-term effect on the budget or the 

economy. Amounts transferred to the Treasury from reducing the capital 

surplus account would be treated as a receipt under federal budget 

accounting but do not produce new resources for the federal government 

as a whole. Absent offsetting policy changes, the one-time transfer 

would reduce the federal budget deficit or increase the budget surplus 

at the time of the transfer, and federal debt held by the public 

likewise would decrease by the amount transferred. In turn, federal 

interest outlays on debt held by the public would be lower in 

subsequent periods. However, Reserve Banks’ earnings payments to the 

Treasury also would be lower in subsequent periods because the Federal 

Reserve would hold a smaller portfolio after the transfer. Over time, 

lower receipts from Federal Reserve earnings would approximately offset 

the lower interest payments to the public.



Background:



As previously noted, the capital surplus account is adjusted to a level 

equal to the paid-in capital account. This adjustment, however, is made 

at the end of the calendar year. During the year, another capital 

account, undistributed net income, reflects the amount of net earnings 

for the current year that have not been distributed. Each week, the sum 

of the balance in the capital surplus account and undistributed net 

income is compared with the paid-in capital account. If the amount of 

the capital surplus account and undistributed net income combined is 

greater than capital paid-in, the excess is paid to the Treasury a week 

later.[Footnote 5] This payment in turn reduces the undistributed net 

income account. At the end of the calendar year, the balance in the 

undistributed net income is transferred to the capital surplus account 

up to the amount of paid-in capital. Any remaining balance is 

distributed to the Treasury.



Essentially, the capital surplus account represents earnings retained 

from prior years, and the undistributed net income represents earnings 

retained from the current year. Both the capital surplus account and 

the undistributed net income account provide a cushion against losses. 

Any Reserve Bank losses first reduce the undistributed net income 

account. The capital surplus account is then reduced if the 

undistributed net income account is not sufficient to absorb the loss.



Transfers of the Reserve Banks’ net earnings to the Treasury are 

classified as federal receipts. Federal receipts consist mostly of 

individual and corporate income taxes and social insurance taxes but 

also include excise taxes, compulsory user charges, customs duties, 

court fines, certain license fees, and the Federal Reserve System’s 

deposit of earnings.



The Treasury securities held by Reserve Banks are considered part of 

the federal debt held by the public. Federal debt consists of 

securities issued by the Treasury and a relatively small amount issued 

by a limited number of federal agencies. Federal debt is categorized 

into debt held by the public and debt held by government accounts. Debt 

held by the public is that part of the gross federal debt held outside 

of federal budget accounts, and this includes any federal debt held by 

individuals, corporations, state or local governments, the Federal 

Reserve System, and foreign governments and central banks.



The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000[Footnote 6] directed the 

Reserve Banks to transfer to the Treasury additional surplus funds of 

$3.752 billion during fiscal year 2000. The Federal Reserve System 

transferred the funds on May 10, 2000. Under the act, the Reserve Banks 

were not permitted to replenish their accounts during fiscal year 2000. 

Once the Reserve Banks were legally permitted to replenish the 

accounts, they did. By December 31, 2000, the capital surplus account 

was replenished for 11 of the 12 Reserve Banks.



The Federal Reserve System Maintains a Capital Surplus Account to 

Cushion Against Losses:



The Federal Reserve System maintains a capital surplus account to 

provide additional capital to cushion against potential losses. 

However, Federal Reserve Board officials have noted that it can be 

argued that a central bank, including the Federal Reserve System, may 

not need to hold capital to absorb losses, mainly because a central 

bank can create additional domestic currency to meet any obligation 

denominated in that currency. Federal Reserve Board officials 

acknowledged that determining the appropriate level of a central bank’s 

capital account is difficult. The Federal Reserve Board’s policy of 

maintaining the capital surplus account at the same level as that of 

the paid-in capital account has resulted in the capital surplus account 

growing from $4.5 billion in 1996 to $7.3 billion in 2001.[Footnote 7]



The Federal Reserve System maintains the capital surplus account 

primarily as a cushion against losses. The Financial Accounting Manual 

for Federal Reserve Banks states that the primary purpose of the 

Federal Reserve capital surplus account is to provide capital to 

supplement paid-in capital for use in the event of loss. According to 

Board officials, the capital surplus reduces the probability that total 

Reserve Bank capital would be wiped out by a loss as a result of dollar 

appreciation, sales of Treasury securities below par value, losses 

associated with discount window lending, or any other losses. 

Individual Reserve Banks use the capital surplus account when they 

experience losses greater than the amount in their undistributed net 

income account.



Federal Reserve Board officials also noted that it could be argued that 

maintaining capital, including the surplus account, provides an 

assurance of a central bank’s strength and stability to investors and 

foreign holders of U.S. currency. Currently, a significant portion of 

U.S. currency is held abroad. According to one estimate published by 

the Federal Reserve Board, $279.5 billion in U.S. currency was held 

overseas as of the fourth quarter of 2001. The total amount of Federal 

Reserve notes outstanding was $611.8 billion as of December 31, 2001. 

Federal Reserve Board officials stated that the demand for U.S. 

currency conceivably could fall if a large loss wiped out the Federal 

Reserve’s capital accounts, giving a misimpression that the Federal 

Reserve was insolvent.



Federal Reserve Board officials have acknowledged publicly the argument 

that a central bank may not need capital to absorb losses because a 

central bank can always meet its obligations in its own currency. We 

found no widely accepted, analytically based criteria to show whether a 

central bank needs capital as a cushion against losses or how the level 

of such an account should be determined. In May 3, 2000, congressional 

testimony, then Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence H. Meyer stated 

the following:



“In the abstract, a central bank with the nation’s currency franchise 

does not need to hold capital. In the private sector, a firm’s capital 

helps to protect creditors from credit losses. Creditors of central 

banks however are at no risk of a loss because the central bank can 

always create additional currency to meet any obligation denominated in 

that currency.”[Footnote 8]



Moreover, an official representing one of the four foreign central 

banks that we contacted agreed that the concept of solvency was 

essentially meaningless for a central bank in its role as a creator of 

currency, and that a massive loss could make a central bank technically 

insolvent, but that there would be no impairment of its ability to 

create and manage assets and issue currency. However, Federal Reserve 

Board officials told us that, because the maintenance of the capital 

surplus account is “costless” to the taxpayer and to the Treasury, the 

argument that a central bank does not need capital is not a rationale 

for reducing the surplus to any particular level, including zero. We 

will discuss the possible effects of a change in the surplus account on 

the federal budget and the economy later in this report.



Federal Reserve Board officials told us that determining the 

appropriate level for a central bank’s capital account is difficult. 

The growth in the Federal Reserve System’s capital surplus account can 

be attributed to growth in the banking system together with the Federal 

Reserve Board policy of equating the amount in the capital surplus 

account with paid-in capital. The Federal Reserve System surplus has 

grown along with the paid-in capital account which itself grew as a 

result of expansion of the banking industry capital during the late 

1990s. In 1996, the capital of all member banks (state member banks and 

national banks) totaled almost $157 billion; by December 2001, it was 

$267 billion. Because the Federal Reserve Act requires members to 

subscribe to a stock subscription equaling 6 percent of their capital 

and surplus, half of which is to be paid in, the Reserve Banks’ capital 

paid-in accounts have increased along with member bank capital and 

surplus. As a result of the Federal Reserve Board’s policy, the Federal 

Reserve capital surplus account grew correspondingly. The level of the 

Federal Reserve capital surplus account is not based on any 

quantitative assessment of the potential financial risk associated with 

the Federal Reserve’s assets or liabilities. According to a Federal 

Reserve Board official, the current policy of setting the levels of 

surplus through a formula reduces the potential for any misperception 

that the surplus is manipulated to serve some ulterior purpose. In 

response to our 1996 recommendation that the Federal Reserve Board 

review its policies regarding the surplus account, the Federal Reserve 

Board conducted an internal study that did not lead to major changes in 

policy.



Several Foreign Central Banks Maintain Accounts That Function Much Like 

the Federal Reserve Surplus Account:



Three of the four central banks that we contacted had capital accounts 

that included ownership shares as well as “surplus” accounts with 

functions similar to the Federal Reserve System capital surplus account 

(see table 1). We found the levels of these accounts varied in size 

and, with the exception of the Bank of England, officials from the four 

central banks explained that the levels were established by law. The 

Bundesbank and the ECB had also established additional “provision” 

accounts that were not part of the subscribed capital[Footnote 9] or 

surplus accounts, but that served as an additional cushion against 

losses. The provision accounts were set up primarily to offset the 

central banks’ exposure to foreign exchange rate and interest rate risk 

and their levels are evaluated on an annual basis. In contrast to these 

central banks, the Bank of Canada does not require an additional 

account to buffer the impact of foreign exchange rate and interest rate 

movements on their assets because it does not hold a significant amount 

of assets denominated in currencies other than the Canadian dollar on 

its balance sheet. Similarly, its domestic assets holdings of Canadian 

government securities are diversified across maturities, approximately 

mirroring the issuance of Canadian government securities. It should be 

noted that accounts at the four central banks that we contacted are not 

fully comparable with the Federal Reserve System capital surplus 

account because of differences in accounting practices.



Table 1: Summary of “Surplus” Accounts Held at the European Central 

Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the Bundesbank:



Central bank: The European Central Bank; Arrangement: The “general 

reserve fund” surplus account was set up in accordance with the ECB 

statute and is funded through retained net earnings each year within 

legally prescribed limits..



Central bank: The Bank of England; Arrangement: The Bank of England’s 

surplus account is the portion of retained earnings that the Bank of 

England keeps every year after it transfers a predetermined amount to 

the Treasury. Her Majesty’s Treasury and the Bank of England negotiate 

a 5-year plan to determine the amount that is transferred each year to 

the Her Majesty’s Treasury. The Bank of England establishes its posttax 

profit (loss), pays over to the Exchequer the share agreed with the 

Treasury beforehand, and retains the remainder in its capital reserve..



Central bank: The Bundesbank; Arrangement: Bundesbank officials told us 

that, in addition to the paid-in capital and the statutory reserves, a 

“provisions” account was created in accordance with Section 26 (2) of 

the Bundesbank Act for the “creation of liability items for general 

risks associated with domestic and foreign business.”.



Central bank: The Bank of Canada; Arrangement: Bank of Canada officials 

told us that they do not have a surplus account because foreign 

currency accounts for only about 1 percent of the Bank of Canada’s 

assets. As a fiscal agent for the Canadian government, the bank manages 

the government’s foreign currency reserves but does not keep a 

significant amount of foreign reserve holdings on its books..



Source: Central bank officials and documents.



[End of table]



The Bundesbank and the ECB use accounting methods that differ from the 

Federal Reserve’s to cushion against foreign currency risk and have set 

up “revaluation accounts” representing valuation reserves arising from 

unrealized gains on assets and liabilities, including foreign currency. 

The levels of these accounts vary automatically in accordance with 

regular market valuations of the assets held compared to their original 

cost.[Footnote 10]



The Bundesbank, bearing especially the foreign exchange risk in mind, 

has established a “provisions” account. When determining how much to 

put into this account, the Bundesbank evaluates its exposure to foreign 

exchange risk and interest rate risk, to the extent of which these 

risks are not already covered by the “revaluation account.” In addition 

to the “provisions” account, the Bundesbank also has a “statutory 

reserves” account that serves as an additional financial buffer against 

risk. This reserve account may be used only to offset falls in value 

and to cover other losses. It is derived from the net profit each year 

and has a maximum level established by legislation.



The levels of capital that the central banks maintain are not directly 

comparable with the Federal Reserve’s capital (including the surplus 

account) for several reasons. First, as previously described, there are 

differences in the accounting systems among the central banks. The 

Bundesbank and the ECB, for instance, use accounts that are not part of 

capital to serve as a cushion against loss. Additionally, when 

determining the levels of the “provisions” account, the Bundesbank and 

the ECB evaluated their exposure to exchange rate and interest rate 

risk. The Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, in contrast, do not 

face significant foreign exchange rate exposure in their accounts.



Reserve Banks Occasionally Have Used Funds from Their Surplus Accounts 

to Absorb Losses:



The Federal Reserve System has not had an annual operating loss since 

1915. From 1989 to 2001, the Reserve Banks incurred some weekly losses 

in which their weekly earnings were not sufficient to absorb the 

losses. The individual Reserve Banks drew on their capital surplus 

accounts at least 158 times to absorb weekly losses during the years of 

1989 to 2001.[Footnote 11] The frequency of transferring surplus funds 

to absorb losses declined during the years from 1998 and 2001. Although 

numerous factors can influence a Reserve Bank’s net earnings, it 

appears that most of the weekly losses incurred by the Reserve Banks 

can be attributed to foreign currency revaluation. Federal Reserve 

Board officials noted that since the Reserve Banks began revaluing the 

Federal Reserve System’s foreign currency holdings on a daily basis 

rather than a monthly basis in July 2001, they expect the size of these 

revaluations will be reduced.



Reserve Bank Earnings Were Not Sufficient to Absorb All of the Reserve 

Bank Weekly Losses:



The individual Reserve Banks transferred funds occasionally from their 

capital surplus accounts to absorb losses from 1989 through 2001. On 

the basis of Federal Reserve Board data, 11 of the 12 Reserve Banks 

reported a total of 352 weeks in which earnings were less than expenses 

and losses. (The 352 weeks were out of 7,337 possible occurrences 

during the approximately 13 years of data at the 11 Reserve Banks.) The 

individual Reserve Banks transferred from the capital surplus accounts 

cumulatively 158 times, when the weekly loss was greater than the 

amount in the undistributed net income account. For the other 194 

weekly losses, the undistributed net income was sufficient to absorb 

the losses.



The amount and frequency of the weekly losses incurred and the use of 

the capital surplus accounts varied across Reserve Banks. The Reserve 

Banks did not incur losses at the same frequency or magnitude because 

their portfolios of Treasury securities and foreign currency were not 

proportional across Reserve Banks. The size of a Reserve Bank’s 

Treasury securities portfolios is driven largely by the value of 

Federal Reserve notes issued by the Reserve Bank,[Footnote 12] but the 

size of its foreign currency portfolio is determined by the prior 

years’ capital and surplus account levels. Four of 11 Reserve Banks 

(Atlanta, Dallas, Kansas City, and Philadelphia) had to transfer funds 

from their surplus accounts to cover more than 50 percent of their 

weekly losses (see table 2). The remaining 7 Reserve Banks transferred 

capital surplus funds that ranged from 26 percent to 46 percent of 

their weekly losses.



Table 2: Eleven Reserve Banks’ Use of Surplus Account from 1989 to 

2001:



Reserve bank: Boston; Number of surplus transfers: 5; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 26.3%; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): $47.3; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 49%.



Reserve bank: New York; Number of surplus transfers: 6; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 33.3; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 344.6; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 52.



Reserve bank: Philadelphia; Number of surplus transfers: 21; Percentage 

of their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 61.8; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 107.0; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 93.



Reserve bank: Cleveland; Number of surplus transfers: 11; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 34.4; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 75.3; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 60.



Reserve bank: Richmond; Number of surplus transfers: 18; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 40.0; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 183.0; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 52.



Reserve bank: Atlanta; Number of surplus transfers: 21; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 51.2; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 216.7; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 88.



Reserve bank: Chicago; Number of surplus transfers: 13; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 46.4; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 201.2; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 67.



Reserve bank: St. Louis; Number of surplus transfers: 7; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 36.8; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 43.9; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 69.



Reserve bank: Kansas City; Number of surplus transfers: 17; Percentage 

of their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 50; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 66.0; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 45.



Reserve bank: Dallas; Number of surplus transfers: 24; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 55.8; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): 167.5; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: 91.



Reserve bank: San Francisco; Number of surplus transfers: 15; 

Percentage of their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: 38.5; 

Maximum single surplus withdrawal (millions): 258.6; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal as a percentage of the total surplus: 82.



Reserve bank: Total; Number of surplus transfers: 158; Percentage of 

their weekly losses requiring surplus funds: N/A; Maximum single 

surplus withdrawal (millions): N/A; Maximum single surplus withdrawal 

as a percentage of the total surplus: N/A.



Note: This table does not include the Federal Reserve Bank of 

Minneapolis.



Source: Federal Reserve Board. :



[End of table]



The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (FRBM) is not included in the 

table because, as explained below, the structure of its assets and 

liabilities differed significantly from that of the other Reserve Banks 

over the period surrounding the century date change and its results 

would bias the overall results. If the FRBM’s capital surplus transfers 

were included, the frequency would increase to 207 times. From May 2000 

to December 2001, FRBM drew down its surplus account 24 times to absorb 

its weekly losses, compared with only 25 times for the entire previous 

11-year period (from Apr. 5, 1989, through Mar. 1, 2000). FRBM’s 

surplus has not been fully restored to a level at which its value 

equates with its paid-in capital, and it has not made a payment to the 

Treasury since the statutorily mandated surplus transfer by the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 was completed in May 2000.



The Federal Reserve Board staff provided us with two reasons for this 

condition. First, FRBM’s share of earnings was lower than that for the 

average Reserve Bank compared with its share of the $3.752 billion 

transfer in May 2000. According to a Federal Reserve Board official, 

FRBM’s lower earnings resulted from its relatively small share of the 

System Open Market Account[Footnote 13] compared with the other 11 

Reserve Banks. For Year 2000 contingency purposes, FRBM stored a large 

amount of currency for the other Reserve Banks. FRBM was selected 

because its bank building had a large cash vault. To obtain currency to 

store for the other Reserve Banks, FRBM had to purchase higher level of 

currency from the other Reserve Banks. FRBM essentially purchased this 

currency by reducing its share of the System Open Market Account. 

Secondly, increases in FRBM’s capital paid-in account due to mergers 

and acquisitions by its member banks increased the amount of capital 

surplus needed to match the value of its paid-in capital. Federal 

Reserve Board staff expect that FRBM will resume weekly payments to the 

Treasury in late 2002 or early 2003.



During the period from 1989 to 2001, none of the Reserve Banks, 

including FRBM, entirely depleted their surplus accounts. Thus, the 

paid-in capital accounts were never needed to cushion any of the weekly 

losses the Reserve Banks incurred. After 1997, the frequency of capital 

surplus transfers by the Reserve Banks was considerably lower. From 

1998 to 2001, the Federal Reserve System, excluding FRBM, averaged 

almost 5 surplus transfers annually compared with the period from 1989 

to 1997, when the Federal Reserve System averaged over 15 surplus 

transfers annually. In 2001, the individual Reserve Banks, excluding 

FRBM, withdrew from their capital surplus account a total of eight 

times for a cumulative total of $292.4 million, almost 4.1 percent of 

the Federal Reserve System’s capital surplus account.



Revaluation of Foreign Currency Assets Appears to Be a Primary Reason 

for the Reserve Banks’ Losses:



It appears that most of the weekly losses, which drew on the capital 

surplus account, resulted from revaluation of foreign currency assets. 

Federal Reserve Board officials told us that, in reviewing the data for 

the losses, they could not recall or identify reasons other than 

foreign currency revaluation as the primary reason for the weekly 

losses. Although the Federal Reserve System’s asset portfolio is 

predominantly Treasury securities, it does include foreign currency 

holdings. As of December 31, 2001, the Federal Reserve’s foreign 

currency holdings were equivalent to $7.3 billion of euros, $7.2 

billion of yen, and $65.6 million of interest receivables. When the 

dollar appreciates against a foreign currency, the value of the foreign 

currency holdings declines in dollar terms, and the Reserve Banks may 

incur a loss. According to Federal Reserve officials, such losses are 

the primary reason that Reserve Banks have drawn on their capital 

surplus accounts. Federal Reserve Board data on the Reserve Banks’ 

weekly losses that occurred since 1997 also suggested that the losses 

resulted from downward revaluation of foreign currency assets.



Although none of the Reserve Banks’ capital surplus accounts were ever 

entirely depleted, all of the capital surplus accounts were 

significantly reduced by one particular foreign currency loss. During 

the week of April 3, 1991, every Reserve Bank, including FRBM, 

recognized a loss that drew down their capital surplus accounts, 

reducing the Federal Reserve System’s capital surplus by $1.67 billion. 

This loss represented almost a 67 percent reduction in the Federal 

Reserve System’s capital surplus account. As of December 31, 1991, the 

capital surplus account totaled $2.65 billion. For 10 of 12 Reserve 

Banks, the reductions in capital surplus that week were the largest 

incurred for the 12-year period.[Footnote 14] The reductions that week 

ranged from 49 percent to 93 percent of the respective Reserve Banks’ 

capital surpluses. The Reserve Banks of Dallas and Philadelphia needed 

to withdraw 91 percent and 93 percent of their capital surplus 

accounts, respectively, to absorb the size of the loss. According to a 

Federal Reserve Board official, the huge net weekly loss was caused by 

a sharp appreciation of the U.S. dollar near the conclusion of the Gulf 

War.



Weekly losses resulting from revaluation of foreign currency holdings 

may occur less frequently in the future because of a recent change in 

Federal Reserve System’s procedures that resulted from the Federal 

Reserve Board study that was conducted following our 1996 report. The 

Reserve Banks now revalue their foreign currency holdings on a daily 

basis rather than a monthly basis, and Federal Reserve Board staff told 

us that they expect daily basis revaluations, which began in July 2001, 

will lessen the volatility of these revaluations. Under the previous 

arrangement, the earnings of the week during which the revaluation 

occurred had to absorb any revaluation loss that had built up during 

the month since the previous revaluation, often leading to losses 

during that week. Daily revaluations generally lead to smaller 

revaluation losses than revaluing on a monthly basis, according to 

Federal Reserve Board officials, making it less likely that they will 

exceed weekly earnings.



Reducing the Surplus Account Provides One-Time Increase in Federal 

Receipts but Yields No New Resources for the Federal Government:



Reducing the Federal Reserve surplus account would create a one-time 

increase in federal government receipts, thereby reducing the budget 

deficit (or increasing the federal budget surplus) at the time of the 

transfer. Because the Federal Reserve System is not included in the 

federal budget, a Reserve Bank transfer to the Treasury is recorded as 

a receipt under current budget accounting.[Footnote 15] This move would 

reduce future Reserve Banks’ earnings and in turn reduce their 

transfers to the Treasury in subsequent periods. Since the one-time 

transfer from the Federal Reserve System also increases Treasury’s cash 

balance over time, the Treasury would sell fewer securities to the 

public and thus pay less interest to the public. Over time, the lower 

interest payments to the public approximately offset the lower receipts 

from Federal Reserve earnings.



After the temporary capital surplus reduction in 2000, transfers of 

Reserve Bank net earnings to the Treasury were lower as the Reserve 

Banks replenished their capital surplus accounts. However, a permanent 

capital surplus reduction would also reduce future Reserve Bank 

earnings because the Reserve Banks would hold a smaller portfolio of 

securities. Since reducing the surplus does not produce new resources 

for the government, however, there would not be significant economic 

effects from its reduction.



While a Reserve Bank transfer to Treasury is recorded as a receipt to 

the government, such transfers do not produce new resources for the 

federal government as a whole. As the nation’s central bank, the 

Federal Reserve System carries out government functions, conducting 

monetary policy and promoting the stability of the U.S. financial 

system. As the Federal Reserve System describes itself, “…it is 

‘independent within the government.’ It is not outside the government.” 

The Federal Reserve System’s holdings, including the capital surplus 

account, may enhance the ability of the Federal Reserve System to 

perform these and other government functions. Reducing the capital 

surplus account and transferring to the Treasury would not move 

resources from private purposes to government purposes. Thus, the 

transfer, by itself, would have no significant long-term economic 

effects. CBO similarly concluded:



“…the transfer of surplus funds from the Federal Reserve to the 

Treasury has no import for the fiscal status of the Federal government… 

Where the funds reside has no economic significance. Hence, any 

transfer of the Federal Reserve surplus fund to the Treasury would have 

no effect on national savings, economic growth, or income.”[Footnote 

16] [Emphasis in original.]



Permanently reducing the Federal Reserve System’s capital surplus 

account would yield a one-time increase in federal receipts, under 

budget accounting; the transfer would have no net budgetary effect in 

subsequent years. Both OMB and Treasury officials told us that reducing 

the capital surplus account would cause the Reserve Banks to sell some 

of their Treasury securities portfolio. This move would reduce Reserve 

Bank earnings and, in turn, reduce payments to the Treasury in 

subsequent periods. This reduction in future transfers to the Treasury 

would occur even if the Reserve Banks were not allowed to replenish 

their capital surplus accounts.



As a hypothetical example, suppose that the Federal Reserve System were 

to reduce permanently its surplus account by $1 billion, and, to 

simplify the example, that it did so by selling $1 billion in Treasury 

securities at the end of a fiscal year and transferring the proceeds to 

the Treasury. This one-time transfer would increase federal revenues by 

$1 billion and, assuming no changes in fiscal policy, reduce that 

year’s deficit by $1 billion. With a smaller portfolio, the Reserve 

Banks’ annual earnings on their Treasury securities would decline by 

about $43 million, on the basis of the August 2002 interest rate on 

newly issued 10-year notes. As a result, the Federal Reserve’s annual 

payments to the Treasury would also decline by about $43 million for 

each of the next 10 years. This $43 million, however, is approximately 

offset by a decrease in interest that Treasury must pay.



Receipt of the $1 billion permits Treasury to sell less debt to the 

public. Continuing the hypothetical example, if the Treasury were to 

use the $1 billion to reduce its issuance of 10-year notes, its 

borrowing costs would decrease by $43 million. Treasury’s continued 

outlays for interest on the $1 billion of securities that the Federal 

Reserve System sold would thus be approximately offset by the interest 

expense that Treasury no longer would incur in selling the new 

securities. OMB staff explained that it would be impossible to quantify 

the exact budgetary effect of permanently reducing the capital surplus 

account, since the securities that the Federal Reserve System would 

sell to reduce the surplus account would not necessarily have the same 

interest rate as those that Treasury would no longer sell, nor the same 

interest rate as Treasury receives on its operating accounts held at 

the Federal Reserve System.



In a provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 

1993,[Footnote 17] Congress directed for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 

that the amount in the surplus account of any Reserve Bank in excess of 

the amount equal to 3 percent of the total paid-in capital and surplus 

of its member banks should be transferred to the Treasury. Moreover, 

the act required that the surplus accounts be reduced an additional 

$106 million in fiscal year 1997 and $107 million in fiscal year 1998 

and that the amounts be transferred to Treasury. These transfers were 

made on October 1, 1997, and 1998, respectively. Also, under the act, 

the Reserve Banks were not permitted to replenish the surplus for these 

amounts during fiscal years 1997 and 1998.[Footnote 18] As of December 

31, 1998, the capital surplus account and the paid-in capital account 

were equal. Although the act did not specifically state the purpose of 

those transfers, its effect was to reduce the federal government’s 

deficit in those years.



The capital surplus transfer mandated by the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2000 resulted in a one-time increase in reported 

federal receipts but was clearly offset by lower Reserve Bank net 

earnings payments to the Treasury in the subsequent fiscal year. One 

reason for this is that the 2000 surplus reduction was temporary: the 

act prohibited the Reserve Banks from replenishing their surplus funds 

by the amounts they transferred in that fiscal year but did not 

prohibit subsequent replenishment. As previously stated, the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act directed the Reserve Banks to transfer 

to the Treasury surplus funds of $3.752 billion during fiscal year 

2000. Under the act, the Reserve Banks were not permitted to replenish 

the capital surplus amounts transferred during fiscal year 2000. 

Because the Federal Reserve Board has discretion over how much it 

transfers to the Treasury, the Reserve Banks began replenishing the 

accounts as soon as they were legally allowed to in October 2000. To 

replenish the capital surplus accounts, the Reserve Banks ceased 

payments of their net earnings to the Treasury until the capital 

surplus accounts were replenished. In November 2000, CBO reported that 

receipts from the Federal Reserve System were $1 billion lower in 

October 2000 than they had been in October 1999 because the Federal 

Reserve System had temporarily stopped its weekly payments to the 

Treasury. Moreover, CBO noted that the Reserve Banks were replenishing 

their capital surplus accounts from earnings that would otherwise be 

paid to the Treasury and were not likely to resume their weekly 

payments until December 2000 or possibly later. Federal Reserve Board 

data on the replenishment of the Reserve Bank surplus accounts 

indicated that the Reserve Banks of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Kansas 

City, and Philadelphia did not transfer any earnings to Treasury for as 

long as 5 to 6 weeks.



Any reduction in the capital surplus account would not have a 

significant effect on Treasury’s financial management, according to 

Treasury officials. First, the capital surplus account represents a 

small fraction of the total federal budget. The capital surplus account 

was $7.3 billion as of December 31, 2001, while total federal outlays 

during fiscal 2001 totaled $1,863.9 billion; thus the capital surplus 

account was less than 1/10 of 1 percent of outlays. These officials 

observed that the capital surplus account balance represented a small 

percentage of the total amount of Treasury securities outstanding in a 

year. As of June 30, 2002, the total amount of Treasury securities 

outstanding was $6,126.5 billion. Finally, these officials noted that 

while the surplus account would be significant relative to Treasury’s 

cash balances, these balances vary considerably on a monthly basis. 

While Treasury monthly cash balances averaged about $24 billion in 

fiscal 2001, for instance, average monthly balances ranged from $12.1 

billion to $43.2 billion.[Footnote 19]



Conclusions:



The Federal Reserve System maintains the surplus account to absorb 

losses. Since 1989, most of the weekly losses that resulted in using 

the capital surplus account were apparently due to monthly revaluation 

of the Federal Reserve System’s holdings of foreign currencies. In most 

cases, the capital surplus account was replenished soon after absorbing 

the loss, and no Reserve Bank ever completely depleted its capital 

surplus account.



Since 2001, however, the Federal Reserve System has begun recognizing 

gains or losses on its foreign currency holdings on a daily basis 

rather than a monthly basis. This change should lessen the use of the 

capital surplus account. The surplus account has grown substantially 

since 1996, reflecting the growth in the member banks’ capital and 

therefore their paid-in capital, which the Federal Reserve System uses 

as the basis for determining the targeted value of the surplus account.



Reducing the surplus account, however, would provide only a one-time 

increase in measured federal government receipts, reflecting a transfer 

from Reserve Banks to the Treasury. There would not be a significant 

economic effect from reducing the surplus account.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Federal 

Reserve Board, OMB, and the Treasury. The Federal Reserve Board’s 

comments are reprinted in appendix II. The Federal Reserve Board said 

that it generally agreed with the information in and conclusions of the 

report. The Federal Reserve Board also noted that it had separately 

provided technical corrections; we have incorporated these corrections 

where appropriate. OMB and the Treasury declined comment, although 

their staffs provided technical corrections that we have incorporated. 

We also obtained and incorporated technical corrections on a draft of 

this report from CBO.



As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 

from its issuance date. At that time, we will send copies of this 

report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate 

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House 

Committee on Financial Services. We will also send copies to the 

Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 

Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Congressional Budget 

Office, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We 

will make copies available to others on request. In addition, this 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://

www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me or James McDermott, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-8678. 

Other key contributors to this report were Nancy Eibeck and Josie Sigl.



Thomas J. McCool

Managing Director, Financial Markets and

   Community Investment:



Signed by Thomas J. McCool:



[End of section]



Appendixes:







Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



To describe the Federal Reserve System’s rationale for maintaining a 

capital surplus account and to understand the capital accounts held at 

the Reserve Banks, we interviewed Federal Reserve Board officials 

primarily from the Division of Monetary Affairs and the Division of 

Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems. We reviewed and analyzed 

sections of the Federal Reserve Act pertaining to the paid-in capital 

and surplus transfers and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000. 

We also reviewed the financial statements of the Reserve Banks from 

1996 to 2001.



To review the policies and practices of foreign central banks regarding 

accounts that serve similar functions as the capital surplus account, 

we judgmentally selected four central banks: the Bank of Canada, the 

Bank of England, the Bundesbank, and the European Central Bank. To 

verify our interpretation of their published reports, legal 

requirements, and financial statements, we contacted members of the 

staffs of the Bank of England and Her Majesty’s Treasury (Treasury of 

the United Kingdom), the Bank of Canada, the Bundesbank, and the 

European Central Bank. We collected and reviewed annual financial 

statements from the four central banks for the years from 1996 to 2001 

to compare/contrast capital and surplus accounts, and asset and 

liability structures. The comparability of these data with the Federal 

Reserve Board is limited, however, due to differences in accounting 

practices.



To describe the Reserve Banks’ use of the capital surplus account from 

1989 to 2001, we analyzed historical data on weekly losses for all 12 

Reserve Banks. These data included the net income or loss of the prior 

Wednesday, the amount of weekly loss, the amount of the Treasury 

payment, the amount of surplus withdrawn, the amount in the 

undistributed net income, and the amount in the surplus before and 

after the weekly loss. Federal Reserve Board staff collected the data 

from the 12 Reserve Banks’ balance sheet information. We did not audit 

Reserve Bank accounting from which the data on the weekly losses were 

derived. Also, we did not review any weeks during the time period that 

the Reserve Bank revenues and gains for a week were greater than the 

expenses. The data we reviewed were for those weeks when the expenses 

and losses were greater than the revenues and gains for each of the 12 

Reserve Banks. The data are limited on the identification of the cause 

of the weekly losses incurred by the Reserve Banks. Federal Reserve 

Board staff confirmed the cause for only those weekly losses that 

occurred during the time period of 1997 to 2001.



We also analyzed the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s 

Annual Reports from 1996 to 2001 to determine the trend in both the 

capital surplus and the paid-in capital accounts. To determine the 

reason for the growth in the paid-in capital accounts, we reviewed 

Federal Reserve Board data on the aggregate member bank capital and 

surplus from 1996 to 2001. According to Federal Reserve Board staff, 

the aggregate data provided us were drawn from bank call reports.



To describe and determine the potential effects of reducing or 

eliminating the surplus account on the federal budget and the economy, 

we interviewed officials from the Federal Reserve Board, the Department 

of the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, and the 

Congressional Budget Office (CBO). We reviewed the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-113, Section 302). We also 

reviewed reports from CBO on the Reserve Banks’ transfers of net 

earnings to the Treasury.



We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., between April 2002 and 

August 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Comments from the Federal Reserve Board:



BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:



WASHINGTON, D. C. 20551:



DIVISION OF MONETARY AFFAIRS:



September 9, 2002:



Mr. Thomas J. McCool:



Managing Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment:



United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C.



Dear Mr. McCool:



Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the GAO’s draft report 

Federal Reserve System: Issues Related to the Surplus Account. The 

report makes clear that, while the benefits of the surplus account can 

be debated, it is costless to the taxpayer and the Treasury. We 

appreciate the efforts of your staff in responding to our earlier 

comments.



Sincerely,



Vincent R. Reinhart, Director:



Signed by Vincent R. Reinhart: 



[End of figure]



FOOTNOTES:



[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Reserve: Current and Future 

Challenges Require Systemwide Attention, GAO/GGD-96-128 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 17, 1996).



[2] Ownership of Reserve Bank stock does not carry the usual rights of 

control and financial interest ordinarily associated with being a 

shareholder in a private-sector corporation.



[3] A weekly loss is defined as a week in which the Reserve Bank 

expenses and losses are greater than the revenues and gains. The 

Federal Reserve Board data we analyzed did not include the weeks in 

which the revenues and gains for a week were greater than the expenses 

and any losses.



[4] These 158 weekly losses were out of 7,337 possible occurrences 

during the approximately 13 years of weekly data for the 11 Reserve 

Banks included in this analysis. The analysis and number of weekly 

losses do not include the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis because 

it would skew the overall total. The Federal Reserve Bank of 

Minneapolis, which will be discussed in greater detail later in the 

report, had a lower level of earnings relative to its capital than the 

other Reserve Banks. The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’s lower 

earnings were the result of its lower level of Treasury securities in 

comparison to its other assets and capital than other Reserve Banks, 

which primarily reflected its purchase and storage of currency issued 

by the other Reserve Banks.



[5] If significant losses over the following week would cause this 

planned payment to Treasury to exceed the undistributed net income, the 

payment amount would be lowered to avoid reducing the capital surplus 

account.



[6] Pub. L. No. 106-113, 13 Stat. 1501A-304 (1999) 12 U.S.C. § 289 (b) 

(2000).



[7] As of September 4, 2002, the paid-in capital account was $8.2 

billion. At the end of the year, the surplus account will be adjusted 

to reflect the growth in the paid-in capital account.



[8] Testimony of Laurence H. Meyer, Board of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House 

of Representatives, May 3, 2000, p. 7.



[9] Capital has broad meaning and may include other accounts.



[10] In practice, these revaluation accounts show unrealized gains. If 

unrealized losses from the previous year exceed the unrealized gains 

registered in the revaluation account at the end of the financial year, 

they are then transferred over to the profit and loss account as an 

expense.



[11] The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, which is not included in 

the total because it would have skewed the overall total, is discussed 

later in this section.



[12] Federal Reserve notes outstanding are considered a liability of 

the Reserve Banks. The primary asset counterpart to the Federal Reserve 

liability for currency in circulation is the Treasury securities and 

federal agency securities that each Reserve Bank holds.



[13] The System Open Market Account includes the Federal Reserve 

System’s portfolio of Treasury and certain other securities that it has 

accumulated through open market operations.



[14] The Reserve Bank of Richmond’s largest single withdrawal from its 

surplus account was for the week of April 4, 2001.



[15] The 1967 President’s Commission on Budget Concepts recommended 

that the Federal Reserve System not be included in the federal budget 

even though it is a government instrumentality and is clearly a federal 

government operation. This recommendation was made for two main 

reasons: inclusion of the Reserve Banks in the budget might jeopardize 

the flexibility and independence of the monetary authorities and 

projection of operations forward--as would be required if the banks 

were included in the budget--did not appear feasible.



[16] Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate for H.R. 974, Small 

Business Interest Checking Act of 2001, April 3, 2001, p. 8.



[17] Pub. L. 103-66, Title III, § 3002.107 Stat. 337 (1993).



[18] Section 3002(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 

amended the Federal Reserve Act to provide, in pertinent part, as 

follows: “(3) REPLENISHMENT OF SURPLUS FUND PROHIBITED.--No Federal 

reserve bank may replenish such bank’s surplus fund by the amount of 

any transfer by such bank under paragraph (1) during fiscal years 1997 

and 1998.” Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 3002(a) (1993). The transfer amounts 

under paragraph (1) were $106 million in fiscal year 1997 and $107 

million in fiscal year 1998.



[19] Treasury’s operating cash is maintained in an account at the 

Federal Reserve Bank of New York as well as in tax and loan accounts in 

other financial institutions.



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