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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

March 2009: 

Iraq: 

Key Issues for Congressional Oversight: 

GAO-09-294SP: 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Next Steps for U.S. Engagement in Iraq: 

Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to Undertake a 
Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces: 

Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.- 
Iraq Security Agreement: 

Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment 
from Iraq: 

Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in 
Iraq during a Drawdown: 

Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense's Future Costs for 
Iraq: 

Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian 
Presence in Iraq: 

Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq: 

Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the 
International Community: 

U.S. Efforts to Help Iraq Govern and Address Its People's Needs: 

Enclosure IX: Building Iraq's Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share 
of Its Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs: 

Enclosure X: Building Iraq's Capacity to Improve Critical Service 
Sectors: 

Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National 
Reconciliation: 

Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq's Refugees: 

Appendices: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force Levels in Iraq: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Treasury: 

Appendix IV: Related GAO Products: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 24, 2009: 

Congressional Committees: 

To assist the 111th Congress, we have enclosed a series of issue papers 
for consideration in developing congressional oversight agendas and 
determining the way forward in securing and stabilizing Iraq. These 
papers are based on the continuing work of the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the more than 130 Iraq-related products 
we have issued since May 2003. 

Since fiscal year 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the 
Department of Defense (DOD) for military efforts primarily in support 
of the Global War on Terrorism.[Footnote 1] The majority of this amount 
has been for military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $49 billion[Footnote 2] has 
been provided to U.S. agencies for stabilization and reconstruction 
efforts in Iraq, including developing Iraq's security forces, enhancing 
Iraq's capacity to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electricity, and 
water sectors, among other activities. This report expands on issues 
discussed on GAO's transition Web site, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-294sp]. 

In January 2007, President Bush announced The New Way Forward in Iraq 
to stem violence and enable the Iraqi government to foster national 
reconciliation. This strategy established goals and objectives through 
July 2008 and reasserted the long-term goal or end state for Iraq: a 
unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain 
itself and is an ally in the war on terror. To support the strategy, 
the United States increased its military presence through a surge of 
brigade combat teams and associated forces. In June 2008, we reported 
that the United States had made some progress in reducing overall 
violence in Iraq and working with the Iraqi government to pass 
legislation promoting national reconciliation. However, many unmet 
goals and challenges remained, including building capacity in Iraq's 
ministries, helping the government execute its capital investment 
budgets, and providing essential services to the Iraqi people.[Footnote 
3] 

With the completion of The New Way Forward and the end of the military 
surge in July 2008, we recommended that the Administration develop an 
updated strategy that clearly articulates U.S. goals, objectives, roles 
and responsibilities, and the military and civilian resources needed to 
build on security and legislative gains. Furthermore, in a second 
report,[Footnote 4] we recommended revisions to the Joint Campaign Plan 
for Iraq--an operational plan for U.S. military and civilian activities 
in Iraq developed by the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and the U.S. 
Embassy Baghdad--that would help Congress assess progress in achieving 
the conditions that would allow for the continued drawdown of U.S. 
forces in Iraq. Specifically, we recommended that DOD and the 
Department of State (State) identify and prioritize the conditions that 
must be achieved in each phase of the campaign to enable a drawdown; 
report the number of U.S. combat brigade teams and other forces 
required for each campaign phase; and estimate the time needed to reach 
the desired end state and end the military portion of the campaign. The 
strategic level actions we called for in our first report would guide 
revisions to the Joint Campaign Plan.[Footnote 5] 

In February 2009, President Obama described a new strategy for Iraq 
consisting of three parts: (1) the responsible removal of combat 
brigades, (2) sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and 
prosperous Iraq, and (3) comprehensive U.S. engagement across the 
region. According to DOD, the United States plans to reduce the number 
of combat troops from about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 
128,000 by September 2009--a difference of 12,000 troops representing 
two brigades and their support units. Under the schedule announced by 
the President, U.S. force levels would decline further by August 31, 
2010, to no more than 50,000 troops. Under the November 2008 bilateral 
security agreement[Footnote 6] between the United States and Iraq, the 
United States must remove all of its remaining forces by December 31, 
2011. 

The issues discussed in the enclosures to this report should be 
considered in further defining the new strategy and its supporting 
operational plans. Key issues include: 

* The security agreement establishes dates for repositioning U.S. 
forces in Iraq and removing them from the country--a significant change 
from the United States' prior, conditions-based strategy for Iraq. 
[Footnote 7] A responsible drawdown in Iraq will need to balance the 
timetable established in the security agreement, military doctrine that 
calls for the delineation of conditions that must exist before military 
operations can end, and the wishes of the Iraqi government. 

* If the United States adheres to the timetable contained in the 
security agreement, DOD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by the 
end of 2011. The redeployment of these forces and the removal of their 
equipment and material will be a massive and expensive effort. 

* The large U.S. military presence has provided vital support to 
civilian operations and has undertaken many traditionally civilian 
tasks. In moving forward, the United States will need to consider how 
to transition from a predominantly military presence to a civilian one 
as U.S. forces draw down. 

* As U.S reconstruction efforts end, Iraq will need to develop the 
capacity to spend its resources, particularly on investment that will 
further economic development and deliver essential services to its 
people. GAO estimates that the Iraqi government had a cumulative budget 
surplus of $47 billion at the end of 2008. 

We obtained information from agency documents and interviews with U.S. 
officials in Iraq and Washington, D.C., including DOD, State, and the 
Departments of Energy and the Treasury; the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID); the Army Corps of Engineers; MNF-I; 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency. We conducted this performance 
audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 
contains additional details about our scope and methodology. Appendix 
II provides updated information on the levels of violence in Iraq, as 
measured by the number of enemy-initiated attacks, and on the number of 
U.S. troops in Iraq. Appendix IV contains a list of GAO products 
directly related to this letter and each of the enclosures. 

The Department of the Treasury provided written comments on a draft of 
this report, which are reprinted in appendix III. Treasury agreed that 
although Iraq's end-2008 cumulative surplus fell short of GAO's earlier 
projection, Iraq's budget surpluses will sufficiently cover its 
projected 2009 budget deficit. Treasury also agreed that Iraq's 
inability to fully execute its budgets hampers the government's efforts 
to further reconstruction and economic growth. Treasury, DOD, State, 
and USAID also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated 
as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the congressional committees 
listed below. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the 
President and Vice President of the United States, and executive branch 
agencies. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any questions, please 
contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov, or 
the individual(s) listed at the end of each enclosure. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be 
found on the last page of this report. For press inquiries, please 
contact Chuck Young at (202) 512-4800. Key contributors to this report 
are included in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Gene L. Dodaro: 
Acting Comptroller General of the United States: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chair: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Vice Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Judd Gregg: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chair: 
The Honorable John M. McHugh: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chair: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Dan Burton: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Kay Granger: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to Undertake a 
Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces: 

Background: 

In November 2008, the United States and Iraq signed a bilateral 
security agreement, which governs the operations of U.S. forces in 
Iraq. The security agreement entered into force on January 1, 2009. 

Issue: 

The security agreement between the United States and Iraq establishes a 
timetable--but no conditions--for drawing down U.S. forces from Iraq by 
the end of 2011. Adopting a drawdown timetable marks a major change 
from the prior U.S. approach of drawing down forces based on security 
and other conditions in Iraq. Military doctrine states that effective 
campaign planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the 
conditions that must exist to draw down forces. In February 2009, the 
President described a new strategy in Iraq, calling for a responsible 
drawdown of U.S. forces. In further defining this strategy and revising 
the Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq, the administration will need to 
clarify what conditions need to be met to undertake this drawdown 
responsibly. 

Key Findings: 

Under Prior Administration, Conditions-based Strategy Shifted to a 
Time-based Approach for Drawing Down U.S. Forces: 

Before signing the security agreement with Iraq, the prior 
administration had linked the drawdown of U.S. forces to the 
achievement of security, political, economic, and diplomatic 
conditions. Meeting these conditions would enable the United States to 
achieve its strategic goal for Iraq: a unified, democratic, and federal 
Iraq that could govern, defend, and sustain itself and become an ally 
in the war on terror. Some conditions the United States sought to 
achieve in Iraq included an improved security situation; more capable 
Iraqi security forces; improved essential services such as access to 
clean water and reliable electricity; and the passage of legislation 
promoting national reconciliation, such as laws governing the 
distribution of oil revenues and amnesty for former insurgents. 

As GAO has previously reported, progress toward achieving these 
conditions has been mixed. For example, while the security situation 
remains tenuous, violence has decreased significantly over the past 2 
years: enemy-initiated attacks decreased from a peak of almost 180 per 
day in June 2007 to about 27 per day in January 2009 (see app. II). 
Further, the number of Iraqi army and police forces nearly doubled from 
about 320,000 in January 2007 to just over 600,000 in October 2008. 
However, according to the Department of Defense (DOD), over the same 
period, the number of Iraqi army units capable of conducting operations 
independently remained at about 10 percent of total units. 

The November 2008 security agreement marked a major shift from a 
conditions-based strategy to a time-based approach for drawing down 
U.S. forces. The security agreement sets a two-phase timetable--but 
with no security, political, economic, or other conditions--for 
removing U.S. forces from Iraq over a 3-year period, primarily because 
the Iraqi government did not agree to include conditions, according to 
DOD and State officials: 

* June 30, 2009: U.S. combat forces must withdraw from Iraqi cities, 
villages, and localities. According to DOD officials, U.S. combat 
forces would continue to conduct combined operations in these areas 
from bases located outside Iraqi cities, villages, and localities. 
Further, some U.S. forces who train Iraqi forces may be co-located with 
Iraqi units in these areas. 

* December 31, 2011: All U.S. forces must leave Iraq. According to DOD 
and Department of State (State) officials, the agreement does not 
envision any U.S. forces remaining in Iraq after that date. 

Iraq and the United States Could Move Forward or Extend the Drawdown 
Time Frame: 

Either government can unilaterally terminate the security agreement by
providing 12 months advance notice. Without a security agreement or 
other mandate, U.S. forces would lack the authority to continue 
operating in Iraq and would have to leave. For example, if Iraqis 
reject the security agreement in a referendum that may be held in July 
2009, the Iraqi government has said it would abide by the results of 
this referendum. Thus, Iraq would likely terminate the security 
agreement, and U.S. forces would have to leave Iraq by as early as July 
2010. 

In addition, DOD and State officials noted that the U.S. and Iraqi 
governments can amend the security agreement by mutual agreement. Such 
amendments could include an extension of the drawdown timetable or an 
authorization of a residual U.S. force to continue training Iraqi 
security forces after 2011. However, according to officials at State 
and DOD, the Iraqi government did not agree to include conditions-based 
provisions in the security agreement due to political pressure against 
a continued U.S. presence. 

The Administration Should Further Define What Conditions Must Be 
Achieved to Allow a Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces: 

The new administration has emphasized the importance of a responsible
drawdown of U.S. forces but has not yet defined this term. In February 
2009, the President announced a significant drawdown of U.S. forces by 
August 31, 2010 and, consistent with the security agreement, the 
removal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011. According to DOD and 
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) officials, the United States plans to 
reduce the U.S. force level from about 140,000 projected in March 2009 
to about 128,000 by September 2009, where it would remain through 
Iraq’s national election scheduled at the end of 2009. Based on 
conditions in Iraq, the MNF-I Commanding General may recommend further 
reductions prior to the election. A few months after the election, the 
United States plans to reduce forces to no more than 50,000 troops by 
August 2010 (see appendix II). 

Military doctrine states that effective planning cannot occur without a 
clear understanding of the end state for U.S. operations and the 
conditions that must exist to end military operations and draw down 
forces. According to doctrine, military operations generally should be 
driven by conditions rather than time requirements. However, DOD 
officials stated they are well aware that a 3-year timetable now exists 
for removing all U.S. forces from Iraq. 

In further defining a new U.S. strategy and revising the Joint Campaign 
Plan for Iraq, the administration must establish the parameters of a 
responsible drawdown, including clarifying the end state for U.S. 
military operations and prioritizing the conditions that would allow 
U.S. troops to draw down. It should also consider how the United States 
would respond if it does not achieve the conditions necessary for a 
responsible drawdown within the security agreement timetable. The 
administration must work with the Iraqi government in further defining 
the new strategy for Iraq. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. How does the administration define a responsible drawdown from Iraq? 

2. What is the current strategic goal for Iraq and how does it differ 
from the prior goal of a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq that can 
govern, defend, and sustain itself and become an ally in the war on 
terror? 

3. To what extent will the administration's plans for removing U.S. 
forces be based on achieving specified conditions in Iraq? 

4. To what extent will the United States attempt to renegotiate 
provisions of the security agreement if security conditions deteriorate 
or other conditions are deemed insufficient to draw down responsibly? 

5. What are the U.S. contingency plans in the event that Iraqis vote 
against the security agreement in July 2009? 

Point of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.-
Iraq Security Agreement: 

Background: 

The U.S.-Iraq security agreement provides the basis for a U.S. military 
presence in Iraq, which previously was authorized by United Nations 
(UN) Security Council resolutions. It also defines legal jurisdiction 
over U.S. servicemembers and DOD civilians and contractors in Iraq, 
which previously were covered by a Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) order. 

Issue: 

In addition to setting a timetable for drawing down U.S. forces, the 
security agreement governs the operations of U.S. forces supporting 
Iraqi efforts to maintain security and stability. It requires Iraqi 
agreement for U.S. military operations; defines U.S. and Iraqi legal 
jurisdiction over individual members of U.S. forces, Department of 
Defense (DOD) civilian employees, and U.S. forces' contractors in Iraq; 
and generally requires all U.S.-held detainees to be released or 
transferred to Iraqi custody. However, many implementing details remain 
to be resolved. In further defining the U.S. strategy and Joint 
Campaign Plan for Iraq, the administration will need to accommodate the 
substantial changes in U.S. operational authority in Iraq. 

Key Findings: 

Iraqi Government Must Agree to All U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: 

The security agreement marks a change in the nature and authority of 
the U.S. military presence in Iraq; its implementation will require a 
shift in how U.S. forces plan, coordinate, and execute operations in 
the country. From 2003 through 2008, the UN Security Council authorized 
the U.S.-led multinational force to take all necessary measures to 
maintain security and stability in Iraq. Acting under this mandate, 
U.S. forces were able to conduct combat operations against violent 
groups, search for and secure weapons, and detain Iraqis and others 
considered to be a threat to Iraq's security and stability. 

Under the security agreement, all U.S. military operations in Iraq must 
be conducted with the Iraqi government's concurrence and fully 
coordinated with Iraqi authorities through a new Joint Military 
Operations Coordinating Committee. For example, U.S. forces must obtain 
Iraqi warrants or other legal authorization to detain individuals and 
search homes, except during combat operations undertaken with Iraqi 
concurrence. U.S. forces retain the right of self-defense in Iraq, as 
defined in international law. 

According to DOD and Department of State (State) officials, many 
implementing details in the security agreement must be resolved. For 
example, it is unclear whether U.S. forces will have a "blanket" 
authorization to conduct certain types of operations, such as medical 
evacuations or routine joint patrols. As of mid-January 2009, the new 
joint coordinating committee had held two initial meetings to develop 
details on implementing the security agreement's requirements for U.S. 
military operations in Iraq. 

Security Agreement Defines U.S. and Iraqi Legal Jurisdiction over U.S. 
Military Servicemembers and DOD Civilians and Contractors: 

The security agreement covers individual U.S. military service members, 
DOD civilian employees, and U.S. contractors and subcontractors, as 
well as their employees in Iraq that supply goods, services, and 
security to or on behalf of U.S. forces under a contract with or for 
those forces. Before the security agreement, CPA Order 17 granted 
immunity from the Iraqi legal process to U.S. military personnel under 
the multinational force and to U.S. contractors operating in Iraq for 
acts performed pursuant to the terms and conditions of their contracts. 

Under the security agreement, Iraq has the primary right to exercise 
jurisdiction over members of U.S. forces and the civilian component for 
as-yet-unspecified, grave premeditated felonies, when such crimes are 
committed outside agreed facilities and duty status. The United States 
has jurisdiction over all other crimes. The security agreement requires 
Iraqi authorities to notify U.S. authorities immediately if they detain 
U.S. service members or DOD civilians and transfer them to U.S. custody 
within 24 hours. 

Under the security agreement, Iraq has the primary right to exercise 
jurisdiction over U.S. forces' contractors, subcontractors, and their 
employees in Iraq. In addition, Iraqi authorities have recently 
suspended CPA Order 17, making all U.S. and foreign contractors and 
their employees in Iraq subject to Iraqi law, according to U.S. 
officials. According to State, a joint U.S.-Iraqi committee is working 
to establish procedures and guidelines for exercising Iraqi 
jurisdiction for private contractors operating in Iraq, including those 
covered by the security agreement. 

Reports Raise Concerns about Iraqi Judicial System: 

DOD, UN, and human rights reports have identified significant 
shortcomings in Iraq's judicial system. A December 2008 Human Rights 
Watch report, for example, concluded Iraq's central criminal court 
"seriously" failed to meet international standards of due process and 
fair trials. Some of these reports raise concerns that detainees in 
Iraqi custody may be tortured or mistreated because Iraqi officials 
often rely on coerced confessions instead of physical evidence, 
particularly in criminal cases. Whether contractors could renegotiate 
their contracts given the changes in circumstances would depend on the 
terms of their contracts, according to DOD officials. These officials 
said that U.S. contractors and their employees are subject to host 
government jurisdiction in other countries where U.S. forces operate 
under a status of forces agreement. Moreover, they note that many U.S. 
contractor employees are Iraqi nationals and, as such, would be subject 
to Iraqi jurisdiction. 

Security Agreement Requires U.S. Forces to Release or Transfer 
Detainees: 

The security agreement requires the release or transfer to Iraqi 
authorities of all detainees held by U.S. forces in Iraq unless 
otherwise requested by the Iraqi government. Acting under UN mandate, 
U.S. forces detained thousands of Iraqis and others considered a threat 
to Iraq's security and stability. As of January 2009, more than 15,000 
detainees remained in U.S. custody, according to State and DOD. DOD 
officials plan to release or transfer to Iraqi custody about 1,200 to 
1,500 detainees per month based on their assessment of Iraqi 
authorities' ability to process and absorb these transfers. Under the 
security agreement, U.S. forces are to provide available information 
about all detainees in their custody to Iraqi authorities, who will 
then obtain arrest warrants for persons wanted by those authorities. 
U.S. forces are to transfer custody of those detainees subject to an 
arrest warrant and release the remaining detainees unless otherwise 
requested by the Iraqi government. According to DOD and State, many 
implementing details for this process must be resolved. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. To what extent will the change in authority for the U.S. military 
operations affect U.S. planning efforts in Iraq? 

2. To what extent will the security agreement's provisions granting 
Iraq primary legal jurisdiction over U.S. contractors and their 
employees in Iraq affect the availability and cost of contractors to 
support U.S. forces? 

3. What kinds of legal protection, if any, could the United States 
provide to contractors in Iraq given the current state of the Iraqi 
judicial system? 

4. To what extent have Iraqi and U.S. officials identified appropriate 
legal authority and developed options for detaining individuals that 
pose continuing security threats to Iraqi or U.S. forces? 

5. What possible amendments to the security agreement, if any, should 
the United States seek to negotiate with Iraq? 

Point of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment 
from Iraq: 

Background: 

Department of Defense (DOD) guidance emphasizes the importance of early 
planning for redeploying U.S. forces and equipment. 

Issue: 

The exact pace for redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq has yet to be 
determined. If the United States adheres to the timeline contained in 
the security agreement, DOD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by 
the end of 2011. In addition, the redeployment of U.S. forces and the 
removal of their equipment and material will be a massive and expensive 
effort. As of March 2008, the United States had in place about 170,000 
pieces of equipment worth about $16.5 billion that would need to be 
removed from Iraq. 

Key Findings: 

DOD's Initial Plans for Redeploying U.S. Forces from Iraq Focused on 
Three Key Assumptions: 

It is unclear how the timeline in the security agreement and operations 
in Afghanistan will affect DOD plans for redeploying U.S. forces and 
equipment from Iraq. As of September 2008, DOD's redeployment plans for 
Iraq were based on three key assumptions that may no longer be 
applicable: 

* Any redeployment will be based on Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 
and Department of State assessments of security and other conditions in 
Iraq. 

* There will be sufficient lead time to refine redeployment plans once 
an order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued. 

* The redeployment of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated 
on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and an estimated flow of no 
more than 2.5 brigades' worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq 
through Kuwait each month. 

DOD Should Consider Key Issues in Developing a Comprehensive Plan for 
Redeploying U.S. Forces from Iraq: 

Based on discussions with DOD officials and an analysis of planning 
efforts, GAO found that the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD's 
redeployment efforts will depend on the extent to which it develops 
plans that address several issues. For example: 

* Roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the return of 
materiel and equipment. Although the U.S. Central Command has 
designated an executive agent to coordinate the redeployment of U.S. 
forces from the Iraqi theater, no unified structure exists to 
coordinate the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and execute 
the return of materiel and equipment. This results in confusion on the 
ways in which those teams should be utilized. Joint doctrine states 
that an unambiguous chain of command and clear responsibilities and 
authorities are necessary for any such effort. In September 2008, GAO 
recommended that DOD take steps to clarify a unified or coordinated 
chain of command over logistical operations. In commenting on our draft 
report, DOD indicated it was taking steps to implement this 
recommendation. 

* Time and cost estimates for base closures. Closing or handing over 
U.S. installations in Iraq will be time consuming and costly. As of 
November 2008, there were 283 U.S. installations in Iraq that will need 
to be closed or turned over to Iraqi forces. According to U.S. Army 
officials, experience has shown that it takes 1 to 2 months to close 
the smallest platoon-or company-size installations, which contain 
between 16 and 200 combat soldiers or marines. However, MNF-I has never 
closed large, complex installations--such as Balad Air Force Base, 
which contains about 24,000 inhabitants and has matured over 5 years. 
U.S. Army officials estimate it could take longer than 18 months to 
close a base of that size. 

* Uncertainties regarding redeployment of contractors. Maintaining 
accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S. government 
property under the control of contractors may present challenges to 
redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq. According to Defense Contract 
Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of 
contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. From late 2007 
through July 2008, planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces did not 
include a theater-wide plan for redeploying contractors. 

* Use of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries. The pace 
at which units can be redeployed and U.S. equipment returned would be 
governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring countries, and 
restrictions on their use. According to DOD, Kuwait is the main point 
of exit for all personnel, equipment, and materiel in Iraq. There are 
nine installations that the United States uses to support operations in 
Iraq, and the U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement governs their 
use. Any redeployment must consider the terms of this agreement, 
particularly given Kuwait's desire to limit the U.S. footprint in 
Kuwait, according to DOD. 

* Availability of transportation and security assets and route 
restrictions. The availability in theater of military owned and 
operated heavy equipment transports and convoy security assets, 
combined with limits on the primary supply route, could inhibit the 
flow of materiel out of Iraq. According to DOD, two types of heavy 
equipment transports support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of 
operations: commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored 
military transports. Any increase in the number of civilian transports 
without a corresponding increase in military transports to facilitate 
control and security increases the risk of accidents. However, DOD 
officials have reported shortages of military transports in theater. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. To what extent has planning begun for the drawdown of U.S. forces 
from Iraq in accordance with the security agreement? 

2. What are the plans and processes by which U.S. installations in Iraq 
will be turned over to the Iraqis? 

3. What are the plans and processes for determining the disposition of 
contractor-managed, U.S.-government-owned property in Iraq? 

4. To what extent will neighboring countries be able to support the 
drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with timelines outlined 
in the security agreement? 

5. What effect, if any, will the expansion of operations in Afghanistan 
have on the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq? 

Point of Contact: 

William Solis, 202-512-8365, solisw@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in 
Iraq during a Drawdown: 

Background: 

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) have relied heavily 
on contractors in Iraq to support troops, civilian personnel, and 
reconstruction efforts. As of October 2008, DOD estimated it had more 
than 163,000 contractors under its contracts. Contractors have provided 
security services, life support, and facilities maintenance, among 
other things. 

Issue: 

Over the past 6 years, contractors have played a key role in U.S. 
efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. As the U.S. and Iraqi 
governments implement the November 2008 security agreement that governs 
the presence, activities, and drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq, DOD 
and State will need to assess the type and level of contractor support 
needed during the drawdown of U.S. forces. At the same time, both 
departments will need to overcome challenges in providing a sufficient 
number of trained personnel to effectively manage and oversee 
contractor performance. As the administration further defines its plans 
for Iraq, it will need to consider the implications of the changing 
nature of contractor support, as well as ways to enhance DOD's and 
State's management capacity. 

Key Findings: 

DOD and State Have Had Difficulties Managing and Overseeing Contractors 
in Iraq: 

Both DOD's and State's ability to effectively manage their contractors 
in Iraq has been hindered by several challenges. The challenges 
experienced by one or both of these agencies include a failure to 
adequately plan for the use of contractors and clearly define their 
requirements, a lack of acquisition and trained contract management and 
oversight personnel with experience working in contingency operations, 
and a lack of policies and procedures. Further, both DOD and State have 
had difficulties identifying the number of contractor personnel in 
Iraq. The lack of visibility makes it difficult for commanders and 
other senior leaders to make informed decisions on the food, housing, 
and security needed for contractors who reside on U.S. facilities. In 
July 2008, DOD and State entered into an agreement to use a common 
database to track contractor personnel in Iraq; however, DOD officials 
have acknowledged that there are weaknesses in the systems designed to 
track contractor personnel in theater. 

DOD's and State's Capacity to Provide Personnel to Oversee Contractors 
Remains Uncertain: 

The lack of a sufficient number of trained acquisition and contractor 
oversight personnel continues to present a considerable challenge to 
both DOD and State. This has contributed to higher costs and schedule 
delays and has hindered operations. For example, 

* In September 2008, GAO reported that the lack of qualified personnel 
to oversee contracts, including those providing linguistic services and 
maintaining the military equipment used in Iraq, hindered efforts to 
oversee and, as necessary, correct poor contractor performance in a 
timely manner. For example, in many cases, the contractor presented 
military equipment that failed government inspection and had to be 
repaired again at additional expense and time to the government. DOD 
personnel indicated they lacked the resources to perform data analyses, 
identify trends in contractor performance, and improve quality 
processes. 

* In July 2008, GAO raised concerns about whether DOD could sustain 
increased levels of oversight on its private security contractors. GAO 
found, for example, that the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), 
which had been recently tasked to provide contract administration over 
private security contracts, increased the number of its personnel in 
Iraq by shifting personnel from other locations and had no strategy for 
sustaining this increase. 

* In January 2009, State's Office of the Inspector General reported 
that the department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not have a 
strong control environment to ensure its primary security service 
contract in Iraq is effectively managed due, in part, to frequent 
changes in management personnel and understaffing combined with a 
drastic increase in workload. In response, State noted that it planned 
to increase the number of contract oversight personnel in Iraq for its 
private security contract and develop additional policy and guidance to 
better manage these contractors. 

Level and Nature of Future Contractor Support Needs to Be Assessed: 

As the drawdown of U.S. military forces occurs, DOD will need to assess 
the proper mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, civilian, and 
contractor personnel during this transitional period. Our prior work 
has shown that the nature and relative degree of contractor support can 
change as the military's mission changes. For example, in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, contractors assumed responsibility for certain support 
functions that had been previously performed by military personnel. 
Moreover, State's reliance on contractors may increase as the 
department currently depends on DOD to provide some services. The U.S.-
Iraq security agreement complicates this assessment because it changes 
the conditions under which contractors operate. For example, the 
agreement includes several provisions that affect U.S. contractors 
working for DOD, such as providing the Iraqi government the primary 
right to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. contractors in the enforcement 
of criminal and civil laws. Similar agreements could also affect U.S. 
contractors working for DOD, particularly State's security contractors. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. To what extent are DOD and State taking actions to improve their 
ability to track and identify contractor personnel in Iraq? To what 
extent do the departments know the functions these contractors are 
performing? 

2. What are the desired mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, 
civilian, and contractor personnel in light of the planned drawdown of 
U.S. forces? What actions are needed to achieve this desired mix? 

3. What process is DOD using to assess the impact of the November 2008 
security agreement and its implementation on DOD's use of U.S. 
contractors to support deployed forces or other key functions? What 
plans has DOD developed in the event that contractors providing 
essential services withdraw their employees? 

4. Is DCMA's workforce sufficient in terms of size and skill level to 
support contingency operations without degrading its ability to oversee 
contractor performance in the United States and elsewhere? 

5. Have DOD and State (1) assessed whether the drawdown of U.S. forces 
in Iraq will increase its reliance on contractors and (2) taken action 
to ensure they have sufficient numbers of contract oversight personnel? 

6. What action is State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security taking to 
ensure the effective oversight of its security contractors? 

Points of Contact: 

William Solis, 202-512-8365, solisw@gao.gov. 

John Hutton, 202-512-7773, huttonj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense's Future Costs for 
Iraq: 

Background: 

Since 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the Department 
of Defense (DOD) for military efforts in support of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT). The majority of this amount has gone to military 
operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Issue: 

DOD has reported substantial costs for Iraq and can expect to incur 
significant costs in the foreseeable future, even as the United States 
develops plans to scale back its presence in Iraq. GAO has found 
problems with DOD processes for cost reporting and estimating--
processes that will be of critical importance to making sound decisions 
about the defense budget. In addition to the need for better cost 
information, moving funding that is currently outside the annual budget 
process into DOD's base budget would enable decision makers to better 
weigh priorities and assess trade-offs. 

Key Findings: 

Near-term Costs for Iraq Are Likely to Be Considerable: 

U.S. military commitments in Iraq, and their associated costs, will 
continue to be substantial, particularly in the near term. These types 
of costs include procurement of new and replacement equipment and 
operation and maintenance costs, which include items such as housing, 
food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation to move 
people, supplies, and equipment. The magnitude of DOD costs will depend 
on several factors and, in some cases, assumptions and decisions that 
have not been made. For example, these costs will likely be affected 
by: 

* implementation of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement and associated 
troop redeployment plans; 

* the nature and extent of continued U.S. military and civilian 
presence in Iraq; 

* types of facilities needed to support troops remaining in and around 
Iraq and costs associated with turning facilities over to Iraq; 

* availability of transportation and security assets to remove materiel 
from Iraq; and: 

* the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. 

Although reducing troops would appear to lower costs, GAO has seen from 
previous operations in the Balkans and Kosovo that costs could rise in 
the near term. For example, as GAO reported in February 2008, the U.S. 
Army estimated it would cost $12 billion to $13 billion a year for at 
least 2 years after the operation ends to repair, replace, and rebuild 
the equipment used in Iraq. Moreover, as GAO reported in September 
2008, the cost of closing the large number of installations in Iraq 
will likely be significant, according to U.S. Army officials. However, 
these costs are difficult to estimate due to uncertainties related to 
the management of hazardous materials and waste, as well as the 
transfer of personal property. Finally, after deployed units return 
home, DOD will need to invest in training and equipment to return these 
units to levels capable of performing "full spectrum operations"--all 
of which could increase war-related costs. 

Reliable Cost Reporting and Cost Estimating Processes Are Critical for 
Sound Defense Funding and Budgetary Decision Making: 

As of September 2008, DOD has reported about $508 billion in 
obligations for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. However, our prior work has shown that the data in DOD’s 
monthly report of GWOT obligations are of questionable reliability. GAO 
was unable to ensure that DOD’s reported obligations for GWOT were 
complete and accurate. Therefore, these reported obligations, including 
obligations for specific operations, should be considered 
approximations. For example, GAO found numerous problems with DOD’s 
processes for recording and reporting its war-related costs, including 
long-standing deficiencies in DOD’s financial management systems and 
business processes, the use of estimates instead of actual cost data, 
and the lack of adequate supporting documentation. DOD has taken some 
steps to address these issues, but problems remain. Meanwhile, DOD uses 
these reported obligations to develop funding estimates for many types 
of costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, such as procurement 
and some types of equipment reset. Without transparent and accurate 
cost information, Congress and DOD will not have reliable information 
on how much the war is costing, sufficient details on how appropriated 
funds are spent, or the reliable historical data needed to develop and 
provide oversight of future funding needs. 

Funding for operations in support of GWOT, including Operation Iraqi
Freedom, has been provided through annual appropriations, as well as
supplemental appropriations that are outside the annual budget process. 
With U.S. commitments in Iraq continuing for the foreseeable future, 
requiring decision makers to make difficult decisions, GAO has 
recommended that DOD consider moving recurring costs into the baseline 
budget, as it has done with other operations. As costs for an operation 
reach a known level of effort and costs become more predictable, 
additional funding should be built into the baseline budget to provide 
decision makers with more transparent information. GAO has made 
recommendations to improve transparency and fiscal responsibility 
related to funding the war on terrorism and to help Congress and the 
administration establish priorities and make trade-offs among those 
priorities in defense funding. DOD has taken steps to address several 
of GAO’s recommendations in order to improve the reliability and 
transparency of its reported cost information and some progress has been
made. However, until all DOD efforts are more fully implemented, it is 
too soon to know the extent to which these changes will improve the 
reliability of DOD’s cost reporting. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. To what extent has DOD estimated the future costs of any continued
military involvement in Iraq? 

2. How will the redeployment of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq 
affect funding needs and requirements? 

3. What steps is DOD taking to move recurring GWOT costs into its 
baseline budgets? 

4. What steps is DOD taking to accurately report costs by operation? 

5. How will DOD balance funding requirements for Iraq with funding 
needs to support other military operations, such as in Afghanistan? 

6. What, if any, steady state funding will be required to support DOD 
activities in Iraq following the eventual drawdown of U.S. combat 
forces? 

Point of Contact: 

Sharon Pickup, 202-512-9619, pickups@gao.gov: 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian 
Presence in Iraq: 

Background: 

A May 2004 presidential directive affirmed, upon the termination of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority, that the Chief of Mission would assume 
responsibility for all U.S. employees, policies, and activities in 
Iraq, except those under an area military commander. It also gave the 
U.S. Central Command responsibility for U.S. security and military 
operations in Iraq, and U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces. 

Issue: 

The United States had a projected 140,000 military personnel deployed 
in Iraq in March 2009 (see appendix II). In addition, there are about 
1,300 authorized U.S. personnel assigned to the U.S. embassy in 
Baghdad--one of the largest in the world--including about 450 civilian 
personnel at 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) at the provincial 
and neighborhood levels. The large U.S. military presence has provided 
vital support to civilian operations and has undertaken many 
traditionally civilian tasks. In further defining its strategy for 
Iraq, the administration needs consider how to transition from a 
predominantly military presence to a civilian one as U.S. forces draw 
down. 

Key Findings: 

U.S. Military Has an Extensive Organizational and Basing Footprint in 
Iraq: 

The projected 140,000 U.S. military personnel in Iraq are part of the 
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). This U.S.-led force operates under 
the U.S. Central Command and consists of three major units--the 
Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which is 
responsible for organizing Iraqi security forces; the Multinational 
Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the tactical unit responsible for command and 
control of operations throughout Iraq; and the Gulf Region Division, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which provides engineering, program, and 
project management support for civil and military construction 
throughout Iraq (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Organization of Multinational Force-Iraq: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Secretary of Defense: 

U.S. Central Command: 

Multinational Force - Iraq (Lead: United States): 
* Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq (Lead: United 
States); 
* Multinational Corps - Iraq (Lead: United States); 
- Multinational Force - West (Lead: United States); 
- Multinational Division - North (Lead: United States); 
- Multinational Division - South East (Lead: United Kingdom); 
- Multinational Division - Baghdad (Lead: United States); 
- Multinational Division - Center (Lead: United States); 
* Gulf Regional Division U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Lead: United 
States). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and Multinational Force-Iraq documents. 

[End of figure] 

MNF-I has an extensive basing footprint in Iraq. According to a DOD 
report, as of March 2009, MNF-I had a total of 51 larger bases--known 
as contingency operation bases and sites--throughout the country. 
Contingency operating bases are usually occupied by an element larger 
than a brigade combat team, typically serve as a hub for command and 
control or logistics, and may include an airfield that can accommodate 
C-130 aircraft. MNF-I also has about 232 smaller bases, known as 
contingency operation locations, that are usually occupied by a 
battalion-size element capable of quick response to operations, 
security, civic assistance, and humanitarian assistance relief. 

Large Military Presence Has Supported U.S. Civilian Operations and Has 
Undertaken Many Civilian Tasks: 

In addition to conducting counterinsurgency operations, U.S. military 
personnel under MNF-I and its subordinate commands have performed a 
wide range of activities in Iraq, including supporting U.S. civilian 
operations, rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, and training and 
equipping Iraqi security forces. For example: 

* U.S. military forces provide PRTs--most of which are located on U.S. 
military bases--with extensive security, food, housing, medical 
evacuation, and other support. The military commander has authority 
over the security and movement of embedded PRTs. Many others provide 
security for PRTs that are collocated with U.S. military units. As U.S. 
forces draw down, the Department of State (State) will have to play a 
larger role in providing security and other support for U.S. civilians. 

* The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, and MNC-I 
have played key roles in reconstructing Iraq. As of January 2009, the 
Gulf Region Division had overseen nearly $7 billion in reconstruction 
projects in such areas as electricity, oil, water, hospitals, and 
schools. Further, from fiscal years 2004 through 2008, DOD obligated 
about $3.3 billion in Commander's Emergency Response Program funds for 
projects that are intended to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction requirements at the brigade and battalion levels. This 
program has funded about 34,400 education, electricity, sanitation, and 
other projects. In comparison, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID)--the primary U.S. foreign assistance agency--has 
obligated $7.2 billion on reconstruction projects in several areas in 
Iraq from fiscal year 2003 through the end of December 2008. It is 
unclear what assistance USAID will provide after U.S. forces leave 
Iraq. 

* Two MNF-I subordinate commands support the development of capable 
Iraqi security forces. MNSTC-I is responsible for organizing, training, 
equipping, and mentoring Iraqi military and police, as well as advising 
Iraq's Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense. Brigades under 
MNC-I partner with Iraqi army units during operations. This arrangement 
differs from other countries where a DOD security cooperation 
organization manages security assistance programs for the military and 
State manages and funds police training under the direction and 
supervision of the Chief of Mission. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. How does the U.S. government plan to provide security, housing, 
medical evacuation, and life support for its civilian personnel in Iraq 
as U.S. forces draw down and eventually leave Iraq? 

2. What additional resources, if any, would State, USAID, or other 
civilian agencies require to compensate for the loss of military 
support to civilian government operations and tasks? 

3. What is DOD and State's plan for transitioning assistance to Iraqi 
security forces from MNF-I to a traditional security cooperation 
organization and police training program under Chief of Mission 
authority? 

Points of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq: 

Background: 

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is one of the largest U.S. embassies in the 
world. As of March 2009, it had about 1,300 authorized U.S. civilian 
positions. 

Issue: 

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad was established under extraordinary 
circumstances in a war zone environment. Normalizing embassy 
operations, including determining appropriate staffing levels, will be 
a challenge. Security vulnerabilities and escalating costs have led to 
calls to evaluate and realign--or rightsize--the number and location of 
staff at U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide. A clearly defined 
strategy for U.S. efforts in Iraq will be critical for the rightsizing 
exercise at Embassy Baghdad. 

Key Findings: 

State Has Adopted GAO's Rightsizing Framework: 

In 2002, GAO developed a framework that provides a systematic approach 
for assessing overseas civilian government workforce size and 
identifying options for rightsizing. The framework links staffing 
levels to the mission's priorities and requirements, physical security, 
and operational costs. The rightsizing framework encourages 
consideration of a range of options for meeting workload requirements 
after an analysis of mission, security, and cost trade-offs. Decision 
makers are then able to determine whether to add, reduce, or change the 
staff mix at an embassy. The Office of Management and Budget and 
Department of State (State) have adopted this framework. State has used 
it as the basis for rightsizing reviews at more than 120 embassies. 

Embassy Baghdad Is Scheduled to Conduct a Rightsizing Review in 2009: 

Embassy Baghdad is scheduled to conduct a rightsizing review in the 
fall of 2009 to link its long-term staffing needs to key mission goals. 
The embassy should consider the following as part of this review: 

* Assessing mission priorities and requirements. The placement and 
composition of staff overseas must reflect the highest priority goals 
of U.S. foreign policy, both in terms of worldwide presence, and within 
a specific post. The 2009 rightsizing review will require a long-term, 
strategic assessment of Embassy Baghdad priorities and allow State and 
other agencies to determine their workload requirements. 

* Determining the appropriate mix of staff. As of March 2009, Embassy 
Baghdad had about 1,300 authorized U.S. civilian positions and a mix of 
contractors, third country nationals, and locally hired Iraqis. Unlike 
most other posts, State has faced challenges in hiring and retaining 
Iraqi employees, as association with the U.S. government continues to 
place Iraqi embassy staff at risk. Thus, State has had to rely more 
extensively on U.S. direct-hire civilians and contractors than is 
customary at other U.S. embassies--a more costly approach than hiring 
local Iraqis. 

* Determining the future role of temporary U.S. civilian entities in 
Iraq. The number of U.S. civilians in Iraq has been, in part, driven by 
the need to staff temporary entities in Iraq. For example, as of March 
2009, the U.S. government had about 450 personnel deployed to U.S.-led 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq, which aim to increase 
Iraq's capacity to govern and deliver public services. According to 
State, PRTs will eventually draw down, but there is currently no 
determination as to what residual form, if any, the PRTs will take. 
Furthermore, in 2007, State established the temporary Iraq Transition 
Assistance Office (ITAO) to help maintain an effective diplomatic 
presence in Iraq. ITAO was tasked with supporting U.S. agencies in Iraq 
in their implementation of U.S. foreign assistance, including hiring 
temporary U.S. employees. At Embassy Baghdad, according to State, there 
are about 100 such positions. It is unclear what role, if any, 
temporary entities such as PRTs and ITAO will play in the future. 

* Providing security for U.S. civilian personnel during and after the 
U.S. military transition. According to State, Embassy Baghdad has more 
security requirements than other U.S. embassies. Keeping staff secure, 
yet productive, remains one of the largest challenges for State's 
diplomatic security agents, who are responsible for securing the 
embassy's personnel, facilities, and information. According to State, 
in addition to diplomatic security agents, the department obligated 
about $1.1 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2008 to fund 
approximately 1,400 security contractors in Iraq. To secure the embassy 
personnel and safeguard embassy information, State also has relied on 
support from the U.S. military. As the U.S. military transitions out of 
Iraq, State's workload--and thus its resource requirements--will 
increase. 

* Assessing the costs of Embassy Baghdad operations. State has called 
for the consolidation of as many administrative and programmatic 
activities at overseas posts as possible to contain costs and expose 
fewer employees to security risks. The International Consolidated 
Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system offers a standard method 
of sharing administrative costs such as motor pool, utilities, and 
information technology services. According to State, ICASS is not 
operational in Iraq due to the mission's security needs. Some agencies 
may need to reassess their staffing levels in Iraq once they are 
required to pay their share of administrative costs. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. What type of diplomatic mission does the administration envision in 
Iraq and how does it plan to provide for the security of its personnel, 
facilities, and information? 

2. To what extent does State have contingency plans in place if Embassy 
Baghdad is unable to decrease its reliance on U.S. civilian government 
personnel over the next 5 years? 

3. To what extent does State have plans in place to balance priorities 
for temporary entities in Iraq, such as PRTs, and any future consulates 
in Iraq against the security requirements and costs of operations? 

4. When should non-State agencies at Embassy Baghdad be expected to 
contribute to the full-cost recovery of administrative support 
services? 

Points of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

Jess Ford, 202-512-4268, fordj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the 
International Community: 

Background: 

Since 2003, 38 countries have participated in the coalition to help 
secure Iraq. In addition, 42 nations and international organizations 
have provided direct financial assistance in the form of grants or 
loans for reconstruction efforts. Several nations have also forgiven 
some of Iraq's outstanding debt to help Iraq finance its reconstruction 
efforts. 

Issue: 

The international community is an important partner in Iraq's 
reconstruction and economic development efforts, providing varying 
levels of military and financial assistance since 2003. Since January 
2004, the United States' 38 coalition partners have collectively 
contributed as many as 25,600 troops to help stabilize the security 
situation. International organizations and several countries also 
pledged substantial financial assistance for reconstruction efforts, 
offering Iraq almost $12 billion in loans and providing $5.6 billion in 
grants. The Paris Club and commercial creditors have forgiven most of 
Iraq's Saddam Hussein regime debt, as Iraq seeks relief from its high 
debt burden. As the United States further defines its assistance 
strategy for Iraq, it must coordinate its efforts with those of the 
international community. 

Key Findings: 

Non-U.S. Coalition Troops Expected to Leave Iraq by July 2009: 

By December 2003, the multinational force in Iraq included 34 nations 
and almost 151,000 troops--about 24,000 of which were provided by 
coalition partners.[Footnote 8] As the security situation has improved 
and the United Nations (UN) mandate for the multinational force 
expired, most coalition partners have removed their troops. As of March 
2009, only three coalition partners remain in Iraq--Australia, Romania, 
and the United Kingdom. These coalition partners have an agreement with 
Iraq to remove their troops by July 2009 (see figure 1). At that time, 
the United States will be the sole remaining nation with troops 
stationed in Iraq. 

Figure 1: Non-U.S. Coalition Troops in Iraq: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a line graph plotting the number of non-U.S. coalition 
troops against the dates of January 2004 through July of 1009 
(projected troop levels from current date through July). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

The International Community Has Provided Reconstruction Funding: 

To support reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and essential 
services, international donors have offered Iraq almost $12 billion in 
loans and provided about $5.6 billion in grants. As of January 2009, 
the Iraqi government had entered into agreements to borrow more than 
$3.7 billion from Italy, Iran, Japan, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the World Bank, according to the Department of State 
(State). Of the $5.6 billion given in grants, almost one-third--or $1.8 
billion--has been deposited in the International Reconstruction Fund 
Facility for Iraq, which is composed of two trust funds, one run by the 
UN Development Group and the other by the World Bank. Almost all of 
these funds have been committed to almost 160 projects that will be 
completed by 2010. In February 2009, the UN and World Bank presented 
plans to commit the remaining funds and close out the trust funds by 
2013. Both organizations plan to fund any additional assistance to Iraq 
through other funding streams, according to State. 

As the security situation has improved, international organizations 
have increased their assistance and re-examined their strategies. In 
August 2008, the UN released its Iraq Assistance Strategy for Iraq 
2008-2010 that defines how the UN will support Iraq's reconstruction in 
various sectors, including governance, education, and economic reform 
through projects and technical assistance. In the last year, the UN 
also has added staff and is considering opening offices in Kirkuk, 
Najaf, Ramadi, and Mosul to support its increased assistance 
activities. Similarly, the World Bank is developing an updated 
assistance strategy to replace its current strategy from August 2005. 

Some of Iraq's Creditors Have Supported Reconstruction through Debt 
Relief: 

To help attract investment needed to finance its economic 
reconstruction, Iraq has sought debt forgiveness for loans taken under 
the Saddam Hussein regime. At the end of 2004, Iraq owed about $120 
billion to foreign creditors--an amount almost five times the size of 
its economy at the time. Of that external debt, Iraq owed about $36 
billion to members of the Paris Club,[Footnote 9] who committed to 
forgive 80 percent of that debt if Iraq agreed to follow an IMF reform 
program. Iraq received the final tranche of Paris Club debt relief in 
late 2008. Nevertheless, Department of the Treasury officials estimate 
that Iraq owes between $49 and $77 billion in bilateral debt. In 
addition to these debts, Iraq owes $29 billion in compensation claims 
for damages and losses resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait in 1990.[Footnote 10] Iraq's oil revenues are currently immune 
from garnishment, liens, and other judgments that would compel Iraq to 
pay these debts and claims, but this immunity will expire in December 
2009 absent further UN Security Council action. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. What efforts are under way to help Iraq coordinate any future 
bilateral assistance, including the United States, for meeting its 
reconstruction and development needs? 

2. How will U.S. strategic planning reflect the efforts of the UN and 
other international organizations in such areas as elections 
assistance, resolution of disputed internal boundaries, and electricity 
production? 

3. How is the United States helping Iraq in its efforts to secure 
relief from its remaining Saddam Hussein regime debts? 

Point of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure IX: Building Iraq's Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share 
of Its Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs: 

Background: 

Oil export revenues are critical to Iraq's economy, accounting for over 
half of the country's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of 
revenues. From 2005 through 2008, Iraq generated an estimated $152 
billion in revenues from crude oil export sales. 

Issue: 

From 2005 through 2007, Iraq had an estimated cumulative budget surplus 
of $29 billion, in part due to limited spending of its investment 
budgets. The need for Iraq to spend its own resources has become 
increasingly critical as U.S. agencies have obligated nearly 90 percent 
of the $49 billion in U.S. appropriations since fiscal year 2003 for 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq. Agencies have 
disbursed nearly 80 percent of these appropriations, as of December 
2008. Iraq's substantial oil reserves and current budgetary resources 
offer the government of Iraq the potential to better finance more of 
the costs of its own security, reconstruction, and economic needs. 

Key Findings: 

Iraqi Government Accumulated Surpluses from 2005 through 2008: 

As of June 2008, the Iraqi government had accumulated financial 
deposits of $39.6 billion (a 33 percent increase from December 2007), 
held in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) at the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank and central government deposits at the Central Bank of 
Iraq (CBI) and Iraq's commercial banks. This balance is the result, in 
part, of an estimated cumulative budget surplus from 2005 through 2008. 
This amount does not include funds in Iraq's foreign exchange reserves, 
funds held at the New York Federal Reserve Bank intended for Foreign 
Military Sales purchases, or funds disbursed from the DFI to J.P. 
Morgan Chase and Citibank for payment on letters of credit. 

For 2008, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $68 billion in 
total revenues, of which crude oil export sales accounted for about $62 
billion. As displayed in table 1, Iraq ended 2005 through 2007 with a 
cumulative budget surplus of $29 billion. GAO estimates that Iraq ended 
2008 with another budget surplus of $18.3 billion. As a result, the 
Iraqi government had a cumulative budget surplus of about $47.3 billion 
at the end of 2008. This is less than GAO's prior projection of a 
cumulative surplus of between $67 billion and $79 billion and reflects 
declining oil prices and an increase in Iraqi spending. In the 
preliminary 2009 Iraqi budget, the Iraqi government projects a budget 
deficit of $16 billion, which would indicate that it plans to spend a 
portion of the accumulated surpluses from prior years. 

Table 1: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surpluses, 2005-2008: 

Total revenues; 
2005: $24.1 billion; 
2006: $32 billion; 
2007: $39.9 billion; 
Total; 2005-2007: $96.0 billion; 
2008: $67.8 billion; 
Total 2005-2008: $163.7 billion. 

MoF expenditures; 
2005: $17.6 billion; 
2006: $22.8 billion; 
2007: $26.6 billion; 
Total; 2005-2007: $67.0 billion; 
2008: $49.5 billion; 
Total 2005-2008: $116.5 billion. 

Surplus; 
2005: $6.5 billion; 
2006: $9.2 billion; 
2007: $13.3 billion; 
Total; 2005-2007: $29.0 billion; 
2008: $18.3 billion; 
Total 2005-2008: $47.3 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBI and IMF data and Iraqi Ministry of Finance 
Budget (MoF). 

Note: Total revenues for 2008 are based on actual crude oil export 
receipts and IMF projections for other revenues, such as taxes and 
domestic oil sales. Sums may differ from totals due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

Iraqi Government Has Been Unable to Spend All of Its Investment Budget: 

Iraq's inability to spend its resources, particularly on investment 
activities, limits the government's efforts to further economic 
development and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. From 
2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government spent an estimated $67 billion 
on operating and investment activities. Ninety percent was spent on 
operating expenses, such as salaries and goods and services, and the 
remaining 10 percent on investments, such as structures and vehicles. 
While total expenditures grew from 2005 through 2007, Iraq was unable 
to spend all of its budgeted funds. For example, in 2007, Iraq spent 80 
percent of its $29 billion total operating budget and 28 percent of its 
$12 billion total investment budget. However, the central government 
ministries[Footnote 11] responsible for providing essential services to 
the Iraqi people spent a smaller share, 11 percent, of their $8 billion 
investment budgets. In 2008, Iraq's investment expenditures have 
increased as compared to 2007. Iraq spent 39 percent of its $24 billion 
investment budget, while the central government ministries have spent 
23 percent of their $16 billion investment budget. According to U.S. 
government, coalition, and international officials, a number of factors 
continue to affect the Iraqi government's ability to spend more of its 
revenues on capital investments and effectively manage resources. These 
factors include the shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and 
budgeting systems, and violence and sectarian strife. 

U.S. Has Funded Capacity Building Activities Since 2005 but Lacks 
Integrated Strategy: 

Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies have led individual efforts to 
improve the capacity of Iraq's ministries without having an overall 
integrated strategy. In 2007, The New Way Forward emphasized the need 
to build capacity in Iraq's ministries and help the government execute 
its capital investment budgets. In response, U.S. capacity development 
efforts shifted their emphasis from long-term institution-building 
projects to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their 
inability to spend their capital investment budgets. 

In October 2007, GAO recommended that Congress consider conditioning 
future appropriations on the completion of an integrated strategy for 
U.S. capacity development efforts. In June 2008, State and Treasury 
created a new Public Financial Management Action Group to help 
integrate and coordinate U.S. government assistance to improve budget 
execution. In addition, in September 2008, State hired a contractor to 
draft a strategic planning document for ministry capacity development. 
As of March 2009, State is reviewing the contractor's proposals. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. How do U.S. capacity-building efforts and future foreign assistance 
programs in Iraq address the government of Iraq's ability to spend its 
resources on investment and maintenance activities? 

2. What strategy does the United States have for transferring remaining 
defense and reconstruction costs to the government of Iraq as current 
U.S. appropriations for these rebuilding activities ends? 

3. What budgetary resources can the government of Iraq provide to 
increase its support for security, economic, and reconstruction efforts 
in the country? 

Point of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure X: Building Iraq's Capacity to Improve Critical Service 
Sectors: 

Background: 

Following the 2003 invasion, U.S. and Iraqi authorities inherited an 
infrastructure that had deteriorated due to the previous regime's 
neglect, international sanctions, and years of conflict, leaving many 
Iraqis with limited or no access to essential services. 

Issue: 

The Iraqi government's efforts to increase its legitimacy and counter 
the insurgent threat depend, in large part, on its ability to expand 
its oil exports and provide essential services such as electricity and 
clean water to all Iraqi communities. Given that appropriated U.S. 
funds for rebuilding these sectors have largely been expended, 
continued reconstruction and sustainability will be dependent on an 
Iraqi government that can resolve the challenges it faces in delivering 
essential services. As the administration further defines its plans for 
Iraq, it will need to consider how best to support the Iraqi 
government's efforts and address these challenges. 

Key Findings: 

Oil Production and Exports Have Increased but More Investment Is 
Needed: 

Oil production and exports account for about 90 percent of Iraq's 
revenue. The Iraqi government's ability to fund reconstruction efforts 
and provide for its citizens depends, in part, on increasing oil 
production and exports. Iraqi and U.S. government investments in the 
oil sector have increased production and exports since 2003, but U.S. 
officials have stated that insufficient focus on security limited the 
impact of the initial U.S. investment. Iraq's oil production increased 
from an annual average of 1.3 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2003 to 
2.36 mbpd as of March 2009. According to the Departments of Defense and 
State (State), investment in Iraq's oil sector is below the minimum 
required to sustain current production; additional foreign and private 
investments are needed. The Ministry of Oil has indicated that 
investments between $25 billion and $75 billion are needed to achieve 
its production target of 6 mbpd. In 2008, the Ministry of Oil spent 
$421 million, or 19 percent of its investment budget for that year. 

Electricity Production Has Increased, but Demand Continues to Outstrip 
Capacity: 

Restoring the electrical infrastructure is critical to reviving the 
Iraqi economy and ensuring productivity of the oil sector; however, 
demand has grown substantially and continues to outstrip capacity. For 
2008, supply met around 52 percent of demand, even with increased 
generation. As a result, Iraq continues to experience electrical 
shutdowns despite billions of dollars invested. According to State, at 
the end of November 2005, average hours of power per day were 8.7 hours 
in Baghdad and 12.6 hours nationwide; by the end of November 2008, 
Baghdad averaged 15.4 hours and the rest of the country averaged 14.6 
hours. The Iraqi Ministry of Electricity estimated in its 2006-2015 
plan that it would need $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to 
provide reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015. However, U.S. 
government officials working with the ministry estimate twice that 
amount will be needed for power generation, transmission, distribution, 
and other infrastructure. Based on U.S. and United Nations reporting, 
inadequate operating and maintenance practices, as well as the lack of 
skilled technicians, inhibit an effective electrical infrastructure. 

Even with Additional Capacity, Many Iraqis Remain without Potable 
Water: 

In the water sector, as of July 2008, U.S.-funded projects had the 
capacity to provide an additional 8.1 million Iraqis with potable 
water, short of the goal of 8.5 million. Even with the additional 
capacity, many Iraqis are without water or have access to water that 
puts them at risk of diseases such as cholera and dysentery, as 
evidenced by outbreaks in 2007 and 2008. According to the United 
Nations, only 40 percent of children have reliable access to safe 
drinking water; with water treatment plants operating at only 17 
percent capacity, large volumes of untreated waste are discharged into 
Iraq's waterways. The health risks associated with a lack of access to 
potable water and proper sewage treatment are compounded by the 
shortage of medical professionals in Iraq's health care system. The 
World Bank has estimated $14.4 billion is needed to rebuild the Iraqi 
public works and water system. 

Iraqi Government Has Spent Little on Improving Essential Services and 
Faces Challenges in Sustaining Existing Projects: 

Iraq has not followed through on commitments to spend more of its own 
money on reconstruction efforts and faces challenges sustaining U.S.-
funded projects. As table 1 indicates, U.S. agencies have spent 87 
percent, or about $9.5 billion, of the $10.9 billion allocated since 
fiscal year 2003 for reconstruction activities in the oil, electricity, 
and water sectors. In contrast, Iraq has spent about 12 percent, or 
about $2.0 billion of the $17.2 billion allocated for investment 
activities in these sectors. In addition, Iraq has faced difficulties 
in sustaining U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. According to U.S. 
officials, Iraqi managers lack the skill level and authority to create 
plans and buy the materials necessary to sustain projects in the energy 
and water sectors. Moreover, poor security has prevented the successful 
implementation of long-term training programs to create the local 
capacity needed to operate and maintain U.S.-funded projects. 

Table 1: Comparison of U.S. and Iraqi Allocations and Spending for 
Selected Sectors (in billions of U.S. dollars): 

Sector: Oil; 
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-2008, allocated: $2.7 billion; 
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-June 2008, spent[A]: $2.5 billion; 
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, allocated: $10.8 billion; 
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, spent[A]: $0.7 billion. 

Sector: Electricity; 
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-2008, allocated: $5.3 billion; 
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-June 2008, spent[A]: $4.8 billion; 
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, allocated: $5.2 billion; 
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, spent[A]: $0.8 billion. 

Sector: Water resources; 
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-2008, allocated: $2.9 billion; 
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-June 2008, spent[A]: $2.2 billion; 
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, allocated: $1.3 billion; 
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, spent[A]: $0.6 billion. 

Sector: Total; 
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-2008, allocated: $10.9 billion; 
U.S. Government: Fiscal years 2003-June 2008, spent[A]: $9.5 billion; 
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, allocated: $17.2 billion; 
Government of Iraq: 2005-2008, spent[A]: $2.0 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of Iraq Ministry of Finance budgets and 
expenditures, and Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury and
U.S. Agency for International Development data. 

Note: The Iraqi figures refer to investment expenses which include 
capital goods and capital projects. The sums may differ from totals due 
to rounding. 

[A] This refers to funds disbursed by U.S. agencies and funds spent by 
the respective Iraqi ministries. 

[End of table] 

Oversight Questions: 

1. What activities are under way to strengthen the Iraqi government's 
ability to operate and maintain its essential services infrastructure, 
particularly for those efforts funded by the U.S. government? 

2. How much additional investment in Iraq's oil infrastructure is 
needed to ensure sustained production and export levels? What actions 
is Iraq 
taking to encourage foreign investment? 

3. While the capacity for providing potable water has increased, what 
steps are being taken to ensure both sustainable delivery and quality 
of water throughout Iraq? 

Point of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National 
Reconciliation: 

Background: 

In 2007, The New Way Forward identified Iraqi political compromise as 
crucial to promoting national reconciliation and stabilizing the 
country. The U.S. and Iraqi governments stated that passage of 
legislation to address core Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd grievances and to 
share hydrocarbon resources equitably was essential. 

Issue: 

Since 2007, the Iraqi government has passed legislation allowing some 
former members of the Ba'ath party to work for the government, granted 
amnesty to Iraqis accused of or in prison for certain crimes, defined 
provincial powers, and passed and implemented a provincial elections 
law. These actions could address grievances by Sunnis and others, 
namely that they have been removed from government, unfairly arrested, 
and underrepresented in provincial councils. However, Iraq has not 
fully implemented some of these laws, passed hydrocarbon legislation, 
or a law to demobilize militias. Finally, Iraq has not completed the 
constitutional review or the constitutionally mandated process to deal 
with claims over disputed areas, especially Kirkuk. In further defining 
the U.S. strategy for Iraq, the administration should consider how to 
support Iraq's reconciliation efforts. 

Key Findings: 

Despite Sectarian Differences, the Iraqi Government Has Passed Key 
Legislation: 

Figure 1 shows the steps Iraq has taken as of February 2009 to enact 
key laws intended to promote national reconciliation. 

Figure 1: Status of Enacting Iraqi Legislation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

De-Ba’athification: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check]; 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Check]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check]. 

Amnesty: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check]; 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Check]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check]. 

Provincial powers: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check]; 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Check]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check]. 

Elections: Electoral commission: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check]; 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Check]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check]. 

Elections: Provincial election law: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check]; 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Check]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Check]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Check]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Check]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Check]. 

Hydrocarbon laws: Framework: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Check]; 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Check]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty]. 

Hydrocarbon laws: Revenue sharing: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Empty]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty]. 

Hydrocarbon laws: Ministry of Oil Restructuring: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Empty]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty]. 

Hydrocarbon laws: Iraq National Oil Company: [Check]; 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: No legislation drafted; 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Empty]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty]. 

Disarmament and demobilization: 
Drafting law: Laws drafted and reviewed: No legislation drafted; 
Drafting law: Draft referred to Council Representatives/Committee: 
[Empty]; 
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Third reading completed, vote taken: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty]; 
Enacting: Law published in Gazette: [Empty]. 

Check = Steps taken since February 2009. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, 
United Nations, and Iraqi government data. 

[End of table] 

Implementation of Legislation Has Been Slow: 

Although Iraq has enacted laws on de-Ba'athification, amnesty, and 
provincial powers, it has been slow to fully implement them. For 
example, the Iraqi government passed de-Ba'athification reform in 
February 2008, but as of January 2009, the Council of Ministers had not 
nominated individuals to head the new commission to implement the law. 
The amnesty law provides for the release of Iraqis sentenced to prison 
and those under investigation or trial, provided they are not involved 
in certain crimes such as kidnapping or murder. According to the 
Department of State (State), Iraqi courts have granted amnesty to many, 
but releases are slow. Also, the Iraqi and U.S. governments are working 
to transfer detainees held by U.S. forces to Iraqi facilities, as 
required by this law and the November 2008 security agreement with 
Iraq, so that the provisions of the amnesty law can be applied to them.
U.S. forces held approximately 15,000 Iraqi detainees, as of January 
2009, according to State and Department of Defense (DOD) officials. In 
addition, Iraq held provincial elections in 14 provinces on January 31, 
2009. 

Some Legislation Has Yet to Be Enacted and Constitutional Issues Have
Not Been Resolved: 

The Iraqi government has not enacted laws to share oil revenues and 
disarm militias, and has not resolved issues in its constitutional 
review. 

* Hydrocarbon legislation consists of four separate laws, but the key
framework law is stalled, according to State. This law defines the
control and management of Iraq’s oil and gas sector. According to
State, the delay illustrates struggles between the federal government
and the Kurdistan Regional Government about how much control the
Kurdistan Regional Government will have over its oil resources. 

* As of February 2009, a law to disarm and demobilize militias had not
passed. According to State, no legislation has been proposed, but
militia activity, specifically from Jaysh al-Mahdi, has substantially
declined. According to a December 2008 DOD report, some militias
are considering reconciliation with the government. 

* Iraq’s Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October
2005, but this did not resolve several contentious issues, including the
powers of the presidency versus the prime minister, claims over 
disputed areas such as oil-rich Kirkuk, and the relative powers of the
regions versus the federal government. Among these issues, a resolution 
on the status of Kirkuk remains a key issue for the Kurdistan Regional 
Government and the United Nations; Kurdistan Regional Government 
officials want resolved the issue of whether Kirkuk is to be part of 
Kurdistan. As of February 2009, the United Nations was working with a 
special committee to recommend mechanisms for sharing power in Kirkuk. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. To what extent have new provincial elections helped stabilize Iraq 
and support national reconciliation? 

2. What are the prospects of resolving the impasse on hydrocarbon
legislation? 

3. What challenges remain to implementing the laws that have already 
been passed? 

4. What actions should the United States take to encourage the Iraqi 
government to pass the remaining legislation intended to promote 
national reconciliation? 

Point of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq's Refugees: 

Background: 

The United Nations (UN) reports that about 4.8 million Iraqis have been 
displaced from their homes, with about 2 million fleeing to neighboring 
countries. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
Iraqi refugees pose an unprecedented burden on the economies and social 
infrastructures of the countries hosting them. 

Issue: 

Despite security improvements, UNHCR has reported that conditions are 
not yet suitable for the safe return of Iraqi refugees, and most 
refugees that do return are settling in areas controlled by their 
particular sect. According to the Department of State (State), the 
United States has recognized the need to take the lead in mitigating 
the effects of this humanitarian crisis. As the administration further 
defines its plan for Iraq, it will need to consider how best to support 
the Iraqi government and the international community in addressing the 
needs of Iraqis displaced within Iraq, as well as those who have fled 
to neighboring countries. 

Key Findings: 

Lack of Reliable Needs Assessments Impedes Assistance: 

Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of the Middle East] 

Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees: 
Egypt; 
Europe; 
Gulf States; 
Islamic Republic of Iran; 
Jordan; 
Lebanon; 
Syrian Arab Republic; 
Turkey. 

According to UNHCR, the majority of Iraqi refugees went to Syria and
Jordan. 

Sources: GAO based on maps from the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

The lack of reliable needs estimates impedes U.S. and international 
efforts to assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria. Official 
Jordanian and Syrian government estimates on the number of Iraqi 
refugees in each country may be overstated, with each country 
estimating up to 500,000 and 1,500,000 Iraqi refugees, respectively, in 
their countries. This is in contrast to the approximately 54,000 and 
220,000 Iraqis that UNHCR had officially registered in Jordan and 
Syria, respectively, as of September 2008. Neither country has enabled 
an independent and comprehensive survey of refugees to be undertaken, 
asserting that assistance should not be targeted toward Iraqi refugees 
while they have populations that need help. Both countries have based 
requests for refugee assistance primarily on their countries’ health and
education needs rather than on the numbers of displaced Iraqis in their
countries, and the U.S. government and UN have included Iraqi refugees 
and host country populations in their assistance programs. Donor country
representatives further noted that the lack of objective and complete
information on the numbers and needs of refugees has made it difficult 
to garner support for these efforts. 

U.S. Government Resettles Iraqis, but Lasting Solutions Remain a 
Challenge: 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges offering lasting solutions
for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the
preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for 
Iraqis to return. The Iraqi government has cited improvements in 
security and offered financial incentives to returning families, but 
there is no clear trend on the number of Iraqis returning to or leaving 
Iraq. Difficulties renewing visas, lack of funds, and limited access to 
employment and public services affect Iraqis’ decisions to stay in or 
return to Iraq. Another solution is resettlement in the host countries, 
though Jordan and Syria consider Iraqi refugees “guests” who should 
return to Iraq once the security situation improves. Resettlement to a
third country is another option, according to State. The U.S. 
government has made progress resettling Iraqis under its U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program. In 2007, the United States admitted 1,608 Iraqi 
refugees but did not achieve State’s expectation of admitting 2,000 to 
3,000 refugees; however, the U.S. government surpassed its fiscal year 
2008 goal of 12,000 with the admission of 13,823 Iraqi refugees. 
According to UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008, other countries resettled 
5,852 Iraqi refugees in calendar years 2007 through 2008. 

A related issue for Congress to consider is the plight of Palestinian 
Iraqis who have been living, mostly under very harsh conditions, in 
three refugee camps in Syria and Iraq for about 3 years. As of December 
31, 2008, about 2,540 refugees remained in these camps. About 446 camp 
refugees were resettled in 2007 and 2008, mostly in Chile and Europe. 
According to UNHCR, during the fall of 2008, Australia, Canada, the 
United States, and several European countries expressed interest in 
resettling these refugees. 

GAO subsequently will issue a more detailed report on U.S. and 
international efforts to assist Iraqi refugees, including some of the 
key challenges faced in planning and delivering this assistance, such 
as determining the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee 
programs by the United States, Iraq, and UN agencies. GAO plans to 
issue a second report in 2009 that will discuss the challenges in 
assisting internally displaced persons within Iraq. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. To what extent is the U.S. government helping Iraq address the needs 
of displaced Iraqis, bilaterally and in coordination with UN assistance
efforts? 

2. As U.S. military forces in Iraq draw down, how will the U.S. 
government aid Iraq in ensuring the security of internally displaced 
and returning Iraqis and support their access to housing and essential 
services? 

3. How is the U.S. government working with the international community 
to improve conditions for Palestinian Iraqis in refugee camps and 
facilitate their eventual resettlement? 

Point of Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of enclosure] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The issues discussed in the 12 enclosures are based on completed and 
ongoing GAO work on Iraq security and reconstruction issues. They 
incorporate information from agency documents and interviews with U.S. 
officials in Iraq and Washington, D.C., including the Departments of 
Defense (DOD), Energy (Energy), State (State), and the Treasury 
(Treasury); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the 
Army Corps of Engineers; the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I); and 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to Undertake a 
Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces: 

To discuss the change in approach that the U.S.-Iraq security agreement 
represents from prior strategies, we relied on previous GAO reporting 
and reviewed the security agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement 
that the U.S. and Iraqi governments signed in November 2008. We 
interviewed DOD and State officials to clarify the language and 
application of the agreements. 

To present the levels of violence, we used MNF-I data on enemy- 
initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners obtained 
from DIA. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for 
establishing general trends in the number of enemy-initiated attacks in 
Iraq. To determine the reliability of the data, we reviewed MNF-I's 
attacks reporting guidance, compared the unclassified data to 
classified sources, and discussed how the data are collected, analyzed, 
and reported with DIA officials. 

To report on the growth of Iraqi security forces, we relied upon DOD 
updates to weekly State reports. We used DOD's number of trained and 
equipped personnel for January 2007 data to represent the number of the 
Iraqi security forces. DOD changed its reporting metrics in November 
2007 from "trained and equipped" forces to "authorized," "assigned," 
and "trained" forces. GAO determined that "assigned" data, based on 
payroll data, are the closest figures to the number of Iraqi security 
forces and are sufficiently reliable and similar to establish a general 
trend of growth in those forces under the previous metric. "Assigned" 
numbers show the same trend as other measures of Iraqi security forces 
growth--"trained" and "authorized" forces. However, as we have noted in 
previous reports, GAO recognizes limitations to these reported data. To 
display the change in Iraqi capabilities, we relied on unclassified DOD 
reporting of Iraqi Army units' "Operational Readiness Assessments." We 
have reviewed the Operational Readiness Assessments and, to the extent 
possible, corroborated the trends with classified data. 

We based our discussion of administration plans for a responsible 
drawdown on public statements. 

Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.- 
Iraq Security Agreement: 

To discuss the implementation of the security agreement, we reviewed 
the text of agreement and the strategic framework agreement that the 
U.S. and Iraqi governments signed in November 2008, Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order 17, and the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council resolutions authorizing the U.S. presence in Iraq. We also 
interviewed State and DOD officials to clarify our understanding of the 
specific language and application of the agreements. We used our prior 
reports as background information for this enclosure. 

Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment U.S. Forces and Equipment from 
Iraq: 

To assess DOD's ability to manage the redeployment of U.S. troops from 
Iraq, we reviewed relevant documents, including command briefings and 
in-progress reviews, orders, joint and Army doctrine, relevant sections 
of the U.S. Code, and staff analyses that we obtained from several DOD 
organizations including U.S. Central Command, MNF-I, and U.S. Army 
Central. We also interviewed officials who were directly involved in 
the logistical planning efforts to determine the status and scope of 
these efforts. We traveled to Kuwait in May 2008 and met with DOD 
officials from a variety of organizations to discuss planning efforts. 
We also visited locations at which various aspects of the redeployment 
and removal process are performed and spoke with local commanders and 
on-site supervisors about their experiences and challenges. 

Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in 
Iraq during a Drawdown: 

To assess DOD's capacity to manage and oversee contractor performance, 
we relied extensively on our prior reports. In preparing these reports, 
we reviewed applicable DOD policies and guidance; interviewed DOD and 
contractor personnel in the United States, Iraq, and other locations; 
and reviewed contract-related information. We also reviewed the 
security agreement to identify provisions applicable to DOD's use of 
U.S. contractors in Iraq. We obtained updated information from DOD on 
the number of contractor personnel working under DOD contracts of as 
October 2008. Our prior work concluded that complete and reliable data 
on contractor personnel data were not available, but we presented the 
reported data along with their limitations as they established a 
minimum number of contractor personnel and provided insight into the 
extent to which agencies had information on the number of contractor 
personnel. Given the limitations we previously found, the data 
presented should not be used to reach conclusions about the total 
number of contractor personnel in Iraq. 

Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense's Future Costs for 
Iraq: 

To discuss the costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, we relied 
extensively on our prior reports related to reporting of overall Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) costs, estimating of GWOT funding needs, 
spending associated with the reset of equipment, and the redeployment 
of U.S. forces from Iraq, among others. Our prior work has found the 
data in DOD's reported obligations for GWOT to be of questionable 
reliability. Consequently, we are unable to ensure that DOD's reported 
obligations are complete, reliable, and accurate, and therefore any 
reported obligations contained in this enclosure should be considered 
approximations. 

Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian 
Presence in Iraq: 

To present the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq, we relied on 
personnel data provided by DOD Joint Staff. We determined the data were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes by comparing unclassified U.S. 
troop numbers to classified sources and discussing how the data are 
collected and reported with DOD officials. To determine the 
organization, missions, and tasks of U.S. military forces in Iraq, we 
reviewed documents from DOD, MNF-I, and MNF-I subordinate commands. 

Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq: 

To develop the elements of the rightsizing framework, we analyzed 
previous reports on overseas staffing issues, including those of the 
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP).[Footnote 12] We interviewed 
officials from the Office of Management and Budget to discuss 
rightsizing initiatives in relation to the President's Management 
Agenda.[Footnote 13] We discussed embassy staffing with rightsizing 
experts, including the Chairman of OPAP and former Undersecretaries of 
State for Management. We also interviewed officials from the State, 
DOD, Treasury, and the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and 
Agriculture, among others. To further develop and test the framework, 
we conducted a case study at the U.S. embassy in Paris (see our July 
2002 report[Footnote 14] for more details about this case study). 

In the enclosure, we describe how elements of the rightsizing framework 
could be applied to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. We obtained agency 
documents and interviewed officials from State's Office of Rightsizing, 
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and the Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security regarding rightsizing challenges at Embassy Baghdad. We 
obtained data on the staffing levels at Embassy Baghdad from State's 
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, as its data were the most 
comprehensive. To assess the reliability of these data, we talked with 
agency officials about data limitations. We determined the data were 
sufficiently reliable to demonstrate that Embassy Baghdad is one of the 
largest U.S. embassies worldwide with an estimated 1,300 total 
authorized positions. 

Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the 
International Community: 

To present the number of non-U.S. troops participating in the 
coalition, we analyzed data from State and DOD from December 2003 to 
December 2008. The departments did not have information on coalition 
troops in Iraq from March to November 2003. We determined that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for estimating the number of troops 
contributed by other countries. 

To discuss the international community's financial contributions to 
Iraq's reconstruction, we updated information previously reported by 
reviewing State documentation and consulting with State and UN 
officials. 

To report on Iraq's foreign debt, we examined documents from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Paris Club of international 
creditors, and relevant U.S. agencies and international organizations. 
To determine the amount of outstanding debt in 2004 (prior to debt 
restructuring) and 2006, we used official IMF estimates of Iraq's 
external debt. Since the IMF estimates for 2006 included debt 
restructuring by non-Paris Club official creditors that had not been 
completed, we used the IMF estimate from 2004 for these countries. We 
worked with Treasury officials to update this information. 

Enclosure IX: Building Iraq's Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share 
of Its Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs: 

To identify Iraq's estimated revenues and expenditures from 2005 
through 2008, and Iraq's financial deposits and budget surpluses 
through 2008, we relied on the data sources and methodology outlined in 
our August 2008 report.[Footnote 15] To update 2008 revenues, we used 
actual crude oil export revenues data through December 2008 as reported 
by the Central Bank of Iraq and provided by Treasury and a December 
2008 update of the IMF's forecast of net revenues from oil-related 
public enterprises and taxes and other revenues. To update total 
expenditures for 2008, we reviewed Iraqi Ministry of Finance monthly 
budget and expenditure data through December 2008, which were provided 
by Treasury. 

Enclosure X: Building Iraq's Capacity to Improve Critical Service 
Sectors: 

To assess Iraq's capacity to provide essential services, we relied 
extensively on our prior reports and updated the information as 
necessary. To do so, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents 
from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, DOD, and the UN. We have determined 
that the data were sufficiently reliable for identifying production 
goals and whether actual production is meeting these goals. We updated 
the data on U.S. and Iraqi spending for the oil, electricity, and water 
sector that we used in our August 2008 report. Our data on U.S. 
spending includes appropriations for the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief 
Fund, Iraq Security Forces fund, Economic Support Fund, Commander's 
Emergency Response Program, Iraq Freedom Fund, Democracy Fund, other 
agency program funds used for Iraq activities, and operating expenses 
from the Coalition Provisional Authority. 

Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National 
Reconciliation: 

To determine progress made on actions related to Iraq's constitutional 
review and enacting and implementing key legislation, we used prior GAO 
reporting and updated information where appropriate. In updating the 
information, we reviewed reports and documentation and spoke with 
officials from the UN, the U.S. Institute for Peace, nongovernmental 
organizations, USAID, DOD, and State. We reviewed draft laws and 
enacted legislation, as well as analyses of the laws. 

Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq's Refugees: 

To identify key challenges to providing humanitarian assistance and 
offering solutions to Iraqi refugees, we reviewed and analyzed reports 
and data from the U.S. government, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), other UN agencies, foreign governments, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and research institutes. During our fieldwork in 
Washington, D.C., we met with officials from State and the Department 
of Homeland Security regarding refugee assistance, refugee admissions, 
special immigrant visa programs, and the challenges they have 
encountered. We also met with research institutions and NGOs and held 
discussion groups with NGOs conducting work in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq 
to discuss strategic planning and program implementation challenges. 
Through our fieldwork in Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman, 
Jordan; and Damascus, Syria, we met with officials from the U.S., 
Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi governments; UNHCR and other UN umbrella 
agencies, including the World Food Program and IOM; international and 
local NGOs; and research institutions. Also, with the help of UNHCR, we 
held discussion groups with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to 
discuss their situations, needs, assistance received, and challenges 
encountered. We toured and observed assistance projects and activities 
in resettlement processing centers. We analyzed U.S. funding, refugee 
admissions, and visa data, and found the data to be sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force Levels in Iraq: 

This appendix provides information on (1) the levels of violence in 
Iraq, as measured through trends in enemy-initiated attacks from May 
2003 through January 2009 and (2) the number of U.S. troops deployed to 
Iraq from January 2006 through January 2009 and projected troop levels 
through October 2010. 

Levels of Violence: 

As shown in figure 1, security conditions in Iraq deteriorated 
following the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, 
but then improved following the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq during 
2007. Specifically, the average daily number of enemy-initiated attacks 
has declined from about 180 in June 2007 to about 25 in October 2008 
and has remained about the same through January 2009. This change 
accounts for a decrease of about 85 percent over a period of a year and 
a half--primarily due to decreases in violence in Baghdad and Anbar 
provinces. From 2003 through 2007, enemy-initiated attacks had 
increased around major political and religious events, such as Iraqi 
elections and Ramadan. In 2007 and 2008, attacks did not significantly 
increase during Ramadan. According to early reporting from the 
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the provincial elections in January 
2009 were not associated with significant increases in violence. 

Figure 1: Average Daily Enemy Initiated Attacks, May 2003 through 
December 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

The following are plotted against a timeline of May 2003 through 
January 2009: 
Total average daily attacks; 
Average daily attacks on coalition; 
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces;; 
Average daily attacks on civilians. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Intelligence Agency-reported 
Multinational Force-Iraq data, January 2009. 

[End of figure] 

The enemy-initiated attacks counted in the Defense Intelligence 
Agency's (DIA) reporting include car, suicide, and other bombs; 
ambushes; murders, executions, and assassinations; sniper fire; 
indirect fire (mortars or rockets); direct fire (small arms or rocket- 
propelled grenades); surface-to-air fire (such as man-portable air 
defense systems, or MANPADS); and other attacks on civilians. They do 
not include violent incidents that coalition or Iraqi security forces 
initiated, such as cordon and searches, raids, arrests, and caches 
cleared. 

According to DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do not 
account for all violence throughout Iraq. For example, they may 
underreport incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each other and attacks 
against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and other areas with few 
or no coalition forces. DIA officials stated, however, that they 
represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be 
used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security 
situation. 

Reports from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, as well as the 
United Nations, have attributed the reduction in violence since June 
2007 to three key factors. First, the U.S. surge of troops allowed a 
change of tactics and contributed to improvements in the security 
environment (see the following section). Second, according to DOD and 
MNF-I reports, the establishment of local nongovernmental security 
forces that oppose al Qaeda in Iraq has helped decrease the levels of 
violence in parts of Iraq, most notably in Anbar province. Third, the 
cease-fire declared in August 2007 by Moqtada al Sadr, the leader of 
the Mahdi Army, an extremist Shi'a militia, contributed significantly 
to the decline in violence in the second half of 2007, according to DOD 
and UN reports. 

U.S. Force Levels in Iraq: 

In January 2007, the prior administration called for an increase of 
over 20,000 U.S. combat and other forces, including an additional five 
brigades, to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods and protect the 
local population. Figure 2 shows the increase of U.S. forces in Iraq 
from about 131,500 in December 2006 to about 169,000 in August 2007, an 
overall increase of about 37,500 troops--almost 30 percent above the 
December 2006 force level. 

Figure 2: U.S. Troops in Iraq, January 2006 through October 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Number of troops plotted against a timeline of January 2006 through 
October 2010 (projected). Specific points in time depicted are: 

Presurge number of troops: 131,500; 
December 2006, Month before surge: 131,500 troops; 
August 2007, Peak of surge: 169,000 troops; 
July 2008, Declared end of surge; goal of 140,000 troops: 147,500 
troops; 
January 2009: 144,000 troops; 
March 2009: 140,000 troops[A] (projected); 
December 2009: 128,000 troops (projected); 
August 31, 2010: 50,000 troops (projected). 

Sources: DOD, Joint Staff, and State Department data, and Presidential 
speech Feb. 27, 2009. 

Note: Projections of troop drawdowns between March 2009 and October 
2009 and between March 2010 and August 31, 2010 reflect an average rate 
of troop reductions over that period. 

[A] DOD has not yet provided the final, unclassified number of U.S. 
troops in Iraq for February and March 2009. The March 2009 number is 
based on a projection provided by DOD officials. 

[End of figure] 

In September 2007, President Bush announced that the United States 
would draw down the surge forces by July 2008--the end of The New Way 
Forward strategy--resulting in a decline in U.S. brigade combat teams 
from 20 to 15 and a projected force level of about 140,000 U.S. troops. 
By December 2008, another brigade combat team was removed from Iraq, 
bringing the total number of brigade combat teams in Iraq to 14, as of 
March 2009. The number of U.S. troops in Iraq has remained above 
projected levels for the end of the surge, and as of January 2009, 
there were about 144,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. 

In February 2009, the President announced a significant drawdown of 
U.S. forces by August 31, 2010. According to DOD and MNF-I officials, 
the United States plans to reduce the number of combat troops from 
about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 128,000 by September 
2009. This troop drawdown would represent 2 combat brigades and their 
support units, reducing the number of U.S. brigades from 14 to 12. 
Based on conditions in Iraq, the MNF-I Commanding General may recommend 
further reductions prior to Iraq's national election scheduled for 
December 2009. A few months after the election, the United States plans 
to further reduce U.S. forces to at most 50,000 troops by August 31, 
2010. According to DOD officials, the remaining force will consist of 6 
brigades and additional support units. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Treasury: 

Note: GAO's comment supplementing those in the report text appears at 
the end of this appendix. 

Department Of The Treasury: 
Assistant Secretary: 
Washington: 

March 13, 2009: 

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 

Dear Mr. Christoff, 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the March 2009 
draft of the GAO's report, Iraq - Key Issues for Congressional 
Oversight. We welcome the GAO's close attention to the way forward in 
Iraq, and particularly the fiscal issues that impact Iraq's 
reconstruction, economic stability, and self-reliance. Treasury 
continues to be closely engaged with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, 
other ministries, and the provincial governments on improving Iraq's 
fiscal processes to help ensure that Iraq's resources are being spent 
efficiently and responsibly for the betterment of the Iraqi people. 

Despite lower oil prices and a changing fiscal environment, Iraq is 
still able to shoulder the burden of its own development, 
reconstruction, and security programs in 2009. The report correctly 
states that although Iraq's end-2008 cumulative surplus fell well short 
of the GAO's earlier projection of $67-79 billion, Iraq's $45 billion 
in cumulative budget surpluses will sufficiently cover the budgeted 
2009 budget deficit of about $16 billion. However, if oil prices remain 
at current levels, Iraq will likely have difficulty financing large 
fiscal deficits in 2010 and 2011, which could impact spending on 
security and reconstruction. Therefore, in addition to improving budget 
execution, Iraq will need to better prioritize spending to help 
maintain fiscal sustainability in the medium term. [See comment 1] 

Iraq's expenditures have increased significantly in 2008: 

The report is correct to point out that Iraq's inability to fully 
execute its budgets hampers the government's efforts to further 
reconstruction and economic growth. But the report should draw 
attention to the significant improvements Iraq has recently made in 
budget execution. In 2008, Iraq made the following improvements in 
budget execution, particularly in spending its investment budget. 

* Iraq spent $50 billion in 2008, compared to just $27 billion in 2007 
(an 86% increase). While public sector wage increases contributed to 
the higher spending, spending on goods and services and investment 
projects also increased substantially. In Iraqi dinar terms, government 
spending increased by 77%, taking into account the 5% appreciation of 
the Iraqi dinar in 2008. 

* Iraq's investment spending was almost $9 billion in 2008, which is 
150% greater than 2007 investment spending. Including commitments, 
total investment spending in 2008 likely approached $12 billion 
(compared to roughly $6 billion in 2007). 

* Iraq approved one-third of the investment budget in the August 2008 
supplemental. Fully executing the original budget plus the supplemental 
by the end of the year would be very ambitious by any standard. 

Integrated strategy to help improve Iraq's budget execution: 

Nonetheless, Iraq has further work to do to improve its ability to 
spend its own resources promptly and effectively. This issue remains a 
key priority for Treasury. We appreciate the report's highlighting of 
Treasury's work with the Embassy to deliver coordinated technical 
assistance to help improve Iraqi budget execution. The U.S. Government 
created the Public Financial Management Action Group (PFMAG) to better 
integrate the many U.S. civilian and military parties active in budget 
execution assistance. The group is dedicated to achieving four goals 
that are critical to facilitating Iraq's reconstruction: 

* Partnering with the Iraqis to mobilize Iraq's substantial financial 
resources; 

* Supporting budget formulation and execution through a broad-based 
engagement with ministries, provincial governments, and other spending 
units; 

* Facilitating the development of a coherent budgetary framework in 
Iraq, incorporating municipal, provincial, and ministerial spending; 
and; 

* Integrating coalition public financial technical assistance into a 
coherent capacity-building effort across all levels of the Iraqi 
Government. 

Treasury's technical advisors area critical piece of the PFMAG, as they 
work with Iraqi officials at the ministries, at the Council of 
Representatives, and in the provinces to help achieve these stated 
goals. Treasury's cadre of technical advisors will continue to support 
the Iraqis in 2009 as the Iraqis further develop their budget 
formulation, execution, and monitoring processes. However, Treasury 
agrees with the GAO's assertion that agencies may need to reassess 
staffing levels if they are required to pay ICASS costs related to 
security and other expenses. 

Signed by: 

Andy Baukol: 
Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs: 
U.S. Department of the Treasury: 

The following is GAO's comment to the Department of the Treasury's 
letter dated March 13, 2009. 

GAO Comment: 

1. GAO's estimate of Iraq's cumulative surplus differs from the 
Department of the Treasury's estimate because we use different sources 
to determine a small a portion of Iraq's 2008 government revenues-- 
specifically, non-oil export related revenues. GAO and Treasury both 
use data from the Central Bank of Iraq concerning revenue generated 
from exports of crude oil, which represents about 90 percent of the 
government's revenue. However, GAO uses the International Monetary 
Fund's estimate of Iraq's government revenue that is derived from all 
other sources, such as oil-related public enterprises and taxes. In 
contrast, Treasury is utilizing information gathered by the U.S. 
Embassy in Baghdad. GAO asked Treasury officials for documentation 
validating their estimate, but they could not do so in time for this 
report's publication. GAO will work with Treasury to validate the 
Ministry of Finance's data for subsequent work in this area. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Related GAO Products: 

Letter and Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to 
Undertake a Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces: 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains 
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008. 

Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the Conditions 
Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-700C]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 2008. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units 
as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully 
Developed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-143R]. 
Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2007. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development 
Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage 
Risk. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-117]. Washington, 
D.C.: October 1, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not 
Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1195]. Washington, D.C.: September 
4, 2007. 

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help 
Achieve U.S. Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788]. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2006. 

Plans for Stabilizing Iraq. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-152C]. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 
2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and 
Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-868C]. Washington, D.C.: September 
29, 2005. 

Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.- 
Iraq Security Agreement: 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains 
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1021T]. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 
2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains 
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP]. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 
2007. 

Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment 
from Iraq: 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for 
Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930]. Washington, D.C.: September 
10, 2008. 

Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in 
Iraq during a Drawdown: 

Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational 
Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-114R]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 20, 2008. 

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor 
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19]. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 
2008. 

Rebuilding Iraq: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and 
Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further 
Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-966]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2008. 

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on 
Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 11, 2008. 

Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other 
Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Oversight and Management of Contractors 
in Future Operations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T]. Washington, D.C.: January 24, 
2008. 

Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense's Future Costs for 
Iraq: 

Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of 
Defense. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-233R]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2008. 

Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian 
Presence in Iraq: 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-86R]. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 
2008. 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection 
for Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in 
Iraq. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-736R]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 23, 2008. 

Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has 
Reached Iraqi Security Forces. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-711]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2007. 

Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq: 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-86R]. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 
2008. 

Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New 
Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and Maintenance 
Requirements. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-641]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006. 

Overseas Staffing: Rightsizing Approaches Slowly Taking Hold but More 
Action Needed to Coordinate and Carry Out Efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-737]. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2006. 

Embassy Management: Actions Are Needed to Increase Efficiency and 
Improve Delivery of Administrative Support Services. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-511]. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 
2004. 

Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Is Key to Considering Relocation of 
Regional Staff to New Frankfurt Center. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1061]. Washington, D.C.: September 
2, 2003. 

Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at U.S. 
Diplomatic Posts in Developing Countries. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-396]. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 
2003. 

Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can 
Support Rightsizing Initiatives. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-780]. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 
2002. 

Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the 
International Community: 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and 
Surplus. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1031]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International 
Donor Commitments. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-827T]. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 
2007. 

Rebuilding Iraq: International Donor Pledges for Reconstruction Efforts 
in Iraq. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-365R]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2007. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-876]. Washington, D.C.: 
July 28, 2005. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, 
and Oversight Issues. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-902R]. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 
2004. 

Enclosure IX: Building Iraq's Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share 
of Its Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs: 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures and 
Surplus. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1144T]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2008. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and 
Surplus. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1031]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains 
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate 
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-568T]. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 
2008. 

Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data Needed to Assess Iraq's Budget 
Execution. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-153]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 15, 2008. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development 
Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage 
Risk. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-117]. Washington, 
D.C.: October 2007. 

Enclosure X: Building Iraq's Capacity to Improve Critical Service 
Services: 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and 
Surplus. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1031]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains 
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008. 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection 
for Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in 
Iraq. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-736R]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 23, 2008. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore 
Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-677]. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
2007. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, 
and Oversight Issues. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-902R]. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 
2004. 

Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National 
Reconciliation: 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains 
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008. 

Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq's Refugees: 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains 
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837]. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP]. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 
2007. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition, the following staff contributed to the report: Judith 
McCloskey, Assistant Director; Johana Ayers; Kathryn Bernet; Margaret 
Best; Ann Borseth; Monica Brym; Burns Chamberlain; Joseph Carney; 
Carole Coffey; Lynn Cothern; Martin de Alteriis; Timothy DiNapoli; 
Walker Fullerton; Richard Geiger; Rhonda Horried; John Hutton; Bruce 
Kutnick; Drew Lindsey; Guy Lofaro; Mae Liles; Tetsuo Miyabara; Kathleen 
Monahan; Mary Moutsos; Valérie Nowak; Suzanne Perkins; Jason Pogacnik; 
Michael Rohrback; Audrey Solis; and William Solis. In addition, 
Kathleen Arredondo provided technical assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] This figure includes appropriations for domestic and overseas 
military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, such as 
Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, as well as stabilization and reconstruction appropriations for 
Iraq and Afghanistan. See GAO, Global War on Terrorism: Reported 
Obligations for the Department of Defense, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-233R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 
2008). 

[2] Of this $49 billion, about $22 billion was provided to DOD for 
improving Iraqi security forces and is included in the $808 billion 
provided primarily in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 

[3] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: 
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008). 

[4] GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the 
Conditions Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq, 
GAO-08-700C (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008). In December 2008, DOD 
declassified the recommendations GAO made in this report. The body of 
the report remains classified. 

[5] Activities at the strategic level include establishing national and 
multinational military objectives, as well as defining limits and 
assessing risks for the use of military and other instruments of 
national power. In contrast, activities at the operational level 
establish objectives that link tactics on the ground to high-level 
strategic objectives. 

[6] Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the 
Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in 
Iraq, November 17, 2008, that took effect January 1, 2009. DOD also 
refers to the security agreement as a status of forces agreement 
(SOFA). 

[7] The agreement also defines Iraqi jurisdiction over U.S. forces, DOD 
civilian employees, and U.S. forces' contractors in Iraq. 

[8] Subsequently, four countries joined the coalition. 

[9] The Paris Club is a group of 19 creditor nations and includes the 
United States. 

[10] Under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 5 percent of Iraq's 
annual oil export revenue is earmarked to finance payment of these 
reparations. 

[11] The central government ministries include the ministries of oil, 
water, electricity, public works, health, housing and construction, 
defense, and interior. These figures therefore exclude the Kurdistan 
Regional Government and provincial governments. 

[12] Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright established OPAP 
following the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa to consider the 
organization of U.S. embassies and consulates. Department of State, 
America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, The Report of the 
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[13] Office of Management and Budget, The President's Management 
Agenda, Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

[14] GAO, Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff 
Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-780] (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 
2002). 

[15] GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, 
Expenditures, and Surplus, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1031] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 
2008). 

[End of section] 

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