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between Reservists and Their Employers' which was released on June 13, 
2002.



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Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on 

Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



June 2002:



RESERVE FORCES:



DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between Reservists and 

Their Employers:



GAO-02-608:



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Average Operational Tempos Have Not Appreciably Increased, but Some 

Reservists Have Been Affected Disproportionately:



DOD’S Management of Relations Between Reservists and Their Employers 

Could Be Improved:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:



Appendix II: Operational Tempos of the Reservists We Surveyed:



Appendix III: Selected Allegations of Problems with Employers or 

of Exceptional Benefits Provided by Employers to Reservists:



Appendix IV: Some Key Provisions from the Uniformed Services Employment 

and Reemployment Rights Act 

(USERRA):



Appendix V: Guard and Reserve Member Survey:



Appendix VI: Employer Survey:



Appendix VII: Characteristics of Employers That Responded to Our 
Survey:



Appendix VIII: Reserve Recruiting--Goals and Annual Accessions (1992-

2001):



Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Defense:



Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:



Table:



Table 1: Reservists on Duty to Support the War on Terrorism, March 19, 

2002:



Figures:



Figure 1: Average Annual Operational Tempo within Six Reserve 

Components, 1992-2001:



Figure 2: Reserve Buildup to Support the War on Terrorism:



Figure 3: Declines in Department of Labor Cases:



Abbreviations:



DOD: Department of Defense:



ESGR: Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve:



USERRA: Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment

Rights Act:



June 13, 2002:



The Honorable Max Cleland

Chairman

The Honorable Tim Hutchinson

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate:



Following the 1991 Gulf War, reservists and employers flooded the 

government with questions and complaints concerning the reemployment 

rights of reservists who had been away from their jobs during the war. 

Subsequently, Congress passed the Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994.[Footnote 1] The act grants service 

members reemployment rights following military duty and addresses the 

rights and responsibilities of both reservists and their employers.



Since the passage of the act, reservists have been increasingly called 

upon to serve in a variety of contingency operations, including 

peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, where many have served 6 months 

or more. The current mobilization for the war on terrorism is adding to 

this increased tempo and is expected to last a long time. Maintaining 

employers’ continued support for their reservist employees will be 

critical if the Department of Defense (DOD) is to retain experienced 

reservists in these times of longer and more frequent deployments.



Concerned that frequent or long deployments could adversely affect 

recruiting and retention in the reserves, you asked us to study the 

issues and challenges surrounding the increased use of reserve forces. 

In particular, you cited the need for the DOD to pay special attention 

to reservists’ civilian careers and other responsibilities to ensure 

the long-term health of the reserves. As agreed with your offices, we 

(1) determined how increases in military operations have affected 

“operational tempos”[Footnote 2] of the reserve components and 

individual reservists and (2) assessed relations between reservists and 

their civilian employers, focusing specifically on the Defense 

department’s outreach efforts designed to improve these important 

relationships.



This report focuses on the more than 870,000 “selected” reserve members 

who generally attend 12 weekends and 2 weeks of training each year (for 

a total of about 38[Footnote 3] days). Unless specified otherwise, the 

terms “reserves” and “reservists” both refer to the collective forces 

of the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the Army Reserve, 

the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force 

Reserve.[Footnote 4] To gain first-hand information on how deployments 

might be affecting reservists and their employers, we surveyed 1,608 

reservists from 22 units that were among the highest tempo units in the 

reserve components, and we surveyed 111 employers of the units’ 

reservists. We also held focus group discussions with reservists who 

had recently deployed. Additional information on our scope and 

methodology, including the units we surveyed and visited, is in 

appendix I.



The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and 

Reserve[Footnote 5] serves as DOD’s focal point in managing the 

department’s relations with reservists and their civilian employers. 

Its small, full-time, paid staff in Virginia and 4,100 volunteers 

throughout the country are responsible for a number of different 

outreach activities. Two specific functions of these personnel are to 

1) educate reservists and employers concerning their rights and 

responsibilities and 2) mediate disputes that may arise between the 

reservists and their employers.



Results in Brief:



Despite increases in operations since 1992, the average operational 

tempo of reserves department-wide increased only slightly between 1992 

and 2001--from 43 to 46 days a year. Normal required training periods 

accounted for the bulk of this total. Average operational tempos 

fluctuated for all components over the period but did not appreciably 

increase, with the exception of the Air Reserve components whose tempos 

have historically been the highest. Tempos increased from 54 to 65 days 

in the Air National Guard. Although component averages have not 

increased appreciably, all the components contain some individual 

reservists who are in units or occupations that have been affected 

disproportionately. For example, during the past 3 years, operational 

tempos within the Army National Guard averaged between 40 and 44 days 

per year, but hundreds of National Guard members from units in Texas, 

Georgia, and Virginia were deployed to Bosnia for 6 months or more. 

Hundreds more from other units are scheduled to participate in future 

6-month deployments. Moreover, reservists in the fields of aviation, 

special forces, security, intelligence, psychological operations, and 

civil affairs have experienced operational tempos two to seven times 

higher than those of the average reservists in their services. The war 

on terrorism has added to the operational tempos in all the reserve 

components, and on March 19, 2002, more than 95,000 reservists were on 

duty. Many of these reservists had been mobilized for 

6 months or more. In contrast, only about 35,000 reservists were on 

duty supporting worldwide military operations during an average day in 

fiscal year 2000.



Several factors hamper DOD’s outreach efforts to both employers and 

reservists.



* DOD lacks complete information on who the reservists’ employers are, 

and it has viewed the Privacy Act[Footnote 6] as a constraint that 

prevents it from requiring reservists to provide this information. 

Because information is incomplete, DOD cannot inform all employers of 

their rights and obligations, cannot identify all exemplary employers 

for recognition, and cannot carry out effective outreach activities.



* DOD relies on volunteers in the field to carry out many of its 

outreach activities. However, these volunteers do not always report 

their contacts with reservists and employers, and, as a result, DOD 

does not know the full extent of problems that arise and has no 

assurance that its outreach activities are being implemented 

consistently.



* Although DOD has an active program in place to address problems that 

arise between reservists and their civilian employers, no such program 

is in place to deal systematically with issues that arise between 

students and their educational institutions. Because students make up 

an estimated one-third of all reservists, it is important that such 

issues as lost tuition, credits, and educational standing be addressed 

more directly.



* DOD has not fully analyzed existing data on reservists’ operational 

tempo and recruiting and retention trends on an ongoing basis to 

determine how deployments might be affecting reservists and their 

employers. More analysis of such data would enable DOD to better 

identify emerging problems and formulate outreach activities to address 

them.



Our surveys and discussions with reservists and employers further 

suggest that DOD’s activities to enhance reserve-employer relations are 

not as effective as they could be. DOD has conducted hundreds of 

briefings each year for both reservists and employers. However, in 

discussions and responses to our surveys, a sizable number of the 

employers and reservists indicated that they were unsure of their 

rights and responsibilities under the Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act, and some had never been briefed on their 

rights and responsibilities. And, while the majority of reservists told 

us that they believed their employers complied with legal requirements, 

some reservists in every one of our focus group discussions alleged 

that their rights had been violated (see app. III). Both employers and 

reservists claimed that frequently they were not given 30-days’ advance 

notice of deployments, and some employers wanted the right to verify 

reserve duty under 30 days on a case-by-case basis. All of these 

findings suggest that some changes may be needed in the management of 

reservist-employer relations.



We are making several recommendations designed to enhance DOD’s 

management of relations between reservists and their employers. Among 

others, these recommendations are directed at seeking more complete 

information on employers, more systematic reporting of contacts with 

reservists and employers in the field, and a more formalized program 

for addressing the needs of students.



In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred with five 

of our seven recommendations and partially concurred with another 

recommendation concerning advance issuance of orders. We modified that 

recommendation to address the Department’s concerns. DOD did not concur 

with our recommendation to analyze the effects of a legislative 

provision on reservists. However, we continue to believe that the 

information in this report supports the need for such an analysis.



Background:



The reserves are an all-volunteer force of about 1.3 million that makes 

up almost half the total military force,[Footnote 7] and more than one-

half of the total force in the Army. Since the end of the Cold War, 

there has been a shift in the way reserve forces have been used. 

Previously, reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion force that 

would supplement active forces during a major war. Today, reservists 

not only supplement but also replace active forces in military 

operations and exercises worldwide. In fact, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) has stated that no significant operation can be conducted without 

reserve involvement.



The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has overall 

supervisory responsibility for matters that involve reserve components, 

and he serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the 

Secretary of Defense on reserve component matters. The Assistant 

Secretary oversees activities of the National Committee for Employer 

Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR). Established in 1972 by 

President Nixon, the ESGR manages activities aimed at maintaining and 

enhancing employers’ support for the reserves. Among its goals is that 

of informing reservists and their employers of their respective rights 

and responsibilities, as military duties can disrupt both the workplace 

and the private lives of reservists.



The ESGR has a small, full-time paid staff in headquarters and 

approximately 4,100 volunteers organized into 54 local committees, one 

for each state and one each for Guam, the District of Columbia, Puerto 

Rico, and the Virgin Islands. These staff provide reservists and 

employers with information and counseling concerning their rights and 

responsibilities. The ESGR uses a few of its full-time staff and about 

200 trained volunteers from local committees to serve as mediators, 

called ombudsmen, when disputes arise between reservists and their 

employers.



The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 

1994[Footnote 8] addresses employee rights related to their involuntary 

and voluntary military service and covers both active duty military and 

reservists. The act applies to military service performed during basic 

training, weekend drills, and annual training, as well as deployments 

related to national emergencies. Among other things, the law requires 

that service members be promptly reemployed upon returning from 

military duty, generally in the same position, and be given the same 

raises, seniority rights, benefits, and promotions they would have 

received if they had remained at their jobs. They must also be 

permitted to use accrued vacation before the beginning of their 

military service and cannot be forced to use vacation time (instead of 

unpaid leave) for military service. Upon return from military duty, 

service members must be provided with continued health benefits, 

without waiting periods or exclusions. The law also prohibits hiring 

discrimination on the basis of past, current, or future military 

obligations.



Average Operational Tempos Have Not Increased Appreciably, but Some 

Reservists Have Been Affected Disproportionately:



Despite increases in operations since 1992, the average operational 

tempo of reserves department-wide increased only slightly from 1992 

through 2001. Average operational tempos fluctuated for all components 

over this period but did not appreciably increase except for the Air 

Force components whose tempos have historically been the highest. But 

while average operational tempo in the reserves has not increased 

appreciably, individual reservists in certain units and occupations in 

all reserve components have been affected disproportionately. The war 

on terrorism has led to major increases in reserve participation. About 

35,000 reservists were on duty supporting worldwide military operations 

during an average day in fiscal year 2000, compared with over 95,000 

supporting the war on terrorism on March 19, 2002.



Tempos of Most Components Have Increased Only Slightly:



Between fiscal years 1992 and 2001, reserve operational tempos 

increased by about 5 percent, from an average of 43.4 to 45.6 days per 

year. [Footnote 9] Regular reserve training declined slightly over the 

period but still accounted for the bulk of the reserve tempo, with 

annual training periods averaging 11.2 days and regular drill periods 

averaging 18.8 days per person in fiscal year 2001.[Footnote 10] 

However, “other” reserve tempo (primarily support to overseas missions 

and exercises) increased almost 37 percent over the period, to about 16 

days per person in fiscal year 2001.



Tempo increases were greatest in the Air Reserve components, which have 

historically had the highest tempos. Over this period, average 

operational tempos rose from 54 to 65 days a year in the Air National 

Guard. Air Force Reserve tempos rose from 55 days in 1992 to 65 days in 

1999, before they began declining. The increases resulted partly from a 

shift that placed more lift and refueling capabilities in the reserve 

components and thus required them to provide more support to the Air 

Force’s active forces. Average operational tempos fluctuated in the 

other reserve components, but most changes from one year to the next 

were 3 days or fewer in either direction. (See fig. 1.):



Figure 1: Average Annual Operational Tempo within Six Reserve 

Components, 1992-20[Footnote 11]01:



[See PDF for image]



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs data.



[End of figure]



Some Units and Reservists Have Been Affected Disproportionately:



Component-wide averages do not reflect the wide differences in the 

operational tempos of individual reservists in certain units and 

occupations in all of the reserve components. While the Air Force seeks 

to spread its high operational tempos as evenly as possible (relying on 

reservists to volunteer regularly for deployments of 30 days or less), 

the other components deploy some reservists for 6 or more months, while 

typically keeping the rest of their forces on 38-or 39-day annual 

training schedules. For example, hundreds of Army National Guard 

soldiers have participated in each of the past three peacekeeping 

rotations to Bosnia, and hundreds more are scheduled to participate in 

future 6-month deployments. Personnel in the fields of aviation, 

special forces, security, intelligence, psychological operations, and 

civil affairs have experienced operational tempos that are two to seven 

times higher than those of the average reservist. Over the past few 

years, all the civil affairs groups in the Army and Marine Corps 

Reserves have supported lengthy Balkans operations. In fact, between 

1998 and 2001, eight members of the Marine Corps Civil Affairs Group 

that we visited deployed to the Balkans twice--

7 to 9 months in Bosnia and an additional 6 months to Kosovo. Appendix 

II lists other examples of high tempos in the units we visited.



Training requirements also contribute to the high tempos of some 

occupational specialties and units. For example, most Air Force Reserve 

and Air National Guard pilots spend at least 87 days on active duty 

each year in order to maintain their proficiency. During the year 

before an overseas deployment or major training exercise, ground forces 

may also face extremely high training requirements. For example, 

members of the 49th Armored Division (Texas Army National Guard) 

averaged 108 days of training prior to their 270-day mobilization to 

Bosnia.



The War on Terrorism Has Increased All Tempos:



Between September 2001 and March 2002, operational tempos increased 

significantly for all of DOD’s reserve components due to the partial 

mobilization[Footnote 12] in effect to support operations Noble Eagle 

and Enduring Freedom, the domestic and overseas operations associated 

with the war on terrorism. Table 1 shows the numbers of reservists on 

duty on March 19, 2002, when DOD’s weekly report figures 

peaked.[Footnote 13] In numerical terms, the Army and the Air National 

Guards had the most people on duty. However, in percentage terms, the 

Coast Guard Reserve and the Air National Guard have been the most 

heavily utilized components. The 95,060 reservists on duty March 19, 

2002, represent a significant increase over the 35,000 reservists who 

were on duty supporting worldwide military operations during an average 

day in fiscal year 2000. Most reservists supporting operations Noble 

Eagle and Enduring Freedom were federally mobilized under involuntary 

orders. Complete data is not yet available on how long reservists are 

serving in these operations, but as of March 2002 many had already been 

mobilized for 6 months.



Table 1: Reservists on Duty to Support the War on Terrorism, March 19, 

2002:



Component: Army National Guard; Reservists on duty[A]: 25,984; 

Percentage of component’s reserve force[B]: 7.



Component: Air National Guard; Reservists on duty[A]: 24,752; 

Percentage of component’s reserve force[B]: 23.



Component: Air Force Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 14,136; Percentage 

of component’s reserve force[B]: 10.



Component: Army Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 13,703; Percentage of 

component’s reserve force[B]: 4.



Component: Naval Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 9,827; Percentage of 

component’s reserve force[B]: 5.



Component: Marine Corps Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 4,788; 

Percentage of component’s reserve force[B]: 5.



Component: Coast Guard Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 1,870; 

Percentage of component’s reserve force[B]: 15.



Component: Total; Reservists on duty[A]: 95,060; Percentage of 

component’s reserve force[B]: 7.



[A] Figures include personnel on duty for airport security, volunteers, 

and those mobilized for state and federal missions, as well as for 

training directly related to the war on terrorism.



[B] Percentages are based on reserve force of 1.3 million rather than 

on drilling reserve population of 870,000.



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.



[End of table]



Component-level figures again do not reflect the impact on some 

specialties and units. The Naval Reserve, for example, has deployed 

only about 5 percent of its total force, but deployed almost all of its 

reservists in the master-at-arms and 9545 (security) fields.[Footnote 

14]



Figure 2 shows that the majority of reservists supporting operations 

related to the war on terrorism have been involuntarily called to duty 

under the partial mobilization that went into effect in September 2001. 

Even if the mobilized force declines in size, the mobilization could 

have considerable long-term effects on reserve operational tempos 

because it allows DOD to activate reservists involuntarily for as long 

as 2 years. Between the end of the Gulf War and September 2001, 

reservists who were involuntarily mobilized to support operations in 

the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and elsewhere had been called to duty 

under Presidential Reserve Call-ups, which limit duty to a maximum of 

270 days.



Figure 2: Reserve Buildup to Support the War on Terrorism:



[See PDF for image]



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.



[End of figure]



DOD’S Management of Relations Between Reservists and Their Employers 

Could Be Improved:



Good relations between reservists and their employers are important, 

because deployments can be disruptive to employers, and difficulties, 

if not resolved, could lead some reservists to abandon military 

service. Yet, DOD has been hampered in managing its activities aimed at 

enhancing relations between reservists and their employers because it 

lacks complete information on who the employers are. We found that both 

reservists and employers are experiencing a variety of problems, yet 

DOD may be unaware of the full extent of problems because reservists 

and employers do not always contact the ESGR for help, and volunteer 

ombudsmen in the field do not always report contacts that are made. 

Furthermore, because the ESGR is not specifically tasked with helping 

student reservists, their unique problems are not being fully 

identified and addressed. Finally, the department has not fully 

analyzed information that could help identify actions needed to improve 

relations between reservists and their employers.



Incomplete Information on Employers Has Hampered DOD’s Outreach 

Activities:



Although DOD recognizes that employer support is crucial to the health 

of its reserve forces and has taken steps to improve this support, its 

outreach efforts are hampered because it cannot identify all of its 

reservists’ employers. Recent efforts to have reservists voluntarily 

report the names of their employers have met with only limited success. 

DOD has not required reservists to report the names of their employers 

in the belief that doing so would be inconsistent with the Privacy Act. 

[Footnote 15] However, a reexamination of this position may be 

warranted because collecting such information would appear to be 

central to the ESGR’s mission.



DOD does not have complete information on employers:



There is no complete listing of the civilian employers of DOD’s reserve 

members. At various times, reserve units, the reserve components, the 

services, and DOD have attempted to compile lists of the civilian 

employers of their reservists. However, none of these lists were 

comprehensive, and the limited lists that were assembled were generally 

not kept up to date.[Footnote 16] For example, to prepare for a survey 

in 1999, DOD assembled a list of 13,752 employers of its reserve 

members. However, when DOD officials provided us with a copy of the 

list in 2001, they acknowledged that this list was incomplete[Footnote 

17] and that it had not been updated since it was first assembled.



The lack of a complete and up-to-date list of employers has hampered 

the ESGR’s ability to conduct outreach efforts. For example, the ESGR 

conducts a “boss lift” program, which takes employers to reservists’ 

training or deployment sites to increase employers’ appreciation of the 

work reservists do, as well as an employer award program. We found that 

some units have conducted multiple boss lifts and have given out scores 

of employer awards, while other units have had no contact with ESGR 

representatives and have not given out any awards or conducted any boss 

lifts.



Voluntary reporting has not yielded complete list of employers:



In 2001, DOD created a data base to collect employer information from 

reservists being mobilized, but the data base is incomplete. Reservists 

are being asked to supply information voluntarily. On May 14, 2002, the 

data base contained data on fewer than 11,000 employers, although more 

than 73,000 reservists had been mobilized to support the war on 

terrorism.



DOD has been reluctant to mandate that reservists provide information 

about their civilian employers due to Privacy Act concerns. The Privacy 

Act limits the amount and type of personal information that the 

government can collect from individuals, stating that organizations may 

keep records of such information only “as is relevant and necessary” 

for them to accomplish their missions. DOD officials told us that if 

the requirements of the Privacy Act could be satisfied, they would 

support the mandatory collection of employer information.



Knowing who the employers of its reservists are and how to contact them 

would appear to be information that the ESGR needs in order to carry 

out its mission. The ESGR was established to enlist the support of 

employers in encouraging employee and citizen participation in the 

Guard and Reserve. The responsibilities of the NCESGR/ESGR, listed in 

DOD Directive 1250.1,[Footnote 18] include taking actions to:



* operate a proactive program that ensures employers’ understanding of 

the role of the reserves;



* encourage compliance with USERRA;



* prevent, resolve, and reduce employer problems and misunderstandings 

through informational services and mediation;



* solicit feedback on employer attitudes and opinions regarding 

participation in the reserves and recommend programs or initiatives to 

enhance and sustain employer support;



* recognize employers who are supportive of their reservist employees; 

and:



* enhance contact and cooperation between local reserve commanders and 

employers.



Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense has stated that the Guard and 

Reserve need the complete support of our nation’s employers to 

accomplish their missions. We believe that a complete list of all 

reservists’ civilian employers would therefore be both relevant and 

necessary if the ESGR is to effectively accomplish the purpose for 

which it was created.



Despite Extensive Briefings, Some Reservists And Employers Are Unsure 

of Their Rights And Responsibilities:



DOD conducts hundreds of annual briefings to inform reservists and 

their employers about their rights and responsibilities under USERRA. 

In addition to these briefings and other outreach efforts, several DOD 

Internet sites explain the law or contain links that direct people to 

the law or explanations of the law.[Footnote 19] Despite DOD’s efforts, 

we found that a sizable number of reservists and employers were unsure 

about their rights and responsibilities.



Employers. Because DOD does not know all the employers of its 

reservists, it cannot inform them directly of their rights and 

responsibilities. A 1999 employer survey by DOD found that 31 percent 

of respondents were not aware of any laws protecting reservists. Twelve 

percent of the 111 respondents in our employer survey said that they 

were unaware of USERRA’s requirements--despite the fact that their 

employees were in the reserve components’ most highly deployed units.



Most reserve unit commanders we interviewed estimated that at least 

one-fourth of employers do not understand the law’s requirements. The 

importance of identifying all employers was demonstrated during one of 

DOD’s most successful outreach efforts, a recent airline symposium. At 

that symposium, a major airline representative stated that the success 

of previous symposiums was demonstrated by the fact that his airline 

“is now in compliance with the law.” He stated that previously his 

airline was violating the law because it was unaware of the law’s 

requirements. This airline is now widely recognized as an exemplary 

employer of reservists.



Most private-sector employers and state and local governments are also 

apparently unaware of another very important option: they may request 

that some of their workers be listed as “key employees” who cannot be 

mobilized.[Footnote 20] On the other hand, federal agencies, which 

employ about 10 percent of reservists, are well aware of the option and 

designated 824 of their own employees in that category in 1999. But 

even after September 11, 2001, only a handful of non-government 

employers had made similar requests, possibly indicating that most 

employers are (or were until very recently) unaware of this option.



Reservists. While most reservists in the high operational tempo units 

we visited knew that a reemployment law existed, many were unfamiliar 

with their specific rights and responsibilities, and a number of 

reservists in our focus group discussions said they had never even 

heard of USERRA. The ESGR attempts to provide an annual briefing for 

all reserve members on their rights and responsibilities under the law, 

but the ESGR acknowledges that the program is not yet reaching all 

reservists. On September 20, 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Personnel and Readiness) issued guidance to the services stating that 

all mobilization orders should include a reference to the ESGR’s toll-

free telephone number and Web site so that reservists can contact the 

ESGR if they have questions regarding their employment/reemployment 

rights.



Extent of Reservist and Employer Problems Is Not Well Understood:



We found that reservists and employers alike have experienced problems 

associated with military service. At every unit we visited, we found 

some reservists who alleged that their employer had not complied with 

USERRA, and we found that the problems of student reservists, who 

represent an estimated one-third of the reserve force, are not being 

fully addressed. Among other things, employers complained about not 

receiving sufficient advance notice of deployments and of being unable, 

under certain conditions, to verify their employees’ military duty.



Yet the ESGR is not keeping track of all the times that reservists or 

employers try to contact the organization for help, and its system of 

volunteer mediators is not reporting all cases consistently. Therefore 

the ESGR cannot know the extent of problems or what actions may be 

needed to improve the effectiveness of its outreach and mediation 

efforts.



Reservists at every unit visited reported difficulties:



Most of the reservists we spoke with said that their employers complied 

with USERRA provisions,[Footnote 21] and some even said that their 

employers had provided benefits above and beyond the requirements of 

the law.[Footnote 22] However, at every focus group in every unit we 

visited, some reservists had complaints about their employers. Some 

said that their supervisors were hostile toward their reserve duty and 

had actively encouraged them to leave the reserves. Others alleged 

employer misconduct that, if confirmed, would be a clear violation of 

the law.[Footnote 23] Allegations included being denied required 

medical benefits, being forced to use vacation time for military duty, 

and being fired. In one unit, more than 30 percent of the members we 

surveyed claimed to have had problems with their employers when they 

returned from an extended deployment to Bosnia.[Footnote 24] For 

example, one said she was fired, and another claimed he had to reapply 

for his job.



Reserve officials, reservists, and employers all commented that even in 

companies with good policies to support reservist employees, reservists 

can face front-line supervisors who do not always comply with the 

policies. One reservist told us that despite working for a major 

corporation that has received numerous ESGR awards, he was placed on 

probation after returning from a 9-month Bosnia mobilization. Appendix 

III provides examples of the types of problems cited by reservists in 

our focus groups, as well as the benefits provided by some exemplary 

employers.



Students experience unique problems:



Student reservists, who make up a sizeable portion of the reserve 

force, have a special set of problems because there is no federal 

statute to protect them against loss of tuition, housing fees, or 

academic credit when they are mobilized. In addition, DOD Directive 

1250.1 (which lays out the responsibilities of the ESGR) does not 

expressly task the ESGR with mediating disputes between reservists and 

their schools. Yet up to one-third of all reservists may be students, 

according to DOD officials. And our survey of 1,608 reservists from 

high operational tempo units found that 22 percent of them were 

students.[Footnote 25]



After the partial mobilization in September 2001, the Servicemembers 

Opportunity Colleges[Footnote 26] volunteered to mediate any disputes 

that arose between student reservists and their schools. However, a 

senior official from the organization told us that as of January 9, 

2002, they had handled only 24 cases. None of the student reservists 

who had voiced concerns at our focus groups had contacted the 

organization. Reservists may simply be unaware of the organization, 

because, unlike the ESGR, it does not have a comprehensive network of 

volunteers to reach out to reservists. While student reservists who 

become aware of the organization are likely to use its Web site to 

obtain information, some may be reluctant to rely on it to 

independently mediate disputes with educational institutions because 

the organization is a consortium of national higher education 

associations.



Because the ESGR has not been specifically tasked with addressing 

student reservists’ problems, it has not established a program to deal 

systematically with concerns that arise. A student’s occupation is not 

directly comparable to that of an employee, and therefore questions 

inevitably arise about the specific protections that might be 

reasonably afforded to students. Some states have laws that offer 

student reservists the option of obtaining tuition refunds when they 

are called to active duty or completing their course work following 

their military duty.[Footnote 27] Such protections come at a cost to 

educational institutions and therefore require careful study.



Employers also reported difficulties:



Information from our employer survey[Footnote 28] as well as our 

discussions with employers highlighted several problems linked to 

reservists’ military service.



Advance notice. Many employers are not receiving adequate advance 

notice prior to their reservist employees’ departure for military duty. 

USERRA requires that employers receive written or oral advance 

notification but does not specify how far in advance it should be given 

and does not require notification if “military necessity” or other 

relevant circumstances prevent giving notice.



Although the law does not specify a timeframe for advance notice of 

employers, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs has emphasized the need to provide orders well in advance of 

deployments,[Footnote 29] in part so that employers could be notified 

promptly. In 1999, DOD had identified inadequate employer notification 

as one of the problems it needed to address. And the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has warned that “unjustifiably 

late notification may harm the working relationship between 

(reservists) and their civilian employers.” Yet in spite of repeated 

memoranda from the Assistant Secretary, advance notification continues 

to be a problem, and the services have not consistently met the 30-day 

advance notification goal. On September 13, 2000, the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness approved a recommended change to 

a DOD directive that would have tasked the services with monitoring the 

timeliness of advance notifications. However, as of January 2002 the 

directive had not been updated to reflect the recommended change, and 

DOD still had no validated data to measure the extent of the advance 

notice problem. [Footnote 30]



In discussions with us and in their survey responses, reservists and 

employers cited cases in which notification was given much less than 30 

days in advance. While some reservists told us that they have been able 

to provide their employers with sufficient advance notice, many told us 

that they themselves did not receive their orders until a few days--or 

in some cases, just hours--before deploying. The commanding general 

told us that one unit in his Bosnia task force had not received its 

orders until after it had arrived in Bosnia. Sixty-eight of 111 

employers who responded to our survey said that they typically receive 

less than 30 days’ advance notice, and 31 of them said that they 

typically receive notification 7 days or less in advance.



Verification. Employers cannot verify their employees’ attendance at 

military duties that last 30 days or less. USERRA gives employers the 

right to request verification for periods of duty that are 31 days or 

longer, but some employers believe they should have the right to 

request documentation for lesser periods if they think their employees 

are not being honest about their duty commitments. According to 

employers, some units and reservists do provide documentation for 

military duty of less than 31 days, but others do not, even when asked 

to do so. Employers noted that they do not want to be flooded with 

orders for every weekend duty, they simply want to be able to verify 

duty in the few cases where they suspect an employee might abuse the 

system. During the airline symposium, senior reserve component 

officials expressed a willingness to work with employers to try and 

minimize or eliminate cases where reservists “abuse their employers” by 

volunteering for non-critical reserve duties at times that are 

particularly inconvenient for the employer.



Costs and disruptions. Reservist employees often cost employers more 

than those who are not reservists because many employers must pay 

overtime premiums to their remaining workers who do the work of 

deployed reservists. Other employers provide pay or benefits to 

deployed reservists while also providing pay and benefits to temporary 

workers who replace the deployed reservists. In addition, pre-

deployment training can cause major disruptions to work schedules, and 

the early, unexpected return of a reservist can add to costs if both 

the reservist and the substitute must be paid.[Footnote 31]



Small employers. DOD and service officials said that small employers 

are most affected by their employees’ reserve duties. A firm of four 

people that loses one of its workers to military service has lost 25 

percent of its work force. These losses can be especially hard if the 

reservists perform a key role within the company (for example, if the 

reservist is the company’s only bookkeeper or salesperson). DOD’s 1999 

survey of employers excluded firms with fewer than five employees. 

However, as noted, DOD does not have a complete or up-to-date list of 

employers and therefore does not actually know how many employers have 

fewer than five employees. Our survey of 1,608 reservists found that 

only 5 percent worked for companies with fewer than five people. 

However, our survey included only reservists from high operational 

tempo units and is therefore not projectable to all 

reservists.[Footnote 32]



Not all problems are being reported:



ESGR officials told us that the caseloads of its ombudsmen, who help 

mediate disputes between reservists and their employers, have been 

rising, but they also acknowledged that the ESGR does not have an 

accurate count of all cases because of incomplete reporting.[Footnote 

33] In fiscal year 2001, the ESGR reported 11,500 cases, but this 

figure includes both an accurate count of cases handled by a few full-

time paid ombudsmen at headquarters and a much less accurate count of 

cases handled by hundreds of part-time volunteers in the field. 

Reporting by volunteers has been sporadic, and some field offices have 

gone an entire year without reporting any cases at all. The ESGR, in 

other words, does not have a complete or accurate way of tracking and 

reporting all contacts made with employers and reservists who are 

seeking help.[Footnote 34]



The current system, which relies largely on part-time volunteers in the 

field, does not ensure complete reporting. This is because ESGR 

volunteers--by virtue of the fact that they are volunteering their 

services in their limited spare time--cannot reasonably be expected to 

document every single contact. Moreover, volunteers are not always 

available to field telephone inquiries. Although many reservists said 

positive things about ESGR’s volunteers, others said that they had not 

contacted the ESGR because the volunteers were hard to reach, and a few 

who had reached the ombudsmen said that they were not helpful. ESGR 

officials told us they plan to set up a new system that would 

eventually route all telephone calls to the ESGR to a central office. 

The system would ensure that all calls are answered, either by the 

full-time headquarters staff or by local volunteers (during their 

office hours). However, the details of this plan, including funding, 

timelines, and responsibilities, have not been worked out.



Disputes that cannot be resolved by the ESGR are referred to the 

Department of Labor. Figure 3 shows that the number of cases (relative 

to the number of reservists) handled annually by Labor has generally 

declined since fiscal year 1995. The actual number of cases referred to 

the Department of Labor declined from 1,069 in fiscal year 1995 to 724 

in fiscal year 2001.



Figure 3: Declines in Department of Labor Cases:



[See PDF for image]



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.



[End of figure]



Several reasons could account for the drop, including a tight labor 

market that forced employers to be more accommodating and a larger 

number of cases resolved by the ESGR.



Data That Could Enhance Program Management Has Not Been Analyzed:



DOD collects a variety of information on reserve recruitment, 

retention, and deployments. But it has not combined this information to 

examine the possible effects of high operational tempos on the reserves 

or to identify actions that might be needed to address problems in 

employee-reservist relations. A surprise problem is that some 

reservists want to deploy more and are unable to do so because of 

certain barriers.



Of specific concern is the effect that high operational tempos may have 

on reserve retention. DOD recently conducted a survey of 75,000 

reservists. Once analyzed, it should provide some information on why 

reservists stay in or leave the reserves. Several studies have 

attempted to identify a possible link between operational tempo and 

retention, but they focused on the active forces and came to different 

conclusions. However, in October 2000, for the first time, DOD began 

collecting operational tempo data on each individual reservist. An 

analysis of the data might shed new light on whether operational tempos 

are affecting retention rates for reservists in specific occupational 

specialties.



Our data, when combined with DOD’s recruiting data, shows that reserve 

recruiting bears close scrutiny. Although the reserve components 

generally had good recruiting years during the recession in 2001, the 

Marine Corps Reserve was the only component that consistently reached 

its goals in each of the last 5 years.[Footnote 35] Two other trends 

are emerging: (1) more people without prior military experience are 

joining the reserves and (2) our survey indicates that these new 
recruits 

are less inclined to stay in the reserves over the long term. The 
number 

of soldiers from the active forces who joined the selected reserves 

dropped from 59.1 percent in fiscal year 1999 to 49.6 percent in fiscal 

year 2001. Our survey of reservists in high tempo units, though not 

projectable, showed wide differences in the career intentions of prior 

service and non-prior service reservists. About 73 percent of 

reservists who had served 4 or more years on active duty intended to 

stay in the reserves for 20 years or more, but only about 54 percent of 

those without prior active duty service intended to stay for a full 20-

year career. If this difference in attitudes were true across the 

reserve force, the shift to non-prior-service recruiting would lead to 

higher recruiting requirements in the future, as fewer reservists 

remain in the reserves for full 20-year careers.



One unexpected finding of our study was that a significant number of 

reservists in the highly deployed units we surveyed have wanted to 

deploy even more. However, the services have been discouraged from 

deploying these individuals by the effects of recent 

legislation,[Footnote 36] which requires that service members who are 

deployed for 401 or more days in a rolling 

730-day (2-year) period receive a $100 high-deployment per diem 

allowance.[Footnote 37]



Sixteen percent of the reservists who responded to our survey said that 

they chose to join their unit because of the unit’s high operational 

tempo; of these, half said operational tempo was the “main” reason they 

joined their unit. During our focus group discussions, a number of 

reservists said that they had enjoyed their operational deployments and 

were anxious to return to overseas missions, such as those in the 

Balkans, because they felt they were “making a difference.” Others said 

that they would have extended their tours to the Balkans, had this been 

an option, and several even said that they had offered to forgo the 

$100-per-day high-deployment allowance just to be able to deploy again. 

These reservists had been told that the law did not allow the payments 

to be waived.



Prior to the enactment of the high-deployment legislation, some active 

service members who were not anxious to deploy had experienced 

deployment rates above the 400-day threshold. On the other hand, the 

reserve components had limited involuntary deployments of their members 

even prior to the legislation, and generally the only reservists who 

spent more than 400 of 730 days deployed were volunteers. Even before 

the payment requirement was suspended following the attacks of 

September 11, the services’ extreme reluctance to pay the high-

deployment per diem allowance had prevented some reservists with 

considerable overseas mission experience from being able to 

deploy.[Footnote 38] When the suspension on the requirement is lifted, 

some reservists who want to deploy may not be able to, and some who do 

not want to deploy may be forced to take their places.



Information on these types of trends needs to be monitored and 

analyzed, in conjunction with retention and deployment data, to provide 

a better understanding of the effects that deployments may be having on 

reserve forces. Using these multiple data sources on a continuing basis 

could also help the ESGR better decide whether additional actions may 

be needed to assist reservists and their employers.



Conclusions:



To effectively manage activities aimed at enhancing relations between 

reservists and their employers, DOD must be able to communicate 

directly with these reservists’ employers. However, DOD’s management of 

these activities has been hampered by incomplete information on who 

these employers are. Recent efforts requesting that reservists 

voluntarily provide employer information have yielded only partial 

information. As a result, DOD cannot inform all employers of their 

rights and obligations, cannot identify the best employers for 

recognition, cannot carry out effective outreach activities, and cannot 

implement proactive public affairs campaigns. DOD has opted for a 

voluntary reporting system in the belief that requiring reservists to 

provide information on their employers may violate the Privacy Act. 

Determining whether the mandatory collection of such information is 

necessary and relevant to the ESGR’s mission is the first step in 

improving the quality of information in DOD’s employer data base.



The ESGR has an active program to address problems that arise between 

reservists and their civilian employers. However, to date, there is no 

federal statute to protect students, who make up an estimated one-third 

of all reservists, against loss of tuition, credits, and educational 

standing due to unexpected or extended deployments. Such difficulties 

could discourage this portion of DOD’s force from joining and remaining 

in the reserves. The directive, which spells out the ESGR’s mission and 

responsibilities, is silent with respect to outreach programs to 

address difficulties student reservists may encounter. Therefore, DOD 

may need to amend the ESGR’s mission and responsibilities to more 

expressly include students so that the ESGR’s outreach activities will 

better serve the needs of all reservists. More study is needed to 

determine what legal or other protections might be reasonably afforded 

to student reservists, because a student’s occupation is not directly 

comparable to that of an employee and because educational institutions 

would be affected by such changes in different ways than civilian 

employers.



The ESGR’s volunteer ombudsmen are providing important contributions to 

the ESGR’s mission; however, they are not always available to field 

telephone calls from reservists and employers and do not always report 

their outreach efforts. As a result, the ESGR cannot determine the 

magnitude or effectiveness of its mediation and outreach efforts and 

cannot determine whether its programs are being implemented in ways 

that are fair and transparent to all employers. The ESGR’s tentative 

plans to move to a system whereby calls are handled centrally might 

yield more complete and accurate information regarding complaints, 

conflicts, and allegations so that they can be addressed promptly and 

consistently. Even with a different system for fielding calls, 

volunteers could continue to contribute to the ESGR’s mission as they 

have in the past, but with fewer administrative responsibilities.



DOD recognizes that extended deployments can have a disruptive effect 

on both reservists and their employers and has emphasized the 

importance of providing sufficient advance notification of deployments 

to both parties. DOD has made several attempts over the last few years 

to achieve its goal of issuing orders 30 days in advance of deployments 

so that reservists can notify their employees promptly. Despite these 

efforts, advance notification continues to be a problem, and the 

services have not complied consistently with the 30-day goal. Although 

there will always be cases in which the 30-day goal cannot be met due 

to the exigencies of military crises, a better understanding of why the 

goal is not being met would help the services know what they can do to 

reduce the incidence of insufficient advance notification. 

Additionally, giving employers the right to verify military duty 

lasting less than 31 days, as some employers desire, appears to be a 

reasonable accommodation that could be granted without undue hardship 

on the part of DOD or reservists.



The legislation that was intended to provide service members additional 

compensation for lengthy deployments has had the unintentional effect 

of penalizing a number of experienced reservists who want to deploy 

more than 400 days during a 2-year period. The requirements of the 

legislation are currently suspended, and reservists are free to 

volunteer as often as they like without the services having to pay them 

an extra $100 per day for service in excess of 400 days. However, the 

provisions of the legislation will go back into effect after the 

current partial mobilization ends. Allowing the services to use 

volunteers without paying the high-deployment per diem allowance could 

help minimize the negative effects and hardships associated with 

involuntary mobilizations and contribute to the long-term health of the 

reserve force.



A great deal of information has been regularly collected on reserve 

force deployments, operational tempos, recruiting, retention, and prior 

active-duty service, and additional survey and individual tempo data 

has recently been collected. Using this full range of data on an 

ongoing basis could help DOD identify trends and gain a better 

understanding of the reasons why reservists leave the reserves and why 

active-duty service members choose not to enter the reserves. This 

information could assist the ESGR in better formulating its outreach 

activities to employers.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



In order to (1) increase the scope and effectiveness of DOD’s outreach 

programs, (2) promote good relations between reservists and their 

employers or schools, and (3) increase an understanding of the effects 

of high operational tempos on reservists, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs, take the following actions:



* Reexamine the provisions of the Privacy Act and determine whether 

requiring reservists to report information about their civilian 

employers is consistent with the act. If a positive determination is 

made, the Secretary should require all reserve personnel to provide the 

Defense Manpower Data Center with the name, full address, and telephone 

number of their civilian employer, and update this information 

promptly, as necessary.



* Add students as a target population to the mission and 

responsibilities of the ESGR, study in depth the problems related to 

deployments that student reservists have experienced, and determine 

what actions the ESGR might take to help students and their educational 

institutions.



* Direct the ESGR to promptly finalize and implement its plans to have 

all calls to ombudsmen routed through a single toll-free number and 

central processing station.



* Direct the services to determine how many orders are not being issued 

30 days in advance of deployments, and why. We recognize that it will 

not be possible to achieve the 30-day goal in all cases. Once the 

causes are clearly identified, the Secretary should direct the services 

to take the necessary corrective actions and periodically assess 

progress toward fuller compliance with the goal.



* Develop a policy so that reserve units will provide employers, upon 

request, with verification of military service periods lasting less 

than 30 days.



* Analyze the effects of the high-deployment per diem statutory 

provision on reservists, taking into account that deployment patterns 

for reservists are different from those of active duty members, and 

that virtually no reservists have been forced to deploy involuntarily 

for more than 400 days over a 730-day period; if warranted, propose 

changes to this statutory provision.



* Analyze, on an ongoing basis, departmental data on trends in the 

reserves for use in formulating outreach activities to employers.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 

with our recommendations. The Department specifically concurred with 

our recommendations on 1) collection of employer information, 2) the 

needs of student reservists, 3) ombudsmen’s assistance, 4) verification 

of service lasting less than 30 days, and 5) the use of data and trend 

analyses to formulate outreach activities.



DOD partially concurred with our recommendation concerning the timely 

issuance of orders. It agreed that it is important to issue orders in a 

timely fashion and said that its “objective” is to establish a policy 

requiring that orders be issued 30 days in advance, unless operational 

requirements dictate otherwise. It further stated that “there is merit 

to studying reasons why the Reserve components sometimes miss this (30-

day) goal” and said it has encouraged the services to review their 

processes and establish metrics for internal management purposes. 

However, it did not concur with the need for the services to report 

quarterly progress toward achieving that goal, stating that this would 

create a “further” administrative burden on those involved with the 

order-writing process.



We believe that if DOD formalizes its 30-day goal as planned, and if 

the services 1) review their internal processes to determine why the 

goal has been missed and 2) establish advance notification metrics for 

internal management purposes, the intent of our recommendation will 

have been met, and routine reporting may be unnecessary. However, since 

DOD acknowledges that late orders are a recurring problem, despite 

several memos from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs stressing the importance of this issue, we believe it 

is important that sufficient attention be given to a clear 

identification of the reasons why units have not been able to comply 

more fully with the 30-day goal. A better understanding of the reasons 

is essential to identify corrective actions that need to be taken. In 

view of DOD’s stated actions, we have modified our recommendation by 

dropping a quarterly reporting requirement and replacing it with a 

requirement to periodically assess the services’ progress toward fuller 

compliance with the 30-day goal.



DOD did not concur with our recommendation to analyze the effects of 

the high-deployment per diem provision on reservists and, if warranted, 

to propose changes to the provision. It stated that when the policy was 

issued, senior leadership made a specific determination to include the 

reserve components, and it further suggested that it may be better to 

expand reserve participation in operational support missions. Although 

the determination to include reserve components in the policy may have 

been valid at the time the policy was issued, we believe that this 

decision should be reexamined in light of currently available 

information. For example, we found no cases in which the policy 

prevented or even limited “excessive” burdens being placed on 

reservists, even though DOD states that the objective of the policy is 

“to prevent excessive (temporary duty) burdens being placed on any 

active or Reserve member.” And the services’ reluctance to pay the 

high-deployment per diem allowance may result in reservists being 

called up involuntarily when others were willing to serve additional 

time voluntarily. In units in short supply and heavy demand, some who 

could be called involuntarily may have already served extensively. As 

we noted in our report, involuntary and repeated call-ups could 

adversely affect reserve retention rates. Therefore, we continue to 

believe that DOD needs to further analyze the effects of the high-

deployment per diem provision on reserve members and determine whether 

changes need to be made.



DOD also provided technical comments that we incorporated as 

appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix IX.



We performed our work between December 2000 and April 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of 

the Air Force. This report will also be made available on GAO’s home 

page at www.gao.gov.



If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3958. Others making key contributions to this 

report are included in appendix X.



Carol Schuster

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:



Signed by Carol Schuster:



[End of section]



Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:



This report is issued in response to a request from the Personnel 

Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, which asked GAO to 

review issues and challenges surrounding the increased use of reserve 

forces. As agreed with your offices, we (1) determined how increases in 

military operations have affected operational tempos of the reserve 

components and individual reservists and (2) assessed relations between 

reservists and their civilian employers, focusing specifically on the 

Defense department’s outreach efforts designed to improve these 

important relationships.



To determine how increases in military operations have affected 

operational tempos of the reserve components and individual reservists, 

we collected and analyzed deployment data and identified areas where 

tempos were high or increasing. We then analyzed available retention 

data to see if any of the data followed the same patterns as deployment 

data.[Footnote 39] We discussed the observed trends with top-level 

reserve officials throughout the Department of Defense. Meetings were 

held with Deputy Assistant Secretaries and other officials from the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/

RA), the National Guard and Reserve General Officer Advisors to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with headquarters 

representatives from each of DOD’s six reserve components. 

Specifically, we met with four reserve component commanders--the 

Directors of the Naval Reserve and the Air National Guard, both located 

in Arlington, Virginia; the Chief of the Air Force Reserve in the 

Pentagon; and the Director of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Affairs 

Division in Quantico, Virginia--and their staffs. We also met with key 

officials from the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and the 

Office of the Director of the Army National Guard, both located in 

Arlington, Virginia.[Footnote 40]



To assess the Department of Defense’s management of activities aimed at 

promoting employers’ support of their reservist employees, we contacted 

officials from the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard 

and Reserve (ESGR) in Arlington, Virginia, and local ESGR officials in 

California, Colorado, Ohio, Louisiana, Texas, and Wyoming. We obtained 

the information that DOD had collected on reservists’ civilian 

employers and reviewed ESGR award data, as well as its data concerning 

employer problems. We also reviewed and analyzed data from the 1994 and 

1997 Air Force Reserve Employer Support Surveys and the1999 Reserve 

Employer Survey commissioned by OASD/RA. We attended ESGR briefings and 

award ceremonies and the July 2001 and March 2002 symposiums between 

the airlines and the reserve components. We also asked high tempo units 

if they had any unit initiatives to reach out to their reservists’ 

civilian employers.



To gain firsthand information from reservists and employers on how 

deployments had affected them, we collected deployment data and 

identified reserve units and personnel that had recently experienced 

high operating tempos. These included units within each of DOD’s six 

reserve components. We did not randomly sample DOD’s 1.3 million 

reservists to determine the effects of increased tempos due to the cost 

and time involved and because DOD had recently conducted a random 

survey of 75,000 reservists on related issues.



Because each service has a different mission and uses its reservists 

very differently, we developed a survey[Footnote 41] to provide some 

baseline data for all the high tempo reservists we visited. Our visits 

were scheduled during normal drill weekends, and generally all 

reservists who were present at the drills were surveyed. In total 1,608 

reservists were surveyed. Although our survey responses are not 

projectable to the total reserve population, all of DOD’s reserve 

components were represented in the responses, as were different 

geographic locations throughout the country.[Footnote 42] The events of 

September 11, 2001, made it impossible to complete all planned visits; 

however, some of the units that we had planned to visit distributed our 

surveys to their reservists even though we were not able to attend 

their monthly drills.



A list of the units and higher headquarters that we surveyed and 

visited follows:



Units: 404th Civil Affairs Battalion (U.S. Army Reserve), Fort Dix, New 

Jersey.



Units: 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (U.S. Army Reserve), 

Arden Hills, Minnesota.



Units: 249th Signal Battalion (Texas Army National Guard), Mineral 

Wells, Texas.



Units: 629th Military Intelligence Battalion (Maryland Army National 

Guard), Laurel, Maryland.



Units: 48th Enhanced Infantry Brigade (Georgia Army National Guard), 

Macon, Georgia.



Units: 648th Engineer Battalion (Georgia Army National Guard), Douglas, 

Georgia.



Units: USS Wadsworth (FFG-9) (U.S. Naval Reserve), San Diego, 

California.



Units: USS Curts (FFG-38) (U.S. Naval Reserve), San Diego, California.



Units: VP-65 Patrol Squadron (U.S. Naval Reserve), Point Mugu, 

California.



Units: Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 59 (U.S. Naval Reserve), Fort 

Worth, Texas[1].



Units: 4th Civil Affairs Group (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve), Naval 

District Washington, Anacostia Annex, District of Columbia.



Units: Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 452 (U.S. Marine Corps 

Reserve), Stewart Air National Guard Base, New York[1].



Units: Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234 (U.S. Marine Corps 

Reserve), Fort Worth, Texas.



Units: 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve), San 

Bruno, California[1].



Units: 336th Air Refueling Squadron (U.S. Air Force Reserve), March Air 

Reserve Base, California.



Units: 729th Airlift Squadron (U.S. Air Force Reserve), March Air 

Reserve Base, California.



Units: 187th Airlift Squadron (Air National Guard), Cheyenne, Wyoming.



Units: 163rd Security Forces Squadron (Air National Guard), March Air 

Reserve Base, California.



Units: 196th Aerial Refueling Squadron (Air National Guard), March Air 

Reserve Base, California.



Units: 112th Fighter Squadron (Air National Guard), Swanton, Ohio[1].



Units: 180th Security Forces Squadron (Air National Guard), Swanton, 

Ohio[1].



Units: 180th Maintenance Squadron (Air National Guard), Swanton, 

Ohio[1].



[1] Command staff provided written answers to GAO questions, and unit 

personnel completed surveys, but we did not personally interview 

personnel from these units.



[End of table]



Higher Headquarters Commands: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina.



Higher Headquarters Commands: U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological 

Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.



Higher Headquarters Commands: 29th Infantry Division (Light) (VA Army 

National Guard), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.



Higher Headquarters Commands: 49th Armored Division (TX Army National 

Guard), Camp Mabry, Texas.



Higher Headquarters Commands: Naval Reserve Force, New Orleans, 

Louisiana.



Higher Headquarters Commands: Naval Surface Reserve Force, New Orleans, 

Louisiana.



Higher Headquarters Commands: Naval Air Reserve Force, New Orleans, 

Louisiana.



Higher Headquarters Commands: Reserve Intelligence Area Four (U.S. 

Naval Reserve), San Diego, California.



Higher Headquarters Commands: Naval Air Reserve Point Mugu, California.



Higher Headquarters Commands: Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs, Reserve Affairs Division (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve), 

Quantico, Virginia.



Higher Headquarters Commands: 452nd Air Mobility Wing (U.S. Air Force 

Reserve), March Air Reserve Base, California.



Higher Headquarters Commands: 446th Airlift Wing (U.S. Air Force 

Reserve), McChord Air Force Base, Washington.



Higher Headquarters Commands: Headquarters California Air National 

Guard, Sacramento, California.



Higher Headquarters Commands: 153rd Airlift Wing (Air National Guard), 

Cheyenne, Wyoming.



Higher Headquarters Commands: 163rd Air Refueling Wing (Air National 

Guard), March Air Reserve Base, California.



Higher Headquarters Commands: 180th Fighter Wing (Air National Guard), 

Swanton, Ohio.



[End of table]



During our unit visits, we also held focus group discussions with 

reservists who had recently deployed. The discussions centered on 

reservists’ relationships with their civilian employers, the types of 

support that the reservists had received during their deployments, and 

steps that could be taken to improve support during future deployments. 

However, we also discussed ways that DOD and the services could improve 

their support to reservists.



To gain the perspective of reservists’ employers, we contacted the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce and held discussions with local employers in 

Austin, Texas; Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas; and Los Angeles, California. 

We also met with representatives from the major passenger and cargo 

airlines at the 2001 Military/Airline Symposium in Dallas, Texas, and 

the 2002 symposium in Crystal City, Virginia. We also reviewed the 

results of OASD/RA’s 1999 employer survey and reviewed ESGR data on 

model employers and employer problems. In addition, we mailed a survey 

to 359 employers of the reservists we visited. Because neither 

DOD[Footnote 43] nor any of the services had a complete and reliable 

data base with the names and addresses of their reservists’ civilian 

employers, we obtained employer names and addresses during our unit 

visits and mailed them our survey. These employers were not randomly 

selected; therefore, our results are not projectable to all employers. 

However, those surveyed included both small and large employers; 

federal, state, and local government entities; and private-sector 

firms.[Footnote 44]



We conducted our review from December 2000 through April 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Operational Tempos of the Reservists We Surveyed:



We surveyed 1,608 reservists from high tempo units (appendix I contains 

a list of the units we visited and contains additional details on our 

survey methodology). Of the 1,608 reservists we surveyed:



* 1,308 were “traditional” drilling reservists,



* 202 were Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) or other full-time reserve 

members,



* 20 left the question about the nature of their reserve service blank, 

and:



* 78 were Military Technicians who were required to be “drilling” 

military members of their units in order to maintain their full-time 

civilian positions with the units.



Question #15 of our survey asked reservists to fill in the number of 

days they had spent on reserve duty between September 2000 and August 

2001 (the start of our unit visits). Of the 1,308 traditional 

reservists that we surveyed:



* 712 performed more than the normally expected level of duty (39 

days),



* 476 performed between 1 and 39 days of duty,[Footnote 45] and:



* 120 left the question blank or performed no duty during the 

designated period.[Footnote 46]



In response to survey question #15, 1,188 traditional reservists said 

that they had duty. The table below summarizes their responses.



[See PDF for image]



[A] Adds to more than 100 percent due to rounding.



[End of table]



We also asked the reservists to tell us about their duty in the 2 

previous years. Forty-four of the 1,308 “traditional” reservists said 

that they averaged at least 180 days of duty per year over the entire 

3-year period. Another 253 reservists said they spent 180 days or more 

on duty during 1 or 2 of the 3 years. About one-third of the reservists 

we surveyed had spent at least 90 days on duty during 1 year during the 

period from September 1998 through August 2001.



[End of section]



Appendix III: Selected Allegations of Problems with Employers or of 

Exceptional Benefits Provided by Employers to Reservists:



During our focus group discussions with reservists from high 

operational tempo units, a number of reservists cited problems they 

allegedly had with their employers as a result of their recent military 

service. (Many of these reservists had recently deployed overseas, but 

the reservists were not all deployed at the same time or for the same 

length of time.) Some alleged that their employers, while not breaking 

the law, had acted in ways that, if true, violated the spirit of 

USERRA. Yet a number of reservists also told us of ways in which their 

employers went out of their way--and beyond the requirements of the 

law--to support them. Reservists we interviewed worked for both public 

and private employers and in firms of all sizes, from Fortune 500 

companies with more than 100,000 employees to firms with a handful of 

employees.



It should be noted that we did not verify the statements made to assess 

their accuracy, and we did not follow up with the Department of Labor 

or the ESGR to determine whether or how problems were resolved. 

Appendix IV contains a summary of some of the provisions of USERRA, in 

layman’s language.



Examples of Problems Identified by Reservists:



Many of the examples below, if true, may have been violations of the 

law; others are examples of questionable practices; still others are 

examples of the hostile work environments that some reservists face.



* One Army National Guard member said he was placed on 90-day 

probation, lost his seniority, was denied the annual raise that went 

into effect during his absence, and lost vacation time and other 

benefits.



* One Army National Guard member alleged that she was denied a raise, 

bonuses, vacation time, and the right to purchase 600 shares of company 

stock after her deployment.



* One Army National Guard member was told he would have to reapply for 

his job. He did, but after waiting 4 months for a response, he found 

work elsewhere.



* One Army National Guard member said the company for which she had 

worked for 13 years laid her off in her absence as part of a downsizing 

and subtracted 1 week of vacation time and 3 personal days of leave.



* One Army National Guard member who worked for a defense contractor 

said she was denied a raise and some accrued leave.



* One Army National Guard member said he was demoted, lost his title 

and his office, was given menial tasks, and was denied a raise.



* One Army National Guard member said she was fired. Her supervisor 

told her that the work she was contracted to perform was finished and 

that there was nothing left for her to do.



* One Army National Guard member alleged that his employer denied him a 

pay raise that he was due.



* One Army National Guard member said that although the company 

president was very supportive of her military obligations, her 

supervisor was not. The supervisor apparently told her she was passed 

over for promotion and did not receive a raise because she had not 

performed at the same level as others, due to her absence.



* One Army National Guard member who works for the federal government 

said he was denied a raise and was passed over for promotion because he 

had been away on deployment.



* One Army National Guard member said his employer canceled his health 

benefits.



* One Army National Guard member said he was fired immediately upon 

giving his employer advance notice of his deployment. The employer, a 

religious organization, allegedly told the reservist that USERRA does 

not apply to religious institutions.



* One Army National Guard member said he was fired, allegedly for 

missing a deadline while he was on deployment.



* One Army National Guard member said he was told he no longer had a 

job because his employer had hired someone else during his absence.



* One Army National Guard member had to wait 30 days to have his health 

benefits reinstated when he returned to his job.



* One Army National Guard member said his employer took away 2 personal 

holidays because he had been unable to use them during deployment.



* One Army National Guard member said he was denied a Christmas bonus 

that was given to all full-time workers.



* One Army National Guard member said he was denied a raise. He was 

deployed for 270 days, and when he returned, there were only 6 days 

left in the evaluation cycle. His employer told him that 6 days is not 

enough to use as a basis for a rating, and therefore did not approve a 

raise.



* One Army Reserve member said he was fired before his deployment, 

shortly after he attended a 2-week training session and a 3-week 

exercise.



* One Army Reserve member said he was denied vacation time and was 

warned he would be fired if he remained in the reserves.



* One Army Reserve member said he had to reapply for his health 

insurance benefits and faced a waiting period before coverage resumed.



* One Army Reserve member who works for a government agency said he was 

not allowed to contribute to his Thrift Savings Plan while deployed and 

“had trouble” returning to his job and lost some status.



* One Army Reserve member was told that because the company’s health 

care provider had changed during his absence, there would be a 

probationary period before his health coverage would become effective.



* One Air Force Reserve member said he was fired, adding that his 

district manager made it known that he did not like the idea of reserve 

participation.



* One Air Force Reserve member was denied a request to take 1 paid day 

of leave before and after a weekend drill and said she was forced to 

take unpaid leave instead. She was also told that she would have to 

take leave for all future reserve duty that conflicted with her job.



* One Air National Guard member stated that he lost dental insurance 

coverage.



* One Air National Guard member said he was removed from the promotion 

list several times because of the time that he spent on reserve duty.



* One Air National Guard member said his employer unfairly terminated 

him and actively discourages participation in the reserves.



* One Air National Guard member who worked for a local law enforcement 

agency said he was fired, and that his department head deliberately 

transferred or “drove out” reservists.



* One Naval Reserve member said he was fired just before being 

deployed.



* One Marine Corps Reserve member said that when she told her new 

employer at a federal agency that she wanted to join the reserves, her 

supervisor warned her it would not be a good idea to join the reserves 

during her probationary period.



* One Air National Guard member said that the probationary period at 

his job is longer for reservists and that being in the reserves is a 

setback for promotion consideration.



* One Army National Guard member who worked for a defense contractor 

said that her supervisor and co-workers treated her with hostility. In 

addition, she said that she was given limited and less desirable tasks 

as a result of her reserve duty.



* One Army National Guard member said his supervisor asked him whether 

he had volunteered or had been ordered to active duty. The reservist 

believed that his supervisor would have fired him, had he volunteered.



* One Army National Guard member said that although his supervisor was 

very familiar with agency policy, someone in the personnel department 

was not. As a result, he was charged leave for his military duty.



* One Army National Guard member said that his supervisor constantly 

harasses him, asking “When are you planning to leave the Guard?”:



* One Army Reserve member said his employer offered him a promotion on 

the condition that he not deploy to Bosnia.



* Two Air National Guard members who worked for a local law enforcement 

agency said they were “reproached” by their supervisors as a result of 

their military duties and questioned regarding their “loyalty” to the 

department.



* One Air National Guard member, on return to his job, was assigned to 

night shift duty. His supervisor told him that the change was 

temporary.



* One Air Force Reserve member said his employer has a policy of 

denying employees the ability to “bid” for jobs if they are deployed 

for more than 179 days.



Examples of Additional Benefits Provided by Employers:



Many employers provide additional pay, as well as benefits that exceed 

the requirements of USERRA. The following examples, cited by service 

members, illustrate some of these benefits.



* A Fortune 500 company that employs some 100,000 people provided an 

Army National Guard member with differential pay and health and life 

insurance coverage while on deployment.



* A company with roughly 400 employees provided an Army National Guard 

member with differential pay.



* Another company provided an Army National Guard member differential 

pay based on his years of experience.



* An educational institution offered a teacher who is also in the Army 

National Guard differential pay during the duration of his deployment.



* An oil company offered one of its Army National Guard employees 

differential pay during his deployment.



* One company provided an Army National Guard member with health care 

coverage and full salary for 90 days during a deployment.



* A state education board offered to pay 4 months salary to an Army 

National Guard member during deployment.



* A telecommunications company paid 100 percent of an Army National 

Guard member’s health care premiums during a deployment that exceeded 

30 days.



* A Fortune 500 company paid an Army Reserve member his full salary 

during deployment.



* A large corporation notified an Army Reserve member of a promotion 

opportunity and held the position open for 3 months, until the 

reservist returned from deployment. The company also provided extended 

leave after deployment and sent care packages and letters during the 

deployment.



* A large accounting and consulting firm provided 4 weeks’ paid 

vacation, 2 weeks’ pay for annual training, and 2 weeks of differential 

pay to a Marine Corps Reserve member during deployment.



* A medium-sized law firm provided a Marine Corps Reserve member 1 

month’s salary and 2 weeks of paid vacation.



* One company provided a Marine Corps Reserve member with health 

insurance coverage and 1 month’s salary during a deployment.



[End of section]



Appendix IV: Some Key Provisions from the Uniformed Services Employment 

and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA):



The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 

enacted October 13, 1994 (Public Law 103-353 codified in Title 38 U.S. 

Code, Chapter 43, sections 4301-4333), addresses employee rights after 

involuntary and voluntary military service. The law covers both active 

duty military members and reservists and applies following basic 

training, weekend drills, and annual training, as well as during times 

of national emergency. This appendix summarized only those provisions 

of USERRA that are referred to in the report and does not attempt to 

discuss these provisions in detail.



* Advance notice. The law requires that service members provide their 

employers with advance notice of military service. Notice may be either 

written or oral. It may be provided by the employee or by an 

appropriate officer of the branch of the military in which the employee 

will be serving. However, no notice is required if military necessity 

prevents the giving of notice, or it is otherwise impossible or 

unreasonable to give notice.



* Duration of service. To retain reemployment rights, cumulative 

absences for military service may not exceed 5 years with respect to 

the particular employer relationship for which a person seeks 

reemployment. However, many military absences do not count against this 

limit. Therefore, it is very unlikely for reservists to exceed the 5-

year limitation unless they accept voluntary orders for extended active 

duty periods. The following are some of the types of duty that do not 

count against the 5-year limitation:



* required training for Reserve and National Guard members, such as 

annual training and weekend drills;



* duty during a war or national emergency;



* duty under involuntary orders during a domestic emergency or national 

security related situations;



* service by volunteers who are ordered to active duty in support of a 

“critical mission or requirement” in times other than war or national 

emergency and when no involuntary call-up is in effect; and:



* federal service by members of the National Guard called into action 

by the president to suppress an insurrection, repel an invasion, or to 

execute the law of the United States.



* Reporting back to work. Time limits for returning to work generally 

depend on the duration of a person’s military service.[Footnote 47]



* Service of 1 to 30 days - After returning from duty, service members 

must report back by the beginning of the first regularly scheduled work 

period on the first full calendar day and the expiration of 8 hours. 

If, due to no fault of the employee, timely reporting back to work 

would be impossible or unreasonable, the employee must report back to 

work as soon as possible.



* Service of 31 to 180 days - Service members must submit an 

application for reemployment no later than 14 days after the completion 

of their military service. If submission of a timely application is 

impossible or unreasonable, the application must be submitted as soon 

as possible.



* Service of 181 or more days - Service members must submit an 

application for reemployment no later than 90 days after the completion 

of their military service.



The reporting or application deadlines are extended for up to 2 years 

for persons who are hospitalized or convalescing because of a 

disability incurred or aggravated during the period of military 

service. Such 2-year period shall be extended for the minimum time 

required to accommodate circumstances beyond the person’s control. If 

the person fails to report to work or to apply for reemployment within 

the required time limits, the person will be subject to the employer’s 

rules governing unexcused absences.



* Documentation upon return. An employer has the right to request that 

a person who is absent for a period of service of 31 days or more 

provide documentation showing that the person’s reemployment is timely, 

and that the person has not exceeded the 5-year service limitation and 

the person’s separation from service was other than disqualifying under 

38 U.S.C. §4304. If a person does not provide satisfactory 

documentation because it is not readily available or does not exist, 

the employer still must promptly reemploy the person.



* Placement of eligible persons in a job.



* Service of 1 to 90 days - The Service members shall be promptly 

reemployed in the following order of priority: (A) in the position the 

person would have held had the person remained continuously employed so 

long as the person is qualified for the job or can become qualified 

after reasonable efforts by the employer to qualify the person; or (B) 

in the position of employment in which the person was employed on the 

date of the beginning of the service in the uniformed services, only if 

the person is not qualified to perform the duties of the position 

referred to in subparagraph (A) after reasonable efforts by the 

employer to qualify the person. Employers do not have the option of 

offering other jobs or equivalent seniority, status, and pay.



* Service of 91 or more days - In addition to the priority above, if a 

person cannot become qualified for the positions in (A) or (B) above, 

then in any other position of lesser status and pay, but that most 

nearly approximates the above positions (in that order) that the 

employee is qualified to perform with full seniority.



* Seniority and non-seniority rights. Reemployed service members are 

entitled to the seniority-based rights and benefits that they would 

have attained with reasonable certainty if they had remained 

continuously employed. Additionally, departing service members must be 

treated as if they are on a leave of absence. Consequently, while they 

are away they must be able to participate in any rights and benefits 

that are available to other employees who are on nonmilitary leaves of 

absence. If there are different types of nonmilitary leave, the service 

members must be accorded the most favorable type of leave.



* Vacation pay. Service members must be permitted to use any vacation 

they had accrued before the beginning of their military service, 

instead of unpaid leave. However, service members cannot be forced to 

use vacation time for military service.



* Health benefits. Health benefit continuation is provided for persons 

who are absent from work to serve in the military. Service members may 

continue their health coverage for up to 18 months after their absences 

begin or for their periods of service (plus the time allowed to apply 

for reemployment), whichever is shorter. The premiums that an employee 

can be charged depend on the length of the employee’s absence.



* Military service of 30 days or less - Service members cannot be 

charged more than the normal employee share of any premium.



* Military service of 31 days or more - Service members can be charged 

up to 102 percent of the full (employee and employer) premium for the 

coverage.



No waiting periods or exclusions can be imposed upon reinstated 

employees who would have maintained their health coverage if they had 

not been absent for military service.



* Discrimination. The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of 

uniformed service status. Employment discrimination because of past or 

future military obligations is prohibited.



[End of section]



Appendix V: Guard and Reserve Member Survey:



[See PDF for image]



[End of section]



Appendix VI: Employer Survey:



[See PDF for image]



[End of section]



Appendix VII: Characteristics of Employers that Responded to Our 
Survey:



We received 111 responses to the survey we sent to 359 employers of 

reservists in the high tempo units included in our analysis. This 

response rate was much lower than anticipated for several reasons. 

First, after we had mailed our survey to the employers, all U.S. Postal 

Service mail deliveries to GAO were suspended due to anthrax concerns. 

Second, we did not include any surveys that arrived after March 29, 

2002. Finally, because survey responses were anonymous, we could not 

conduct phone surveys with employers who had not responded to the mail 

survey. Because we did not survey a random sample of reservists’ 

employers, the results of our survey are not projectable to all 

employers. However, the responses came from a variety of different 

types and sizes of employers as summarized below. These organizations:



* Represented employers of different sizes--from 4 to 41,810 employees:



Responses to Survey Question #5.



[See PDF for image]



[End of table]



* Had different numbers of reservist employees--from 0 to 763:



Responses to Survey Question #8.



[See PDF for image]



Note: figures add to 101% due to rounding.



[End of table]



* Represented all sectors of the economy:



* Federal Government Agencies (7):



* State and Local Governments (31):



* Manufacturing Firms (11):



* Professional/Technical Organizations (13):



* Marketing Firms (3):



* Service Providers (25):



* Other (21):



* Health Care Providers:



* Mining Firms:



* Banks:



* Construction Firms:



* Churches/Religious Organizations:



* Transportation Providers:



* Non-profit Institutions:



* Came from at least 12 different states and the District of Columbia:



* Alabama (1):



* California (16):



* District of Columbia (2):



* Kansas (1):



* Maryland (6):



* Minnesota (1):



* North Carolina (2):



* New Jersey (2):



* New York (5):



* Texas (6):



* Utah (1):



* Virginia (17):



* Wyoming (12):



Note: To help protect the anonymity of respondents, the surveys did not 

ask the respondents for their names or locations. However, the 

respondents were asked to separately mail a post card that indicated 

the employer had completed the survey. The information on the location 

of the respondents came from the post cards, not from the surveys. 

Unfortunately, we received only72 post cards to go with the 111 

surveys.



[End of section]



Appendix VIII: Reserve Recruiting--Goals and Annual Accessions (1992-

2001):



FY92; Goal; ARNG: 65,233; USAR: 59,700; USNR: 17,887; USMCR: [Empty]; 

ANG: 10,376; USAFR: 10,423; DOD Total: 163,619.



FY93; Goal; ARNG: 68,177; USAR: 50,600; USNR: 19,537; USMCR: 10,140; 

ANG: 10,454; USAFR: 10,592; DOD Total: 169,500.



FY94; Goal; ARNG: 69,710; USAR: 46,500; USNR: 13,144; USMCR: 11,122; 

ANG: 10,325; USAFR: 10,434; DOD Total: 161,235.



FY95; Goal; ARNG: 60,649; USAR: 47,732; USNR: 13,660; USMCR: 11,748; 

ANG: 8,496; USAFR: 12,578; DOD Total: 154,863.



FY96; Goal; ARNG: 61,793; USAR: 50,179; USNR: 16,850; USMCR: 10,388; 

ANG: 11,000; USAFR: 7,090; DOD Total: 157,300.



FY97; Goal; ARNG: 59,262; USAR: 47,935; USNR: 16,950; USMCR: 10,063; 

ANG: 9,996; USAFR: 9,702; DOD Total: 153,908.



FY98; Goal; ARNG: 56,638; USAR: 47,940; USNR: 15,329; USMCR: 10,174; 

ANG: 8,004; USAFR: 10,874; DOD Total: 148,959.



FY99; Goal; ARNG: 56,958; USAR: 52,084; USNR: 20,455; USMCR: 9,464; 

ANG: 8,520; USAFR: 11,791; DOD Total: 159,272.



FY00; Goal; ARNG: 54,034; USAR: 48,461; USNR: 18,410; USMCR: 9,341; 

ANG: 10,080; USAFR: 9,624; DOD Total: 149,950.



FY01; Goal; ARNG: 60,252; USAR: 34,910; USNR: 15,250; USMCR: 8,945; 

ANG: 11,808; USAFR: 8,051; DOD Total: 139,216.



FY92; Accessions; ARNG: 71,700; USAR: 67,342; USNR: 17,864; USMCR: 

[Empty]; ANG: 11,606; USAFR: 10,533; DOD Total: 179,045.



FY93; Accessions; ARNG: 67,360; USAR: 50,255; USNR: 18,367; USMCR: 

10,216; ANG: 9,163; USAFR: 10,908; DOD Total: 166,269.



FY94; Accessions; ARNG: 61,248; USAR: 47,412; USNR: 13,006; USMCR: 

11,236; ANG: 9,177; USAFR: 11,464; DOD Total: 153,543.



FY95; Accessions; ARNG: 56,711; USAR: 48,098; USNR: 13,701; USMCR: 

12,043; ANG: 8,351; USAFR: 9,757; DOD Total: 148,661.



FY96; Accessions; ARNG: 60,444; USAR: 46,187; USNR: 16,820; USMCR: 

12,566; ANG: 9,958; USAFR: 7,566; DOD Total: 153,541.



FY97; Accessions; ARNG: 63,495; USAR: 47,153; USNR: 17,106; USMCR: 

10,744; ANG: 9,986; USAFR: 8,383; DOD Total: 156,867.



FY98; Accessions; ARNG: 55,401; USAR: 44,212; USNR: 14,986; USMCR: 

10,213; ANG: 8,744; USAFR: 8,877; DOD Total: 142,433.



FY99; Accessions; ARNG: 57,090; USAR: 41,784; USNR: 15,715; USMCR: 

9,565; ANG: 8,398; USAFR: 7,518; DOD Total: 140,070.



FY00; Accessions; ARNG: 61,260; USAR: 48,596; USNR: 14,911; USMCR: 

9,465; ANG: 10,730; USAFR: 7,740; DOD Total: 152,702.



FY01; Accessions; ARNG: 61,956; USAR: 35,622; USNR: 15,344; USMCR: 

9,117; ANG: 10,258; USAFR: 8,826; DOD Total: 141,123.



FY92; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 109.9%; USAR: 112.8%; USNR: 99.9%; USMCR: 

[Empty]; ANG: 111.9%; USAFR: 101.1%; DOD Total: 109.4%.



FY93; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 98.8%; USAR: 99.3%; USNR: 94.0%; USMCR: 

100.7%; ANG: 87.7%; USAFR: 103.0%; DOD Total: 98.1%.



FY94; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 87.9%; USAR: 102.0%; USNR: 99.0%; USMCR: 

101.0%; ANG: 88.9%; USAFR: 109.9%; DOD Total: 95.2%.



FY95; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 93.5%; USAR: 100.8%; USNR: 100.3%; USMCR: 

102.5%; ANG: 98.3%; USAFR: 77.6%; DOD Total: 96.0%.



FY96; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 97.8%; USAR: 92.0%; USNR: 99.8%; USMCR: 

121.0%; ANG: 90.5%; USAFR: 106.7%; DOD Total: 97.6%.



FY97; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 107.1%; USAR: 98.4%; USNR: 100.9%; USMCR: 

106.8%; ANG: 99.9%; USAFR: 86.4%; DOD Total: 101.9%.



FY98; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 97.8%; USAR: 92.2%; USNR: 97.8%; USMCR: 

100.4%; ANG: 109.2%; USAFR: 81.6%; DOD Total: 95.6%.



FY99; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 100.2%; USAR: 80.2%; USNR: 76.8%; USMCR: 

101.1%; ANG: 98.6%; USAFR: 63.8%; DOD Total: 87.9%.



FY00; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 113.4%; USAR: 100.3%; USNR: 81.0%; USMCR: 

101.3%; ANG: 106.4%; USAFR: 80.4%; DOD Total: 101.8%.



FY01; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 102.8%; USAR: 102.0%; USNR: 100.6%; 

USMCR: 101.9%; ANG: 86.9%; USAFR: 109.6%; DOD Total: 101.4%.



ARNG--Army National Guard:



USAR--United States Army Reserve:



USNR--United States Naval Reserve:



USMCR--United States Marine Corps Reserve:



ANG--Air National Guard:



USAFR--United States Air Force Reserve:



[End of table]



In fiscal year 2001, five of DOD’s six reserve components achieved 

their recruiting goals. While this is a significant accomplishment, 

recruiting results of the recent past indicate that recruiting figures 

should continue to be scrutinized closely. The fiscal year 2001 success 

did not come without a cost. In recent years the services have had to 

increase the size of their recruiting forces, expand their bonus 

programs, increase their education incentives, and increase their 

advertising budgets. In addition, the nation was in a recession in 

2001.



While recruiting goals are important, the services and reserve 

components view recruiting within the context of their programmed end 

strengths. If retention is better than expected in a particular year, 

then the reserve components may achieve their desired end strengths 

without achieving their recruiting goals. This was the case for the Air 

National Guard in fiscal year 2001; it achieved only 82 percent of its 

recruiting goal, but achieved 100.4 percent of its end 

strength.[Footnote 48]



While end strengths are more important than recruiting figures in the 

short term, a service or component that consistently misses its 

recruiting goals is likely to eventually suffer long term consequences, 

regardless of its end strength position. A component that repeatedly 

misses its recruiting goals will need to continue retaining a higher-

than-average percentage of recruits during subsequent years or it will 

eventually become out of balance, with too many senior personnel and 

not enough junior personnel. Over time, increasing numbers of personnel 

at the senior levels make it more difficult for those people to be 

promoted. Decreased promotion rates tend to lead to increased attrition 

rates, which would lead to end strength problems if a component were 

already having problems meeting its recruiting goals.



[End of section]



Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Defense:



See comment after this appendix.



RESERVE AFFAIRS:



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500:



Ms. Carol R. Schuster:



Director, Defense Capabilities Management U.S. General Accounting 

Office Washington, D. C. 20548:



Dear Ms. Schuster:



This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General 

Accounting Office (GAO) draft report GAO-02-608, “RESERVE FORCES: DoD 

Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations Between Reservists and Their 

Employers,” dated May 1, 2002 (GAO Code 702099). This office 

appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the draft GAO 

report and offers the following comments and concerns.



Although the audit began in December 2000, much of the analysis was 

accomplished during a time of turbulence in the DoD as the War on 

Terrorism had increased operational tempos for the Reserve components. 

In this regard, the GAO acknowledges that the events of September 2001 

limited their survey responses, and the face-to-face interviews of 

Reserve component members focused on only a small cross section of high 

usage units and are admittedly not projectable to the entire Reserve 

force.



While in general concurrence with the recommendations, this office has 

concerns with the specific tracking and reporting requirements in 

recommendation number four concerning the timely issuance of orders. 

While there is merit to studying reasons why the Reserve components 

sometimes miss this goal, the requirement for reporting would create a 

further administrative burden on those engaged in the order issuance 

process. However, the Department has encouraged the components to 

review their processes and establish metrics for internal management 

purposes. We will continue in our overall efforts to improve the 

timeliness of receipt of mobilization and deployment orders by Reserve 

component members.



We also have concerns with recommendation number six. The Department 

made a specific recommendation, in coordination with the Reserve 

components senior leadership, to include the RCs in this aspect of the 

High Deployment policy:



Suggested technical changes for clarification and accuracy have been 

provided separately to the GAO staff.



The DoD comments to the draft report recommendations are provided in 

the enclosure.



Sincerely,



Craig W. Duehring Principal Deputy:



Signed by Craig W. Duehring:



Enclosure: As stated:



GAO CODE 702099/GAO-02-608:



“RESERVE FORCES: DOD ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER MANAGE RELATIONS BETWEEN 

RESERVISTS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS”:



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:



RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in 

conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs, reexamine the provisions of the Privacy Act and determine 

whether requiring Reservists to report information about their civilian 

employers is consistent with the act. If a positive determination is 

made, the Secretary should require all Reserve personnel to provide the 

Defense Manpower Data Center with the name, full address, and telephone 

number of their civilian employer, and update this information 

promptly, as necessary. (Page 27/Draft Report).



DoD RESPONSE: Concur. OSD/RA will again contact the Department’s 

Privacy Act point of contact for a determination. If a favorable 

determination is made, development and implementation of DoD and 

service policies and procedures will ensure comprehensive population of 

the employer support database will be attained.Follow-up procedures 

will also be developed to ensure the database is promptly updated in 

the event of employer change.



RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in 

conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs, add students as a target population to the mission and 

responsibilities of the ESGR, study in depth the problems related to 

deployments that student Reservists have experienced, and determine 

what actions the ESGR might take to help students and their educational 

institutions. (Page 27/Draft Report).



DoD RESPONSE: Concur. During strategic planning, ESGR identified 

students and educational institutions as a target customer group. 

However, without additional resources ESGR can only provide limited 

information and mediation for Guard and Reserve students.



RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in 

conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs, direct the ESGR to promptly finalize and implement its plans 

to have all calls to ombudsmen routed through a single toll-free number 

and central processing station. (Page 27/Draft Report).



DoD RESPONSE: Concur. Implementation of this recommendation is nearly 

complete. ESGR plans also call for the eventual development of a call 

center to increase capability and further take advantage of this 

concept.



RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in 

conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs, direct the Services to determine how many orders are not being 

issued 30 days in advance of deployments, and why. We recognize that it 

will not be possible to achieve the 30-day goal in all cases. Once the

causes are identified, the Secretary should direct the Services to take 

the necessary corrective actions and to report quarterly to the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs on the progress 

achieved in reducing the number of cases. (Page 27/Draft Report).



DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. Instituting a repetitive reporting 

requirement would create a further administrative burden on those who 

are currently involved in the orders issuance process. We are 

continuing to strongly emphasize the importance of the thirty-day order 

window. We also have encouraged the components to review their 

processes and establish metrics for internal management purposes. 

Finally, we are hopeful that the new personnel system, DIMHRS, will 

make this goal more feasible. The OSD objective is to establish, in 

DoDI 1235. 10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the 

Ready Reserve, a policy requiring issuance of orders 30-days in 

advance, unless operational requirements dictate otherwise.



RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in 

conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs, develop a policy so that Reserve units will provide employers, 

upon request, with verification of military service periods lasting 

less than 30 days. (Page 27/Draft Report).



DoD RESPONSE: Concur.The Department will investigate development and 

implementation of such a policy. However, any such policy should only 

be required if the verification of military service is “upon request” 

from the employer.



RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in 

conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs, analyze the effects of the high-deployment per diem statutory 

provision on Reservists, taking into account that deployment patterns 

for Reservists are different from those of Active Duty members, and 

that virtually no Reservists have been forced to deploy involuntarily 

for more than 400 days over a 730-day period; if warranted, propose 

changes to this statutory provision. (Page 27/Draft Report).



DoD RESPONSE: Non concur. The Department made a specific determination, 

in coordination with the Reserve components senior leadership, to 

include the RCs in this aspect of the High Deployment Policy. The 

objective of this aspect of the High Deployment Policy is to prevent 

excessive TDY burdens being placed on any Active or Reserve member. If 

the RC, as a force provider to Combatant Commanders, have long term 

requirements to fill, it may be better that more personnel be asked to 

participate in such operational support.



RECOMMENDATION 7: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in 

conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs, analyze, on a ongoing basis, departmental data on trends in 

the Reserve components for use in formulating outreach activities to 

employers. (Page 27/Draft Report).



DoD RESPONSE: Concur. As stated in recommendation 1 the successful 

development of the Employer Support Database will greatly enhance the 

Department’s outreach activities.



Comment: In view of DOD’s stated Actions, we have modified our 

recommendation by dropping a quarterly reporting requirement and 

replacing it with a requirement to periodically assess the services’ 

progress toward fuller compliance with the 30-day goal.



[End of section]



Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contact:



Gwendolyn Jaffe (202) 512-4691:



Acknowledgments:



James Bancroft, Larry Bridges, Herbert Dunn, Jack Edwards, Michael 

Ferren, J. Kris Keener, Stefano Petrucci, Irene Robertson, and Matthew 

Sakrekoff also made significant contributions to the report.



[End of section]



FOOTNOTES



[1] Pub. L. 103-353, October 13, 1994, 38 U.S.C. §§4301-4333.



[2] In this report, operational tempo refers to the total days 

reservists spend participating in normal drills, training, and 

exercises, as well as domestic and overseas operational missions. 



[3] Some reserve components expect their members to perform 38 days of 

duty each year, while other components expect 39. The difference 

largely centers on how the components view travel to annual training. 

Some count it as part of the training, and others authorize an “extra” 

day for travel. 



[4] Coast Guard Reserve figures have been included when available from 

DOD. However, we did not include the Coast Guard Reserve in our focus 

groups since it comes under the Department of Transportation in time of 

peace and reverts to the Department of the Navy only in wartime or when 

directed by the president.



[5] The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and 

Reserve is sometimes abbreviated NCESGR, but throughout this report we 

use the more common ESGR abbreviation to include both the headquarters 

and volunteer field staff of the organization.



[6] 5 U.S.C. §552a.



[7] The 1.3 million figure excludes members of the retired reserve. 



[8] See note 1.



[9] It should be noted that the operational tempo during our 1992 

baseline year already exceeded the 38 or 39 days of training that 

reservists are normally expected to attend each year. 



[10] Average training figures can fall below 38 days per year for a 

number of reasons. Personnel who retire or leave the reserves during 

the year may attend only a few days of training before leaving. Some 

training may also be waived for a certain period of time following a 

reservist’s return from a long deployment. Finally, some reservists may 

not attend training as expected. 



[11] These figures exclude full-time Guard and Reserve members and new 

members who have not yet completed their basic military and technical 

skills training. 



[12] A “partial” mobilization permits the President to mobilize ready 

reserve units and individuals (up to 1 million reservists) for as long 

as 2 years, while presidential reserve 

call-ups, such as those for operations in the Balkans and Southwest 

Asia were limited to 

270 days.



[13] Coast Guard participation peaked on October 4, 2001, when 21.5 

percent of the Coast Guard Reserve members were on active duty.



[14] About 5,000 of the Naval Reserve personnel who were mobilized went 

to force security positions. 



[15] 5 U.S.C. §552a.



[16] Most of the reserve units we visited did not maintain employer 

lists. A few had assembled lists when they were deployed, but they did 

not keep them up to date after their deployments. 



[17] In 1999 the reserve components had almost 880,000 members who 

participated in regular training.



[18] National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 

(NCESGR), 

August 17, 1999.



[19] www.esgr.org is one of these web sites.



[20] 32 CFR 44.5(b)(1).



[21] Appendix IV includes additional details on the specific provisions 

of the act that relate to this report.



[22] Since the partial mobilization in September 2001, many employers 

have increased their benefits to reservists. However, many changes are 

temporary and apply only to reservists who are specifically called to 

support the war on terrorism. Of the 111 employers who responded to our 

survey, 60 said they provide health benefits beyond those required by 

the law, 28 said that they make up the difference for employees who are 

paid less in the military than they are on their civilian jobs, and 19 

said that they provide employees with full pay for at least part of the 

time that they are gone on military duties. 



[23] We did not verify the allegations, and some reservists were 

unaware that the alleged employer misconduct might constitute a 

violation of the law.



[24] We visited this unit in the field and were able survey 32 members 

between firing exercises. However, more than triple that number 

deployed to Bosnia.



[25] Appendix V contains a copy of the survey we distributed to 

reservists in high tempo units.



[26] The Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges is a consortium of 

national higher education associations and more than 1,500 colleges. 

The organization helps to coordinate postsecondary educational 

opportunities for service members through voluntary programs that are 

funded by the military services.



[27] At the time of our review, three states (Arkansas, New Jersey, and 

Texas) had laws providing such protection. And many new recruits 

without prior military experience have joined the reserves in recent 

years to obtain funding for education.



[28] Appendix VI contains a copy of the survey, and appendix VII 

contains a profile of the employers that responded to the survey.



[29] The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs has suggested that 30 days’ advance notification is a 

reasonable goal, and the services had agreed to this goal in September 

2000.



[30] The recommended change was to DOD Directive 1235.10, “Activation, 

Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve,” July 1, 1995.



[31] Companies also derive benefits from hiring reservists. In 

responding to DOD’s 1999 survey, 72 percent of the employers surveyed 

agreed or strongly agreed with the following statement: “The training 

and experience received by a National Guard or Reserve employee makes 

that person a more valuable employee to my company.” Only 10 percent 

disagreed or strongly disagreed.



[32] Within our survey group, 1,102 reservists had full-time jobs and 

100 had part-time jobs. The remaining 406 were unemployed or did not 

respond to the question about their employment (see question 10 on the 

survey in app. V). Of the 1,202 workers, only 60 said they worked for 

firms with 5 or fewer employees. (See question 11 on the survey in app. 

V.)



[33] Because the ESGR figures are incomplete, we cannot verify whether 

its caseload is increasing. A case can range from a single telephone 

call in which a question is answered to extensive mediation efforts. 



[34] The ESGR does have accurate data from its Web site, which was 

established in fiscal year 1997 to provide information to both 

reservists and employers. In fiscal year 1998 the site had an average 

of 200 inquiries per week, but the number rose to an average of 5,000 

per week in early 2001. In October 2001 Web inquiries rose to 42,000 

per week before leveling off at about 14,000, per week in 2002. Most 

visitors to the site view the USERRA law or download the site’s list of 

frequently asked questions.



[35] See appendix VIII for additional details concerning recruiting 

goals and annual accessions.



[36] Pub. L. 106-65, Oct. 5, 1999, §586, which amended Part II of 

subtitle A of title 10, U.S.C. by inserting a new chapter, “Chapter 50-

-Miscellaneous Command Responsibilities.”



[37] 37 U.S.C. §436.



[38] Because the legislation went into effect on October 1, 2000, and 

was temporarily suspended 373 days later, on October 8, 2001, no 

service member has yet been paid a high-deployment per diem allowance.



[39] Both deployment and retention figures were available, but in many 

cases the figures were aggregated differently, which made it difficult 

to compare trends. Much of the available deployment data showed 

mobilization and demobilization dates for task force organizations but 

did not show what portion of the personnel in a particular unit 

deployed. Available attrition data was captured for traditional 

military units, divisions, wings, squadrons, battalions etc., but not 

for mission task force organizations.



[40] We did not meet with officials from the Department of 

Transportation’s U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. However, we did obtain 

background information from DOD concerning Coast Guard reservists who, 

while comprising only about 1 percent of the nation’s total reserve 

force, perform a number of key safety and security missions both at 

home and abroad.



[41] Appendix V contains a copy of the survey. We had planned to 

compare the results of our high tempo survey to the results of DOD’s 

survey of 75,000 randomly selected reservists. However, the results of 

DOD’s survey had not been finalized when we ended our audit work in 

March 2002.



[42] A good portion of our work was conducted in Texas and California, 

the two states with the largest reserve populations. There are over 

110,000 selected reserves in those two states.



[43] Following the events of September 11, 2001, DOD encouraged the 

services to collect employer information from mobilized reservists for 

future input into an automated data base. By November 6, 2001, the on-

line data base was fully functional and the services and individual 

reservists were able to enter data through the Defense Manpower Data 

Center Web site. However, by May 14, 2002, more than 73,000 reservists 

had been mobilized and the data base contained fewer than 11,000 

employer records.



[44] Appendix VII contains a copy of the survey, and appendix VIII 

provides additional details about the employers who responded to the 

survey.



[45] Some of the reservists with low duty levels were not in the 

reserves in September 2000 and joined part-way through the period 

covered by our question (September 2000 to August 2001). 



[46] Some reservists joined the reserves between the cut-off date for 

our question (August 2001) and the times when we distributed our last 

surveys (during a unit visit in January 2002). 



[47] With the exception of fitness-for-service examinations.



[48] The Air National Guard uses projected retention rates to set an 

annual recruiting goal that will lead to its desired end strength. It 

does not adjust this recruiting goal throughout the year. Therefore, 

when retention was better than expected in 2001, the Air National Guard 

made a conscious decision to recruit less than its goal in order to 

achieve its desired end strength.



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