GAO-06-450, Elections: The Nation's Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 General Election


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Report to Congressional Committees: 

Untied States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

June 2006: 

Elections: 

The Nation's Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 
General Election: 

GAO-06-450: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-450, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2004 general election was the first presidential election that 
tested substantial changes states made to their election systems since 
the 2000 election, including some changes required by the Help America 
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA required some major changes in the 
nation’s elections processes, not all of which had to be implemented by 
the November 2004 election. HAVA addressed issues of people, processes, 
and technology, all of which must be effectively integrated to ensure 
effective election operations. GAO initiated a review under the 
authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election 
issues of broad interest to Congress. For each major stage of the 
election process, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems 
since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and 
(2) challenges encountered in the 2004 election. For this report, GAO 
sent a survey to the 50 states and the District of Columbia (all 
responded) and mailed a questionnaire to a nationwide sample of 788 
local election jurisdictions about election administration activities 
(80 percent responded). To obtain more detailed information about 
experiences for the 2004 election, GAO also visited 28 local 
jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to represent a range of election 
system characteristics. 

What GAO Found: 

In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local 
jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, 
but it is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For 
example, 41 states obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 
1, 2006, to implement a requirement for statewide voter registration 
lists. States also had discretion in how they implemented HAVA 
requirements, such as the identification requirements for first-time 
mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions described different 
identification procedures for first-time mail registrants who 
registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed 
regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office 
must cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, 
provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA 
also created the Election Assistance Commission, which has issued best 
practice guides and voluntary voting system standards and distributed 
federal funds to states for improving election administration, 
including purchasing new voting equipment. The results of our survey of 
local election jurisdictions indicate that larger jurisdictions may be 
replacing older equipment with technology-based voting methods to a 
greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper 
ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the 
elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance 
management, security, and testing will continue to be important to 
ensuring the integrity of the overall elections process. GAO found that 
states made changes—either as a result of HAVA or on their own—to 
address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000 
election. GAO also found that some challenges continued—such as 
problems receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle 
agencies, addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, 
recruiting and training a sufficient number of poll workers, and 
continuing to ensure accurate vote counting. At the same time, new 
challenges arose in the November 2004 election, such as fraudulent, 
incomplete, or inaccurate applications received through voter 
registration drives; 
larger than expected early voter turnout, resulting in long lines; 
and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and determining the 
eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote 
certification deadlines. 

Figure: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, 
Process, and Technology: 

[See PDF for Image] 

[End of Figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-450]. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-451SP]. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-452SP]. 

To view the full product or the related surveys, click on the links 
above. 

For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-
8777 or JenkinsWO@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Transmittal Letter: 

Executive Summary: 

Purpose: 

Background: 

Results in Brief: 

Principal Findings: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 1: 

Election Authority: 

Election System Elements: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Chapter 2: 

Overview: 

Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election: 

Processing Registration Applications Received from MVAs and Other NVRA 
Entities Remained a Challenge: 

Jurisdictions Encountered New Challenges Processing the Large Volume of 
Voter Registration Applications for the November 2004 General Election: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 3: 

Overview: 

Absentee Voting: 

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting: 

Early Voting: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 4: 

Overview: 

HAVA Made Changes Intended to Improve Election Administration: 

Some States Reported Changing Identification Requirements for All 
Prospective Voters: 

Recruiting a Sufficient Number of Skilled, Reliable Poll Workers 
Continued to Be a Challenge for Large and Medium Jurisdictions: 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported on 
Challenges Training Poll Workers: 

Poll Worker Performance Problems in Some Large and Medium 
Jurisdictions: 

Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Met Standards Continued to Be a 
Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That 
Designing Clear Ballots Continued to Be a Challenge: 

Preparing Ballots or Voting Equipment Not a Problem Reported by Most 
Jurisdictions, but These Activities Can Be a Challenge for Some 
Jurisdictions: 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported 
Experiencing Long Lines on Election Day, while Officials in Other 
Jurisdictions Did Not: 

Overloaded Phones on Election Day Posed Problems for Some Large and 
Medium Jurisdictions: 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Third-
Party Observers Were a Challenge on Election Day 2004: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 5: 

Overview: 

Events in the November 2000 Election Preceded the HAVA Requirement for 
Provisional Ballots: 

State and Local Jurisdictions Varied in Their Implementation for 
Providing Provisional Ballots for the November 2004 Election 218: 

State and Local Jurisdictions Reported Variation in Several Areas 
Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Are Counted: 

A Number of Factors Contribute to Difficulties in Estimating and 
Comparing Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 6: 

Overview: 

In the 2004 General Election the Vote-Counting Process Remained Complex 
and Marked by Local Diversity: 

For the 2004 General Election, More States Had Requirements or Guidance 
for Determining Voter Intent: 

Recounts and Contested Elections Remained Uncommon for the November 
2004 General Election: 

Several States Had Further Developed Their Specifications for an 
Election Recount since the 2000 General Election: 

Vote Count Audits Were Not Prevalent in the 2004 General Election, but 
Some States Reported Taking Action to Require Them: 

Local Jurisdictions Reported Some Mistakes and Technical Challenges in 
Counting Votes for the 2004 General Election: 

In the 2004 General Election, Some Election Jurisdictions Reported 
Difficulty Meeting Deadlines for Certifying the Final Vote Count: 

The Recount in Washington State Revealed the Intricacies of the 
Election Process, but Also Yielded Many State Reforms: 

Concluding Observations: 

Chapter 7: 

Overview: 

Voting Methods Vary among Jurisdictions and Are Being Influenced by 
States' Choices and HAVA: 

Voting Equipment Performance Was Not Consistently Measured during the 
2004 General Election, but Estimated Levels of Performance Satisfaction 
Were High: 

Attention to Voting System Security Management Continues to Vary amid 
Published Concerns and Federal Improvement Efforts: 

Certain Types of Tests and Evaluations Were Widely Performed on Voting 
Systems, while Others Were Less Common: 

Information on Jurisdictions' Election Technology Integration Is 
Limited, but Current and Emerging Technologies Offer Greater 
Opportunities: 

Concluding Observations: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products: 

Appendix II: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials: 

Appendix III: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions: 

Appendix IV: Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions GAO Visited: 

Appendix V: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix VI: Voter Registration Deadlines for States and the District 
of Columbia: 

Appendix VII: Characteristics of Early Voting Jurisdictions Visited: 

Appendix VIII: Selected State Statutory Requirements for Absentee 
Voting: 

Appendix IX: State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling Places and 
Alternative Voting Methods: 

Appendix X: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements 
for Local Jurisdictions to Use Federal Standards for Voting Systems: 

Appendix XI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

Glossary: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions That Removed Names from 
Voter Registration List for 2004 General Election for Various Reasons: 

Table 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Engaged in 
Various Quality Assurance Activities when Entering Completed Voter- 
Registration Applications: 

Table 3: Options Allowed by States for Requesting and Returning 
Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 4: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Voter Error Problems in Processing 
Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 5: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods When Absentee Ballot 
Applications Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 6: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Problems in Processing Submitted 
Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 7: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods when Absentee Ballots 
Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 8: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Voters Did Not Vote More than Once, 
November 2004 General Election: 

Table 9: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Absentee Ballots Were Actually 
Completed by the Person Requesting the Ballot, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Table 10: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions, by Jurisdiction 
Size, That Encountered Specific Voter Error Problems on Absentee 
Applications That Used the Federal Post Card Application, November 2004 
General Election: 

Table 11: States Reporting Differing Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines 
from Inside and Outside the United States, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Table 12: Early Voting Period in 24 Early Voting States and the 
District of Columbia, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 13: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Various Staff Mixes at Early Voting Locations, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Table 14: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Various Methods to Train Early Voting Staff, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Table 15: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Provided Alternative Voting Methods and 
Accommodations for the November 2004 General Election: 

Table 16: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Took Steps to Provide Voter Education Prior to 
the November 2004 General Election: 

Table 17: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Used Sources to Recruit Poll Workers for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Table 18: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Nationwide That 
Provided Provisional, Challenge, or Other Ballots for the November 2004 
Election under Various Scenarios: 

Table 19: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Various 
Methods to Inform Voters of the Outcome of Their Provisional Ballot, 
November 2004: 

Table 20: Reported Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted in Selected 
Jurisdictions: 

Table 21: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Having Written Ballot 
Security Policies and Procedures, November 2004 General Election: 

Table 22: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Particular 
Voting Methods by Ballot Type for the November 2004 Election: 

Table 23: States Reported Changes to Recount Provisions since 2000 for 
the 2004 General Election: 

Table 24: Voting System Security Tasks and Responsibilities for the 
2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions 
Visited by GAO: 

Table 25: Security Controls Reportedly Used in the 2004 General 
Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by 
GAO: 

Table 26: Voting System Security Topics Addressed in Security Plans 
Submitted by Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: 

Table 27: Types of Testing and Evaluation for Voting Systems, with 
Common Time Frames and Responsibilities: 

Table 28: Population in Each State Group: 

Table 29: Local Election Survey Sample Allocation: 

Table 30: Local Election Jurisdiction Survey Response Rates, Overall 
and by Sample Strata: 

Table 31: Local Election Jurisdictions Visited: 

Table 32: States Reporting on November 2004 General Election 
Registration Deadlines: 

Table 33: Selected Information on Jurisdictions We Visited That Had 
Early Voting: 

Table 34: Selected State Requirements for Domestic Absentee Voting, 
November 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

Table 35: States' Mail-in Absentee Ballot Application and Mail-in 
Absentee Ballot Deadlines for Inside the United States, November 2004 
General Election: 

Table 36: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places: 

Table 37: State Provisions for Alternative Voting Methods and 
Accommodations: 

Table 38: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places 
and Accommodations for Individuals with Disabilities for the November 
2004 General Election: 

Table 39: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements for 
Use of Voluntary Federal Standards for New Voting Systems for the 
November 2006 General Election: 

Figures Figures: 

Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 
Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 
2004 General Election: 

Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be 
Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in 
Place for the 2004 General Election: 

Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant 
Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, 
Process, and Technology: 

Figure 8: Many States Report Challenges Matching Voter Registration 
Information with State Records: 

Figure 9: States Reporting That They Had or Would Have as of January 
2006, Capability for Real-Time Access to Voter Registration List to 
Enter, Update, and Query Information: 

Figure 10: States' Reported Capabilities to Electronically Match Voter 
Registration Information with State Death Records and Felony Conviction 
Records: 

Figure 11: Virginia Voter Registration Form Indicating whether the 
Voter Had Registered Elsewhere: 

Figure 12: Colorado Voter Registration Form with Instructions for 
First- Time Mail Registrants: 

Figure 13: Example of the Voter Registration Application Process: 

Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 
Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for 
2004 General Election: 

Figure 15: Total Weekly Voter Registration Applications Documented by a 
Large Jurisdiction in 2004: 

Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions with 
Insufficient Election Workers to Process Voter Registration 
Applications: 

Figure 17: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Had Names 
on Voter Registration Applications Appearing to Be Fraudulent and 
Volume of Fraudulent Applications Identified for the 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 18: Mail-in Absentee Voting Process: 

Figure 19: Example of a Standard Absentee Ballot Application Form for 
the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 20: Two Examples of Absentee Ballot Envelopes with the Inclusion 
of Affidavit Information--One with Certification on Inner Envelope and 
One with Certification on Outer Envelope--for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 21: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Problems Processing Absentee Applications because the Applicant Did Not 
Meet the Excuse Required by State Law, November 2004 General Election:  

Figure 22: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 23: Example of Envelope Illustrating Official Postal Marking for 
Absentee Ballot Materials, November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 24: The Federal Post Card Application Used before and after the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 25: Twenty-four States and the District of Columbia Reported 
Providing Early Voting as an Option in the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 26: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Offered 
Early Voting for Various Time Periods, November 2004 General Election:  

Figure 27: King County, Washington, Poster Used to Inform Prospective 
Voters of New Identification Requirements: 

Figure 28: Examples of Voter Information Signs Posted at Polling Places 
for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 29: Efforts to Inform Voters Prior to the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 30: States' Reported Identification Requirements for Prospective 
Voters for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 31: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 32: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Enough Poll 
Workers with Specific Political Party Affiliation for the November 2004 
General Election: 

Figure 33: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Poll Workers 
with Information Technology Skills or Computer Literacy for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 34: Materials Used to Recruit Poll Workers in Jurisdictions We 
Visited: 

Figure 35: Reported State Requirements for Poll Worker Training for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 36: Examples of Instructions and Checklists Provided to Poll 
Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 37: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 38: Town Hall in Madbury, New Hampshire: 

Figure 39: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining Enough 
Polling Places That Were Accessible to Voters with Disabilities for 
November 2004 General Election: 

Figure 40: El Paso County, Colorado, Optical Scan Ballot: 

Figure 41: DRE and Optical Scan Voting Equipment That Large 
Jurisdictions Had to Prepare and Deliver Prior to Election Day: 

Figure 42: Provisional Ballot Envelope: 

Figure 43: Middlesex County, New Jersey, Challenged Voter Affidavit: 

Figure 44: Affidavit Containing Provisional Ballot Instructions for 
Poll Workers in Champaign, Illinois: 

Figure 45: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be 
Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

Figure 46: Examples of Written Information Provided to Voters to 
Inquire whether Their Provisional Vote Was Counted: 

Figure 47: Sealed Voting Equipment Bag: 

Figure 48: Punch Card Tabulator Connected to Computer: 

Figure 49: Punch Card Voting Booth: 

Figure 50: New Hampshire Guidance for Determining Voter Intent on Paper 
Ballots: 

Figure 51: Number of States Reporting Federal and Statewide Recounts 
for the 2004 Primary or General Elections: 

Figure 52: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in 
Place for the 2004 General Election: 

Figure 53: Examples of Voting Equipment: 

Figure 54: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant 
Voting Methods in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

Figure 55: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant 
Voting Methods in 2004, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 56: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire 
Particular Voting Systems before the November 2006 General Election: 

Figure 57: State-Reported Status of Lever and Punch Card Voting 
Equipment in 2000, 2004, and 2006: 

Figure 58: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Single and Multiple Voting Methods in the November 2004 General 
Election:  

Figure 59: Precinct Count Optical Scan Voting Equipment: 

Figure 60: State-Reported Involvement in the Use of Specific Voting 
Methods in the 2004 and 2006 General Elections: 

Figure 61: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Identifying 
Factors That Influenced Buying or Leasing Voting Equipment since the 
2000 General Election: 

Figure 62: Federal Payments to States in Fiscal Year 2003 under HAVA to 
Replace Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment: 

Figure 63: Example of DRE Instructions and Equipment: 

Figure 64: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Voting 
System Performance Information for the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

Figure 65: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Accuracy for the 2004 General Election, by 
Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 66: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Equipment Reliability for the 2004 General 
Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 67: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Equipment Failures for the 2004 General Election, 
by Predominant Voting Method: 

Figure 68: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting System Efficiency for the 2004 General Election, 
by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 69: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Satisfied with Voting 
System Performance for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 70: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Identified 
Security Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election, by 
Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 71: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Security 
Controls in the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 72: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Documented 
Security Policies or Procedures for Their Voting Systems in the 2004 
General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 73: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Established 
Policies or Procedures for Electronic Transmission of Voted Ballots in 
the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: 

Figure 74: State-Reported Standards Required for Voting Systems: 

Figure 75: State-Reported Voting System Certification Requirements for 
the 2004 General Election: 

Figure 76: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Conducting 
Postelection Voting System Audits for the 2004 General Election, by 
Predominant Voting Method: 

Figure 77: Examples of Portable Memory Cards and Cartridges Used with 
Voting Equipment:  

Figure 78: Examples of Ballot Tabulation Equipment and Environments: 

Figure 79: Example of an Assembly for Producing a Voter-Verifiable 
Paper Audit Trail for DRE Voting Equipment: 

Figure 80: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Networking 
or Remote Access for Voting Equipment in the 2004 General Election: 

Figure 81: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Automated 
Election Support for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

Figure 82: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions with Plans to 
Acquire Voting Equipment: 

Abbreviations: 

ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act: 

DRE: direct recording electronic: 

EAC: Election Assistance Commission: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FEC: Federal Election Commission: 

FPCA: Federal Post Card Application: 

FVAP: Federal Voting Assistance Program: 

HAVA: Help America Vote Act: 

MCD: minor civil division: 

MVA: motor vehicle agency: 

NASED: National Association of State Election Directors: 

NIST: National Institute for Standards and Technology: 

NVRA: National Voter Registration Act: 

PKI: public key infrastructure: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

UOCAVA: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: 

VVPT: 

Transmittal Letter: 
June 6, 2006: 

Congressional Committees: 

The November 2004 presidential election was not as close as the 2000 
presidential election, but it still raised concerns about our election 
processes. Following the 2004 general election, a number of members of 
Congress asked GAO to review aspects of that election. In response to 
these requests, GAO initiated a review under the authority of the 
Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad 
interest to Congress. 

This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United 
States and the November 2004 general election. Specifically, for each 
major stage of the election process--voter registration, absentee and 
early voting, preparing for and conducting elections, provisional 
voting, and counting the votes--plus voting methods, this report 
discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, 
including steps taken to implement the Help America Vote Act, and (2) 
challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 
election. 

Copies of this report are being sent to the congressional leadership 
and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on 
Science. Copies will also be sent to state election officials and the 
election official for the District of Columbia and local elections 
jurisdictions that participated in our research and will be made 
available to other interested parties upon request. As a courtesy, we 
are providing other members of Congress a copy of the report's 
highlights page and executive summary. 

If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin, 
Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777; or 
William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, at (202) 512-8757. They can also be 
reached by e-mail at rabkinn@gao.gov and jenkinswo@gao.gov, 
respectively. Contacts and key contributors are listed in appendix XI. 

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Trent Lott: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Rules and Administration: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers, III: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Juanita Millender-McDonald: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on House Administration: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Arlen Specter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Executive Summary: 

Purpose: 

Faith in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at 
the foundation of our democracy. All eligible persons, but only 
eligible persons, should be able to cast their votes and have their 
validly cast votes counted accurately. Reports of problems encountered 
in the close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter 
registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated 
voting systems raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of 
certain aspects of the U.S. election system. Subsequently, the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted,[Footnote 1] and major 
election reforms are now being implemented. The November 2004 general 
election highlighted some of the same challenges as in 2000 as well as 
some new challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and 
implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both 
elections highlighted the importance of the interaction of people, 
processes, and technology in ensuring effective election operations and 
maintaining public confidence that our election system works. 

The November 2004 general election was the first federal election that 
tested changes states have made to their systems of election 
administration since the 2000 general election and the first 
presidential election since the enactment of HAVA. HAVA includes a 
number of provisions related to the administration of federal elections 
affecting voter registration, absentee voting, voting systems, and 
other election administration activities. 

The November 2004 general election was not as close or contentious as 
the 2000 general election, but media reports, interest groups, and 
members of Congress raised concerns about various aspects of the 
elections process. Following the November 2004 election, a number of 
members of Congress asked us to review aspects of that election. In 
response to these requests, we initiated a review under the authority 
of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of 
broad interest to Congress using an approach similar to that we used to 
examine election issues following the November 2000 election. During 
the design of the review, GAO kept key committees of jurisdiction and 
interested parties informed of its work. 

This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United 
States and the November 2004 election. It discusses (1) changes to 
election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to 
implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials in 
the November 2004 election for each major stage of the election 
process--voter registration, absentee and early voting, Election Day 
preparation and activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--and 
for voting technology. 

Background: 

In the United States, election authority is shared by federal, state, 
and local entities. In addition to HAVA, federal laws have been enacted 
in several major areas of the voting process such as the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), which was designed to expand the 
opportunities for citizens to register to vote in federal elections by 
allowing registration by mail and at state motor vehicle agencies (MVA) 
and other public agencies, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), which facilitated absentee voting 
by these populations. 

The U.S. election system is highly decentralized, with primary 
responsibility for managing, planning, and conducting elections 
residing at the local jurisdiction level--generally, the county level 
in most states, but some states have delegated election responsibility 
to subcounty governmental units. Subcounty election jurisdictions in 9 
states account for about 75 percent of about 10,500 local election 
jurisdictions in the United States, but about 12 percent of the 2000 
U.S. Census population. Local election jurisdictions vary widely in 
size and complexity, ranging from small New England townships to Los 
Angeles County, whose number of registered voters exceeds that of many 
states. Our election system is based upon a complex interaction of 
people (voters, election officials, and poll workers), processes 
(controls), and technology that must work effectively together to 
achieve a successful election. Every stage of the election process-- 
registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting 
Election Day activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--is 
affected by the interface of people, processes, and technology. 

Following the November 2000 general election, GAO issued a series of 
reports addressing a range of issues that emerged during that 
election.[Footnote 2] These reports also identified challenges that 
election officials reported they faced in major stages of the election 
process. We have also issued reports since the November 2004 general 
election on voter registration issues and security and reliability of 
electronic voting. As appropriate, information from our October 2001 
comprehensive report on election processes nationwide was used as a 
basis for determining changes since 2000.[Footnote 3] Our more recent 
reports were used to supplement this report on challenges election 
officials faced in the November 2004 election. Our methodology for this 
report included a Web-based survey of all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia (all 51 responded) and a mail questionnaire sent to a 
representative probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions 
nationwide, stratified by population (632, or 80 percent, responded). 
We also conducted site visits to a nonprobability sample of 28 local 
election jurisdictions in 14 states, selected to reflect variation in 
such factors as geographic location, whether early voting was offered, 
whether recounts for federal or statewide offices occurred, and voting 
technology used.[Footnote 4] Some of the 28 jurisdictions visited were 
among those we had visited for our 2001 election report. In stratifying 
our nationwide mail survey of local election jurisdictions, we grouped 
election jurisdictions by their 2000 U.S. Census population--small 
(less than 10,000), medium (10,000 to 100,000), and large (more than 
100,000). These categories are also used in this report to describe 
jurisdictions we visited. The results of our state and local surveys 
are presented in two supplemental products that can be found on our Web 
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.][Footnote 5] 

Results in Brief: 

The most prevalent changes to state and local elections systems since 
the 2000 presidential election were changes required under HAVA, which, 
among other things, established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 
(EAC) with wide-ranging duties that include providing information and 
assistance to states and local jurisdictions with regard to election 
administration. EAC is led by four Commissioners who are to be 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The 
Commissioners who, under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 
2003, were appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by 
the Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January 
2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives; 
however, EAC has reported that its delayed start-up affected its 
ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames 
specified in the act. In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual 
report, the delayed EAC start-up affected states' procurement of new 
voting systems and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions 
to meet related HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. 

In addition, HAVA included specific changes to certain aspects of state 
administration of federal elections. Some key changes included 
requirements for states to implement statewide voter registration 
lists, a requirement that certain first-time mail registrants provide 
identification with their registration application or when they vote 
for the first time at the polls, and a requirement that most states 
permit, under certain circumstances, the casting of provisional 
ballots--those cast by voters at the polls whose eligibility to vote is 
unclear and to be determined later--in elections for federal office. 
HAVA also provided for funding to encourage states to replace their 
punch card and lever voting equipment, and set out voting system 
standards that state voting systems used in federal elections must 
meet. While HAVA defined some parameters for these requirements, the 
act leaves the states discretion in choosing the methods of 
implementing them. It is too early to determine the full effect that 
HAVA's requirements may have on the elections process because those 
requirements are in different stages of implementation. States had to 
implement HAVA's requirements for provisional voting and identification 
for first-time voters who register by mail prior to the November 2004 
election. However, 41 states obtained waivers, allowed under HAVA, to 
delay the implementation of their statewide voter registration systems 
from January 1, 2004, to January 1, 2006. Moreover, states are in 
different stages of replacing their older voting equipment, such as 
punch card and lever machines, with newer technology. 

On the basis of our surveys of states and local jurisdictions and 
visits to selected jurisdictions, we found that states varied in their 
progress in implementing their statewide voter registration lists and 
how they have implemented their voting systems. Except for the 9 states 
that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA's requirements for establishing 
a statewide voter registration lists, all other states subject to the 
statewide list requirement were not required to perform list 
maintenance activities as defined in HAVA until the extended waiver 
deadline of January 2006. By the November 2004 general election, states 
were in various stages of implementing provisions of HAVA related to 
their statewide voter registration lists and performing voter list 
verification and maintenance, and had different capabilities and 
procedures at the state and local level for performing required list 
maintenance functions. Thus, states are still working to fully 
implement HAVA's voter registration requirements. As states gain more 
experience with their statewide voter registration and data-matching 
systems and processes, it is likely their systems and processes will 
evolve. Given the continuing challenge of maintaining accurate voter 
registration lists in a highly mobile society, this is to be expected. 

We also found that implementation of the identification provision for 
certain first-time mail registrants varied. One noteworthy variation is 
in the definition of mail registration: Some local jurisdictions we 
visited said that applications received through voter registration 
drives would be treated as mail registrations and thus would be subject 
to the HAVA identification requirements. Other local jurisdictions we 
visited said applications from registration drives were not to be 
treated as mail registrations and therefore were not subject to the 
HAVA identification requirements. As to the other two provisions, the 
results of GAO's survey of state and local officials and jurisdictions 
we visited showed that states varied in their implementation of HAVA's 
requirement for provisional voting. One variation of particular note 
during the November 2004 election was the difference in state 
requirements regarding the location where voters must cast their 
provisional ballots in order for them to be counted. For example, in 
some jurisdictions, once the voter's eligibility to vote had been 
verified, the provisional ballot was counted if it was cast within the 
voter's county of residence, while in other jurisdictions the ballot 
was counted only if the voter had cast it in the assigned precinct. 
Notwithstanding these variations for implementing provisional voting, 
it is clear that provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter 
participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when 
attempting to vote. 

Many states have taken advantage of federal funding to replace their 
punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods. The 
results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that 
large jurisdictions are replacing older voting equipment with more 
technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small 
jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and 
constitute the majority of jurisdictions across the United States. On 
the basis of states' reported plans and local jurisdictions' estimated 
plans for acquiring voting systems for future elections, the election 
technology environment can be characterized as varied and evolving. 
Accordingly, voting system performance management, security, and 
testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the 
overall election process. 

In addition to reporting the required HAVA changes, some states 
reported having taken other actions since the 2000 general election to 
reform election administration; for example, 6 states reported they had 
eliminated the need for an excuse to vote absentee, and 9 states 
reported establishing procedures to conduct an automatic recount 
(audit), in full or in part, of the vote tabulation to help ensure 
accuracy of the vote prior to certification. 

Election officials identified challenges faced in the November 2004 
general election. Some of these challenges were also identified as 
challenges in GAO's October 2001 comprehensive report on the election 
processes, while others were raised with us for the first time. 

Continuing Challenges in 2004: 

* Voter registration. According to our nationwide survey of local 
election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local 
jurisdictions reported that they continued to encounter challenges with 
the voter registration lists that they had experienced in the 2000 
general election, such as difficulties related to voter registration 
applications with inaccurate and incomplete voter registration 
information, multiple registrations by the same person, or ineligible 
voters appearing on the list. Election jurisdictions also continued to 
face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor 
vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities. 

* Absentee voting. The results of our nationwide survey indicate that 
election jurisdictions continued to experience absentee voting 
challenges that included receiving late absentee voter applications and 
ballots, managing large workloads with inadequate resources, addressing 
voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete absentee 
applications, and preventing potential fraud. Although election 
officials in jurisdictions we visited provided examples of procedures 
used to help protect against fraud such as comparing signatures on 
absentee applications to signatures on registration applications, 
election officials still suspected instances of fraud. In 1 
jurisdiction we visited, election officials reported they referred to 
the district attorney for investigation matters pertaining to 44 
individuals who allegedly voted absentee ballots with invalid 
signatures. 

* Election Day activities. According to our nationwide survey of local 
election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local 
jurisdictions reported that they encountered many of the same 
challenges preparing for and conducting Election Day activities in the 
November 2004 general election as they did in November 2000, including 
recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled poll workers, 
locating a sufficient number of polling places that met requirements, 
designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were many 
candidates or issues to include, having long lines at polling places, 
and handling the large volume of telephone calls received from voters 
and poll workers on Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide 
survey, we estimate that large jurisdictions and, to some extent, 
medium jurisdictions encountered these challenges more than small 
jurisdictions. 

* Vote counting. On the basis of interviews with election officials, 
many of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology for 
vote counting that had confronted election officials across the country 
in the November 2000 general election continued to be a challenge for 
them in the 2004 general election. Voting equipment problems, poll 
worker errors, and voter errors were reported as making it difficult to 
tabulate the votes quickly and accurately. 

* Voting technology. According to our local jurisdiction survey and 
visits, voting system performance measures have not been systematically 
embraced, reliable performance data have not been collected, and 
security and testing activities have not been consistently required and 
performed for all voting systems. As a result, effective management of 
voting technology remains a challenge for many states and local 
jurisdictions because election officials may continue to use a 
patchwork of operational indicators and anecdotal experiences, rather 
than requirements-based information on voting system performance, to 
support decisions regarding voting system investments and operations. 

New Challenges in 2004: 

* Registrations from registration drives. Election officials in some 
local election jurisdictions we visited reported that efforts of 
various groups to "get out the vote" by registering new voters through 
voter registration drives created new challenges not identified to us 
in the 2000 general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions 
we visited, election officials told us they faced a challenge 
processing large volumes of voter registration applications just prior 
to the deadlines for registration. The conditions that election 
officials reported experiencing in processing the volume of voter 
registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully 
train temporary workers, can result in data entry errors that would 
have the impact of not properly registering eligible voters and not 
identifying ineligible voters. Moreover, while not reported as a 
prevalent problem, applications received from voter registration drives 
was a challenge reported by election officials, who said that some of 
these applications had incomplete or invalid addresses, fictitious 
names, or questionable signatures. On the basis of our nationwide 
survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 5 percent of 
local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared 
to have fraudulent names. 

* Early voting. Election officials reported encountering new challenges 
managing early voting. Some local jurisdictions we visited reported 
that they experienced long lines at early voting locations resulting 
from larger than expected early voter turnout. In some jurisdictions we 
visited, election officials said that factors such as inadequate 
planning on their part, limitations on types of facilities that could 
be used for early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring 
more staff or acquiring more voting locations affected their management 
of large early voter turnout. 

* New UOCAVA provision. A new challenge could develop for election 
officials as a result of a HAVA amendment to UOCAVA. In an effort to 
help make registration and voting easier for absent uniformed service 
voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United 
States, this 2002 amendment extended the period of time that can be 
covered by a single application from the year during which the 
application was received to a time period covering up to the next two 
subsequent general elections for federal office, or 4 years. However, 
election officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a 
possible unintended consequence of this amendment could be that when 
uniformed services personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, 
absentee ballots may not be sent to the correct address for subsequent 
general elections. Even with a 2005 revision to the Federal Post Card 
Application form where voters can indicate that they want ballots for 
one federal election only, election officials were concerned that many 
absentee ballots would be returned as undeliverable. 

* Third-party polling place activities. Election officials in some of 
the jurisdictions we visited in states where the presidential race was 
considered close (often referred to as battleground states) reported 
encountering challenges with disruptive third-party (e.g., poll 
watchers, observers, and electioneers) activities at polling places on 
Election Day. In some instances, these third parties simply increased 
the number of people that poll workers were to manage at a polling 
location; 
in others, election officials told us third-party observers' behavior 
negatively affected poll workers and voters. 

* Provisional voting. The implementation of provisional voting 
requirements as specified under HAVA highlighted another instance where 
states varied in their election systems, with somewhat distinct 
approaches for providing and counting provisional ballots. That is, 
states reported various differences in their counting processes such as 
the prescribed location (e.g., county or precinct) in which a voter 
must cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be counted. Another 
way states varied included circumstances, apart from those specified in 
HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when voters 
claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot. States also varied in 
the design of provisional ballots and how they tracked them. 

* Vote counting deadlines. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge to 
election officials with respect to counting the votes: Some 
jurisdictions reported difficulty completing the extra steps required 
to verify and count provisional votes within the time allowed for 
tallying the final vote count. 

* Voting systems. States and local jurisdictions face a broad challenge 
in ensuring consistent accuracy, integrity, and security among their 
voting systems in light of their adoption of various versions of 
federal voluntary voting system standards containing somewhat 
different--and, in some cases, outdated--performance thresholds for 
voting equipment. Adoption of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System 
Guidelines by EAC on December 13, 2005, provided updated criteria that 
states and local jurisdictions can choose to apply when evaluating and 
certifying their voting equipment. Organizations involved with voting 
system certification--including federal, state, and local governments; 
testing authorities; 
and vendors--may need the capacity to assume the workloads associated 
with the adoption of current standards, including upgrading, testing, 
and certifying newly acquired voting systems to meet the standards, 
particularly if the standards are to be applied to the 2006 general 
election. Furthermore, as states and jurisdictions move to a more 
integrated suite of election systems, proactive and systematic efforts 
in areas such as standards will be essential to addressing emerging 
technical, security, and reliability interactions among systems and 
managing risks in this dynamic election environment. 

Principal Findings: 

Voter Registration: 

In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter 
registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two 
goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons of registering to 
vote, and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to 
those eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not 
inadvertently removed from the registration lists. During 2004 and 
2005, many states were in the process of implementing their HAVA- 
required statewide voter registration lists and associated requirements 
for maintaining such a list. Thus, the potential benefits to be gained 
from HAVA's requirement for a statewide voter registration list were 
not evident in many states at the time of the November 2004 general 
election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA intended to help states and 
local election jurisdictions have access to more accurate voter 
registration list information, such as identifying duplicate 
registrations and matching the voter information against other state 
agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many 
states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of 
being able to verify voter registration application information with 
state motor vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to 
match voter registration lists with a state agency's records to 
identify felons who may be ineligible to vote. 

Local jurisdictions also encountered instances where voters claimed to 
be registered to vote and their names were not on the voter 
registration list. When this occurs, under HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements, states must permit voters to cast provisional ballots if 
the voters assert that they are registered in the jurisdiction where 
they desire to vote and are eligible to vote in a federal election. The 
results of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions 
indicate that many local jurisdictions encountered problems determining 
whether a provisional ballot was eligible to be counted where voters 
claimed to have registered at a motor vehicle agency or at another NVRA 
entity but there was insufficient evidence that the voter had submitted 
a registration application at one of those offices. 

While registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election 
system generally, applying to register and being registered are not 
synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the 
voter registration applications they receive. Local election 
jurisdictions continued to encounter challenges with the voter 
registration lists for the November 2004 election such as difficulties 
related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration 
information, multiple registrations, and ineligible voters appearing on 
the lists. The surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions 
prior to the November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of 
balancing ease of registration with assurances that only eligible 
voters are on the registration rolls. In some cases, election officials 
reported that hundreds or thousands of applications were submitted just 
before the registration deadline and close to Election Day. According 
to our nationwide survey and visits to selected jurisdictions, entering 
voter registrations in a timely manner presented a challenge for some 
election officials in marshaling the needed resources, including in 
some cases hiring and training temporary employees, to review the 
applications, obtain missing or incomplete information from applicants, 
determine that the registrants were eligible to vote in the 
jurisdiction, and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were added 
to the voter registration rolls prior to Election Day. As shown in 
figure 1, we estimate that 19 percent of jurisdictions nationwide 
received applications just prior to the registration deadline that 
posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day, with large 
jurisdictions experiencing problems more than medium and small 
jurisdictions.[Footnote 6] 

Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 
Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 
2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium 
and small jurisdictions. 

[End of figure] 

During our site visits, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that 
on a daily basis it was 30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data 
entry. As a result, election officials reported that they hired 80 full-
time temporary workers who worked two full-time shifts to enter all 
eligible applications into the voter registration list used at the 
polls on Election Day. Election officials in another large jurisdiction 
told us that they unexpectedly received about 10,000 last-minute 
registration applications. 

According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and 
election officials in jurisdictions we visited, many local election 
jurisdictions had processes to help manage receipt of voter 
registration applications such as training for MVA and other NVRA 
entities' staff and local election office's staff for data entry and 
tracking of registration application forms. However, some local 
jurisdictions did not report having such management processes. We 
estimate that 76 percent of all jurisdictions provided training to data 
entry staff about the processing and inputting of registration 
applications, and we estimate that over half of all jurisdictions 
tracked incoming registration applications to ascertain the total 
number received, the number entered into registration lists, and the 
number not processed because of omission or application error, and to 
identify ineligible voters based on age or residence. In addition, some 
local jurisdictions we visited reported that they implemented processes 
such as tracking the number of applications distributed and the source 
from which applications are received, and providing receipts to voter 
registrants to help alleviate problems encountered with properly 
registering voters. 

In addition to challenges encountered processing the large volume of 
registration applications received through voter registration drives, 
on the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, 
we estimate that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter 
registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names. 
Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported receiving 
voter registration applications that had irregularities. For example, 
election officials in 1 jurisdiction reported receiving applications 
that were unreadable, had questionable signatures, were incomplete, or 
had invalid addresses. Election officials in another jurisdiction also 
reported receiving applications with fictitious names and fake 
signatures. Generally, election officials reported that the number of 
applications that were irregular were few in number, especially in 
relation to the total number of applications received. 

Absentee and Early Voting: 

Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote 
absentee or early. For the November 2004 general election, 3 additional 
states reported that they no longer required voters to provide excuses 
such as being ill, having a disability, or being away from the precinct 
on Election Day to vote absentee. Three states reported expanding their 
provisions for permanent absentee status (usually reserved for the 
elderly or individuals with disabilities), allowing voters to receive 
absentee ballots for a state-specified time period, such as 4 years. 
One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in absentee 
voters provide an affidavit from a notary or witness for their 
signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Furthermore, HAVA 
amended UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of time that 
can be covered by a single absentee ballot application by absent 
uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing 
outside of the United States from the year during which the application 
was received to a time period covering up to the two next regularly 
scheduled general elections for federal office. 

Absentee voting. Voting prior to Election Day can make voting easier 
for voters but can also create challenges for election officials. On 
the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, 
more than half of all jurisdictions encountered problems receiving 
absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots from voters too late 
to process--an estimated 55 percent of jurisdictions received 
applications too late and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too 
late, as shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, 
November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[B] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and 
large jurisdictions. 

[End of figure] 

Although the extent of the problem in terms of the number of 
applications and ballots that could not be processed is unknown, the 
estimated number of jurisdictions encountering the problem would seem 
to be of some concern to state and local election officials. Absentee 
application deadlines close to Election Day provide citizens increased 
time to apply to vote absentee. But such deadlines can create 
difficulties for election officials, providing a short period of time 
to ensure that eligible voters receive absentee ballots in time to 
vote, including having time to notify voters and have the voters 
correct errors on their ballot applications, such as failing to sign 
them. The impact of absentee ballot application deadlines on voters' 
ability to complete and return the absentee application and ballot in 
time for their votes to be counted is another example of the 
difficulties of balancing voter access and ease of voting with 
appropriate election administration processes and controls. 

Election officials identified problems related to voter errors on 
absentee ballot applications and ballots. On the basis of our 
nationwide survey of election jurisdictions, we estimate that almost 
half of the jurisdictions encountered problems with missing or 
illegible signatures on absentee ballot applications, and our survey 
results also indicate that local jurisdictions encountered problems 
with, among other things, missing or inadequate voting residence 
addresses on absentee applications and missing or incomplete witness 
information for a voter's signature or information. In jurisdictions 
that we visited, some election officials told us of steps they took, 
when time permitted, to address voter errors. States reported having 
information on their Web sites that included information on the basic 
requirements for requesting and casting an absentee ballot. In 
addition, some absentee voting applications and ballots provided to us 
by elections jurisdictions we visited included instructions for voting 
absentee. 

Mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to be particularly 
susceptible to fraud. Election fraud could include such activities as 
completion of a ballot by someone other than the registered voter or an 
attempt by a voter to cast more than one ballot in an election. On the 
basis of our nationwide survey, we estimated that a majority of 
jurisdictions used procedures in the November 2004 election designed to 
help ensure that absentee voters did not vote more than once and that 
absentee ballots were actually completed by the person requesting the 
ballot. However, some mail-in absentee voter fraud concerns remained. 
In particular, election officials expressed concern regarding absentee 
voters being unduly influenced or intimidated while voting by third 
parties who went to voters' homes and offered to assist them in voting 
ballots. Election officials also expressed concerns about the influence 
of third parties on voters for early voting when voters waiting in line 
were approached by candidates and poll watchers. 

Uniformed military and overseas absentee voters. Election officials in 
a few jurisdictions we visited told us of a possible unintended 
consequence that may create a challenge with respect to provisions in 
UOCAVA as amended by HAVA, whereby the Federal Post Card Application 
can possibly cover as many as two subsequent general elections for 
federal office. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited 
said that when uniformed service personnel are reassigned to other duty 
posts, ballots might not be sent to the correct address for subsequent 
general elections. Election officials in some of these jurisdictions 
said they were taking steps to help ensure that absentee ballots would 
be sent to the correct address for the 2006 general election, such as 
requesting e-mail addresses as a means to obtain information to update 
mailing addresses or conducting mass mailings to these voters to 
confirm mailing addresses. However, election officials were concerned 
that if these efforts are not successful, a number of the ballots 
mailed to addresses provided on the Federal Post Card Application for 
the November 2006 election would be returned as undeliverable. This was 
a concern for these election officials because the jurisdictions would 
have to absorb the expense of mailing ballots that would be 
undeliverable. Furthermore, a potential effect may be that some 
uniformed services voters, who applied to vote absentee using the 
Federal Post Card Application, may not receive their ballots for 
subsequent general elections. As noted in our April 2006 report on 
election assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, one of the 
top two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for these voters was 
that they were undeliverable.[Footnote 7] 

Early voting. With respect to early voting, election officials in some 
jurisdictions we visited identified obtaining adequate staffing for 
conducting early voting as a challenge, especially when given the 
unanticipated large early voter turnout. In 11 of the 14 early voting 
jurisdictions visited, election officials emphasized the importance of 
staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election 
office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. According to our 
nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 30 percent 
of jurisdictions used permanent staff to work early voting polling 
locations. Our nationwide survey also showed that jurisdictions used 
other types of staff and combinations of staff such as permanent and 
part-time staff. Depending on the number of early voting locations to 
be staffed, using experienced staff may not always be feasible, and 
using other staff may affect the speed with which voters can be 
processed and may contribute to long lines. As states fully implement 
their statewide voter registration lists, processing voters at early 
voting locations may become easier as the voter registration systems 
evolve and systems become user-friendly so that all types of staff can 
be more effective in processing voters. 

Conducting Elections: 

States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the 
November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA requirements and 
other state actions to improve the administration of elections in the 
United States. HAVA established requirements with respect to elections 
for federal office for, among other things, certain voters who register 
by mail to provide identification prior to voting; 
mandated that voting equipment accessible to individuals with 
disabilities be located at each polling place; 
and required that voter information be posted at polling places on 
Election Day. Since the November 2000 general election, some states 
have also reported making changes to their identification requirements 
for all voters. 

Many of the challenges that election officials reported encountering in 
preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election were 
not new challenges. Recruiting and training an adequate supply of poll 
workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing communications 
on Election Day were challenges that we identified in our October 2001 
report on the November 2000 general election.[Footnote 8] As shown in 
figure 3, on the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that more 
large jurisdictions encountered difficulties than medium and small 
jurisdictions when it came to obtaining a sufficient number of poll 
workers. 

Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[B] The difference between small and medium jurisdictions is 
statistically significant. 

[C] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[D] Jurisdictions could indicate not applicable for a variety of 
reasons, including that poll workers are not recruited, but elected or 
appointed; 
that elections are conducted by mail ballot, and as a result there is 
not a need for poll workers to staff polling places on Election Day; 
or that the election officials themselves serve as poll workers. 

[E] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor 
that involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and 
technologies associated with numerous activities. However, we found in 
our survey of local jurisdictions and site visits to 28 localities that 
more large and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions reported that they 
encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting the November 
2004 general election than small jurisdictions did. This may be because 
the complexity of administering an election and the potential for 
challenges increase with the number of people and places involved and 
the scope of activities and processes that must be conducted, such as 
the need to provide ballots and voter assistance in languages other 
than English. The results of our local election jurisdiction survey 
indicate that more large and medium jurisdictions than small 
jurisdictions took steps--such as through voter education or providing 
instructions at polling places for poll workers--designed to minimize 
potential problems. Many of the election officials in large 
jurisdictions we visited told us that being well prepared, having 
established policies and procedures in place, and having high-quality 
election staff were factors that contributed to a smooth Election Day. 
One problem that election officials in some jurisdictions reported 
encountering on Election Day was actions by poll watchers and other 
third parties that election officials considered disruptive. This 
presents another issue that election officials may need to include in 
their Election Day preparations and training. 

Provisional Voting: 

Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that 
some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions 
regarding the voters' eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 
2004, states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for 
federal office by voters who assert that they are eligible to vote and 
registered in that jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter 
registration list.[Footnote 9] Such states are also required under HAVA 
to provide provisional ballots in federal elections under other 
circumstances, such as for certain voters who registered by mail and do 
not have required identification. While HAVA requires that states 
permit an individual under certain circumstances to cast a provisional 
ballot in a federal election, the act left the specific choices on the 
methods of implementation to the discretion of the states. Under HAVA, 
election officials receiving provisional voter information are to 
determine whether such individuals are eligible to vote under state 
law. If an individual is determined to be eligible, HAVA specifies that 
such individual's provisional ballot be counted as a vote in that 
election in accordance with state law. 

On the basis of our survey of state election officials, our nationwide 
survey of election jurisdictions, and our visits to jurisdictions, 
states and local jurisdictions varied in a number of ways in how they 
implemented HAVA's provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 
election. For example, in addition to those specified in HAVA, the 
circumstances reported by states and local jurisdictions when a 
provisional ballot would be offered varied, with some jurisdictions 
allowing voters claiming they did not receive an absentee ballot to 
vote provisionally. The results of our survey of state elections 
officials showed that states also varied as to the location where 
voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for such ballots to 
be eligible to be counted, as shown in figure 4. 

Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be 
Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Six states are not subject to HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements, but 2 of these 6 (Wisconsin and Wyoming) authorize some 
measure of provisional voting. Both of these states are included with 
the 32 states that reported requiring that provisional voters must cast 
their votes in the specific precincts in which they are registered in 
order for their votes to be eligible to be counted. 

[End of figure] 

On the basis of our interviews with local election officials, local 
election procedures and unique circumstances add to the differences 
among jurisdictions. For example, in some jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials described various factors that affected the counting 
of provisional ballots, such as the time allowed for provisional voters 
to provide missing identification. Specifically, in 1 jurisdiction, 
voters had to provide the required identification before the polls 
closed for the ballot to be counted, while in other jurisdictions the 
ballot would be counted if the voter provided the required 
identification within a specified number of days after Election Day. 

These variations in provisional voting implementation highlight how 
individual state rules, procedures, and practices may have affected the 
number of provisional ballots cast and counted in the November 2004 
election. These differences and limited data availability make it 
difficult to determine with certainty how many provisional ballots were 
cast and counted nationally in the November 2004 election. However, the 
data that are available indicate that the HAVA requirement for 
provisional voting has helped to better facilitate voter participation 
of those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to 
vote. 

Counting the Votes: 

Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the 
50 states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is 
the same across the nation: to accurately process those ballots 
requiring verification and accurately count every valid ballot. As with 
the elections process overall, conducting an accurate vote count is not 
a simple process. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to 
detail, and the seamless integration of people, processes, and 
technology. 

In 2004, vote counting remained an intricate multistep process 
characterized by a great variety of local procedures depending on a 
local jurisdiction's technology, size, and preferences. The multistep 
process can involve such activities as the initial vote count, a vote 
count audit to verify the accuracy of the count, certification of the 
vote count, and recounts of the votes when an election is 
close.[Footnote 10] There were some notable developments related to 
conducting recounts that may be mandatory (because of a close margin of 
victory) or requested. Some states reported that they added rules for 
mandatory recounts. Others reported that they changed their guidance 
for who may request a recount. Regarding vote count audits, while 29 
states and the District of Columbia reported they did not require 
audits of vote counts, 21 states reported having provisions that 
required or allowed audits of vote counts, as shown in figure 5. 
Furthermore, 9 states reported having taken some legislative or 
executive steps toward doing so since November 2004. 

Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in 
Place for the 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Includes District of Columbia. 

[End of figure] 

Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a 
jurisdiction for casting their ballots--early, absentee, provisional, 
and Election Day voting--enhances eligible voters' opportunity to vote. 
At the same time, multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make 
the vote-counting process more complicated. In addition, short 
deadlines for certifying the final vote--as little as 2 days in 1 
state--provide little time for election officials to review, verify, 
and count provisional and absentee ballots. Larger jurisdictions 
generally face more challenges than smaller jurisdictions because of 
the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types--absentee, 
provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for many 
jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in tracking, 
verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in November 
2004, some election officials in jurisdictions we visited said that 
they are implementing new procedures for provisional voting, such as 
printing provisional ballots in a color different from other types of 
ballots or using paper ballots rather than direct recording electronic 
(DRE) machines for provisional voters. These procedures are intended to 
help election officials track provisional ballots to ensure that they 
are all accounted for and included in the vote count. 

Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington told us that they are moving 
to all-mail elections, which was authorized on a countywide basis by a 
new state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail voting 
eliminates some challenges that can affect accurate vote counting-- 
e.g., poll worker training on voting equipment operations and 
provisional voting or the chance of malfunctioning voting equipment at 
the polls--it magnifies the importance of other aspects of the process, 
such as accurately matching voter signatures and having clear guidance 
for determining voter intent from improperly or unclearly marked 
ballots. 

The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed 
the interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring 
an accurate vote count. In the initial statewide count, a mere 261 
votes separated the two top candidates, and an initial recount reduced 
that margin of victory to just 42 votes out of more than 2.7 million 
cast, and the final recount resulted in a 129-vote margin of victory 
for the candidate who came in second in the first two vote counts. The 
experiences of election jurisdictions that had to conduct the recounts 
illustrated how small errors in the election administration process can 
affect the vote count. For example, in at least 11 counties provisional 
ballots were found by a Washington state superior court to have been 
counted without verifying voter signatures or before verification of 
voter registration status had been completed. Furthermore, 573 absentee 
ballots were erroneously disqualified in one county, and 22 absentee 
and provisional ballots were discovered in the base units of optical 
scan machines in another county after the election had been certified. 
Were any state's election processes subjected to the very close 
scrutiny that characterized the recount in Washington state, it is 
likely that imperfections would be revealed. Votes are cast and 
elections are conducted by people who are not and cannot be 100 percent 
error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the consistently 
error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large 
jurisdictions with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person, 
absentee, or provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve a 
consistently error-free count can help to ensure that any errors are 
reduced to the minimum humanly possible. 

Voting Methods and Technologies: 

The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied 
and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local 
jurisdiction survey estimates. Figure 6 shows the estimated percentages 
of all jurisdictions' use of a predominant voting method in the 2000 
and 2004 general elections. Two key patterns emerged in the use of 
voting methods between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. First, we 
estimate that the percentage of large jurisdictions using DREs doubled 
from 15 percent in the 2000 general election to 30 percent in 2004. The 
predominant voting method most often used for large jurisdictions 
changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE and 
precinct count optical scan in 2004. In contrast, we estimate that the 
predominant voting methods most often used remained the same for small 
and medium jurisdictions (paper ballots and precinct count optical 
scan, respectively) from 2000 to 2004. Furthermore, on the basis of our 
local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of 
jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical scan equipment before the 
2006 general election. Second, in response to our state survey, 9 
states reported that they eliminated the lever machine and punch card 
voting methods for the 2004 general election. In addition, 18 other 
states plan to eliminate lever or punch card voting methods for the 
2006 general election. This greater state involvement in jurisdictions' 
choice of voting methods, the availability of federal funding to 
replace lever and punch card voting equipment, and certain HAVA 
requirements--among other factors--are likely influences on the 
adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods. 

Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant 
Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by 
specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing 
for updates to the federal voting system standards, including the 
performance components of those standards. According to our local 
jurisdiction survey, most local jurisdictions adopted performance 
standards for accuracy, reliability, or efficiency for the 2004 general 
election--usually standards selected by their respective states. It is 
important that system performance be measured during an election, when 
the system is being used and operated according to defined procedures 
by voters and election workers, to provide a basis for determining 
where performance needs, requirements, and expectations are not being 
met so that timely corrective action can be taken. As was the case for 
the 2000 general election, jurisdictions collected various types of 
voting system performance measures for the 2004 general election, 
although some types of measures were collected by fewer jurisdictions 
than others--in part because they were not well suited to particular 
voting methods. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 
the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied 
with their systems' performance during the 2004 general election, even 
though performance data may not have been collected to an extent that 
would provide firm support for these views. The moderate collection 
levels of data on operational voting systems' performance may present a 
challenge to state and local election officials in their efforts to 
make informed decisions on both near-term and long-term voting system 
changes and investments. 

Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public 
confidence in the election process, and according to our local 
jurisdiction survey estimated results, accomplishing this was a shared 
responsibility among states, local jurisdictions, vendors, law 
enforcement officials, and others for most jurisdictions. According to 
our state survey, estimates from our local jurisdiction survey, and 
visits to jurisdictions, there were differences across states and 
jurisdictions in areas such as the adoption of system security 
standards and reported implementation of system security controls, 
which was generally consistent with what we reported in our October 
2001 report on election processes. In addition, 27 states reported in 
our state survey that they are requiring jurisdictions to apply 
voluntary federal standards to voting systems used for the first time 
in the November 2006 general election that are outdated, unspecified, 
or entail multiple versions. In the area of testing, most states 
reported that they required national or state certification of their 
voting systems, but the systems covered by those requirements and the 
criteria used for certification also varied by state and by voting 
method. Readiness (logic and accuracy) testing continued to be commonly 
performed by an estimated 92 percent of local jurisdictions that used 
automated voting systems for the 2004 general election, but the local 
election officials we talked with described a variety of testing 
approaches.[Footnote 11] We estimate that two other forms of testing-- 
parallel testing and postelection auditing of voting equipment--were 
much less prevalent than readiness testing and were conducted by 2 
percent and 43 percent of jurisdictions that used automated voting, 
respectively.[Footnote 12] Appropriately defined and implemented 
standards for system functions and testing processes are essential to 
ensuring the accuracy, integrity, and reliability of voting systems 
across all phases of the elections process. States and local 
jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and consistently 
applying appropriate standards and other directives for security 
management and testing to address vulnerabilities and risks in their 
specific election environments. 

The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of 
voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 
general election according to estimates from our local jurisdiction 
survey and visits to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of 
integration we examined, such as electronic programming or setup and 
electronic management. Furthermore, relatively few local jurisdictions 
we visited reported having plans for integrating or further integrating 
their election-related systems and components for the 2006 general 
election, and in the instances where jurisdictions reported plans, the 
scope and nature of the plans varied. Nevertheless, there is real 
potential for greater integration among voting systems, election 
systems, and components as states and jurisdictions act on plans to 
acquire optical scan and DRE equipment that lends itself to 
integration. It is unclear if and when this migration to more 
technology-based voting methods will produce more integrated election 
system environments. However, suitable standards and guidance for these 
interconnected components and systems--some of which remain to be 
developed--could facilitate the development, testing, operational 
management, and maintenance of components and systems, thereby 
maximizing the benefits of current and emerging election technologies 
and achieving states' and local jurisdictions' goals for performance 
and security. The challenge inherent in such a dynamic environment is 
to update system standards so that emerging technical, security, and 
reliability interactions are systematically addressed. 

Concluding Observations: 

The administration of election systems will never be error free or 
perfect. Each stage of the election process poses a major challenge for 
election officials. Effective management of the election system 
requires a variety of resources that must be prepared, mobilized, and 
deployed at regular intervals. These resources include the people who 
conduct the election and participate in it, the processes that govern 
what the people do and how the election is conducted, and the 
technology that facilitates the efforts of the people as they work 
through the election processes. Although responsibility for election 
administration falls largely on local governmental units, state and 
federal governments have a role to play in helping to minimize the 
types of errors that can occur. Thus, as technology evolves and 
circumstances warrant, state and federal governments might consider 
what, if any, actions on their part could help to improve election 
processes. 

GAO found that states have made changes--either as a result of HAVA or 
on their own--that addressed some of the challenges identified in the 
2000 general election. GAO also found that some challenges continue and 
new challenges occurred in the 2004 general election. In passing HAVA, 
Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve 
upon several aspects of the voting administration system. It is too 
soon to determine the full effect of those changes, especially the 
requirement for statewide voter registration lists for federal 
elections and new voting systems, both of which are at different stages 
of implementation across the states. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 1: 
Introduction: 

The basic goal of the elections system in the United States is 
straightforward: All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, 
should be able to cast their votes and, if such votes have been 
properly cast by the voters, have those votes counted accurately. Faith 
in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the 
foundation of our democracy. Reports of problems encountered in the 
close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter registration 
lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated voting 
equipment raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of certain 
aspects of the U.S. election system. After the events surrounding the 
November 2000 general election, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(HAVA) was enacted and major election reforms are now being 
implemented.[Footnote 13] The November 2004 general election 
highlighted some of the same challenges as 2000 as well as some new 
challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and 
implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both 
elections highlighted the importance of the effective interaction of 
people, processes, and technology in ensuring effective election 
operations and maintaining public confidence that our election system 
works. 

Since 2001, GAO has issued a series of reports covering aspects of the 
election process primarily with respect to federal elections.[Footnote 
14] This report focuses on the changing of such election processes in 
the United States and the November 2004 general election. Specifically, 
primarily with respect to federal elections, our objectives were to 
examine each major stage of the election process to (1) identify 
changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps 
taken to implement HAVA, and (2) describe the issues and challenges 
encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election. 

Election Authority: 

Election authority is shared by federal, state, and local officials in 
the United States. Congressional authority to affect the administration 
of elections derives from various constitutional sources, depending 
upon the type of election.[Footnote 15] Congress has passed legislation 
in several major areas of the voting process. For example, the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA),[Footnote 16] expanded the 
opportunities for citizens to register to vote for federal elections 
by, among other things, requiring most states to accept registration 
applications for federal elections by mail and at state motor vehicle 
agencies (MVA) and at certain other state agencies. The act also 
requires that in the administration of elections for federal office, 
states are to take certain steps to accurately maintain voter 
registration lists, and it limits the circumstances for removing names 
from voter lists. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 
Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) requires states to, among other things, permit 
uniformed services voters absent from the place of residence where they 
are otherwise qualified to vote, their dependents, and U.S. citizens 
residing outside the country to register and vote absentee in elections 
for federal office.[Footnote 17] 

The Help America Vote Act was enacted into law on October 29, 2002. As 
discussed below, the act includes a number of provisions related to 
voter registration, provisional voting, absentee voting, voting 
equipment, and other election administration provisions, and authorizes 
the appropriation of funds to be used toward implementing the law's 
requirements. HAVA also provides that the choices on the methods of 
implementation of such requirements, for example, a computerized 
statewide voter registration list, provisional voting, voter 
information requirements at the polling place, identification 
requirements, and voting system standards (for ballot verification, 
manual audit capacity, accessibility, and error rates), are left to the 
discretion of the states. HAVA further specifies that such requirements 
are minimum requirements and should not be construed to prevent states 
from establishing election technology and administration requirements 
that are stricter than HAVA requirements as long as they are not 
inconsistent with certain other specified provisions. 

HAVA, in general, applies to all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. Areas covered by the law include: 

* Computerized statewide voter registration list: HAVA requires most 
states to implement a single, uniform, centralized, computerized 
statewide voter registration list to serve as the official voter 
registration list for the conduct of all elections for federal office 
in each such state.[Footnote 18] Under HAVA, the computerized statewide 
voter registration list was to have been implemented by 2004. However, 
40 states and the District of Columbia received waivers to extend the 
deadline until January 1, 2006. States are required to perform regular 
maintenance of the voter list by comparing it to state records on 
felons and deaths, and to match voter registration applicant 
information on the voter list with information in the state motor 
vehicle agency's records and Social Security Administration records, as 
appropriate. 

* Absentee ballots: HAVA contains various amendments to UOCAVA 
regarding absentee voting for absent uniformed service voters and 
certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States. 
The amendments, among other things, (1) required that the secretaries 
of each military department, to the maximum extent practicable, provide 
notice to military personnel of absentee ballot deadlines, (2) extended 
the time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application 
from UOCAVA voters, and (3) prohibited states from refusing to accept 
or process, with respect to federal elections, a voter registration 
application or an absentee ballot application by an absent uniformed 
services voter on the ground that the application was submitted before 
the first date that the state otherwise accepts or processes 
applications for that year from nonuniformed service absentee voters. 

* Provisional ballots: HAVA requires most states to implement 
provisional voting for elections for federal office.[Footnote 19] Under 
HAVA, in an election for federal office, states are to provide a 
provisional ballot to an individual asserting (1) to be registered in 
the jurisdiction for which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible 
to vote in a federal election but (3) whose name does not appear on the 
official list of eligible voters for the polling place. Provisional 
ballots are also to be provided in elections for federal office to 
individuals who an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, 
and for court-ordered voting in a federal election after the polls have 
closed. These various types of individuals, under HAVA, are to be 
permitted to cast the provisional ballot upon the execution of written 
affirmation at the polling place that they are registered voters in the 
jurisdiction and that they are eligible to vote in that election. If 
election officials determine that the individual is eligible under 
state law to vote, the individual's provisional ballot is to be counted 
as a vote in accordance with state law. HAVA also requires that a free 
access system be established to inform voters if their votes were 
counted, and if not, the reason why. 

* Polling places: HAVA provisions targeted, among other things, 
improving information at polling places and Election Day procedures. To 
improve the knowledge of voters regarding voting rights and procedures, 
HAVA requires election officials[Footnote 20] to post voting 
information at each polling place on the days of elections for federal 
office, including, for example, a sample ballot, polling place hours, 
how to vote, instructions for first-time voters who registered by mail, 
and general information on federal and state voting rights laws and 
laws prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation. The act also authorized 
the appropriation of funds for payments to states for educating voters 
concerning voting procedures, voting rights, and voting technology. 
Under HAVA, voting systems used in elections for federal office are 
required to meet specified accessibility requirements for individuals 
with disabilities. With respect to improving accessibility, HAVA also 
authorized the appropriation of funds for payments to states to be used 
for improved accessibility of polling places for, among others, 
individuals with disabilities and those with limited English 
proficiency. HAVA also requires that such voting systems provide 
individuals with disabilities with the same opportunity for access and 
participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters. 
In connection with this requirement, HAVA provides for the use of at 
least one direct recording electronic (DRE) device or other voting 
system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling 
place.[Footnote 21] 

* Identification requirements: Under HAVA, states are to require that 
certain voters who register by mail to provide specified types of 
identification when voting at the polls or send a copy of the 
identification with their mailed applications.[Footnote 22] Acceptable 
identification includes a current and valid photo identification or 
current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or 
other government document that shows the name and address of the voter. 
Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met the identification 
requirement may cast a vote under HAVA's provisional voting section. 
Similarly, mail-in ballots from persons who have not provided the 
required identification also are to be counted as HAVA provisional 
ballots. 

* Election administration: HAVA also established an agency with wide- 
ranging duties to help improve state and local administration of 
federal elections. The Election Assistance Commission is to be involved 
with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to states 
implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national 
clearinghouse and resource for information with respect to the 
administration of federal elections, conducting studies, administering 
programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements to 
some aspects of election administration, and helping to develop testing 
for voting systems, and standards for election equipment. EAC is led by 
four Commissioners, who are to be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners, who, under HAVA, were to be 
appointed by February 26, 2003, were appointed by the President in 
October 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in December 2003. Since 
beginning operations in January 2004, EAC has achieved many of its 
objectives. Among other things, EAC has held hearings on the security 
of voting technologies and the national poll worker shortage; 
established a clearinghouse for information on election administration 
by issuing two best practices reports; 
distributed payments to states for election improvements, including 
payments for voter education and voting equipment replacement; 
drafted changes to existing federal voluntary standards for voting 
systems; and established a program to accredit the national independent 
certified laboratories that test electronic voting systems against the 
federal voluntary standards. However, EAC has reported that its delayed 
start-up affected its ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities 
within the time frames specified in the act. In turn, according to its 
fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed EAC start-up affected 
states' procurement of new voting equipment and the ability of some 
states and local jurisdictions to meet related HAVA requirements by 
statutory deadlines. 

* Voting systems: One of the primary HAVA provisions relates to 
encouraging states to replace punch card voting systems and lever 
voting systems and authorizing appropriations for payments to support 
states in making federally mandated improvements to their voting 
systems. A voting system includes the people, processes, and technology 
associated with any voting method. It encompasses the hardware and 
software used to define the ballot, conduct the vote, and transmit and 
tally results, and system maintenance and testing functions. With 
respect to standards for voting systems used in elections for federal 
office, HAVA requirements for such systems include providing voters 
with the ability to verify their votes before casting their ballots, 
producing permanent paper records for manual auditing of voting 
systems, and compliance of voting system ballot counting error rates 
with those set out in specified federal voting system standards. HAVA 
also directs that updates to the federal voluntary voting system 
standards for these requirements be in place by January 1, 
2004,[Footnote 23] and provides for additional updates to the voluntary 
standards as approved by the Election Assistance Commission. Mechanisms 
are also specified that can be used by states and localities in 
acquiring and operating voting systems, including accreditation of 
laboratories to independently test and evaluate voting systems and 
federal certification for voting systems that undergo independent 
testing. 

The time frames for implementing various HAVA requirements ranged from 
as early as 45 days after enactment (a deadline for establishing a 
grant program for payment to the states for improved election 
administration) to as late as January 1, 2006, for various voting 
system standards.[Footnote 24] Several key deadlines were set for 
January 1, 2004, including implementation of HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements and the establishment of a statewide voter registration 
list (or to request a waiver from the deadline until January 1, 2006). 
States receiving funds to replace punch card voting systems or lever 
voting systems could also request a waiver until January 1, 2006; 
otherwise such systems were to be replaced in time for the November 
2004 general elections. The deadline for states and jurisdictions to 
comply with specific requirements for voting systems, such as producing 
a paper record for audit purposes, was January 1, 2006. 

HAVA vests enforcement authority with the Attorney General to bring a 
civil action against any state or jurisdiction as may be necessary to 
carry out specified uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology 
and administration requirements under HAVA. These requirements pertain 
to HAVA voting system standards, provisional voting and voting 
information requirements, the computerized statewide voter registration 
list requirements, and requirements for persons who register to vote by 
mail. The enforcement of federal statutes pertaining to elections and 
voting has, with certain exceptions, been delegated by the Attorney 
General to the Civil Rights Division. 

Election System Elements: 

The U.S. election system is highly decentralized and based upon a 
complex interaction of people (election officials and voters), 
processes, and technology. Each of the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia has its own election system with a somewhat distinct approach. 
Within each of these 51 systems, the guidelines and procedures 
established for local election jurisdictions can be very general or 
specific. Each election system generally incorporates elements that are 
designed to allow eligible citizens to vote and ensures that votes are 
accurately counted. While election systems vary from one local 
jurisdiction to another, most election systems have the elements 
identified in figure 7. 

Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, 
Process, and Technology: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Delegation of Election Responsibility: 

Typically, states have decentralized elections so that the details of 
administering elections are determined at the local jurisdiction. 
States can be divided into two groups according to how they delegate 
election responsibilities to local jurisdictions. The first group 
include 41 states where election responsibilities are delegated to 
counties, with a few of these states delegating election 
responsibilities to some cities, and 1 state that delegates these 
responsibilities to election regions. We included the District of 
Columbia along with this group. The second group is composed of 9 
states that delegate election responsibilities to subcounty 
governmental units, known by the U.S. Census Bureau as minor civil 
divisions (MCD). However, in 1 of these states, Minnesota, election 
functions are split between county-level governments and MCDs. For 
example, registration is handled exclusively by county officials, and 
functions, such as polling place matters, are handled by MCDs. Overall, 
about 10,500 local government jurisdictions are responsible for 
conducting elections nationwide, with the first group of states 
containing about one-fourth of the local election jurisdictions and 
about three-fourths of the local election jurisdictions located in the 
states delegating responsibilities to MCDs. Although more election 
jurisdictions are in the 9 states, most of the population (88 percent 
of the U.S. population based on the Census of 2000) lives in the states 
delegating responsibilities primarily to counties. 

Voter Registration: 

While voter registration is not a federal requirement, the District of 
Columbia and all states, except North Dakota, generally require 
citizens to register before voting.[Footnote 25] The deadline for 
registering, and what is required to register, varies; 
at a minimum, state eligibility provisions typically require a person 
to be a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age, and a resident of the 
state, with some states requiring a minimum residency period. Citizens 
apply to register to vote in various ways, such as at motor vehicle 
agencies, during voter registration drives, by mail, or at local voter 
registrar offices. Election officials process registration applications 
and compile and maintain the list of registered voters to be used 
throughout the administration of an election. Prior to HAVA, voter 
registration lists were not necessarily centralized at the state level, 
and separate lists were often managed by local election officials. HAVA 
requires voter registration information for federal elections to be 
maintained as a statewide computerized list and matched with certain 
state data, and that voter registration application information be 
matched with certain state data and, in some cases, with federal data, 
to help ensure that the voter list is accurate. 

Absentee and Early Voting: 

All states and the District of Columbia have provisions allowing voters 
to cast their ballot before Election Day by voting absentee with 
variations on who may vote absentee, whether the voter needs an excuse, 
and the time frames for applying and submitting absentee ballots. In 
addition, some states also allow early voting, in which the voter goes 
to a specific location to vote in person prior to Election Day. As with 
absentee voting, the specific circumstances for early voting--such as 
the dates, times, and locations--are based on the state and local 
requirements. In general, early voting allows voters from any precinct 
in the jurisdiction to cast their vote before Election Day either at 
one specific location or at one of several locations. The early voting 
locations are staffed by poll workers who have a registration list for 
the jurisdiction and ballots specific to each precinct. The voter is 
provided with and casts a ballot for his or her assigned precinct. 

Conducting Elections: 

Election officials perform a broad range of activities in preparation 
for and on Election Day itself. Prior to an election, officials recruit 
and train poll workers to have the skills needed to perform their 
Election Day duties, such as opening and closing the polls, operating 
polling place equipment, and explaining and implementing provisional 
voting procedures for certain voters such as those who are not on the 
registration list. Where needed and required, election officials must 
also recruit poll workers who speak languages other than English. 
Polling places have to be identified as meeting basic standards for 
accessibility and having an infrastructure to support voting machines 
as well as voter and poll worker needs. Ballots are designed and 
produced to meet state requirements, voter language needs, and identify 
all races, candidates, and issues on which voters in each precinct in 
their jurisdiction will vote. Election officials seek to educate voters 
on topics such as what the ballot looks like, how to use a voting 
machine, and where their particular polling place is located. Finally, 
election officials seek to ensure that voting equipment, ballots, and 
supplies are delivered to polling places. 

On Election Day, poll workers set up and open the polling places. This 
can include tasks such as setting up the voting machines or voting 
booths, readying supplies, testing equipment, posting required signs 
and voter education information, and completing paperwork such as 
confirming that the ballot is correct for the precinct. Before a voter 
receives a ballot or is directed to a voting machine, poll workers 
typically are to verify his or her eligibility. The assistance provided 
to voters who are in the wrong precinct depends on the practices for 
that particular location. 

Provisional Voting: 

One of the most significant post-2000 election reforms found in HAVA, 
according to the Election Assistance Commission, is that states are 
required to permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast a 
provisional ballot in federal elections.[Footnote 26] More 
specifically, states are to provide a provisional ballot to an 
individual asserting to be (1) registered in the jurisdiction for which 
he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote in a federal 
election, but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list of 
eligible voters for the polling place. In addition, provisional ballots 
are to be provided in elections for federal office to individuals who 
an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court- 
ordered voting in a federal election after the polls have closed. 
Although many states had some form of provisional balloting prior to 
the passage of HAVA, 44 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
were required to provide provisional ballots for the 2004 general 
election. Under HAVA, 6 states were exempt from HAVA's provisional 
voting requirements because they either permitted voters to register on 
Election Day or did not require voter registration.[Footnote 27] If 
individuals are determined to be eligible voters, their provisional 
ballots are to be counted as votes in accordance with state law, along 
with other types of ballots, and included in the total election 
results. 

Vote Counting and Recounting: 

Following the close of the polls, election officials and poll workers 
complete a number of basic steps to get the votes counted and determine 
the outcome of the election. Equipment and ballots are to be secured, 
and votes are to be tallied or transferred to a central location for 
counting. The processes used to count or to recount election votes vary 
with the type of voting equipment used in a jurisdiction, state 
statutes, and local jurisdiction policies. Votes from Election Day, 
absentee ballots, early votes (where applicable), and provisional 
ballots are to be counted and consolidated for each race to determine 
the outcome. While preliminary results are available usually by the 
evening of Election Day, the certified results are generally not 
available until days later. Some states establish a deadline for 
certification of results, while other states do not. 

Voting Methods and Technologies: 

Voting methods are tools for accommodating the millions of voters in 
our nation's approximately 10,000 local election jurisdictions. Since 
the 1980s, ballots in the United States have been cast and counted 
using five methods: paper ballots, lever machines, punch cards, optical 
scan, and DREs. Four of the five methods by which votes are cast and 
counted involve technology; only the paper ballot system does not use 
technology. The three newer methods--punch card, optical scan, and DRE-
-depend on computers to tally votes. Punch card and optical scan 
methods rely on paper ballots that are marked by the voter, while many 
DREs use computers to present the ballot to the voter. Voting systems 
utilize technology in different ways to implement these basic voting 
methods. For instance, some punch card systems include the names of 
candidates and issues on the printed punch card, while others use a 
booklet of candidates and issues that must be physically aligned with 
the punch card. The way systems are designed, developed, tested, 
installed, and operated can lead to a variety of situations where 
misunderstanding, confusion, error, or deliberate actions by voters or 
election workers can, in turn, affect the equipment's performance in 
terms of accuracy, ease of use, security, reliability, and efficiency. 
In fact, some recent election controversies have been specifically 
associated with particular voting methods and systems. Nevertheless, 
all voting methods and systems can benefit from established information 
technology management practices that effectively integrate the people, 
processes, technologies. 

Scope and Methodology: 

For this report, we conducted a Web-based survey of election officials 
in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, surveyed by mail a 
nationally representative stratified random probability sample of 788 
local election jurisdictions, and conducted on-site interviews with 
election officials in 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states. Copies of 
the survey instruments are in appendixes II and III. In addition, the 
results of our state and local surveys are presented in two 
supplemental GAO products that can be found on our Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.][Footnote 28] Appendix IV provides a 
summary of jurisdictions we visited. In reporting the state survey 
data, actual numbers of states are provided. When reporting local 
jurisdiction survey data, we provide estimates for jurisdictions 
nationwide. Unless otherwise noted, the maximum sampling error, with 95 
percent confidence, for estimates of all jurisdictions from our local 
jurisdiction survey is plus or minus 5 percentage points 
(rounded).[Footnote 29] We also provide some national estimates by 
jurisdiction population size, and the sampling errors for these 
estimates are slightly higher. For these estimates, large jurisdictions 
are defined as those with a population over 100,000, medium 
jurisdictions have a population of over 10,000 to 100,000, and small 
jurisdictions have a population of 10,000 or less. Unless otherwise 
noted, all estimates from our local jurisdiction survey are within our 
planned confidence intervals. 

Jurisdictions in which we conducted on-site interviews were chosen 
based on a wide variety of characteristics, including voting methods 
used, geographic characteristics, and aspects of election 
administration, such as whether early voting was offered. We did not 
select jurisdictions we visited on the basis of size, but as 
appropriate, we identify the size of a jurisdiction we visited using 
the same groupings we used for our nationwide mail survey. 

We also reviewed extensive prior GAO work and other national studies 
and reports, and attended an annual election official conference. A 
comprehensive description of our methodology for this report is 
contained in appendix V. 

We conducted our work between March 2005 and February 2006 in 
Washington, D.C; Dallas; Los Angeles; and 28 local election 
jurisdictions in 14 states, in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 2: 
Voter Registration: 

In general, the goal of a voter registration system is to ensure that 
eligible citizens who complete all the steps required of them to 
register to vote in their jurisdictions are able to have their 
registrations processed accurately and in a timely fashion, so they may 
be included on the rolls in time for Election Day. The November 2000 
general election resulted in widespread concerns about voter 
registration in the United States. Headlines and reports questioned the 
mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration by highlighting 
accounts of individuals who thought they were registered being turned 
away from polling places on Election Day, the fraudulent use of the 
names of dead people to cast additional votes, and jurisdictions 
incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter 
registration lists. With the passage of HAVA,[Footnote 30] with respect 
to federal elections, most states were required to establish statewide 
computerized voter registration lists and perform certain list 
maintenance activities as a means to improve upon the accuracy of voter 
registration lists.[Footnote 31] List maintenance is performed by 
election officials and consists of updating registrants' information 
and deleting duplicate registrations and the names of registrants who 
are no longer eligible to vote. 

The voter registration process includes the integration of people, 
processes, and technology involved in registering eligible voters and 
in compiling and maintaining accurate and complete voter registration 
lists. In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter 
registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two 
goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons registering to vote, 
and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those 
eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not 
inadvertently removed from the voter registration lists. This has been 
a challenging task, and remains so, as we and others have noted. While 
registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election system 
generally, applying to register and being registered are not 
synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the 
voter registration applications they receive. This chapter describes 
various HAVA and state changes related to the voter registration 
processes that have occurred since the 2000 general election. It also 
examines continuing and new registration challenges encountered by 
local jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. 

Overview: 

With respect to voter registration, a significant change since the 2000 
general election is the HAVA requirement for states to each establish a 
single, uniform, statewide, computerized voter registration list for 
conducting elections for federal office. The HAVA requirements for 
states to develop statewide lists and verify voter information against 
state and federal agency records presented a significant shift in voter 
list management in many states. While the initial deadline to implement 
HAVA's statewide list requirement was January 1, 2004, more than 40 
states took advantage of a waiver allowing an extra 2 years to complete 
the task, or until January 1, 2006. The statewide registration lists 
for federal elections are intended to implement a system capable of 
maintaining voter registration lists that are more accurate by 
requiring states to (1) match voter registration application 
information against other state and federal agency databases or records 
to help ensure that only eligible voters are added to such lists, (2) 
identify certain types of ineligible voters whose names should be 
removed from the lists, and (3) identify individual voter names that 
appear more than once on the list to be removed from the lists. While 
HAVA defined some parameters for the required statewide voter 
registration lists and required matching voter information with certain 
state and federal records, the act leaves the choices on the methods of 
implementing such statewide list requirement to the discretion of the 
states. On the basis of our survey of state election officials, states 
varied in the progress made in implementing their statewide voter 
registrations lists, how they have implemented these systems, and the 
capabilities of their systems to match information with other state and 
federal agency records as well as many other features of the state 
systems. 

In addition to requiring states to develop statewide voter registration 
lists, HAVA provides that states must require that mail registrants who 
have not previously voted in a federal election in the state are to 
provide certain specified types of identification with their mail 
application, and if they do not provide such identification with their 
application, these first-time mail registrants are to provide the 
identification at the polls. Furthermore, if such a voter does not have 
the requisite identification at the polls, HAVA requires that the voter 
be provided a provisional ballot with the status of his or her ballot 
to be determined by the appropriate state or local official. As with 
the statewide voter registration list requirement, HAVA leaves the 
choices on the methods of implementing the provisional voting 
requirement to the discretion of the states. On the basis of interviews 
of officials in 28 local election jurisdictions, implementation of the 
requirement for first-time voters who registered by mail varied. One 
noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration, where 
some local jurisdictions we visited told us that applications received 
through voter registration drives would be treated as mail 
registrations subject to HAVA identification requirements and other 
local jurisdictions we visited told us applications from registration 
drives were not treated as mail registrations and therefore were not 
treated as subject to HAVA identification requirements. 

As noted above, during 2004 and 2005 many states were in the process of 
implementing their HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists and 
associated requirements for maintaining the lists. Thus, the potential 
benefits to be gained from HAVA's requirement for the statewide voter 
registration lists were not evident in many states at the time of the 
November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA 
intended to help states and local election jurisdictions to have access 
to more accurate voter registration list information, such as 
identifying duplicate registrations and matching the voter information 
against other state agency databases or records, were not yet fully 
implemented by many states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet 
seeing the benefits of being able to verify voter registration 
application information with state motor vehicle agency databases to 
identify eligible voters, or to match voter registration lists with 
state vital statistics agency records to identify deceased persons, and 
to appropriate state agency's records to identify felons who may be 
ineligible to vote. Thus, on the basis of our nationwide survey and 
local election jurisdictions we visited, many local jurisdictions 
continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists 
that they had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as 
difficulties related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter 
registration information, multiple registrations, or ineligible voters 
appearing on the list. In addition, election officials in some 
jurisdictions we visited told us they continued to face challenges 
obtaining voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies 
and other NVRA entities.[Footnote 32] 

In addition, for some local election jurisdictions we visited, election 
officials told us that efforts on the part of various groups to get out 
the vote by registering new voters through voter registration drives 
created new challenges not identified to us as a problem in the 2000 
general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials told us they faced a challenge processing large 
volumes of voter registration applications just prior to the deadlines 
for registration, which included challenges in some large jurisdictions 
to resolve issues of incomplete or inaccurate (and potentially 
fraudulent) applications submitted by entities conducting voter 
registration drives. 

Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General Election: 

HAVA requires states to, among other things, (a) implement a single, 
uniform, computerized statewide voter registration list for conducting 
elections for federal office;[Footnote 33] (b) perform regular 
maintenance by comparing the voter list against state records on felons 
and deaths; (c) verify information on voter registration applications 
with information in state motor vehicle agency databases or with a 
Social Security Administration database, as appropriate. In addition, 
HAVA imposes new identification requirements for certain mail 
registrants--such as, individuals who register by mail and have not 
previously voted in a federal election within the state.[Footnote 34] 

HAVA Requirements for Statewide Voter Registration List: 

Historically, to ensure that only qualified persons vote, states and 
local jurisdictions have used various means to establish and compile 
voter registration lists.[Footnote 35] Prior to HAVA, we noted in our 
October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide that 
in compiling these lists, election officials used different methods to 
verify the information on registration forms, check for duplicate 
registrations, and update registration records, and we noted that 
states' capabilities for compiling these lists varied. At the time, 
some states had statewide voter lists, but others did not and were not 
required to do so. Moreover, most jurisdictions we visited at the time 
maintained their own local, computerized voter lists.[Footnote 36] 
Under HAVA, this has changed. HAVA requires the chief election official 
in the state to implement a "single, uniform, official, centralized, 
interactive, computerized statewide voter registration list" that must 
contain the name and registration information of every legally 
registered voter in the state. Under HAVA, states were required to be 
in compliance with the statewide voter registration list requirement by 
January 2004 unless they obtained a waiver until January 2006. Forty- 
one states and the District of Columbia obtained a waiver and thus, for 
the 2004 general election, were not required to have their statewide 
voter registration lists in place.[Footnote 37] 

With respect to the HAVA required statewide voter registration list, 
states are to, among other things: 

* Make the information in such lists electronically accessible to any 
election officials in the state. 

* Ensure that such voter lists contain registration information on 
every legally registered voter in the state, with a unique identifier 
assigned to each legally registered voter. 

* Verify voter identity; most states are required to match voter 
information obtained on the voter registration application for the 
applicant's drivers' license number or the last four digits of the 
voter's Social Security number, when available, to state MVAs or the 
Social Security Administration databases. In connection with this 
requirement to verify voter registration application information, 
states must require that individuals applying to register to vote 
provide a current and valid driver's license number, or the last four 
digits of their Social Security number; if neither has been issued to 
the individual, then the state is to assign a unique identifier to the 
applicant. The state MVA must enter into an agreement with the Social 
Security Administration (SSA), as applicable, to verify the applicant 
information when the last four digits of the Social Security number are 
provided, rather than a driver's license number or state ID 
number.[Footnote 38] 

* Perform list maintenance on the statewide voter registration lists by 
coordinating them on a regular basis with state records on felony 
status and deaths, in order to identify and remove names of ineligible 
voters.[Footnote 39] List maintenance is also to be conducted to 
eliminate duplicate names. 

* Implement safeguards ensuring that eligible voters are not 
inadvertently removed from statewide lists. 

* Include technological security measures as part of the statewide list 
to prevent unauthorized access to such lists. 

Except for the 9 states that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA's 
requirements for establishing a statewide voter registration list, all 
other states subject to the statewide list requirement were not 
required to perform list maintenance activities as defined in HAVA 
until the extended waiver deadline of January 2006. By the November 
2004 general election, states were in various stages of implementing 
provisions of HAVA related to their statewide voter registration lists 
and performing voter list verification and maintenance, and had 
different capabilities and procedures at the state and local levels for 
performing required list maintenance functions. Many states reported 
that their statewide voter registration systems implementing the 
statewide list requirement include or will include additional election 
management features not required under HAVA. 

Progress Establishing Statewide Voter Registration Lists Varied: 

Voter registration system development was an ongoing process in 2004 
and 2005. For the November 2004 general election, the use of technology 
to compile voter registration information remained an issue. Developing 
and implementing statewide computerized voter lists has been an ongoing 
process for many states, and state and local election officials 
reported encountering difficulties along the way. Our state survey and 
site visits suggest that states and jurisdictions were still coming to 
terms, as of the last half of calendar year 2005, with how their 
systems should be updated and whether states or jurisdictions should 
control the flow of information into statewide registration systems. 

As mentioned in chapter 1, HAVA vests the Attorney General with the 
responsibility of enforcing certain HAVA requirements with respect to 
the states. In January 2006, the Justice Department asked all states, 
the District of Columbia, and other covered territories to provide a 
detailed statement of their compliance with voting systems standards 
and implementation of a single, uniform, official, centralized, 
interactive computerized statewide voter registration list. If the 
states, the District of Columbia, or covered territories were not 
implementing HAVA's requirements for the computerized statewide voter 
registration lists as of January 2006, the Justice Department reported 
that it then asked them to identify steps they planned to take to 
achieve full implementation of the HAVA-compliant statewide voter 
registration list and the date on which each step would be 
accomplished. According to Justice Department officials, they are 
reviewing the information provided by the states, the District of 
Columbia, and such territories to make determinations of what, if any, 
enforcement action might be needed. The Department of Justice reports 
that it entered into a memorandum of agreement with California in 
November 2005 after that state realized it would not be able to fully 
meet HAVA's requirements by the January 1, 2006, deadline. On March 1, 
2006, the Department of Justice also filed suit in a federal district 
court against the state of New York alleging the state not to be in 
compliance with, among other things, HAVA's requirement for a 
computerized statewide voter registration list and seeking a judicial 
determination of noncompliance and a court order requiring the state to 
develop a plan for how it will come into compliance.[Footnote 40] 

During our site visits in 2005, we asked local election officials about 
the status of their statewide registration systems. Election officials 
in some local jurisdictions we visited cited difficulties related to 
implementing their statewide voter registration systems involving, 
among other things, internal politics and technology-related 
challenges. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction 
reported that a disagreement between the State Board of Elections and 
local election officials over the type of system to implement delayed 
the project for a year. State election officials wanted a system 
requiring all voter registrations to be entered at the state level but 
maintained locally. The local election officials expressed the view 
that such a system would result in a lack of control over data entry at 
the local level at the front end, while imposing accountability on them 
on the back end (data maintenance). During our interview in August 
2005, these election officials told us that a statewide registration 
system had not been implemented yet. In some jurisdictions, the 
difficulties cited by election officials may have reflected the fact 
that they were establishing statewide voter registration systems for 
the first time. For example, in 1 large jurisdiction that was 
establishing a HAVA voter registration list from scratch, local 
election officials noted that at the time of our interview in August, 
the system was behind schedule, lacked the ability to identify 
duplicates, had no quality control, and was not planned to function as 
a real-time system. 

State Capabilities for Matching Voter Registration Lists with State and 
Federal Records, as Required by HAVA, Were Under Way or Not Yet 
Achieved: 

In our survey of states and the District of Columbia, and our survey of 
local election jurisdictions nationwide, among other things, we 
inquired about the status of their capabilities for meeting HAVA 
provisions for (1) verifying voter registration application information 
against MVA and SSA databases and (2) maintaining the statewide voter 
lists by comparing information on the statewide voter registration list 
against state death records and felon information, and discussed the 
issues during our local site visits. Our work focused on how states had 
matched or planned to match voter registration lists against other 
state records, as required by HAVA. However, it is important to note 
that the success of such matching in ensuring accurate voter 
registration lists is dependent upon the accuracy and reliability of 
the data in the databases used for matching. If that state's MVA 
databases, felon records, death records, or other records used for 
matching are inaccurate, they can result in voter registration list 
errors. 

Matching to MVA Databases: 

When a driver's license or driver's license number is presented as 
identification when registering to vote in an election for federal 
office, HAVA requires that states match the voter registration 
application information presented with that in the MVA 
records.[Footnote 41] In our survey of state election officials, we 
asked states whether their voter registration systems would have the 
capability to perform electronic matching of such voter registration 
information with state motor vehicle agency records for the purposes of 
verifying the accuracy of information on the registration application. 
Twenty-seven states reported they will have or currently had the 
capability to match on a real-time basis, 15 states and the District of 
Columbia reported they will have or currently had capability to match 
in batches, and 4 states reported they would not have the capability to 
perform electronic matching. The remaining 4 states included 2 states 
that reported that they are not subject to HAVA's registration 
information verification requirement because they collect the full 
Social Security numbers on voter registration applications;[Footnote 
42] 1 state, North Dakota, which does not require voter registration, 
did not respond, and 1 state reported that it was uncertain of its 
capability to perform electronic matching. 

Matching with SSA Records: 

With respect to matching voter information with SSA data when a Social 
Security number is presented instead of a driver's license, in our 
state survey, 7 states had and 26 states and the District of Columbia 
reported that they would have the capability, by January 1, 2006, to 
electronically match voter registration information with SSA (through 
the MVA); 10 states reported they planned to have this capability in 
place but not by January 2006; and 6 states had not yet determined 
whether they could do so. Many states reported concerns with whether 
SSA would be able to return responses to verify requests in a timely 
manner. Specifically, 30 states and the District of Columbia reported 
some level of concern about the issue. When asked whether they thought 
local jurisdictions would be able to resolve nonmatches resulting from 
SSA verification checks, opinions were divided, with a number of states 
(21) expressing some degree of concern about this, while a nearly equal 
number (22 states and the District of Columbia) did not. 

In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration 
lists, we found that in one state (Iowa) that had verified its voter 
registration list with SSA before the 2004 general election, there was 
no unique match for 2,586 names, according to the SSA records.[Footnote 
43] As we stated in our report, Iowa officials said that the biggest 
problem they faced was that SSA did not specify what specific voter 
information did not match (i.e., was the mismatch in name, date of 
birth, or final four-digit Social Security number). Without that 
information, they were not able to efficiently resolve the non-matching 
problems. In that same report, we also noted that an SSA official said 
that the system established to perform the HAVA matching on the four- 
digit Social Security number is not able to provide that detail. In 
addition, we found that use of SSA's database to identify deceased 
registrants, which is linked with the system established to perform the 
HAVA verification of voter registration application information, had 
matching and timeliness issues. 

Overall Matching Challenges: 

As shown in figure 8, many states reported that they faced significant 
challenges when trying to match voter registration information with 
state records. For example, in our survey, 29 states and the District 
of Columbia reported that records with incomplete data posed a 
challenge; 19 states and the District of Columbia reported that 
obtaining records not maintained electronically was a challenge; 
and 23 states reported that verifying information against incompatible 
electronic record systems was also a challenge. 

Figure 8: Many States Report Challenges Matching Voter Registration 
Information with State Records: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Includes the District of Columbia. 

[End of figure] 

During our site visits to local jurisdictions, we obtained additional 
views on how well, in general, states were believed to perform various 
data-matching functions.[Footnote 44] We asked local election officials 
to describe their state system's ability to match voter registration 
information with MVA and SSA records and the system's ability to verify 
information on eligibility status for felons, noncitizens, and others 
with other state databases or records. One jurisdiction in Illinois 
reported it was not sure how or if its voter registration system would 
be able to match data with MVA and SSA databases or to verify 
eligibility status for felons and by age. An official in a jurisdiction 
in Florida said that Florida's system could not verify information on 
the eligibility status of felons, noncitizens, the mentally 
incompetent, or the underaged--though plans were under way to obtain 
information from the Clerk of Courts Information System to perform some 
of these tasks. 

Removing Voters Names from the Registration List: 

HAVA's list maintenance provisions require states to match the 
statewide voter registration list information against certain state 
records to identify ineligible voters and duplicate names.[Footnote 45] 
If a voter is ineligible under state requirements and is to be removed 
from the statewide voter registration list, states are generally 
required to remove such names in accordance with NVRA provisions 
relating to the removal of voter names from registration lists for 
federal elections. Under NVRA, in the administration of voter 
registration for federal elections, states may not remove the names of 
people who are registered to vote for nonvoting and names may be 
removed only for certain specified reasons: at the request of the 
registrant; by reason of criminal conviction, as provided by state law; 
by reason of mental incapacity, as provided by state law; 
or pursuant to a general program that makes a reasonable effort to 
remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists by reason 
of the death of the voter or on the ground that the voter has changed 
address to a location outside the election jurisdiction on the basis of 
change of address information from the U.S. Postal Service (but only if 
either (1) the voter confirms in writing a change of address to a place 
outside the election jurisdiction or (2) the voter has failed to 
respond to a confirmation mailing and the voter has not voted or 
appeared to vote in any election between the time of such notice and 
the passage of two federal general elections).[Footnote 46] 

Reasons Names Removed from Registration Lists: 

In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked 
about the reasons names were removed from voter registration lists. On 
the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, the following 
table shows various reasons that jurisdictions removed names from voter 
registration lists for the 2004 general election and our estimates of 
how frequently names were removed for that reason. For example, the 
most frequent reason was the death of the voter (76 percent). Names 
were removed with about equal frequency because the voter requested 
that his or her name be removed (54 percent) or the registrant's name 
appeared to be a duplicate (52 percent). The least frequent reason was 
for mental incompetency (10 percent). In many jurisdictions, names were 
not removed but rather placed on an inactive list for a period of time. 
In our survey of local jurisdictions, nearly half, or an estimated 46 
percent, took this step. 

Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions That Removed Names from 
Voter Registration List for 2004 General Election for Various Reasons: 

Name removed because:: Information received from state/county vital 
statistics offices identified registrants as deceased; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 76. 

Name removed because:: Registrants requested that their names be 
removed from the voter registration list (e.g., moved out of 
jurisdiction or other reason); 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 54. 

Name removed because:: Registrant's name appeared to be a duplicate; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 52. 

Name removed because:: Change of address information received from U.S. 
Postal Service showed that the registrants had moved outside of the 
jurisdiction where registered; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 45. 

Name removed because:: Registrant failed to respond to a notice from 
the registrar and had not voted or had not appeared to vote in the most 
recent two federal elections; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 38. 

Name removed because:: Felony records received from federal/state/local 
governmental entities identified registrant as ineligible to vote or 
register to vote because of a felony conviction; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 38. 

Name removed because:: Newspaper obituaries identified registrant as 
deceased; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 31. 

Name removed because:: Names removed from the voter registration list 
for other reasons; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 11. 

Name removed because:: Information received from federal/state/local 
courts indicating that registrant had been judged to be mentally 
incompetent; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 10. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[End of table] 

In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration 
lists,[Footnote 47] on the basis of interviews of election officials in 
14 jurisdictions and 7 state election offices, we reported that in 
larger jurisdictions, the task of identifying and removing registrants 
who died can be substantial. For example, in the city of Los Angeles, 
in 1 week in 2005 alone, almost 300 persons died. 

The issue of felons voting unlawfully--that is, voting when their 
felony status renders them ineligible to voter under state law--was a 
high-profile issue in some jurisdictions. According to an election 
official in a Washington jurisdiction we visited, this issue was 
identified during the November 2004 general election. This official 
also told us that the Secretary of State is working to establish a 
database that will indicate felony status and cancel the registration 
of felons. This election official noted that the jurisdiction rarely 
receives information from federal courts on felony convictions. Under 
federal law, U.S. Attorneys are to give written notice of felony 
convictions in federal district courts to the chief state election 
official of the offender's state of residence.[Footnote 48] In our June 
2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists,we found 
that U.S. Attorneys had not consistently provided this information, and 
while the law did not establish a standardized time frame or format for 
forwarding the federal felony conviction information, election 
officials in 7 states we visited reported that the felony information 
received from U.S. Attorneys was not always timely and was sometimes 
difficult to interpret.[Footnote 49] We recommended that the U.S. 
Attorneys provide information in a more standardized manner. 

Removing Duplicate Names: 

Under HAVA, duplicate names on the statewide voter registration list 
are also to be identified and removed. In our state survey, 49 states 
and the District of Columbia reported that their voter registration 
systems will include a function for checking duplicate voter 
registration records.[Footnote 50] On the basis of our nationwide 
survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 72 percent of local 
jurisdictions employed a system of edit checks (automated controls to 
identify registration problems) to identify duplicates. Our prior work 
has also found that states were, for the most part, able to handle 
duplicate registrations--though obtaining timely, accurate data to 
facilitate the identification of duplicate registrations has been 
viewed as a challenge among some state election officials. 
Specifically, in our February 2006 report on certain states' (9 states 
that did not seek a waiver until January 1, 2006 and were to implement 
a computerized statewide voter registration list by January 1, 2004) 
experiences with implementing HAVA's statewide voter registration 
lists, we found that 8 of the 9 states we reviewed screened voter 
applications to identify duplicate registrations, and most did so in 
real time.[Footnote 51] We also reported that 8 of these 9 states 
checked voter registration lists for duplicate registrations on an 
annual, monthly, or other periodic basis. And 4 of the 9 states 
reported that implementing the HAVA requirements led to some or great 
improvement in the accuracy of their voter lists by reducing duplicate 
registrations or improving the quality of voter information before it 
was entered into the statewide voter list. 

Checking for duplicates remained a challenge for some in 2004 and 2005, 
however. In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter 
registration lists, we noted that officials in 7 of the 21 local 
election jurisdictions we spoke with during 2004 and 2005 had some 
concern about the accuracy and timeliness of data they received to 
identify duplicate registrants and verify that registrants resided 
within the jurisdiction.[Footnote 52] They noted that the matching and 
validation of names are complex and made more so when considering 
aliases and name changes, as are matches such as "Margie L. Smith" with 
"Margaret Smith." Officials from several states who reported, at the 
time of our review, that their state had not implemented a statewide 
voter registration system noted that there was no way to identify 
duplicates outside their jurisdiction. 

Most States Reported Having Established Centralized Voter Registration 
Systems, and Half Reported They Can Enter Voter Information on a Real- 
Time Basis: 

While HAVA requires that both state and local election officials have 
immediate electronic access to information in the statewide voter 
registration list, HAVA grants states discretion as to the method used 
to ensure that this capability is established.[Footnote 53] According 
to EAC, state and local election officials may determine whether to 
establish (a) a top-down system, whereby the statewide voter 
registration list resides on a state database hosted on a single, 
central platform (e.g., a mainframe or client servers), which state and 
local election officials may query directly; (b) a bottom-up system, 
whereby the statewide voter list is stored on a state-level database 
that can be downloaded to jurisdictions and updated by the state only 
when the jurisdictions send new registration information back to the 
state;[Footnote 54] or (c) take another approach. According to the EAC 
voluntary guidance on HAVA's statewide voter registration system, the 
top-down approach most closely matches HAVA requirements--but other 
configurations may be used as long as they meet the HAVA requirement 
for a single, uniform list that allows election officials to have 
immediate access. 

Our 2005 survey of state election officials sought information on how 
states were implementing statewide computerized voter registration 
systems. We asked, among other things, whether states were using a top- 
down or a bottom-up approach. In response, 40 states and the District 
of Columbia reported that they have a database maintained by the state, 
with information supplied by local jurisdictions (top-down system); 
4 states reported that local jurisdictions retain their own lists and 
transmit information to a statewide list (a bottom-up system); 
and 5 states reported they use a hybrid of these two options. We also 
asked whether state election officials would have immediate, real-time 
access to their state lists for the purposes of entering new voter 
registration information, updating existing information, and querying 
voter registration records. About half the states and the District of 
Columbia reported they had or would have all these capabilities. 
Specifically, 24 states and the District of Columbia reported they had 
or would have as of January 2006, real-time access for entering new 
voter registration information, while 23 states reported they did not 
plan to do so and 2 states did not respond. In addition, 26 states and 
the District of Columbia reported that they had or would have as of 
January 2006, real-time access for updating existing voter registration 
information, while 21 states reported they did not plan to do so and 2 
states did not respond. And 47 states and the District of Columbia 
reported they had or would have as of January 2006 real-time access for 
querying all state voter registration records, while 1 state reported 
it would not do so and 1 state did not respond. For each of these 
questions, one state reported it too would have these capabilities, but 
not by the January 1, 2006, HAVA deadline. 

We also sought state election officials' views on whether election 
officials in local jurisdictions would have immediate, real-time access 
to voter list information for the same three purposes stated above: 
entering new information, updating existing information, and querying 
records. In our state survey, most states and the District of Columbia 
reported that local jurisdictions had these capabilities. Specifically, 
46 states and the District of Columbia reported that local 
jurisdictions had or would have as of January 2006, real-time access 
for entering new voter registration information, and 3 other states 
reported that they planned to do so as well, but not by January 1, 
2006. Also, 46 states and the District of Columbia reported that local 
jurisdictions had or would have as of January 2006, real-time access 
for updating existing voter registration information, and 3 other 
states planned to do so as well, but not by the deadline. Finally, 47 
states and the District of Columbia reported local jurisdictions had or 
would have as of January 2006 the capability to query records for their 
jurisdictions in real time, and 2 states planned to do so, but not by 
January 2006. Figure 9 compares the capability of state and local 
jurisdiction election officials to access the voter registration lists 
to perform certain tasks. 

Figure 9: States Reporting That They Had or Would Have as of January 
2006, Capability for Real-Time Access to Voter Registration List to 
Enter, Update, and Query Information: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Most States Reported They Will Match Statewide Voter Registration List 
Information Electronically against State Databases: 

While HAVA's list maintenance provisions require states to coordinate 
statewide voter registration list information with certain other state 
records within their state in order to identify and remove ineligible 
names, the act does not specifically provide that such coordination 
must be done electronically. However, to determine whether state 
systems had or would have the capability to perform electronic data 
matching, our survey asked states about existing or planned electronic 
capability. As shown in figure 10, more than half the states reported 
that they had, or planned to have, the ability to match voter 
registration information electronically with state records on felony 
convictions and deceased registrants. Specifically, 25 states reported 
they had and 15 states reported that they would have the capability to 
electronically match against state death records as of January 2006, 
and 6 states and the District of Columbia planned to have the 
capability, but not by January 2006. Three states reported that they 
did not plan to have this capability. With respect to identifying 
ineligible felons, 16 states reported they had, and 15 reported they 
would have the capability to electronically match against felony 
conviction records as of January 2006, while 9 states planned to do so 
but would not have done so by January 2006. In addition, 7 states and 
the District of Columbia did not plan to have this capability, and 2 
states had not determined whether to have the capability. 

Figure 10: States' Reported Capabilities to Electronically Match Voter 
Registration Information with State Death Records and Felony Conviction 
Records: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Includes District of Columbia. 

[End of figure] 

On the topic of states' efforts to meet HAVA's data-matching 
requirements electronically--as opposed to transmitting paper records-
-EAC recommends that voter registration information be transmitted 
electronically, particularly between states and their MVAs. EAC further 
recommends that to the extent allowed by state law and available 
technologies, the electronic transfer between statewide voter 
registration lists and coordinating verification databases should be 
accomplished through direct, secure, interactive, and integrated 
connections. While EAC provided guidance to states for their statewide 
systems, under HAVA, the states are to define the parameters for 
implementing interactive and integrated systems. 

Security of Voter Information in the Statewide Voter Registration 
Lists: 

HAVA requires election officials to provide adequate technological 
database security for statewide voter registration lists that is 
designed to prevent unauthorized access.[Footnote 55] EAC provided 
states with voluntary guidance, issued in July 2005, to help clarify 
HAVA's provisions for computerized statewide voter registration lists. 
Among other things, the EAC guidance noted that such computer security 
must be designed to prevent unauthorized users from altering the list 
or accessing private or otherwise protected information contained on 
the list. Access may be controlled through a variety of tools, 
including network-or system-level utilities and database applications 
(such as passwords and "masked" data elements). Special care must be 
taken to ensure that voter registration databases are protected when 
linked to outside systems for the purposes of coordination. Any major 
compromise of the voter registration system could lead to considerable 
election fraud.[Footnote 56] 

We sought information on what documented standards or guidance for 
computer and procedural controls would be in place to prevent 
unauthorized access to the lists. In our state survey, 45 states and 
the District of Columbia reported having such standards or guidance, 3 
plan to do so, and 1 reported that it did not know. We also asked 
states what actions they had taken or planned to take to deal with 
privacy and intrusion issues. We asked, for instance, what, if 
anything, had been done to install or activate mechanisms to detect or 
track unauthorized actions affecting the state's computerized voter 
registration system. A majority of states reported actions had been 
taken or were to be taken at some point. Specifically, 26 states 
reported taking action as of August 1, 2005, while 12 states and the 
District of Columbia reported they would do so by January 1, 2006. An 
additional 4 states reported that actions were planned, but at no 
particular point in time. In a related question, we asked what actions 
had been taken or were planned to install or activate mechanisms to 
protect voter privacy. Again, a majority of states reported actions had 
been taken or were to be taken at some point. Specifically, 32 states 
reported taking action as of August 1, 2005, while 13 states and the 
District of Columbia reported they would do so by January 1, 2006. Two 
other states reported actions would be taken at a later point in time. 

During our site visits, we asked local election officials what 
standards or procedures were used for the November 2004 general 
election to help ensure that the registration list was secure and that 
the privacy of individuals was protected. Election officials in most 
jurisdictions reported that voter information (such as name and 
address) is public information if it is to be used for political 
purposes--though some do not release Social Security numbers, and 
others limit access to this information by requiring a fee. Some local 
election officials noted that security standards for this information 
were not set by the state but rather at the county or local level, 
though many look to the state for future guidance on standards. The 
type of security in place to restrict access to voter registration 
records varied by jurisdiction; among the procedures commonly used were 
password protection (so that only certain election officials could log 
onto the voter registration system to access the information); storage 
of voter registration records in locked facilities; use of "best 
practice" protocols such as system firewalls; and in some cases, 
registration information is maintained on a computer system that is 
separate from the jurisdiction's central system. Along these lines, 1 
jurisdiction noted that it planned to implement a public key 
infrastructure (PKI). A PKI is a system of computers, software, 
policies, and people that can be used to facilitate the protection of 
sensitive information and communications. The official noted it is a 
felony in that jurisdiction to use a PKI authorization without 
authorization from the State Board of Elections. Election officials in 
another jurisdiction we visited told us that all voter registration 
system users must log on using unique user IDs and passwords, which are 
maintained by the county registrar. The system tracks all data entries 
and changes, which user made them, and when they were made. In a few 
jurisdictions, election officials said they grant additional privacy to 
the records of voters involved in domestic disputes or other law 
enforcement matters. 

When asked whether they had any plan to develop or change existing 
security standards or procedures, local election officials in 16 of the 
28 jurisdictions we visited told us there were no plans to alter 
current practices, though some noted they were not sure. Among those 
indicating that security procedures were being enhanced, election 
officials in 1 large jurisdiction said they planned to enclose their 
computer systems server in a secure case with restricted access. 
Another official in a large jurisdiction in another state said that 
because of a change in state law in 2004, a hard copy of voter records 
was no longer available for public inspection. 

Sharing Registration and Eligibility Information among States Is 
Limited: 

As mentioned earlier, the HAVA computerized statewide voter 
registration list provisions require states to perform list maintenance 
to identify duplicate registrations, deceased registrants, and 
registrants who may be ineligible to vote under state law based upon a 
felony conviction. However, we note that requirements for matching 
voter registration lists with certain state records leaves some 
potential gaps for incomplete and inaccurate voter registration lists 
because election officials may not have information regarding 
registered voters who die out of state or who are in prison in another 
state and ineligible because of a criminal conviction. To determine 
whether states went beyond HAVA requirements to share voter 
registration data with other states to identify registrants who died in 
another state, were incarcerated in another state, or registered in 
another state, we asked on our survey of state election officials 
whether they had taken action to electronically exchange voter 
registration information with at least 1 other state and whether they 
were sharing registration information routinely with other states. In 
our state survey, 31 states and the District of Columbia reported that 
they did not plan to electronically exchange voter registration 
information with another state. However, 35 states and the District of 
Columbia reported they share information with states when a new 
registrant indicates he or she previously resided in another state. 
Other types of information sharing across state lines were less common. 
For instance, 6 states reported sharing voter registration information 
with neighboring states, and 1 state reported that it shared 
information with states where an individual is known to reside part of 
the year. In our state survey, 14 states reported they do not currently 
share voter registration information with other states. 

We analyzed state and federal voter registration applications to 
determine whether these applications provided space for applicants to 
indicate they were registered in other states or in other jurisdictions 
within the same state to identify duplicate registrations.[Footnote 57] 
We obtained state application forms during site visits with local 
election jurisdictions, from state Web sites or, if not available from 
there, we obtained the application from the state. Registration forms 
were those on the Web site or obtained from the states as of January 
2006. Applications for the 46 states and the District of Columbia and 
both federal applications had a place on their registration application 
where registration applicants could indicate prior registration in 
another state on their forms. Three states (Kentucky, Texas, and 
Wyoming) did not include a place on their registration forms to 
identify prior registration information in another state.[Footnote 58] 
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia included a space for 
registration applicants to indicate prior registration in another 
jurisdiction within their state on their forms, or in the case of the 
District of Columbia applicants were to indicate the address of their 
last registration. Four states (Alaska, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Wyoming) 
did not provide space to indicate prior registration within their 
state. Figure 11 is an example of a state registration form that 
provided a space for the voter registration applicant to indicate that 
he or she had registered in another state. 

Figure 11: Virginia Voter Registration Form Indicating whether the 
Voter Had Registered Elsewhere: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

On the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, we 
estimated that 12 percent of local jurisdictions administered their own 
registration application form in addition to the state registration 
application. Of the 12 percent who had their own form, we estimate that 
70 percent had space on their voter registration applications so that 
an applicant can indicate whether he or she was previously registered 
in another state.[Footnote 59] However, we estimate that about a third 
did not capture this information on their forms. 

Many States Have or Plan to Have Additional Election Management 
Features in Voter Registration Systems: 

Although HAVA's voter registration-related provisions focus primarily 
on state election management activities for developing, verifying, and 
maintaining voter lists, we sought information on what other types of 
registration system upgrades, if any, states planned, and we asked at 
the sites we visited what additional system capabilities, if any, had 
been implemented or planned. In our state survey, 15 states reported 
taking action to upgrade the processing speed or records capacity of 
their systems as of August 2005; 
6 states reported that such actions would be taken by January 2006; 
and 12 states and the District of Columbia reported they would take 
such action at a later time. 

In other recent work, we have also looked at selected states' efforts 
to enhance their statewide voter list systems. In our February 2006 
report on certain states' experiences with implementing HAVA's 
statewide voter registration lists, we found that 7 of 9 states that 
reported implementing HAVA provisions for a computerized, statewide 
voter registration system by January 1, 2004, also reported that they 
have upgraded or enhanced their systems, or planned to so do, to 
include additional election management capabilities.[Footnote 60] For 
example, Arizona reported plans to upgrade its current system to 
reflect reciprocity agreements with other states, so that election 
officials can be alerted when a voter moves from state to state, and 
will allow election officials to retrieve data on such issues as voter 
petitions, provisional ballots, poll worker training, and polling 
locations. Other states reported adding or planning similar 
enhancements. Kentucky reported another type of enhancement: It has 
used its statewide computerized voter registration system to establish 
voter information centers on the state's Web site, to assist applicants 
and staff in the voter registration process. 

During our site visits, we asked local election officials to comment on 
the election management functions their voter registration systems 
might perform. While some local election officials noted they were not 
certain whether their new statewide voter registration systems would 
include the same array of features as the local county versions, other 
local election officials in some jurisdictions responded that they 
expect their statewide systems to be able to perform some or all of the 
following functions: 

* maintain records confirming mailings to new registrants, 

* generate letters informing rejected applicants of reasons for 
rejection, 

* generate forms or mailing labels, 

* note status or date of absentee applications and ballots sent and 
received, 

* identify polling places for use on Election Day, and: 

* identify poll workers. 

In some jurisdictions, other capabilities were mentioned; 
2 large jurisdictions noted, for instance, that bar coding would be 
used to identify registrants, and 2 other large jurisdictions indicated 
that their systems would track and maintain candidate petition 
information. 

Not all jurisdictions expressed equal confidence in the extra (non- 
HAVA-related) capabilities of their systems. Election officials in a 
couple of large jurisdictions, for instance, told us they were not 
certain their statewide voter system would have features comparable to 
those already in place, and that their vendor or state was taking a one-
size-fits-all approach for all jurisdictions regardless of size, rather 
than taking specific local needs into account. In some jurisdictions, 
election officials stated that their statewide systems were still too 
new to know whether these additional functions would be operational, 
and some said they were not yet familiar with all the system's 
capabilities. 

Implementation of Identification Requirements for First-Time Mail 
Registrants Varied: 

HAVA imposed new identification requirements for certain mail 
registrants--such as, individuals who register by mail and have not 
previously voted in a federal election within the state.[Footnote 61] 
These individuals (first-time mail registrants) must provide certain 
specified types of identification either by submitting copies of such 
identification during the mail registration process or by presenting 
such identification when voting in person for the first time following 
their mail registration.[Footnote 62] Moreover, first-time mail 
registrants are to be informed on the application that appropriate 
identifying information must be submitted with the mailed form in order 
to avoid additional identification requirements upon voting for the 
first time. An individual who asserts that he or she has registered by 
mail and desires to vote in person but who does not meet the 
identification requirements may cast a provisional ballot under HAVA's 
provisional language. However, according to election officials in some 
jurisdictions we visited, casting a provisional ballot requires that 
these voters are to provide identification to election officials by a 
specified time (e.g., by close of polls on Election Day or within a 
certain number of days following Election Day) to have their ballot 
count. On the basis of our local survey, we estimate that 32 percent of 
local jurisdictions encountered a problem in counting provisional 
ballots because voters did not provide identification as specified by 
HAVA for mail-in registrants and were voting for the first time in the 
precinct or jurisdiction.[Footnote 63] Our discussion of provisional 
voting processes appears in chapter 5. 

HAVA, in general, provides states with discretion as to the methods of 
implementing HAVA's identification requirements for first-time mail 
registrants, such as ensuring that voters comply with the requirements 
and, subject to certain limitations, allows states to establish 
requirements that are stricter than those required under HAVA.[Footnote 
64] According to our state survey, 7 states reported that such HAVA 
requirements were already covered by existing state legislation or some 
type of state executive action (such as orders, directives, 
regulations, or policies); 
44 states and the District of Columbia reported that they enacted new 
legislation or took some type of state executive action (such as 
orders, directives, regulations, or polices) to address the 
identification requirements in HAVA for first-time mail 
registrants.[Footnote 65] 

We analyzed state and federal (NVRA) voter registration application 
forms to determine whether the applications provided instructions on 
identification requirements for individuals registering in a 
jurisdiction for the first time. We obtained some state application 
forms during site visits with local election jurisdictions, and others 
from state Web sites or, if not available from there, we obtained the 
application from the state. Registration forms were those on the Web 
site or obtained from the states as of January 2006. Our analysis 
showed that 39 states and the District of Columbia had information on 
their application forms and 10 states did not provide this information 
on their forms.[Footnote 66] The NVRA voter registration form included 
this information. Figure 12 is an example of a voter registration form 
that included instructions for first-time mail registrants. 

Figure 12: Colorado Voter Registration Form with Instructions for First-
Time Mail Registrants: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

During our site visits, we asked local election officials whether they 
considered registering by mail to only include when someone mails in a 
single application or to also include mailed-in applications from voter 
registration drives. Five local jurisdictions told us that applications 
received by mail as a result of voter registration drives are not 
treated as mail-in applications and therefore are not treated as 
subject to mail registration identification requirements under HAVA; 
3 jurisdictions told us that applications submitted by voter 
registration drives were treated as mail-in applications subject to 
HAVA's mail registration identification requirements. Election 
officials in 1 of these jurisdictions told us that under their state 
law (Pennsylvania) all voters who are voting for the first time in a 
district must show a valid form of identification, regardless of how 
they registered to vote. 

Also, during our site visits we asked local election officials how they 
processed voter registration applications from first-time mail 
registrants for the 2004 general election. Election officials reported 
taking different approaches, many involving mailed communications from 
election officials sent back to the applicant, particularly if required 
information was missing. For example, at least 2 large jurisdictions 
reported that first-time voters who did not mail in identification with 
their applications were sent letters instructing them to do so. 
Similarly, officials in 2 jurisdictions in another state said letters 
were sent to applicants whose applications were incomplete, advising 
them of the need to provide photo ID--and informed applicants that if 
they failed to do so, they may have to use a provisional ballot on 
Election Day, which would be subject to the voter subsequently 
providing identification. In other jurisdictions, though local election 
officials reported taking steps to process incomplete applications from 
first-time voters, they did not necessarily give the applicant a chance 
to correct the application prior to Election Day. For example, in a 
medium jurisdiction we visited, first-time voter applicants who did not 
submit proper identification were to have been given provisional 
ballots. However, the election official told us her office did not 
inform them about this in advance for the 2004 general election. 

In addition to contacting applicants to inform them of the need to 
provide identification discussed above, 1 jurisdiction we visited told 
us that it periodically provided a list of applicants who provided 
driver's license numbers but did not provide identification at the time 
of registration to the state MVA as another means to verify the 
registrant's identity. In this case, the MVA compared the county clerk 
office's registration list against its list of licensed drivers to see 
if the name, date of birth, and driver's license number matched, and 
returned the results to election officials. If all these data elements 
matched, the election official certified the records and these 
prospective voters were not required to show identification at the 
polling place. 

If a registrant did not provide identification prior to Election Day, 
local election officials at all 28 sites we visited reported having a 
system for recording first-time voters who failed to provide 
identification and transferring that information to a polling site by 
annotating the poll book. One large jurisdiction, for example shaded 
the voter line in the poll book, while another printed the words "ID 
required" next to the voter's name. With respect to voters who 
presented themselves at a polling place and did not have 
identification, election officials at some local jurisdictions we 
visited described different ways that the voter's provisional ballot 
could become verified. For example, a jurisdiction in Georgia said that 
if a voter did not provide identification at the polls, it allowed the 
voter to vote a provisional ballot and the voter had until 2 days after 
the election to provide identification. Another jurisdiction in Kansas 
told us that the voter had until the day that votes were canvassed to 
provide identification. Other jurisdictions told us that voters would 
have until the close of the polls on Election Day to provide 
identification to election officials. A local jurisdiction in 
Washington told us that if the voter did not have identification on 
Election Day, the voter would vote a provisional ballot and election 
officials would subsequently have the voter's signature matched against 
the registration application to verify the voters identity. 

Processing Registration Applications Received from MVAs and Other NVRA 
Entities Remained a Challenge: 

Citizens generally have numerous opportunities to apply to register to 
vote. Figure 13 shows several of these opportunities--such as applying 
at a local election office, at a motor vehicle agency, or through a 
voter registration drive--and the processes used to submit an 
application. 

Figure 13: Example of the Voter Registration Application Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Problems with applications submitted to MVAs have been identified as a 
challenge since 1999. Our October 2001 report on election processes 
found that 46 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide had problems 
processing applications submitted at MVAs and other public registration 
sites designated pursuant to NVRA requirements.[Footnote 67] In its 
reports to Congress on the impact of NVRA on federal elections in 1999 
through 2002, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) found that several 
states reported problems with election officials receiving applications 
from MVA offices in a timely manner, resulting in, the FEC stated, "the 
effective disenfranchisement" of citizens who had applied to vote but 
were not processed by Election Day.[Footnote 68] FEC recommended in 
both reports that states develop ongoing training programs for 
personnel in NVRA agencies, such as MVAs. 

HAVA includes requirements providing that voters who contend that they 
registered (at MVAs or through other means) in the jurisdiction in 
which they desire to vote, but whose names are not on the voter 
registration list for that polling place, be allowed to cast a 
provisional ballot.[Footnote 69] HAVA also requires that voters who an 
election official asserts is not eligible to vote also be permitted to 
cast a provisional ballot. Election officials would determine the 
voter's eligibility under state law and whether the vote should count 
as part of the vote counting process. From our local jurisdiction 
survey, we estimate that for the 2004 general election, 61 percent of 
local jurisdictions had a problem in counting provisional ballots 
because of insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted voter 
registration applications at MVAs.[Footnote 70] In addition, we 
estimate that 29 percent of local jurisdictions had a problem in 
counting provisional ballots because of insufficient evidence that 
individuals had submitted voter registration applications at NVRA 
agencies other than MVAs.[Footnote 71] Also, our September 2005 report 
on managing voter registration reported that 4 of 12 jurisdictions we 
surveyed reported that election office staff experienced 
challenges,[Footnote 72] either to a great extent or some extent, 
receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle 
agencies.[Footnote 73] They reported taking steps to address the 
problem by hiring additional staff to handle the volume of applications 
received and by contacting applicants to obtain correct information. 

There is evidence that, at least in 1 jurisdiction, election officials 
took steps since the 2000 general election to address the MVA voter 
registration issue, though problems persisted for the November 2004 
general election. When we revisited the same small jurisdiction in 2005 
that we had visited in 2001, election officials reported they were 
still experiencing problems receiving registration forms from the MVA, 
for all those who registered to vote there--but noted that the process 
had improved. For example, they said elections staff now have access to 
the MVA database directly, so they can verify whether someone who 
claimed to have registered at the MVA actually did so. 

In our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that few jurisdictions 
provided training to MVA or other NVRA agencies. Specifically, for the 
2004 general election, we estimate that 12 percent of local 
jurisdictions provided training or guidance to MVA offices and an 
estimated 3 percent provided training to other NVRA entities regarding 
procedures for distributing and collecting voter registration 
applications. Large jurisdictions are statistically different from 
small or medium jurisdictions, and medium jurisdictions are 
statistically different from small jurisdictions. Specifically, we 
estimate that 34 percent of large jurisdictions provided training to 
MVA offices, an estimated 18 percent of medium jurisdictions did so, 
and an estimated 9 percent of small jurisdictions did this. In 
addition, large jurisdictions are statistically different from both 
medium and small jurisdictions in providing training to other NVRA 
entities. 

In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes 
nationwide, we identified measures such as improving the training of 
MVA staff as a means of addressing challenges related to applications 
received from MVAs.[Footnote 74] After the November 2004 general 
election, the National Task Force on Election Reform--composed almost 
exclusively of officials who served in voter registration and 
administration of elections capacities[Footnote 75]--reported that 
while the NVRA expanded the number of locations and opportunities where 
citizens can apply to register to vote, supporting the voter 
registration application process is a secondary duty for entities that 
do so under this law. The task force report noted that it is a 
challenge for these entities to provide this service in a consistent 
manner and to transfer the registrations collected accurately and 
efficiently to voter registration offices. 

Jurisdictions Encountered New Challenges Processing the Large Volume of 
Voter Registration Applications for the November 2004 General Election: 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, some election 
officials noted that while extending voter registration deadlines gave 
voters additional chances to register, it shortened the time for 
processing applications.[Footnote 76] And a few election officials 
raised concerns about short time frames for processing applications in 
relation to the possibility of voter fraud if there was insufficient 
time to verify an applicant's eligibility. For the 2004 general 
election, the time frame for processing applications had the potential 
to pose an even greater challenge given the increase in the number of 
voter registration applications that elections officials reported 
receiving for the November 2004 general election. The conditions that 
election officials experienced in processing the volume of voter 
registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully 
train temporary workers, could have resulted in data entry errors that 
would have had the impact of not properly registering eligible voters 
and not identifying ineligible voters. 

During our site visits to local jurisdictions, election officials told 
us that for the 2004 general election, entering applications in a 
timely manner was possible--but challenges did arise, and election 
officials described actions taken to help ensure that voters were 
properly registered. Furthermore, on the basis of our survey of local 
election jurisdictions, we estimate that 81 percent of local 
jurisdictions were able to process applications received just prior to 
the registration deadline--though we estimate 19 percent of the 
jurisdictions received applications just prior to the registration 
deadline that posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day. As 
shown in figure 14, we estimate that large jurisdictions experienced 
problems in entering the number of voter registration applications more 
than small and medium jurisdictions. Large jurisdictions are 
statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. This 
may be attributable to larger jurisdictions having larger populations 
with more registration activity, among other things. 

Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 
Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for 
2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium 
and small jurisdictions. 

[End of figure] 

All jurisdictions we visited reported that they were able to enter all 
eligible applications into the voter registration lists. Nevertheless, 
most reported it was a challenge to process the large volume of 
applications received. For example, 1 large jurisdiction we visited 
reported that on a daily basis it was 30,000 to 40,000 applications 
behind in data entry. As a result, election officials reported that 
they hired 80 full-time temporary workers who worked two full-time 
shifts to enter all eligible applications into the voter registration 
list used at the polls on Election Day. Election officials in another 
large jurisdiction told us that they unexpectedly received about 10,000 
last-minute registrants. Another large jurisdiction reported it was 
"swamped" with registration applications right before the registration 
deadline and was not prepared for the volume of applications submitted. 
Several jurisdictions required permanent employees to work extended 
hours or on weekends. To manage registration workloads, other 
jurisdictions reported hiring temporary workers and recruiting county 
employees to handle processing workloads. Figure 15 shows the reported 
spike in voter registration applications received prior to Election Day 
in 1 large jurisdiction. Some applications were received after the 
final week allowed for voter registration and could not be registered 
for the 2004 general election but were registered for future elections. 

Figure 15: Total Weekly Voter Registration Applications Documented by a 
Large Jurisdiction in 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In our state survey, a few states reported that since the 2000 general 
election they increased the time that voters in their states have to 
register. Although setting registration deadlines close to Election Day 
itself provides citizens increased time to apply to register, reducing 
the number of days from the registration deadline to Election Day can 
make it difficult for election officials to ensure that all eligible 
voters are included on the voter registration list. Specifically, in 
our state survey, 3 states (Maryland, Nevada, and Vermont) reported 
changing their registration deadlines for the November 2004 general 
election. For the 2000 general election, Maryland's registration 
deadline had been 25 days before the election, but for the 2004 general 
election, the deadline for registration was 21 days before the 
election, extending the time that voters could register by 4 days. 
Nevada's 2000 registration deadline (9 p.m. on the fifth Saturday 
preceding any primary or general election) remained the same for mail- 
in registrations. However, for the 2004 general election, the state 
extended in-person registration by 10 days. Vermont's voter 
registration deadline changed from the second Saturday before the 
election to the second Monday before the election, allowing voters 2 
more days to register. Appendix VI provides information on state laws 
pertaining to registration deadlines. 

On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, entering all voter 
registration applications for the time between the registration 
deadline and the November 2004 general election posed problems for 
large jurisdictions more than it did for small and medium 
jurisdictions. Specifically, we estimate that 41 percent of large 
jurisdictions experienced problems, 18 percent of medium jurisdictions, 
and 13 percent of small jurisdictions. Large jurisdictions are 
significantly different from both medium and small jurisdictions. 
Inasmuch as large jurisdictions have more potential registrants, it is 
reasonable to expect that they would experience more difficulty 
entering all voter registration applications by Election Day than 
smaller ones would. 

For the 2004 general election, while many states reported having 
registration deadlines that were 20 to 30 days prior to Election Day, a 
few states reported having registration deadlines that were 10 days or 
less prior to Election Day, and some states reported having same-day 
registration. Four states (Alabama, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) 
reported having registration deadlines that were 10 days or less prior 
to Election Day. Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming reported having Election Day registration at the polling place. 

According to Our Nationwide Survey and Jurisdictions Visited, Some 
Jurisdictions Lacked Sufficient Staff to Process Applications: 

Having sufficient staff to process the increased number of voter 
registration applications was an issue for large local election 
jurisdictions. On the basis of our nationwide survey, most local 
jurisdictions (an estimated 89 percent) had a sufficient number of 
election workers (whether full-time, part-time, or temporary) who were 
able to enter registration applications in a timely manner. However, we 
estimate that 11 percent had an insufficient workforce for this task. 
Large jurisdictions experienced problems with insufficient election 
workers to enter voter registrations applications more than small and 
medium jurisdictions did, as shown in figure 16. The difference between 
large jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions is 
statistically significant. This difference could be attributable to 
larger jurisdictions having a greater need for additional staff. 

Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions with 
Insufficient Election Workers to Process Voter Registration 
Applications: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The difference between large jurisdictions and both medium and 
small jurisdictions is statistically significant. 

[End of figure] 

Several jurisdictions we visited reported that there was a price to pay 
for the large volume of registration applications received, such as the 
need to hire temporary workers or extend the hours of permanent 
employees in order to process voter registration applications for the 
November 2004 general election. Election officials in several 
jurisdictions we visited commented on the financial impact of the 
temporary workers hired, overtime hours, and the purchase of needed 
equipment, such as computers. 

In our September 2005 report on managing voter registration, we noted 
that all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions we surveyed faced challenges 
receiving and processing voter registration applications during the 
2004 general election and took various steps to address them.[Footnote 
77] For example, election officials in 7 of the 14 jurisdictions 
reported challenges checking voter registration applications for 
completeness, or for accuracy, or for duplicates. At that time, as in 
our more recent site visits, jurisdictions reported hiring extra staff, 
among other things, to address these challenges. 

Larger Jurisdictions More Likely than Small or Medium Ones to Provide 
Training to Staff and Track Receipt of Voter Applications: 

Providing training to data entry staff and tracking applications 
provide ways for election officials to manage the flow of applications 
for processing that can help ensure that voter registration 
applications are appropriately entered into the voter registration 
list. As part of our inquiry into the methods jurisdictions used to 
enter completed registration application data into voter lists, our 
questionnaire to local election jurisdictions asked how they went about 
accomplishing this task. On the basis of our survey, we estimate that 
76 percent of all local jurisdictions provided training to data entry 
staff about the processing and inputting of registration applications. 
Seventy-five percent of small jurisdictions provided this training, 73 
percent of medium jurisdictions did so, and 94 percent of larger 
jurisdictions did so, too. Large jurisdictions are statistically 
different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Another activity 
that election officials undertook when entering completed registration 
applications included tracking incoming registrations. The results of 
our survey show that over half of local jurisdictions tracked incoming 
registration applications to ascertain the total number received, the 
number entered into registration lists, and the number not processed 
because of omission or application error, and to identify ineligible 
voters based on age or residence. Again, large jurisdictions are 
statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Table 
2 provides information on the different activities that local election 
jurisdictions undertake when entering completed registration 
applications into the official voter registration list. 

Table 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Engaged in 
Various Quality Assurance Activities when Entering Completed Voter- 
Registration Applications: 

Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering 
completed registration applications: Provided training to data entry 
staff about the processing and inputting of registration 
applications[A]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 76; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 75; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 73; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 94. 

Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering 
completed registration applications: Employed a system of edit checks 
in the voter registration database to identify duplicates[B]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 72; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 66; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 82; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 95. 

Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering 
completed registration applications: Employed a system of edit checks 
in the voter registration database to identify ineligibles based on 
age[A]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 67; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 62; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 74; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 89. 

Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering 
completed registration applications: Employed a system of edit checks 
in the voter registration database to identify ineligibles based on 
residence[A]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 64; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 61; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 68; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 84. 

Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering 
completed registration applications: Verified input of data by the same 
or a different individual to confirm initial input accuracy[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 60; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 57; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 64; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 77. 

Jurisdictions engaged in the following activities when entering 
completed registration applications: Tracked incoming registration 
applications for total number received, number entered into 
registration list, and number not processed because of an omission or 
error on application[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 59; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions: (<10,000): 55; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions: (10,000-100,000): 64; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions: (>100,000): 74. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium 
and small jurisdictions. 

[B] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[C] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small 
jurisdictions. 

[End of table] 

Processing Applications Obtained through Voter Registration Drives 
Posed Additional Challenges for Some Jurisdictions: 

Nongovernmental organizations in many states sponsored voter 
registration drives for the November 2004 general election in an effort 
to increase the number of citizens eligible to vote. Voter registration 
drives pose a dilemma for some election officials. On one hand, voter 
registration drives provide another means by which persons can apply to 
register to vote. On the other hand, they pose challenges in assessing 
the validity of submitted registrations and in processing large numbers 
of registrations submitted close to the registration deadline. For the 
November 2004 general election, election officials in some 
jurisdictions we visited told us they encountered challenges validating 
and processing the large number of voter registration applications 
obtained through voter registration drives that employed either paid 
staff (where workers are paid for each voter registration application 
completed and submitted to election authorities prior to Election 
Day)[Footnote 78] or used volunteers. For example, Wisconsin's state 
legislative audit bureau conducted an evaluation of the 2004 general 
election in its state.[Footnote 79] It found, among other things, that 
many registration deputies appointed for the November 2004 general 
election worked for special interest groups or political parties 
interested in increasing voter turnout.[Footnote 80] The evaluation 
states that investigators found that registration deputies had 
submitted 65 falsified names for the 2004 general elections and that 
district attorneys in two counties charged four individuals with 
submitting fraudulent registration forms. According to the evaluation 
report, these registration deputies were reportedly paid by their 
employer on a per registrant basis, which may have encouraged them to 
submit fraudulent registration forms to increase their compensation. 

Such questions about the integrity of the voter registration process 
were of particular concern in battleground states such as Florida, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, where margins of victory were slim and accurate 
tallies of eligible votes were therefore of consequence.[Footnote 81] 
In our state survey several states reported that their state election 
provisions do not address the issue of voter registration drives that 
involve payment per application, while relatively fewer states reported 
prohibiting them outright. Specifically, 19 states and the District of 
Columbia reported that state laws or executive actions are silent about 
these drives (that is, it is left up to each local jurisdiction to 
decide). However, 1 of these 19 states further reported that while its 
state law does not address voter registration drives that involve 
payment per application, the conduct of such drives is not left up to 
each local jurisdiction--the local jurisdictions have no authority in 
regulating such matters. Sixteen states reported that voter 
registration drives are allowed either by state law or by executive 
action, 13 states reported that they are prohibited by state law, and 2 
states did not respond. 

In addition, our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions 
inquired about their awareness and handling of registration drives, and 
any actions taken to deter fraudulent applications from being submitted 
by persons or groups participating in paid registration drives, and we 
discussed this matter during our site visits to selected jurisdictions 
as well. In our nationwide survey, we estimate that 91 percent of all 
local jurisdictions were not aware of such drives, while 9 percent were 
aware. About a third (an estimated 32 percent) of the large 
jurisdictions--those with populations greater than 100,000--were aware 
of such drives. We also queried local election jurisdictions whether 
any names on voter registration applications appeared to be fraudulent. 
On the basis of our local survey, nearly all jurisdictions--an 
estimated 95 percent--did not have any names that appeared to be 
fraudulent. Although only 5 percent of local election jurisdictions had 
voter registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names, 
an estimated 70 percent identified receiving 10 fraudulent applications 
or fewer, an estimated 14 percent identified receiving 10 or more 
fraudulent applications, and an estimated 16 percent did not know the 
volume of fraudulent applications received. The distribution of the 
volume of fraudulent applications received is of a smaller subset of 
our total sample and therefore has larger confidence intervals than 
other estimates. Figure 17 shows the extent to which local 
jurisdictions identified experiencing fraudulent voter registration 
applications. 

Figure 17: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Had Names 
on Voter Registration Applications Appearing to Be Fraudulent and 
Volume of Fraudulent Applications Identified for the 2004 General 
Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The distribution of the volume of fraudulent applications 
received is of a smaller subset of our total sample and therefore has 
larger confidence intervals than other estimates. For the category of 
10 or fewer fraudulent applications the confidence interval is +/-17 
percent, for the category of 10 or more the confidence level is +/-16 
percent, and for the category of don't know the confidence level is +/
-12 percent. Furthermore, not all respondents who had names on voter 
registration applications that appeared to be fraudulent answered our 
question about the volume of these applications. Therefore, our 
estimate of the subset for the volume of applications that were 
received is based on 4 percent of jurisdictions that answered that 
question. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, our prior work raised concerns about the quality of voter 
registration applications obtained through voter registration drives. 
In our September 2005 report on managing voter registration, we 
reported that among 12 of 14 local jurisdictions we surveyed, 
processing applications received from voter registration drives 
sponsored by nongovernmental organizations posed a challenge to 
election officials because applications were incomplete or 
inaccurate.[Footnote 82] 

Election Officials' Views on Irregular Voter Registration Applications 
from Registration Drives: 

During our site visits, we sought local officials' views on a host of 
issues related to the integrity of the voter registration process, 
including how or whether voter registration drive applications were 
tracked, how many registration applications were submitted by volunteer 
or paid registration drives in calendar year 2004 leading up to the 
November election, and how their jurisdictions dealt with irregular 
applications. (We defined irregular applications as those using 
fictitious names, unusual dates of birth, nonexistent addresses, or 
fake signatures or party affiliations.) We also asked election 
officials whether they had the ability to determine if individuals were 
using false or fictitious names. Many local jurisdictions that we 
visited told us that they did not have specific procedures to ensure 
that voter applications obtained through voter registration drives were 
collected or tracked. This was because, in some cases, the application 
forms could simply be downloaded from the Internet. One large 
jurisdiction that did not track applications coming from various 
sources told us it planned to begin doing so, using a drop-down menu in 
its statewide voter registration system that will allow staff to record 
the information. 

Overall, at local jurisdictions that we visited where applications from 
voter registration drives were tracked or at least estimated, the 
number and proportion of applications submitted through voter 
registration drives relative to total registrations--and the number and 
proportion considered irregular--varied widely. For example, in 1 large 
jurisdiction, election officials reported that approximately 30,000 
registrations received in 2004--about 90 percent--were submitted by 
registration drives. Of these, the election officials estimated that 
only about 50 applications were irregular--that is, they were 
unreadable, had questionable signatures, were incomplete, or had 
invalid addresses. The election official from this jurisdiction noted 
that it appeared some of the applications had been filled out by 
individuals who took addresses from the phone book and changed them 
slightly. In another large jurisdiction in a battleground state, local 
election officials estimated that 70,000 registration applications were 
submitted by volunteer or paid registration drives, and here too 
irregularities were noted--such as fictitious names and fake 
signatures--but election officials stated that these irregular 
applications represented a "low" percentage of the total. In other 
large jurisdictions, fewer voter registration applications were 
received; 1 jurisdiction, for example, in another battleground state, 
reported receiving 2,500 such applications and estimated that about 20 
percent of them were irregular. Two medium jurisdictions we visited 
reported receiving a few hundred voter registration applications or 
fewer, and both reported that there were no irregularities. One small 
jurisdiction did not report any voter registration drives taking place. 

When we asked local election officials during our site visits whether 
they had the ability to determine whether a person actually tried to 
vote using a false or fictitious name, responses were mixed: Election 
officials in 3 large jurisdictions we visited told us they did not have 
the ability to make this determination. An election official in another 
large jurisdiction stated that "there is no way to know if someone 
falsely registered has voted." Others, however, reported that they were 
able to determine whether false identities had been used. For example, 
in 1 large jurisdiction, election judges check voter IDs and signatures 
at the polls to prevent the use of fictitious identities. One large 
jurisdiction verifies voter registration information against Social 
Security and driver's license information and checked voter history 
internally; election officials in this jurisdiction reported that they 
believe anyone who attempted to use a false or fictitious name in the 
November 2004 general election would have been caught. And in another 
jurisdiction, election officials told us that if an individual 
attempted to vote using a fictitious name that was not in the poll 
book, that individual would be issued a provisional ballot--which would 
not be verified if it was determined that the name was indeed 
fictitious. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited said 
there was no way to know whether the poll book already contained 
fictitious names. 

When asked what steps, if any, local jurisdictions we visited took to 
notify law enforcement or other legal authorities on irregular 
registration applications received, most reported taking some actions. 
For example, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported providing 
irregular registration applications to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the district attorney's office and to the 
Secretary of State's office for investigation. Both the FBI and the 
district attorney declined to pursue the matter on the ground that they 
were understaffed, the jurisdiction reported. The Secretary of State's 
office concluded that while the registration applications were 
fraudulent or fictitious, a purposeful fraud was not committed and that 
the people completing the fake applications were not trying to alter an 
election, but to obtain money by working for the registration drives. 
Four other jurisdictions that we visited said they contacted 
appropriate state or federal authorities, such as state law 
enforcement, a State's Attorney, a state election enforcement agency, 
or the FBI, but election officials did not know whether any action had 
been taken. 

In addition, in our June 2005 report on maintaining voter registration 
lists, we reported that election officials in seven locations we 
visited referred reported instances of voter registration fraud 
allegations to appropriate agencies, such as the district attorney and 
the U.S. Attorney for investigation.[Footnote 83] Also, EAC issued 
voluntary guidance in July 2005 to help states implement HAVA. EAC's 
guidance suggested that when the voter registration verification 
process indicates the possible commission of an election crime, such as 
the submission of false registration information, such matters should 
be forwarded to local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities 
for investigation. 

Some Jurisdictions Have Controls to Manage Registration Drives: 

When we asked local jurisdictions that we visited whether they had 
procedures in place for registration groups to follow when submitting 
applications, election officials in most jurisdictions reported that 
some type of system was in place to control registration drives. For 
example, 1 large jurisdiction reported that it had a program to train 
volunteer field registrars to register citizens on behalf of the county 
registrar; these field registrars were to comply with all registration 
rules and laws and must themselves be registered voters, and 
noncandidates, have proof of identify, complete a 2-hour training 
course, and pass a brief examination before taking an oath. In 
addition, this same jurisdiction required that any group requesting 
more than 50 voter registration forms was required to provide a plan to 
the state elections department for when, where, and how it would 
distribute the forms--all of which were numbered so that election 
offices could track them. Some jurisdictions reported, however, that no 
procedures were in place that registration groups had to follow. One 
large jurisdiction, for instance, reported that anyone can run a voter 
registration drive simply by downloading the voter registration form 
from the election office Web site. 

On the topic of what actions, if any, local jurisdictions had taken to 
deter paid registration drives from submitting fraudulent registration 
applications, from our nationwide survey, we estimate that roughly half 
of the estimated 9 percent of local jurisdictions that were aware that 
paid registration drives were occurring provided training or guidance 
on how to accurately complete an application, and an estimated 41 
percent of these jurisdictions notified the persons or groups engaged 
in paid registration drives that they had submitted incomplete, 
inaccurate, or fraudulent applications.[Footnote 84] In addition, on 
the basis of our survey, 41 percent of local jurisdictions that were 
aware of the drives helped prevent submission of incomplete, 
inaccurate, or fraudulent applications by working with persons and 
groups engaged in paid registration drives.[Footnote 85] 

Actions Taken to Help Prevent Fraudulent Registrations and Ensure 
Submission of Registrations to Election Offices: 

In a couple of jurisdictions, election officials told us they took 
other steps, such as meeting with registration drive organizers and 
contacting the registrant identified on the application, to help 
prevent fraudulent registrations. A jurisdiction in Colorado reported 
that numerous complaints had been received from voters who claimed to 
have completed registrations through a drive but for whom the county 
had no record of application. The jurisdiction reported that Colorado's 
legislature passed a bill pertaining to voter registration drives. 
Subsequently, Colorado enacted legislation effective in June 2005 that, 
among other things, requires voter registration organizers to file a 
statement of intent with the Secretary of State, fulfill training 
requirements pursuant to rules promulgated by the Secretary of State, 
and, in general, submit or mail registration applications within 5 
business days. In addition, the 2005 state legislation provides that 
voter registration organizers may not compensate persons circulating 
voter registration application forms based on the number of 
applications distributed or collected. The Secretary of State issued 
rules in November 2005 implementing such requirements, including rules 
that require registration drive organizers to file a statement of 
intent with the Secretary of State and require persons circulating such 
application forms to ensure that the tear-off receipt on the 
application is completed and given to the applicant. Election officials 
in 17 jurisdictions we visited told us that they had procedures in 
place for managing voter registration drives to some extent. For 
example, in 1 medium jurisdiction, election officials stated that 
groups or persons seeking to run registration drives must be trained 
and deputized by the registrar's office. 

Concluding Observations: 

In 43 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, successfully 
registering to vote prior to Election Day is a prerequisite for casting 
a ballot and having that ballot counted. States are still working to 
fully implement HAVA's voter registration requirements. As states gain 
more experience with their statewide voter registration and data 
matching systems and processes, it is likely their systems and 
processes will evolve. Given the continuing challenge of maintaining 
accurate voter registration lists in a highly mobile society, this is 
to be expected. 

For election officials, the voter registration process presents a 
continuing challenge in balancing ease of registration for eligible 
voters with sufficient internal controls to help ensure that only 
eligible voters are added to and remain on the voter registration 
rolls. To maintain accurate voter registration lists, election 
officials must use and rely upon data from a number of sources, such as 
state death and criminal records and applications from MVAs. 

HAVA's requirements for creating and maintaining statewide voter 
registration lists and its identification requirements for first-time 
voters who register by mail were designed to help improve the accuracy 
of voter registration lists and reduce the potential for voter fraud. 
Specifically, HAVA's requirements for creating and maintaining a 
statewide voter registration list was designed to improve voter 
registration list accuracy by identifying duplicate registrations 
within the state and identifying those ineligible to vote because of 
death, criminal status, or other reasons. HAVA requires states to match 
the names and other identifying information on their statewide voter 
registration lists against death and felony records in the state. 
States may voluntarily match their voter registration lists with the 
voter registration lists, death, felony, or other records in other 
states. In the absence of voluntary cross-state matching, it is 
possible to fully implement HAVA's statewide voter registration 
provisions and still have ineligible persons on the state's voter 
registration rolls on Election Day, such as those who died out of state 
or were convicted in federal courts or other states.[Footnote 86] Nor 
would implementing HAVA's statewide matching requirements identify 
persons who are registered to vote in more than one state. Although 
some states report sharing registration and eligibility information 
among states, the practice was generally limited to neighboring states 
or dependent upon a registrant indicating that he or she previously 
resided in another state. 

HAVA includes a provision that requires certain first-time voters who 
register by mail to provide identification as proof of their identity 
and eligibility to vote in the jurisdiction. Which voters must present 
identification either with their mail application or when they vote for 
the first time depends upon how states and local jurisdictions define 
"mail registrations" subject to HAVA's identification requirement. In 
our site visits, we found that some local jurisdictions considered 
registration applications submitted by registration drives to be mail 
registrations subject to HAVA's identification requirement for first- 
time voters, while other jurisdictions did not consider such 
registrations to be mail registrations subject to the identification 
requirement. This distinction has importance on Election Day for first- 
time voters who registered through registration drives. In those 
jurisdictions that considered mail registrations to include 
registration drive applications, first-time voters who registered 
through registration drives would be required to show an acceptable 
form of identification at the polls on election day. If they did not do 
so, they are to be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, but the 
ballot would only be counted upon a state determination that the voter 
is eligible to vote under state law. In contrast, in those 
jurisdictions that did not consider mail applications to include those 
submitted through registration drives, first-time voters would not be 
treated as subject to the HAVA identification requirement and could 
generally cast a regular ballot that would be counted with all other 
regular ballots. 

Election jurisdictions continue to face challenges in obtaining voter 
registration applications from NVRA entities, including MVAs. Some 
local jurisdictions have established processes to manage receipt of 
voter registration applications from these entities, such as training 
for staffs of these agencies. To the extent that NVRA entities do not 
track and forward to the appropriate election jurisdiction the voter 
applications that they have received, voters may be required to cast 
provisional ballots instead of regular ones because their names do not 
appear on the voter registration lists. In addition, the provisional 
ballot will not be counted if the voter's valid registration cannot be 
verified. Our survey of local election jurisdictions found that many 
local jurisdictions encountered problems counting provisional ballots 
in cases where voters claimed to have registered at an MVA or some 
other NVRA entity but there was insufficient evidence that the voter 
had submitted a registration application at the MVA or NVRA entity. 

A surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions prior to the 
November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of balancing ease of 
registration with assurance that only eligible voters are on the 
registration rolls. Some election jurisdictions reported registration 
drive groups submitted hundreds or thousands of applications just 
before the registration deadline. When the registration deadline is 
close to Election Day, processing these applications presents a 
tremendous challenge in checking applications for completeness, having 
time to contact applicants to obtain missing information, verifying 
applicants' eligibility to vote, and adding the name of eligible voters 
to the registration list. Some jurisdictions reported hiring and 
training temporary employees to process the applications. The enormous 
workload and time constraints associated with processing large numbers 
of last-minute applications can increase the chances that errors will 
be made in determining voter eligibility, and the names of some 
eligible voters may not be added to the list in time for Election Day. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 3: 
Absentee and Early Voting: 

A growing number of citizens seem to be casting their ballots before 
Election Day using absentee and early voting options that are offered 
by states and local jurisdictions. 

However, circumstances under which these voters vote and the manner in 
which they cast their ballots before Election Day differ because there 
are 51 unique election codes.[Footnote 87] Because of the wide 
diversity in absentee and early voting requirements, administration, 
and procedures, citizens face different opportunities for obtaining and 
successfully casting ballots before Election Day. 

To collect information about absentee and early voting options, in our 
state and local surveys we asked questions about each of these voting 
options separately. We defined absentee voting as casting a ballot, 
generally by mail, in advance of Election Day (although ballots could 
be returned through Election Day and dropped off in person). We defined 
early voting as generally in-person voting in advance of Election Day 
at specific polling locations, separate from absentee voting. However, 
there is some measure of overlap between absentee voting and early 
voting reported by the states, especially where states have reported in-
person absentee voting to be, in effect, early voting. This may be due, 
in part, to the fact that the relational statutory framework for early 
voting and absentee voting varies among the states--with some states, 
for example, providing early voting within the context of the state's 
absentee voting provisions, while others, for example, provide for 
absentee voting within the context of the state's early voting 
provisions. Similarly, local jurisdictions that completed our survey 
may also have had some measure of overlap in relation to their 
practices for absentee and early voting. During our interviews with 
local election officials in jurisdictions that offered early voting, we 
were able to obtain more detailed information about absentee and early 
voting procedures and practices for those jurisdictions. 

On the basis of our site visits to jurisdictions that had early voting, 
absentee and early voting were similar in some ways and distinct in 
others. Election officials described to us that when voters cast 
absentee ballots, they typically followed a specific process including 
applying for and receiving the ballot and returning their marked 
ballots before Election Day or, in some cases, returning the ballot up 
until the close of polls on Election Day.[Footnote 88] According to the 
description that election officials gave us, early voting was distinct 
from in-person absentee voting in that in-person absentee voters 
usually applied for and received a ballot, and cast it at the 
registrar's office, while early voters reported to a voting location 
where early voting staff verified their eligibility to vote, usually by 
accessing the jurisdiction's voter registration list. Also, early 
voting usually did not require citizens to provide an excuse, as some 
states required for absentee voting, and it was usually allowed for a 
shorter period of time than absentee voting. For example, in the 14 
jurisdictions we visited in 7 states that reported having early voting, 
the time frame allowed for absentee voting was almost always at least 
twice as long as that for early voting (e.g., Colorado allowed 30 days 
for absentee voting and 15 days for early voting). Early voting was 
similar to Election Day voting in that the voting methods were usually 
the same. However, according to election officials in jurisdictions we 
visited that had early voting, voters were not limited to voting in 
their precinct because all early voting locations had access to a 
complete list of registered voters for the jurisdiction (not just 
precinct specific) and had appropriate ballots that included federal, 
state, and precinct-specific races. Appendix VII provides a description 
of selected characteristics of the early voting jurisdictions we 
visited. 

In this chapter, we will discuss changes since 2000 and challenges 
related to (1) absentee voting in general, (2) overseas military and 
civilian absentee voting, and (3) early voting. 

Overview: 

Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote 
absentee or early. For the November 2004 general election, 21 states 
reported that they no longer required voters to provide excuses such as 
being ill, having a disability, or being away from the precinct on 
Election Day to vote absentee--an increase of 3 states from the 
November 2000 general election. Three states reported expanding their 
provision for permanent absentee status (usually reserved for the 
elderly or those with disabilities), allowing voters to receive 
absentee ballots for a state-specified time period, such as 4 years. 
One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in absentee 
voters provide an attestation from a notary or witness for their 
signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Eliminating the 
need for a notary or witness removes a potential barrier to an absentee 
ballot being counted. According to election officials in 2 
jurisdictions in 1 state we visited that required a notary or witness 
signature, an absentee ballot may not be counted if voters neglect to 
have their ballots witnessed or notarized. Furthermore, HAVA amended 
the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to, 
among other things, extend the period of time that can be covered by a 
single absentee ballot application by absent uniformed service voters 
and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States 
from the year during which the application was received to a time 
period covering up to the two next regularly scheduled general 
elections for federal office. 

Election officials reported facing some of the same challenges in the 
November 2004 general election that they had identified to us for the 
November 2000 general election, and they also reported some new 
challenges. Continuing absentee voting challenges included (1) 
receiving late absentee voter applications and ballots; 
(2) managing general workload, resources, and other administrative 
constraints; (3) addressing voter error issues such as unsigned or 
otherwise incomplete absentee applications and ballot materials; 
and (4) preventing potential fraud. 

Election officials also told us that they encountered new challenges in 
the November 2004 general election. Some election officials said that 
the increased early voter turnout during this election resulted in long 
lines. In some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials said 
that factors such as inadequate planning on their part, limitations on 
types of facilities that could be used for early voting locations, and 
funding constraints on hiring more staff or acquiring more voting 
locations affected their management of large early voter turnout. In 
addition, some election officials reported that they encountered a 
challenge handling disruptive third parties as they attempted to 
approach early voters who were in line to vote. Another challenge could 
develop as a result of a 2002 HAVA amendment to UOCAVA. In an effort to 
help make registration and voting easier for absent uniformed service 
voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United 
States, this 2002 amendment, as noted above, extended the period of 
time that can be covered by a single application from the year during 
which the application was received to a time period covering up to the 
next two subsequent general elections for federal office. Election 
officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a possible 
unintended consequence of this amendment could be that when uniformed 
services personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, absentee ballots 
may not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general 
elections. Even with a 2005 revision to the ballot request form whereby 
voters can indicate that they want ballots for one federal election 
only, election officials in 3 of these jurisdictions were concerned 
many absentee ballots would be returned as undeliverable. 

Absentee Voting: 

Absentee voting allows citizens the opportunity to vote when they are 
unable to vote at their precinct on Election Day. Although 
availability, eligibility requirements, administration, and procedures 
vary across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, absentee voting 
generally follows a basic process. As figure 18 shows, this process 
included four basic steps for the November 2004 general election. 

Figure 18: Mail-in Absentee Voting Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] In general, for a mail-in absentee ballot application to be 
approved, it must meet certain state or local requirements. For 
example, in some states, the voter must be registered, and in some 
jurisdictions, the signature on the absentee application must match the 
one on the voter registration application, among other things. 

[End of figure] 

Jurisdictions we visited typically provided absentee ballot 
applications that registered voters used to request absentee ballots in 
a standard state or jurisdiction form, as shown in figure 19. 

Figure 19: Example of a Standard Absentee Ballot Application Form for 
the November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

According to our state survey, state election officials reported that 
registered voters could visit or write their local election office, or 
in some cases visit a state or local election Web site, to obtain an 
application or learn what information was required to request an 
absentee ballot. State election officials reported registered voters 
could return a completed absentee ballot application via the U.S. mail 
or in many other different ways as allowed by state absentee ballot 
provisions. Also, some election officials in jurisdictions we visited 
told us that voters could complete any part of the absentee voting 
process in person at their local elections office. Table 3 shows the 
various options allowed by states for requesting and returning absentee 
ballot applications. However, it is important to note that particular 
local jurisdictions might not have offered all of the options described 
below. 

Table 3: Options Allowed by States for Requesting and Returning 
Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: 

Options: Allowed for requesting absentee ballot applications; 
Number of states[A]: [Empty]. 

Options: In person; 
Number of states[A]: 51. 

Options: U.S. mail; 
Number of states[A]: 51. 

Options: Telephone; 
Number of states[A]: 41. 

Options: E-mail; 
Number of states[A]: 42. 

Options: Via facsimile; 
Number of states[A]: 48. 

Options: Via state Web site; 
Number of states[A]: 30. 

Options: Download from Web site; 
Number of states[A]: 41. 

Options: Allowed for returning absentee ballot applications; 
Number of states[A]: [Empty]. 

Options: In person; 
Number of states[A]: 51. 

Options: U.S. mail; 
Number of states[A]: 51. 

Options: E-mail; 
Number of states[A]: 11. 

Options: Via facsimile; 
Number of states[A]: 34. 

Options: Via state Web site; 
Number of states[A]: 4. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials. 

[A] States include the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 

[End of table] 

According to our state survey results, states reported that applicants 
could find out the status of their absentee ballot application after it 
was submitted and offered at least one of several ways, including 
telephoning a state or local jurisdiction office, telephoning a hotline 
or toll-free number, or e-mailing a state or local jurisdiction office. 
For example, in 49 states and in the District of Columbia, applicants 
could telephone a state or local jurisdiction office, and in 47 states 
and in the District of Columbia, applicants could e-mail a state or 
local jurisdiction office to find out their absentee ballot 
applications' status. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
notified the applicant if the application was rejected. 

While absentee ballots are generally provided to the voter through the 
mail, unless voting in person, on the basis of our survey of a 
representative sample of local jurisdictions nationwide, some 
jurisdictions provided absentee ballots using fax and e-mail. 
Specifically, for the November 2004 general election, we estimate that 
17 percent of local jurisdictions provided absentee ballots by fax, and 
4 percent of local jurisdictions provided absentee ballots by e-mail. 
On the basis of our discussions with election officials in 
jurisdictions we visited, absentee ballots are generally returned 
through the mail. 

Election officials in most jurisdictions we visited said that voters 
used a combination of envelopes for returning completed absentee 
ballots so that voters' identities would be distinct from the ballots 
they were casting. For example, a voter would place the completed 
ballot in a secrecy (inner) envelope, which would then be placed in an 
outer envelope. The secrecy envelope would be to ensure that the voted 
ballot was not linked to the voter, while the voter's affidavit 
information, such as a name, address, and signature, needed to certify 
that the voter was eligible to vote, would be marked on the outer 
envelope. Election officials in some jurisdictions provided examples of 
the envelopes used to return absentee ballots. One of these examples 
had a separate affidavit envelope, which was to be placed in a pre- 
addressed return envelope and mailed to the local elections 
jurisdiction. Other examples allowed the voter to include the affidavit 
information on the back of the pre-addressed return envelope. Once the 
local elections jurisdiction certified that the absentee ballots could 
be counted using the affidavit information, election officials in 
jurisdictions we visited told us that they removed the secrecy envelope 
(with the voted ballot sealed inside) and set it aside for counting. 
Figure 20 shows examples of absentee ballot return envelopes and the 
inclusion of affidavit information. 

Figure 20: Two Examples of Absentee Ballot Envelopes with the Inclusion 
of Affidavit Information--One with Certification on Inner Envelope and 
One with Certification on Outer Envelope--for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In our survey of state election officials, we asked whether absentee 
voters were able to find out the status of their submitted absentee 
ballots in various ways. According to our state survey, 44 states and 
the District of Columbia reported that absentee voters were able to 
telephone a state or local jurisdiction office, 32 states and the 
District of Columbia reported that absentee voters were able to e-mail 
a state or local jurisdiction office, 16 states reported that absentee 
voters could telephone a hotline or toll-free number, and 5 states 
reported that absentee voters' ballot status was available via a Web 
site. Furthermore, 16 states reported that either state or local 
jurisdictions would notify the voter if the absentee ballot was not 
counted. However, 6 states reported that they do not allow voters to 
check the status of their absentee ballots at all. For example, Vermont 
reported that state law does not allow voters to find out whether or 
not the absentee ballot was counted. Kentucky reported that it does not 
track whether or not an individual voter's ballot was counted because 
linking a voted ballot back to a specific voter violates that voter's 
right to a secret ballot. 

A Few States Reported Changes to Absentee Voting Requirements since 
2000: 

A few states reported changes to their requirements with respect to 
absentee voting by (1) no longer requiring a reason or excuse for 
voting absentee; (2) eliminating the need for a mail-in absentee voter 
to have a notary or witness for the voter's signature to accompany the 
ballot; and (3) not limiting permanent absentee voting status to 
individuals with disabilities or the elderly. 

Excuse Requirement: 

According to our state survey regarding the November 2004 general 
election, all 50 states and the District of Columbia had some 
provisions allowing registered voters to vote before Election Day, but 
not every registered voter was eligible to do so. Twenty-one states 
reported allowing voters to vote absentee for the November 2004 general 
election without first having to provide a reason or excuse. The other 
29 states and the District of Columbia reported requiring voters to 
meet one of several criteria, or "excuses," to be eligible to vote 
before Election Day, such as having a disability, being elderly, or 
being absent from the jurisdiction on Election Day. The following are 
examples of excuses that some states required: 

* absent from the state or county on Election Day; 

* a member of the uniformed services or a dependent; 

* a permanent or total disability; 

* ill or having a temporary disability; 

* over a certain age, such as 65; 

* at a school, college, or university; 

* employed on Election Day in a job for which the nature or hours 
prevent the individual from voting at his or her precinct, such as an 
election worker; 
and: 

* involved in emergency circumstances, such as the death of a family 
member. 

In our survey of local jurisdictions, we asked about problems 
encountered when processing absentee ballot applications. As shown in 
figure 21, we estimate that 9 percent of local jurisdictions received 
absentee applications that did not meet the excuse required by law, in 
states where excuses were required. The issue of applicants not meeting 
the required excuse is more of a problem for large jurisdictions than 
small or medium jurisdictions. 

Figure 21: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Problems Processing Absentee Applications because the Applicant Did Not 
Meet the Excuse Required by State Law, November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The difference between large jurisdictions and small and medium 
jurisdictions is statistically significant. 

[End of figure] 

According to our state survey, the number of states that allowed 
absentee voting without an excuse increased from 18 in 2000 to 21 in 
2004. Since November 2004, 2 more states reported that they have 
eliminated their excuse requirement. Specifically, during visits to 
local jurisdictions in New Jersey, election officials told us that 
state law had changed since the November 2004 general election. 
According to these officials, no-excuse absentee voting was adopted by 
the New Jersey legislature and became effective in July 2005. Ohio also 
amended its absentee voter provisions, effective January 2006, to 
provide for no-excuse absentee voting. 

Notary or Witness Signature Requirement: 

Election officials in 2 jurisdictions in 1 state we visited told us 
that if voters returned a completed (voted) ballot without having the 
signature notarized or affirmed by a witness, the vote would be 
disqualified and not counted. For the November 2004 general election, 
according to our state survey, 12 states reported requiring that mail- 
in absentee ballots contain attestation by a notary or witness for a 
voter's signature to accompany the absentee ballot. From the November 
2000 election to the November 2004 election, Florida was the only state 
that reported in our state survey that it had dropped the requirement 
that mail-in absentee ballots contain attestation by a notary or 
witness for a voter's signature. 

Permanent Absentee Voting: 

Permanent absentee voting, which typically was available to individuals 
with disabilities or the elderly, was another way some states sought to 
help enfranchise certain categories of voters. Permanent absentee 
status, where offered, generally allowed the voter to apply for mail-in 
absentee ballots once (rather than for each separate election) over a 
specified time period. State requirements dictated when and how often a 
voter must apply for permanent absentee status. For example, for the 
November 2004 general election, in a New Jersey jurisdiction that we 
visited, election officials told us that state law required those 
eligible for permanent absentee status to apply at the beginning of the 
calendar year to receive absentee ballots for that year. According to 
the absentee ballot application provided by this jurisdiction, a 
voter's permanent absentee status remains in effect throughout that 
year unless the voter notifies the election office otherwise. An 
election official in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited said that 
his state allowed permanent absentee voters to apply once every 4 
years. In this state, permanent absentee voters were to receive 
absentee ballots for all elections during the 4-year period, according 
to the election official. In 2 Washington jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials told us that any voter could qualify for permanent 
absentee status for all future elections (e.g., no time period 
specified). In one of these Washington jurisdictions, election 
officials provided a copy of the permanent absentee application 
instructing voters that their permanent absentee status would be 
terminated upon the (1) voter's written request, (2) cancelation of the 
voter's registration record, (3) death or disqualification, or (4) 
return of an ongoing absentee ballot as undeliverable. 

Our state survey results showed that since the November 2000 general 
election, 3 states (California, Rhode Island, and Utah) reported state 
changes that expanded, in some manner, the use of permanent absentee 
voting. For example, California, reported changes for the November 2004 
election that allowed any voter to apply for and receive permanent 
absentee status. For the November 2000 general election, California 
previously reported that only certain categories of voters with 
disabilities (e.g., blind voters) were eligible for permanent absentee 
status. Overall, the results of our state survey showed that at the 
time of the November 2004 general election, 17 states reported having 
some provision for permanent absentee status, 32 states and the 
District of Columbia reported that they did not provide for permanent 
absentee status, and Oregon reported conducting its election entirely 
by mail--making permanent absentee status unnecessary in this state. 

Appendix VIII provides information on states' requirements for no- 
excuse absentee voting and witness or notary signature provisions for 
the November 2000 and 2004 general elections and shows where changes 
occurred. States did not report any changes to their permanent absentee 
requirements since the November 2000 general election. 

Receiving Late Absentee Ballot Applications and Ballots for the 
November 2004 General Election Continued to Be a Challenge: 

The results from our state survey show that deadlines for voters to 
both apply for absentee ballots and return them to local jurisdictions 
to be counted differed among states. According to our state survey for 
the November 2004 general election, 47 states and the District of 
Columbia reported that they had absentee ballot application deadlines 
that ranged from Election Day (5 states: Connecticut, Maine, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and South Dakota) to 21 days before Election Day (Rhode 
Island). Three states (Florida, New Hampshire, and Oregon) reported 
having no absentee ballot application deadline, although ballots in 
these states had to be returned by the close of polls on Election 
Day.[Footnote 89] 

With respect to state deadlines for returning absentee ballots, many 
states reported having more than one deadline to correspond with 
differing methods of returning such ballots to election officials. In 
our state survey, 44 states reported having provisions requiring that 
absentee ballots be returned by or on Election Day; 
7 states reported having provisions requiring that absentee ballots be 
returned a certain number of days before Election Day; 
and 8 states and the District of Columbia reported having provisions 
allowing mailed absentee ballots to be returned a certain number of 
days after Election Day, if such ballots were postmarked by a specified 
date. For example, for the 2004 November general election, Alaska 
reported two deadlines: (1) mail-in absentee ballots were to be 
received by close of business on the 10th day after the election when 
postmarked on or before Election Day, and (2) in-person absentee 
ballots were to be delivered by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. 

Also, according to our state survey, Nebraska reported that for 
absentee ballots returned by mail, the deadline changed from no later 
than 2 days after Election Day for the November 2000 general election 
to the close of polls on Election Day for the November 2004 general 
election. According to our state survey, these deadlines may be 
different for absent uniformed service voters and certain other 
civilian voters residing outside the United States, a subject that will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 

In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes, we 
reported that election officials for the 2000 general election 
identified receiving applications and ballots after state statutory 
deadlines as a challenge.[Footnote 90] According to our nationwide 
survey, local jurisdictions encountered similar problems with 
processing absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots for the 
November 2004 general election. More specifically, on the basis of our 
survey, we estimate that 55 percent of local jurisdictions received 
absentee ballot applications too late to process. We also estimate 77 
percent of local jurisdictions encountered problems in processing 
absentee ballots because ballots were received too late. Furthermore, 
we asked jurisdictions about which problems were encountered most 
frequently. An estimated 25 percent of local jurisdictions encountered 
the ballot lateness problem most frequently. Figure 22 shows that 
medium and large jurisdictions encountered lateness with absentee 
ballots more than small jurisdictions did. 

Figure 22: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered 
Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, 
November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[B] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and 
large jurisdictions. 

[End of figure] 

Appendix VIII summarizes states' deadlines for receiving domestic mail- 
in absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots. 

Election officials in the local jurisdictions we visited told us that 
they tried to approve applications and mail absentee ballots to voters 
as quickly as possible, assuming that the ballots had been finalized 
and printed. In 8 jurisdictions we visited in 5 states (Colorado, 
Kansas, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Washington), election officials 
said that their states mandated that local election jurisdictions 
process absentee ballot applications within a specified time period, 
such as within 24, 48, or 72 hours of receipt of the application. In 2 
Pennsylvania jurisdictions we visited, election officials stated that 
they established a local policy encouraging election staff to process 
absentee ballot applications faster (such as on the day of receipt) 
than the time period specified in state law (which was 48 hours). In 1 
Illinois and 1 Nevada jurisdiction we visited, election officials said 
that while a 24-or 48-hour turnaround time for absentee ballot 
applications was not mandated in state law, local office policy was to 
process them as quickly as possible--such as within 24 hours of receipt 
of the application. 

During our site visits, election officials in 9 jurisdictions stated 
that they received large numbers of mail-in absentee ballot 
applications just prior to the deadlines prescribed by state law. Most 
of these election officials said they were able to meet their state- 
mandated or office policy application-processing time, although they 
had to work long hours and hire additional staff to process the 
absentee ballot applications by the deadline. In 1 Florida jurisdiction 
we visited, local election officials said that even though they had no 
absentee ballot application deadline, they processed applications using 
"long hours and extra people" and tried to send out absentee ballots 
within 24 hours of receiving a complete application. 

In jurisdictions we visited in Pennsylvania and Colorado, election 
officials said that sometimes the 24-or 48-hour turnaround was 
impossible to meet because the state did not finalize the ballots for 
printing until the days immediately preceding Election Day for the 
November 2004 election. For example, an election official in the 
Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited told us that determining whether 
or not an independent presidential candidate's name was to be included 
on the November 2004 general election ballot proved to be a challenge. 
In this jurisdiction, the validity of petition signatures supporting 
the independent candidate's request to be included on the ballot was 
challenged in state court about 10 weeks before the election. As a 
result, according to the election official, election officials were 
required to participate in a court-mandated process of verifying the 
signatures. According to the election official, it took about 10 days 
in court to resolve the situation, which delayed the printing of the 
ballots. 

In 6 jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that slowness 
in the delivery of the mail added to the processing time crunch during 
the week before Election Day--a problem that is out of election 
officials' control and may contribute to the local election officials' 
receipt of absentee voting materials after state-mandated deadlines. 
Although envelopes can use an "official election mail" designation, 
election officials in these 6 jurisdictions we visited said that the 
U.S. Postal Service did not always process absentee voting materials in 
a timely manner. For example, in one New Mexico jurisdiction we 
visited, election officials stated that they experienced serious 
problems with the U.S. Postal Service delivering absentee ballot 
applications. These officials felt that the post office ignored the 
envelopes' official election mail designation and did not process and 
deliver them quickly. Election officials in this jurisdiction said that 
their telephone system crashed numerous times leading up to Election 
Day in November 2004, given the heavy volume of incoming calls from 
voters checking on the status of their absentee ballot applications. In 
one Pennsylvania jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said 
that postal concerns were raised when some college students' absentee 
ballot applications were received after Election Day. These officials 
could not definitely say at what point these applications might have 
been delayed and explained that the mail delivery delay could have been 
attributable to either the U.S. Postal Service or the university's 
mailing center. Figure 23 illustrates the use of special postal 
markings for absentee ballot materials. 

Figure 23: Example of Envelope Illustrating Official Postal Marking for 
Absentee Ballot Materials, November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

While election officials in 6 jurisdictions we visited told us about 
challenges with mail delivery, election officials in 7 jurisdictions we 
visited told us that they did not have problems with mail delivery or 
coordinating with the U.S. Postal Service. In an Illinois jurisdiction 
we visited, election officials told us that prior to the election, 
staff from his office met with the postmaster to establish a good 
working relationship. Election officials in a New Hampshire and Ohio 
jurisdiction we visited stated that the post office was very helpful. 
In a Nevada jurisdiction we visited election officials said that they 
received excellent service from the postal service. 

When an absentee application was received after the state-mandated 
deadline, election officials in 13 jurisdictions we visited told us 
that they often sent these applicants a letter explaining that their 
application was received too late. In 5 of these same jurisdictions, 
election officials said they also provided an alternative to absentee 
voting such as early voting, voting on Election Day, or in-person 
absentee voting, where the voter could visit the election office and 
complete the absentee voting process in person. 

Voter Errors in the November 2004 Election Continued to Be a Challenge 
with Processing Absentee Ballot Applications and Ballots: 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that 
election officials for the 2000 general election identified voters' 
failure to provide critical information, with respect to signatures and 
addresses, as challenges to successfully processing mail-in absentee 
applications and verifying ballots for counting.[Footnote 91] According 
to our nationwide survey for the November 2004 election, local 
jurisdictions encountered similar voter errors that could affect the 
jurisdictions' ability to establish voter eligibility or approve the 
ballot for counting when processing absentee ballot applications and 
absentee ballots. 

Absentee Ballot Applications: 

In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions what problems 
they encountered in processing absentee ballot applications. We 
estimate that 48 percent of them identified problems receiving absentee 
ballot applications that contained a missing or illegible voter 
signature. Furthermore, we asked about which problems were encountered 
most frequently. An estimated 20 percent of local jurisdictions 
encountered the problem of receiving absentee ballot applications that 
contained a missing or illegible voter signature most frequently. Table 
4 shows our estimates of the types of voter errors local jurisdictions 
encountered with absentee ballot applications submitted for the 
November 2004 general election. 

Table 4: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Voter Error Problems in Processing 
Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election: 

Problem: Missing or illegible signature[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 48; 
Small: (< 10,000): 44[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 55; 
Large: (>100,000): 73[D]. 

Problem: Missing or inadequate voting residence address[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 35; 
Small: (< 10,000): 30[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 42; 
Large: (>100,000): 70[D]. 

Problem: Applied to wrong jurisdiction[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 33; 
Small: (< 10,000): 32[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 32; 
Large: (>100,000): 58[D]. 

Problem: Missing or inadequate voting mailing address[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 32; 
Small: (< 10,000): 25[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 43; 
Large: (>100,000): 74[D]. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and 
medium jurisdictions. 

BAll size jurisdictions are statistically different from one another. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[End of table] 

On the basis of our nationwide survey, large jurisdictions had more of 
a problem than small or medium jurisdictions concerning missing or 
illegible signatures. Specifically, we estimate that 73 percent of 
large jurisdictions encountered this problem, while we estimate 44 
percent and 55 percent of small and medium jurisdictions respectively 
encountered it. Large jurisdictions are statistically different from 
medium and small jurisdictions. 

When elections officials were unable to process absentee ballot 
applications, our nationwide survey showed that some local 
jurisdictions contacted applicants to inform them of the status of 
their application using the methods listed in table 5. Specifically, on 
the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 72 
percent of all jurisdictions telephoned applicants when their absentee 
applications could not be processed. We found no significant difference 
based on the size of the jurisdiction with regard to this contact 
method. However, we estimate that 84 percent of medium jurisdictions 
and 90 percent of large jurisdictions contacted absentee applicants by 
U.S. mail. In contrast, 63 percent of small jurisdictions contacted 
absentee applicants with problem applications via U.S. mail. Small 
jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large 
jurisdictions. We also estimate that 10 percent of local jurisdictions 
did not inform any applicants about the status of their application. 

Table 5: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods When Absentee Ballot 
Applications Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: 

Methods used to inform applicants of application status: Telephoned the 
applicant; 
All jurisdictions: 72; 
Small: (< 10,000): 72[D]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 73; 
Large: (>100,000): 77. 

Methods used to inform applicants of application status: Contact by 
mail[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 69; 
Small: (< 10,000): 63[D]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 84; 
Large: (>100,000): 90. 

Methods used to inform applicants of application status: Contact by e- 
mail[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 20; 
Small: (< 10,000): 18[D]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 21; 
Large: (>100,000): 46. 

Methods used to inform applicants of application status: Other[C]; 
All jurisdictions: 15; 
Small: (< 10,000): 18[D]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 9; 
Large: (>100,000): 11. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and 
large jurisdictions. 

[B] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and 
medium jurisdictions. 

[C] "Other" included contact by facsimile or contacting voters' 
relatives, among other things. 

[D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[End of table] 

In an Illinois jurisdiction that we visited, elections officials told 
us that they would do everything possible in an attempt to obtain 
complete absentee applications from voters. If the absentee ballot 
application was incomplete, election office staff said they contacted 
the voter and attempted to resolve the problem in the best way 
practical, according to the election officials. For example, if the 
application was missing the voter's signature and there was enough 
time, the staff mailed the application back to the voter for signature. 
If time was limited, the staff called the voter and asked him or her to 
visit the election office to sign the application. An election official 
in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited told us that if applicants 
forgot to include one part of an address, such as a ZIP code, but 
election staff could match the rest of the address and voters' 
identifying information with their registration information, the 
application was approved. Election officials in another Pennsylvania 
jurisdiction and a Nevada jurisdiction told us that the voter 
registration system automatically generated letters to voters when the 
application could not be processed for any reason. 

Absentee Ballots: 

In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions what problems 
they encountered in processing submitted absentee ballots. We estimate 
that 61 percent of all jurisdictions reported that absentee ballots 
were received without the voter's signature on the envelope. We 
estimate 54 percent of small jurisdictions, 76 percent of medium 
jurisdictions, and 90 percent of large jurisdictions encountered this 
problem. Jurisdictions of all sizes are statistically different from 
one another. Table 6 shows our estimates of the types of problems 
election officials encountered on absentee ballots. We estimate that 81 
percent of local jurisdictions encountered at least one of the problems 
listed. 

Table 6: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Problems in Processing Submitted 
Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election: 

Problems encountered: Envelope not signed[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 61; 
Small: (< 10,000): 54; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 76; 
Large: (>100,000): 90[C]. 

Problems encountered: Missing or incomplete witness signature or 
information; 
All jurisdictions: 36; 
Small: (< 10,000): 38; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 33; 
Large: (>100,000): 36[C]. 

Problems encountered: Improper or missing notary signature; 
All jurisdictions: 18; 
Small: (< 10,000): 19; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 16; 
Large: (>100,000): 12[C]. 

Problems encountered: Signature on the envelope did not match the 
application or digitized signature on file[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 13; 
Small: (< 10,000): 9; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 18; 
Large: (>100,000): 48[C]. 

Problems encountered: Voter identification marks on envelope or 
ballot[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 9; 
Small: (< 10,000): 9; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 7; 
Large: (>100,000): 23[C]. 

Problems encountered: Voter identification number not included; 
All jurisdictions: 3; 
Small: (< 10,000): 2; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 5; 
Large: (>100,000): 7[C]. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Jurisdictions of all sizes are statistically different from one 
another. 

[B] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and 
medium jurisdictions. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[End of table] 

If the ballot was not able to be verified, election officials in some 
jurisdictions we visited told us that they attempted to contact the 
voter, time permitting, so that the affidavit envelope could be 
corrected and approved for counting. In 10 jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials said that they reviewed the affidavit envelope 
information to approve the ballots as they received them rather than 
waiting until Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we 
estimate that 40 percent of local jurisdictions contacted the voter by 
mail in an attempt to address a problem with the affidavit envelope, 
and 39 percent contacted the voter via telephone. Table 7 shows our 
estimates of the contact methods used by local jurisdictions when 
absentee ballots had problems that could prevent them from being 
approved for counting if not corrected. 

Table 7: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods when Absentee Ballots 
Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election: 

Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Contacted the voter by 
mail[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 40; 
Small: (< 10,000): 31[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 61; 
Large: (>100,000): 66. 

Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Telephoned the voter; 
All jurisdictions: 39; 
Small: (< 10,000): 38[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 42; 
Large: (>100,000): 41. 

Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Did not inform voters; 
All jurisdictions: 27; 
Small: (< 10,000): 29[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 24; 
Large: (>100,000): 25. 

Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Did not receive any 
ballots that could not be processed; 
All jurisdictions: 21; 
Small: (< 10,000): 25[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 12; 
Large: (>100,000): 3. 

Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Contacted the voter by 
e-mail; 
All jurisdictions: 8; 
Small: (< 10,000): 8[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 7; 
Large: (>100,000): 15. 

Methods used to inform voters of ballot status: Other[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 11; 
Small: (< 10,000): 11[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 7; 
Large: (>100,000): 16. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Small jurisdictions are statistically different than medium and 
large jurisdictions. 

[B] "Other" included contacting the voter by facsimile, contacting a 
family member of the voter, or providing a hotline number for voters to 
check their ballot status, among other things. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[End of table] 

Differences in whether voters were contacted by mail when there were 
problems with their absentee ballots were based on the size of the 
local elections jurisdiction. Specifically, we estimate that 31 percent 
of small, 61 percent of medium, and 66 percent of large jurisdictions 
contacted voters by mail. Small jurisdictions are statistically 
different from medium and large jurisdictions. 

While election officials in 10 jurisdictions we visited told us that 
they qualified absentee ballots prior to Election Day--allowing them 
time to follow up with voters, in 6 local jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials told us that they qualified or approved absentee 
ballots for counting on Election Day. According to election officials 
in these jurisdictions, contacting the voter for corrected or complete 
ballot information was not a viable option because there was not enough 
time. These election officials stated that absentee ballots with 
incomplete or inaccurate information on the affidavit envelope would 
not be qualified or counted. 

Some election officials in jurisdictions we visited told us that voters 
can visit local election offices and complete all or part of the 
absentee process in person. Some election officials told us that when 
voters vote in-person absentee, officials are well situated to help 
ensure that the application and ballot are complete and accurate before 
accepting them. For example, in one Connecticut jurisdiction we 
visited, election officials told us that they did not have incomplete 
absentee ballot applications from voters who visited the office in 
person because they reviewed the application and required the person to 
correct any errors before leaving. 

Some Election Jurisdictions Continued to Have Concerns about Fraud and 
Had Procedures to Address the Potential for Fraud: 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that 
election officials for the 2000 general election had concerns with mail-
in absentee voting fraud, particularly regarding absentee voters being 
unduly influenced or intimidated while voting.[Footnote 92] However, we 
also reported that election officials identified that they had 
established procedures to address certain potential for fraud, such as 
someone other than the registered voter completing the ballot or voters 
casting more than one ballot in the same election. 

Once the voters received and voted absentee ballots in accordance with 
any state or local requirements (such as providing a signature or other 
information on the affidavit envelope), such ballots were to be 
returned to specified election officials. In general, local election 
officials or poll workers were to review the information on the 
affidavit envelope and subsequently verified or disqualified the ballot 
for counting based on compliance with these administrative 
requirements, according to election officials in some local 
jurisdictions we visited. 

In our state survey, we asked states whether they specified how local 
jurisdictions were to determine eligibility of absentee ballots. 
According to our survey, 44 states and the District of Columbia 
reported that at the time of our survey, they specified how to 
determine absentee ballot eligibility, while 6 states reported that 
they did not. Colorado, for example, specified that the poll worker is 
to compare the signature of the voter on a self-affirmation envelope 
with a signature on file with the county clerk and recorder. Wisconsin 
specified, among other things, that inspectors ascertain whether a 
certification has been properly executed, if the applicant is a 
qualified elector of the ward or election district, and that the voter 
has not already voted in the election. 

Our survey of local elections jurisdictions asked election officials if 
they used any of the procedures described in table 8 to ensure that the 
absentee voter did not vote more than once for the November 2004 
general election. These procedures could have been conducted either 
manually by elections officials or through system edit checks. On the 
basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 69 percent 
of jurisdictions checked the Election Day poll book to determine 
whether the voter had been sent an absentee ballot, and 68 percent of 
jurisdictions checked the Election Day poll book to determine whether 
the voter had completed an absentee ballot. 

Table 8: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Voters Did Not Vote More than Once, 
November 2004 General Election: 

Procedure: Election Day poll book checked to determine whether the 
voter had been sent an absentee ballot; 
All jurisdictions: 69; 
Small: (< 10,000): 65[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 77; 
Large: (>100,000): 82. 

Procedure: Election Day poll book checked to determine whether the 
voter had completed an absentee ballot; 
All jurisdictions: 68; 
Small: (< 10,000): 66[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 74; 
Large: (>100,000): 56. 

Procedure: Election Day poll book checked against the absentee ballots 
prior to counting them[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 64; 
Small: (< 10,000): 68[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 54; 
Large: (>100,000): 48. 

Procedure: Applications or voter registration system checked to 
determine whether the voter had already applied for an absentee 
ballot[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 58; 
Small: (< 10,000): 52[C]; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 70; 
Large: (>100,000): 85. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Small jurisdictions are significantly different from medium and 
large jurisdictions. 

[B] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[End of table] 

On our survey of local jurisdictions, we also asked if any of the 
procedures listed in table 9 were in place to ensure that the absentee 
ballots were actually completed by the person requesting the ballot. On 
the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 70 
percent of jurisdictions compared the absentee ballot signature with 
the absentee application signature. 

Table 9: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Absentee Ballots Were Actually 
Completed by the Person Requesting the Ballot, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Procedure: Absentee ballot signature was compared with the absentee 
application signature[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 70; 
Small: (< 10,000): 72; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 69; 
Large: (>100,000): 40[C]. 

Procedure: Absentee ballot signature had to be witnessed (in only those 
states that required it)[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 54; 
Small: (< 10,000): 64; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 28; 
Large: (>100,000): 25[C]. 

Procedure: Absentee ballot signature was compared with the voter 
registration signature; 
All jurisdictions: 39; 
Small: (< 10,000): 36; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 47; 
Large: (>100,000): 62[C]. 

Procedure: Absentee ballot signature had to be notarized (in only those 
states that required it); 
All jurisdictions: 8; 
Small: (< 10,000): 7; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 14; 
Large: (>100,000): 6[C]. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and 
medium jurisdictions. 

[B] Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and 
large jurisdictions. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[End of table] 

With respect to comparing the absentee ballot application signature 
with the absentee ballot signature, there were differences based on the 
size of the jurisdiction. On the basis of our survey of local 
jurisdictions, we estimate that 72 percent of small, 69 percent of 
medium, and 40 percent of large jurisdictions compared these 
signatures. Large jurisdictions are significantly different from small 
and medium jurisdictions. One reason that large jurisdictions may 
differ is that they have a large volume of absentee ballots to process 
and it may be too resource intensive to compare signatures, among other 
things. 

During our site visits, elections officials provided examples of the 
procedures they used to ensure against fraud. For example in 20 local 
jurisdictions that we visited, election officials said that when the 
ballot signature was compared with the absentee application signature, 
voter registration signature, or some other signature on file, the 
signatures had to match for the ballot to be approved and counted. In 
addition to matching signatures, election officials in 2 Illinois 
jurisdictions and 1 New Jersey jurisdiction we visited told us that 
during the Election Day absentee ballot qualification process, poll 
workers were instructed to check the poll book to determine if the 
voter had cast an Election Day ballot. In 1 of these Illinois 
jurisdictions, if poll workers found both an Election Day and absentee 
ballot were cast, they were instructed to void the absentee ballot so 
that it would not be counted. In addition to matching signatures, 
election officials in a Nevada jurisdiction we visited said that they 
used an electronic poll book to manage absentee, early, and Election 
Day voting to ensure that voters cast only one ballot. Once a ballot 
was cast in this jurisdiction, the electronic poll book was annotated 
and the voter was not allowed to cast another ballot. 

Although election officials in the 20 jurisdictions mentioned above 
told us that they had procedures in place designed to help prevent 
fraud during the absentee voting process, election officials told us 
that they still suspected instances of fraud. For example, in a 
Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that they 
referred 44 individuals who allegedly voted absentee ballots with 
invalid signatures to the district attorney for investigation. In a New 
Mexico jurisdiction that we visited, election officials told us that 
organized third parties went door to door and encouraged voters to 
apply for absentee ballots. Once these voters received their ballots, 
according to election officials, the third parties obtained the voters' 
names (in New Mexico this is public information, according to such 
officials), and went to the voters' homes and offered to assist them in 
voting the ballots. These election officials said that they were 
concerned that the latter part of this activity might be intimidating 
to voters and could result in voter fraud. 

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting: 

In general, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 
requires, among other things, that states permit absent uniformed 
services members and U.S. citizen voters residing outside the country 
to register and vote absentee in elections for federal office.[Footnote 
93] In addition, states also generally offer some measure of absentee 
voting for registered voters in their states not covered under UOCAVA. 
The basic process for absentee voting under UOCAVA is generally similar 
to that described in figure 18 for absentee voters not covered under 
UOCAVA in that UOCAVA voters also must establish their eligibility to 
vote on their absentee ballot application, and the ballot must be 
received by the voter's local jurisdiction to verify it for counting. 
Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that they 
allow UOCAVA voters to submit a voted ballot via facsimile--a method 
that might not be allowed for absentee voters not covered under UOCAVA 
because of concerns about maintaining ballot secrecy. In 6 
jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that they require 
voters under UOCAVA to submit a form acknowledging that ballot secrecy 
could be compromised when ballots are faxed. 

One mechanism used to simplify the process for persons covered by 
UOCAVA to apply for an absentee ballot is the Federal Post Card 
Application (FPCA), which states are to use to allow such absentee 
voters to simultaneously register to vote and request an absentee 
ballot. On our survey of local jurisdictions, we asked if any problems 
were encountered in processing absentee applications when the applicant 
used the FPCA. We estimate that 39 percent of local jurisdictions 
received the FPCA too late to process--a problem also encountered with 
other state-provided absentee ballot applications. Table 10 shows our 
estimates of problems local jurisdictions encountered when processing 
Federal Post Card Applications. In addition, we asked about which 
problems were encountered most frequently when the FPCA was used, and 
an estimated 19 percent of local jurisdictions encountered the problem 
of receiving the FPCA too late to process more frequently than other 
problems. 

Table 10: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions, by Jurisdiction 
Size, That Encountered Specific Voter Error Problems on Absentee 
Applications That Used the Federal Post Card Application, November 2004 
General Election: 

Problems: Application received too late[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 39; 
Small: (< 10,000): 32; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 53; 
Large: (>100,000): 70. 

Problems: Missing or inadequate voting residence address[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 31; 
Small: (< 10,000): 24; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 41; 
Large: (>100,000): 75. 

Problems: Applied to wrong jurisdiction[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 29; 
Small: (< 10,000): 25; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 36; 
Large: (>100,000): 60. 

Problems: Missing or inadequate voting mailing address[A]; 
All jurisdictions: 24; 
Small: (< 10,000): 17; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 36; 
Large: (>100,000): 67. 

Problems: Missing or illegible signature[B]; 
All jurisdictions: 21; 
Small: (< 10,000): 16; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 27; 
Large: (>100,000): 57. 

Problems: Application not witnessed, attested, or notarized; 
All jurisdictions: 13; 
Small: (< 10,000): 13; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 13; 
Large: (>100,000): 14. 

Problems: Did not meet excuse required by state law; 
All jurisdictions: 3; 
Small: (< 10,000): 2; 
Medium: (10,000 to 100,000): 4; 
Large: (>100,000): 13. 

Source: GAO analysis of local election jurisdiction survey data. 

[A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[B] Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and 
medium jurisdictions. 

[End of table] 

Also, uniformed services voters and U.S. citizen voters residing 
outside of the country are allowed to use the Federal Write-In Absentee 
Ballot to vote for federal offices in general elections. This ballot 
may be used when such voters submit a timely application for an 
absentee ballot (i.e., the application must have been received by the 
state before the state deadline or at least 30 days prior to the 
general election, whichever is later) but do not receive a state 
absentee ballot. Some states' absentee ballot application forms 
included serving in a uniformed service or residing outside the country 
as excuses for voting absentee. According to our state survey, 4 states 
(Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island) reported that they 
require attestation by a notary or witness for a voter's signature on 
voted mail-in absentee ballots but do not require uniformed service 
voters and U.S. citizen voters outside the country to provide this on 
their voted ballots. 

For the 2004 November general election, according to our state survey, 
9 states reported having absentee ballot deadlines for voters outside 
the United States that were more lenient than the ballot deadlines for 
voters inside the United States. Table 11 lists these 9 states and the 
difference between the mail-in ballot deadline from inside the United 
States and the mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United 
States. 

Table 11: States Reporting Differing Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines 
from Inside and Outside the United States, November 2004 General 
Election: 

State: Alaska; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 10 days 
after Election Day and postmarked by Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 15 
days after Election Day and postmarked by Election Day. 

State: Arkansas; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 
Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 10 
days after Election Day. 

State: Florida; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 
Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: No 
later than 10 days after Election Day if postmarked or signed and dated 
by Election Day (federal races only). 

State: Louisiana; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 1 day 
before Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 
Election Day. 

State: Maryland; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 1 day 
after Election Day if postmarked before Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 10 
days after Election Day and postmarked before Election Day. 

State: Massachusetts; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 
Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 10 
days after Election Day and postmarked by Election Day. 

State: Ohio; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 
Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 10 
days after Election Day. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 4 days 
before Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 
Deadline extended per court order for November 2004 general election 
for not only absentee ballots from outside the United States but also 
for those voters covered by UOCAVA, including domestic uniformed 
service members, who are nonetheless absent from the place of residence 
where they are otherwise qualified to vote. 

State: Texas; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from inside the United States: 
Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States: 5 days 
after Election Day. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey state election officials. 

[End of table] 

HAVA amended the UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of 
time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application--the 
Federal Post Card Application--by absent uniformed service voters and 
citizen voters residing outside the United States from the year during 
which the application was received to a time period covering up to the 
two next regularly scheduled general elections for federal office. To 
illustrate, if uniformed service voters or civilian voters residing 
outside the United States submitted a completed FPCA in July 2004, they 
would have been allowed to automatically receive ballots for the next 
two federal general elections, including those held in 2004 and 2006. 
(See fig. 24 for an example of the FPCA used in 2004.) 

In 4 local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that 
the amendment described above may present a challenge for successfully 
delivering absentee ballots to the uniformed services members because 
they tend to move frequently. For example, in a North Carolina 
jurisdiction that we visited, election officials stated that addresses 
on file for such voters at the time of the November 2004 general 
election may be no longer correct and that mail sent to these voters 
could be returned as undeliverable. Also, in 1 jurisdiction in Georgia 
that we visited, election officials told us that they were concerned 
that many of the absentee ballots sent in subsequent general elections 
would be returned as undeliverable. In an Illinois jurisdiction we 
visited, elections officials expressed concerns about paying the 
postage for mail that may be undeliverable will be a challenge in 
future years. Also, we noted in our March 2006 report on election 
assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, that one of the top 
two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for UOCAVA voters was 
that the ballots were undeliverable.[Footnote 94] 

The Federal Post Card Application was revised in October 2005, after 
the November 2004 general election, and now allows overseas military 
and civilians to designate the time period for which they want to 
receive absentee ballots. (See figure 24 for the revised FPCA.) Those 
who do not wish to receive ballots for two regularly scheduled general 
elections can designate that they want an absentee ballot for the next 
federal election only and then complete the form and request a ballot 
for each subsequent federal election separately. The FPCA used at the 
time of the November 2004 election did not allow overseas military and 
civilian voters to make this designation. 

Figure 24: The Federal Post Card Application Used before and after the 
November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Even with the revised FPCA, some applications might not have this box 
checked, and jurisdictions could continue to have absentee ballots 
returned as undeliverable. In an attempt to mitigate these problems, 
election officials in 3 local jurisdictions we visited told us that 
they planned several activities in an attempt to maintain and update 
the addresses of uniformed services voters and civilian voters residing 
outside the country. In a Washington jurisdiction we visited, election 
officials told us that they began requesting e-mail addresses from such 
voters so that any problems with these applications or ballots could be 
corrected more efficiently. In previous elections, when e-mail 
addresses were not available, elections officials in this jurisdiction 
told us that many absentee applications and ballots sent to uniformed 
services members and civilian voters residing outside the United States 
were often returned as undeliverable. In a Georgia jurisdiction that we 
visited, election officials said that they planned to create a 
subsystem within their voter registration system. This subsystem will, 
according to the election officials, allow staff in the election office 
to produce a form letter for each uniformed services voter that will 
verify the voter's current address. The election officials also told us 
letters will be mailed in January asking the voter to contact the 
jurisdiction to confirm that he or she continues to reside at the 
address on the letter. If the jurisdiction does not receive 
confirmation from the uniformed services voter, the election officials 
told us that they will contact the Federal Voting Assistance Program 
(FVAP) for assistance in locating the voter.[Footnote 95] In an 
Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that they 
plan to canvass all uniformed services members and civilians residing 
outside the United States who are registered in the state in 2006. 
Election officials in this jurisdiction told us that they had 
approximately 7,400 such registered voters who completed the FPCA and 
that the jurisdiction planned to canvass these voters to confirm that 
they continued to reside at the address on the FPCA. This jurisdiction 
expects that as many as half of these canvass cards will be returned as 
undeliverable. Once the cards are returned, state law allows those 
voters whose canvass cards are returned to be deleted from the voter 
registration list, according to the election officials. 

Early Voting: 

Early voting is another way to provide registered voters with the 
opportunity to cast ballots prior to Election Day. However, conducting 
early voting is generally more complicated for election officials than 
conducting Election Day voting. In the jurisdictions we visited in 7 
states with early voting, election officials described early voting as 
generally in-person voting at one or more designated polling locations 
usually different from polling locations used at the precinct level on 
Election Day. The voting may or may not be at the election registrar's 
office. Early voting is distinct from in-person absentee voting in that 
in-person absentee voters usually apply for an absentee ballot at the 
registrar's office and vote at the registrar's office at that time. 
Also, early voting usually does not require an excuse to vote, which 
some states require for absentee voting, and in the jurisdictions we 
visited in 7 states with early voting, it was usually offered for a 
shorter period of time than absentee voting.[Footnote 96] The time 
frame allowed for absentee voting was almost always at least twice as 
long as for early voting. For example, election officials in the 
Colorado jurisdictions we visited said that they allow 30 days for 
absentee voting and 15 days for early voting. In the jurisdictions we 
visited in 7 states with early voting, election officials said early 
voting is similar to Election Day voting in that the voter generally 
votes using the same voting method as on Election Day. However they 
added that it differs from Election Day voting in that voters can vote 
at any early voting polling location because all early voting locations 
have access to a list of all registered voters for the jurisdiction 
(not just precinct specific) and can provide voters with appropriate 
ballots that include federal, state, and precinct-specific races. 

Proponents argue that early voting is convenient for voters and saves 
jurisdictions money by reducing the number of polling places and poll 
workers needed on Election Day, and also provides the voter with more 
opportunity to vote. Opponents counter that those who vote early do so 
with less information than Election Day voters, and there is no proof 
that early voting increases voter turnout. Statistics on voter turnout 
for early voting can be difficult to come by, partly because some 
states and localities combine early and absentee voting 
numbers.[Footnote 97] Nevertheless, early voting in certain 
jurisdictions appears to be popular with voters and on the rise. In a 
New Mexico jurisdiction, election officials told us that early voting 
accounted for about 34 percent of the ballots cast in that 
jurisdiction. In North Carolina and Colorado elections jurisdictions we 
visited, election officials said that early voters cast about 35 and 38 
percent of the jurisdictions' total votes in the November 2004 
election, respectively. In a Nevada jurisdiction we visited, election 
officials told us that the percentage of voters who voted early 
steadily increased over time. The officials said that in 1996, about 17 
percent of voters voted early; in 2000, 43 percent voted early; and in 
the November 2004 general election, about 50 percent (271,500) of their 
voters voted early. 

Our prior work on the 2000 general election did not identify states 
that offered early voting as we have defined it. Rather, we reported on 
absentee and early voting together. Thus, we are unable to identify the 
change in the number of states that offered early voting for the 
November 2000 general election and the November 2004 general election. 
We describe the availability of early voting throughout the nation and 
the challenges and issues that election officials encountered in the 
November 2004 general election as they conducted early voting in 
selected jurisdictions. Many early polling locations in Florida and 
elsewhere received media publicity about voters standing in long lines 
and waiting for long periods of time to vote early. In half of the 
local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials described 
encountering challenges that included long lines, and some identified 
challenges dealing with disruptive third-party activities at the polls. 

Early Voting Appears to Be Gaining in Popularity: 

For the November 2004 general election, in our state survey, 24 states 
and the District of Columbia reported offering early voting. In 
addition, 2 states--Illinois and Maine--reported, in our state survey, 
that they had enacted legislation or taken executive action since 
November 2004 to provide for early voting in their states. Another 7 
states reported that with respect to early voting, they (1) had 
legislation pending, (2) considered legislation in legislative session 
that was not enacted, or (3) had an executive action that was pending 
or was considered. Figure 25 shows where early voting was provided for 
the November 2004 general election. 

Figure 25: Twenty-four States and the District of Columbia Reported 
Providing Early Voting as an Option in the November 2004 General 
Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 23 
percent of jurisdictions were in states that offered early voting. 
Furthermore, we estimate that 16 percent of small jurisdictions, 40 
percent of medium jurisdictions, and 52 percent of large jurisdictions 
were in states that offered early voting. Small jurisdictions are 
statistically different from both medium and large jurisdictions. 

The Number of Days and Hours to Conduct Early Voting: 

The number of days that early voting was available in these 24 states 
and the District of Columbia varied. In some cases, early voting was 
allowed no sooner than a day or a few days prior to Election Day, while 
in other cases voters had nearly a month or longer to cast an early 
ballot. Table 12 shows the range of days for early voting among the 
states and the District of Columbia that reported providing early 
voting for the November 2004 election. 

Table 12: Early Voting Period in 24 Early Voting States and the 
District of Columbia, November 2004 General Election: 

States that reported providing early voting: Alaska; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 16 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Arizona; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: At least 30 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Arkansas; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: California; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 30 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Colorado; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Florida; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Georgia; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 5 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Hawaii; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 10 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Idaho; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: Beginning of early voting period is 
unspecified-early voting period ends on the day before the election. 

States that reported providing early voting: Iowa; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: Up to 40 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Kansas; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: Up to 20 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Louisiana; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 12 to 6 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Montana; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 45 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Nebraska; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: Beginning of early voting period is 
unspecified-early voting period ends by close of polls on Election Day. 

States that reported providing early voting: Nevada; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 14 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: New Mexico; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 17 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: North Carolina; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: Up to 19 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: North Dakota; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Oklahoma; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 3 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Tennessee; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: Up to 20 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Texas; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 14 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: Utah; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: Beginning of early voting period is 
unspecified-early voting period ends on the day before the election. 

States that reported providing early voting: Vermont; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: Unspecified. 

States that reported providing early voting: West Virginia; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 18 days. 

States that reported providing early voting: District of Columbia; 
Statutory early voting period[A]: 15 days. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[A] For the purposes of this table, the phrase "early voting period" 
refers to the period of time during which in-person early ballots may 
be cast in elections for federal office. Different time periods may be 
applicable under state laws with respect to early ballot applications 
and nonfederal elections. 

[End of table] 

On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 75 
percent of the jurisdictions that offered early voting offered it for 2 
or more weeks prior to Election Day. Figure 26 shows the estimated 
percentage of local jurisdictions that offered early voting for various 
time periods. 

Figure 26: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Offered 
Early Voting for Various Time Periods, November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The 95 percent interval for these percentages is +/-10 percentage 
points or less. Figures do not total 100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Among the local jurisdictions that we visited in the 7 states that 
provided early voting, we found that the shortest time frame allowed 
for early voting was in Georgia, which had 5 days, and the longest time 
frame allowed for early voting was in New Mexico, with 28 days. 
Furthermore, in the local jurisdictions we visited in the 7 states that 
provided early voting, election officials supplied information on early 
voting hours that ranged from weekday business hours to those that 
included weekends and evenings. For more details on the characteristics 
of early voting sites we visited, see appendix VII. 

During the course of our work, a limited review of state statutes 
showed, for example, that Nevada statute requires early voting polling 
places be open Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., during the 
first week of early voting and possibly to 8 p.m. during the second 
week, dependent upon the county clerk's discretion. In addition, under 
the Nevada provision, polling places must be open on any Saturdays 
within the early voting period from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., and may be open 
on Sundays within the early voting period dependent upon the county 
clerk's discretion. Under these provisions, the early voting period is 
to begin the third Saturday prior to an election and end the Friday 
before Election Day. Similarly, Oklahoma statute provides that voters 
be able to cast early ballots from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on the Friday and 
Monday immediately before Election Day, and from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. on 
the Saturday immediately before Election Day. Some states' statutes are 
less prescriptive, such as those of Florida, where the statute 
specifies that early voting should be provided for at least 8 hours per 
weekday during the early voting period, and at least 8 hours in the 
aggregate for each weekend during the early voting period, without 
specifying the specific hours such voting is to be offered. Other 
states, such as Kansas, however, do not specify in statute the hours 
for voting early.[Footnote 98] Kansas statute, in general, leaves it to 
county election officials to establish the times for voting early. 
Officials at some local jurisdictions we visited said that their hours 
of operations were set based on the hours of the election office or by 
the hours of the facility that was hosting early voting such as a 
shopping mall or a library. 

According to our survey of local jurisdictions, an estimated 34 
percent[Footnote 99] of local jurisdictions that provided early voting 
for the November 2004 general election offered early voting during 
regular business hours (e.g., from 8 a.m. until 4 p.m.) on weekdays, 
and 16 percent[Footnote 100] offered early voting during regular 
business hours on weekdays and during other hours. Other hours included 
weekday evenings (after 4 p.m. or 5 p.m. until 7 p.m. or 9 p.m.) and 
Saturdays (all day) and Sundays (any hours) for about 2 percent of the 
jurisdictions, respectively. 

Determining Number and Types of Early Voting Locations: 

As with early voting time frames, some states reported having 
requirements for local election jurisdictions regarding the number of 
early voting locations. In our state survey, 17 of the 25 entities 
(including 24 states and the District of Columbia) that reported 
offering early voting for the November 2004 general election also 
reported having requirements for local jurisdictions regarding the 
number or distribution of early voting locations. Kansas election 
standards, for example, provide for one such voting location per county 
unless a county's population exceeds 250,000, in which case the 
election officer may designate additional sites as needed to 
accommodate voters. 

Election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited said that state statute 
determined the number of locations, while election officials in 13 
other jurisdictions told us they decided the number of locations. For 
example, New Mexico's early voting statutory provisions specifically 
require that certain counties with more than 200,000 registered voters 
establish not fewer than 12 voting locations each. During our site 
visits, we asked jurisdictions how they determined the number of early 
voting locations. In a Nevada jurisdiction that we visited, election 
officials said that the number of locations was determined by the 
availability of resources such as fiscal and manpower needs. In a 
Colorado jurisdiction we visited, an election official said he would 
like to have had more early voting locations but could not because the 
jurisdiction did not have the funds to pay for additional costs 
associated with additional sites, such as the cost for computer 
connections needed for electronic voter registration list capability. 
In a North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, election officials said 
that they had only one early voting location because they did not have 
election staff that would be needed to manage another site. 

Conducting Early Voting: 

In many ways, early voting is conducted in a manner substantially 
similar to Election Day voting in that polling locations are obtained, 
workers are recruited to staff the sites for each day polling locations 
are to be open, and voting machines and supplies are delivered to the 
polling locations. However, as described by election officials in 
jurisdictions we visited that had early voting, early voting differs 
from Election Day voting in that staff are generally required to 
perform their voting day-related duties for more than 1 day, and staff 
generally do not use poll books to identify eligible voters and check 
them in. Instead, as described by some of these jurisdictions, early 
voting staff usually access the jurisdiction's voter registration list 
to identify eligible voters and to indicate the voter voted early to 
preclude voting on Election Day or by absentee ballot. Also, election 
officials told us that, generally, staff must possess some computer 
skills and need to be trained in using the jurisdiction's voter 
registration system. Furthermore, staff must be aware that ballots are 
specific to the voter's precinct. 

In our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we asked 
about the type of staff who worked at early voting polling places. 
According to our survey for the November 2004 general election, local 
election jurisdictions relied on permanent election jurisdiction staff 
most often to work at early voting polling locations. As table 13 
shows, we estimate 30 percent of local jurisdictions offered early 
voting using only permanent election jurisdiction staff to work at the 
early voting polling places; we estimate that 14 percent of local 
jurisdictions used poll workers exclusively; and we estimate 14 percent 
used other staff (e.g., county or city employees). 

Table 13: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Various Staff Mixes at Early Voting Locations, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Staff: Permanent staff; 
Percent: 30[A]. 

Staff: Poll workers; 
Percent: 14[ B]. 

Staff: Other (respondents wrote in other categories); 
Percent: 14[C]. 

Staff: Permanent and temporary part-time staff; 
Percent: 7[D]. 

Staff: Permanent staff and poll workers; 
Percent: 4[D]. 

Staff: Permanent, temporary full-time, and temporary part-time staff 
and poll workers; 
Percent: 4[D]. 

Staff: Permanent and temporary full-time staff; 
Percent: 4[D]. 

Staff: Permanent and temporary part-time staff and poll workers; 
Percent: 4[D]. 

Staff: Temporary part-time staff and poll workers; 
Percent: 3[D]. 

Staff: Temporary full-time staff and poll workers; 
Percent: 2[D]. 

Staff: Permanent, temporary full-time, and temporary part-time staff; 
Percent: 2[D]. 

Staff: Temporary full-time and temporary part-time staff and poll 
workers; 
Percent: 1[D]. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-9 
percentage points. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +7 or -6 
percentage points. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +8 or -6 
percentage points. 

[D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +6 or -4 
percentage points. 

[End of table] 

Election officials at 11 jurisdictions we visited emphasized the 
importance of staffing early voting locations with experienced staff 
such as election office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. 
Even with experienced staff working early voting locations, election 
officials at local jurisdictions we visited mentioned that staff were 
required to take training and were provided tools to help them perform 
their duties. 

In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions that provided 
early voting about the ways that staff were trained for early voting. 
As shown in table 14, the majority of jurisdictions used methods, such 
as providing a checklist of procedures, written guidance for self-study 
or reference, and quick reference materials for troubleshooting, to 
train early voting staff. 

Table 14: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Various Methods to Train Early Voting Staff, November 2004 General 
Election: 

Ways that early voting staff were trained: Provided a checklist of 
procedures; 
Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 80. 

Ways that early voting staff were trained: Provided written guidance 
for self-study or reference; 
Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 78. 

Ways that early voting staff were trained: Provided quick reference 
materials for troubleshooting; 
Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 74. 

Ways that early voting staff were trained: Provided classroom training; 
Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 56. 

Ways that early voting staff were trained: Viewed training video; 
Percentage of local jurisdictions[A]: 31. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] The 95 percent confidence interval for all percentages is +/-11 
percentage points or less. 

[End of table] 

Local jurisdictions could do more than one of the above ways to train 
early voting staff. On the basis of our local survey, we estimate that 
14 percent of local jurisdictions used classroom training, written 
guidance for self-study or reference, a checklist of procedures, and 
quick reference materials for troubleshooting to train early voting 
staff.[Footnote 101] 

When asked about what worked particularly well during early voting, 
election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited in Colorado said that 
that they provided 8 hours of training and had on-site supervision that 
they thought contributed to a successful early voting experience. The 
election officials also said they used a feature in their electronic 
poll book system to track the number of ballots used at each site to 
determine whether sites had adequate inventories of ballots. The 
program for the poll book system had an alarm that went off if any site 
was running low on ballots, according to these election officials. Two 
other jurisdictions we visited in Kansas and Florida noted the 
importance of having experienced staff for early voting, with the 
election officials in 1 Kansas jurisdiction saying that designating a 
group of workers to work on early voting helped the process run 
effectively and the election officials in 1 Florida jurisdiction saying 
that having the supervisor of elections office staff on site to support 
early voting helped make the process work well. 

Some Local Jurisdictions We Visited Encountered Long lines Resulting 
from Larger than Expected Early Voter Turnout: 

When asked about challenges with early voting faced during the November 
2004 general election, in half of the local jurisdictions we visited 
that offered early voting election officials identified long lines as a 
major challenge. Election officials at 5 local jurisdictions we visited 
said that they had not anticipated the large number of voters who had 
turned out to vote early. Officials attributed challenges handling the 
large number of voters and resulting long lines to problems with 
technology, people, and processes. Election officials at local 
jurisdictions we visited made the following comments: 

* Election officials in one Florida jurisdiction we visited said that 
their jurisdiction faced more early voters than anticipated and this 
fact, coupled with slowness in determining voter eligibility, resulted 
in long lines. They said that on the first day of early voting, staff 
was unable to access the voter registration list because laptops were 
not functioning properly. To address the problem, a worker at the early 
voting location paired with another worker, who called the supervisor 
of elections office to obtain voter registration information and 
provide information on the voter seeking to vote early. 

* An election official in another Florida jurisdiction said that while 
state law provides for early voting in the main office of the 
supervisor of elections, other locations may be used only under certain 
conditions. For example, in order for a branch office to be used, it 
must be a full-service facility of the supervisor and must have been 
designated as such at least 1 year prior to the election. In addition, 
a city hall or public library may be designated as an additional early 
voting location, but only if the sites are located so as to provide all 
voters in the county an equal opportunity to cast a ballot, insofar as 
is practicable. The official thought more flexibility was needed to 
allow him to either have more early voting locations or use other types 
of facilities, such as a local community center, that could accommodate 
more voters. 

* An election official in a Nevada jurisdiction we visited said that 
the jurisdiction's process flow was inadequate to handle the large 
turnout for early voting. The election official said that the 
jurisdiction had not planned sufficiently to manage the large turnout 
for early voting and did not have enough staff to process voters. The 
election official said that in the future, he will hire temporary 
workers and will assign one person to be in charge of each process 
(e.g., checking in voters, activating the DRE machine, etc.) In 
addition, the election official said that, in hindsight, he made a 
questionable decision to close all but two early voting locations for 
the last day of early voting. The closing of all but two locations on 
the last day of early voting coincided with a state holiday so children 
were out of school. The decision to close all but two locations caused 
3 to 3½ hours of wait time, with parents waiting in line with children. 
The election official said he has set a goal for the future that no 
wait time should be longer than half an hour.[Footnote 102] 

To address challenges related to heavy early voter turnout, election 
officials in 1 Nevada jurisdiction said they have gradually added new 
early voting locations each year to keep up with the increasing number 
of people who vote early. In a New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, 
election officials said that they used a smaller ratio of voters to 
machines than required by state statute. According to these election 
officials, the state required at least one machine for every 600 
voters, and during early voting, the election officials said they used 
one machine for every 400 voters registered in the jurisdiction. 

In 1 Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that 
they addressed the challenge of long lines by having greeters inform 
voters about the line and make sure the voters had required 
identification with them. They said they provided equipment 
demonstrations and passed out sample ballots so people in line could 
consider their choices, if they had not already done so. They also said 
they offered people in line the option of absentee ballot applications. 

Some Jurisdictions We Visited Encountered Challenges Dealing with 
Disruptive Third-Party Activities: 

In 3 jurisdictions we visited, election officials stated that they 
encountered challenges dealing with disruptive third-party activities 
at early voting sites. In particular, concerns were raised about 
various groups attempting to campaign or influence voters while the 
early voters waited in line. State restrictions on various activities 
in or around polling places on Election Day include prohibitions 
relating to, for example, the circulation of petitions within a certain 
distance of a polling place, the distribution of campaign literature 
within a certain distance of the polls, the conduction of an exit or 
public opinion poll within a certain distance of the polls, and 
disorderly conduct or violence or threats of violence that impede or 
interfere with an election. Election officials in 1 jurisdiction we 
visited stated that campaign activities too close to people waiting in 
line were a concern to the extent that police were called in to monitor 
the situation at one early voting location. Election officials in a 
Florida jurisdiction we visited said that they were concerned about 
solicitors, both candidates and poll watchers, approaching people 
waiting in line to vote early and offering them water or assistance in 
voting.[Footnote 103] While Florida's statutory provisions in place for 
the November 2004 general election contained restrictions of various 
activities in or around polling places on Election Day, such provisions 
did not explicitly address early voting sites. Amendments to these 
provisions, effective January 2006, among other things, explicitly 
applied certain restrictions of activities in or around polling places 
to early voting areas. With respect to poll watchers, these amendments 
also prohibit their interaction with voters to go along with the pre- 
existing prohibition on obstructing the orderly conduct of any election 
by poll watchers. 

Concluding Observations: 

Making voting easier prior to Election Day has advantages for voters 
and election officials, but also presents challenges for elections 
officials. Many states and local jurisdictions appear to be moving in 
the direction of enabling voters to vote before Election Day by 
eliminating restrictions on who can vote absentee and providing for 
early voting. Many states allowed voters to use e-mail and facsimiles 
to request an absentee ballot application and, in some cases, to return 
applications. To the extent that large numbers of voters do vote 
absentee or early, it can reduce lines at the polling place on Election 
Day and, where permitted by state law, ease the time pressures of vote 
counting by allowing election officials to count absentee and early 
votes prior to Election Day. 

However, there are also challenges for election officials. An estimated 
55 percent of jurisdictions received absentee ballot applications too 
late to process, and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too late. 
Although we do not know the extent of these problems in terms of the 
number of applications and ballots that could not be processed, the 
estimated number of jurisdictions encountering these problems may be of 
some concern to state and local election officials. Absentee 
application deadlines close to Election Day provide citizens increased 
time to apply to vote absentee. However, the short time period between 
when applications are received and Election Day may make it difficult 
for election officials to ensure that eligible voters receive absentee 
ballots in time to vote and return them before the deadline for receipt 
at election offices. 

Voter errors on their absentee applications and ballots also create 
processing problems for election officials. These include missing or 
illegible signatures, missing or inadequate voting residence addresses, 
and missing or incomplete witness information for a voter's signature 
or other information. In addition, mail-in absentee ballots are 
considered by some to be particularly susceptible to fraud. This could 
include such activities as casting more than one ballot in the same 
election or someone other than the registered voter completing the 
ballot. Despite efforts to guard against such activities, election 
officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited expressed some 
concerns, particularly regarding absentee voters being unduly 
influenced or intimated by third parties who went to voters' homes and 
offered to assist them in voting their ballots. Some election officials 
expressed similar concerns about the influence of third parties on 
early voters waiting in line who were approached by candidates and poll 
watchers. After this happened in Florida in November 2004, the state 
amended its election provisions to prohibit such activity with respect 
to early voters. 

Getting absentee ballots to uniformed service personnel and overseas 
citizens is a continuing challenge. UOCAVA permitted such voters to 
request an absentee ballot for the upcoming election, and HAVA extended 
the covered period to include up to two subsequent general elections 
for federal office. Because the duty station of uniformed service 
personnel may change during the period covered by the absentee ballot 
requests, election officials in jurisdictions we visited were concerned 
that they have some means of knowing the current mailing address. Some 
jurisdictions are taking action to ensure that they have the correct 
address for sending absentee ballots for the November 2006 election, 
such as requesting e-mail addresses that can be used to obtain the most 
current address information prior to mailing the absentee ballot. To 
the extent there are problems identifying the correct address, 
uniformed service personnel and overseas civilians may either not 
receive an absentee ballot or receive it too late to return it by the 
deadline required for it to be counted. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 4: 
Conducting Elections: 

Whether voters are able to successfully vote on Election Day depends a 
great deal on the planning and preparation that occur prior to the 
election. Election officials carry out numerous activities--including 
recruiting and training poll workers; selecting and setting up polling 
places; designing and producing ballots; educating voters; and 
allocating voting equipment, ballots, and other supplies to polling 
places--to help ensure that all eligible voters are able to cast a 
ballot on Election Day with minimal problems.[Footnote 104] In our 
October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide we 
described these activities as well as problems encountered in 
administering the November 2000 general election.[Footnote 105] Since 
then, federal and state actions have been taken to help address many of 
the challenges encountered in conducting the November 2000 general 
election. However, reports after the November 2004 general election 
highlighted instances of unprepared poll workers, confusion about 
identification requirements, long lines at the polls, and shortages of 
voting equipment and ballots that voters reportedly encountered on 
Election Day. This chapter describes changes and challenges--both 
continuing and new--that election officials encountered in preparing 
for and conducting the November 2004 general election. 

Overview: 

States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the 
November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA provisions and other 
state actions to improve the administration of elections in the United 
States. In addition to establishing a commission--the U.S. Election 
Assistance Commission--with wide-ranging duties that include providing 
information and assistance to states and local jurisdictions--HAVA also 
established requirements with respect to elections for federal office 
for, among other things, certain voters who register by mail to provide 
identification prior to voting; mandated that voting systems accessible 
to individuals with disabilities be located at each polling place; 
and required voter information to be posted at polling places on 
Election Day. HAVA also authorized the appropriation of federal funds 
for payments to states to implement these provisions and make other 
improvements to election administration. Since the November 2000 
general election, some states have also reported making changes to 
their identification requirements for all voters. 

Election officials reported encountering many of the same challenges 
preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election as they 
did in 2000, including recruiting and training an adequate supply of 
skilled poll workers, locating a sufficient number of polling places 
that met requirements, designing ballots that were clear to voters when 
there were many candidates or issues (e.g., propositions, questions, or 
referenda), having long lines at polling places, and handling the large 
volume of telephone calls received from voters and poll workers on 
Election Day. Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we 
visited also reported encountering new challenges not identified to us 
in the 2000 general election with third-party (e.g., poll watchers, 
observers, or electioneers) activities at polling places on Election 
Day. On the basis of our survey of a representative sample of local 
election jurisdictions nationwide and our visits to 28 local 
jurisdictions, the extent to which jurisdictions encountered many of 
these continuing challenges varied by the size of election 
jurisdiction. Large and medium jurisdictions--those jurisdictions with 
over 10,000 people--generally encountered more challenges than small 
jurisdictions. In most results from our nationwide survey where there 
are statistical differences between the size categories of 
jurisdictions, large jurisdictions are statistically different from 
small jurisdictions. 

HAVA Made Changes Intended to Improve Election Administration: 

HAVA established EAC to provide voluntary guidance and assistance with 
election administration, for example, by providing information on 
election practices to states and local jurisdictions and administering 
programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements to 
some aspects of election administration.[Footnote 106] HAVA also added 
a new requirement for states to in turn require certain first-time 
voters who register by mail who have not previously voted in a federal 
election in the state to provide identification prior to 
voting,[Footnote 107] and jurisdictions reported taking steps to 
implement this requirement and inform voters about it. In addition, 
HAVA includes provisions to facilitate voting for individuals with 
disabilities, such as requirements for accessible voting systems in 
elections for federal office.[Footnote 108] HAVA established voter 
information requirements at polling places on the day of election for 
federal office[Footnote 109] and authorized the appropriation of 
funding for payments to states to expand voter education efforts. 

HAVA Established EAC to Provide Guidance and Assistance with Election 
Administration: 

HAVA established EAC, in part, to assist in the administration of 
federal elections by serving as a national clearinghouse for 
information and providing guidance and outreach to states and local 
officials.[Footnote 110] In our October 2001 report on election 
processes, we estimated that on the basis of our survey of local 
election jurisdictions in 2001, 40 percent of local election 
jurisdictions nationwide were supportive of federal development of 
voluntary or mandatory standards for election administration similar to 
the voluntary standards available for election equipment. We also 
reported in 2001 that some election officials believed that greater 
sharing of information on best practices and systematic collection of 
information could help improve election administration across and 
within states.[Footnote 111] To assist election officials, since its 
establishment, EAC has produced two clearinghouse reports, one of which 
covers election administration.[Footnote 112] EAC released a Best 
Practices Toolkit on Election Administration on August 9, 2004, to 
offer guidance to election officials before the November 2004 general 
election. The document is a compilation of practices used by election 
officials that covers topics such as voter outreach, poll workers, 
polling places, and election operations. Of note, this compilation 
provided election officials with a checklist for HAVA implementation 
that covers identification for new voters, provisional voting, 
complaint procedures, and access for individuals with disabilities. EAC 
has made this guidance available to states and local jurisdictions via 
its Web site and engaged in public hearings and outreach efforts to 
inform the election community about the resource tool. 

EAC also administers programs that provide federal funds for states 
under HAVA to make improvements to aspects of election administration, 
such as implementing certain programs to encourage youth to become 
involved in elections; training election officials and poll workers; 
and establishing toll-free telephone hotlines that voters may use to, 
among other things, obtain general election information. The results of 
our state survey of election officials show that as of August 1, 2005, 
most states reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for a variety 
of activities related to improving election administration. For 
example, 45 states and the District of Columbia reported spending or 
obligating HAVA funding for training election officials, and 32 states 
and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating funding to 
establish toll-free telephone hotlines. 

HAVA Added a New Requirement for Certain Voters, and Jurisdictions 
Reported Taking Steps to Inform Voters: 

As discussed in chapter 2, under HAVA, states are to require certain 
first-time voters who registered to vote by mail to provide 
identification prior to voting.[Footnote 113] Voters who are subject to 
this provision are those individuals who registered to vote in a 
jurisdiction by mail and have not previously voted in a federal 
election in the state, or those who have not voted in a federal 
election in a jurisdiction which is located in a state that has not yet 
established a computerized voter registration list, as required by 
HAVA. When voting in person, these individuals must (if not already 
provided with their mailed application) present a current and valid 
photo identification, or a copy of a current utility bill, bank 
statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document 
that shows the name and address of the voter. Under HAVA, voters at the 
polls who have not met this identification requirement may cast a vote 
under HAVA's provisional voting provisions. Additional information on 
provisional voting processes and challenges is presented in chapter 5. 

Election officials in 21 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported 
encountering no problems implementing the HAVA first-time voter ID 
requirement, and officials in some of these jurisdictions provided 
reasons why there were no problems.[Footnote 114] For example, election 
officials in 2 jurisdictions in Colorado told us that they did not 
encounter implementation problems because all voters, under state 
requirements, were required to show identification. Election officials 
in some other jurisdictions we visited reported that they took steps to 
inform voters of the new HAVA ID requirement for such voters 
registering by mail. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction 
in Ohio reported that they contacted about 300 prospective voters 
twice, either by phone or by letter, prior to the election to inform 
them that that they needed to show identification. Figure 27 
illustrates a poster used in a jurisdiction we visited to inform 
prospective voters about the new identification requirements. 

Figure 27: King County, Washington, Poster Used to Inform Prospective 
Voters of New Identification Requirements: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

HAVA Includes Provisions to Facilitate Voting for Individuals with 
Disabilities: 

HAVA contains provisions to help facilitate voting for individuals with 
disabilities,[Footnote 115] including requirements for the 
accessibility of voting systems used in elections for federal office, 
effective January 1, 2006. HAVA also authorized the appropriation of 
funding for payments to states to improve the accessibility of polling 
places. In October 2001, we issued a report that examined state and 
local provisions and practices for voting accessibility, both at 
polling places and with respect to alternative voting methods and 
accommodations.[Footnote 116] We reported in 2001 that all states and 
the District of Columbia had laws or other provisions concerning voting 
access for individuals with disabilities, but the extent and manner in 
which these provisions addressed accessibility varied from state to 
state. In addition, in our 2001 report we noted that various features 
of the polling places we visited had the potential to prove challenging 
for voters with certain types of disabilities. On the basis of our 
observations on Election Day 2000, we also estimated that most polling 
places in the contiguous United States had one or more physical 
features, such as a lack of accessible parking or barriers en route to 
the voting room, that had the potential to pose challenges for voters 
with disabilities.[Footnote 117] Results from our 2005 surveys show 
that at the time of the November 2004 general election, many states and 
local jurisdictions had taken steps to meet HAVA's requirement for 
accessible voting systems, as well as making other changes to help 
improve the accessibility of voting for individuals with disabilities. 

HAVA Requirements for Accessible Voting Systems: 

HAVA requires that, effective January 1, 2006, each voting system used 
in a federal election must meet certain accessibility requirements. 
These voting systems are required to provide individuals with 
disabilities with the same opportunity for access and participation 
(including independence and privacy) as for other voters. These HAVA 
requirements specify that such accessibility include nonvisual 
accessibility for voters who are blind or visually impaired. HAVA 
provides for the use of at least one DRE or other voting system 
equipped for voters with disabilities at each polling place. The 
results of our state survey show that as of August 1, 2005, 41 states 
and the District of Columbia reported having laws (or executive action) 
in place to provide each polling location with at least one DRE voting 
system or other voting system equipped for individuals with 
disabilities by January 1, 2006. Of the remaining 9 states, 5 reported 
having plans to promulgate laws or executive action to provide each 
polling location with at least one DRE voting system or other voting 
system equipped for individuals with disabilities, and 4 reported that 
they did not plan to provide such equipment or were uncertain about 
their plans.[Footnote 118] 

Some local election jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines 
at polling places for the November 2004 general election. On the basis 
of our survey of a representative sample of local election 
jurisdictions nationwide, we estimate that 29 percent of all 
jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at each polling place 
in the November 2004 general election.[Footnote 119] Further, more 
large and medium jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines than 
small jurisdictions. We estimate that 39 percent of large 
jurisdictions, 38 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 25 percent of 
small jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at each polling 
place. The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. Election officials 
from some small jurisdictions who provided written comments on our 
survey questionnaire expressed concerns about how this requirement 
would be implemented in their jurisdictions and whether electronic 
voting machines were the best alternative. For example, one respondent 
wrote: "We [live] in a small town … and use paper ballots and that has 
worked very well in the past and I believe will work very well in the 
future. Voting machines should be decided on for much larger areas with 
a lot more than our 367 population with 150 voters." Another wrote: "We 
are a small rural township with about 160 voters. Our 2004 election 
went well; as usual, we had no problems. We use paper ballots. We have 
some concerns with the implementation of HAVA. We are being forced to 
use expensive voting machines that will require expensive programming 
for every election. We are concerned about these costs.… If our limited 
budget can't afford those expensive machines and programming, we may 
need to combine our township polling place with another township--maybe 
several townships. The additional driving to a different polling place 
miles away will discourage voters from voting--particularly our elderly 
residents. So these efforts (HAVA) to help voters will actually hinder 
voters." 

In an effort to address these issues, Vermont, which has about 250 
small and medium election jurisdictions that use paper and optical scan 
ballots, took an alternative approach to meeting the HAVA requirement, 
according to an election official. Instead of providing one DRE machine 
for each of its 280 polling places, Vermont plans to implement a secure 
vote-by-phone system that allows voters to mark a paper ballot, in 
private, using a regular telephone at the polling place. According to 
the Vermont's Secretary of State's Office, a poll worker uses a 
designated phone at the polling place to call a computer system located 
at a secure location and access the appropriate ballot for the voter. 
The computer will only permit access to the system from phone numbers 
that have been entered into the system prior to the election, and only 
after the proper poll worker and ballot access numbers have been 
entered. The phone system reads the ballot to the voter, and after the 
voter makes selections using the telephone key pad, the system prints 
out a paper ballot that is automatically scanned by the system and 
played back to the voter for verification. The voter may then decide to 
cast the ballot or discard it and revote. The system does not use the 
Internet or other data network, and it produces a voter-verified paper 
ballot for every vote cast. In addition, according to an election 
official, voters are able to dial into a toll-free telephone number for 
at least 15 days prior to an election to listen to, preview, and 
practice with the actual ballot they will vote on Election Day. This is 
a way of providing a sample ballot to voters, as well as providing an 
opportunity for voters to become familiar with using the telephone 
system. 

Provisions for Polling Place Accessibility and Other Accommodations: 

For our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, our analysis 
included a review of state statutes, regulations, and written policies 
pertaining to voting accessibility for all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia, as well as policies and guidelines for a statistical 
sample of 100 counties.[Footnote 120] As part of our 2005 surveys, we 
asked states to report on provisions concerning accessibility and local 
jurisdictions whether they provided accommodations or alternative 
voting methods for individuals with disabilities in the November 2004 
general election. While the methodologies in the 2001 report and this 
report differ, results of our 2005 surveys show that states and local 
jurisdictions have taken actions to help improve voting for individuals 
with disabilities by, for example, using HAVA funds, taking steps to 
help ensure accessibility of polling places, and providing alternative 
voting methods or accommodations. 

Most states reported that they had spent or obligated HAVA funding to 
improve the accessibility of polling places, including providing 
physical or nonvisual access. The results of our state survey of 
election officials show that as of August 1, 2005, 46 states and the 
District of Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for 
this purpose. For instance, election officials in a local jurisdiction 
we visited in Colorado told us they had used HAVA funds to improve the 
accessibility of polling places by obtaining input from the disability 
community, surveying the accessibility of their polling places, and 
reviewing the DRE audio ballot with representatives of the blind 
community. 

States and local jurisdictions reported taking a variety of actions 
designed to help ensure that polling places are accessible for voters 
with disabilities, including specifying guidelines or requirements, 
inspecting polling places to assess accessibility, and reporting by 
local jurisdictions on polling place accessibility to the state. In our 
October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, we noted that state 
involvement in ensuring polling places are accessible and the amount of 
assistance provided to local jurisdictions could vary widely. For 
example, in 2001 we reported that 29 states had provisions requiring 
inspections of polling places, and 20 states had provisions requiring 
reporting by local jurisdictions.[Footnote 121] According to our 2005 
state survey, 43 states and the District of Columbia reported requiring 
or allowing inspections of polling places, and 39 states and the 
District of Columbia reported that they required or allowed reporting 
by local jurisdictions. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate 
that 83 percent of jurisdictions nationwide used state provisions to 
determine the accessibility requirements for polling places. During our 
site visits to local jurisdictions, we asked election officials to 
describe the steps they took to ensure that polling places were 
accessible. Election officials in many of the jurisdictions we visited 
told us that either local or state officials inspected each polling 
location in their jurisdiction using a checklist based on state or 
federal guidelines. For example, election officials in the 4 
jurisdictions we visited in Georgia and New Hampshire told us that 
state inspectors conducted a survey of all polling locations. Election 
officials in the 2 jurisdictions we visited in Florida told us that 
they inspected all polling places using a survey developed by the 
state. Appendix IX presents additional information about state 
provisions for alternative voting methods and accommodations for the 
November 2000 and 2004 general elections. 

In addition to making efforts to ensure that polling places are 
accessible, some local jurisdictions provided alternative voting 
methods pursuant to state provisions (such as absentee voting) or 
accommodations at polling places (such as audio or visual aids) that 
could facilitate voting for individuals with disabilities. Table 15 
presents results from our survey of local election jurisdictions about 
the estimated percentages of jurisdictions that provided alternative 
voting methods or accommodations to voters for the November 2004 
general election. 

Table 15: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Provided Alternative Voting Methods and 
Accommodations for the November 2004 General Election: 

Provision[A]: Early voting[ B]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 27; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 20; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 41; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 49[C]. 

Provision[A]: Absentee voting (no excuse or an allowable excuse); 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 86; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 84; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 91; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 89. 

Provision[A]: Permanent absentee voting (for instance, absentee voting 
status for a time period or number of elections)[B]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 58; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 52[D]; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 74; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 68. 

Provision[A]: Curbside voting; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 55; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 55[D]; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 54; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 60. 

Provision[A]: Audio or visual aids to assist voters with disabilities 
(magnifying lens)[E]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 42; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 38[D]; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 50; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 57[C]. 

Provision[A]: Braille ballots or voting methods; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 15; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 15; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 16; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 10. 

Provision[A]: Large-font ballots or instructions; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 13; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 11; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 19; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 21. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Some provisions, such as early voting, might not be provided by 
some jurisdictions because state provisions do not authorize them. Some 
provisions may not be applicable for the type of voting system a 
jurisdiction uses. 

[B] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[D] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[E] The difference between large and small jurisdictions is 
statistically significant. 

[End of table] 

HAVA Helped to Expand State and Local Jurisdictions' Voter Education 
Efforts: 

Election officials' efforts to educate citizens can help minimize 
problems that could affect citizens' ability to successfully vote on 
Election Day. Informing the public about key aspects of elections 
includes communicating how to register, what opportunities exist to 
vote prior to Election Day, where to vote on Election Day, and how to 
cast a ballot. This information can be distributed through a number of 
different media, including signs or posters, television, radio, 
publications, in-person demonstrations, and the Internet. In our 
October 2001 report on election processes, we stated that lack of funds 
was the primary challenge cited by election officials in expanding 
voter education efforts. From our 2001 survey of local election 
jurisdictions, we estimated that over a third of jurisdictions 
nationwide believed that the federal government should provide monetary 
assistance for voter education programs.[Footnote 122] Since the 
November 2000 election, changes in voter education efforts include HAVA 
requiring certain information to be posted at polling places and 
authorizing the payment of federal funds to states to use for educating 
voters, and states and local jurisdictions reported expansion of voter 
education efforts. 

HAVA Required Voter Information at Polling Places and Provided for 
Funding to States: 

To help improve voters' knowledge about voting rights and procedures, 
HAVA required election officials to post voting information at each 
polling place on the day of each election for federal office and 
authorized the payment of funding to states for such purposes. This 
required voting information includes a sample ballot, polling place 
hours, instructions on how to vote, first-time mail-in instructions, 
and general information on federal and state voting rights laws and 
laws prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation. Results of our state 
survey of election officials show that as of August 1, 2005, 40 states 
and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA 
funding for voting information, such as sample ballots and voter 
instructions, to be posted at polling places. Election officials in all 
28 jurisdictions we visited told us they posted a variety of voter 
information signs at polling places on Election Day 2004. Figure 28 
illustrates examples of some of these signs. 

Figure 28: Examples of Voter Information Signs Posted at Polling Places 
for the November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

HAVA also authorized the payment of funding for voter education 
programs in general, and according to our state survey, as of August 1, 
2005, 44 states and the District of Columbia reported spending or 
obligating HAVA funding for these programs. For example, according to 
its HAVA plan, Florida required local election officials to provide 
descriptions of proposed voter education efforts, such as using print, 
radio, or television to advertise to voters, in order to receive state 
HAVA funds in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Election officials in 2 
jurisdictions we visited in Florida provided us information about voter 
education campaigns that they implemented. Election officials in 1 of 
these jurisdictions reported designing election advertisements to be 
shown on movie theater screens in the beginning of the summer season; 
election officials in the other jurisdiction told us they implemented a 
"Get Out the Vote" television advertising campaign with a cable company 
intended to reach hundreds of thousands of households during the weeks 
prior to the November 2004 general election. 

Variety of Local Election Jurisdictions' Actions to Educate Prospective 
Voters: 

More local election jurisdictions appear to have taken steps to educate 
prospective voters prior to Election Day in 2004 than in 2000, and on 
the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, more large and 
medium jurisdictions took these steps than small jurisdictions. In our 
October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that local election 
jurisdictions provided a range of information to prospective voters 
through multiple media. For example, on the basis of our 2001 survey of 
local jurisdictions, we reported that between 18 and 20 percent of 
local jurisdictions nationwide indicated they placed public service ads 
on local media, performed community outreach programs, or put some 
voter information on the Internet. On the basis of our 2005 survey, we 
estimate that more jurisdictions provided these measures. For instance, 
we estimate that 49 percent of all jurisdictions placed public service 
ads on local media, and 43 percent of all jurisdictions listed polling 
places on the Internet. However, increases in the overall estimates 
from the 2001 and 2005 surveys are, in part, likely due to differences 
in the sample designs of the two surveys and how local election 
jurisdictions that were minor civil divisions (i.e., subcounty units of 
government) were selected. Because of these sample design differences, 
comparing only election jurisdictions that are counties provides a 
stronger basis for making direct comparisons between the two surveys' 
results.[Footnote 123] These county comparisons show increases as well. 
For instance, for the November 2000 election, we estimate that 21 
percent of county election jurisdictions placed public service ads on 
local media, while for the November 2004 election, we estimate that 61 
percent of county election jurisdictions placed such ads.[Footnote 124] 

In our 2005 survey, we also looked at whether there were differences 
between the size categories of jurisdictions, and generally, more large 
jurisdictions provided voter education prior to Election Day than 
medium and small jurisdictions. For instance, we estimate that 88 
percent of large jurisdictions, 46 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 
38 percent of small jurisdictions listed polling place locations on 
Internet Web sites. Table 16 presents estimated percentages of 
jurisdictions that provided various voter education steps prior to the 
November 2004 general election. 

Table 16: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Took Steps to Provide Voter Education Prior to 
the November 2004 General Election: 

Step: Provided sample ballots, either by mail or by printing in 
newspaper; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 87; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 86; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 91; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 86. 

Step: Placed polling place locations on Internet Web site[A]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 43; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 38[B]; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 46; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 88. 

Step: Placed public service ads on local media, such as TV, radio, or 
newspapers[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 49; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 43[B]; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 62; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 63. 

Step: Conducted outreach with local organizations, such as political 
parties or charitable or social groups[D]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 26; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 16; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 43; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 76. 

Step: Mailed vote-casting instructions on using the jurisdiction's 
voting system to registered voters[A]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 12; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 11; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 9; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 28. 

Step: Demonstrations of voting equipment (at county fairs, registrar's 
office, public events)[D]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 28; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 21; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 41; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 61. 

Step: Provided information to voters about their specific polling place 
location[E]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 83; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 82; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 83; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 92. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] The differences between large jurisdictions and both medium and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant: 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[C] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[D] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[E] The difference between large and small jurisdictions is 
statistically significant. 

[End of table] 

Large jurisdictions may have provided voter education through multiple 
media in order to reach a broader audience of prospective voters. For 
instance, Web sites were used to provide information to voters by 
nearly all large jurisdictions. On the basis of our 2005 survey of 
local jurisdictions, we estimate that 93 percent of large 
jurisdictions, 60 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 39 percent of 
small jurisdictions had a Web site. The differences between all size 
categories are statistically significant. During our site visits, 
election officials in large jurisdictions described a variety of voter 
education mechanisms used to reach a number of prospective voters. For 
example, election officials in a large Nevada jurisdiction we visited 
told us that their office partnered with power, water, and cable 
companies to provide voter registration information in subscribers' 
billing statements. Election officials in other jurisdictions we 
visited reported using a variety of other media to encourage 
participation or provide information to a broad audience of prospective 
voters. For example, figure 29 illustrates a billboard, cab-top sign, 
and milk carton used in local jurisdictions we visited. 

Figure 29: Efforts to Inform Voters Prior to the November 2004 General 
Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Some States Reported Changing Identification Requirements for All 
Prospective Voters: 

Whether or not all voters should be required to show identification 
prior to voting is an issue that has received attention in the media 
and reports since the November 2000 general election. Recent state 
initiatives, such as those in Georgia, that in general require voters 
to provide photo identification, exemplify the challenge that exists 
throughout the election process in maintaining balance between ensuring 
access to all prospective voters and ensuring that only eligible 
citizens are permitted to cast a ballot on Election Day. Results of our 
state and local jurisdiction surveys show that while providing 
identification could be one of several methods used to verify identity, 
it was not required by the majority of states, nor was it the only way 
used to verify voters' identities in the majority of local 
jurisdictions for the November 2004 election. Voter identification 
requirements vary in flexibility, in the number and type of acceptable 
identification allowed, and in the alternatives available for verifying 
identity if a voter does not have an acceptable form of identification. 

Results of our state survey of election officials show that for the 
November 2004 general election 28 states reported that they did not 
require all prospective voters to provide identification prior to 
voting in person.[Footnote 125] Twenty-one states reported that they 
required all voters to provide identification prior to voting on 
Election Day 2004. However, 14 of these states reported allowing 
prospective voters without the required identification an alternative. 
In 9 of these 14 states the alternative involved voting a regular 
ballot in conjunction with, for example, the voter providing some type 
of affirmation as to his or her identity. For example, Connecticut, in 
general, allowed voters who were unable to provide required 
identification to swear on a form provided by the Secretary of State's 
Office that they are the elector whose name appears on the official 
registration list. Kentucky allowed an election officer to confirm the 
identity of a prospective voter by personal acquaintance or by certain 
types of documents if the prospective voter did not have the required 
identification. The other 5 states reporting that they offered an 
alternative did so through the use of a provisional ballot if a 
prospective voter did not have the required identification. For the 
November 2004 election, 5 of the 21 states that reported having 
identification requirements also had statutory provisions requiring, in 
general, that such identification include a photograph of the 
prospective voter.[Footnote 126] For the other 16 states that reported 
requiring identification, there was a range of acceptable forms of 
identification, including photo identification, such as a driver's 
license, and other documentation, such as a copy of a government check 
or current utility bill with a voter's name and address. Figure 30 
presents information on the identification requirements for prospective 
voters for the November 2004 general election for all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia. 

Figure 30: States' Reported Identification Requirements for Prospective 
Voters for the November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions about how they 
checked voters' identities, such as by asking voters to state their 
name and address, verifying voters' signatures, or asking voters to 
provide a form of identification or documentation. On the basis of this 
survey, we estimate that 65 percent of all local jurisdictions checked 
voters' identification as one way to verify their identities on 
Election Day. However, in an estimated 9 percent of all jurisdictions, 
providing identification was the only way voters could verify their 
identities. 

Since the November 2004 general election, several states have reported 
that they have considered establishing identification requirements for 
all prospective voters, and some reported that they have implemented 
requirements. Results of our state survey show that at the time of our 
survey, 9 states reported having either considered legislation (or 
executive action) or legislation (or executive action) was pending to 
require voters to show identification prior to voting on Election 
Day.[Footnote 127] Four states, at the time of our survey, reported 
having taken action since November 2004 to require that voters show 
identification for in-person Election Day voting. For example, changes 
in Arizona law and procedure emanating from a November 2004 ballot 
initiative were finalized in 2005 after receiving approval from the 
Department of Justice. These Arizona changes require voters to present, 
prior to voting, one form of identification with the voter's name, 
address, and photo, or two different forms of identification that have 
the name and address of the voter. Indiana enacted legislation in 2005 
requiring, in general, that voters provide a federal-or state-of- 
Indiana-issued identification document with the voter's name and photo 
prior to voting, whereas 2005 legislation in New Mexico and Washington 
imposed identification requirements but allowed prospective voters to 
provide one of several forms of photo or nonphoto forms of 
identification. In all four states, if voters are not able to provide a 
required form of identification, they are allowed to cast a 
provisional, rather than a regular, ballot. Finally, a state that had 
identification requirements in place for the November 2004 general 
election may have taken additional actions to amend such requirements. 
Georgia, for instance, required voters in the November 2004 general 
election to provide 1 of 17 types of photo or nonphoto identification. 
In 2005 Georgia enacted legislation that, in general, amended and 
reduced the various forms of acceptable identification and made the 
presentation of a form of photo identification, such as a driver's 
license, a requirement to vote.[Footnote 128] 

Recruiting a Sufficient Number of Skilled, Reliable Poll Workers 
Continued to Be a Challenge for Large and Medium Jurisdictions: 

Having enough qualified poll workers to set up, open, and work at the 
polls on Election Day is a crucial step in ensuring that voters are 
able to successfully vote on Election Day. The number of poll workers 
needed varies across jurisdictions, and election officials recruit poll 
workers in a variety of ways using different sources and strategies. 
Some poll workers are elected, some are appointed by political parties, 
and some are volunteers. Election officials in jurisdictions we visited 
reported considering several different factors--such as state 
requirements, registered voters per precinct, historical turnout, or 
poll worker functions at polling places--to determine the total number 
of poll workers needed. On the basis of our survey of local 
jurisdictions, we estimate that recruiting enough poll workers for the 
November 2004 general election was not difficult for the majority of 
jurisdictions. However, large and medium jurisdictions encountered 
difficulties to a greater extent than small jurisdictions. To meet 
their need, election officials recruited poll workers from numerous 
sources, including in some cases, high schools and local government 
agencies, to help ensure that they were able to obtain enough poll 
workers for Election Day. Poll workers with specialized characteristics 
or skills were also difficult for some large and medium jurisdictions 
to find. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported 
that finding qualified poll workers could be complicated by having a 
limited pool of volunteers willing to work long hours for low pay. Poll 
worker reliability continued to be a challenge for some jurisdictions-
-especially large jurisdictions--that depend on poll workers to arrive 
at polling places on time on Election Day. 

Recruiting Enough Poll Workers Was Not Difficult for the Majority of 
Jurisdictions, but Many Large and Medium Jurisdictions Encountered 
Difficulties: 

We estimate that recruiting enough poll workers for the November 2004 
general election was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions, 
and may have been less of a challenge for the November 2004 election 
than it was for the November 2000 election. For example, on the basis 
of our 2001 survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 51 percent of 
county election jurisdictions found it somewhat or very difficult to 
find a sufficient number of poll workers for the November 2000 
election.[Footnote 129] In contrast, from our 2005 survey, we estimate 
that 36 percent of county election jurisdictions had difficulties 
obtaining enough poll workers for the November 2004 election. In our 
2005 survey, there are differences between size categories of election 
jurisdictions in the difficulties encountered obtaining a sufficient 
number of poll workers, with more large and medium jurisdictions 
encountering difficulties than small jurisdictions. As shown in figure 
31, we estimate that 47 percent of large jurisdictions, 32 percent of 
medium jurisdictions, and 14 percent of small jurisdictions found it 
difficult or very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of poll 
workers. 

Figure 31: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[B] The difference between small and medium jurisdictions is 
statistically significant. 

[C] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[D] Jurisdictions could indicate not applicable for a variety of 
reasons, including that poll workers are not recruited, but elected or 
appointed; 
that elections are conducted by mail ballot, and as a result there is 
not a need for poll workers to staff polling places on Election Day; 
or that the election officials themselves serve as poll workers. 

[E] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Election officials in large and medium jurisdictions, with typically 
more polling places to staff, are generally responsible for obtaining 
more poll workers than officials in small jurisdictions. For example, 
election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois told 
us that recruiting enough poll workers for Election Day was always a 
challenge and November 2004 was no different. They said that state law 
specifies a minimum of 5 poll workers per precinct, and there were 
2,709 precincts in their jurisdiction for the November 2004 general 
election, requiring at least 13,545 poll workers. In contrast, election 
officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire told us 
that they never had difficulties finding poll workers because they were 
able to use a pool of volunteers to staff the 9 poll worker positions 
at their one polling place. 

While election officials in 10 of the 27 large and medium jurisdictions 
we visited told us they had difficulties recruiting the needed number 
of poll workers, election officials in the other 17 jurisdictions did 
not report difficulties. These officials provided a variety of reasons 
why they did not encounter difficulties, including having a set number 
of appointed or elected poll workers for each precinct, having a 
general public interest in being involved in a presidential election, 
and using a variety of strategies and sources to recruit poll workers. 
For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in New Mexico 
told us that their lack of problems with recruitment was due to the 
fact that they had a full-time poll worker coordinator who began the 
search for poll workers very early and, as a result, was able to fill 
all of the positions needed (about 2,400) for the November 2004 
election. Election officials in other large jurisdictions reported that 
they were able to obtain enough poll workers by relying on multiple 
sources. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in 
Kansas told us that they made an exhaustive effort to recruit about 
1,800 poll workers for the November 2004 general election that included 
soliciting from an existing list of poll workers, working with 
organizations, using a high school student program to obtain about 300 
student poll workers, recruiting from a community college, using county 
employees, and coordinating with the political parties. On our 
nationwide survey we asked local jurisdictions about the sources they 
used to recruit poll workers for the November 2004 general election, 
and table 17 presents estimates from this survey on a variety of 
sources that jurisdictions used. 

Table 17: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Used Sources to Recruit Poll Workers for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

Source: Lists or rosters of poll workers from past elections[A]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 89; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 86; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 96; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 98. 

Source: Referrals from poll workers[A]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 62; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 48[B]; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 92; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 97. 

Source: Political parties[A]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 48; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 36[B]; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 72; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 82. 

Source: High schools[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 21; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 13; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 36; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 59[D]. 

Source: Colleges[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 11; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 4; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 18; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 64[D]. 

Source: Public announcements or information posted on jurisdiction's 
Web site[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 18; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 9; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 31; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 77. 

Source: City/county government offices[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 18; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 12; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 25; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 65[D]. 

Source: Local school districts[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 10; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 5; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 17; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 43[D]. 

Source: Civic, cultural, or religious organizations[C]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 10; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 3; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 21; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 63[D]. 

Source: Private firms[E]; 
Percentage of all jurisdictions: 2; 
Percentage of small jurisdictions (<10,000): 0; 
Percentage of medium jurisdictions (10,000 to 100,000): 2; 
Percentage of large jurisdictions (>100,000): 24[F]. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[C] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[D] The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[E] The differences between large jurisdictions and both medium and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[F] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +8 and - 
7 percentage points. 

[End of table] 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we identified several 
recruiting strategies that election officials reported helped in their 
efforts to obtain enough poll workers.[Footnote 130] On the basis of 
our local jurisdictions survey, student poll workers and county or city 
employees were used as sources for poll workers by many medium and 
large jurisdictions in the November 2004 general election, as shown in 
table 17. These two sources were also cited as having worked well by 
election officials in several of the jurisdictions we visited. For 
example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado told us that 
their high school student poll worker programs helped them to obtain a 
sufficient number of skilled poll workers and reported that 200 of 
their about 600 poll workers were high school students. Election 
officials in other jurisdictions we visited reported that high school 
students often helped them in obtaining enough poll workers with 
specialized skills or characteristics, such as needed language skills. 
According to our state survey, 38 states and the District of Columbia 
reported allowing poll workers to be under the age of 18. 

Local government offices were another source of poll workers for the 
November 2004 general election. As shown in table 17, we estimate that 
65 percent of large jurisdictions, 25 percent of medium jurisdictions, 
and 12 percent of small jurisdictions recruited poll workers from city 
or county government offices. For example, election officials in a 
large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that the chief poll worker at most 
of the jurisdiction's 329 polling places is a county employee, and 
described benefits of recruiting local government employees as poll 
workers, including their experience in dealing with the public. 

According to Our Nationwide Survey, Poll Workers with Specialized 
Skills Were Difficult to Find for Some Jurisdictions: 

The specific skills and requirements needed for poll workers varies by 
jurisdiction, and in some cases by precinct, but can include political 
party affiliation, specific technical or computer skills, or 
proficiency in languages other than English. On the basis of our survey 
of local jurisdictions, we estimate that most jurisdictions nationwide 
did not encounter difficulties recruiting poll workers with these 
specific skills and requirements. However, the results show that the 
ease of obtaining poll workers with these skills varied by the size of 
the election jurisdiction, with large and medium jurisdictions 
generally experiencing more difficulties than small jurisdictions. 

Some states require political balance between poll workers at polling 
places. For example, New York election law, which requires that each 
election district must be staffed with four election inspectors (i.e., 
chief poll workers) and a variable number of poll workers (depending 
upon specified conditions), requires that appointments to such 
positions for each election district be equally divided between the 
major political parties. Election officials in some jurisdictions we 
visited told us that even though not required, they tried to maintain a 
balance in poll workers' political party affiliation. Recruiting enough 
poll workers with specific political party affiliations continued to be 
a challenge for some, in particular large and medium jurisdictions. 
From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 49 percent of 
large jurisdictions, 41 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 22 percent 
of small jurisdictions had difficulties recruiting enough Democratic or 
Republican poll workers, as shown in figure 32. 

Figure 32: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Enough Poll 
Workers with Specific Political Party Affiliation for the November 2004 
General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[B] The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. 

[C] Not all local jurisdictions are required to obtain poll workers 
with specific party affiliations. 

[D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Election officials in 11 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported 
experiencing some difficulties finding enough poll workers with needed 
party affiliations. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction 
in Connecticut told us that because their jurisdiction was 
predominantly one political party it was difficult to find minority 
party poll workers. Election officials in these 11 jurisdictions told 
us that they recruited independents, unaffiliated persons, or student 
poll workers to fill minority party poll worker positions. 

Recruiting poll workers with necessary information technology skills or 
computer literacy was also a challenge for some large and medium 
jurisdictions, according to our survey of local jurisdictions. We 
estimate that 34 percent of large jurisdictions and 28 percent of 
medium jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to obtain 
poll workers with these skills, whereas, we estimate that 5 percent of 
small jurisdictions had difficulties, as shown in figure 33. 

Figure 33: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Poll Workers 
with Information Technology Skills or Computer Literacy for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[B] The difference between small and large jurisdictions is 
statistically significant. 

[C] Jurisdictions may not need to recruit poll workers with technical 
or computer skills because they, among other reasons, use paper or 
mechanical voting systems, use paper poll books, or specifically train 
poll workers for any skills needed in these areas. 

[D] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Election officials in 23 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us 
that computer or technically skilled poll workers were not needed in 
their jurisdictions for the November 2004 general election. However, 
election officials in some of these jurisdictions reported that they 
foresaw a need for poll workers with these skills with the 
implementation of electronic poll books or new voting technology. Among 
the reasons cited for not needing technically skilled poll workers were 
the use of paper ballots or lever machines, the ease of use of DRE 
voting equipment, and that any needed skills were taught. In addition, 
election officials in many jurisdictions we visited told us that they 
recruited and trained technicians or troubleshooters to maintain, 
repair, and in some cases set up voting equipment prior to Election 
Day. 

Some jurisdictions may be required under the language minority 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act to, in general, provide voting 
assistance and materials in specified minority languages in addition to 
English. We asked on our survey of local jurisdictions whether 
jurisdictions encountered difficulties recruiting poll workers who were 
fluent in the languages covered under the Voting Rights Act for their 
jurisdiction and estimate that for the majority (61 percent) of all 
jurisdictions, this requirement was not applicable. We estimate that 15 
percent of all jurisdictions indicated that recruiting poll workers 
fluent in languages other than English was difficult or very 
difficult.[Footnote 131] Jurisdictions of all size categories may 
encounter difficulties recruiting poll workers with needed language 
skills for different reasons. For instance, small jurisdictions may 
find it difficult to recruit enough poll workers fluent in other 
languages because of a limited pool of potential recruits, whereas 
large jurisdictions may be required to provide voters with assistance 
in multiple languages other than English. Los Angeles County, for 
example, was required to provide voters assistance in six languages 
other than English for the November 2004 election. Election officials 
in some of the large jurisdictions we visited reported encountering 
difficulties obtaining poll workers with needed language skills, but 
these officials also told us about their efforts to recruit poll 
workers with language skills. For example, election officials in a 
large jurisdiction in Illinois reported that they recently established 
an outreach department to assist in the recruitment of poll workers 
with specialized language skills. The jurisdiction has hired outreach 
coordinators for the Hispanic, Polish, and Chinese communities to 
assist with recruiting. Figure 34 illustrates materials used by 
election officials in some jurisdictions we visited to recruit poll 
workers with a variety of skills for the November 2004 general 
election. 

Figure 34: Materials Used to Recruit Poll Workers in Jurisdictions We 
Visited: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Described Factors 
That Affected Recruiting Poll Workers: 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we identified long 
hours, low pay, and an aging volunteer workforce as factors that 
complicated election officials' efforts to recruit enough poll 
workers.[Footnote 132] Election officials in some, but not all, of the 
jurisdictions we visited in 2005 told us that one or more of these 
factors complicated their efforts to find enough quality poll workers 
for the November 2004 general election. For example, election officials 
in a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that it was difficult to find 
people who wanted to work, considering that most families are two- 
income households and Election Day is a long--14 hours--grueling day. 
Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Washington told us that 
they never have enough poll workers, noting that the pay is minimal, 
the hours are long, and the majority of the poll worker population is 
elderly. Election officials in several of these jurisdictions we 
visited reported concerns about finding poll workers in light of a 
limited pool of volunteers. For example, election officials in a large 
jurisdiction in Colorado told us the average age of poll workers was 
over 70 years old and expressed concerns about obtaining poll workers 
who could physically work a 12-hour day. Alternatively, election 
officials in a large jurisdiction in Florida told us that the younger 
generation does not have the same commitment to civic duty that the 
older poll worker generation had and recruiting enough qualified poll 
workers may be a challenge in the future. These officials noted that 
about three-quarters of their poll workers are return participants. An 
election official in a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, where the 
median age of poll workers is about 75 years old, suggested that 
serving as a poll worker should be treated similarly as serving on jury 
duty--it should be everyone's civic duty to serve as a poll worker. 

Poll Worker Reliability Continued to Be a Challenge, Especially in 
Large Jurisdictions: 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that poll 
worker reliability was a challenge for election officials, who depended 
on poll workers to arrive on time, open, and set up polling 
places.[Footnote 133] Poll worker absenteeism was a challenge for large 
and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions in the November 2004 general 
election. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, 
we estimate that 61 percent of large jurisdictions, 20 percent of 
medium jurisdictions, and 2 percent of small jurisdictions encountered 
problems with poll workers failing to show up on Election Day. The 
differences between all size categories are statistically significant. 
One way that election officials in several large jurisdictions we 
visited minimized the impact of poll worker absenteeism was to recruit 
backup poll workers to ensure that polling places were set up and 
adequately staffed, even if some poll workers failed to show up. For 
example, election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in 
Illinois reported that approximately 1 to 2 percent of about 13,000 
poll workers did not show up on Election Day. However, these officials 
reported that they had recruited stand-by judges who were to report to 
the elections office on Election Day in case an already scheduled judge 
did not show up. Election officials in a few other jurisdictions we 
visited told us that they called poll workers before Election Day to 
help ensure they showed up. For instance, election officials in a large 
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania told us that they called all of the chief 
poll workers--about 1,300 people--during the week prior to the 
election. Election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in 
Connecticut went a step further, reporting that in addition to placing 
wake-up calls to all of the chief poll workers, they offered rides to 
poll workers to help ensure they showed up on time. 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported on 
Challenges Training Poll Workers: 

Voters' experiences on Election Day are largely informed by their 
interactions with poll workers, who are responsible for conducting many 
Election Day activities, such as setting up polling places, checking in 
voters and verifying their eligibility to vote, providing assistance to 
voters, and closing the polling places. Although these workers are 
usually employed only for 1 day, the success of election administration 
partly depends on their ability to perform their jobs well. Depending 
on the applicable state requirements and the size of the jurisdiction, 
the steps that election officials take to adequately prepare all of 
their poll workers can vary, but may include training, testing, or 
certification. Ensuring that poll workers were adequately trained for 
Election Day was a challenge reported by some election officials in 
large and medium jurisdictions we visited, but these officials also 
reported a variety of steps they took to help prepare poll workers for 
Election Day. 

State Requirements for Training Poll Workers Varied: 

Most states and the District of Columbia reported having training 
requirements for poll workers for the November 2004 general election, 
but the frequency and content of training varied. Some states also 
reported providing guidance related to the training of poll workers. 
According to our state survey, for the November 2004 general election, 
18 states reported having had poll worker training requirements and 
providing guidance; 20 states and the District of Columbia reported 
having had training requirements; 9 states reported providing guidance; 
1 state reported that it did not require training nor provide guidance; 
and Oregon, which conducted all-mail voting on Election Day 2004, 
indicated this requirement was not applicable.[Footnote 134] Figure 35 
shows reported state requirements for training for the chief poll 
worker at a precinct or polling place and for poll workers. 

Figure 35: Reported State Requirements for Poll Worker Training for the 
November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Includes the District of Columbia. 

[B] The total does not add to 50 because 2 states indicated that this 
requirement was not applicable--1 of which was Oregon, which conducted 
all-mail voting on Election Day 2004. 

[C] The total does not add to 50 because 1 state did not respond to 
this question on our survey and Oregon indicated this requirement was 
not applicable. 

[End of figure] 

About half of the states with training requirements reported requiring 
that poll workers be trained prior to every election or every general 
election. According to our survey, of the 38 states and the District of 
Columbia that reported having training requirements for poll workers, 
22 states and the District of Columbia reported requiring poll workers 
to be trained prior to every election or every general election. For 
example, Florida provisions in place for the November 2004 general 
election required that poll workers have a minimum of 3 hours of 
training prior to each election and demonstrate a working knowledge of 
the laws and procedures relating to voter registration, voting system 
operation, balloting, and polling place procedures, and problem-solving 
and conflict resolution skills. These Florida provisions also require, 
among other things, that local election officials are to contract with 
a "recognized disability-related organization" to develop and assist 
with training for disability sensitivity programs, which must include 
actual demonstrations of obstacles confronted by persons with 
disabilities during the voting process, including obtaining access to 
the polling place and using the voting system. Ten states reported 
requiring that poll workers be trained on a scheduled basis (e.g., 
yearly or every 2 years). For example, under provisions in place for 
the November 2004 general election, New Jersey required that all 
district board members attend training sessions for each election at 
least once every 2 years. The other 6 states reported that training was 
required at least once, but not prior to every general election; 
that the frequency of training was not specified; 
or that they did not know. 

For the November 2004 general election, fewer states reported requiring 
testing or certification than training for poll workers. According to 
our state survey, 12 states reported having requirements for testing or 
certification for poll workers, and 16 states reported having these 
requirements for the chief poll worker at a precinct or polling place. 
Election officials in 6 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported 
that poll workers were certified or tested after training. Election 
officials in 6 other jurisdictions told us that they used informal 
tests or quizzes or informally monitored poll workers performance in 
training. For instance, election officials in a jurisdiction in Kansas 
told us that they gave poll workers a nongraded quiz at the end of 
training. In Nevada, where state election officials indicated in our 
state survey that there are no requirements for poll worker training or 
testing, election officials in the 2 jurisdictions we visited told us 
that they required poll workers to attend training. Election officials 
in 1 of these jurisdictions required all poll workers to attend a 
training class each year and to pass a hands-on performance test in 
which they demonstrate their ability to perform their assigned 
function, such as checking in voters or programming the DRE voting 
equipment. 

Election Officials Reported on Training Conducted and Challenges 
Encountered: 

Training provided to poll workers varies greatly among local election 
jurisdictions. Therefore, we asked questions about training challenges 
as part of our site visits only where we were able to gain an 
understanding of the types of training and specific conditions faced by 
local jurisdictions. Election officials in a small jurisdiction we 
visited in New Hampshire reported that they did not conduct training 
for the November 2004 general election because poll workers only 
receive training if they have not previously worked in the polling 
place, and all nine poll workers had worked in the polling place 
before. Election officials in the 27 other jurisdictions we visited 
described the training that they provided poll workers for the November 
2004 general election. According to these officials, poll worker 
training generally occurred in the weeks or month before the election 
and ranged from 1 hour to 2 days, depending on the type of poll worker 
being trained. Election officials in most of these jurisdictions 
reported that training was mandatory. However, the frequency varied, 
with election officials in the majority of jurisdictions reporting that 
they required training prior to every election. Election officials in a 
few jurisdictions reported that poll workers received training at least 
once or on a scheduled basis, such as once every 2 years. Election 
officials in many jurisdictions told us that poll workers were paid to 
attend training, and payments could range from $5 to $50. 

While election officials in nearly all of these jurisdictions reported 
that training was conducted by these officials and their staffs, the 
manner in which the training was conducted varied. For example, 
election officials in a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that poll 
workers were trained in a workshop fashion in which 15 to 20 poll 
workers were provided hands-on training for their specific function, 
such as operating voting machines or processing voters. In a large 
jurisdiction in Kansas, election officials told us that they conduct 
the training for between 70 and 100 poll workers using a formal 
presentation as well as the documents poll workers use on Election Day 
and the voting equipment. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in 
Washington told us that poll worker training consisted of a PowerPoint 
presentation conducted in a train-the-trainer style where election 
officials trained the chief poll workers, who then trained the poll 
workers. 

Election officials in 9 of the 27 large and medium jurisdictions we 
visited reported encountering some challenges with training poll 
workers, but generally reported that they overcame them. Some of the 
challenges reported by these officials included keeping poll workers 
informed about new or changing requirements, conveying a vast amount of 
information about election processes to a large number of people in a 
limited time, and ensuring that poll workers understand their tasks and 
responsibilities. For instance, election officials in a large 
jurisdiction in Ohio told us that it was challenging keeping up with 
state changes and incorporating such changes into poll worker training. 
Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Connecticut told us that 
effectively training poll workers on a variety of new changes (such as 
those required by HAVA) could be challenging because the procedures can 
be difficult to understand, especially for tenured poll workers who 
have been working at the polls for many years. Election officials in a 
large jurisdiction in Kansas noted that addressing the need to have a 
systematic way to evaluate poll worker performance at polling places 
was a challenge. These officials said that they currently rely on the 
fact that the poll worker showed up, general observations of the poll 
workers' performance, and feedback cards completed by voters exiting 
the polls. Election officials in the jurisdictions we visited reported 
taking steps to address these challenges, such as providing poll 
workers training manuals or booklets for reference on Election Day, 
training poll workers to perform one function, and conducting training 
in a workshop fashion with smaller class sizes. 

Poll Worker Performance Problems in Some Large and Medium 
Jurisdictions: 

Election officials and poll workers perform many tasks throughout the 
day to ensure that elections run smoothly and that voters move 
efficiently through the polling place. These activities can include 
checking in voters, providing instructions for voting machine 
operation, or assisting voters at the polls. We asked on our survey of 
local jurisdictions whether for the November 2004 general election 
jurisdictions encountered poll workers failing to follow procedures for 
a variety of activities, including, among others, procedures for voter 
identification requirements, providing correct instructions to voters, 
and voting machine operation. Overall, according to this survey, most 
local election jurisdictions nationwide did not encounter problems with 
poll worker performance. For example, we estimate that: 

* 90 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers 
failing to follow procedures related to voter identification 
requirements, 

* 92 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers 
failing to provide correct instructions to voters, and: 

* 94 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers 
failing to follow procedures for voting machine operation. 

However, we estimate that poll worker performance problems encountered 
varied by size category of jurisdiction, with more large jurisdictions 
encountering problems than medium and small jurisdictions. For example, 
we estimate that 37 percent of large jurisdictions, 19 percent of 
medium jurisdictions, and 3 percent of small jurisdictions encountered 
problems with poll workers failing to follow procedures related to 
voter identification requirements. In terms of providing correct 
instructions to voters, we estimate that 31 percent of large 
jurisdictions, 12 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of 
small jurisdictions encountered problems with poll worker performance 
in this area. For both results, the differences between all size 
categories are statistically significant. 

Large jurisdictions could have encountered problems for a variety of 
reasons, including having more poll workers to train and oversee or 
having fewer options for recruiting skilled poll workers. While 
jurisdictions may have reported on our survey that they encountered 
problems with a particular aspect of poll workers' performance, written 
comments provided on the questionnaire indicated that these problems 
may not have been widespread or may have been easily remedied after 
they occurred. For example, one survey respondent wrote: "Errors were 
few and far between, but with 4,500 poll workers, it is very difficult 
to answer that [our jurisdiction did not encounter any problems with 
poll workers' performance.]" Election officials in 12 of the 28 
jurisdictions we visited reported that they encountered some problems 
with poll workers' performance, but that generally the majority of poll 
workers performed well. For example, an election official in a large 
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania we visited told us that while the 
jurisdiction did not encounter serious problems with performance, in 
the official's opinion, it would be disingenuous to report that there 
were no problems with the 6,500 poll workers working the polls on 
Election Day. 

Most Jurisdictions Provided Guidance at Polling Places to Help Poll 
Workers: 

In an effort to minimize poll worker confusion or performance problems, 
many jurisdictions provided written guidelines or instructions for poll 
workers to use at the polling place. On our nationwide survey we asked 
local jurisdictions whether or not for the November 2004 general 
election they had written guidelines or instructions at the polling 
place for poll workers covering a variety of topics, such as voting 
equipment operation; 
procedures related to verifying voters' eligibility to vote; 
and assisting voters with special needs, such as voters with 
disabilities or who spoke a language other than English. We estimate 
that 94 percent of all jurisdictions had at least one set of written 
guidelines at polling places for poll workers. Further, more large and 
medium jurisdictions provided instructions to poll workers than small 
jurisdictions. For example, we estimate that 99 percent of large 
jurisdictions, 96 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 80 percent of 
small jurisdictions provided written instructions for poll workers to 
use at polling places if a voter's name was not on the poll list. In 
addition, we estimate that 96 percent of large jurisdictions, 92 
percent of medium jurisdictions, and 71 percent of small jurisdictions 
provided written guidelines to use at the polls for identification 
requirements for first-time voters who registered by mail and did not 
provide identification with their registration. For both of these 
results, small jurisdictions are statistically different from both 
medium and large jurisdictions. 

During our site visits, election officials in 26 of the 28 
jurisdictions we visited reported that they provided written 
instructions or checklists for poll workers to have at polling places. 
Election officials in the 2 smallest population size jurisdictions we 
visited reported that they did not provide written instructions for 
poll workers. As the officials in a small jurisdiction in New Hampshire 
said, they are at the polling place to resolve issues personally as 
they arise. Figure 36 illustrates examples of some checklists that 
election officials in jurisdictions we visited provided to us. 

Figure 36: Examples of Instructions and Checklists Provided to Poll 
Workers for the November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Written instructions and checklists may help poll workers, but problems 
on Election Day can still be encountered with some issues, in 
particular issues related to voter registration. We asked on our survey 
of local jurisdictions whether for the November 2004 general election 
jurisdictions maintained a written record to keep track of issues or 
problems that occurred on Election Day. We estimate that 55 percent of 
all jurisdictions nationwide maintained a written record to keep track 
of issues. Of those that did maintain a record and provided written 
comments on our survey, the issues most frequently cited by election 
officials were problems with voter registration (e.g., not being 
registered, being registered at another polling location, or being in 
the wrong polling location). 

Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Met Standards Continued to Be a 
Challenge for Some Jurisdictions: 

Election officials are responsible for selecting and securing a 
sufficient number of polling places that meet basic requirements and 
standards. Polling place locations vary across jurisdictions but can 
include public and private facilities, such as schools, government 
buildings, fire departments, community centers, libraries, churches, 
and residential facilities. To meet the needs of the voting population, 
polling places should be easily accessible to all voters, including 
voters with disabilities. Polling places also need to have a basic 
infrastructure, including electricity, heating and cooling units, and 
communication lines, to support some voting machines and be comfortable 
for voters and poll workers. In our October 2001 report on election 
processes, we stated that obtaining polling places for the November 
2000 election was not a major challenge for most 
jurisdictions.[Footnote 135] On the basis of our 2005 survey of local 
jurisdictions, obtaining a sufficient number of polling places was not 
difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. However, finding polling 
places that met these standards was generally more difficult for large 
and medium jurisdictions than for small jurisdictions. Election 
officials in many jurisdictions reported combining precincts in one 
polling place, with minimal challenges, for the November 2004 general 
election. 

Finding a Sufficient Number of Polling Places Was Difficult for Some, 
but Not Most, Jurisdictions: 

For the November 2004 election, obtaining a sufficient number of 
polling places was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. On 
the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 3 
percent of all jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to 
obtain a sufficient number of polling places for the November 2004 
general election. However, the difficulty encountered in finding enough 
polling places varied by the size category of jurisdiction. We estimate 
that 14 percent of large jurisdictions, 8 percent of medium 
jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties 
obtaining enough polling places, as presented in figure 37. 

Figure 37: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient 
Number of Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[B] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[C] All size categories are statistically different from each other. 

[D] Jurisdictions may indicate not applicable if they do not use 
polling places on Election Day because of all mail balloting, or 
because only one polling location is used on Election Day. 

[End of figure] 

Small jurisdictions may not experience difficulties obtaining polling 
places for a variety of reasons, among them because they do not have to 
find as many locations to support an election as large jurisdictions 
do. For example, election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited 
in New Hampshire told us that because of the small voting population 
(about 1,200), they only needed to use one polling place--the town 
hall--for the November 2004 general election, as shown in figure 38. 

Figure 38: Town Hall in Madbury, New Hampshire: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In contrast, large jurisdictions could be responsible for selecting 
hundreds of polling places for Election Day. Election officials from a 
large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois reported that they used over 
1,800 polling places for the November 2004 election and hired staff to 
find polling places that met standards for their jurisdiction. Although 
election officials in some large and medium jurisdictions told us that 
they needed to find numerous polling places, officials in only 1 large 
jurisdiction we visited in Kansas told us that they encountered 
difficulties finding suitable polling places, in part because of low 
payments provided to use polling place facilities. Election officials 
in this jurisdiction reported that in 2003 they implemented a campaign 
to "recruit" polling places and sent letters to schools and other 
possible locations in addition to conducting site visits and 
inspections. These election officials reported that after their 
efforts, they added about 70 polling places for use on Election Day 
2004. 

Finding Accessible Polling Places and Polling Places with Parking and 
Phone Lines Was Difficult for Some Jurisdictions: 

Selecting accessible polling places includes assessing parking areas, 
routes of travel, exterior walkways, and entrances, as well as interior 
voting areas. In our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, 
we identified a variety of challenges faced by election officials in 
improving the accessibility of voting--including the limited 
availability of accessible buildings and the lack of authority to 
modify buildings to make them more accessible.[Footnote 136] Finding 
accessible polling places continued to be a challenge for some 
jurisdictions for the November 2004 general election. On the basis of 
our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 36 percent of large 
jurisdictions, 25 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 5 percent of 
small jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to find enough 
accessible polling places, as shown in figure 39. 

Figure 39: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 
Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining Enough 
Polling Places That Were Accessible to Voters with Disabilities for 
November 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[B] All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

[C] Jurisdictions may indicate not applicable if they do not use 
polling places on Election Day because of all mail balloting, or 
because only one polling location is used on Election Day. 

[End of figure] 

Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that they 
encountered challenges finding accessible polling places. For example, 
election officials in 2 large jurisdictions we visited reported that it 
was challenging to find polling places that were accessible because 
many of the public buildings in their jurisdiction were older 
facilities and were not compliant with the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA). However, election officials reported taking steps to help 
ensure that polling places were accessible. For example, election 
officials in a large jurisdiction in Georgia reported that they hired a 
private company to conduct surveys of the polling locations and 
determine whether they were accessible and what, if any, changes needed 
to be made to make the facilities compliant. Some election officials 
described making minor or temporary modifications to polling places to 
ensure that they were accessible, for example, by adding ramps, using 
doorstops for heavier doors, or clearly identifying accessible 
entrances. 

In addition to being accessible for all voters, polling places should 
have sufficient parking for voters and phone lines to provide for 
communication on Election Day. From our local jurisdiction survey, more 
large and medium jurisdictions encountered difficulties in finding 
polling places with these characteristics than small jurisdictions. On 
the basis of this survey, we estimate that 38 percent of large 
jurisdictions, 18 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 4 percent of 
small jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining polling places with 
adequate parking. The differences between all size categories are 
statistically significant. In terms of finding polling places with 
adequate phone lines, we estimate that 35 percent of large 
jurisdictions, 33 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 9 percent of 
small jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining polling places with 
adequate phone lines. Providing cell phones to poll workers was one way 
for some jurisdictions to help ensure communication between polling 
places and the election office on Election Day. Also on the basis of 
our survey, we estimate that cell phones provided by the jurisdiction 
were the primary means of communication for 29 percent (plus or minus 9 
percent) of large jurisdictions, 15 percent (+9 percent, -6 percent) of 
medium jurisdictions, and 3 percent of small jurisdictions.[Footnote 
137] For both of these results, the differences between both large and 
medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 
significant. Election officials in some large jurisdictions we visited 
included cell phones as part of the supplies provided to each polling 
place. For example, officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in 
Nevada told us they paid poll workers $5 to use their own cell phones. 

Combining Precincts at a Polling Location Continues to Be a Strategy to 
Address Challenges with Obtaining Polling Places: 

We identified several strategies in our October 2001 report on election 
processes that election officials said helped in their efforts to 
obtain enough polling places, including locating more than one precinct 
at a single polling place.[Footnote 138] Results of our 2005 state and 
local surveys and site visits show that combining precincts at a 
polling location continued to be a strategy used by local 
jurisdictions, predominantly large and medium jurisdictions, to find 
adequate polling locations for voters in all precincts. According to 
our state survey, nearly all states (47) reported that they allowed 
precincts to be colocated in a polling place for the November 2004 
general election.Ten states reported allowing colocation only under 
specified conditions, for instance, if no suitable polling place 
existed for a precinct, and 37 states reported allowing colocation but 
did not specify conditions. On the basis of our survey of local 
jurisdictions, we estimate 33 percent of all jurisdictions had multiple 
precincts located in the same polling place. However, more large and 
medium jurisdictions combined precincts than small jurisdictions. We 
estimate that 78 percent of large jurisdictions, 63 percent of medium 
jurisdictions, and 19 percent of small jurisdictions had multiple 
precincts located in the same polling location. The differences between 
all size categories are statistically significant. During our site 
visits, election officials in 22 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited 
told us that they combined precincts in the same polling location for 
the November 2004 general election. Included in the 6 jurisdictions 
that did not report combining precincts in a single polling place were 
the 1 small and 2 medium jurisdictions we visited. Further, in many of 
the large jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that 
most of their polling places had more than one precinct. For example, 
election officials in a large jurisdiction in Ohio told us that there 
was an average of three precincts per polling location, but that there 
could be up to nine precincts in one polling place. 

Although combining precincts may help solve the issue of obtaining a 
sufficient number of voting places that meet requirements, other 
challenges may surface, including voter confusion in not finding the 
correct precinct at a location, poll worker confusion about eligibility 
if a voter is not in the correct precinct poll book at a polling place, 
and the possibility of voters voting on the wrong voting machine for 
their precinct. However, on the basis of our local survey, few 
challenges were encountered in polling places where precincts were 
combined for the November 2004 general election. We estimate that of 
the 33 percent of jurisdictions with multiple precincts at a polling 
location, 85 percent (+6 percent, -5 percent) did not experience 
challenges in terms of voters locating their correct precinct.[Footnote 
139] Election officials in jurisdictions we visited described steps 
they took to help ensure that voters were able to easily find their 
correct precinct, including posting signage to direct voters to the 
correct precinct, using specially designated poll workers as greeters 
to direct voters as they entered the polling location, setting up 
separate tables or voting areas for each precinct, and locating the 
precincts in distinct areas of the building, for example, in the gym 
and cafeteria of a school building. 

Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited told us that they 
consolidated functions, such as the check-in table or voting equipment, 
for precincts located in the same polling location in order to avoid 
voter confusion or problems with voting. For example, election 
officials in a jurisdiction in Kansas reported that they used one 
registration table with a consolidated poll book for all precincts at a 
polling location. As a result, voters only needed to locate one table. 
Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada reported that once 
voters checked in, they were able to vote on any voting machine in the 
polling location because the machines were programmed with ballots from 
each of the precincts located at the polling place, and poll workers 
activated the particular ballot style for a particular voter. 

Beyond consolidating some functions at a polling place, in 2004 
Colorado authorized the use of "vote centers," which are polling places 
at which any registered voter in the local election jurisdiction may 
vote, regardless of the precinct in which the voter resides. Each vote 
center is to use a secure electronic connection to a computerized 
registration list maintained by the local election office to allow all 
voting information processed at any vote center to be immediately 
accessible to computers at all other vote centers in the jurisdiction. 
Larimer County, with 143 precincts and about 200,000 registered voters, 
reported using 31 vote centers for the November 2004 general election. 
Election officials in Larimer County described several benefits of vote 
centers, including voter convenience; cost-effectiveness; minimal voter 
wait time on Election Day; and overall easier management, including 
requiring fewer poll workers. Election officials told us that voters 
liked the convenience of being able to vote anywhere in the 
jurisdiction, regardless of the precinct they live in. Vote centers can 
also be cost-effective, according to election officials, for 
jurisdictions faced with replacing voting equipment to comply with HAVA 
accessibility requirements for voting systems used in federal 
elections. Using vote centers also reduces the number of polling places 
a jurisdiction needs, which can be cost-effective with respect to 
finding enough accessible polling places. Election officials also told 
us that on Election Day they were able to avoid having long lines at 
most vote centers by issuing media announcements to voters throughout 
the day specifying which vote centers were busy and which were not, and 
by using their electronic poll book technology to process voters 
quickly and to monitor ballots and supplies. Officials told us that on 
average there was a 15-minute wait time for voters. Finally, officials 
told us that from the perspective of election officials, vote centers 
facilitated aspects of election administration because there were fewer 
locations (about 30 instead of about 140) and fewer poll workers 
overall to recruit and train. 

While other jurisdictions in Colorado have used vote centers since the 
November 2004 election or are planning to pilot vote centers in 
elections in 2006, election officials in a second jurisdiction we 
visited in Colorado explained why their jurisdiction opted to not use 
vote centers.[Footnote 140] Officials told us that their jurisdiction 
assessed the feasibility of implementing vote centers and concluded 
that despite several advantages offered by vote centers, the cost of 
implementation was prohibitive. For example, election officials 
identified costs including the connectivity for the electronic poll 
books, so that voters can be credited with voting in real time; 
potential rental costs for facilities, such as hotels, to house vote 
centers; 
and the expense of purchasing additional voting equipment. Because a 
voter in a jurisdiction using vote centers can vote at any vote center, 
each vote center needs to be stocked with all applicable ballot styles 
for an election or have DRE voting machines capable of being programmed 
with all applicable ballot styles, according to election officials. For 
the November 2004 general election, these officials told us that they 
used optical scan for absentee and Election Day voting and DREs for 
early voting. To avoid the cost and confusion of having to print and 
keep track of ballot styles for their 378 precincts--compared to 
Larimer County's 143 precincts--election officials said that they would 
need to purchase additional DRE voting machines if they were to 
implement vote centers. 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That 
Designing Clear Ballots Continued to Be a Challenge: 

Election officials are responsible for designing ballots that meet 
various state requirements, possibly federal requirements under the 
minority language provisions of the Voting Rights Act relating to 
offering voting materials in specified minority languages in addition 
to English, and the requirements of the particular voting equipment, 
and these ballots must be easy for voters to understand. Ballot design 
generally involves both state and local participation. Most states (46 
states and the District of Columbia) were involved in ballot design for 
the November 2004 general election. For instance, according to our 
state survey, 17 states and the District of Columbia reported designing 
ballots for local jurisdictions, 3 states reported requiring approval 
of the ballot design, and 26 states reported having requirements for 
local jurisdictions regarding ballot design (e.g., layout, candidate 
order, or paper stock).[Footnote 141] Specifically, election officials 
must determine all races, candidates, and issues that voters in each 
precinct in a jurisdiction will vote on and construct layouts for these 
races and issues for the particular types of ballots used with their 
election equipment. Figure 40 illustrates an optical scan ballot used 
in El Paso County, Colorado, for the November 2004 general election. 

Figure 40: El Paso County, Colorado, Optical Scan Ballot: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that despite 
the controversy over the "butterfly ballot" and other ballot problems 
in the aftermath of Florida's 2000 general election, very few 
jurisdictions nationwide thought that confusing ballot design was a 
major problem.[Footnote 142] Ballot design problems were not 
highlighted by voters as a problem in the November 2004 election; 
therefore, we did not inquire about the extent of ballot design 
problems in our local survey of jurisdictions. However, we asked about 
ballot design processes and problems during our visits to local 
election jurisdictions. Election officials in all of the jurisdictions 
we visited reported that they did not encounter voter problems with 
confusing ballot designs for the November 2004 general election. 
However, election officials in 7 jurisdictions we visited told us that 
designing easily understood ballots that meet the particular 
constraints of the voting equipment can be challenging when there are a 
large number of races or issues to include on the ballot. For example, 
election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in Colorado that used 
optical scan ballots told us that fitting all of the races and 
questions on the ballot is always challenging, but they managed to do 
so by limiting the number of words on ballot questions and using small 
fonts. These officials noted that they provided magnifying glasses at 
polling places to assist voters. Election officials in a jurisdiction 
we visited in Florida reported that they had to use oversized optical 
scan ballots to accommodate the number of constitutional amendments 
that had to be included on the ballot. 

Some ballot design options taken to help ensure clarity for voters 
could lead to problems later. For example, election officials in a 
jurisdiction in Kansas reported that they used a two-sided ballot 
design requiring that the optical scan counting equipment read the 
ballot front and back, which presented a problem. Chapter 6 discusses 
challenges with counting ballots. The requirements of the voting 
equipment may also limit options election officials can take related to 
ballot design. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in 
Illinois that used punch cards reported that lengthy ballots could have 
been a problem in the November 2004 election, but they decided to 
change the type of punch card ballot used. These officials told us that 
increasing the number of punch positions allowed for more space on the 
ballot and prevented challenges related to length of ballot. However, 
with punch card ballots, the greater the number of choices on a punch 
card, the greater the potential for voter error in punching the 
preferred choice, as voters must align the ballot carefully. 

Election officials in jurisdictions we visited that designed their 
ballots described steps they took to ensure that ballots were clear to 
voters, including using templates from the state or election management 
systems, proofreading both before and after printing, and public 
viewing or testing of ballots. For example, election officials in a 
jurisdiction in Colorado told us that prior to printing they send 
proofs of the ballot designs to candidates for their review. After 
printing, election officials said that staff members and 
representatives of the political parties test the ballot designs to 
ensure that there are no problems with how the ballots are processed 
through the counting equipment. Election officials in another 
jurisdiction in Colorado reported conducting a mock election with 
county employees to review the ballot and test a ballot from each 
package of printed ballots. Election officials in a jurisdiction in 
Ohio told us that they displayed the ballots for the general public to 
view and test. 

Preparing Ballots or Voting Equipment Not a Problem Reported by Most 
Jurisdictions, but These Activities Can Be a Challenge for Some 
Jurisdictions: 

The activities and plans that election officials undertake related to 
preparing ballots or voting equipment can have a direct impact on a 
voter's Election Day experience. For example, reports about the 
November 2004 election highlighted shortages of ballots and voting 
machines at some polling places. While election officials may not be 
able to prepare for every contingency that could affect a voter's wait 
time or experience at the polls, ensuring that there is a sufficient 
number of ballots or voting machines can minimize potential problems. 
On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that few 
jurisdictions had problems with ballot or voting equipment shortages 
for the November 2004 general election. We estimate that 4 percent of 
all jurisdictions experienced problems with Election Day ballot 
shortages, and an estimated 4 percent of all jurisdictions did not have 
enough voting equipment on Election Day. However, there were 
statistical differences between large and small jurisdictions in having 
enough voting equipment. We estimate that 12 percent of large 
jurisdictions, 4 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 3 percent of 
small jurisdictions did not have enough voting equipment. Election 
officials in 23 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that they 
encountered no challenges with preparing and delivering ballots, voting 
equipment, and supplies for the November 2004 general election. 
However, these activities could present logistical challenges for 
jurisdictions if there are unexpected delays, or for jurisdictions that 
are required to prepare ballots in multiple languages or prepare and 
deliver numerous voting machines to a large number of polling places. 

To ensure that there is an adequate supply of machine-readable paper 
ballots on Election Day, election officials may conduct numerous 
activities, such as designing, reviewing, proofreading, printing, and 
testing ballots. Uncertainties about ballot content, such as whether or 
not certain candidates or issues will be included on the ballot, could 
affect these activities by delaying printing or leading to a last- 
minute rush to ensure that ballots are printed in time for the 
election. While election officials in most of the jurisdictions we 
visited did not report encountering these uncertainties, election 
officials did in 4 jurisdictions. For example, election officials in a 
jurisdiction in Colorado reported that ballot printing was delayed by 
three statewide lawsuits regarding the content of the ballot. These 
officials reported that they prepared two ballot designs--one with a 
particular candidate's name and one without--so that they would be 
prepared to send the ballots to an external printer regardless of the 
lawsuits' outcome. 

Some jurisdictions are required to provide ballots in languages other 
than English. Producing ballots in multiple languages can add to the 
complexity of preparing ballots because election officials must take 
steps to ensure proper translation and printing for each required 
language. On the basis of our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate 
that 6 percent of jurisdictions nationwide provided ballots in other 
languages. We estimate that significantly more large jurisdictions 
provided ballots in languages other than English than medium and small 
jurisdictions. We estimate that 26 percent of large jurisdictions 
(compared to 10 percent of medium jurisdictions and 3 percent of small 
jurisdictions) provided ballots in languages other than 
English.[Footnote 143] 

Once voting equipment, ballots, and supplies have been prepared, 
ensuring that they are transported to polling places can be a 
logistical challenge for jurisdictions with thousands of voting 
machines and hundreds of polling places. Election officials in 18 of 
the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that they contracted with 
moving companies to deliver voting equipment to polling places prior to 
Election Day. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania told us that they contract with a moving company that 
transports about 1,000 DREs to about 400 polling places in the week 
prior to Election Day. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada 
told us that to ensure that voting machines were delivered to the 
correct polling places, they bar-coded each DRE and also assigned a bar 
code to each polling place. Upon delivery, contract movers used 
scanners to read the bar codes on each DRE and the bar code for the 
specific polling place. Prior to Election Day, these officials said 
that teams of election staff technicians then went to each polling 
place to set up the DREs and verify the scanned bar codes. After 
setting up the DREs, the rooms in which they were located were secured 
until Election Day. In contrast, in a jurisdiction we visited in New 
Hampshire, two election workers delivered 12 optical scan counters to 
the 12 polling places at 4:00 a.m. on Election Day. Figure 41 shows 
stored voting equipment--with accompanying delivery instructions for 
each DRE for 1 location--in 3 large jurisdictions we visited that 
needed to be prepared and delivered to polling places prior to Election 
Day. 

Figure 41: DRE and Optical Scan Voting Equipment That Large 
Jurisdictions Had to Prepare and Deliver Prior to Election Day: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported 
Experiencing Long Lines on Election Day, while Officials in Other 
Jurisdictions Did Not: 

Long voter wait times are a problem that election officials try to 
avoid. However, voters waiting in line at the polls was an issue 
identified in reports reviewing the November 2004 general election. 
These reports identified a variety of factors, including confusion 
about a voter's registration status, ballot or voting equipment 
shortages, or malfunctioning voting equipment that led to long voter 
wait times. We asked election officials during our site visits whether 
or not any polling places in their jurisdictions had long lines during 
the November 2004 general election and to describe factors they thought 
contributed to or helped to reduce long lines. 

Election officials in 17 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported 
having long lines at one or more polling places in their jurisdiction 
at some point on Election Day. However, there was variation in the 
reported voter wait times, times of day, and numbers of polling places 
with lines. For instance, election officials described voter wait times 
that ranged from 15 minutes to 1 ½ hours. Some election officials 
reported that the longer lines occurred in the morning; 
others told us that they kept polling places open past the official 
closing time to accommodate voters who were in line when the polls 
closed. Election officials in over half these 17 jurisdictions 
attributed long lines to higher than expected voter turnout, both in 
general and at peak voting times. Some of these jurisdictions were 
located in states where the presidential race was considered close 
(often referred to as "battleground states").[Footnote 144] For 
example, the election official in a jurisdiction in Nevada attributed 
long lines to using a new voting system in addition to being a 
battleground state and encountering high voter turnout. This official 
estimated that there were between 30,000 and 35,000 more voters for the 
November 2004 general election than in previous elections. Election 
officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited in Ohio told us that higher 
than expected voter turnout in some precincts led to long lines. For 
example, election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions reported that 
at a polling place where two precincts were located there was higher 
than expected turnout because of a school board race. According to 
these officials, at this polling place there was a single line for 
voters from both precincts to check in at the registration table, and 
this line backed up. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Ohio 
told us that some precincts had long lines, and one precinct in 
particular had a waiting time of up to 1 hour. These officials said 
that one precinct closed 30 to 45 minutes after closing time for the 
voters that were in line at 7:30 p.m. 

Election officials in 11 of 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that 
none of the polling places in their jurisdictions had long lines, and 
some described factors that helped to reduce or prevent lines. High 
voter turnout prior to Election Day--either during early voting or 
through absentee voting--was one factor they identified. For example, 
election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited--a second jurisdiction 
in Nevada and 1 in New Mexico--told us that about 60 percent of those 
who cast ballots voted early or absentee. Election officials in a 
jurisdiction we visited in Washington (which reported that it did not 
require or allow early voting) told us that they attributed their lack 
of long lines on Election Day to the fact that two-thirds of voters in 
their jurisdiction vote by absentee ballot. Election officials in a 
jurisdiction in Florida reported that in planning for the November 2004 
general election, they decided to encourage early and absentee voting 
as alternatives to Election Day voting in anticipation that there would 
be heavy turnout for the general election. Their voter education 
campaign, which included buying airtime on radios and in movie 
theaters, stressed early voting options. In the end, about 40 percent 
of voters cast early ballots, which, according to election officials, 
made crowds easier to manage on Election Day. 

Overloaded Phones on Election Day Posed Problems for Some Large and 
Medium Jurisdictions: 

On Election Day, poll workers may need to communicate with election 
officials at the central office for a variety of reasons--to inquire 
about a person's eligibility to vote if his or her name does not appear 
in the poll book, to report voting equipment problems, or to report 
other issues that could occur at a polling place on Election Day. On 
the basis of our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, for the 
November 2004 general election, we estimate that for 48 percent of all 
jurisdictions, the primary means of communication between polling 
places and the central office was telephones installed at polling 
places. Cell phones were also used as a primary means of communication 
in some jurisdictions. For example, on the basis of our local survey 
results, we estimate that for 25 percent of all jurisdictions, personal 
cell phones were the primary means of communication. 

Having inadequate communication lines on Election Day was a problem for 
election officials in the November 2000 election, as we noted in our 
October 2001 report on election processes.[Footnote 145] On the basis 
of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, communication problems 
between polling places and the election office on Election Day were a 
challenge for some jurisdictions in the November 2004 election, and 
these problems varied by the size category of jurisdiction, with more 
large jurisdictions encountering major problems than medium and small 
jurisdictions. We estimate that 36 percent of large jurisdictions, 63 
percent of medium jurisdictions, and 89 percent of small jurisdictions 
encountered no major problems with the communication system used at 
polling places. Small jurisdictions may not have experienced 
communication problems on Election Day for a variety of reasons, among 
them because a single polling place is located in the same building as 
the central election office, allowing the election officials to be 
physically present to resolve any questions or issues. Election 
officials in small jurisdictions provided comments on our nationwide 
survey of local jurisdictions about the primary communication system 
used in their jurisdictions on Election Day, including "personal 
contact--the clerk's office is across the hall from the polling place," 
"[we] yelled across the room," or "we are the central office and the 
polling place." In addition, the election official in the small 
jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire told us that the town clerk 
was on site at the one polling place. 

Election Day communication problems encountered by some large and 
medium jurisdictions included overloaded phones because of the volume 
of calls. On the basis of our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate 
that 49 percent (plus or minus 8 percent) of large jurisdictions, 14 
percent of medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions 
experienced overloaded phone systems.[Footnote 146] The differences 
between all size categories are statistically significant. Election 
officials in many large jurisdictions we visited reported receiving 
numerous phone calls on Election Day, both from polling places and from 
the public. In addition to poll workers calling from polling places, 
election officials at the central office may receive phone calls from 
citizens asking about the location of their polling place or whether or 
not they are registered to vote. For example, a large jurisdiction we 
visited in Nevada reported receiving over 35,000 calls on Election Day 
2004, about three times the number reportedly received in 2000. 
Election officials reported that most calls received were from people 
wanting to know whether or not they were registered or where their 
polling place was, despite providing polling place locations on their 
Web site, printing the locations in the newspaper, and mailing a sample 
ballot listing polling place locations to every registered voter in the 
jurisdiction. Election officials in 2 other large jurisdictions in 
Florida and Kansas reported that the volume of calls received was 
extremely high and that most inquiries concerned voter eligibility. In 
1 of these 2 jurisdictions, election officials told us that many poll 
workers could not get through to the elections office to verify voter 
registration information, which may have increased the number of 
provisional ballots issued during the election. 

Election officials in many of the large jurisdictions we visited 
reported taking steps to manage, or even reduce, the volume of calls 
from both polling places and the public. These actions included setting 
up call centers or phone banks, installing additional phone lines in 
their offices, or hiring temporary workers. For example, election 
officials in a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania reported that after 
experiencing problems being able to handle the volume of calls on 
Election Day 2000, they implemented a call center at their office with 
30 phone lines for the November 2004 election. While these election 
officials reported receiving "a lot" of calls for the 2004 general 
election, they said they were able to successfully handle the volume 
because of the new phone lines. Election officials in a large 
jurisdiction in Illinois reported that a feature, new for the November 
2004 election, on the jurisdiction's Web site that allowed voters to 
determine their polling place online helped to reduce the number of 
phone calls received from people asking about polling location. 

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That Third-
Party Observers Were a Challenge on Election Day 2004: 

After the November 2004 general election, some reports highlighted 
allegations of voter intimidation by third parties (e.g., poll 
watchers, observers, or electioneers) at polling places. To gain a 
better understanding of the extent to which this alleged behavior 
occurred and because the range of behaviors and circumstances in which 
they could have occurred was difficult to capture on a structured 
survey, we asked election officials during our site visits about 
challenges they faced conducting voting on Election Day--specifically, 
we asked them about any problems they encountered with voter 
intimidation. Election officials in 19 of the 28 jurisdictions we 
visited did not report experiencing problems with third parties on 
Election Day. However, election officials in 9 jurisdictions we visited 
in battleground states reported challenges with disruptive third-party 
activities.[Footnote 147] In some instances these third parties simply 
increased the number of people that poll workers were to manage at a 
polling location; 
in others, election officials told us third-party observers provided 
misinformation to voters or even used intimidation tactics. 

Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada told us that poll 
watchers were the biggest challenge on Election Day. Poll watchers, 
according to election officials, had been bused in from another state 
to observe the election because Nevada was a battleground state, which 
led to having 14 poll watchers at some locations. These officials noted 
that while most poll watchers simply observed, the poll watchers did 
increase the number of people at polling places, creating more for poll 
workers to manage. Election officials in other jurisdictions reported 
that third-party behavior negatively affected poll workers and voters. 
For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Pennsylvania 
reported that one of the biggest challenges on Election Day was 
managing poll workers' stress levels in an especially contentious 
election where poll watchers and observers yelled at them throughout 
the day. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Nevada told us 
that outside observers' behavior was disruptive and noted that the 
observers were contentious, violated electioneering limits at the 
polling place, and questioned every action that poll workers made. 
Election officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado reported that at one 
polling location on a college campus, poll watchers and representatives 
of a national organization were encouraging students to go to the 
polling place at one time to create a disruption. Students were also 
being encouraged to get back in line after they had voted, which caused 
long lines for other voters. Election officials said that they ended up 
calling security officers to help manage the situation. 

In other instances, election officials reported that observers provided 
misinformation to voters or even used intimidation tactics. Election 
officials in a jurisdiction in Florida reported that third-party 
organizations caused confusion at polling places by misinforming voters 
and staging demonstrations. In a jurisdiction we visited in Colorado, 
election officials told us that poll watchers caused problems at some 
polling places by providing misinformation to voters, such as informing 
them that their provisional ballots would not be counted. In a 
jurisdiction in New Mexico, election officials said that one polling 
place had to remain open until 10:30 p.m. because voters were 
encouraged by local political advocates to go to that polling place to 
vote even though the polling location for their precinct had been 
changed. As a result, according to these officials, hundreds of 
provisional ballots were cast at the polling place, which made for long 
waiting times. Election officials in another jurisdiction in New Mexico 
reported that outside candidate advocates and observers from political 
parties tried intimidation tactics and treated people at the polls 
"terribly." For example, these election officials told us that some 
advocates were observed taking photographs of the license plates of 
Hispanic voters as they arrived at polling places. 

We did not ask a specific question about third-party activities at 
polling places on our survey of local jurisdictions because of the 
complexities in capturing the range of alleged behaviors on a 
structured survey. However, we asked whether local election 
jurisdictions maintained a written record of issues that occurred on 
Election Day and, if so, what issue or problem occurred most frequently 
on Election Day. Several election officials from jurisdictions in 
battleground states that provided comments on our nationwide survey 
wrote that electioneering or poll watchers did. For example, election 
officials from Florida, Colorado, and Iowa wrote "voters complained 
about being harassed by demonstrators while waiting in line to vote," 
"poll watchers acting aggressively," and "poll watchers (who were 
attorneys, mostly) were interfering with the process, intimidating 
precinct officials, and giving erroneous advice to voters who showed up 
at the wrong polling place." 

Concluding Observations: 

Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor 
that involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and 
technologies associated with numerous activities. Many of the 
challenges that election officials reported encountering in preparing 
for and conducting the November 2004 election were not new. Recruiting 
and training an adequate supply of poll workers, finding accessible 
polling places, and managing communications on Election Day were 
challenges we identified in our October 2001 report on the November 
2000 election. 

Data from our local elections jurisdiction survey and site visits to 28 
locations, indicate that more large, and to some extent medium, 
jurisdictions encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting 
the November 2004 general election than did small jurisdictions. This 
is not surprising. Larger, diverse jurisdictions may face challenges 
smaller jurisdictions do not, such as recruiting poll workers with non- 
English language skills. Larger jurisdictions are also likely to need 
to rely to a greater degree on technology to manage their elections 
administration process, and this brings its own set of challenges. The 
complexity of administering an election and the potential for 
challenges increase with the number of people and places involved, the 
ethnic diversity and language skills of the voting population, and the 
scope of activities and processes that must be conducted. Many of the 
election officials in large jurisdictions we visited told us that being 
well prepared, having established policies and procedures in place, and 
having qualified election staff were factors that contributed to a 
smooth Election Day. One problem that occurred on Election Day in some 
jurisdictions that election officials reported encountering was the 
actions of poll watchers and other third parties that election 
officials considered disruptive. This presents another issue that 
election officials may need to include in their Election Day 
preparations and training. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 5: 
Provisional Voting: 

A goal of the election process is to ensure that every eligible voter 
is able to cast a vote and have that vote counted. In the November 2000 
general election, reports of some voters showing up at the polls and 
not being able to vote raised concerns about eligible voters' names not 
appearing on the voter registration list at the polling place or poll 
workers not otherwise being able to determine voters' eligibility. 
While many jurisdictions reported in 2001 having at least one procedure 
in place to help resolve eligibility questions for voters whose names 
did not appear on a polling place registration list, only 20 states 
plus the District of Columbia reported using some form of provisional 
ballot for the 2000 general election.[Footnote 148] 

One of the major changes since the 2000 general election has been the 
implementation of a HAVA provision requiring, in general, that states 
permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast provisional 
ballots in elections for federal office. In general, under HAVA, voters 
who claim to be eligible to vote and registered in the jurisdiction 
they desire to vote in but whose names do not appear on the polling 
place registration list are to be allowed to cast provisional ballots 
in a federal election. These ballots are called provisional because 
they are counted only if an election official determines that the voter 
is eligible under state law to vote. In terms of ballot access, 
provisional ballots benefit voters by allowing an individual to cast a 
vote, in general, when there is some question as to the individual's 
eligibility such as when the individual's name is not on the 
registration list or the individual's eligibility has been questioned 
by an election official. In terms of ballot integrity, provisional 
ballots benefit election officials by allowing them to determine voter 
eligibility prior to counting such ballots (i.e., verifying provisional 
ballots). 

In this chapter, we describe (1) events that preceded HAVA's 
provisional voting requirements, (2) how states and local jurisdictions 
implemented the requirement to provide provisional ballots, (3) how 
states and local election jurisdictions qualified provisional ballots 
for counting, and (4) the difficulties of estimating and comparing the 
number of provisional ballots that were cast and counted. 

Overview: 

Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that 
some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions 
regarding the voters' eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 
2004, most states permit the casting of provisional ballots in 
elections for federal office by voters who affirm in writing that they 
believe they are eligible to vote and registered in that jurisdiction, 
but are not found on the voter registration list.[Footnote 149] Such 
states are also required under HAVA to provide provisional ballots in 
federal elections under other circumstances such as for certain voters 
who registered by mail and do not have required identification, and 
where an election official asserts that an individual is ineligible to 
vote. Provisional votes cast under HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements are to be counted in accordance with state law if election 
officials determine that the voter is eligible to vote under state law. 
Under HAVA, 6 states are exempt from the act's provisional voting 
requirements because they either permitted the voter to register on 
Election Day or did not require voter registration.[Footnote 150] 

On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local 
election jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local 
jurisdictions varied in a number of ways regarding how they implemented 
HAVA's provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 election. 
Among other things, we found variation in the: 

* additional circumstances, apart from those circumstances specified in 
HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when voters 
claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot; 

* design of ballots themselves and how they were tracked; 
and: 

* voting method used for casting provisional ballots, such as optical 
scan ballots or DRE. 

With respect to the counting of provisional votes, states reported 
various differences in their counting processes such as the prescribed 
location from which a voter must cast a provisional ballot in order for 
it to be counted. Also, with respect to the counting of provisional 
ballots, according to our estimates from our survey of local election 
jurisdictions nationwide, a voter not meeting residency requirements 
was the most frequently cited problem, followed by insufficient 
evidence that the voter was registered. In jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials also varied in how they handled a lack of 
information from the voter that was needed to verify a provisional 
ballot. 

National figures on provisional ballots for the November 2004 election 
are difficult to estimate because of a lack of data on provisional 
ballots cast and counted, and variation in how states implemented 
provisional voting. Nevertheless, we estimate that between 1.1 million 
and 1.7 million provisional ballots were cast in the November 2004 
election. The variation in how provisional voting was implemented makes 
it difficult to compare the use and counting of provisional ballots 
among jurisdictions. A number of factors can affect the number of 
provisional ballots cast and counted. For example, one such factor 
could be an instance in which the polling location hours were extended 
and votes cast during the extended hours were cast provisionally. 

Events in the November 2000 Election Preceded the HAVA Requirement for 
Provisional Ballots: 

Following the November 2000 election, in our October 2001 comprehensive 
report on election processes nationwide, we noted that the biggest 
problems on Election Day involved resolving questions about voter 
eligibility.[Footnote 151] Typically, a voter's eligibility is 
established before a voter receives a ballot, most often by a poll 
worker examining a poll book or registration list for the person's 
name. If the name appears on the list and other identification 
requirements are met, the voter is given a regular ballot and is 
allowed to vote. We also noted in our report that in the November 2000 
election, a large number of voters with eligibility issues created 
frustration for voters, long lines, and problems communicating between 
the polls and election headquarters as workers tried to resolve 
eligibility issues. 

For the 2000 general election, when the voter's name did not appear on 
the registration list, we reported in October 2001 that jurisdictions 
had different procedures for dealing with the question of the voter's 
eligibility. More specifically, we reported that 20 states plus the 
District of Columbia used some form of provisional ballot when a 
voter's name was not on the voter list, with verification of 
registration conducted after the election.[Footnote 152] As we 
reported, provisional balloting measures went by different names among 
the states, including provisional ballot, challenged ballot, special 
ballot, emergency paper ballot, and escrow ballot. Further, in 5 states 
in the 2000 general election, we reported that voters could complete an 
affidavit when voting with no further verification of their 
registration information being required by state law prior to the 
ballot being counted. 

The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that of the 19 million registered 
voters who did not vote in 2000, 6.9 percent did not vote because of 
uncertainty regarding their registration.[Footnote 153] In our October 
2001 report, we noted that headlines and reports questioned the 
effectiveness of voter registration by highlighting accounts of 
individuals who thought they were registered being turned away from 
polling places on Election Day and jurisdictions incorrectly removing 
the names of eligible voters from voter registration lists. Our report 
also found that almost half of the jurisdictions nationwide in 2000 
reported having problems with registration applications submitted at 
motor vehicle agency offices that election officials believed could 
result in individuals showing up at the polls to vote and discovering 
that they were not registered. 

Numerous recommendations were made for federal regulations to require 
that all states provide provisional voting. For example, the Federal 
Election Commission in June 2001 recommended that all states devise 
procedures for voters to cast provisional ballots at the polls under 
certain conditions, as did the National Commission of Federal Election 
Reform in August 2001 and the National Task Force on Election Reform in 
July 2001, among others. 

Under HAVA, in an election for federal office, most states are to 
permit individuals to cast a provisional ballot under certain 
circumstances.[Footnote 154] The statutory deadline for implementing 
HAVA's provisional voting requirement was January 1, 2004. For federal 
elections, states are, in general, required to allow the casting of a 
provisional ballot by an individual: 

* asserting to be registered in the jurisdiction in which the 
individual desires to vote and eligible to vote but whose name does not 
appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place, 
or: 

* whom an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, or: 

* who registered to vote by mail but does not have (and has not 
previously provided) the required registration identification when 
trying to vote in person or by mail, or: 

* casting a vote pursuant to a court order or other type of order 
extending poll closing times. 

HAVA requires that an individual be permitted to cast a provisional 
ballot upon the execution of a written affirmation before an election 
official at the polling place. The written affirmation must state that 
the individual is registered to vote in that jurisdiction and eligible 
to vote in that election. HAVA specifies that either the provisional 
ballot or the written affirmation information be transmitted to an 
appropriate election official for a determination as to whether the 
individual is eligible to vote under state law. Under HAVA, if an 
individual is determined to be eligible, the provisional ballot is to 
be counted as a vote in accordance with state law. Election officials, 
under HAVA, are to give the individual written information on how to 
ascertain whether the vote was counted and, if the vote was not 
counted, the reason the vote was not counted. HAVA directs that state 
or local election officials establish a free access system, such as a 
toll-free number, for provisional voters to ascertain such information. 

While HAVA established conditions under which an individual must be 
allowed to cast a provisional ballot, states are not prohibited from 
offering provisional ballots for other reasons, or from using ballots 
with other names (e.g., a challenged ballot) to serve provisional vote 
purposes. HAVA explicitly provides that the specific choices on the 
methods of complying with certain act requirements, including the 
provisional voting requirements, are left to the discretion of the 
state.[Footnote 155] In addition, HAVA provides that a state may 
establish election technology and administration requirements that are 
stricter than HAVA requirements, so long as they are not inconsistent 
with other specified federal requirements.[Footnote 156] 

State and Local Jurisdictions Varied in Their Implementation for 
Providing Provisional Ballots for the November 2004 Election: 

On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local 
election jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local 
jurisdictions provided for provisional voting in a variety of ways for 
the November 2004 election. These differences contributed to the 
variation in the number of provisional votes cast among jurisdictions. 

The results of our state survey of election officials show that states 
reported using new or existing legislative or executive actions (which 
included executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies) to 
implement HAVA's provisional voting requirements. Specifically, our 
state survey showed: 

* 27 states reported enacting new legislation or taking executive 
action to meet HAVA's provisional voting requirements; 

* 11 states and the District of Columbia reported using the state's 
existing legislative or executive action to meet the 
requirements;[Footnote 157] 

* 7 states said HAVA provisional requirements were met by a combination 
of new legislation or executive action and existing actions;[Footnote 
158] 

* 5 states (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and 
Wisconsin), in response to the question of how their state established 
the provisional voting requirements set forth in HAVA, answered that 
they were exempt from such requirements; 
these 5 states are exempt from HAVA provisional requirements, in 
general, because they have same-day voter registration or no voter 
registration.[Footnote 159] 

Connecticut officials responded, for example, that the state enacted 
legislation after HAVA to establish HAVA provisional voting 
requirements. Connecticut state laws were enacted in June 2003 related 
to the application for a provisional ballot, casting of the ballot, and 
determination of eligibility for counting of provisional ballots, among 
other things. In contrast, Alaska election officials reported that 
existing legislation met HAVA's provisional voting requirements. 
According to Alaska's 2005 updated HAVA plan, the state had an existing 
provisional voting process known as Questioned Voting. This process, 
established in the early 1980s, required only minimal changes to meet 
HAVA provisional voting requirements. Alaska requires use of a 
questioned ballot for any voter who votes at a polling location where 
his or her name does not appear on the precinct register, or if the 
voter does not have identification and is not personally known by the 
election official. In our state survey, New Jersey reported meeting 
HAVA provisional voting requirements with a combination of existing and 
new legislation. In one New Jersey jurisdiction we visited, election 
officials stated that state provisional voting procedures were first 
established in 1999. According to these officials, the state amended 
its provisional ballot election law after HAVA to allow use for voting 
by court (or other) order after the polls have closed, and by first- 
time mail registrants who do not provide identification. 

Paper Ballots and DRE Were Voting Methods Used to Cast Provisional 
Ballots: 

Election officials in 25 of the 26 jurisdictions we visited that 
provide for provisional voting told us that they used some form of 
paper ballot for Election Day provisional voting for the November 2004 
election.[Footnote 160] For example, election officials in the Illinois 
jurisdictions we visited said that the regular punch card ballot was 
used by provisional voters, and then placed in provisional ballot 
envelopes. In the New Jersey jurisdictions we visited officials said 
that provisional votes were cast on paper ballots that could be counted 
with optical scan machines (if voters were determined to be eligible). 
Election officials in Connecticut jurisdictions said that they used 
hand-counted paper ballots for provisional voters. 

According to election officials in 1 Ohio jurisdiction and 1 Nevada 
jurisdiction, DRE was used for Election Day provisional 
voters.[Footnote 161] According to election officials or documents they 
provided in the 2 jurisdictions we visited that used DRE for 
provisional voting on Election Day, the processes used for casting 
provisional votes were as follows: 

* In the Ohio jurisdiction, election officials said voters first 
completed an affidavit statement with a preprinted code number, and 
signed a special section of the poll book. The poll worker then 
inserted a unit into the DRE that contained the ballot for the 
precinct. The poll worker then pressed the provisional ballot selection 
on the DRE and entered the code number for the individual voter 
associated with the voter's affidavit statement. The individual then 
voted. 

* In one Nevada jurisdiction, DREs were used for Election Day 
provisional voting, but optical scan ballots were used for provisional 
voters participating in early voting. According to the poll worker's 
manual provided by election officials, Election Day provisional voters 
completed an affirmation with identifying information and the reason 
they were casting a provisional ballot. As described to us by election 
officials at this jurisdiction, the poll worker then added precinct 
information, and both signed the affirmation. The poll worker then 
activated the DRE with a card. To indicate that the ballot was 
provisional, the poll worker pressed "0" and the machine provided a 
provisional voter identification number that the poll worker copied 
onto the voter affirmation and provisional voter receipt. The voter 
then voted. 

The Provisional Ballot Design and Tracking Procedures Varied among 
States: 

According to election officials in the jurisdictions we visited, the 
design of provisional ballots varied for the November 2004 election. 
The provisional ballot differences included variation in terms of the 
races included, ballot and envelope color, the envelopes they were 
placed in, and the information included on the provisional ballot 
envelopes. For example, in the Nevada jurisdictions, the provisional 
ballot only included races for federal offices, while in the Kansas 
jurisdictions, officials said that the provisional ballot was the same 
as a regular ballot. In 1 Georgia jurisdiction, election officials 
stated that they were using an absentee ballot for provisional voters 
but were inserting it into a salmon-colored envelope, whereas in an 
Illinois jurisdiction we visited, "Provisional" was printed in pink 
letters across the punch card ballot used in that jurisdiction so that 
these ballots were distinguishable from other ballots. 

The provisional ballot envelopes also varied in terms of what 
information was provided in the jurisdictions we visited, according to 
example envelopes provided to us (or described) by election officials. 
The outside of the provisional ballot envelopes in most of the 
jurisdictions we visited served as the voter's written affirmation that 
is required by HAVA. For example, in a jurisdiction in Illinois, the 
ballot envelope included instruction to voters on how to cast a 
provisional ballot; 
in a Florida jurisdiction (as well as in Illinois) the provisional 
envelope includes information on the reason why the provisional ballot 
was cast. In New Mexico and Colorado jurisdictions we visited, the 
envelope included a tear-off tab with information on how voters could 
find out whether their vote counted, and if not, why it was not 
counted. In addition, election officials in some jurisdictions we 
visited described provisional ballots being placed in envelopes, 
sometimes with a second security envelope covering the ballot inside. 
Figure 42 shows an example of a provisional ballot envelope. 

Figure 42: Provisional Ballot Envelope: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Officials in jurisdictions we visited described a variety of methods 
used for tracking provisional ballots in the November 2004 election. 
Methods included having individual ballots numbered, maintaining an 
inventory or log, accounting for provisional ballots at the beginning 
and end of Election Day, and using specially colored ballots or 
envelopes for holding provisional ballots. The following are examples 
of how election officials in four jurisdictions we visited said they 
tracked provisional ballots for the November 2004 election: 

* In a Pennsylvania jurisdiction, election officials tracked 
provisional ballots cast at the polling place on a form provided by the 
election officials. Provisional ballots were marked with a sticker 
indicating that they were provisional. The sticker also had an 
identification number for tracking the ballot, and the voter was 
provided a receipt with the identification number to use when calling 
for information on the status of their ballot. All provisional ballots 
were placed inside of green envelopes. 

* In a New Mexico jurisdiction, an election official said that ballots 
were numbered sequentially, so that the poll workers could track the 
numbers. The precinct judges certified the numbers of the ballots they 
received, used, delivered, and destroyed. 

* In a New Jersey jurisdiction, the municipal clerk issued a specific 
number of provisional ballots (25) to each precinct, with a "Custody 
Receipt" form that identified who was in possession of the orange bag 
with the provisional ballots and an accounting of all ballots 
originally issued. A ballot that had been voted was enclosed in a gray 
envelope and then put back in the orange bag. 

* In a Kansas jurisdiction, separate poll books, separate envelopes for 
provisional ballots, and separate pouches for envelopes containing 
provisional ballots (all blue in color) facilitated tracking the 
ballots as separate items from regular Election Day ballots. No 
tracking of the actual ballot occurred (before it was voted) because 
the same optical scan paper ballot was used for regular Election Day 
voters. 

Additional Circumstances for Using Provisional Ballots Varied for the 
November 2004 Election: 

Apart from permitting voters to cast provisional ballots under the 
circumstances specified in HAVA, some jurisdictions we surveyed or 
spoke with had additional reasons for providing provisional ballots to 
voters in the November 2004 election and other types of ballots that 
could be used for different circumstances. In addition, election 
officials in jurisdictions we visited told us about different 
approaches for offering provisional ballots. 

Provisional Ballots Were Provided for a Variety of Reasons in 
Jurisdictions We Visited: 

In the local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials 
described various circumstances, in addition to those required by HAVA, 
in which a provisional ballot was provided to a prospective voter in 
the November 2004 election. The additional circumstances under which 
provisional ballots were provided are established by state officials. 
For example, 

* In one Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated 
that provisional ballots were available to voters who did not have the 
identification required of all voters in the state and also available 
if a person was listed as a felon in the poll book. Further, election 
officials told us that the Colorado Secretary of State issued guidance 
just prior to the 2004 general election that allowed individuals-- 
claiming to have registered at a voter registration drive but for whom 
the jurisdiction had no record--to vote provisionally. 

* Election officials in jurisdictions we visited in Colorado, Florida, 
Kansas, Ohio, and Washington said that voters claiming they had not 
received their absentee ballots were provided with provisional ballots. 
In other jurisdictions, such as the 2 we visited in Connecticut, voters 
were allowed to vote regularly if their absentee ballot did not arrive. 

* Kansas election officials reported that they allowed voters to cast 
provisional ballots if the voter did not trust the voting machines and 
wanted a paper ballot, or if the voter had a different last name than 
the listed one because of marriage or divorce. 

The extent to which voters are provided with provisional ballots varied 
depending on whether states required identification of all voters or 
only certain voters, according to our state survey. Some states 
reported that they require all voters to provide identification; 
some reported that they require only provisional voters to produce 
identification, while others reported that they do not require 
identification from voters other than first-time voters who registered 
by mail, as required by HAVA.[Footnote 162] Chapter 4 on conducting 
elections discusses state requirements for voter identification for all 
voters. According to our state survey, 6 states--Arizona, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, and Wisconsin--reported 
requiring identification from only provisional voters in the November 
2004 election, but Michigan and Utah reported allowing an alternative 
to identification for provisional voters who did not have required 
identification. In Michigan, for example, a voter receiving a 
provisional ballot who was unable to meet the identification 
requirement was permitted, according to election officials responding 
to our state survey, to fax, mail, or hand-deliver an acceptable form 
of photo identification to the clerk anytime during the 6 days 
following the election. 

Alternatives to Provisional Voting Available in Some Jurisdictions We 
Visited: 

Some jurisdictions we visited reported that Election Day voting options 
other than provisional ballots were available. For example, election 
officials in jurisdictions we visited in Ohio said that provisional 
ballots were the only special ballots available for that election. In 
contrast, in a New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, election officials 
said the state offered an in-lieu-of ballot for voters who requested an 
absentee ballot, and claimed it did not arrive. These election 
officials said the in-lieu-of ballot was the same as a provisional 
ballot, but it was placed in a different sleeve for later determination 
of whether an absentee ballot had been cast or not. At a Connecticut 
jurisdiction we visited, election officials described the state's 
presidential ballot, available at the clerk's office on Election Day 
for the November 2004 election. A presidential ballot, according to 
election officials and documents they provided, allowed voting for 
president and vice-president by former Connecticut residents who had 
moved to another state within 30 days of the election and for that 
reason could not vote in their new state of residence.[Footnote 163] 

Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited, such as 1 
jurisdiction in Florida and 2 jurisdictions in New Jersey, said their 
procedures allowed challenged voters to sign a statement, such as an 
affidavit declaring their eligibility, and to vote on a regular ballot 
that would be counted with other ballots on Election Day. According to 
poll worker guidance provided by election officials in the Florida 
jurisdiction, a written challenge must be submitted under oath and 
given to the voter; 
then the voter has the right to submit an oath affirming his or her 
eligibility. The polling place clerk and inspectors must resolve the 
challenge by majority vote, providing a regular ballot if the decision 
is in the prospective voter's favor. The guidance states that a 
challenged voter who refuses to sign the oath must be offered a 
provisional ballot. In both jurisdictions we visited in New Jersey, 
voters who were challenged were not issued a provisional ballot, 
according to documents provided by election officials. As stated in the 
poll worker manual for one of the jurisdictions for the 2004 general 
election, a voter who was challenged completed a challenged voter 
affidavit, as shown in figure 43. The manual stated that the location's 
four poll workers take a vote to decide whether the voter would be 
allowed to vote. On the basis of the decision, the challenged voter 
cast a regular ballot or was not allowed to vote, according to the 
manual (in case of a tie, the voter was allowed to vote). 

Figure 43: Middlesex County, New Jersey, Challenged Voter Affidavit: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked for 
information on the use of provisional ballots, challenged ballots, or 
other types of ballots under various scenarios for the November 2004 
election.[Footnote 164] Table 18 shows the extent to which we estimate 
that local jurisdictions provided provisional ballots as compared to 
providing other types of ballots. 

Table 18: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Nationwide That 
Provided Provisional, Challenge, or Other Ballots for the November 2004 
Election under Various Scenarios: 

Scenario: Individuals who registered by mail (without providing 
identification),voted for the first time, and did not bring proper 
identification with them to the polling place; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 49; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 6; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 7; 
Not applicable: 39. 

Scenario: Individuals who claimed they were at the correct polling 
place but were not on the voter registration list at the polling place; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 48; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 7; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 13; 
Not applicable: 33. 

Scenario: Individuals who were challenged by an election official as 
ineligible to vote; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 23; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 23; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 3; 
Not applicable: 49. 

Scenario: Individuals who voted after the polling place closing times 
when the polling place was kept open late because of a federal court, 
state court, or other order extending the polling place hours; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 6; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 1; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 2; 
Not applicable: 91. 

Scenario: Individuals who said they had requested an absentee ballot 
but that the ballot never arrived; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Provisional ballots: 18; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Challenge ballots: 1; 
Percentage of jurisdictions providing: Other: ballots: 19; 
Not applicable: 60. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

Note: Jurisdictions could indicate using more than one type of ballot 
for a particular scenario; therefore, the row of percentages may not 
add to 100 percent. 

[End of table] 

Jurisdictions Varied in Their Approach to Providing Provisional 
Ballots: 

Apart from permitting voters to cast provisional ballots under the 
circumstances specified in HAVA, election officials in jurisdictions we 
visited described differing approaches under which provisional ballots 
were utilized for the November 2004 election. 

Election officials in most of the 28 jurisdictions we visited said that 
in the November 2004 election they would not refuse an individual a 
provisional ballot. In a Colorado jurisdiction, election officials said 
that election judges were instructed to direct all voters meeting the 
criteria for voting provisionally (e.g., claiming to be registered and 
eligible, but with some eligibility question) to the provisional voting 
table. In 1 Nevada jurisdiction, the election official said that anyone 
could receive a provisional ballot. He said that they had Las Vegas 
tourists who wanted to vote a provisional ballot, even though they were 
informed that it would not be counted. Election officials in 1 
Washington jurisdiction said voters knew that they could cast a ballot 
regardless of circumstances, and election officials in the other 
Washington jurisdiction said that provisional ballots served as a 
conflict avoidance tool at the polls. Election officials in both New 
Mexico jurisdictions said that if a voter was not on the registration 
list, he or she was immediately given a provisional ballot. According 
to the New Mexico election officials, precinct officials were not to 
direct a voter to the correct precinct; 
instead, under the provisional voting rule, they were to offer a 
provisional ballot to the voter. 

Election officials in some other jurisdictions we visited told us that 
poll workers may have taken certain steps before providing a voter with 
a provisional ballot. In 1 Illinois jurisdiction, an election official 
said that if a potential voter was not listed, the poll workers first 
tried to determine if the voter was registered in another jurisdiction. 
If that was the case, the poll workers then directed the voter to that 
jurisdiction, but they did not refuse to provide a provisional ballot 
if a voter requested one. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, election officials 
told us that if a voter was registered in Ohio, everything was done to 
get the voter to the correct precinct. In a New Jersey jurisdiction we 
visited, election officials explained that poll workers take several 
steps when the voter's name was not listed in the poll book. Poll 
workers were instructed, according to the poll worker's manual, to 
check the poll book for misspellings or for the name being out of 
alphabetical sequence, and to check the county street guide to see if 
the voter was in the wrong location. Election officials in this 
jurisdiction also told us that voters who were in the wrong location 
were directed to the correct location. They added that voters who did 
not wish to vote provisionally were told to go before a superior court 
judge to plead their cases. 

In 5 jurisdictions we visited, election officials said there were 
instances where election officials would refuse to provide a 
provisional ballot on Election Day. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, election 
officials said that a provisional ballot was provided if the potential 
voter appeared at the polling place. However, if the person came to the 
election office on Election Day and no record of voter registration was 
found by the Registrar, then the voter was not allowed to vote 
provisionally. A potential voter stating that he or she was not 
registered or not a resident was a reason not to offer the individual a 
provisional ballot, according to election officials in 1 jurisdiction 
in Nevada, and 1 in New Jersey, and both jurisdictions in North 
Carolina. Officials in 1 Georgia jurisdiction we visited said that an 
individual might not be offered a provisional ballot if he or she was 
on the voter registration list and therefore eligible to vote a regular 
ballot. 

Whether a provisional ballot was provided or not might have been based, 
in part, on the size of the jurisdiction and the familiarity of the 
poll workers with the voters. Several election officials in small local 
jurisdictions included in our nationwide survey made this point in 
written comments. For example, comments included the following: 

* "This is a small township. We don't have the problems big cities 
have. People know who lives in the township. They know their 
neighbors." 

* "Most voters are personally known, including their addresses." 

* "We were told that the state voter list was the bible for the day. 
But we had one lady who should have been provisional but we all knew 
where she lived so we let her vote. It was the choir lady's niece. Her 
signature was on file." 

In larger jurisdictions, poll workers might be less likely to know the 
voters in the precinct and may have made greater use of provisional 
ballots than in smaller jurisdictions. 

Newness of Providing Provisional Ballots Presented Some Challenges in 
November 2004: 

Some jurisdictions we visited reported that knowing how many 
provisional ballots to have available for the November 2004 election 
was a challenge. However, on the basis of our survey of local 
jurisdictions, we estimate that for the November 2004 election, only 1 
percent of jurisdictions had a shortage of provisional ballots. The 
difficulty with anticipating the need for provisional ballots, 
according to an Illinois jurisdiction election official, was that 
officials had no historical experience to rely upon in deciding how 
many to make available at each site. In this jurisdiction, provisional 
ballots were used for the first time in the November 2004 election, 
according to the election official. Similarly, in a Pennsylvania 
jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that they had no 
basis to plan for the number needed, and that they had to rush to 
produce (e.g., placing a provisional ballot sticker over an absentee 
ballot) additional provisional ballots at the last minute because some 
precincts needed more than were initially allocated. Election officials 
in one Nevada jurisdiction we visited said some polling places were 
overstocked while others were understocked, requiring them to shuttle 
the ballots between polling places. In a Colorado jurisdiction we 
visited, election officials said that last-minute changes by state 
officials created a need for more provisional ballots because this 
change allowed individuals who registered during a voter registration 
drive but who were not on the voter list to vote provisionally. 

On the basis of our local survey, poll workers failing to follow 
procedures for conducting provisional voting surfaced as an issue in 
some jurisdictions in the November 2004 election. We estimate that 12 
percent of jurisdictions nationwide encountered poll worker performance 
problems related to their failure to follow procedures with provisional 
voting. The newness of the provisional procedures or last-minute 
changes in the guidance were challenges that confused poll workers, 
according to election officials in jurisdictions we visited. 
Specifically, 

* In a Georgia jurisdiction, election officials told us there was a 
question regarding whether several college students were eligible to 
vote provisionally, and state election officials were called for 
clarification (the students were allowed to vote provisionally). 

* In a Connecticut jurisdiction, election officials said poll workers 
were confused about the process, issuing provisional ballots in some 
cases before checking with the Registrar to try to locate the 
prospective voters in the statewide database. 

* In both Nevada jurisdictions, election officials we visited 
identified poll worker training needs; 
for example, in 1 of the Nevada jurisdictions election officials said 
provisional ballot materials were not adequately tracked and returned. 

* In an Ohio jurisdiction, election officials identified poll worker 
handling of provisional ballots as an area for improvement based on 
finding valid provisional ballots returned in envelopes for soiled and 
defaced ballots. In addition, they said about half of the provisional 
voters did not sign the poll book, as they were supposed to have done 
under this jurisdiction's requirements. Furthermore, voters were to 
place their provisional ballots in a colored provisional sleeve for 
determination of eligibility before the vote was submitted, but the 
election official estimated that about 10 percent of the provisional 
ballots were placed directly in the ballot box instead. 

Some election officials in jurisdictions we visited described actions 
they took to implement provisional voting that worked well for the 
November 2004 election. Several identified training given to poll 
workers that prepared them for provisional voting, or had staff 
dedicated to handling provisional votes, or poll workers with prior 
provisional voting experience. For example, election officials in 1 
Colorado jurisdiction said that they had election judges whose sole 
responsibility was conducting provisional voting. According to these 
election officials, the election judges (i.e., poll workers) were well 
trained and sat at a separate table to handle provisional voting. One 
jurisdiction we visited in Illinois had specific instructions on the 
voter affidavit for election workers to follow. Figure 44 provides an 
example of the affidavit. 

Figure 44: Affidavit Containing Provisional Ballot Instructions for 
Poll Workers in Champaign, Illinois: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

State and Local Jurisdictions Reported Variation in Several Areas 
Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Are Counted: 

HAVA specifies that voters casting ballots under HAVA's provisional 
balloting requirements must, in general, execute a written affirmation 
stating that they are registered in the jurisdiction in which they 
desire to vote and that they are eligible to vote in that election. 
Polling place officials, under HAVA, are to transmit either the ballot 
or the written affirmation information to an appropriate election 
official for verification to ascertain if the individual is eligible to 
vote under state law. In the November 2004 election, state requirements 
regarding the location from which voters had to cast their provisional 
ballot in order for it to be counted (e.g., in the specific precinct in 
which the voter is registered or anywhere within the county--city, 
parish, township--in which the voter was registered) was one key 
difference among states. States also varied in how missing voter 
information was handled and how voters were informed whether their vote 
was counted or not. On the basis of our national survey of local 
jurisdictions, the most frequent problem encountered by local 
jurisdictions in counting provisional ballots was that voters did not 
meet residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or 
jurisdiction. 

Location Where Voters Must Cast Their Ballots in Order to Be Counted 
Varied among States: 

HAVA requires states to provide provisional balloting where, among 
other things, individuals assert that they are registered in the 
jurisdiction in which they desire to vote. The term "jurisdiction" in 
HAVA's provisional voting requirements is not specifically defined. As 
a result, states establish, under their own election codes, the 
applicable jurisdiction where voters must cast their provisional ballot 
from in order for such ballot to be eligible to be counted. For 
example, in some states this location is the specific precinct in which 
the voter is registered, and in other states, the voter may be anywhere 
within the county (city, parish, township) in which the voter resides 
and is registered. Our survey of state election officials asked where a 
provisional voter needed to cast a vote in order for it to be counted 
for the November 2004 election. Figure 45 shows where states reported 
that provisional voters needed to cast their votes in order for such 
votes to be eligible to be counted. 

Figure 45: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be 
Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 General 
Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Six states are not subject to HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements, but 2 of these 6 (Wisconsin and Wyoming) authorize some 
measure of provisional voting. Both of these states are included with 
the 32 states that reported requiring that provisional voters must cast 
their votes in the specific precincts in which they are registered in 
order for their votes to be eligible to be counted. 

[End of figure] 

Variation in state requirements as to the location where a provisional 
ballot must have been cast in order to be counted was also evident in 
the jurisdictions we visited. For example, voters in Kansas could, 
according to election officials, vote provisionally in precincts other 
than where they were registered (but within the same county) and if 
otherwise eligible to vote have their vote partially counted (e.g., for 
county, state, or federal offices or issues). Nevada election officials 
said they count provisional votes cast anywhere in the county where the 
voter was registered and otherwise eligible, but all provisional 
ballots only included federal races. Election officials in both 
Washington jurisdictions we visited reported that a voter in the 
November 2004 election was allowed to cast a provisional ballot 
anywhere in the state of Washington, and the ballot would be forwarded 
to the correct county (if the ballot was cast in a county other than 
the one in which the voter was registered) and counted if the voter was 
eligible. Election officials in 1 Washington jurisdiction we visited 
said that county election workers mailed the provisional ballots for 
non-Washington residents to the Secretary of State of the state where 
the voter claimed to be registered, but these officials were not 
knowledgeable of what became of the ballots. 

Election officials in several states have faced court challenges to 
their state requirements regarding the location where a provisional 
ballot must have been cast in order to be counted. The litigation has 
primarily arisen in states requiring that a provisional voter had to 
cast a vote in the specific precinct in which he or she was registered, 
in order for that vote to be counted. In this context, the courts have 
generally held that HAVA does not require a state to count provisional 
votes cast in the wrong precinct as legal votes when they would 
otherwise be considered invalid under state law.[Footnote 165] 

In our state survey, we also asked state election officials if they 
anticipated that their state would change, by November 2006, where a 
provisional voter must cast a vote for it to be counted. Forty states 
reported that they did not anticipate such rules would change. Election 
officials in 4 states reported they anticipated a change by November 
2006. Three out of the 4 states (Arkansas, Nevada, and New Jersey) 
reporting that they anticipated a change for 2006 had reported for the 
November 2004 general election that a provisional voter could have cast 
a vote anywhere within the county (city, parish, township) in which the 
voter resides and have such vote counted. The fourth state, Colorado, 
had reported for the November 2004 general election that provisional 
voters had to cast their votes in the specific precincts in which they 
were registered in order for their votes to be counted. Georgia, 
Maryland, and the District of Columbia said they did not know whether 
rules specifying where a provisional voter must cast a ballot in order 
to be counted could be anticipated to change, and the remaining 4 
states responded that they will not have provisional voting. These 4 
states are not subject to provisional voting requirements. 

Residency Requirements and Evidence of Registration Were the Most 
Frequent Problems Nationwide Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Were 
Counted: 

In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked 
about problems that local jurisdictions encountered during the November 
2004 election in counting provisional ballots. On the basis of our 
survey, in jurisdictions where provisional ballots were cast we 
estimate that the most frequent problems concerned voters not meeting 
residency requirements or lacking evidence that the voter was 
registered. Specifically, we estimate: 

* 66 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) of jurisdictions had a problem 
with voters not meeting residency eligibility requirements for the 
precinct or jurisdiction,[Footnote 166] 

* 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) received insufficient evidence 
that individuals had submitted voter registration applications at motor 
vehicle agency offices, 

* 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had instances of insufficient 
evidence that individuals had registered or tried to register directly 
with the election office, 

* 34 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had registration applications 
received by the registrar very close to or after the registration 
deadline, 

* 32 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had voters not providing 
identification as specified by HAVA for registrants who registered by 
mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct or 
jurisdiction, 

* 29 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) received insufficient evidence 
that individuals had submitted voter registration applications at 
National Voter Registration Act agencies other than motor vehicle 
agency offices, 

* 28 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) had provisional ballot envelopes 
or ballots that were incomplete or illegible, and: 

* 20 percent of jurisdictions had problems with voters who did not sign 
a sworn statement that they met the qualifications to be eligible to 
vote in the precinct or jurisdiction. 

Written comments made by local election officials in our nationwide 
survey identified some additional problems encountered with counting 
provisional ballots. Examples included uncertainty whether a convicted 
felon's voting rights, lost as a result of such conviction, had been 
restored; a voter's registration records that had been sealed by a 
court; and the state changing the rules several times right up to 
Election Day, creating confusion, according to election officials. 

Jurisdictions Visited Identified Variations in How Missing Information 
Was Handled when Provisional Ballots Were Counted: 

In addition to variation in where states required provisional ballots 
to be cast in order to be counted for the November 2004 election, local 
jurisdictions we visited reported a variation in how to handle a lack 
of identification or a missing signature. For example, election 
officials in one New Mexico jurisdiction we visited said that first- 
time voters that did not provide the required identification had until 
the close of the polls on Election Day to bring their identification to 
the county clerk's office. In contrast, according to election officials 
in a New Jersey and a Georgia jurisdiction, provisional voters were 
allowed up to 2 days to produce identification for their vote to be 
counted, and in a Nevada jurisdiction, voters had until 5:00 p.m. the 
Friday after the election. 

With respect to mail registrants who were permitted to cast provisional 
ballots because they did not provide required identification when 
voting for the first time, election officials in 1 Illinois 
jurisdiction we visited reported a lack of clarity as to what 
subsequent identification-related verification was needed prior to 
counting provisional ballots. According to the Illinois election 
officials, the state's guidance resulted in a situation where one 
Illinois jurisdiction required the voter to provide to the county 
clerk's office identification with an address that matched the address 
in the voter registration list within 48 hours after the election in 
order to be counted, while another jurisdiction did not require the two 
such addresses match. The Illinois officials stated that this issue has 
been clarified. 

Jurisdictions we visited also varied in how they handled a missing 
voter signature. For example, in 1 Colorado jurisdiction, election 
officials said that they mailed letters to voters who failed to sign 
their provisional ballot envelopes and allowed the voters up to 10 days 
after the election to come in and sign so that their votes would be 
counted. This was not a procedure described in all jurisdictions we 
visited. In 1 jurisdiction in New Mexico, ballots would not be counted 
for voters who did not sign the provisional ballot affidavit or roster. 
In 1 Georgia jurisdiction we visited, voters had to complete a new 
voter registration form or their provisional ballots were not counted. 

Telephone Was Used Most Often to Provide Voters with the Outcome of 
Their Provisional Vote: 

HAVA requires that provisional voters be provided with written 
information about how to find out whether their vote was counted (and 
if not, why) using a free access system established by state or local 
election officials. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we 
estimate that the majority of local jurisdictions that had provisional 
ballots cast used the telephone (often toll-free) as the free access 
system for voters in the November 2004 election to obtain information 
on whether their provisional ballot was counted, and if not counted, 
why not. Table 19 shows the estimated percentage of jurisdictions that 
used various methods. Some jurisdictions used more than one method. 

Table 19: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Various 
Methods to Inform Voters of the Outcome of Their Provisional Ballot, 
November 2004: 

Method used: Local election office telephone number; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 84[A]. 

Method used: State election office telephone number; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 50[B]. 

Method used: Letter informing voters of the outcome of their 
provisional ballot; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 51[B]. 

Method used: Internet Web site address; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 35[B]. 

Method used: E-mail informing voters of the outcome of their 
provisional ballot; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method: 3[C]. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. The estimates 
are based on a subgroup of jurisdictions where provisional ballots were 
cast. 

[A] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +6,-3 
percentage points. 

Note: Jurisdictions could indicate using more than one method, 
therefore the percentages add to more than 100 percent. 

[End of table] 

Election officials from jurisdictions we visited described a number of 
ways that provisional voters were provided information about how to 
learn the outcome of their votes for the November 2004 election, such 
as ballot receipts, a copy of the voter's affidavit, a form letter, or 
a tear-off portion of the provisional ballot envelope. In a New Jersey 
jurisdiction we visited, provisional voters were given a toll-free 
number at which to leave their name and address, and then the results 
were mailed to them, according to election officials. The jurisdiction 
election officials noted that this process worked well. Figure 46 
provides examples of the information voters were provided to inquire 
whether their vote was counted. 

Figure 46: Examples of Written Information Provided to Voters to 
Inquire whether Their Provisional Vote Was Counted: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In our local jurisdiction survey, we asked how soon after Election Day 
information on the outcome of a provisional ballot was made available 
to voters. According to written comments, feedback was reported by some 
election officials to be available to voters after the November 2004 
election as early as the next day, or within 7 days after the election, 
although some allowed 1 month, or until the election was certified. 

Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited reported 
that few voters called to find out if their provisional votes were 
counted. For example, in a Colorado jurisdiction, officials reported 
approximately 100 calls out of over 6,100 ballots cast; 
a Kansas jurisdiction election official estimated receiving calls from 
6 provisional voters out of over 3,600 that voted; a New Jersey 
jurisdiction reported receiving 69 inquiries from voters out of over 
6,300 cast; and in 3 other jurisdictions we visited, election officials 
reported no one called to find out if his or her vote was counted. 

A Number of Factors Contribute to Difficulties in Estimating and 
Comparing Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted: 

Estimating the number of provisional ballots initially cast and those 
that were counted in the November 2004 election is difficult because 
complete information is not available, and because of differences in 
how state and local jurisdictions have implemented HAVA provisional 
voting requirements affecting how and whether such ballots are provided 
and counted. Those same factors limit the value of comparing 
provisional ballots cast and counted among jurisdictions. Although 
estimation is difficult, our survey allowed us to estimate provisional 
ballots cast, but with strong caveats. 

While HAVA required that most states permit individuals to cast 
provisional ballots under certain circumstances, not all jurisdictions 
reported having provisional ballots cast in their jurisdiction in the 
November 2004 election. On the basis of our survey of local 
jurisdictions, we estimate that provisional votes were cast in 33 
percent of jurisdictions and none were cast in 67 percent of 
jurisdictions.[Footnote 167] Our estimates varied by size of 
jurisdiction regarding whether provisional votes were cast or not. We 
estimate that in 99 percent of large jurisdictions, 84 percent of 
medium jurisdictions, and 12 percent of small jurisdictions provisional 
votes were cast in the November 2004 election. The differences between 
all sizes of jurisdictions were statistically significant. 

The difference between different sizes of jurisdictions' use of 
provisional ballots may be explained in part by comments from election 
officials in local jurisdictions surveyed and from officials in 
jurisdictions we visited. For example, officials in several smaller 
jurisdictions included in our nationwide survey who reported that 
provisional ballots were not cast in their jurisdiction had indicated 
in written comments that election workers are likely to have personal 
knowledge of a voter's eligibility. As one election official from a 
Wisconsin jurisdiction wrote, provisional ballots were available, but 
use of the ballots was not necessary. Similarly, in a small 
jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire, election officials told us 
that given the town's small population of roughly 1,600 residents, 99 
percent of the time someone in the room knew the individual and could 
vouch for his or her identity. In this circumstance, according to 
election officials, no verification was necessary at the poll to ensure 
the voter's identification. 

Data Were Lacking for National Estimate of Provisional Votes Cast and 
Counted: 

The number of provisional ballots cast and counted nationally is 
difficult to estimate with precision because of the limited data 
available and data quality concerns. Estimates that are available, 
however, do serve as an indication that the HAVA provisional voting 
requirements have allowed potentially eligible voters who otherwise 
might have been turned away to participate. We requested November 2004 
data on provisional ballots cast and counted in our survey of local 
election jurisdictions nationwide, but because of missing information 
and other methodological concerns, our estimate is provided only with 
strong caveats. We estimate that a total of between 1.1 million and 1.7 
million provisional ballots were cast. Our range reflects the fact that 
an estimated 20 percent of the jurisdictions in our survey did not 
provide data on how many provisional ballots were cast. We could not 
estimate the number of provisional ballots that were counted with any 
level of certainty, because of a very high level of missing data--an 
estimated 40 percent of the jurisdictions did not provide data on the 
number of provisional ballots counted. 

In addition, some jurisdictions in our survey providing the number of 
provisional ballots cast may have actually provided the number of 
provisional votes counted. It is possible this may have occurred 
because jurisdictions would more likely have a record of the number of 
provisional votes determined to be qualified and counted than they 
would have the number of provisional votes originally submitted at 
polling places (cast).[Footnote 168] For example, in 1 jurisdiction we 
visited, provisional ballot numbers were provided only on the number of 
provisional votes that were counted. If some responses to our survey of 
local jurisdictions actually provided the number of votes counted 
rather than the number of votes cast, then our estimate of provisional 
votes cast may be an underestimate. 

HAVA specifies that information be made available to individuals 
through a free access system (such as a toll-free telephone number or 
an Internet Web site) regarding whether their provisional votes were 
counted and, if a vote was not counted, the reason it was not 
counted.[Footnote 169] The specifics of implementing such a system, 
such as the methods by which such information is to be identified, 
collected, and maintained, however, under HAVA, are left to the 
discretion of state and local election officials. The National Task 
Force on Election Reform recommended that states develop a uniform 
method for reporting provisional ballots at the state and national 
levels, and also that states collect data on the number of provisional 
ballots cast on Election Day.[Footnote 170] Some states might require 
the information on ballots cast and counted be sent for statewide 
figures. Election officials in a Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, 
for example, said that the Registrar completed a provisional ballot 
report for the Secretary of State in accordance with state guidance. 

Other national estimates of the number of provisional votes cast and 
counted in the November 2004 election have been affected by data 
quality issues. The Election Assistance Commission, using data from its 
survey of election administrators,[Footnote 171] estimated that 1.9 
million voters cast provisional ballots at the polls in November 2004, 
and that 1.2 million of those votes cast were counted.[Footnote 172] As 
with our estimates, EAC cautioned that the coverage, or response rate, 
for its estimates was limited. The response rate for provisional 
ballots cast and counted was 46 percent and 38 percent, respectively. 
The report authors stated that data quality issues, such as missing 
data or data error entries (such as in 15 jurisdictions in the EAC 
report where the number of provisional ballots counted was greater than 
the jurisdiction reported as cast) were identified and corrected where 
possible. 

On the basis of data collected at different times from different 
sources in different states, electionline.org estimated that over 1.6 
million provisional ballots were cast, and nearly 1.1 million of them 
were counted. However, readers are cautioned here as well about the 
limitations of the available data. For example, figures are not 
definitive because of the variation in requirements and procedures 
among (or even within) states, and estimates are based on incomplete 
information.[Footnote 173] The authors stated that they provided 
provisional voting estimates with the intent of moving the discussion 
of provisional voting forward. 

Number of November 2004 Provisional Votes Cast and Counted in Local 
Jurisdictions We Visited: 

Information provided by some of the jurisdictions we visited 
illustrates the variation in the reported number of provisional ballots 
cast and counted during the November 2004 election, as shown in table 
20. 

Table 20: Reported Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted in Selected 
Jurisdictions: 

Jurisdiction: El Paso, CO; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 6,158; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 4,779; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 78; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 242,888. 

Jurisdiction: Larimer, CO; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 2,636; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 1,798; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 68; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 147,112. 

Jurisdiction: New Haven, CT; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 75; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 67; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 89; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: Not available. 

Jurisdiction: Dougherty, GA; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 130; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 12; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 9; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 33,809. 

Jurisdiction: Muscogee, GA; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 210; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 107; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 51; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 64,336. 

Jurisdiction: Champaign, IL; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 292; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 64; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 22; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 84,153. 

Jurisdiction: Chicago, IL; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 22,611; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 13,838; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 61; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 1,063,860. 

Jurisdiction: Johnson, KS; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 10,942; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 7,375; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 67; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 259,599. 

Jurisdiction: Wyandotte, KS; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 3,664; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 2,780; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 76; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 53,630. 

Jurisdiction: Clark, NV; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 4,352; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 1,543; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 35; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 546,858. 

Jurisdiction: Washoe, NV; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 1,465; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 880; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 60; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 159,511. 

Jurisdiction: Bernalillo, NM; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 12,367; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 6,233; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 50; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 263,054. 

Jurisdiction: Santa Fe, NM; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 580; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 230; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 40; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 67,782. 

Jurisdiction: Carteret, NC; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 1,099; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 888; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 81; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 31,770. 

Jurisdiction: Guilford, NC; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 2,260; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 1,291; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 57; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 201,854. 

Jurisdiction: Cuyahoga, OH; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 25,309; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 16,750; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 66; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 687,255. 

Jurisdiction: Mahoning, OH; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 2,786; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 2,350; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 84; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 134,290. 

Jurisdiction: Clark, WA; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 5,214; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 4,215; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 81; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 172,277. 

Jurisdiction: King, WA; 
Provisional: ballots cast: 31,712; 
Total provisional ballots counted of those cast: 28,010; 
Percentage of provisional ballots cast that were counted: 88; 
Total: ballots counted in jurisdiction: 898,238. 

Source: GAO summary of information provided by jurisdictions we 
visited. 

[End of table] 

When looking at provisional ballots cast and counted for a particular 
jurisdiction, the variability in the implementation of provisional 
voting by states and jurisdictions makes interpretation and comparison 
among jurisdictions difficult. As mentioned earlier, the number of 
provisional votes cast and counted may vary based on a number of 
factors. In general, states and jurisdictions vary in why and how 
provisional ballots are provided to potential voters, as well as the 
state and local procedures for how provisional ballots are counted. A 
partial list of these factors includes the following: 

* State provisions varied regarding the additional circumstances (apart 
from the minimum requirements specified in HAVA) under which a 
provisional ballot may be offered. 

* Some states offered other voting options in addition to provisional 
ballots to voters with eligibility issues (such as signing an 
affidavit, then voting normally or casting a challenged ballot). 

* The manner and extent to which the provisional ballot options 
available to voters are actually utilized varied in connection with the 
size and approach of the jurisdictions. For example, smaller 
jurisdictions were, according to election officials, less likely to use 
the provisional ballot option than larger jurisdictions because they 
were more knowledgeable of voters in their jurisdictions and therefore 
better positioned to address eligibility issues than larger 
jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions reported taking additional steps 
to send the voter to the correct precinct before offering a provisional 
ballot, whereas other jurisdictions might not do so. 

* States established the location where voters must cast their 
provisional ballots from in order for such ballots to be eligible to be 
counted. For example, in some states this location is the specific 
precinct in which the voter is registered, and in other states, the 
voter may be anywhere within the county (city, parish, township) in 
which the voter resides and is registered. 

* States or local jurisdictions established other conditions (e.g., the 
time limit for providing required identification) that varied in 
determining whether a provisional vote was to be counted. 

* There were other factors, such as instances in which the polling 
location was kept open late because of a federal court, state court, or 
other order extending the polling hours. 

Notwithstanding the variations we have identified in provisional voting 
processes and challenges identified by some election officials in 
jurisdictions we visited, several election officials reported that they 
thought the provisional voting process worked well for the November 
2004 election, in that people who would normally not have been able to 
cast a ballot were allowed to do so, and some of those ballots were 
counted. 

Concluding Observations: 

While many jurisdictions reported that for the November 2000 election 
having at least one procedure in place to help resolve eligibility 
questions for voters whose name did not appear on a polling place 
registration list, only 20 states plus the District of Columbia 
reported using some form of provisional voting in the November 2000 
election. In those states in which it was not available, voters whose 
names did not appear on polling place registration lists, but stated 
they had properly registered to vote, were often not permitted to cast 
a regular ballot. Provisional voting is an important means of enhancing 
voter access to the polls. 

HAVA required all states that required registration prior to Election 
Day to provide for provisional balloting by the November 2004 election, 
but left to states the specific choices on how they would implement 
that requirement. In exercising this discretion, states have created 
varied provisional voting rules and practices. Under HAVA, provisional 
ballots are to be counted as a vote under state law if the person 
casting the ballot is determined to be eligible to vote under state 
law. These statutory provisions and determinations of eligibility and 
what constitutes a properly voted ballot vary by state and thus affect 
the state rules and procedures used to determine whether provisional 
ballots are counted. At least 1 state, for example, allows voters to 
cast a provisional ballot for statewide offices anywhere in the state, 
with the ballot returned for eligibility verification and counting to 
the jurisdiction in which the voter said he or she was registered. 
Other states required that voters cast provisional ballots in their 
assigned precinct for the ballots to be counted. The actual impact of 
these varying practices on provisional balloting and vote counting is 
unknown. Comparable data across states are not available to determine 
whether or how these variations affect the number of voters who are 
permitted to cast provisional ballots or the percentage of provisional 
ballots that are actually counted. Thus, it is difficult to assess the 
potential impact of a state changing its existing rules and practices. 
However, based on the data that are available, it is clear that 
provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation of 
those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to vote. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 6: 
Counting the Votes: 

Once the polls close on Election Day, the process of determining and 
certifying the final results begins. Vote counting is a complex, 
multistep process with many variations across the nation. The exact 
process depends upon a number of variables. Among them are state 
requirements that define standards for determining voter intent for 
ballots that are not clearly marked, deadlines for certifying the final 
count, and specifications for conducting recounts when required. The 
types of ballots to be counted affect vote tabulations because absentee 
and provisional ballots typically undergo some type of verification 
before counting, while early and regular Election Day ballots typically 
do not require this processing. The types of technology used for vote 
casting and counting--hand-counted paper ballots and machine-counted 
ballots (punch card, optical scan, and those cast electronically)--also 
add variance to how votes are handled. The counting process requires 
attention to detail, and problems in any one election stage can affect 
the final vote count. Moreover, its orchestration requires the 
effective interaction of people, processes, and technology. This 
chapter discusses the continuity and key changes since the 2000 general 
election and challenges--new and ongoing--encountered by election 
officials in the 2004 general election with respect to counting votes. 

Overview: 

In the 2004 general election, vote counting remained an intricate, 
multistep process characterized by a great variety of local procedures 
depending on a local jurisdiction's technology, size, and preferences. 
As with the 2000 general election, the proportion of jurisdictions 
nationwide reporting recounts or contested elections remained small in 
the 2004 general election. There were some notable developments related 
to vote counting. A significant change was the fact that by the 2004 
general election more states had developed guidance for determining 
voter intent on unclear ballots. Eighteen states that reported not 
having guidance in the 2000 general election reported in our survey 
they had such guidance in place for the 2004 general election. In 
addition, 9 states reported changes relating to the process of 
conducting recounts. Some added requirements for mandatory recounts. 
Others changed their conditions and guidance for conducting recounts. 
The results of our state survey showed that while 29 states and the 
District of Columbia did not require audits of vote counts, 9 states 
reported having taken some legislative or executive steps toward doing 
so. 

Many of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology that 
had confronted election officials across the country in the November 
2000 general election continued to challenge them in the 2004 general 
election. Equipment problems, poll worker errors, and voter errors made 
it difficult to tabulate the votes quickly and accurately, according to 
some election officials. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge to 
election officials, as well: Some jurisdictions reported difficulty 
completing the extra steps required to verify and count provisional 
votes within the time allowed for tallying the final vote count. 
Finally, while recounts and contested elections remained rare in the 
2004 general election, those that did occur, particularly in Washington 
state, revealed the intricacies and vulnerabilities of the election 
process. 

In the 2004 General Election the Vote-Counting Process Remained Complex 
and Marked by Local Diversity: 

The basic elements of the vote-counting process we described in our 
October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide 
remained in practice for the general election of 2004.[Footnote 174] Of 
necessity, it was a complex, multistep process, with many variations, 
depending on a jurisdiction's technology, size, and preferences. As 
with other elections, vote counting in the 2004 general election 
involved certain common steps: closing and securing the polls and 
voting equipment; securing the ballots; reconciling the number of 
ballots at the polls (e.g., the number available at the polls compared 
to the number cast, spoiled, and remaining); transporting ballots and 
equipment from the polling places to a central location where they were 
secured; in some cases electronically transmitting results from polling 
place voting equipment to a central tally location; verifying 
provisional and absentee ballots for counting; determining whether and 
how to count ballots that may be improperly or unclearly marked; 
conducting any necessary recounts; and certifying the final count. 

Local Jurisdictions We Surveyed and Visited Secured Machines and 
Ballots in a Variety of Ways: 

Preliminary to counting, a key step was to secure the voting machines 
and ballots so that no additional votes could be cast. Procedures for 
securing equipment varied with the equipment that was in use. However, 
on the basis of our survey of a representative sample of local election 
jurisdictions nationwide, we estimate that 91 percent of all 
jurisdictions used hardware locks and seals as one of their predominant 
security measures. In our site visits, local election officials also 
described securing DRE tapes and cartridges under lock and key before 
and after they were delivered to boards of elections or other 
authorities. For example, election officials from 1 jurisdiction we 
visited described securing memory cards in optical scan counting 
machines by attaching a plastic band with a serial number. The band 
would have to be severed in order for the memory card to be removed, 
according to election officials. One such band is shown in Figure 47 
securing a voting equipment bag. 

Figure 47: Sealed Voting Equipment Bag: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited also described a 
variety of measures they took to ensure that ballots were not lost or 
miscounted. In 1 Washington jurisdiction, officials said they secured 
punch card ballots at polling places for counting elsewhere by 
transporting ballots twice: once earlier on Election Day and the other 
time after the polls had closed. These officials also said that ballots 
were bundled into groups of 50, separated by type (Election Day, 
provisional, and absentee ballots), and put into transport carrier safe 
boxes. Two poll workers, one from each political party, accompanied the 
ballots when they were transported to the elections office for 
counting. Similarly, in a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election 
officials said that at the close of Election Day they sealed optical 
scan ballots from the polling place and the optical scan counter to 
prevent tampering. Then, two election judges transferred the ballots 
and optical scan counter to the counting center. 

While ballot-securing methods varied, the results of our local 
jurisdiction survey showed that most jurisdictions had written policies 
and procedures in place in the November 2004 general election to secure 
ballots (including paper and electronically stored ballots). As shown 
in table 21, on the basis of our survey we estimate that two-thirds of 
local jurisdictions had written procedures for transporting ballots, 
and about three-quarters had written procedures in place for secure 
ballot storage rooms. 

Table 21: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Having Written Ballot 
Security Policies and Procedures, November 2004 General Election: 

Policies and procedures: Transporting unvoted ballots to polling 
places; 
Percentage of jurisdictions that had written policies and procedures: 
66. 

Policies and procedures: Transporting voted ballots or e-memory to 
locations for counting[A]; 
Percentage of jurisdictions that had written policies and procedures: 
66. 

Policies and procedures: Providing secure rooms or building where 
unvoted ballots are stored; 
Percentage of jurisdictions that had written policies and procedures: 
71. 

Policies and procedures: Providing security for rooms or building where 
voted ballots are stored; 
Percentage of jurisdictions that had written policies and procedures: 
76. 

Policies and procedures: Securing the electronic transmission of voted 
ballots for counting[B]; 
Percentage of jurisdictions that had written policies and procedures: 
18. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] Transporting ballots or e-memory to locations was not applicable 
for an estimated 20 percent of jurisdictions. 

[B] Securing electronic transmissions was not applicable for an 
estimated 57 percent of jurisdictions. 

[End of table] 

In addition, reconciling ballots with the number of voters was a common 
step in securing ballots before they were counted. According to our 
state survey, 47 states and the District of Columbia reported that they 
required jurisdictions to count or keep track of ballots that were 
unused, spoiled, rejected, or issued but not returned. Two states, 
Montana and Maine, reported not requiring jurisdictions to count or 
keep track of such ballots. New York reported in our survey that 
because it does not have paper ballots, such tracking was not 
necessary. New York reported that it did not use paper, optical scan, 
or punch card ballots. During our visits to election jurisdictions, we 
asked officials how they reconcile ballot and voter numbers. The 
election officials reported conducting cross-checks in a number of 
ways, but generally followed a process of reconciling any discrepancies 
between the total numbers of ballots on hand at the beginning of the 
day, the number of voters who signed in at the polling place, and the 
number of ballots cast. 

Counting, Canvassing, and Certifying the Vote Was an Intricate and 
Varied Operation: 

Once the ballots were reconciled in the November 2004 election, local 
jurisdictions tabulated and canvassed (or reviewed) the vote. Both 
counting and canvassing the count were an ongoing process in the effort 
to ensure an accurate tally. After initial tabulations of votes on 
election night, which were typically released to the public, canvassing 
was typically the process of reviewing all votes by precinct, resolving 
problem votes, and counting all types of votes (including absentee and 
provisional votes) for each candidate and issue on the ballot and 
producing an official total for each. The official total was usually 
certified by an election official. This process varied among 
jurisdictions in terms of how and where it was done and who was 
responsible. 

The counting process involved several different types of ballots, cast 
under different circumstances: 

* General election votes are cast at polling places on Election Day by 
voters who appeared in the registration lists for that precinct and 
voted a regular ballot. 

* Provisional votes are cast by those, for example, whose registration 
(and qualification to vote) could not be established at the time of 
voting at the polls on Election Day. 

* Absentee votes are generally votes received and cast by mail before 
Election Day. 

* Early votes are generally cast in person before Election Day. 

According to our local survey, for the November 2004 general election, 
local jurisdictions nationwide used different voting methods for 
different ballot types. As shown in table 22, we estimate the largest 
percentages of jurisdictions used optical scan and paper hand-counted 
ballots for Election Day. Also, optical scan and punch card vote- 
counting methods were used at precincts or at central locations. 
Jurisdictions could check more than one voting method. 

Table 22: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Particular 
Voting Methods by Ballot Type for the November 2004 Election: 

Voting method: DRE; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for general Election Day 
voting: 7; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for absentee voting: 4; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: provisional voting: 1; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: early voting: 4. 

Voting method: Central count optical scan; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for general Election Day 
voting: 24; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for absentee voting: 20; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: provisional voting: 9; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: early voting: 5. 

Voting method: Precinct count optical scan; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for general Election Day 
voting: 32; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for absentee voting: 24; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: provisional voting: 
10[A]; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: early voting: 5. 

Voting method: Lever machine; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for general Election Day 
voting: 7; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for absentee voting: 1; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: provisional voting: 1; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: early voting: 1. 

Voting method: Central count punch card ballot; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for general Election Day 
voting: 3; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for absentee voting: 3; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: provisional voting: 2; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: early voting: 1. 

Voting method: Precinct count punch card ballot; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for general Election Day 
voting: 2; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for absentee voting: 1; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: provisional voting: 2[A]; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: early voting: 1. 

Voting method: Paper (hand-counted) ballot; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for general Election Day 
voting: 35; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for absentee voting: 36; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: provisional voting: 18; 
Percentage of jurisdictions using method for: early voting: 8. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

[A] A small number of jurisdictions indicated on our questionnaire that 
they use precinct count equipment for provisional ballots. This could 
be true when a jurisdiction does not physically count provisional 
ballots at a precinct, but when officials programmed optical scan or 
punch card tabulating machines to accept provisional ballots only from 
specified precincts. 

[End of table] 

In our local jurisdiction survey, we also asked what predominant voting 
method was used to process the largest number of ballots in the 2004 
general election. We estimate that hand-counted paper ballots were the 
predominant tabulation method for 30 percent of all jurisdictions, 
although these were almost all small jurisdictions. Specifically, we 
estimate that 41 percent of small jurisdictions, 3 percent of medium 
jurisdictions, and no large jurisdictions hand-counted paper 
ballots.[Footnote 175] Small jurisdictions were statistically different 
from large jurisdictions. 

As in the November 2000 general election, the counting process for the 
November 2004 election took place at precincts or at centralized 
locations, such as election headquarters at town halls and even 
warehouses. In jurisdictions we visited, we learned about some of the 
substantial variations in the sequence, procedures, and precautions 
taken to conduct the count. We found in our site visits that vote 
counting ranged from a very simple process in a small jurisdiction to 
more complex processes in larger jurisdictions. For example, a small 
New Hampshire jurisdiction, with just over 1,000 registered voters, had 
one polling place and one precinct open on Election Day, according to 
election officials. They told us the paper ballots were not transferred 
to any location for counting and were hand-counted by 25 election 
workers. These officials also said that five teams of five individuals 
each reviewed votes cast on each paper ballot and used paper and pencil 
to record and tally vote totals. The final election outcomes were 
written on a standard form and submitted to the New Hampshire Secretary 
of State's office, according to election officials. 

In contrast, election officials in a large Washington jurisdiction 
described a more complex process for their centralized vote count of 
punch card ballots. As described by these officials, their process 
enabled them to begin reporting results on Election Day evening by 
precinct and to provide updates of the count every 30 minutes. Once 
Election Day ballots were transferred to the election office by poll 
workers, the ballots were counted to determine total numbers, according 
to election officials. They also told us that after the ballots were 
separated by precinct, up to 20 inspection boards, composed of two 
Republicans and two Democrats each, inspected the ballots one precinct 
at a time. In the inspection process, the officials said that the 
ballots were further separated into categories--those that were machine-
readable and those that required further examination, such as ballots 
with write-in candidates or with a chad hanging by two or more corners. 
Once all questions were resolved (including any that would require 
review by a canvassing board), they told us ballots in batches of 500 
each were placed in trays by precinct and brought to the ballot 
tabulation area. According to these officials, the jurisdiction used a 
punch card tabulator, which was connected to a computer and had a 
processing speed of 600 ballots per minute (see fig. 48). Once all 
ballots were counted, jurisdiction election officials told us they 
generated an unofficial report with results for all races and voting 
propositions. This initial tally was posted on the county Web site and 
released to the press, candidates, and public, according to election 
officials. 

Figure 48: Punch Card Tabulator Connected to Computer: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Six of the jurisdictions we visited told us that they counted Election 
Day votes at the local precinct, where poll workers would tabulate 
results and resolve any ballot issues that could be handled locally. 
For example, in a large Kansas jurisdiction, election officials said 
that voters were able to place their ballots in an optical scanner at 
the polling place that read the ballot and rejected it if there were 
any problems. According to officials there, the machines could return 
to the voter any ballot that, for example, had too few or too many 
votes for a specific office and provide a screen message for what to 
correct before resubmitting the ballot. After the polls closed, the 
optical scan machines with their memory cards--which had been 
programmed for the specific precinct--were transferred to election 
headquarters, according to election officials. The officials also said 
the optical scan machines were linked electronically to one computer 
and data from the memory cards were uploaded so that votes from all 
precincts could be tallied. 

Additional Steps Were Required to Manage Absentee, Provisional, and 
Early Votes: 

Absentee, provisional, and early votes each required some additional 
steps to manage in order to include them in the vote count. 

Absentee votes: According to our state survey, all states reported 
having some provision for absentee voting in the 2004 general election. 
As we discussed in chapter 3, on absentee voting, absentee ballots must 
typically undergo some type of verification prior to counting. At 1 
Colorado jurisdiction we visited, officials said that they began 
verifying and counting absentee ballots 10 days before Election Day. At 
1 jurisdiction in Washington election officials said that they 
qualified the absentee ballots as they were received at the election 
office, but did not count the votes until 3:00 p.m. on Election Day. 
Additionally, at a jurisdiction in Illinois, election officials said 
that they distributed most absentee ballots to their respective 
precincts to be counted along with the Election Day ballots. In each of 
these jurisdictions, however, according to election officials, the 
absentee ballot results were not released until after the Election Day 
polls were closed. Also, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, 
we estimate that 99 percent of election jurisdictions included the 
counts of qualified absentee ballots in the final certified count, 
regardless of their effect on the outcome. 

Provisional votes: Provisional voting, which was required by HAVA in 
all but 6 states during the 2004 general election, generally required 
several steps. At all of the local jurisdictions we visited that used 
provisional ballots, election officials said that the ballots were 
transferred to an election office or central count location, where the 
eligibility of the voter was verified before they were counted. We 
estimate, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, that 83 
percent of jurisdictions that provided provisional ballots during the 
2004 general election transferred the provisional ballots to a central 
location for counting. Those jurisdictions that did not engage in 
transfers may have been jurisdictions with only one precinct, in which 
case, the votes were tallied on-site. At all of the jurisdictions we 
visited that used provisional ballots election officials said they 
included provisional ballots determined to be verified in certified 
vote counts regardless of their effect on the outcome of the election. 

Early votes: According to our state survey, for the November 2004 
election, 24 states and the District of Columbia reported they allowed 
early voting, and from our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 
about 23 percent of local jurisdictions allowed early voting in the 
election. In early voting jurisdictions we visited, a variety of 
reconciliation and counting processes were used, according to election 
officials. At one jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us 
that early voting DRE votes were reconciled daily. According to these 
officials, at the end of the early voting period, election department 
staff shut down the DRE machines and removed the memory cards (which 
stored cast votes). The officials said that the memory cards were 
sealed and returned to the election department office for counting, in 
a manner similar to Election Day DRE votes. In another jurisdiction we 
visited that used optical scan machines for early voting, officials 
told us that ballots were inserted by voters into the machines at the 
polls--the same procedure used on Election Day. At the end of each 
early voting day, according to the officials, the ballots from that day 
were physically transferred to the clerk's office and the optical scan 
results were submitted by modem to the jurisdiction's headquarters. 

Election Certification Periods Varied by State: 

Election returns posted on election night are unofficial and are not 
considered final until canvassing--the process described earlier of 
reviewing all votes by precinct, resolving problem votes, and counting 
all types of votes--is complete and the count is certified. 
Certification is when the vote count is finalized, generally by state 
and local officials. Our state survey showed that for the 2004 general 
election, states reported varied practices for when counts were 
certified and by whom, similar to the general election of 2000. 

Our state survey showed that most states reported setting certification 
deadlines, but the certification periods varied from state to state. 
Four states (Alaska, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island) and the 
District of Columbia reported not specifying a deadline following 
Election Day for certification of election results, while all other 
states reported specifying such a deadline. For example, certification 
on the second day after Election Day was reported by Delaware, while 
not later than 40 days was reported by Michigan. Some states reported 
caveats and varying levels of specificity in the certification 
deadlines. Maine reported allowing 3 days for local election official 
certification and 20 days for state-level certification. Missouri's 
reported deadline was by the fourth Tuesday following the election. 
North Dakota reported a deadline of not less than 3 days, but not more 
than 6. Similarly, the requirement reported for Texas was 15 to 30 days 
after the election. 

For the 2004 General Election, More States Had Requirements or Guidance 
for Determining Voter Intent: 

An important facet of the canvassing process is the consideration that 
may or may not be given to ballots that have not been marked properly. 
An improper mark, for example, could be a circle around a candidate's 
name instead of a checked box on a ballot that is to be scanned 
optically. For those states providing for the determination of voter 
intent, the importance of having explicit and consistent criteria for 
treating unclear ballots became evident in the 2000 general election 
when different interpretations for punch card ballots in Florida made 
the close presidential race extremely contentious. While subsequent 
federal reforms have not specified standards for treating unclear 
ballots, HAVA requires that each state adopt uniform standards, by 
January 2006, that define what constitutes a vote and what will be 
counted as a vote for each category of voting system used in the 
state.[Footnote 176] 

In our state survey, 39 states and the District of Columbia reported 
that for the November 2004 general election they had requirements or 
guidance for determining voter intent that focused primarily on 
improper ballot marks. Forty-five states and the District of Columbia 
reported they had requirements or guidance for determining how or 
whether to count a machine-unreadable ballot--one that cannot be 
processed by machine because it is damaged. 

Eighteen states that had reported not having provisions in place for 
the 2000 general election reported to us in our 2005 state survey that 
they had voter intent guidance for the November 2004 general election. 
Georgia, for example, had developed requirements for four methods: DRE 
machines, lever-type machines, optical scan, and hand-counted paper 
ballots. Some of Georgia's requirements were for certain ballots 
rejected by optical scan machines. These requirements provide for some 
measure of subjective determination of a voter's intent by election 
officials in certain specified instances. In such an instance, a vote 
shall be counted, under these Georgia provisions, if in the opinion of 
the vote review panel, the voter has clearly and without question 
indicated a choice for which the voter desired to vote. In addition, 
under specified circumstances, these Georgia provisions also provide 
for a similar type of voter intent determination with respect to hand- 
counted paper ballots. 

As described below, we found in our site visits that under state or 
local guidance, local jurisdictions we visited had gone to varied 
lengths in the 2004 general election to salvage ballots that were 
improperly marked or that were machine unreadable. These efforts varied 
by the type of voting equipment used in the jurisdiction. 

Optical scan ballots: In some jurisdictions, election officials told us 
that optical scan machines located at polling places could notify the 
voter of an unreadable or incorrectly marked ballot at the moment it 
was submitted. However, where the ballots were transferred to a central 
location for counting this would not be the case. In one jurisdiction 
in Colorado where optical scanning was done centrally for absentee 
ballots, election officials told us they were required to interpret 
voter intent or replace an unreadable ballot. According to election 
officials, the jurisdiction had instructions, which they stated were 
based on state statutes, specifying that bipartisan election judges 
would be the responsible parties for determining voter intent. Their 
deliberations, however, would be observed by others, according to the 
instructions. If a decision was reached on voter intent, a replacement 
ballot could be created and run through the optical scanner, according 
to the officials. 

Officials in a Kansas jurisdiction we visited said that state election 
standards were very specific for interpreting an incorrectly marked 
optical scan ballot. They would count a vote if an oval shape is 
marked, near but not inside the oval, and not closer to another 
candidate's name. A completed oval would also be counted if another 
oval for the same race was scribbled or crossed out. If the ballot 
could be interpreted locally, officials said election workers 
duplicated the vote on a new ballot for the optical scanner to read. 
According to election officials, if the intent was not clear, the 
ballot would be sent to the Board of Canvassers for further 
examination. State guidance also included standards for hand-counted 
paper ballots. 

In Florida, guidance in place for the November 2004 general election 
was even more specific than that provided in Colorado or Kansas. The 
guidance specified, for example, that, with respect to manual recounts, 
a vote may be counted if "there is an 'X', a check mark, a plus sign, 
an asterisk or a star, any portion of which is contained in a single 
oval or within the blank space between the head and tail of a single 
arrow and which does not enter into another oval or the space between 
the head and tail of another arrow." It also allowed for a vote to be 
counted under additional specified circumstances including if "there is 
a diagonal, horizontal, or vertical line, any portion of which 
intersects two points on the oval and which does not intersect another 
oval at any two points," provided that the horizontal line does not 
strike through the name of the candidate. 

Punch cards: While federal election reforms included provisions 
promoting replacement of punch card ballots, on the basis of our local 
jurisdiction survey, some jurisdictions continued to use them in the 
2004 election. As was the case for other types of ballots, levels of 
guidance for interpreting voter intent varied by state. Illinois 
reported that it had no requirements or guidance for determining voter 
intent, according to our state survey. Election officials in 2 Illinois 
jurisdictions using punch card ballots told us in our site visit that 
election workers did not attempt to ascertain the intent of voters on 
punch card ballots that were improperly punched. If the ballot could 
not be counted by a punch card-counting machine because of an improper 
punch or mark, the votes were not to be counted. 

In contrast to Illinois, Washington reported that it had guidelines or 
requirements regarding voter intent and allowed for remaking an 
unreadable or damaged punch card. In a Washington jurisdiction we 
visited that used punch card ballots in the 2004 general election, 
election officials said that state law guided their jurisdiction's 
written instructions for determining voter intent. Election officials 
said voters were given very specific instructions for how to change 
their vote before casting their vote, if necessary, on a punch card 
ballot while at the polls. These officials also said ballots could be 
either enhanced or duplicated if it was clear that a voter had followed 
these instructions. Also, according to the officials, a problem ballot 
could be enhanced or duplicated by officials if voter intent could 
easily be determined. If voter intent was at all unclear, the ballot 
was to be sent to the canvassing board for review. According to 
officials, canvassing board meetings were open to the public and state 
guidelines were to be used to interpret voter intent. Figure 49 shows a 
punch card voting booth. 

Figure 49: Punch Card Voting Booth: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Hand-counted paper ballots: While we estimate, on the basis of our 
local jurisdiction survey, that no large jurisdictions and only 3 
percent of medium jurisdictions used paper ballots in the November 2004 
general election for their predominant voting method, 41 percent of 
small jurisdictions did. This voting method presented yet another 
variation in the process of determining voter intent. For example, in 
one small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire, election officials 
we spoke with said a senior election official was on hand during ballot 
counting. They said if a ballot was unclear, the senior official would 
be involved to discuss it. If it was still unresolved, state guidance 
called for an unclear ballot to "be counted in accordance with a 
majority vote of the election officials present." The guidance, which 
we examined, also provided examples of what marks on a paper ballot to 
accept, as shown in figure 50. 

Figure 50: New Hampshire Guidance for Determining Voter Intent on Paper 
Ballots: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Recounts and Contested Elections Remained Uncommon for the November 
2004 General Election: 

As with the 2000 general election, recounts and contested elections 
were an uncommon event in the 2004 general election. On the basis of 
our local survey, we estimate that 92 percent of election jurisdictions 
nationwide did not conduct a recount for federal or statewide office. 
Also on the basis of our survey, recounts were more prevalent in large 
than in small election jurisdictions. Specifically, we estimate that 4 
percent of small jurisdictions, 16 percent of medium, and 24 percent of 
large jurisdictions conducted recounts for federal or statewide 
offices. Both large and medium jurisdictions were statistically 
different from small jurisdictions. Similarly, in our state survey, 37 
states and the District of Columbia reported they had no recounts for 
federal or statewide offices during the primary or general elections of 
2004, as shown in figure 51. 

Figure 51: Number of States Reporting Federal and Statewide Recounts 
for the 2004 Primary or General Elections: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Includes District of Columbia. 

[End of figure] 

Recounts are, in general, conducted because a candidate, voter, or 
group of voters has requested it or because the margin of victory was 
within a certain specified margin such that state provisions required 
or allowed for a recount. Election officials in local jurisdictions we 
visited in several states where recounts were conducted described to us 
the procedures they used for their 2004 general election recounts. In a 
New Hampshire jurisdiction, where a recount was conducted of the 
presidential race of 2004, officials said the recount was requested by 
a presidential candidate to test the accuracy of the optical scan vote- 
counting equipment. The officials provided the following description of 
the recount: Five wards in the jurisdiction had been selected for a 
sample recount. It was conducted by the New Hampshire Secretary of 
State's office, not by the local election jurisdiction. The 
jurisdiction's only role in the recount was to provide the Secretary of 
State with the optical scan ballots from the applicable wards. After 
the Secretary of State recounted a portion of the optical scan ballots 
and found no significant discrepancies between the initial vote tally 
and the partial recount, a full recount was not conducted statewide, 
according to these officials. 

In North Carolina, races for two statewide offices (the Agricultural 
Commissioner and the Superintendent of Public Instruction) were subject 
to recounts because, under state law, the close margin of victory 
allowed the losing candidates to request a recount, according to 
election officials. In 1 North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, which 
used DRE machines, local election officials described the recount 
process as follows: The recount was conducted in a different manner 
from the initial count. For the initial count, votes were 
electronically transferred from each DRE machine to vote storage 
devices at the polls that stored the vote totals by precinct. The 
precinct totals were then downloaded from the vote storage devices onto 
a computer located at the jurisdiction's election headquarters, and 
vote tabulation software summed vote totals from each precinct for each 
election contest in the jurisdiction. During the recount, rather than 
relying on aggregated votes totaled by precinct for a vote count, 
officials tabulated individual DRE ballots. To complete this process, 
the jurisdiction's tabulation software recognized individual ballot 
images from the DRE machines rather than aggregated votes per precinct. 
The individual ballot images were downloaded onto the computer in 
election headquarters, and votes for the races in question were 
retabulated (by voter, rather than by precinct as in the initial 
count). The outcomes of both the Agricultural Commissioner and the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction races were unaffected by the 
recount results. 

Generally, contested elections are court actions initiated by a 
candidate or voter alleging, for example, that some type of misconduct 
or fraud on the part of another candidate, election officials, or 
voters, occurred in a particular election. The results of our local 
survey indicate that contested elections were rare during the period 
from 2001 to the 2004 general election. In our local survey, we asked 
local jurisdictions whether they held any primary or general elections 
for federal or statewide offices during this period that were 
contested, and if so, whether the outcomes for these elections changed. 
On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that 5 percent of 
local election jurisdictions held a federal or statewide election that 
was contested during this period. The contested elections in which the 
winner did change involved races for offices such as state judge or 
governor, or for the U.S. House of Representatives. 

Perhaps the most heavily contested election in November 2004, which 
received a great deal of press coverage, was the Washington state 
governor's race. A close margin of victory and a candidate request 
prompted two recounts, and after the state certification of a winner in 
the election, the second place candidate's campaign and seven voters 
filed a petition in a state Superior Court contesting such 
certification, alleging that errors, omissions, mistakes, neglect, and 
other wrongful acts had occurred in conducting the election. The Chelan 
County Superior Court dismissed the election contest petition, finding 
that the petitioners failed to prove that grounds for nullification of 
the election existed.[Footnote 177] The Superior Court held, in 
general, that while there was some evidence of irregularities, the 
petitioners failed to adequately prove that the outcome of the election 
was changed as a result. The recount itself, however, revealed the 
substantial complexities involved in accomplishing an error-free count. 
We discuss this case more closely later in this chapter. 

Several States Had Further Developed Their Specifications for an 
Election Recount since the 2000 General Election: 

State provisions for recount processes vary, and not all states have 
provided for or required them in the past. For the November 2004 
general election, however, several states reported that they had 
introduced or further developed their specifications for election 
recounts since the 2000 general election. 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that 47 
states and the District of Columbia had provisions for recounts, though 
most did not have mandatory recount provisions.[Footnote 178] To better 
understand recount reform efforts to help ensure vote count accuracy 
since the 2000 election, we asked states in our 2005 survey about 
changes to their mandatory recount provisions in place for the November 
2004 general election. Nineteen states reported requiring a mandatory 
recount predominantly in cases of a tie or close margin of victory, 
whereas in 2001, 17 states indicated they required mandatory recounts. 
Thus, 2 more states reported requiring mandatory recounts for the 2004 
general election than for the 2000 general election. In addition, 3 
other states reported amending their existing provisions for mandatory 
recounts, while 3 said they had changed their requirements or guidance 
for who may request a recount as shown in table 23. Three states-- 
Hawaii, Mississippi, and Tennessee--reported not having any formal 
provision for conducting recounts--both for the 2000 or 2004 general 
elections. 

Table 23: States Reported Changes to Recount Provisions since 2000 for 
the 2004 General Election: 

States reporting changes: Alabama, Pennsylvania, Texas; 
Type of change since 2000: Mandatory recount requirement added. 

States reporting changes: Arizona, Minnesota, Washington; 
Type of change since 2000: Mandatory recount requirements amended. 

States reporting changes: Florida, Maine, Rhode Island; 
Type of change since 2000: Requirement or guidance for who may request 
a recount changed. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials: 

[End of table] 

Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Texas were the states that reported adding 
mandatory recount provisions for the 2004 election. Alabama law, in 
place for the 2004 general election, requires a recount when the 
election returns for any public office indicate that a candidate or 
ballot measure is defeated by not more than one-half of 1 percent of 
the votes cast for the office or the ballot measure--unless the 
defeated candidate submits a written waiver. In Pennsylvania, a recount 
is mandatory if an election is decided by one-half of 1 percent or 
less--unless the defeated candidate requests in writing that a recount 
and recanvass not be made. Texas reported that a recount was required 
only if two or more candidates tie in an election. 

For the 2004 general election, Arizona, Minnesota, and Washington 
reported adding more specifications to the vote margins that trigger 
recounts in their states than were in effect during the 2000 general 
election. Arizona added triggers for different types of races. For the 
2000 general election, Arizona reported requiring a mandatory recount 
when the margin of votes between the two candidates receiving the most 
votes was not more than 0.1 percent of votes cast for both candidates, 
or 200 votes for statewide offices and 50 votes for the state 
legislature. For the 2004 general election, Arizona reported in our 
state survey that it had amended its mandatory recount requirements so 
that the thresholds triggered by the number of votes only applied when 
the total number of votes cast was 25,000 or fewer. 

Washington's mandatory recount provisions in place for the November 
2004 general election had changed since the November 2000 general 
election. The requirement in 2000 for a mandatory recount by machine 
was a margin of 0.5 percent or less of total votes cast for the top two 
candidates. If the margin was less than 150 votes and less than 0.25 
percent of total votes cast for the top two candidates, a manual 
recount was required. The amended requirement, in place for the 
November 2004 general election, specified that a recount by machine was 
required when the margin is both fewer than 2,000 votes and less than 
0.5 percent of total votes cast for the top two candidates. If the 
margin was fewer than 150 votes and less than 0.25 percent of total 
votes cast for the top two candidates, there was to be a manual 
recount. 

Since the November 2000 election, Minnesota amended its mandatory 
recount triggers to include a specific percentage margin of victory in 
certain circumstances, rather than only a specified difference in the 
absolute number of votes between the top two candidates. While a margin 
of 100 votes or fewer in an election had previously triggered a recount 
for the 2000 general election, Minnesota election officials reported in 
our state survey that for the 2004 general election their state 
required a recount if the margin was determined to be either less than 
one-half of 1 percent of the total number of votes counted or, was 10 
votes or less when no more than 400 votes are cast. 

According to our state survey, state requirements or guidance for who 
may request a recount, in place for the November 2004 general election, 
changed in Florida, Maine, and Rhode Island since 2000. While any 
Florida candidate or candidate's political party in 2000 could request 
a recount, this was no longer true for the November 2004 general 
election. For the 2004 general election, Florida election officials 
reported that no candidate or political party could request a recount, 
and that the only authorized recounts were mandatory recounts to be 
conducted when the margin of victory was 0.5 percent or less of the 
total votes cast. Rhode Island, which reported that for the November 
2000 general election it had allowed recount requests by any candidate 
who trailed the winning candidate by less than 5 percent, reported that 
for the November 2004 general election, it required a smaller margin 
before a losing candidate could request a recount. For example, for 
races with between 20,001 and 100,000 votes, Rhode Island reported that 
it required a margin of 1 percent or less (or 500 votes) before a 
trailing candidate could request a recount, and for races with more 
than 100,000 votes the required margin was one-half of 1 percent (or 
1,500 votes) before a trailing candidate could request a recount. 
Maine, on the other hand, reported that its recount provisions in place 
for the November 2004 general election were clarified to provide that 
an apparent losing candidate, rather than only the second-place 
candidate, could request a recount. 

Vote Count Audits Were Not Prevalent in the 2004 General Election, but 
Some States Reported Taking Action to Require Them: 

Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia reported that for the 
2004 general election, they did not have provisions requiring or 
allowing local jurisdictions to conduct a vote count audit of election 
results. However, in our state survey, 9 states reported taking action 
since November 2004 (e.g., enacted legislation or took executive 
action) to require audits of vote counts. As used in this report, a 
vote count audit is an automatic recount, in full or in part, of the 
vote tabulation, irrespective of the margin of victory, in order to 
ensure accuracy before certification. 

On the basis of our state survey, as shown in figure 52, 8 states 
reported that for the 2004 general election they had a vote count audit 
requirement for all local jurisdictions, and 2 states reported 
requiring vote count audits for some local jurisdictions. Election 
officials from 29 states and the District of Columbia reported that for 
the 2004 general election they did not require or allow local 
jurisdictions to conduct vote count audits. Eleven states reported that 
they allowed them. We estimate, on the basis of our local survey, that 
15 percent of all local jurisdictions were required by their states to 
conduct such audits as part of the certification process for the 2004 
general election. Larger and medium jurisdictions were more likely to 
have been required to do so than smaller jurisdictions. Nine percent of 
small jurisdictions, 27 percent of medium, and 38 percent of large 
jurisdictions conducted a required vote count audit of the 2004 general 
election. Both large and medium jurisdictions were statistically 
different from small jurisdictions. 

Figure 52: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in 
Place for the 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Includes District of Columbia. 

[End of figure] 

Nine states reported in our state survey that they had enacted 
legislation or taken some executive action to require audits since 
November 2004.[Footnote 179] For example, in Washington, beginning 
January 1, 2006, prior to election certifications, county officials 
must audit the results of votes cast on DRE machines. The audit must be 
conducted by randomly selecting up to 4 percent of the DRE voting 
machines or one machine, whichever is greater, and for each device, 
comparing the results recorded electronically with the results recorded 
on paper. 

During our visits to local election jurisdictions, election officials 
in 5 jurisdictions described conducting vote count audits as a part of 
the election certification process for the November 2004 general 
election. For instance, 2 large jurisdictions in Nevada reported that 
the state requires each jurisdiction to randomly audit election results 
when DRE machines were used. According to officials in 1 of these 
Nevada jurisdictions, they were required to select 1 percent of DRE 
machines, or 20 machines, whichever amount is greater, and to perform a 
manual audit of the machine-tabulated vote totals. The officials said 
that they used a computer program to randomly select which of the 
jurisdiction's 740 DRE machines to audit. To conduct a paper-based 
audit, they told us that for each randomly selected machine, election 
workers printed the DRE result tapes from the voter-verified paper 
trail printer, manually counted the vote data on the tapes, and 
compared the manual count results to the original electronic results. 

In one large Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials told 
us they were required by the state to automatically audit (by 
retabulating votes) results of punch card ballots in 5 percent of their 
precincts, which were randomly selected. According to the officials, 
the State Board of Elections sent the jurisdiction officials a letter 
specifying which randomly selected precincts had to retabulate their 
votes. 

Election officials in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited said that 
state law required random audits when electronic voting machines were 
used. According to these officials, they were required to audit 2 
percent of DRE vote totals following an election. They told us, 
however, that in practice they actually audit all DRE machine vote 
totals to ensure an accurate vote count. They stated that vote data 
stored on DRE backup memory cards is printed and compared to vote data 
stored on DRE cartridges used in original vote counts. They said they 
operated on the assumption that because the internal memory cards serve 
as a backup system, there should be no difference in the totals. 

Local Jurisdictions Reported Some Mistakes and Technical Challenges in 
Counting Votes for the 2004 General Election: 

As in the general election of 2000, the 2004 general election saw 
failures to properly employ voting equipment. At several of the 
jurisdictions we visited, officials recounted mistakes in using the DRE 
systems, for example, that echoed other recent findings (in our 
September 2005 report on the security and reliability of electronic 
voting), noting inadequate understanding of the equipment on the part 
of those using it.[Footnote 180] 

In our September 2005 report on electronic voting, we noted that 
instances of fewer votes counted than cast in one Pennsylvania county 
in the 2004 general election had resulted from incorrectly programmed 
DRE machines. Similarly, in our 2005 site visits to election 
jurisdictions for this report, officials with whom we spoke recounted 
difficulties that had resulted from mistakes in programming the 
electronic equipment. In 1 Florida jurisdiction, for example, officials 
reported that the storage capacity of an optical scan accumulator (used 
to combine vote data from DREs and optical scanners) had been 
inadequately programmed to capture all of the votes cast. Officials 
there were able to discover and rectify the problem so that all votes 
were counted. In a Nevada jurisdiction, officials said that on Election 
Day, there were 198 provisional ballots (out of 4,532 cast) that were 
incorrectly programmed on the DRE machines at several polling 
locations, resulting in the provisional votes being counted without the 
voter first being qualified. According to these officials, poll workers 
forgot to add the "0" to the beginning of the precinct number. The 
officials noted that 2004 was the first time that the jurisdiction had 
used provisional voting and that in the future they planned to use 
paper provisional ballots to avoid any confusion. 

In a North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us 
about how a misunderstanding of the voting equipment resulted in the 
loss of votes. Specifically, election officials were unclear about the 
vote storage capacity of a DRE machine used in early voting and failed 
to notice the machine's warning that its file was full. The software 
installed on this machine was an older version of the program and only 
recognized up to 3,500 votes, according to election officials. Election 
administrators believed that it could recognize up to 10,500 votes. 
They discovered the error at the close of Election Day when reconciling 
the number of votes cast on the DRE machine used in early voting with 
the number of voters credited with early voting at the polls. 
Furthermore they said it was not until they subsequently conducted a 
simulation of votes cast that they discovered the cause of the problem. 
They also discovered that while the machine's software flashed warnings 
on its screen when the voter file became full, election workers had not 
seen it because of the screen's positioning. Also, according to the 
officials, they had been operating under the assumption that the 
machine would have automatically stopped accepting votes once the limit 
had been reached. Instead, the machine had continued to accept votes 
cast, overwriting earlier votes in order to accommodate the new ones. 
The officials said they determined that 4,235 votes were lost. 

Not all equipment failures resulted in lost votes, but some did create 
technical challenges. Officials in a Colorado jurisdiction stated that 
memory cards for optical scan machines at early voting sites sometimes 
failed, which meant that all affected optical scan ballots were 
rescanned using a new card once poll workers realized that the original 
card was malfunctioning. Also, in our September 2005 report on the 
security and reliability of electronic voting mentioned earlier, we 
noted that a Florida county experienced several problems with its DRE 
system, including instances where each touch screen took up to 1 hour 
to activate and had to be activated separately and sequentially, 
causing delays at the polling place. In addition, we reported that 
election monitors discovered that the system contained a flaw that 
allowed one DRE machine's ballots to be added to the canvass totals 
multiple times without being detected. In another instance, our report 
notes that a malfunction in a DRE system in Ohio caused the system to 
record approximately 3,900 votes too many for one presidential 
candidate in the 2004 general election. We also reported that a state- 
designated voting system examiner in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction noted 
that the county DRE system had technical problems, such as failure to 
accurately capture write-in votes, frozen computer screens, and 
difficulties sensing voters' touches. 

During our 2005 site visits, officials from 3 jurisdictions also 
described several cases of jamming problems with optical scan and punch 
card ballot tabulators. For example, election officials in a Kansas 
jurisdiction we visited told us that an extensive two-sided optical 
scan ballot frequently jammed voting machines because of its length. 
These officials told us that they used a two-sided ballot design which 
required that the optical scan counting equipment read the ballot front 
and back, which presented a problem. According to the officials, the 
ballot was not scored properly to feed easily through the equipment and 
paper jams occurred frequently. Election officials said the ballots had 
to be hand-sorted into 13 groups before scanning, which took time. 
Similarly, officials in a New Jersey jurisdiction told us that their 
optical scan machines had frequently jammed when reading provisional 
and absentee ballots. According to the officials, the ballots had two 
or three folds, which in combination with the high volume of ballots 
being read, jammed the machine regularly. To repair the jams, officials 
told us they would straighten ballots and run them through again, or, 
if needed, would remake the ballot. Also, officials in an Illinois 
jurisdiction we visited said punch cards had also jammed in their 
tabulator. Officials there said that this had been likely due to the 
punch cards swelling in humid weather, and this problem had caused the 
scanner to misread ballots on several occasions. In all of these 
instances, the problems were corrected. 

While we heard in our site visits about some human error at the polls, 
in our survey of local jurisdictions we found that human error was a 
problem for a small portion of election jurisdictions in terms of at 
least one key function. Specifically, we estimate that 6 percent of 
local jurisdictions nationwide experienced poll worker errors in 
tracking and accounting for ballots. To the extent that these errors 
occurred, they were more common in large jurisdictions. We estimate 1 
percent of small jurisdictions, 14 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 
34 percent of large jurisdictions had these errors. The differences 
between all size categories are statistically significant. In 10 of the 
jurisdictions we visited, election officials cited poll worker or voter 
errors as the cause of discrepancies in the number of ballots and 
voters. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, for example, election officials said 
the discrepancy in the number of ballots and votes was caused by the 
fact that poll workers did not track some voters who left the polling 
place without voting. In a Florida jurisdiction, according to election 
officials, some voters left the polling place without signing a poll 
book (which was used to reconcile voter numbers). Another cause for 
discrepancies in the number of ballots and voters cited by election 
officials in a Washington jurisdiction was that poll workers 
erroneously counted some provisional ballots as regular Election Day 
ballots, which led to the appearance of more regular Election Day 
ballots cast than voters credited with voting in that manner. 

Finally, from election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited, we 
learned of voter errors in using voting technology. In one Kansas 
jurisdiction, officials reported that some voters did not know how to 
scroll down the electronic screen to see all of the information. Also, 
we were told by election officials in a New Jersey jurisdiction that 
poll workers had noticed that some voters had failed to press a button 
to finalize their votes. According to these officials, the poll workers 
watched for such a mistake, and in at least one instance, reached under 
the curtain to register a vote while both a Democrat and a Republican 
poll worker observed the maneuver. 

In the 2004 General Election, Some Election Jurisdictions Reported 
Difficulty Meeting Deadlines for Certifying the Final Vote Count: 

According to state survey responses, 7 states (Arkansas, California, 
Georgia, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia) 
encountered a challenge during the 2004 general election related to 
timely completion of the certification process. For example, Georgia 
election officials reported difficulty in certifying election results 
in a timely manner that would allow a runoff election to commence 
within 3 weeks of Election Day. California officials responded that 
achieving an appropriate balance between vote count accuracy and the 
speed of vote tabulation was a challenge statewide. Arkansas officials 
said that the Secretary of State's office had to contact local election 
jurisdictions numerous times to receive certified election results in a 
timely manner. 

In some local jurisdictions we visited, we also heard about difficulty 
meeting certification deadlines, particularly with regard to 
provisional ballots. In 7 local election jurisdictions we visited, 
election officials cited concerns with the timing requirements of 
election certifications. Specifically, the task of verifying voter 
information with respect to provisional ballots and counting 
provisional ballots made achieving certification deadlines difficult. 
For example, officials in 1 Colorado jurisdiction said that verifying 
and counting provisional ballots within the state-mandated 12-day 
period required that the county hire additional workers. A Florida 
jurisdiction reported a similar challenge, but in this instance, these 
officials stated that the county canvassing board was required to 
consider each provisional ballot individually, which added to the 
challenge to meet the short state certification deadline. One large 
jurisdiction in Illinois also reported that its 14-day certification 
deadline was difficult to achieve because of the large number of 
provisional ballots that had to be verified and counted. In a 
Washington jurisdiction, officials stated that verifying and counting 
all ballots (including provisional ballots) within state-mandated 
periods had been a challenge in 2004. In 2005, the Washington state 
legislature extended the mandated certification deadline from 15 to 21 
days following any general election. 

The Recount in Washington State Revealed the Intricacies of the 
Election Process, but Also Yielded Many State Reforms: 

While the 2004 recount in Washington was one of few statewide recounts 
conducted across the country, the types of issues that surfaced during 
the recount about Washington's election system identified problems in 
all three key elements of elections--people, process, and technology. 
The close gubernatorial race and the recount subjected these elements 
to close scrutiny, revealing the vulnerability and interdependence of 
the various stages of the elections process and the unerring attention 
to detail that is required to run an error-free election. It was, in 
fact, the closest gubernatorial race in United States history. In the 
initial statewide count, a mere 261 votes separated the top two 
candidates--about 0.001 percent of the total votes cast. An initial 
recount reduced that margin of victory to just 42 votes out of more 
than 2.7 million cast, and the final recount resulted in a 129-vote 
margin of victory for the candidate who came in second in the first two 
vote counts. 

In part because it is the largest election jurisdiction (in number of 
voters) in Washington state, King County was the subject of some of the 
greatest scrutiny. However, problems were identified by courts in other 
jurisdictions in the state as well. As a result of this scrutiny, as 
discussed below, Washington state, and King County itself, has 
subsequently instituted many reforms. 

Breakdowns in Interaction of People, Process, and Technology Can Impair 
the Vote Count: 

We reviewed a variety of reports and studies on this extraordinary 
election, including state task force studies, an internal county 
review, a management audit sponsored by the Election Center,[Footnote 
181] and the findings of a state Superior Court that resulted from a 
lawsuit challenging the results of the final recount. The principal 
problems we identified in these materials ranged from poll worker 
errors to challenges in using equipment. Described here, they 
illustrate how breakdowns in the interface of people, process, and 
technology may, at any stage of an election, impair an accurate vote 
count. 

Provisional Ballots Counted before Being Validated: 

In at least 11 counties provisional ballots were found by a Washington 
state Superior Court to have been counted without verifying voter 
signatures or before verification of voter registration status was 
completed.[Footnote 182] For example, in Pierce County, Washington, 77 
provisional ballots were found by the Superior Court to have been 
improperly cast. Provisional ballots were to have included on the 
ballot envelope the voter's name and residence. Because the provisional 
voter's identity or residence was not marked on the provisional ballot 
envelope for these 77 ballots, voter registration status could not be 
verified. In King County, the court found that 348 provisional ballots 
were improperly cast without verifying voter eligibility. The Election 
Center management audit found this had occurred because the provisional 
voters had been allowed to put their ballots, which had not been 
verified, directly into the optical scan machines at the voting 
precincts. The Superior Court found that of these 348 provisional 
ballots, 252 were ultimately determined to have been cast by registered 
voters. According to the audit, this error resulted from poll worker 
confusion about who was accountable for the provisional voting process 
at the polls. No one poll worker was assigned responsibility for 
tracking provisional ballots. 

Illegal Votes Cast by Felons: 

The Superior Court also found that more than 1,400 votes had been cast 
illegally by felons during the November 2004 general election in 
counties across Washington. Under Washington state law, in general, 
persons convicted of a federal or state felony are not eligible to vote 
unless their right to vote has been restored. According to the King 
County audit, some felons were registered to vote in King County. The 
audit stated that election registration officials had very limited 
information available to them regarding such felons that would have 
allowed them to periodically purge the rolls. Moreover, according to 
the audit report, when a former felon who wished to register signed an 
affidavit to attest to the fact that his or her voting rights had been 
restored, election officials had no expedient way to verify the claim, 
particularly for former felons convicted in a different county. In 
addition, the audit report noted that election officials did not 
necessarily have the authority to refuse to accept a registration form. 
In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration 
lists, we found that similar challenges in identifying and removing 
felons from voter rolls were reported in other states as well.[Footnote 
183] 

More Votes Counted than Cast: 

The Superior Court found that more votes were counted than the number 
of voters credited with voting. Specifically, a judge cited evidence of 
190 excess votes counted in Clark County, 77 excess votes counted in 
Spokane County, 20 excess votes counted in Island County, and 14 excess 
votes counted in Kittitas County. In a King County internal report, 
election officials reported that the discrepancy between voters 
credited with voting and ballots cast was about 0.2 percent, or over 
1,000 votes. The Election Center management audit concluded that the 
discrepancy may have been due, in part, to the use of an electronic 
wand held by temporary employees to scan the entry codes in the poll 
book when registrants came to vote. The audit noted space limitations 
and difficulty hearing the wand's beep when it processed a bar code may 
have prevented an accurate count of voters. During our site visit with 
King County officials, they told us that separate from the wanding 
issue, poll worker training deficiencies may have contributed to 
discrepancies in the number of votes credited and cast when voter 
information was not entered properly into poll books. 

Uncounted Ballots Discovered after Results Had Been Certified: 

According to the Superior Court's findings, in several counties 
uncounted ballots were discovered after the certification of the 
initial election results. The Superior Court found that there were 64 
uncounted absentee ballots found in Pierce County and 8 in Spokane 
County. According to the Election Center audit, in King County, the 
uncounted ballots were both absentee and provisional ballots, and 22 
absentee and provisional ballots were discovered in the base units of 
optical scan machines after the election was certified. The audit 
concluded that poll workers had failed to adhere to their procedures 
for checking these units when reconciling ballots after the polls 
closed, and recommended strengthening both procedures and training. 

Absentee Ballots Erroneously Disqualified: 

In King County, during the second recount, the King County Canvassing 
Board discovered that election workers had disqualified 573 absentee 
ballots during initial canvassing when they could not find the voters' 
signatures in the county's new computerized voter registration list for 
verification. In addition, the election workers had not checked 
elsewhere for these signatures, such as on the voters' paper 
registration forms. In the recount, the King County Canvassing Board 
decided to recanvass these ballots to determine whether their 
disqualification had been appropriate or whether these ballots should 
have been counted.[Footnote 184] According to the King County audit, 
the voter registration list had been very recently updated, and for 
this reason, not all voter signatures had been scanned and 
electronically stored in time for the general election so that election 
workers would have been able to find them. 

Verifying absentee ballots was another issue highlighted during the 
recount. According to press accounts, differences existed in how local 
jurisdictions in the state verified the signatures of absentee and 
provisional voters. The Seattle Times reported conducting a survey in 
which it found that signatures went through as many as four levels of 
review in one county and only one level in another. Also, the newspaper 
reported that some counties would look for as many as six different 
identifying traits of a signature, while others "eyeballed the 
handwriting." Recommendations by the Governor's Election Reform Task 
Force identified the verification of voter signatures as one of several 
areas needing more procedural consistency among the counties. 

The Washington Recount Fueled Several Reforms at the State and Local 
Levels: 

Washington enacted into law a series of election reform measures in 
2005 designed to clarify, standardize, and strengthen election 
requirements and procedures. Several of the statewide reforms 
specifically address problems described above, but others are broader 
measures designed to improve election administration. Examples of these 
measures are listed below. 

* Unique provisional and absentee ballots: All provisional and absentee 
ballots are required to be visually distinguishable from one another 
and must be either printed on colored paper or imprinted with a bar 
code for the purpose of identifying the ballot as a provisional or 
absentee ballot. The bar code must not identify the voter. Provisional 
and absentee ballots must be incapable of being tabulated by polling 
place counting devices. 

* Standardized guidelines for signature verification processes: The 
Secretary of State is to establish guidelines for signature 
verification relating to, for example, signatures on absentee and 
provisional ballot envelopes. All election personnel assigned to verify 
signatures are required to receive training on the established 
guidelines. State law also provides that while signatures on certain 
mail-in ballot envelopes (such as absentee ballots) must be compared 
with the voter's signature in the county registration files, variation 
between the signature on a return envelope and the signature of that 
voter in the registration files due to the substitution of initials or 
the use of common nicknames (e.g., Joseph Smith versus Joe Smith) is 
permitted so long as the surname and handwriting are clearly the same. 

* Triennial review of county election processes and reports listing 
corrective actions: Instead of being performed periodically, state- 
conducted reviews of county election-related policies, procedures, and 
practices are to be performed at least once every 3 years. If staffing 
or budget levels do not permit a 3-year review cycle, such reviews must 
be done as often as possible. The county auditor or the county 
canvassing board must respond to the review report in writing, listing 
steps to be taken to correct any problems. Before the next primary or 
general election, the Secretary of State's office must visit the county 
and verify that the corrective action has been taken. 

* Election law manuals for use in all vote-counting centers: The 
Secretary of State must prepare a manual explaining all election laws 
and rules in easy-to-understand, plain language for use during the vote 
counting, canvassing, and recounting process. The manuals must be 
available for use in all vote-counting centers throughout the state. 

* Option to conduct voting entirely by mail: Another change introduced 
by the state, which may avoid errors at the polls, has been to give 
county officials the option to conduct elections entirely by mail. The 
new measure authorizes the use of all-mail voting in counties upon the 
express approval by a county's legislative authority and provides that 
such approval must apply to all primary, special, and general elections 
conducted by the county. For example, King County has announced plans 
to conduct elections entirely by mail in 2007. The King County 
Independent Task Force on Elections found in 2005 that the King County 
election process basically involved simultaneously conducting two 
dissimilar elections. The task force stated that increasingly, a 
majority of King County voters (565,011, or slightly more than 62 
percent in 2004) used the permanent absentee or vote-by-mail process. 
Despite this fact, the task force reported that the county also 
conducted a traditional election involving about 330,000 voters 
assigned to over 2,500 precincts and 540 individual polling places, and 
the use of hundreds of temporary election workers who must be trained 
and who work at the polling places for more than 13 hours on election 
days. Furthermore, the task force stated that both election processes 
contain independent, complex, and often conflicting requirements that 
have clearly caused significant problems for King County election 
officials. Having one means of voting for all citizens is perceived to 
be both more efficient and cost-effective than the previous process, 
according to the task force. 

* Paper records for electronic voting devices and precertification 
audits of electronic voting results: All electronic voting devices 
must, beginning January 1, 2006, produce an individual paper record of 
each vote, at the time of voting, that may be accepted or rejected by 
the voter before finalizing his or her vote. This audit is to be 
conducted by randomly selecting a specified percentage of electronic 
voting devices and, for each device, comparing the results recorded 
electronically with the paper records. The audit process must be open 
to observation by political party representatives if such 
representatives have been appointed and are present at the time of the 
audit. 

Separate from changes made at the Washington state level, King County, 
as reported in the Election Center audit, also implemented or was in 
the process of implementing changes to improve election administration 
that specifically address issues that arose during the 2004 general 
election.[Footnote 185] Examples of such reported changes are below: 

* Controls to manage provisional ballots: Provisional ballots will be 
color-coded for easy recognition and will have timing marks that 
prevent the counter at the polling place from accepting them. 
Therefore, the voter has no option but to return his or her provisional 
ballot to a poll worker, who will place it in a provisional envelope. 
One additional poll worker is to be assigned to each polling place to 
exclusively manage provisional ballots for all voters at that polling 
place. 

* Controls to prevent misplaced ballots: Poll workers are required to 
record the serial number located at the bottom of the optical scan bins 
on the ballot reconciliation transmittal form. The serial number is not 
visible if any ballots remain in the bin. Increased poll worker 
training, attaching a flashlight to the inside of each bin, and 
continued adherence to existing procedures for troubleshooters to 
examine each bin before certification are also intended to help ensure 
that all ballots are properly handled and counted in future elections. 

* Additional procedures for tracking absentee ballots and registration 
signatures: King County performed a database search of the entire voter 
file prior to the fall 2005 elections, in order to identify missing or 
unreadable signatures. On the basis of the search results, elections 
personnel contacted voters and made significant progress in updating 
the files. In addition, procedures at the absentee ballot operation 
center have been enhanced. New logs were created for tracking absentee 
ballots that required additional research because they were not easily 
verified. Also, in any instance where a voter registration signature is 
not on file, or is illegible, a search for the original record, as well 
as a call and a letter to the voter, is required. 

* Improvements to procedures for reconciling ballots and voters: For 
the 2005 primary and general elections, the use of electronic hand 
wands to scan poll books, when reconciling ballot and voter numbers, 
was to be done at a county center where more space would be available. 
New checklists were developed that required staff to balance the number 
of signatures recorded with the wand against the number of ballots 
counted by the computer. Also, the hand-wand process was to occur at 
the beginning rather than at the end of the canvass to allow more time 
for any necessary research into potential discrepancies. 

Concluding Observations: 

Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the 
50 states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is 
the same across the nation: to accurately count all ballots cast by 
eligible voters. As with the elections process overall, conducting an 
accurate vote count is not a simple process. It requires many steps, an 
unerring attention to detail, and the seamless integration of people, 
processes, and technology. 

Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a 
jurisdiction for casting their ballots--early, absentee, provisional, 
and Election Day voting--enhances eligible voters' opportunity to vote. 
At the same time, multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make 
the vote-counting process more complicated. In addition, short 
deadlines for certifying the final vote--as little as 2 days in 1 
state--provide little time for election officials to review, verify, 
and count provisional and absentee ballots. Larger jurisdictions 
generally face more challenges than smaller jurisdictions because of 
the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types--absentee, 
provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for many 
jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in tracking, 
verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in November 
2004, some jurisdictions are implementing new procedures for 
provisional voting, such as printing provisional ballots in a color 
different from other types of ballots or using paper ballots rather 
than DRE machines for provisional voters. 

Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington have announced plans to move 
to all-mail elections, which was authorized on a county-wide basis by 
recent state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail 
voting eliminates some challenges--e.g., poll worker training on voting 
equipment operations and provisional voting or the chance of 
malfunctioning voting equipment at the polls--in some circumstances it 
could magnify the importance of other aspects of state election 
processes, such as verifying votes, accurately matching voter 
signatures and having guidance for determining voter intent from 
improperly or unclearly marked ballots. For those jurisdictions 
allowing or requiring the determination of a voter's intent from an 
improperly or unclearly marked ballot, the importance of having 
explicit and consistent criteria for treating such ballots became 
evident in the 2000 general election when different interpretations for 
such ballots in Florida made the close presidential race extremely 
contentious. Eighteen states that reported they did not have voter 
intent guidance in place for the November 2000 general election 
reported to us in our state survey that they did have voter intent 
requirements or guidance in place for the November 2004 general 
election. While federal election provisions do not address the state 
counting issue of ascertaining voter intent, HAVA did require states to 
adopt, by January 2006, uniform and nondiscriminatory standards 
defining what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for 
each type of voting system used by the state. 

The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed 
the interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring 
an accurate vote count. That experience also illustrated how small 
errors in election operations can affect the vote counting process. 
Were any state's election processes subjected to the very close 
scrutiny that characterized the recount in Washington state, it is 
likely that imperfections would be revealed. Votes are cast and 
elections are conducted by people who are not and cannot be 100 percent 
error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the consistently 
error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large 
jurisdictions with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person, 
absentee, or provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve 
consistent error-free vote counts can help to ensure that any errors 
are reduced to the minimum humanly possible. 

[End of section] 

Chapter 7: 
Voting Methods and Technologies: 

Voting methods can be thought of as tools for accommodating the 
millions of voters in our nation's more than 10,000 local elections 
jurisdictions. These tools are as simple as a pencil, paper, and a box, 
or as sophisticated as programmable computer-based touch 
screens.[Footnote 186] Regardless of method, however, the proper 
operation and functioning of each depends on its effective interplay 
with the people who participate in elections (both voters and election 
workers) and the processes (governed by policies, procedures, and so 
forth) that govern the interaction of people with one another and with 
the voting method. 

This chapter focuses on voting methods--the technology variable in the 
people, process, and technology election equation. It describes the use 
of voting methods in the 2004 general election, compares this 
technology environment with that of the 2000 general election, and 
examines plans for voting technologies in the 2006 election, 
particularly in light of the roles being played by states and HAVA. It 
also examines efforts to measure and understand how well voting 
equipment performed in the 2004 election (see fig. 53 for equipment 
examples), including the state of performance standards and local 
jurisdictions' overall satisfaction with their respective voting 
methods. Additionally, this chapter discusses the state of practice 
relative to voting system security, testing, and integration, and 
presents key challenges facing all levels of governments as voting 
systems, related election systems, and supporting technologies continue 
to evolve. 

Figure 53: Examples of Voting Equipment: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Overview: 

The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied 
and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local 
jurisdiction survey estimates. We estimate on the basis of our local 
jurisdiction survey that the predominant voting methods most often used 
for the 2004 general election by large jurisdictions were DRE and 
precinct count optical scan, while medium jurisdictions most often used 
precinct count optical scan and small jurisdictions most often used 
paper ballot. In addition, the predominant voting method most often 
used for large jurisdictions changed from precinct count optical scan 
in 2000 to both DRE and precinct count optical scan in 2004, while the 
predominant voting methods remained the same for the other jurisdiction 
sizes. Also in the 2004 general election, an estimated one-fifth of 
jurisdictions used multiple voting methods to support voting 
activities. Most states generally exercised influence over the voting 
methods used by their respective elections jurisdictions through a 
range of approaches such as requiring the use of one specific voting 
method, helping with local acquisition efforts, or eliminating voting 
methods, according to our 2005 state survey. Ten states and the 
District of Columbia reported that they required the use of one 
specific method for the 2004 general election, and 4 additional states 
planned to require a specific method for the 2006 general election. 
Sixteen states and the District of Columbia reported that they were 
involved to some extent in local jurisdiction efforts to acquire voting 
systems, components, and services. States also reported that they were 
eliminating lever and punch card equipment between the 2000 and 2006 
general elections. Specifically, for the November 2000 general 
election, 37 states reported that they used lever or punch card voting 
equipment; 
by the November 2006 general election, only 4 states had plans to use 
lever and punch card equipment. HAVA has influenced state and local 
decisions regarding particular voting methods by providing funds to 
states to replace punch card and lever voting equipment with other 
voting methods. This greater state involvement in jurisdictions' choice 
of voting methods, combined with federal funding to replace lever and 
punch card voting equipment and certain HAVA requirements-- among other 
factors--is likely to influence the adoption of DRE and optical scan 
voting methods. 

Federal and state standards provide an important baseline for the 
performance of voting systems and were widely adopted for the 2004 
general election. However, according to our local jurisdiction survey, 
voting equipment performance was not consistently measured during the 
2004 general election and varied by jurisdiction size and voting 
method, in part because some types of measures were not well suited to 
particular voting methods. For example, small jurisdictions were 
generally less likely to collect accuracy measures such as accuracy of 
voting equipment (estimated at 31 percent for small jurisdictions) than 
large and medium jurisdictions (66 percent and 54 percent, 
respectively), and this may be because the predominant voting method 
most used by small jurisdictions was paper ballot. On the other hand, 
on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the 
vast majority of all jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied 
with their systems' performance during the 2004 general election. For 
instance, we estimate that 78 percent of jurisdictions were very 
satisfied or satisfied with the accuracy of their voting system 
performance. The estimated high satisfaction levels demonstrated across 
different voting system performance areas and jurisdiction sizes 
contrast with our lower estimates of the performance measures that were 
collected for the 2004 general election. Although the reasons for 
moderate collection levels for performance measures are unclear, 
jurisdictions that may not have collected performance data or may have 
considered such information not applicable to their situation may lack 
sufficient insight into their system operations to adequately support 
their satisfaction in the variety of performance areas we surveyed. The 
moderate collection levels of data on operational voting system 
performance may present a challenge to state and local election 
officials in their efforts to make informed decisions on both near-term 
and long-term voting system changes and investments. 

A wide range of recently published concerns for the security of voting 
systems and the development of nationwide mechanisms under HAVA to 
improve security standards and processes have not yet produced a 
consistent approach across all jurisdictions for managing the security 
of voting systems. Our 2005 local jurisdiction survey and our visits to 
local jurisdictions found that voting system security has been 
primarily shouldered by local jurisdictions. However, states, vendors, 
law enforcement officials, and others shared in these efforts to 
varying degrees for the 2004 general election. Our state survey for the 
2004 general election and visits to local jurisdictions indicated that 
security mechanisms employed by some states--but not others--included 
promulgation of policies and guidance, compliance of voting equipment 
with security standards, and monitoring and evaluation of implemented 
security controls. According to our local jurisdiction survey estimates 
and visits to local jurisdictions, jurisdictions and their support 
organizations were largely responsible for implementation of security 
controls, such as access restrictions to voting equipment, system 
backup capabilities, and security-related testing. Estimates from our 
local jurisdiction survey also showed, however, that many jurisdictions 
nationwide had not documented their security measures, and we found 
that several of the jurisdictions we visited reported that they had not 
implemented recommended measures, such as security plans, training, and 
documentation of policies and procedures. Furthermore, decisions by 
states to continue using outdated voting system standards may allow the 
vulnerabilities of newer technologies to go unevaluated and impair 
effective management of the corresponding security risks. States and 
local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and 
consistently applying appropriate standards and other directives to 
meet the vulnerabilities and risks of their specific election 
environments. 

Testing and evaluation of voting systems also varied across states and 
jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. Our state survey found 
that most states required certification testing of their voting systems 
using a range of criteria. However, responsibility for purchasing a 
certified system typically rested with local jurisdictions. Other 
results from our 2005 state survey and responses from jurisdictions we 
visited indicated that acceptance testing continued to be commonly 
performed, but there was wide variation in the responsibilities and 
practices for this type of testing, including whether such testing was 
applied to new systems or upgrades, the extent of vendor participation, 
and the coverage of hardware and software functions. Also on the basis 
of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that most jurisdictions 
conducted readiness (logic and accuracy) testing for the 2004 general 
election as they did for the 2000 election, but in some jurisdictions 
we visited, we found they used different procedures that may have 
included one or more processes such as diagnostic tests, mock 
elections, or suites of test votes. In contrast, our local survey 
estimates indicate that parallel testing was employed by fewer than an 
estimated 2 percent of jurisdictions. This may be due to, in part, the 
lack of directives for conducting such tests.[Footnote 187] Finally, 
postelection voting system audit tests were conducted by fewer than 
half of jurisdictions for the 2004 general election, according to our 
local survey estimates, although many more large and medium 
jurisdictions performed these tests than small jurisdictions. As with 
other types of testing, the requirements and practices for audit tests 
were diverse. Factors associated with the testing of voting systems may 
further challenge states and local jurisdictions as they adapt to 
changes in voting system capabilities, standards, and national 
certification for the 2006 general election. Those factors are likely 
to include increased certification testing workloads to recertify 
systems with new capabilities, ongoing limits to the number of 
available testing laboratories until a new laboratory accreditation 
process becomes fully operational, and more complex testing because a 
new version of the federal voluntary voting system guidelines has been 
added in 2005 to older federal standards from 1990 and 2002 that states 
are already using. 

The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of 
voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 
general election, according to estimates from our local jurisdiction 
survey and visits to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of 
integration we examined, such as electronic programming or setup and 
electronic management. Two-thirds of the jurisdictions we visited told 
us that they used electronic programming or setup of voting equipment, 
and an estimated 7 percent of jurisdictions that used voting methods 
other than paper ballots, according to our local survey, connected 
their voting equipment via a local network at polling locations. 
Relatively few local jurisdictions we visited also reported having 
plans for integrating or further integrating their election-related 
systems and components for the 2006 general election, and in the 
instances where jurisdictions reported plans, the scope and nature of 
the plans varied. For instance, officials at 5 jurisdictions we visited 
reported plans to introduce a voter-verifiable paper trail (VVPT) 
capability for future elections, and officials from 1 jurisdiction 
reported plans to purchase an optical scanner with the ability to 
tabulate both DRE and optical scan election results. Nevertheless, the 
potential for greater integration in the future does exist as states 
and jurisdictions act on plans to acquire the kind of voting equipment 
(e.g., optical scan and DRE products) that lends itself to integration. 
For example, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate 
that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical 
scan equipment before the 2006 general election, and officials from 2 
jurisdictions we visited who used DRE equipment told us that their 
state planned to purchase electronic poll books for its precincts to 
use during the 2006 elections to electronically link its voter 
registration system with its voting systems. It is unclear if and when 
this migration to more technology-based voting methods will produce 
more integrated election system environments. However, suitable 
standards and guidance for these interconnected components and systems-
-some of which remain to be developed--could facilitate the 
development, testing, operational management, and maintenance of 
components and systems, thereby maximizing the benefits of current and 
emerging election technologies and achieving states' and local 
jurisdictions' goals for performance and security. The challenge 
inherent in such a dynamic environment is to update system standards so 
that emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions are 
systematically addressed. 

Voting Methods Vary among Jurisdictions and Are Being Influenced by 
States' Choices and HAVA: 

The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied 
and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local 
jurisdiction survey estimates. We estimate on the basis of our local 
jurisdiction survey that the predominant voting methods most often used 
for the 2004 general election by large jurisdictions were DRE and 
precinct count optical scan, while medium jurisdictions most often used 
precinct count optical scan and small jurisdictions most often used 
paper ballot. Two key patterns emerged in the use of voting methods 
between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. First, we estimate that 
the percentage of large jurisdictions using DREs doubled from 15 
percent in the 2000 general election to 30 percent in 2004. The 
predominant voting method for large jurisdictions changed from precinct 
count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE and precinct count optical scan 
in 2004. In contrast, we estimate that the predominant voting methods 
remained the same for small and medium jurisdictions (paper ballots and 
precinct count optical scan, respectively) from 2000 to 2004. 
Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate 
that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical 
scan equipment before the 2006 general election. Second, in response to 
our state survey, 9 states reported that they eliminated the lever 
machine and punch card voting methods for the 2004 general election. In 
addition, 18 other states plan to eliminate lever or punch card voting 
methods for the 2006 general election. This greater state involvement 
in jurisdictions' choice of voting methods, the availability of federal 
funding to replace lever and punch card voting equipment, and certain 
HAVA requirements--among other factors--are likely influences on the 
adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods. 

Voting Methods Differ by the Size of Local Jurisdictions and States' 
Choices: 

Since the November 2000 general election, the DRE voting method has 
become more widely used in large jurisdictions, according to our local 
jurisdiction 2005 survey. During the same period, states' reported use 
of lever machine and punch card voting methods has decreased, according 
to responses to our 2005 state survey. Our state and local jurisdiction 
surveys also indicate plans for changes to voting technologies for the 
2006 general election. 

Overall, the estimated percentages of predominant voting methods used 
by local jurisdictions in the 2000 and 2004 general elections did not 
change appreciably. In particular, from our local jurisdiction survey, 
we estimate that the mix of predominant voting methods used in the 
November 2000 general election was 5 percent DRE, 21 percent central 
count optical scan, 26 percent precinct count optical scan, 5 percent 
central count punch card, 2 percent precinct count punch card, 8 
percent lever, and 31 percent paper.[Footnote 188] In comparison, we 
estimate that the mix for the November 2004 general election (in the 
same order) was 7 percent DRE, 21 percent central count optical scan, 
30 percent precinct count optical scan, 2 percent central count punch 
card, 2 percent precinct count punch card, 7 percent lever, and 30 
percent paper. Figure 54 compares these percentage changes. 

Figure 54: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant 
Voting Methods in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

According to our local jurisdiction survey, there may have been a small 
shift away from punch card and lever machine voting methods (estimated 
at 3 percent or 1 percent loss of jurisdictions, respectively) and may 
have been an increase in optical scan and DRE voting equipment 
(estimated at 5 percent and 2 percent gain of jurisdictions, 
respectively) for the 2004 general election. However, these differences 
are not statistically significant. During the same time frame, we 
estimate that 16 percent of jurisdictions acquired new voting equipment 
through their own purchases or leases and 15 percent of jurisdictions 
through purchases or leases by their state. Thus, the new voting 
equipment acquired by many jurisdictions since 2000 did not 
substantively affect the predominant voting methods that were already 
in use. 

One notable change did occur, however, in the use of predominant voting 
methods in the 2000 and 2004 general elections. The percentage of large 
jurisdictions using DREs doubled (estimated at 15 percent in 2000 and 
30 percent in 2004, respectively)--an increase that is statistically 
significant. This increase in the use of DREs changed the predominant 
voting method most often used for large jurisdictions, which was 
precinct count optical scan in 2000, to both DRE and precinct count 
optical scan in 2004. A smaller increase in the use of DREs among 
medium jurisdictions (from an estimated 13 percent in 2000 to 20 
percent in 2004) is not statistically significant, and there was 
virtually no change in DRE use among small jurisdictions (an estimated 
1 percent for both elections). In contrast, the use of paper ballots as 
a predominant voting method did not appreciably change between the 2000 
and 2004 general elections (with overall use at 30 percent in 2000 and 
31 percent in 2004, respectively). Small jurisdictions were the major 
contributors to this steady use of paper ballots (estimated at 43 
percent in 2000 and 41 percent in 2004, respectively); 
medium jurisdictions were minor contributors (3 percent for each 
election). (No large jurisdictions used paper ballots as their 
predominant voting method for either of these elections.) We also 
estimate that use of precinct count optical scan as the predominant 
voting method for medium jurisdictions did not change appreciably 
between the 2000 and 2004 elections (estimated at 35 percent in 2000 
and 39 percent in 2004, respectively). Figure 55 shows the estimated 
use of predominant voting methods for small, medium, and large 
jurisdictions in the 2004 general election. 

Figure 55: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant 
Voting Methods in 2004, by Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Percentages for predominant voting methods within each 
jurisdiction size may not add to 100 because of rounding. 

[A] The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[B] The differences between both small and medium jurisdictions and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[C] The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. 

[End of figure] 

The more widespread adoption of DREs by large jurisdictions was 
consistent with their greater proportion among jurisdictions that 
acquired voting equipment since 2000. According to our local 
jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 37 percent of large jurisdictions 
bought or leased new voting equipment since 2000, compared with 21 
percent of medium jurisdictions and 12 percent of small jurisdictions, 
where the differences between large jurisdictions and both medium and 
small jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate 
that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical 
scan equipment before the 2006 general election.[Footnote 189] Both 
large and medium jurisdictions are more likely to have plans to acquire 
DREs before the November 2006 general election (estimated at 34 percent 
each) than small jurisdictions (estimated at 13 percent), while small 
jurisdictions are more likely to have plans to acquire precinct count 
optical scan voting equipment (estimated at 28 percent) than medium or 
large jurisdictions (estimated at 17 percent and 15 percent, 
respectively). In general, fewer jurisdictions expected to acquire 
central count optical scan voting equipment than the other two voting 
methods, although the differences were not statistically significant. 
The percentages of jurisdictions planning to acquire the newer voting 
systems before the next general election are shown in figure 56 by the 
size of jurisdiction. 

Figure 56: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire 
Particular Voting Systems before the November 2006 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. The 95 percent 
confidence interval for large jurisdictions planning to acquire DREs is 
+/-8 percentage points. 

[B] The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. 

[C] The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. 

[End of figure] 

Another interesting pattern emerged in voting methods between November 
2000 and November 2004 at the statewide level. Thirty-seven states 
reported that at least 1 jurisdiction used lever machine or punch card 
voting equipment for the November 2000 general election. By the time of 
the November 2004 general election, the number of states that continued 
to employ these voting methods decreased to 28. Specifically, our state 
survey results show that 9 states reported that they completed 
replacement of all their punch card or lever voting equipment before 
the November 2004 general election, and 4 other states reported that 
they completed their replacements since the 2004 election. Of the 
remaining 24 states that reported using the punch card and lever 
methods in 2000 but had not yet replaced them at the time of our 
survey, 18 reported that they planned to replace all punch card and 
lever voting equipment by the November 2006 general election, while 3 
planned to replace a portion of their equipment by then. One state 
reported no replacement plans prior to the November 2006 general 
election. Figure 57 summarizes the states' progress and plans for 
replacing punch card and lever voting equipment. 

Figure 57: State-Reported Status of Lever and Punch Card Voting 
Equipment in 2000, 2004, and 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Our local jurisdiction survey provided insight into jurisdictions' 
plans for acquiring technology-based voting methods and the time frames 
for executing these plans, which may increase the predominance of these 
methods in future elections. Specifically, we estimate that 25 percent 
of local jurisdictions are planning to acquire precinct count optical 
scan machines by the November 2006 general election, 19 percent expect 
to acquire DREs by then, and about 7 percent plan to acquire central 
count optical scan equipment before that election.[Footnote 190] In 
addition, we estimate that between 4 and 10 percent of local 
jurisdictions had plans to acquire additional equipment in each of 
these voting methods but had not set a target date for doing so at the 
time of our survey.[Footnote 191] 

During visits to election jurisdictions across the country, local 
election officials explained some of their motivations behind plans to 
acquire DRE or optical scan voting equipment. For example, election 
officials in 6 jurisdictions cited HAVA as the reason for purchasing 
new DRE equipment, particularly HAVA's requirement that each voting 
place have at least one voting method that is accessible to persons 
with disabilities, as we discussed earlier in chapter 4.[Footnote 192] 
More specifically, officials in 1 large jurisdiction in Connecticut 
said that they would evaluate the use of DREs to meet HAVA 
accessibility requirements before deciding whether to purchase more 
DREs in time for the November 2006 general election. Election officials 
from 5 other jurisdictions stated that they planned to purchase new 
voting equipment to provide a VVPT, a requirement levied by 3 of the 14 
states we visited (Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico). Officials from 5 
other jurisdictions said that they expected to acquire new voting 
equipment but did not give a reason and, in some cases, did not yet 
know what type of equipment they would obtain. Officials in 
jurisdictions that did not plan to purchase new voting equipment told 
us that their existing equipment was sufficient or that budget 
constraints prevented the acquisition of new equipment, among other 
reasons. 

More Jurisdictions Used Several Voting Methods: 

As for the 2000 general election, some jurisdictions used multiple 
voting methods to support the 2004 general election, and some of these 
methods were more widely used than others for particular types of 
voting. In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes 
nationwide, we reported that 5 percent of jurisdictions used more than 
one voting method.[Footnote 193] On the basis of our 2005 local 
jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 21 percent of jurisdictions used 
more than one voting method in the November 2004 general election, with 
the most common combination of methods being central count optical scan 
with paper ballot (estimated to be 5 percent of 
jurisdictions).[Footnote 194] Other common combinations in 2004 were 
lever machine with paper ballot (4 percent) and DRE with paper ballot 
(3 percent). DRE with central count optical scan was one of numerous 
other combinations used by 2 percent or less of local jurisdictions. 
Figure 58 shows the estimated proportion of jurisdictions with the most 
prevalent single and combination voting methods. 

Figure 58: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 
Single and Multiple Voting Methods in the November 2004 General 
Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Percentages for single and multiple voting methods do not add to 
100 because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

The specific mix of voting methods used can also be viewed with respect 
to particular types of voting (e.g., absentee, early, provisional) that 
were supported in the 2004 election. In this regard, some voting 
methods were applied to a particular type of voting more frequently 
than others. We estimate that paper ballot was the most widely used 
voting method for absentee voting (36 percent of jurisdictions), 
provisional voting (18 percent), and early voting (8 percent). Precinct 
count optical scan (shown in fig. 59) was generally the second most 
widely used voting method for these types of voting (24 percent of 
jurisdictions for absentee, 10 percent for provisional, and 5 percent 
for early voting, respectively), while central count optical scan was 
the third most widely used method (20 percent of jurisdictions for 
absentee, 9 percent for provisional, and 5 percent for early voting, 
respectively). 

Figure 59: Precinct Count Optical Scan Voting Equipment: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Jurisdictions' Voting Methods Were Influenced by the States and HAVA: 

Most states have generally exercised influence over the voting methods 
used by their respective elections jurisdictions through a range of 
approaches. In particular, for our state survey, a majority of states 
(32) and the District of Columbia said that they restricted the voting 
methods employed by local jurisdictions in the 2004 election either by 
requiring the use of one specific method (10 states and the District of 
Columbia) or providing a list of approved voting methods for the 
jurisdiction to select from (22 states). An alternate approach reported 
by 10 states was to require local jurisdictions to obtain state 
approval when selecting a voting method. The remaining 8 states said 
that local jurisdictions chose the voting method they used without any 
state involvement. 

In addition to affecting the choice of voting methods, 16 states and 
the District of Columbia reported that they were involved to some 
extent in local jurisdiction efforts to acquire voting systems, 
components, and services. For example, 1 state reported that it 
evaluated voting equipment options and vendors, and then contracted 
with a single vendor to supply voting equipment for all jurisdictions 
in the state. Jurisdictions within this state then had the option of 
purchasing additional voting equipment from this vendor, as needed. The 
top map of figure 60 shows the role of each state in the selection of 
specific voting methods for jurisdictions in the 2004 general election. 

Figure 60: State-Reported Involvement in the Use of Specific Voting 
Methods in the 2004 and 2006 General Elections: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Responses to our state survey indicate that state influence over the 
voting methods to be used in the November 2006 general election will 
continue to increase. Four additional states planned to require the use 
of a single voting method statewide, which will bring the total number 
of states doing so to 14, and the District of Columbia will do so as 
well. Also, 5 additional states reported that they will require local 
jurisdictions to select a voting method or methods from a state- 
approved list, bringing this total to 27; 
8 states intended to continue to allow local jurisdictions to select 
their voting methods with state approval. Only 1 state was not 
expecting to be involved in decisions on voting methods for its 
jurisdictions for 2006. The bottom map of figure 60 shows the role of 
each state in the selection of specific voting methods for 
jurisdictions in the 2006 general election. 

Consistent with state survey responses indicating their contributions 
to local jurisdictions' selection of voting methods and on the basis of 
our local jurisdiction survey, one of the most frequent factors that 
influenced the 16 percent of local jurisdictions that bought or leased 
new voting equipment since the November 2000 general election was state 
requirements or certification of the equipment (an estimated 83 percent 
of the 16 percent of jurisdictions that bought or leased the new voting 
equipment). Other widely influential factors included ease of equipment 
use (91 percent), vendor demonstrations (72 percent), and affordability 
(68 percent). In contrast, local requirements and HAVA funding were 
less influential factors for local jurisdictions' acquisition of voting 
equipment (44 percent and 45 percent of jurisdictions, respectively). 
(See fig. 61.) 

Figure 61: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Identifying 
Factors That Influenced Buying or Leasing Voting Equipment since the 
2000 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Note: These percentages represent responses from the estimated 16 
percent of our sample of local jurisdictions that responded to our 
local jurisdiction survey that they bought or leased new voting 
equipment for the 2004 general election or later. The 95 percent 
confidence interval for values in all categories is +/-13 percentage 
points or less. 

HAVA has also influenced state and local decisions regarding particular 
voting methods through mechanisms to encourage the adoption of 
technology. Among other things, HAVA provided funds to states to 
replace punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods 
(Section 102 funds).[Footnote 195] During fiscal year 2003, the General 
Services Administration (GSA) reported distributing about $300 million 
to 30 states that applied for these funds. Figure 62 depicts an 
overview of the funds distributed to states specifically to replace 
lever machines and punch card voting equipment. (Fig. 57 presented an 
overview of states' progress in replacing lever and punch card voting 
equipment.) In responding to our state survey, 24 of the 30 states 
reported that they had invested at least a portion of these funds to 
replace lever or punch card voting equipment as of August 1, 2005. 

Figure 62: Federal Payments to States in Fiscal Year 2003 under HAVA to 
Replace Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: These figures represent lower limits on payments for replacement 
of lever and punch card voting equipment as made under HAVA Section 
102. States may use additional HAVA funding obtained under HAVA Section 
101 for voting equipment replacement or upgrade. However, these uses 
have not been separately tracked or reported by EAC or GSA to date. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to the funding that HAVA earmarked for voting equipment 
replacement, states could also apply for other HAVA funds that could be 
used for multiple purposes, including replacement or upgrade of voting 
systems (Section 101 funds).[Footnote 196] In its 2004 annual report, 
EAC reported that almost $344 million had been distributed to each of 
the 50 states and the District of Columbia under this multiple purpose 
funding category. In all, 44 states and the District of Columbia 
reported in our state survey that they had spent or obligated funds 
from one or both of these HAVA funding sources in order to improve, 
acquire, lease, modify, or replace voting systems and related 
technology. EAC requires states to submit detailed annual reports on 
the use of those funds but has not yet compiled data from the state 
reports about spending for voting equipment covered in HAVA Section 
101. 

Besides authorizing funding for changes to voting methods, HAVA also 
has the potential to influence voting methods through new requirements 
for the usability and accountability of voting systems. Among other 
things, HAVA requires that voting systems used in federal elections 
provide voters with ballot verification and correction capabilities by 
January 1, 2006, including: 

* the opportunity to verify their ballots in a private and independent 
manner before they are cast; 

* the ability to change their ballots or correct any error in a private 
and independent manner before the ballots are cast and counted; 
and: 

* the capability to both notify the voter whenever more than one 
candidate has been selected for a single office and correct the 
ballots.[Footnote 197] 

HAVA also requires voting equipment to generate a permanent paper 
record with manual audit capacity as an official record of the 
election.[Footnote 198] 

Our October 2001 report on election processes described how voting 
methods varied in their ability to support features such as error 
identification and correction for voters.[Footnote 199] With regard to 
minimizing voter error at the polls, our local jurisdiction survey for 
the 2004 general election found that, for instance, voters were 
provided the opportunity to correct a ballot or exchange a spoiled 
ballot for a new one in most jurisdictions, and such capabilities were 
largely available for all voting methods. Our estimates of the 
availability of ballot correction capabilities range from 100 
percent[Footnote 200] (for jurisdictions whose predominant voting 
method was central count punch cards) to 70 percent (for jurisdictions 
predominantly using DREs).[Footnote 201] However, the differences among 
these voting methods were not statistically significant. Figure 63 
shows one approach that allows voters to verify and correct their 
ballots using a particular voting method (DRE). 

Figure 63: Example of DRE Instructions and Equipment: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

With regard to voting equipment that generated a permanent paper record 
with a manual audit capability for election audits in the 2004 general 
election (including solutions such as VVPT), we estimate that few 
jurisdictions that used DREs had this capability.[Footnote 202] 
Specifically, from our local jurisdiction survey, a small proportion of 
jurisdictions that used DREs for the 2004 election had manual audit 
capabilities such as VVPT (estimated at 8 percent of DRE 
jurisdictions)[Footnote 203] or printing of ballot images (11 percent 
of DRE jurisdictions).[Footnote 204] An estimated 52 percent of 
jurisdictions using DREs had equipment that produced an internal paper 
record that was not voter-verifiable.[Footnote 205] With this limited 
implementation of HAVA-related capabilities in the 2004 general 
election, it appears that most of the voting system and election 
process changes to comply with these specific HAVA usability and 
accountability requirements will need to be satisfied by jurisdictions 
for the 2006 general election. 

Voting Equipment Performance Was Not Consistently Measured during the 
2004 General Election, but Estimated Levels of Performance Satisfaction 
Were High: 

Voting system performance can be viewed in terms of accuracy, 
reliability, and efficiency. Accuracy refers to how frequently the 
equipment completely and correctly records and counts votes; 
reliability refers to a system's ability to perform as intended, 
regardless of circumstances; 
and efficiency refers to how quickly a given vote can be cast and 
counted. Performance in each of these areas depends not only on how 
well a given voting system was designed and developed, but also on the 
procedures governing its operation and maintenance and the people who 
use and operate it. Thus, it is important that system performance be 
measured during an election when the system is being used and operated 
according to defined procedures by voters and election workers. As we 
have previously reported in our October 2001 report on election 
processes, measuring how well voting systems perform during a given 
election allows local election officials to better position themselves 
for ensuring that elections are conducted effectively and 
efficiently.[Footnote 206] Such measurement also provides the basis for 
knowing where performance needs, requirements, and expectations are not 
being met so that timely corrective action can be taken. 

HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by 
specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing 
for updates to the federal voting system standards, including the 
performance components of those standards. Moreover, according to our 
local jurisdiction survey, most local jurisdictions adopted performance 
standards for the 2004 general election--usually standards selected by 
their respective states.[Footnote 207] As was the case for the 2000 
general election, jurisdictions collected various types of voting 
system performance measures for the 2004 general election, although 
some types of measures were collected by fewer jurisdictions than 
others--in part because they were not well suited to particular voting 
methods. Furthermore, from our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate 
that the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very satisfied or 
satisfied with their systems' performance during the 2004 general 
election, even though performance data may not have been collected to 
an extent that would provide firm support for these views. 

HAVA Has Increased the Focus on Voting System Performance: 

In our October 2001 report on voting equipment standards, we reported 
that the national voluntary voting system standards being used by some 
states and local jurisdictions at that time were originally approved in 
1990[Footnote 208] and were thus out of date.[Footnote 209] Among other 
things, these standards identified minimum functional and performance 
thresholds for voting systems in terms of accuracy, reliability, and 
efficiency. In 2002, the Federal Election Commission updated these 
standards and, in doing so, provided new or enhanced coverage of 
certain performance requirements for, among other things,[Footnote 210] 

* voting system components that define, develop, and maintain election 
databases; perform election definition and setup functions; format 
ballots; count votes; consolidate and report results; and maintain 
records to support vote recounts; 

* direct feedback to the voter that indicates when an undervote or 
overvote is detected in DRE and paper-based voting systems that 
encompass punch cards and optical scan; 

* system standards to meet the needs of voters with disabilities, 
including specific standards for DREs; 
and: 

* strengthened election record requirements to address a range of 
election management functions, including such functions such as ballot 
definition and election programming. 

HAVA further focused attention on voting system performance by 
establishing a performance requirement for systems used in elections 
for federal offices and by providing for updates to federal voting 
system standards. Specifically, HAVA required that voting systems used 
in federal elections comply with error rate standards specified in the 
2002 federal voting system standards.[Footnote 211] Under these 
standards, the maximum acceptable error rate during testing is 1 in 
500,000 ballot positions.[Footnote 212] In addition, HAVA directed EAC 
to revise the voluntary national voting system standards, and to test, 
certify, decertify, and recertify voting system hardware and software 
with respect to national voting system standards using accredited 
testing laboratories. 

Most Jurisdictions Adopted Voting System Performance Standards, but 
Collection of Performance Measures Varied by Jurisdiction Size and 
Voting Method: 

On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the 
vast majority of jurisdictions that used some type of automated voting 
equipment on Election Day generally established written standards for 
the performance of their voting equipment for the November 2004 general 
election.[Footnote 213] Of these, most jurisdictions (an estimated 77 
percent) had adopted their state's standards or requirements pertaining 
to voting system performance, although a few had adopted performance 
standards from a source other than their state (10 percent) or 
developed their own (8 percent).[Footnote 214] The apparently high 
adoption rate for standards among states and local jurisdictions is 
important because it indicates broad acceptance of a basic management 
tool needed for systematic performance measurement and evaluation. 

Consistent with our results on voting system performance measurement 
from our October 2001 report on election processes,[Footnote 215] 
estimates from our local jurisdiction survey indicated that 
jurisdictions used several specific measures that could be generally 
grouped into the areas of accuracy, reliability, and efficiency to 
assess the performance of their voting systems for the 2004 general 
election. However, jurisdictions measured how well their systems 
actually performed in the 2004 election to varying degrees. In the 
discussion below, we compare jurisdictions' collection of selected 
information on voting system performance for the 2000 and 2004 general 
elections, and then examine jurisdictions' performance monitoring in 
each of the three performance areas. 

On the basis of on our local jurisdiction surveys for the 2000 and 2004 
elections, we estimate that about 50 percent of jurisdictions collected 
performance information in both elections using three measures-- 
accuracy, undervotes, and overvotes. The percentage of jurisdictions 
that collected information on a fourth performance measure--average 
time to vote--was much smaller (estimated at 10 percent or less). The 
differences between estimates for the two elections are not 
statistically significant.[Footnote 216] Figure 64 shows the 
percentages of jurisdictions that collected these performance measures 
for the 2000 and 2004 general elections. 

Figure 64: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Voting 
System Performance Information for the 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: These estimates include only county election jurisdiction 
subgroup comparisons between the 2001 and 2005 surveys. See appendix V 
for further details about sampling differences between the surveys. 

[End of figure] 

Accuracy: 

In the area of accuracy, we estimate that 42 percent of jurisdictions 
overall monitored the accuracy of voting equipment in the 2004 general 
election.[Footnote 217] Other widely used measures of accuracy in the 
2004 general election were spoiled ballots (estimated at 50 percent of 
jurisdictions),[Footnote 218] undervotes (50 percent of jurisdictions), 
and overvotes (49 percent of jurisdictions). During our visits to local 
jurisdictions, election officials in several jurisdictions told us that 
measuring overvotes was not a relevant performance indicator for 
jurisdictions using lever machines and DREs because neither permits 
overvoting. Election officials in several local jurisdictions we 
visited also told us that undervotes were not a meaningful metric 
because most voters focused on a limited range of issues or candidates 
and thus frequently chose not to vote on all contests. 

Jurisdictions' collection of the accuracy measures we studied for the 
2004 general election varied according to jurisdiction size, with small 
jurisdictions generally less likely to collect these measures than 
other jurisdiction sizes. Both large jurisdictions (an estimated 66 
percent) and medium jurisdictions (54 percent) were significantly more 
likely than small jurisdictions (31 percent) to collect data on vote 
count accuracy. In addition, large jurisdictions (65 percent) were 
significantly more likely than small jurisdictions (47 percent) to 
collect data on undervotes.(See fig. 65.) This disparity may be due to 
the proportion of smaller jurisdictions that use paper ballots and for 
whom collection of these data would be a manual, time-consuming 
process. 

Figure 65: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Accuracy for the 2004 General Election, by 
Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions in these 
categories is +/-6 percentage points. 

[C] The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for 
small jurisdictions is +/-6 percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Reliability: 

In the area of reliability, we estimate that 15 percent of 
jurisdictions measured the reliability of their voting equipment in 
terms of pieces of equipment that failed, and 11 percent measured 
equipment downtime.[Footnote 219] As with accuracy, a higher percentage 
of large and medium jurisdictions collected such reliability data than 
small jurisdictions, and in the case of equipment failures, there were 
statistically significant differences in the collection of this 
information among different sizes of jurisdictions. (See fig. 66.) 
Importantly, an estimated 55 percent of all jurisdictions kept a 
written record of issues and problems that occurred on Election Day, 
which could be a potential source of reliability data. 

Figure 66: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Equipment Reliability for the 2004 General 
Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are 
statistically significant. 

[End of figure] 

Collection of reliability data for automated voting equipment was also 
related to the predominant voting method used by a jurisdiction, with 
jurisdictions that predominantly used DREs more likely to collect 
reliability data than those that used optical scan voting methods. An 
estimated 45 percent of jurisdictions whose predominant method was DREs 
collected information on the number of pieces of voting equipment that 
failed. The next most frequently collected information on machine 
failures was for precinct count optical scan systems (an estimated 23 
percent of jurisdictions) and central count optical scan systems (an 
estimated 10 percent). The differences in data collection on equipment 
failures among jurisdictions that predominantly used DREs and those 
that used precinct count optical scan or central count optical scan 
voting methods are statistically significant. (See fig. 67.) 

Figure 67: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting Equipment Failures for the 2004 General Election, 
by Predominant Voting Method: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The differences between DRE and both central count and precinct 
count optical scan voting methods are statistically significant. 

[A] The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is +/-13 percentage 
points. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan 
percentages is +7 or -5 percentage points. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan 
percentages is +8 or -7 percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Efficiency: 

In the area of efficiency, we estimate that 13 percent of jurisdictions 
measured their voting system's speed of counting votes, 17 percent 
measured the time it took for election workers to set up equipment, and 
4 percent measured the average length of time it took for voters to 
cast ballots on Election Day. Large jurisdictions (34 percent) were 
significantly more likely than were both medium jurisdictions (19 
percent) and small jurisdictions (9 percent) to collect information on 
counting speed. There were no significant differences for other 
efficiency measures by jurisdiction size. (See fig. 68.) 

Figure 68: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 
Information on Voting System Efficiency for the 2004 General Election, 
by Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are 
statistically significant. 

[End of figure] 

It is worth noting that for several types of performance measures in 
our local jurisdiction survey, jurisdiction size was a factor in 
whether system performance information was collected. Generally, large 
jurisdictions were most likely to record voting system performance and 
small jurisdictions were least likely, with medium jurisdictions in 
between. Moreover, large jurisdictions were more likely to keep a 
written record of issues or problems that occurred on Election Day. 
Specifically, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we 
estimate that 79 percent of large jurisdictions kept such records, 
compared with 59 percent of medium jurisdictions and 52 percent of 
small jurisdictions.[Footnote 220] The differences between large 
jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically 
significant. The responsibilities for monitoring or reporting voting 
system performance most often rested with local jurisdictions. On the 
basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 83 percent of 
local jurisdictions had local officials responsible for performance 
monitoring or reporting, while states or other organizations (such as 
independent consultants or vendors) held such responsibilities in 11 
percent and 13 percent of jurisdictions, respectively. 

Information obtained during our visits to local election jurisdictions 
was generally consistent with the above estimates from our local 
jurisdiction survey. For example, election officials in the 28 
jurisdictions we visited most frequently cited number of undervotes (14 
jurisdictions), overvotes (10 jurisdictions), and equipment failures 
(10 jurisdictions) as types of performance metrics collected. Another 
collected metric (cited by election officials in 6 jurisdictions we 
visited) was equipment speed, measured in terms of how fast the voting 
equipment downloaded vote totals or transmitted totals to its central 
count location, and the time required to cast a vote (reported by 
election officials in 4 jurisdictions, although officials in 2 of these 
4 jurisdictions limited their measurements to early voting). Another 
measurement that election officials in some jurisdictions told us they 
collected was comments from poll workers and voters on the efficiency 
of the equipment. For instance, an election official in a large 
jurisdiction in Georgia told us that poll workers commented that it 
took 20 minutes to vote using the voting equipment's audio feature. In 
addition, election officials in several jurisdictions that we visited 
told us that they had established performance management programs for 
their voting systems. For example, election officials in 1 jurisdiction 
reported that they collected data on the time it took to vote to better 
allocate its voting equipment to various locations. Officials in a 
large jurisdiction in Kansas said they had conducted a survey of voters 
concerning their satisfaction with the ease of use of voting equipment 
during the 2004 general election and determined that they were very 
satisfied. 

Local Jurisdictions Were Generally Satisfied with Their Voting Systems 
in 2004, although Some Problems Were Reported: 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that 96 
percent of local jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with the 
performance of the voting equipment during the November 2000 general 
election. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 
general election, we estimate that election officials were generally 
satisfied with their voting system performance. Estimated satisfaction 
varied for specific areas of voting system performance, ranging from 
relatively high levels for accuracy (78 percent), speed of vote 
counting (73 percent), time to set up equipment (63 percent), and 
number of spoiled or ruined ballots (61 percent), to relatively low 
levels for equipment failures (37 percent), and downtime (36 
percent).[Footnote 221] Some of these measures may not be applicable to 
all jurisdictions, such as those using only hand-counted paper ballots. 
When jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots were 
excluded from our results, satisfaction levels were higher in all 
performance areas--accuracy (86 percent), speed of vote counting (83 
percent), time to set up equipment (76 percent), number of spoiled 
ballots (68 percent), equipment failures (54 percent), and downtime (52 
percent). However, even with the exclusion of paper ballot 
jurisdictions, "not applicable" responses were often selected by 
jurisdictions in the areas of equipment failures (41 percent not 
applicable) and downtime (43 percent not applicable). 

Also on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, for five of six 
satisfaction measures, we estimate that medium and large jurisdictions 
were satisfied or very satisfied with their voting systems more 
frequently than small jurisdictions and that most of these differences 
are statistically significant. These ratings may be related to the 
widespread use of paper ballots by small jurisdictions, where this 
voting method was predominant in an estimated 41 percent of 
jurisdictions. Figure 69 shows the frequency of satisfaction in each of 
six performance areas for large, medium, and small jurisdictions. 

Figure 69: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Satisfied with Voting 
System Performance for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Satisfaction combines percentages with responses for "satisfied" 
or "very satisfied." Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper 
ballots on Election Day were excluded from this figure. 

[A] The differences between both small and medium jurisdictions and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[B] The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are 
statistically significant. 

[C] The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. 

[D] The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[E] The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. The 95 percent 
confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/-7 percentage points. 

[F] The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/-7 
percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

The estimated high satisfaction levels demonstrated across different 
voting system performance areas and jurisdiction sizes contrast with 
our lower estimates of the performance measures that were collected for 
the 2004 general election. Although the reasons for moderate collection 
levels for performance measures are unclear, jurisdictions that may not 
have collected performance data or may have considered such information 
not applicable to their situation may lack sufficient insight into 
their system operations to adequately support their satisfaction in the 
variety of performance areas we surveyed. 

Local election officials at most of the 28 jurisdictions we visited 
also expressed satisfaction with the performance of their voting 
systems or method. For example, 

* Election officials in several jurisdictions using optical scan 
systems stated that they were pleased with their equipment because it 
produced a paper trail and permitted fast processing. Officials in 1 
large jurisdiction in Florida added that their use of the same 
equipment over several elections made it easy for voters to use the 
equipment in both 2000 and 2004. 

* Election officials in several other jurisdictions using DREs told us 
that their equipment was easy to use and provided results that were 
accurate and timely. Officials in 1 large jurisdiction in New Jersey 
reported that, in contrast to paper ballots, DREs do not require poll 
workers to interpret a voter's ballot. 

* Election officials in a large Connecticut jurisdiction using lever 
machines said that voters were happy with the equipment and that it had 
worked well for over 60 years. They emphasized that the simplicity and 
transparency of the equipment's counting mechanisms gave voters 
confidence that their votes would be counted correctly. 

* Election officials in a small New Hampshire jurisdiction using paper 
ballots reported that they had used the same hand-counted paper ballot 
system for decades and it has been very cost-effective for the small 
population of voters in the jurisdiction. 

Overall, election officials in few of the 28 jurisdictions that we 
visited reported substantive performance issues, such as overvoting, 
undervoting, or equipment failure. 

Although the estimated level of satisfaction with voting equipment 
performance in the 2004 general election was high overall, some 
dissatisfaction existed. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, 
we estimate that between 1 and 4 percent of jurisdictions were 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their voting systems in the 2004 
general election for the six performance areas of our survey. 

Our local jurisdiction survey provided additional insight into the role 
of voting equipment in jurisdictions' dissatisfaction ratings. Of 
almost 300 responses to our open-ended question about the issue or 
problem that occurred most frequently on Election Day, November 2004, 
fewer than 20 responses were specifically related to voting equipment. 
The most frequent reason for voting system dissatisfaction was voting 
equipment malfunction. Ballot errors related to voting equipment were 
much less frequently mentioned. 

Although such problems were rarely mentioned by election officials 
during our visits to local jurisdictions, some did describe a few 
reasons for dissatisfaction with voting equipment, including: 

* the additional time required to count ballots using DREs versus the 
optical scan equipment previously used, 

* the perceived lower reliability and greater failure rates of DREs 
over the voting equipment used in the past, 

* accuracy problems with DRE computer programs, and: 

* difficulty in first-time poll worker operation and voter use of DREs. 

Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited noted situations 
that required considerable effort to resolve. For example, as mentioned 
in our discussion of vote counting in chapter 6, election officials in 
a North Carolina jurisdiction told us that 4,235 ballots were lost by 
one of the DREs used for early voting because the software manufacturer 
had not installed an upgrade that would have allowed the machine to 
record up to 10,000 ballots rather than its original limit of 3,500 
ballots. The machine continued to show the number of people who voted 
on the machine after 3,500 ballots had been cast, but did not store the 
results of their ballots. As a result, the jurisdiction switched to 
hand-counted paper ballots for elections after the 2004 general 
election until its state can approve a new automated system for use. 
Given the real and potential impacts of situations where 
dissatisfaction was reported, systematic collection and analysis of 
performance information may help provide election officials with 
objective support for decisions to improve the operation and upgrade of 
these systems. 

Attention to Voting System Security Management Continues to Vary amid 
Published Concerns and Federal Improvement Efforts: 

Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public 
confidence in the election process, and accomplishing this is a shared 
responsibility among federal, state, and local jurisdiction 
authorities. Among other things, voting system security involves 
ensuring that technical security controls embedded in voting equipment 
operate as intended, as well as ensuring that security policies and 
procedures governing the testing, operation, and use of the systems are 
properly defined and implemented by state and local election officials. 

Our October 2001 report on election processes identified voting system 
security challenges facing local jurisdictions, such as consistent 
application of controls and adequacy of resources.[Footnote 222] HAVA 
recognized some of these challenges by requiring specific system 
security controls and providing improved security management guidance. 
Nevertheless, while we estimate from our local survey that most 
jurisdictions have assigned responsibility for voting system security 
to individuals and implemented certain security controls, the nature 
and extent of their respective security efforts and activities varied 
widely. In particular, according to our state survey, estimates from 
our local jurisdiction survey, and visits to jurisdictions, there are 
differences across jurisdictions in the (1) adoption of system security 
standards, with some states requiring jurisdictions to use outdated 
standards for voting systems; (2) reported implementation of system 
security controls; and (3) testing performed to ensure that security 
controls are functioning properly. For instance, we estimate on the 
basis of our local jurisdiction survey that at least 19 percent of 
local jurisdictions nationwide (excluding jurisdictions that reported 
using paper ballots) did not conduct security testing for the systems 
they used in the November 2004 general election. In addition, 27 states 
reported in our state survey that they are requiring jurisdictions to 
apply federal standards to voting systems used for the first time in 
the November 2006 general election that are outdated, unspecified, or 
entail multiple versions. This variability in implementation and 
testing of controls is generally consistent with what we reported for 
the 2000 general election. Moreover, our September 2005 report on the 
security and reliability of electronic voting highlighted substantial 
security issues and concerns for more modern electronic voting systems 
and reinforced the importance of effective security 
management.[Footnote 223] 

HAVA Has Increased Focus on Voting System Security: 

HAVA recognized the importance of effective voting system security 
through two primary mechanisms. First, it required voting systems to 
produce a permanent paper record that provides a manual review 
capability and constitutes the official record for recounts by January 
1, 2006.[Footnote 224] The paper record can be compared with polling 
place records and voting system documentation to ensure that authorized 
ballots have been completely and accurately counted. Second, HAVA 
provided various means to assist states and localities in acquiring and 
operating secure voting systems. These include provisions for EAC to 
(1) update voting system standards for voting systems, including 
standards for security;[Footnote 225] (2) establish processes for 
accrediting voting system testing laboratories and conducting tests of 
voting systems against the standards;[Footnote 226] and (3) create a 
process for federal certification of voting systems that undergo the 
testing process.[Footnote 227] In doing so, HAVA created tools and 
resources that states and local jurisdictions can leverage when, for 
example, acquiring systems from vendors, conducting system testing, and 
operating and auditing voting systems. 

However, delays in establishing EAC and commission funding challenges 
resulted in the first update to the 2002 voluntary voting system 
standards, and its provisions for system security, not being approved 
until December 2005.[Footnote 228] Further, commission efforts to 
establish processes for accrediting testing laboratories, conducting 
testing, and certifying systems are still under way. 

Efforts to Address System Security Continued to Vary Widely, and 
Jurisdictions Were Inconsistent in Following Common Security Practices: 

As was the case for the November 2000 general election, the nature and 
extent of voting system security efforts and activities during the 2004 
election varied among jurisdictions. Moreover, these efforts and 
activities do not in all cases reflect the use of recommended system 
security management practices and current voting system security 
standards. 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that 
jurisdictions had taken a number of steps to manage the security of 
their respective voting systems for the 2000 general election.[Footnote 
229] In particular, we estimated that 89 percent of the local 
jurisdictions assigned responsibility for performing security-related 
functions to one or more individuals, and implemented some type of 
controls to protect their equipment during the election. Examples of 
implemented security controls included such physical controls as locks 
and surveillance, and such embedded controls as access restrictions and 
firewalls. However, we also reported in 2001 that an estimated 40 
percent of the jurisdictions had not assessed the security threats and 
risks on which their controls were based,[Footnote 230] and 19 percent 
had not reviewed the sufficiency of their security controls. Moreover, 
the nature of established controls varied by type of system, and these 
controls were not uniformly followed across jurisdictions.[Footnote 
231] 

For the November 2004 general election, jurisdictions addressed system 
security to varying degrees and through various means. At the 
foundation of these approaches, responsibilities for voting system and 
network security were distributed among local officials, the state, and 
third parties (e.g., independent consultants and vendors) in varying 
proportions. On the basis of our 2005 local jurisdiction survey, we 
estimate that 90 percent of all jurisdictions (excluding those that 
used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day) specifically 
assigned responsibility for voting system security in the 2004 general 
election.[Footnote 232] We estimate that 67 percent of these local 
jurisdictions assigned responsibilities for voting system and network 
security to local election officials, 14 percent relied on state 
officials to perform these responsibilities, and 24 percent assigned 
them to third parties.[Footnote 233] Moreover, this distribution varied 
somewhat according to jurisdiction size, with large jurisdictions 
depending on local officials the most and medium jurisdictions 
depending on local officials the least. Figure 70 shows how voting 
system and network security responsibilities were distributed among 
various parties for each size of jurisdiction. 

Figure 70: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Identified 
Security Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election, by 
Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Jurisdictions may have identified more than one group with 
assigned security responsibilities. Jurisdictions that used only hand- 
counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded from this survey 
question. 

[A] The difference between medium jurisdictions and large jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for 
small jurisdictions is +/-7 percentage points. 

[B] Others include third parties, such as independent consultants and 
vendors. 

[End of figure] 

On the basis of our visits to local jurisdictions, the types of system 
security responsibilities and the groups that performed them further 
demonstrate the variation among security approaches and controls 
applied to voting systems. Specifically, election officials in these 
jurisdictions were typically responsible for implementing security 
controls, state officials were usually involved with developing 
security policy and guidance and monitoring local jurisdictions' 
implementation of security, and third parties performed tasks such as 
ensuring adequate security of voting equipment during transport or 
storage. Table 24 shows examples of security tasks and the parties that 
performed them as reported to us by election officials in the 
jurisdictions that we visited. 

Table 24: Voting System Security Tasks and Responsibilities for the 
2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions 
Visited by GAO: 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Secure ballot programming; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Sealing of voted ballots; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Secure storage of voting equipment; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: X; 
(e.g., schools). 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Video surveillance of stored equipment or ballots; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Access control to stored election materials; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Protection of voting equipment and materials during transport; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: X; 
(e.g., law enforcement officials). 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Inventory management of voting equipment and ballots; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Monitoring vote tallying systems for unauthorized connections; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Impoundment of election materials after elections; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: [Empty]; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Monitoring or testing of equipment accuracy before, during, or after 
elections; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: X; 
Performing entity: Third parties: X. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Security awareness training for election personnel; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: X; 
Performing entity: Third parties: X. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Certification of voting equipment; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: X; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Development of security policies and guidance for local jurisdiction 
use; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: X; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Examples of voting system security tasks identified by local officials: 
Monitoring implementation of security policies; 
Performing entity: Local officials: X; 
Performing entity: State: X; 
Performing entity: Third parties: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of documents provided by local jurisdictions we 
visited. 

[End of table] 

Responses to our state survey showed that both states and third parties 
participated in security responsibilities related to monitoring and 
evaluating security and privacy controls. Although the most frequently 
cited party responsible for this area was local officials (identified 
by 38 states), just less than one-half of the states (22 states and the 
District of Columbia) reported that they had some level of 
responsibility for security monitoring and evaluation as well. In 
addition, 22 states responded that third parties (e.g., independent 
consultants or vendors) were involved in monitoring and evaluating 
controls. Overall, security monitoring and evaluation was performed by 
two or more entities in 26 of the states. 

The use of certain security controls was similarly varied. On the basis 
of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 59 percent of 
jurisdictions used power or battery backup, 67 percent used system 
access controls, 91 percent used hardware locks and seals, and 52 
percent used backup electronic storage for votes.[Footnote 234] We 
further estimate that 95 percent of jurisdictions used at least one of 
these controls, with hardware locks and seals being most consistently 
used across the automated voting methods associated with this survey 
question.[Footnote 235] Furthermore, we estimate that a lower 
percentage of small jurisdictions used power or battery backup and 
electronic backup storage of votes for their voting equipment than 
large or medium jurisdictions, and these differences are statistically 
significant in most cases. Figure 71 presents the use of various 
security controls by jurisdiction size. 

Figure 71: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Security 
Controls in the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: More than one type of security control may have been identified. 

[A] The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for 
small jurisdictions is +/-8 percentage points. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/-8 
percentage points. 

[C] The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. The 95 percent 
confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/-8 percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

We estimate that a small percentage of local jurisdictions (10 percent) 
provided remote access to their voting systems for one or more 
categories of personnel--local election officials, state election 
officials, vendors, or other parties.[Footnote 236] Small 
jurisdictions, in particular, were less likely to provide remote access 
to their voting systems (estimated at 7 percent) than either medium 
jurisdictions (13 percent) or large jurisdictions (19 percent). The 
difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is 
statistically significant. For each category of personnel--local 
officials, state election officials, vendors, or other parties--7 to 8 
percent of jurisdictions did not know if remote access was available to 
their systems, a situation that could increase the risk of unauthorized 
access to these systems. Some of the jurisdictions responding to this 
survey question described a variety of protections to mitigate the risk 
of unauthorized remote access, including locally controlled passwords, 
passwords that change for each access, and local control of 
communications connections. 

Among the jurisdictions that we visited, election officials reported 
that various security measures were in use during the 2004 general 
election to safeguard voting equipment, ballots, and votes before, 
during, and after the election. However, the measures were not 
uniformly reported by officials in these jurisdictions, and officials 
in most jurisdictions reported that they did not have a security plan 
to document these measures or other aspects of their security program. 
The security controls most frequently cited by officials for the 
jurisdictions that we visited were locked storage of voting equipment 
and ballots, and monitoring of voting equipment. Other security 
measures mentioned during our visits included testing voting equipment 
before, during, or after the election to ensure that the equipment was 
accurately tallying votes; planning and conducting training on security 
issues and procedures for elections personnel; and video surveillance 
of stored ballots and voting equipment. Table 25 summarizes the types 
and frequency of security measures reported by election officials in 
the jurisdictions we visited. 

Table 25: Security Controls Reportedly Used in the 2004 General 
Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by 
GAO: 

Reported security control: Locked/sealed storage of voting equipment 
and ballots[A]; 
Number of jurisdictions: 25. 

Reported security control: Monitoring of voting equipment[ A]; 
Number of jurisdictions: 14. 

Reported security control: Encrypted ballots or election results[ A]; 
Number of jurisdictions: 10. 

Reported security control: Security plans[A]; 
Number of jurisdictions: 8. 

Reported security control: Testing of voting equipment[ A]; 
Number of jurisdictions: 7. 

Reported security control: Control of voting machine memory cards by 
precinct personnel during elections[ A]; 
Number of jurisdictions: 6. 

Reported security control: Video surveillance for voting equipment or 
ballots; 
Number of jurisdictions: 5. 

Reported security control: Security training; 
Number of jurisdictions: 4. 

Source: GAO analysis of interviews from local jurisdictions we visited. 

[A] One or more jurisdictions we visited indicated this security 
control was not applicable because of the voting method used. 

[End of table] 

Notwithstanding this range of reported security controls that were used 
in the 2004 general election by jurisdictions we visited, 
jurisdictions' activities and efforts for managing voting system 
security were not always in line with recommended system security 
practices. Our research of recommended practices shows that effective 
system security management involves having, among other things, (1) 
defined policies governing such system controls as authorized functions 
and access, and documented procedures for secure normal operations and 
incident management; (2) documented plans for implementing policies and 
procedures; (3) verified implementation of technical and procedural 
controls designed to reduce the risk of disruption, destruction, or 
unauthorized modification of systems and their information; 
and (4) clearly assigned roles and responsibilities for system 
security. 

On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 46 
percent of election jurisdictions nationwide that used some type of 
automated voting method had written policies for voting system security 
and access in place for the November 2004 general election, while 45 
percent had formal security procedures.[Footnote 237] Written security 
policies were more prevalent among large jurisdictions, an estimated 65 
percent, compared to an estimated 52 percent of medium jurisdictions 
and an estimated 41 percent of small jurisdictions. The difference 
between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant. 
More large and small jurisdictions had formal security procedures (an 
estimated 51 percent and 47 percent, respectively) than medium 
jurisdictions (an estimated 39 percent), although these differences are 
not statistically significant. Figure 72 shows the estimated 
percentages of jurisdictions with written security policies and 
procedures by jurisdiction size. 

Figure 72: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Documented 
Security Policies or Procedures for Their Voting Systems in the 2004 
General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Percentages in each category of jurisdiction size may not add to 
100 because of rounding. Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted 
paper ballots on Election Day were excluded from this survey question. 

[A] The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for 
small and medium jurisdictions is +/-8 percentage points. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for small and large 
jurisdictions is +/-8 percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

In our earlier discussion of local survey responses related to counting 
votes in chapter 6, we estimated that many jurisdictions had written 
policies and procedures for ballot security in the 2004 general 
election. However, we estimate that up to one-fifth of jurisdictions 
did not have written policies and procedures uniformly in place, 
including policies and procedures for transporting unvoted and voted 
ballots or electronic memory, storing unvoted and voted ballots, and 
electronic transmission of voted ballots. The disparity in written 
policies and procedures was observed for electronic transmission of 
voted ballots for counting, where an estimated 18 percent of 
jurisdictions had such security management tools,[Footnote 238] 
compared with between 66 and 76 percent of jurisdictions for each of 
the other four types of ballot controls--a difference that is 
statistically significant but which may be linked to the percentage of 
jurisdictions that used paper ballot and older technologies in the 2004 
general election. Yet we also found that an estimated 17 percent of 
jurisdictions whose predominant method was DRE had no policies or 
procedures for electronic transmission of voted ballots for 
counting.[Footnote 239] In addition, the differences in estimates of 
policies and procedures for electronic ballot transmission among 
jurisdictions whose predominant voting method was punch cards and those 
whose methods were DRE or optical scan are statistically significant. 
Figure 73 shows the variation in estimates of documented policies and 
procedures for electronically transmitting ballots among jurisdictions 
that used specific voting methods. 

Figure 73: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Established 
Policies or Procedures for Electronic Transmission of Voted Ballots in 
the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Estimates of respondents who selected "not applicable" for this 
survey question ranged between 38 and 75 percent. 

[A] The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is +/-14 percentage 
points. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan 
is +9 or -8 percentage points. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan 
is +/-8 percentage points. 

[D] The 95 percent confidence interval for lever machine is +11 or -6 
percentage points. 

[E] The 95 percent confidence interval for paper ballot is +6 or -4 
percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Moreover, our visits to local jurisdictions found diverse approaches to 
documenting security policies and procedures. Election officials in 8 
of the jurisdictions that we visited told us that they had written 
instructions for managing security aspects of their voting equipment 
and processes. However, some guidance we reviewed did not cover these 
topics. Election officials in some jurisdictions stated that their 
security measures were contained in the voting process documentation 
for the voting system or were covered in election worker training. For 
example, the hardware guide for the voting system used by some 
jurisdictions described the verification and authentication functions 
that were built into the system to secure vote counts during 
transmission of the precinct results to the jurisdiction, including 
processes for ballot creation and vote tabulation that also included 
security procedures. In contrast, several other jurisdictions that we 
visited had published detailed security policies and procedures for 
their voting systems that included, for example, network security 
policies for election tabulation, procedures for securing and 
protecting election equipment and software, testing voting equipment to 
ensure accurate recording of votes, and disaster recovery plans, and 
they provided them to GAO. Officials in several jurisdictions also 
described their steps to ensure that election workers had access to, 
and were trained in, the contents of the policies and procedures for 
securing ballots and voting equipment. 

Information system security plans typically identify the 
responsibilities, management approach, and key controls to be 
implemented for an information system, based on an assessment of 
identified risks to the information. Election officials in a few of the 
jurisdictions that we visited told us that they had security plans in 
place for the November 2004 general election (8 of 28). Officials at 4 
of the jurisdictions that we visited stated that they had security 
plans or plan components that were approved at the state level, and 
officials in 1 large jurisdiction in Nevada reported having a state 
statutory requirement for a voting system security plan. However, 
jurisdictions that employed advanced security technologies, such as 
encryption, in their systems did not always have a plan that would 
document how the elections people, process, and technologies would work 
together to provide comprehensive protections. Moreover, the contents 
of plans we obtained from our visits to local jurisdictions varied 
widely. One of the jurisdiction security plans we examined covered most 
aspects of the voting process, from ballot preparation through recount, 
while another plan focused on the security of its vote-tallying system 
in a stand-alone environment. Two security plans covered several 
security topics including risk assessment, physical and personnel 
controls, and incident response. Table 26 shows the variation in topics 
covered in the security plans we reviewed.[Footnote 240] 

Table 26: Voting System Security Topics Addressed in Security Plans 
Submitted by Jurisdictions Visited by GAO: 

Security topic: Risk assessment; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 1: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 2: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 3: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 4: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 5: X. 

Security topic: Awareness training; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 1: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 2: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 3: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 4: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 5: [Empty]. 

Security topic: Physical controls; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 1: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 2: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 3: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 4: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 5: [Empty]. 

Security topic: Personnel controls; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 1: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 2: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 3: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 4: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 5: [Empty]. 

Security topic: Access controls; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 1: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 2: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 3: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 4: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 5: [Empty]. 

Security topic: Security testing or audit; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 1: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 2: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 3: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 4: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 5: [Empty]. 

Security topic: Backup and recovery; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 1: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 2: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 3: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 4: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 5: [Empty]. 

Security topic: Incident response; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 1: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 2: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 3: X; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 4: [Empty]; 
Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans: 5: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of documents provided by local jurisdictions we 
visited. 

[End of table] 

Security testing is an important way to verify that system security 
controls have been implemented and are functioning properly. From our 
survey of state election officials, 17 states and the District of 
Columbia reported that they had conducted security testing of the 
voting systems used in the 2004 general election, and 7 other states 
reported that they required local jurisdictions to conduct such 
testing. The remaining 22 states said that they did not conduct or 
require system security testing. (Three states reported that security 
testing was not applicable for their voting systems.) Moreover, from 
our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least 19 percent of 
local jurisdictions nationwide (excluding jurisdictions that reported 
that they used paper ballots) did not conduct security testing for the 
systems they used in the November 2004 general election. Although 
jurisdiction size was not a factor in whether security testing was 
performed, the percentage of jurisdictions performing security testing 
was notably higher when the predominant voting method was DRE (63 
percent)[Footnote 241] and lower for jurisdictions where the 
predominant method was central count optical scan (38 percent)[Footnote 
242] or precinct count optical scan (45 percent).[Footnote 243] 
However, the difference in the percentages of jurisdictions performing 
security testing on DRE or central count optical scan is not 
statistically significant. 

Beyond jurisdictions' efforts to verify implementation of voting system 
security controls, some states required that their voting systems be 
nationally qualified against the federal voluntary voting system 
standards, which include a security component. In particular, from our 
state survey, most states that used a new voting system for the first 
time in the November 2004 general election said that they required the 
system to go through qualification testing. For example, all 26 states 
that used DREs for the first time in the 2004 general election, as well 
as the District of Columbia, required qualification testing and 
approval by the National Association of State Election Directors 
(NASED).[Footnote 244] Similarly, of the 35 states and the District of 
Columbia that used optical scan systems for the first time in the 2004 
general election, 31 reported that they required voting systems to be 
qualified. Nine of the 10 states that used new punch card systems for 
the first time in the 2004 general election also reported that they 
required voting systems to be qualified. 

Security Standards Being Used Vary by State and Jurisdiction: 

States and jurisdictions are applying a variety of security standards 
to their voting systems, some of which are no longer current. 
Specifically, 44 states and the District of Columbia reported on our 
state survey that they were requiring local jurisdictions' voting 
systems being used for the first time in the November 2006 general 
election to comply with voluntary federal voting system standards, 
which include security standards. However, they are not all using the 
same version of the voluntary standards. This is troublesome because 
the 2002 standards are more stringent than the 1990 standards in 
various areas, including security. For instance, the 2002 standards 
establish security requirements and acceptable levels of performance 
for the telecommunications components of voting systems, while the 1990 
standards do not include detailed requirements for this control 
measure. 

According to our analysis of responses states reported in our state 
survey, 17 of the 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that 
their voting systems must comply solely with the 2002 standards that 
were developed and approved by the Federal Election Commission and 
later adopted by EAC. However, 27 other states are requiring their 
jurisdictions to apply federal standards to their new voting systems 
that are outdated, unspecified, or entail multiple versions. In the 
case of 5 of these 27 states where multiple versions of voluntary 
federal standards will be applied, one of the versions is the Voluntary 
Voting System Guidelines, which was approved by the EAC in December 
2005.[Footnote 245] These guidelines promote security measures that 
address gaps in prior standards and are applicable to more modern 
technologies, such as controls for distributing software and wireless 
operations. Nevertheless, these same 5 states reported that they will 
also apply older federal standards to systems that are new to the 2006 
election. Furthermore, 2 other states responded that they do not plan 
to require their voting systems to comply with any version of the 
voluntary federal standards, while 3 additional states reported that 
they had not yet made a decision on compliance with voluntary federal 
standards for 2006. (One state did not respond.) Figure 74 depicts the 
number of states that reported applying voluntary federal voting system 
standards to their new voting systems. Appendix X summarizes responses 
for all states and the District of Columbia regarding reported 
requirements for local jurisdictions' use of federal standards for 
their voting systems. 

Figure 74: State-Reported Standards Required for Voting Systems: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: State respondents were allowed to select multiple items for this 
survey question. 

[End of figure] 

Simultaneous use of multiple versions of voting system standards is not 
new for the 2006 election. Not all NASED-qualified voting systems that 
may have operated during the 2004 election were tested against a single 
version of security standards. For example, many systems that were 
qualified before the 2004 general election had been tested against the 
1990 Federal Election Commission standards, rather than the more 
stringent 2002 standards. 

The use of outdated system security standards increases the risk of 
system integrity, availability, and confidentiality problems for all 
voting methods, but it is of special concern for jurisdictions that use 
their systems in a networked environment or transmit election data 
using telecommunications capabilities. This is because the use of such 
connectivity introduces vulnerabilities and risks that the older 
versions of the standards do not adequately address, as we have 
previously described in our September 2005 report on the security and 
reliability of electronic voting.[Footnote 246] 

Recent Studies and Analyses Have Raised Concerns about the Security 
Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses of Modern Voting Systems: 

After the 2000 general election, Congress, the media, and others cited 
numerous instances of problems with the election process. As the use of 
electronic voting systems expanded and the 2004 general election 
approached, the media and others continued to report problems with 
these systems that caused some to question whether they were secure and 
reliable. To clarify the wide range of concerns and issues raised and 
identify recommended practices for addressing them, our September 2005 
report on the security and reliability of electronic voting analyzed 
over 80 recent and relevant studies related to the security and 
reliability of electronic voting systems.[Footnote 247] We focused on 
systems and components associated with vote casting and counting, 
including those that define electronic ballots, transmit voting results 
among election locations, and manage groups of voting machines. 

In summary, our September 2005 report stated that while electronic 
voting systems hold promise for a more accurate and efficient election 
process, numerous organizations and individuals have raised concerns 
about their security, citing instances of weak security controls, 
system design flaws, inadequate system version control, inadequate 
security testing, incorrect system configuration, poor security 
management, and vague or incomplete voting system standards, among 
other issues. For example, we reported that studies found (1) some 
electronic voting systems did not encrypt cast ballots or system 
records of ballots, and it was possible to alter both without being 
detected; (2) it was possible to alter the files that define how a 
ballot looks and works so that the votes for one candidate could be 
recorded for a different candidate; and (3) vendors installed 
uncertified versions of voting system software at the local level. We 
also reported that some of these concerns were said to have caused 
local problems during national elections--resulting in the loss or 
miscount of votes.[Footnote 248] We added, however, that many of the 
reported concerns were drawn from specific system makes and models or 
from a specific jurisdiction's election, and that there has been a lack 
of consensus among election officials and other experts on the 
pervasiveness of the concerns. 

We also reported in September 2005 that federal organizations and 
nongovernmental groups have issued recommended practices and guidance 
for improving the election process, including electronic voting 
systems, as well as general practices for the security of information 
systems. For example, in mid-2004, EAC issued a collection of practices 
recommended by election experts, including state and local election 
officials.[Footnote 249] This guidance includes approaches for making 
voting processes more secure and reliable through, for example, risk 
analysis of the voting process, poll worker security training, and 
chain of custody controls for Election Day operations, along with 
practices that are specific to ensuring the security and reliability of 
different types of electronic voting systems. As another example, in 
July 2004, the California Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology issued a report containing recommendations 
pertaining to testing equipment, retaining records of ballots, and 
physically securing voting systems.[Footnote 250] In addition to such 
election-specific practices, numerous recommended practices are 
available that are relevant to any information system. For instance, 
we, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), and 
others have issued guidance that emphasizes the importance of 
incorporating security and reliability into the life cycle of 
information systems through practices related to security planning and 
management, risk management, and procurement.[Footnote 251] We noted 
that the recommended practices in these election-specific and 
information technology-focused documents provide valuable guidance 
that, if implemented effectively, should help improve the security of 
voting systems. 

Further, our September 2005 report stated that since the passage of 
HAVA, the federal government has begun a range of actions that are 
expected to improve the security and reliability of electronic voting 
systems. Specifically, after beginning operations in January 2004, EAC 
was leading efforts to (1) draft changes to the existing federal 
voluntary standards for voting systems, including provisions related to 
security;[Footnote 252] (2) develop a process for certifying, 
decertifying, and recertifying voting systems; (3) establish a program 
to accredit the national independent testing laboratories that test 
electronic voting systems against the federal standards; and (4) 
develop a software library and clearinghouse for information on state 
and local elections and systems. However, we observed that these 
actions were unlikely to have a major effect in the 2006 federal 
election cycle because at the time of our report publication the 
changes to the standards had not yet been completed, the system 
certification and laboratory accreditation programs were still in 
development, and the software library had not been updated or improved 
since the 2004 elections. Further, we stated that EAC had not defined 
tasks, processes, and time frames for completing these activities, and 
we recognized that other organizations had actions under way that were 
intended to improve the security of electronic voting systems. These 
actions include developing and obtaining international acceptance for 
voting system standards, developing voting system software in an open 
source environment (i.e., not proprietary to any particular company), 
and cataloging and analyzing reported problems with electronic voting 
systems. 

To improve the security and reliability of electronic voting systems, 
we made recommendations to EAC for establishing tasks, processes, and 
time frames for improving the federal voluntary voting system 
guidelines, testing capabilities, and management support available to 
state and local election officials. The EAC commissioners agreed with 
our recommendations and stated that actions to address each were either 
under way or intended, and the NIST director agreed with our 
conclusions. 

Certain Types of Tests and Evaluations Were Widely Performed on Voting 
Systems, while Others Were Less Common: 

To ensure that voting systems perform as intended during use, the 
systems must be effectively tested, both before they are accepted from 
the manufacturer and before each occasion that they are used. Further 
confidence in election results can be gained by conducting Election Day 
and postelection audits of voting systems. For the November 2004 
general election, voting system testing was conducted for almost all 
voting systems, but the types and content of the testing performed 
varied considerably. Most states and local jurisdictions employed 
national and state certification testing and readiness testing to some 
extent, but the criteria used in this testing were highly dependent on 
the state or jurisdiction. Also, many, but not all, states and 
jurisdictions conducted acceptance testing of both newly acquired 
systems and those undergoing changes or upgrades. In contrast, 
relatively few states and jurisdictions conducted parallel testing 
during elections or audits of voting systems following elections. 

To assist election officials in testing voting systems for the 2004 
general election, most local jurisdictions documented policies and 
procedures related to some types of testing, according to estimates 
based on our survey of local jurisdictions. However, the testing 
approaches embodied in policies and procedures that the local 
jurisdictions we visited shared with us varied considerably. 
Furthermore, in jurisdictions we visited, few voting system problems 
were reported as a result of local testing, and correspondingly few 
changes were made to the systems or election processes. The variability 
in testing approaches among states and jurisdictions underscores our 
previously reported concerns from our September 2005 report about 
whether actual testing of voting systems is sufficient to ensure 
satisfaction of system requirements, including those associated with 
accuracy, reliability, and security.[Footnote 253] 

Voting system test and evaluation can be grouped into various types or 
stages: certification testing (national level), certification testing 
(state level), acceptance testing, readiness testing, parallel testing, 
and postelection voting system audits. Each of these tests has a 
specific purpose, and is conducted at the national, state, or local 
level at a particular time in the election cycle. Table 27 summarizes 
these types of tests. 

Table 27: Types of Testing and Evaluation for Voting Systems, with 
Common Time Frames and Responsibilities: 

Test type: Certification (national)[A]; 
Purpose: To verify compliance of voting equipment with federal 
standards; 
When conducted: Prior to (or as a condition of) system acceptance; 
Responsibility: Federal authorities and independent laboratories[B]. 

Test type: Certification (state); 
Purpose: To validate compliance of voting equipment with state-specific 
requirements; 
When conducted: Before election; 
Responsibility: State election authorities. 

Test type: Acceptance; 
Purpose: To verify that voting equipment delivered by a vendor meets 
state or local requirements; 
When conducted: Before election; 
Responsibility: State or local election authorities. 

Test type: Readiness (logic and accuracy); 
Purpose: To verify that voting equipment is functioning properly, 
usually by confirming that predictable outputs are produced from 
predefined inputs[C]; 
When conducted: Before election; 
Responsibility: Local election authorities. 

Test type: Parallel; 
Purpose: To verify accurate performance of voting equipment through 
random selection and systematic evaluation of operational equipment; 
When conducted: During election; 
Responsibility: State or local election authorities. 

Test type: Audit; 
Purpose: To review and reconcile election records to confirm correct 
conduct of an election or uncover evidence of problems with voting 
equipment or election processes; 
When conducted: After election; 
Responsibility: State or local election authorities. 

Source: GAO analysis based on G AO-02-3 and GAO-05-956. 

[A] With the enactment of HAVA in 2002, responsibility for overseeing 
national testing of voting systems and certifying those that met 
federal standards was assigned to EAC in HAVA § 231(a)(1) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 15371(a)(1)). EAC assumed this responsibility in August 
2005, when it was transferred from NASED. Under NASED, national testing 
against federal standards was called qualification testing. 

[B] Refers to EAC and testing laboratories accredited by them as 
provided for in HAVA § 231 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15371). 

[C] Readiness testing that is conducted to confirm the proper 
functioning of election equipment on Election Day just before the polls 
open is sometimes called verification testing. 

[End of table] 

Many states have laws or regulations that mandate specific types of 
testing for voting equipment and time frames for conducting those 
tests. Documented policies and procedures for testing and evaluation 
provide an important means for ensuring that testing is effectively 
planned and executed. Effective test and evaluation can greatly reduce 
the chances of unexpected or unknown equipment problems and errors. 
From our local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 election, we estimate 
that 85 percent of local jurisdictions had documented policies and 
procedures for some type of voting system testing, 6 percent of 
jurisdictions did not have policies and procedures for testing, and 9 
percent did not know whether their jurisdictions had them. Larger 
jurisdictions were more likely to have these management tools than 
smaller ones. An estimated 96 percent of large jurisdictions had 
documented testing policies and procedures, compared with 89 percent of 
medium and 82 percent of small jurisdictions.[Footnote 254] The 
difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically 
significant. 

The testing policies and procedures of the local jurisdictions we 
visited presented a wide variety of approaches and details for the 2004 
general election. For instance, election officials in 1 large 
jurisdiction in Connecticut told us that they did not conduct 
acceptance testing on their lever equipment, which had been in use for 
many years, and did not conduct either parallel testing or audit 
testing, stating that these tests were not applicable to its systems 
for 2004. However, officials said they did conduct readiness testing at 
the polling place prior to the election. Election officials in a large 
Ohio jurisdiction that used punch card voting equipment told us that 
readiness testing had been conducted by local officials. However, 
election officials stated that certification and acceptance testing 
were not performed for 2004 because this system had been used in prior 
elections. They also said that neither parallel testing nor audit 
testing of voting systems was performed. Officials in a large Colorado 
jurisdiction we visited that used central count optical scan equipment 
told us that they obtained state certification of the newly purchased 
equipment, conducted acceptance and readiness testing prior to the 
election, and executed another readiness test following the election. 
Election officials in a large Georgia jurisdiction that used DRE voting 
equipment reported that the state performed both certification and 
acceptance testing when the equipment was purchased and conducted a 
parallel test of the tabulation system during the election. Further, 
local officials reported that they conducted readiness testing prior to 
the election, but did not perform postelection audit testing. For the 5 
local jurisdictions that provided us with copies of procedures for 
readiness testing, three sets of procedures were developed by the 
jurisdictions themselves and two sets were developed by the voting 
equipment vendors. 

National Certification Testing Was Widely Performed, but Its Standards 
and Usage Varied: 

The enactment of HAVA in 2002 established federal responsibilities for 
the certification of voting systems to meet federal standards and 
provided the framework for a national testing program. The act charged 
EAC, supported by NIST, with instituting a federal program for the 
development and adoption of voluntary voting system guidelines against 
which voting systems can be evaluated, establishing processes and 
responsibilities for accrediting laboratories to test systems, and 
using the results of testing by the accredited labs to certify the 
voting systems. In 2005, EAC developed guidelines for the certification 
process and defined the steps needed for the process to transition from 
NASED to EAC. States and local jurisdictions are to decide whether and 
how to use the testing and certification results from the federal 
program in their elections processes. 

Most states continued to require that voting systems be nationally 
tested and certified. In our October 2001 report on election processes, 
we reported that 38 states required that their voting systems meet 
federal standards for the November 2000 general election, which meant 
that the systems were tested by NASED. For voting systems being used 
for the first time in the 2004 general election, national certification 
testing was almost uniformly required. From our prior discussion of 
state survey responses in the context of voting system security, 26 of 
27 states using DRE for the first time in this election, as well as the 
District of Columbia, required them to be nationally certified, while 9 
of the 10 states using punch card equipment for the first time, and 30 
of 35 states and the District of Columbia using optical scan equipment 
for the first time, said they had such requirements. 

It is unclear whether the proportion of nationally certified systems 
changed between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. In our October 
2001 report on election processes nationwide, we reported that an 
estimated 39 percent of jurisdictions used NASED-qualified voting 
equipment for the 2000 general election.[Footnote 255] However, for the 
2004 general election, we estimate that 68 percent of jurisdictions did 
not know whether the respective systems that they used were NASED- 
qualified. This uncertainty surrounding the national qualification 
status of a specific version of voting system at the local level 
underscores a concern we recently reported with respect to electronic 
voting security and reliability in our September 2005 report on this 
topic--that is, even though voting system software may have been 
qualified and certified at the national or state levels, software 
changes and upgrades performed at the local level may not be qualified 
and certified.[Footnote 256] 

The upcoming 2006 general election can be viewed as a challenging 
transition period in the voting system capabilities, standards, and 
national certification, with several testing-related factors 
potentially increasing the difficulty of this transition. First, HAVA's 
requirements for voting system capabilities, such as voter error 
correction and manual audit, along with the attendant new guidelines, 
are likely to require additional testing at the national level to 
recertify previously fielded and certified systems that have been 
upgraded. Second, this increased workload is not likely to be met with 
added national testing capacity, since the process for accrediting new 
voting system testing laboratories is not expected to produce newly 
accredited labs in time for the 2006 election. Third, the complexity of 
the testing being performed is likely to increase because states report 
that they will collectively apply the full range of available 
standards--1990, 2002, and 2005 standards, as well as various 
combinations of these--to voting systems first used for the November 
2006 election. As a result, a range of test protocols must be developed 
or maintained, and a variety of corresponding tests must be planned, 
executed, and analyzed to meet the variety of standards. 

States Generally Required Certification of Voting Systems Using a Range 
of Criteria: 

Most states continue to certify voting systems to ensure that they meet 
minimum state election requirements. In our October 2001 report on 
election processes, we reported that 45 states and the District of 
Columbia had certification programs for their voting systems, 38 of 
which required that the systems be tested before they were certified 
for the 2000 general election.[Footnote 257] In addition, we reported 
that an estimated 90 percent of local jurisdictions used state- 
certified voting equipment for the November 2000 general election. 
However, we also reported that state officials had expressed concerns 
with voting system changes that did not undergo recertification. Since 
then, we have reported that security experts and election officials 
have expressed similar concerns.[Footnote 258] 

For the November 2004 general election, 42 states and the District of 
Columbia reported on our state survey that they required state 
certification of voting systems.[Footnote 259] (See fig. 75.) Seven 
states required certification of the voting equipment purchased at the 
state level for local jurisdictions in the 2004 election. However, in 
35 states and the District of Columbia, officials reported that 
responsibility for purchasing a state-certified system rested with the 
local jurisdiction. While state certification requirements often 
included NASED testing, as well as approval or confirmation of 
functionality for particular ballot conditions, some states also 
included additional requirements for features such as quality of 
construction, transportation safety, and documentation. Although the 
remaining 8 states did not require state certification, the officials 
we contacted described other mechanisms to address the compliance of 
voting equipment with state-specific requirements, such as a state 
approval process or acceptance of voting equipment based on federal 
certification. Figure 75 shows states' reported certification 
requirements for voting systems used in the 2004 general election. 

Figure 75: State-Reported Voting System Certification Requirements for 
the 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

For the 2006 general election, 44 states reported that they will have 
requirements for certification of voting systems, 2 more states than 
for the 2004 general election. The District of Columbia reported that 
it will not require voting system certification for the 2006 general 
election. Of the 44, all but 1 expected to conduct the certification 
themselves; the 1 state reported that it would rely solely on a 
national independent testing authority to make its certification 
decision. Furthermore, of the 43 other states conducting certification 
themselves, 41 reported that they would include testing of system 
functions to obtain certification. In addition, 18 of the 43 states 
planned to involve a national testing laboratory in their certification 
process. 

Acceptance Testing Continued to Be Commonly Performed, but Implemented 
Practices Varied Widely: 

As we reported previously in our October 2001 report on election 
processes, either states or local jurisdictions conducted acceptance 
tests prior to the 2000 general election.[Footnote 260] However, the 
testing processes, test steps, and involvement of vendors in the 
testing performed varied by jurisdiction and by type of equipment. 
Also, we reported in our 2001 report that states and local 
jurisdictions sometimes relied heavily on vendors to design and conduct 
acceptance tests. With respect to vendor involvement in particular, we 
reported that vendors were sometimes heavily relied upon to design and 
conduct acceptance tests. 

For the 2004 election, the extent and variety of acceptance testing was 
similar to those for the 2000 election. With regard to state roles and 
involvement in acceptance testing of new voting systems, 26 states and 
the District of Columbia reported responsibilities at some level of 
government. Specifically, 8 states and the District of Columbia 
reported on our survey that they had responsibility for performing 
acceptance testing, 15 states required local jurisdictions to perform 
such testing, and 3 states reported that requirements for acceptance 
testing existed at both the state and local levels. Twenty-two states 
either did not require such testing or did not believe that such 
testing was applicable to them. (Two states did not know their 
acceptance testing requirements for the 2004 election.) More states 
required that acceptance testing be performed for changes and upgrades 
to existing systems than they did for new systems--30 states in all and 
the District of Columbia. Specifically, 15 states and the District of 
Columbia were responsible for performing acceptance tests for changes 
and upgrades, 10 states required local jurisdictions to perform these 
tests, and 5 states required acceptance testing at both the state and 
local levels. 

Election officials at a majority of the local jurisdictions that we 
visited told us that they conducted some type of acceptance testing for 
newly acquired voting equipment. As with the 2000 general election, 
these officials described a variety of approaches to acceptance testing 
for the 2004 general election. For example, the data used for testing 
could be vendor-supplied, developed by election officials, or both, and 
could include system initialization, logic and accuracy, and tamper 
resistance. Other steps, such as diagnostic tests, physical inspection 
of hardware, and software configuration checks, were also mentioned as 
testing activities by local election officials. Further, election 
officials from 3 jurisdictions that we visited said that vendors were 
heavily involved in designing and executing the acceptance tests, while 
officials from another jurisdiction that we visited said that vendors 
contributed to a portion of their testing. In 2 jurisdictions in 
Georgia, officials said that acceptance tests were conducted at a 
university center for elections systems. 

Readiness Testing Continued to Be Widely Performed Using Various 
Approaches: 

Most jurisdictions conducted readiness testing, also known as logic and 
accuracy testing, for both the 2000 and 2004 general elections. In 
addition, some states reported that they conducted readiness testing 
for the 2004 general election. The content and nature of these tests 
varied among jurisdictions. 

According to our state survey, 49 states and the District of Columbia 
reported that they performed readiness testing of voting systems at the 
state level, the local level, or both (1 state did not require 
readiness testing). Most states required local jurisdictions to perform 
readiness testing (37 states in all). However, 7 states reported that 
they performed their own readiness testing of voting equipment for the 
2004 general election in addition to local testing. Five states and the 
District of Columbia reported that they had no requirements for local 
jurisdictions to perform readiness testing but conducted this testing 
themselves. State laws or regulations in effect for the 2004 election 
typically had specific requirements for when readiness testing should 
be conducted and who was responsible for testing, sometimes including 
public demonstrations of voting system operations. For example, one 
state mandated that local jurisdictions conduct three readiness tests 
using all types of election ballots including audio ballots. One test 
took place before Election Day and two occurred on Election Day--before 
the official counting of ballots began and after the official counting 
had been completed. Another state required the Secretary of State to 
conduct testing using pre-audited ballots before Election Day, as well 
as on Election Day before ballots were counted. 

On the basis of a subgroup of local election jurisdictions from our 
2000 election survey, we estimate that 96 percent of jurisdictions 
nationwide conducted readiness testing before the 2000 general 
election.[Footnote 261] For a comparable subgroup of jurisdictions in 
the 2004 general election, we estimate that 95 percent of local 
jurisdictions conducted readiness testing. The frequency with which 
readiness testing was conducted in 2004 was largely stable across all 
jurisdictions of various sizes that did not solely use hand-counted 
paper ballots, ranging between an estimated 90 percent (for small 
jurisdictions) to an estimated 96 percent (for large jurisdictions). 
Whenever the sample of jurisdictions permitted statistical comparison, 
there were also no significant differences between the percentages of 
jurisdictions that said they conducted readiness testing for various 
predominant voting methods. 

The variety of readiness testing activities performed by jurisdictions 
for the 2000 general election was also evident for the 2004 general 
election. Election officials in all of the local jurisdictions we 
visited following the 2004 election reported that they conducted 
readiness testing on their voting equipment using one or more of the 
approaches we identified for the 2000 election, such as diagnostic 
tests, integration tests, mock elections, and sets of test votes. 
Election officials in many of these jurisdictions told us that they 
combined test approaches. For example, officials in 1 large 
jurisdiction in Florida told us that they conducted pre-election 
testing using complete ballots (not test decks) to determine the 
accuracy of the marks and to see if there were any errors in voting 
machine programming. They told us that logic and accuracy testing was 
performed for each machine using undervoted ballots and overvoted 
ballots, and that zero tapes were run for each voting machine before 
the election.[Footnote 262] In addition, a diagnostic test was run 
before the election on each voting machine. According to the local 
officials, this was the test approach described in the manufacturer's 
preparation checklist. Election officials in another Florida 
jurisdiction stated that readiness testing included integration testing 
to demonstrate that the voting system is properly programmed; 
the election is correctly defined on the system; 
and all system inputs, outputs, and communication devices are in 
working order. In the case of these jurisdictions, the state requires 
logic and accuracy testing and submission of the test parameters to the 
state. 

Parallel Testing Was Not Frequently Performed: 

Parallel testing was not widely performed by local jurisdictions in the 
2004 general election, although 7 states reported on our state survey 
that they performed parallel testing of voting systems on Election Day, 
and another 6 states reported that this testing was required by local 
jurisdictions.[Footnote 263] From our survey of local jurisdictions, we 
estimate that 2 percent of jurisdictions that did not solely use hand- 
counted paper ballots conducted parallel testing for the 2004 general 
election.[Footnote 264] Large and medium jurisdictions primarily 
performed this type of testing (7 percent and 4 percent of 
jurisdictions, respectively). The percentage of small jurisdictions 
performing this type of testing was negligible (0 percent). The 
differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small 
jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

Our visits to local jurisdictions affirmed the limited use of parallel 
testing. Specifically, election officials in 2 of the 28 jurisdictions 
that we visited told us that they performed parallel testing. Officials 
in 1 large jurisdiction in Georgia told us that parallel testing was 
conducted by the state in conjunction with a university center for 
voting systems. In another case, officials in a large jurisdiction in 
Kansas told us that parallel testing was required by the local 
jurisdiction and was publicly conducted. In both cases, the tests were 
conducted on voting equipment for which security concerns had been 
raised in a voting equipment test report issued by the state of 
Maryland prior to the 2004 general election. Local officials who told 
us that parallel testing was not performed on their voting systems 
attributed this to the absence of parallel testing requirements, a lack 
of sufficient voting equipment to perform these tests, or the 
unnecessary nature of parallel testing because of the stand-alone 
operation of their systems. 

Postelection Voting System Audit Requirements and Practices Were 
Diverse: 

According to our state survey, 22 states and the District of Columbia 
reported that they performed postelection voting system audits for the 
2004 general election. Specifically, 4 states and the District of 
Columbia reported that they conducted postelection audits of voting 
systems themselves, 16 states required that audits of voting systems be 
conducted by local jurisdictions, and 2 states reported that audits of 
voting systems were performed at both the state and local levels. State 
laws or regulations in effect for the 2004 general election varied in 
when and how these audits were to be conducted. In addition, a variety 
of statutes cited by states for testing requirements did not mention 
postelection voting system audits, and the one that did lacked details 
on the scope or components of such audits. 

According to our local jurisdiction survey, postelection voting system 
audits were conducted by an estimated 43 percent of local jurisdictions 
that did not solely use hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day. 
This practice was much more prevalent at large and medium jurisdictions 
(62 percent and 55 percent, respectively) than small jurisdictions (34 
percent).[Footnote 265] The differences between small jurisdictions and 
both medium and large jurisdictions are statistically significant. We 
further estimate that these voting system audits were conducted more 
frequently in jurisdictions with central count optical scan voting 
methods (54 percent) than they were in jurisdictions with precinct 
count optical scan voting methods (35 percent).[Footnote 266] Figure 76 
shows the estimated use of postelection audits for jurisdictions with 
different voting methods in the 2004 general election. 

Figure 76: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Conducting 
Postelection Voting System Audits for the 2004 General Election, by 
Predominant Voting Method: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is +/-14 percentage 
points. 

[B] The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan 
is +/-10 percentage points. 

[C] The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan 
is +/-8 percentage points. 

[End of figure] 

Election officials in 14 of 28 local jurisdictions that we visited told 
us that they conducted postelection voting system audits. However, the 
conditions and scope of voting system audits varied. Some were routine, 
while others were conducted only in the event of close races or 
challenges to results. Among the 14 jurisdictions, most of the 
officials we spoke with said that they focused on reconciling voting 
machine counts with known votes, and officials in 2 of these 
jurisdictions characterized the voting system audits largely as voting 
system logic and accuracy tests. However, officials with a few 
jurisdictions told us that they also reviewed voting machine logs, 
sampled results from random precincts, or employed independent auditors 
to repeat and verify vote counting. In 1 large jurisdiction in Nevada, 
an election official told us that paper results were compared to the 
tabulated results of votes counted on 24 machines. In addition, every 
voting machine was activated and the same scripts used for pre-election 
testing were rerun through the machines. According to the election 
official, this level of testing was required by law. 

Information on Jurisdictions' Election Technology Integration Is 
Limited, but Current and Emerging Technologies Offer Greater 
Opportunities: 

The number of jurisdictions that have integrated particular aspects of 
voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 
general election for the areas of integration we examined, based on 
estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and visits to local 
jurisdictions. For the areas of integration we did examine, the scope 
and nature of this integration was diverse and included remote 
programming of electronic ballots, statewide tabulation of voting 
results, and end-to-end management of the election process. 
Nevertheless, the potential for greater integration in the future does 
exist as states and jurisdictions act on their earlier discussed plans 
to acquire the kind of voting equipment (e.g., optical scan and DRE 
products) that lends itself to integration. It is unclear if and when 
this migration to more technology-based voting methods will produce 
more integrated election system environments. However, suitable 
standards and guidance for these interconnected components and systems-
-some of which remain to be developed--could facilitate the 
development, testing, operational management, and maintenance of 
components and systems, thereby maximizing the benefits of current and 
emerging election technologies and achieving states' and local 
jurisdictions' goals for performance and security. 

Reported Instances of Certain Election Systems Integration Approaches 
Have Been Inconsistent: 

Various voting systems, components, and technologies--some of which 
have been available since the 2000 general election--encompass a wide 
range of functional capabilities and system interactions. According to 
our local jurisdiction survey estimates and visits to election 
jurisdictions for the 2004 general election, officials reported various 
types of integration, but there were few instances. The areas in which 
integration was reported can be grouped into four categories: (1) 
electronic programming or setup of voting equipment from a centralized 
facility, (2) electronic aggregation and tabulation of voting results 
from multiple voting systems or locations, (3) add-on voting features 
and technologies, and (4) electronic management of voting equipment and 
operations. 

Electronic Programming or Setup: 

Electronic programming or setup of voting equipment involves 
integration between an administrative system and voting equipment to 
initialize vote count totals, load ballot definitions, and authorize 
voter access. As we previously reported in our September 2005 report on 
the security and reliability of electronic voting, this type of 
integration has raised security concerns.[Footnote 267] Election 
officials in 19 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited used portable 
memory cartridges or cards for electronic programming or setup of their 
voting equipment. To accomplish programming or setup, officials at some 
of the local jurisdictions that we visited said that they used a 
computer to preload voting equipment with ballots or tabulation logic 
prior to transporting the equipment to polling locations. At 1 large 
New Jersey jurisdiction, officials stated that the administrative 
computer used a dedicated connection to the election server to 
electronically transmit the data and logic necessary to program and 
enable the units for the election. Election officials in some 
jurisdictions told us that an administrative system loaded ballot 
definitions onto portable electronic devices, such as memory cartridges 
or smart cards, which were then physically transported to the locations 
where the voting equipment was being prepared for the election--either 
at a storage facility or polling location (see fig. 77). The cartridges 
or cards were then inserted into individual voting units to prepare or 
activate them for the election. Some electronic ballot cards were 
provided directly to the voter to activate the voting equipment, then 
returned to election workers when the ballot has been cast. 

Figure 77: Examples of Portable Memory Cards and Cartridges Used with 
Voting Equipment: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Electronic Aggregation or Tabulation: 

Electronic aggregation or tabulation of cast ballots also requires 
integration between voting equipment and another computer system that 
is responsible for collecting and aggregating the votes. Figure 78 
shows examples of computer systems used for vote tabulation. 

Figure 78: Examples of Ballot Tabulation Equipment and Environments: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Transfer of votes or election results between the voting equipment and 
the central tabulator may employ portable electronic media or 
telecommunication lines. Portable electronic media were the means that 
officials at 7 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited said they used 
to electronically aggregate election results from multiple voting 
locations. For DRE equipment, memory cartridges that stored cast 
ballots from individual voting units were transferred to the election 
office, and the data they contained were uploaded and tallied by an 
electronic tabulation system. 

Some jurisdictions also used telecommunications services to transfer 
election data from polling locations or election coordination centers 
to tabulation facilities, although how these services were used varied. 
Officials at 4 jurisdictions that we visited told us that they employed 
dial-up connections to transmit local vote tallies for further 
tabulation. For instance, election officials in a large jurisdiction in 
Washington told us that after the polls were closed and all ballots 
were scanned and recorded by the optical scan machines at each polling 
place, the machines were taken to storage areas, where the results were 
transmitted to the central computer for tabulation using the 
jurisdiction's phone line. Officials at a large jurisdiction that we 
visited in Ohio said that they had election judges take voting machine 
memory cartridges from their polling locations to facilities where 
laptop computers would read the cartridges and transmit vote tallies 
over phone lines to a remote access server at the elections office. In 
a large jurisdiction that we visited in Illinois, election officials 
told us that they took their portable precinct ballot counters to 1 of 
10 stations throughout the city, where vote totals from the counters 
were encrypted and transmitted to a remote access server via a cellular 
network. 

Add-on Features and Technologies: 

Add-on features and technologies to ensure the accuracy of votes, 
provide easier access to persons with disabilities or special needs, 
and enhance security or privacy were also integrated into voting 
systems by a few states and jurisdictions for the 2004 general 
election. Officials at both large jurisdictions in Nevada that we 
visited told us that they had integrated a VVPT capability into their 
DREs to meet a state requirement for VVPT. Figure 79 shows one example 
of a VVPT voting system component. Overall, we estimate that about 8 
percent of jurisdictions operating DRE voting equipment in the November 
2004 general election produced VVPT.[Footnote 268] 

Figure 79: Example of an Assembly for Producing a Voter-Verifiable 
Paper Audit Trail for DRE Voting Equipment: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Audio features were also added to voting systems for the 2004 election. 
Officials at 6 of the jurisdictions that we visited reported that they 
had incorporated an audio ballot component into their DRE machines for 
voters with sight impairments. Election officials in 3 jurisdictions 
reported that they offered audio ballots in languages other than 
English. 

Security and privacy capabilities, such as data encryption and virtual 
private networks, were also reportedly integrated into several 
jurisdictions' voting system environments for the 2004 general election 
to protect electronically transferred election data or to secure remote 
system access. Election officials at 6 of the 28 jurisdictions that we 
visited said they used encryption to protect ballots during electronic 
storage. Officials at both jurisdictions in Georgia explained that 
their state-selected DRE equipment used individual access cards for 
each voter, uniquely encrypted data on the card (including the voter's 
cast ballot) for each polling location, and a separately encrypted 
electronic key needed to access the voter's ballot. Officials at 7 
jurisdictions said they applied encryption to the transmission of 
election results during the 2004 general election. Election officials 
in 1 large Colorado jurisdiction stated that they used a virtual 
private network to ensure the secrecy of data and authenticity of 
parties when transmitting election results from jurisdictions to the 
state. 

Electronic Management: 

Electronic management of voting equipment and operations was another 
form of integration employed for the 2004 general election. Electronic 
management covers such functions as equipment testing, initializing, 
operational monitoring, diagnosis, troubleshooting, shutdown, and 
auditing. It also includes election operations that affect voting 
equipment, such as voter processing at the polling place and handling 
of absentee ballots. We previously reported that some of these 
capabilities were available during the 2000 general election in our 
October 2001 report on election processes.[Footnote 269] For the 2004 
general election, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we 
estimate that 7 percent of jurisdictions that used voting methods other 
than paper ballots connected their voting equipment via a local network 
at their polling locations. The frequency with which remote access to 
voting systems was provided for the 2004 general election was similarly 
low (estimated at 10 percent of jurisdictions that used voting methods 
other than paper ballots) but was again affected by the size of 
jurisdictions. We estimate that a higher percentage of large 
jurisdictions used remote access to voting equipment (estimated at 19 
percent) than medium jurisdictions (13 percent) or small jurisdictions 
(7 percent). The difference between large and small jurisdictions is 
statistically significant.[Footnote 270] Furthermore, we estimate that 
remote access was primarily provided to local election officials (in 6 
percent of jurisdictions) and to a lesser extent, state election 
officials, voting equipment vendors, and third parties. Figure 80 shows 
the estimated percentages of jurisdictions of various sizes that used 
networking or various types of remote access. These capabilities pose 
voting system security and reliability concerns as reported in our 
September 2005 report on the security and reliability of electronic 
voting.[Footnote 271] From approximately 20 open-ended text responses 
to our survey of local jurisdictions that described steps taken to 
prevent unauthorized remote access to voting systems, four safeguards 
were identified: employing passwords for remote users, limiting 
operations to specific election activities, use of virtual private 
networks, and system monitoring. 

Figure 80: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Networking 
or Remote Access for Voting Equipment in the 2004 General Election: 

[See PDF for image] 

[A] Jurisdictions may have selected one or more types of remote access. 

[End of figure] 

As we previously reported in our September 2001 report on voting 
assistance to military and overseas citizens, state and local election 
officials used technologies like electronic mail and faxing to better 
integrate activities during the 2000 general election and to improve 
communications with absentee voters.[Footnote 272] According to our 
estimates from the local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 election, 
jurisdictions continued to use electronic mail to interact with voters 
and also relied on Web sites for a variety of election needs including 
voter registration status, the application and processing of absentee 
ballots, and the status of provisional ballots. For seven items in our 
survey where we asked about jurisdictions' use of e-mail and Web sites 
for voter services, we estimate that large jurisdictions generally used 
these technologies more frequently than both medium and small 
jurisdictions, and that differences in six of these items were 
statistically significant. Figure 81 shows the extent to which 
jurisdictions of different sizes employed e-mail and Web sites for 
selected voter services. In addition to using technology to support 
individual voters, election officials in 1 large jurisdiction we 
visited in New Mexico described their use of telecommunications 
technology to support early voting at multiple locations. This 
jurisdiction connected its registration database to its early voting 
locations with dedicated phone lines, thus making voter registration 
information electronically available at each location. 

Figure 81: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Automated 
Election Support for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The 95 percent confidence interval for all jurisdiction sizes is 
+/-8 percentage points or less. 

[A] The differences between both small and medium jurisdictions and 
large jurisdictions are statistically significant. 

[B] The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are 
statistically significant. 

[C] The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions 
is statistically significant. 

[End of figure] 

Prospects for Expanded Use of Integrated Election Systems Are Unclear: 

Relatively few local jurisdictions we visited reported having plans for 
integrating or further integrating their election-related systems and 
components for the 2006 general election, and in cases where they had 
plans, the scope and nature of the plans varied. At the same time, we 
estimate on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey that a 
relatively large proportion of jurisdictions expect to acquire DREs and 
optical scan systems, which will introduce greater integration 
opportunities. However, given the uncertainty surrounding the specific 
types of systems and features to be acquired, the extent and timing of 
greater integration of voting systems and components, as well as 
election-related systems, remains to be seen. 

More specifically, officials in several jurisdictions that we visited 
told us about plans to integrate relatively modular add-on components 
to their systems, while officials with several other jurisdictions 
described plans for more complex end-to-end interactions among election 
systems and technologies. For example, officials at 5 jurisdictions 
that we visited reported plans to introduce a VVPT capability for 
future elections, and officials at 2 jurisdictions reported plans to 
integrate an audio component to comply with HAVA requirements. In 
another case, officials in 2 jurisdictions told us that their state is 
planning to purchase electronic poll books for its precincts to use 
during the 2006 elections to electronically link its voter registration 
system with its voting systems. Officials at another jurisdiction told 
us that they plan to obtain a new optical scanner that will be used to 
tabulate both DRE and optical scan election results. 

The scope and magnitude of election system integration may be 
influenced, in part, by the jurisdictions' adoption of the optical scan 
and DRE voting methods and the corresponding products that support add- 
on automated features, such as languages and accessibility tools, and 
interactions among automated components of the election process, such 
as ballot generation and tabulation. As we discussed earlier in this 
chapter, one-fifth of local jurisdictions are planning to acquire new 
optical scan and DRE voting equipment in time for the 2006 general 
election. For instance, on the basis of our survey of local 
jurisdictions, we estimate that 25 percent of jurisdictions plan to 
acquire precinct count optical scan voting equipment by the November 
2006 general election. However, some jurisdictions had not yet 
finalized their time frame for acquiring voting equipment at the time 
of our survey. In addition, their acquisition plans also include 
technologies for their election Web sites. Figure 82 estimates the 
percentages of jurisdictions with acquisition plans for various 
technologies and their implementation time frames. While the advent of 
more technology-based voting methods provides greater opportunities for 
integration, the uncertainty around the timing and nature of their 
introduction makes the future extent of this integration unclear at 
this point. 

Figure 82: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions with Plans to 
Acquire Voting Equipment: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

It is important for voting system standards developers to recognize the 
opportunity and potential for greater integration of election systems. 
EAC recently adopted a new version of the voluntary voting system 
guidelines in December 2005 that will become effective in December 
2007. However, this version does not address some of the capabilities 
discussed above. For instance, the guidelines do not address the 
integration of registration systems with voting systems. Neither do 
they address commercial-off-the-shelf devices (such as card readers, 
printers, or personal computers) or software products (such as 
operating systems or database management systems) that are used in 
voting systems without modification. EAC has acknowledged that more 
work is needed to further develop the technical guidelines in areas 
such as voting accessibility, usability, and security features. Such 
efforts have the potential to assist states and local jurisdictions in 
maximizing the benefits of emerging election technologies. 

Concluding Observations: 

The challenges confronting local jurisdictions in acquiring and 
operating voting technologies are not unlike those faced by any 
technology user--adoption and consistent application of standards for 
system capabilities and performance, reliable measures and objective 
data to determine whether the systems are performing as intended, 
rigorous and disciplined performance of security and testing 
activities, and successful management and integration of the people, 
process, and technology components of elections during system 
acquisition and operation. These challenges are heightened by other 
conditions common to both the national elections community and other 
information technology environments: the distribution of 
responsibilities among various organizations, technology changes, 
funding opportunities and constraints, emerging requirements and 
guidance, and public attention. 

The extent to which states and local jurisdictions adopt and 
consistently apply up-to-date voting systems standards will directly 
affect the security and performance of voting systems. A substantial 
proportion of jurisdictions have yet to adopt the most current federal 
voting system standards or related performance measures. Even if this 
happens, however, other challenges loom because systems will need to be 
tested and recertified by many states (and by federal processes 
whenever states have adopted national standards) to meet any newly 
adopted voting standards and HAVA requirements for accuracy. 
Organizations involved with recertification--including federal, state, 
and local governments; testing authorities; and vendors--may need the 
capacity to assume the workloads associated with expected increases in 
the adoption of current standards and the use of new voting systems so 
that potential risks to near-term election processes are minimized. 

Reliable measures and objective data are also considered essential 
management practices for determining whether the technology being used 
is meeting the needs of the jurisdiction's user communities (both the 
voters and the officials who administer the elections). Looking back to 
the November 2000 and 2004 general elections, we estimate that the vast 
majority of jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their 
respective technologies. However, considering that our local 
jurisdiction surveys for the 2000 and 2004 elections indicated limited 
collection of voting system performance data, we conclude that 
estimated levels of satisfaction with voting equipment found in our 
local surveys have been mostly based on a patchwork of operational 
indicators and, based on site visits to local jurisdictions, have 
involved anecdotal experiences of election officials. Although these 
impressions should not be discounted, informed decision making on 
voting system changes and investment would benefit from more objective 
data about how well existing equipment is meeting specific 
requirements, such as those governing system accuracy, reliability, 
efficiency, and security. No one voting method, or particular voting 
system make and model, will meet the needs of every jurisdiction. The 
challenge is thus to ensure that decisions about staying with an 
existing voting method or investing in new or upgraded voting equipment 
are made on the basis of reliable and relevant data about the 
operational performance of the existing method against requirements and 
standards, as well as the benefits to be derived versus the costs to be 
incurred with each choice. 

Effective execution of well-planned security and testing activities 
provides opportunities to anticipate and address potential problems 
before they affect election results. This is important because even a 
few instances of election errors or disruptions can have a sizable 
impact if election results are close. We estimate that the vast 
majority of jurisdictions performed security and testing activities in 
one form or another for the 2004 general election. However, the nature 
and extent of these activities varied among jurisdictions--to some 
degree by jurisdiction size, voting method, or perceived applicability 
of the activities. These activities were also largely responsive to-- 
and limited by--formal state and local directives. When appropriately 
defined and implemented, such directives can promote the effective 
execution of security and testing practices across all phases of the 
elections process. As voting technologies and requirements evolve, 
states and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating 
and consistently implementing the directives to meet the needs of their 
specific election environments. 

As we noted for the 2000 general election, managing the three election 
components of people, process, and technology as interrelated and 
interdependent variables presents an important challenge in the 
acquisition or operation of a given voting method. Whether a state or 
jurisdiction is acquiring, testing, operating, or maintaining a new 
voting system or an existing one, how successfully the system actually 
performs throughout the election cycle will depend not only on how well 
the technology itself has been designed, but also on how well the 
people and processes associated with the system fulfill their roles for 
each stage. The technical potential of more extensive integration of 
voting equipment, components, and election systems also holds the 
prospect for even more interrelationships and interdependencies among 
the people, processes, and technologies, with all their attendant 
risks. In addition to establishing minimum functional and performance 
requirements and processes for voting system aspects of the election 
process, system standards can also be used to govern the integration of 
election systems; address the accuracy, reliability, privacy, and 
security of components and interfaces; and deliver needed support for 
the people and processes that will use the integrated election systems. 
Timely development of integration standards presents a challenge to the 
election community to keep pace with the advancement of election 
systems and technology. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products: 

Elections: Absentee Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens 
Increased for 2004 General Election, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-521. 
Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2006. 

Election Reform: Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal 
Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists. GAO-
06-247. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2006. 

Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter 
Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote. GAO-05-997. 
Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2005. 

Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of 
Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be 
Completed. GAO-05-956. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2005. 

Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections 
Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists. GAO-05-478. 
Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005. 

Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related 
Voting Irregularities. GAO-04-1041R. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 
2004. 

Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents 
Challenges. GAO-04-975T. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004. 

Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals. GAO-02-90. 
Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the Nation. 
GAO-02-3. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors That Affected Uncounted 
Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election. GAO-02-122. Washington, D.C.: 
October 15, 2001. 

Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards. GAO-02-
52. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and Alternative 
Voting Methods. GAO-02-107. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should 
Be Improved. GAO-01-1026. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001. 

Comparison of Voting Age Population to Registered Voters in the 40 
Largest U.S. Counties. GAO-01-560R. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2001. 

Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election 
Administration. GAO-01-470. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2001. 

Bilingual Voting Assistance: Assistance Provided and Costs. GAO/GGD- 97-
81. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 1997. 

Puerto Rico: Confusion over Applicability of the Electoral Law to 
Referendum Process. HRD-93-84. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 1993. 

Voting: Some Procedural Changes and Informational Activities Could 
Increase Turnout. PEMD-91-1. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 1990. 

Bilingual Voting Assistance: Costs of and Use during the November 1984 
General Election. GGD-86-134BR. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 1986. 

Justice Can Further Improve Its Monitoring of Changes in State/Local 
Voting Laws. GGD-84-9. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 1983. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions GAO Visited: 

Local election jurisdictions, such as counties, cities, townships, and 
villages, conduct elections--including federal and state contests. We 
visited 28 local election jurisdictions to collect information about 
the election administration process and their experiences during the 
November 2004 general election. In addition to information such as 
population size, number of precincts, and type of voting system used in 
the November 2004 general election,[Footnote 273] we include 
information about whether these jurisdictions provided bilingual voting 
materials. Under section 203 of the Voting Rights Act,[Footnote 274] 
the Census Bureau Director is to make determinations[Footnote 275] 
based upon the most recent Census data as to which jurisdictions must 
provide voting materials[Footnote 276] in specified minority languages 
as well as in the English language. In our summaries we identify, 
pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the 
Voting Rights Act, whether or not each of the 28 jurisdictions we 
visited is currently (e.g., for purposes of this appendix, as of the 
November 2004 election) required to provide bilingual voting materials 
to any particular group of language minority voters. 

Following is a brief summary of these 28 local jurisdictions, as 
reported to us by election officials we met with. The summaries, except 
where another source is specifically identified, are based upon 
information provided to us by local election officials and provide a 
general description of the environment in which the local election 
jurisdictions operate. The statements in this appendix that are based 
upon information from local election officials were not independently 
verified by us. 

Larimer County, Colorado: 

The County Clerk and Recorder is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Larimer County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Larimer County had 10 full-time employees and 
1 part-time employee working on election administration activities. The 
2000 Census showed that Larimer County had a population of about 
251,000. During our site visit, Larimer County election officials told 
us that for the 2004 election, the county had about 200,000 registered 
voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under 
the Voting Rights Act, Larimer County is not currently required to 
provide bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language 
minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in 
English only. For the November 2004 election, the county had 144 
precincts. However, Larimer County used 31 "vote centers" as polling 
places. On Election Day, any registered voter could go to any of the 31 
vote centers to cast a ballot. The county also offered its registered 
voters the opportunity to vote early at designated early voting 
locations prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general 
election, the county used optical scan ballots for early, absentee, 
provisional, and Election Day voting. For early and Election Day 
voting, the ballots were counted at the early voting sites and vote 
centers. Absentee and provisional ballots were counted centrally using 
optical scan counters. This county was included in our site visits to 
local jurisdictions for our October 2001 comprehensive report on 
election processes nationwide.[Footnote 277] 

El Paso County, Colorado: 

The County Clerk and Recorder is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in El Paso County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, El Paso County had nine full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that El Paso County had a population of about 517,000. During our site 
visit, El Paso County election officials told us that for the 2004 
election, the county had about 354,000 registered voters. Pursuant to 
the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the Voting Rights 
Act, El Paso County is not currently required to provide bilingual 
voting materials to any particular group of language minority voters. 
As a result, the county provides voting materials in English only. For 
the November 2004 general election, the county had 378 precincts. The 
county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early 
at designated locations prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 
general election, the county used direct recording electronic (DRE) 
voting systems for early voting. Optical scan ballots were used to 
record absentee, provisional, and Election Day votes. Ballots cast on 
Election Day were counted using optical scan counters located in 
precincts. Absentee and provisional ballots were counted centrally. 

City of New Haven, Connecticut: 

Responsibility for election administration for the City of New Haven is 
divided between two entities--the Registrars of Voters and the City 
Clerk's Office. The Registrars of Voters have responsibility for voter 
registration, Election Day activities, provisional voting, vote 
counting and recounts, voting equipment, and voter education. The City 
Clerk is responsible for designing and disseminating absentee ballots, 
printing paper ballot strips for the lever machines, and providing 
sample ballots to polling places. At the time of our visit, there were 
six full-time staff in the Registrars of Voters Office and three full- 
time staff in the City Clerk's Office working on election 
administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that the City of New 
Haven had a population of about 124,000. During our site visit, New 
Haven election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, 
the city had about 58,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census 
Bureau Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, the City 
of New Haven is currently required to provide bilingual voting 
materials to a particular group of language minority voters. As a 
result, the city provides voting materials in English and Spanish. For 
the November 2004 general election, the city had 42 precincts operating 
on Election Day and used lever machines for Election Day voting. Paper 
ballots were used to record absentee and provisional votes and were 
hand-counted in a central location. In addition, the city provided 
presidential ballots to Connecticut residents that were not registered 
to vote, and former Connecticut residents who had moved to another 
state within 30 days of the election. These ballots could be used only 
to vote for presidential and vice presidential candidates. 

City of Hartford, Connecticut: 

Responsibility for election administration for the City of Hartford is 
divided between two entities--the Registrars of Voters and the City 
Clerk's Office. The Registrars of Voters have the responsibility for 
voter registration, Election Day activities, provisional voting, vote 
counting and recounts, voting equipment, and voter education. The City 
Clerk is responsible for designing and disseminating absentee ballots, 
printing paper ballot strips for the lever machines, and providing 
sample ballots to polling places. At the time of our visit, there were 
nine full-time staff in the Registrars of Voters and three full-time 
staff in the City Clerk's Office working on election administration 
activities. The 2000 Census showed that the City of Hartford had a 
population of about 122,000. According to the Secretary of State's Web 
site, at the time of the 2004 general election, the city had about 
58,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's 
determinations under the Voting Rights Act, the city of Hartford is 
currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to a 
particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the city 
provides voting materials in English and Spanish. For the November 2004 
general election, the city had 23 precincts operating on Election Day 
and used lever machines for Election Day voting. Paper ballots were 
used to record absentee and provisional votes and were hand-counted in 
a central location. In addition, the city provided presidential ballots 
to Connecticut residents who were not registered to vote, and former 
Connecticut residents who had moved to another state within 30 days of 
the election. These ballots could be used only to vote for presidential 
and vice presidential candidates. 

Broward County, Florida: 

The County Supervisor of Elections is responsible for overseeing 
election administration in Broward County, from registration through 
recounts. At the time of our visit, Broward County had 72 full-time 
staff working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census 
showed that Broward County had a population of about 1.6 million. 
During our site visit, Broward County election officials told us that 
for the November 2004 general election, the county had about 1 million 
registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's 
determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Broward County is currently 
required to provide bilingual voting materials to a particular group of 
language minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting 
materials in English and Spanish. County officials told us that they 
were unable to provide voting materials in Seminole, a Native American 
language, because the language is phonetic and cannot be written. In 
addition, county officials told us that they provided some voter 
education materials in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Creole. For 
the November 2004 general election, the county had 793 precincts 
operating on Election Day. The county also offered its registered 
voters the opportunity to vote early at designated locations prior to 
Election Day. For the November 2004 general election, the county used 
DRE voting systems on Election Day and for early voting. Paper ballots 
were used to record absentee and provisional votes and were counted 
centrally using optical scan counters. 

Leon County, Florida: 

The County Supervisor of Elections is responsible for overseeing 
election administration in Leon County, from registration through 
recounts. At the time of our visit, Leon County had 16 full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Leon County had a population of about 239,000. During our site 
visit, Leon County election officials told us that for the November 
2004 general election, the county had about 171,000 registered voters. 
Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the 
Voting Rights Act, Leon County is not currently required to provide 
bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language minority 
voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in English 
only. Additionally, for the November 2004 general election, the county 
provided ballots in Braille for the blind. The county had 179 precincts 
operating on Election Day for the November 2004 general election. The 
county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early 
at the Supervisor of Elections' office building prior to Election Day. 
For the November 2004 general election, the county used paper ballots 
to record absentee, early, provisional, and Election Day votes. 
Election Day and early voting ballots were counted using precinct 
optical scan counters, and absentee and provisional ballots were 
counted centrally using optical scan counters. 

Dougherty County, Georgia: 

The Supervisor of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Dougherty County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Dougherty County had three full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Dougherty County had a population of about 96,000. During our site 
visit, Dougherty County election officials told us that for the 2004 
general election, the county had about 46,000 registered voters. 
Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the 
Voting Rights Act, Dougherty County is not currently required to 
provide bilingual voting materials and assistance to any particular 
group of language minority voters. As a result, the county provides 
voting materials in English only. For the November 2004 general 
election, the county had 31 precincts operating on Election Day. The 
county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early 
in the election office prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 
general election, the county used DRE voting systems for Election Day, 
early, and in-person absentee voting. Paper ballots were used to record 
provisional and mail-in absentee votes and were counted centrally using 
optical scan counters. This county was included in our site visits to 
local jurisdictions for our October 2001 report on election 
processes.[Footnote 278] 

Muscogee County, Georgia: 

The Director of Elections, appointed by the City Council, is 
responsible for overseeing election administration in Muscogee County, 
from registration through recounts. At the time of our visit, Muscogee 
County had five full-time staff working on election administration 
activities. The 2000 Census showed that Muscogee County had a 
population of about 186,000. During our site visit, Muscogee County 
election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the 
county had about 106,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census 
Bureau Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Muscogee 
County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting materials 
to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the 
county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 2004 
general election, the county had 49 precincts, with 1 absentee voting 
precinct for purposes of counting ballots, operating on Election Day. 
The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote 
early at the election office prior to Election Day. For the November 
2004 general election, the county used DRE voting systems for Election 
Day and early voting. Paper ballots were used to record absentee and 
provisional ballots and were counted centrally using optical scan 
counters. 

Champaign County, Illinois: 

The County Clerk is responsible for overseeing election administration 
in Champaign County, from registration through recounts. At the time of 
our visit, Champaign County had 16 full-time staff working on election 
administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Champaign County 
had a population of about 180,000. During our site visit, Champaign 
County election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, 
the county had about 123,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census 
Bureau Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Champaign 
County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting materials 
to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the 
county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 2004 
general election, the county had 117 precincts operating on Election 
Day. The county used punch card ballots to record Election Day, 
absentee, and provisional votes. These ballots were counted centrally 
using punch card counter machines. This county was included in our site 
visits to local jurisdictions for our October 2001 report on election 
processes.[Footnote 279] 

City of Chicago, Illinois: 

The Executive Director of the Board of Elections is responsible for 
overseeing election administration in the City of Chicago, from 
registration through recounts. At the time of our visit, the City of 
Chicago had 300 full-time staff on the Board of Elections working on 
election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that the 
City of Chicago had a population of about 2.9 million. During our site 
visit, Chicago election officials told us that for the 2004 general 
election, the city had about 1.4 million registered voters. Pursuant to 
the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the Voting Rights 
Act, Cook County, in which the City of Chicago is located, is currently 
required to provide bilingual voting materials to particular groups of 
language minority voters. As a result, the city provides voting 
materials in English, Spanish, and Chinese (including Mandarin and 
Cantonese). In addition, election officials told us that they provide 
voter registration information and other materials in 15 languages, 
including Croatian, Korean, Russian, and Tagalog. For the November 2004 
general election, the city had 2,709 precincts operating on Election 
Day. The city used punch card ballots to record Election Day, absentee, 
and provisional votes. Election Day and absentee ballots were counted 
in each precinct using punch card counters. Provisional ballots were 
counted centrally using punch card counters. 

Wyandotte County, Kansas: 

The County Election Commissioner is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Wyandotte County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Wyandotte County had six full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Wyandotte County had a population of about 158,000. During our 
site visit, Wyandotte County election officials told us that for the 
November 2004 general election, the county had about 89,000 registered 
voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under 
the Voting Rights Act, Wyandotte County is not currently required to 
provide bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language 
minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in 
English only. For the November 2004 general election, the county had 
159 precincts operating on Election Day. The county also offered its 
registered voters the opportunity to vote early at the headquarters 
office prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general election, 
the county used paper optical scan ballots to record Election Day, 
absentee, early, and provisional votes. Election Day ballots were 
counted at the precincts using optical scan counters, and early ballots 
were counted at the early voting location using optical scan counters. 
Absentee and provisional ballots were counted using optical scan 
counters in a central location. 

Johnson County, Kansas: 

The County Election Commissioner is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Johnson County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Johnson County's Election Office had 16 full- 
time staff working on election administration activities. The 2000 
Census showed that Johnson County had a population of about 451,000. 
During our site visit, Johnson County election officials told us that 
for the November 2004 general election, the county had about 349,000 
registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's 
determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Johnson County is not 
currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to any 
particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the county 
provides voting materials in English only. For the November 2004 
general election, the county had 415 precincts operating on Election 
Day. The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to 
vote early at designated early voting locations prior to Election Day. 
For the November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting 
systems for Election Day voting. Paper optical scan ballots were used 
to record early, absentee, and provisional votes and were counted in a 
central location using optical scan counters. 

City of Manchester, New Hampshire: 

The City Clerk is responsible for overseeing election administration 
for the City of Manchester, from registration through recounts. At the 
time of our visit, the City Clerk's Office had 14 full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that the City of Manchester had a population of about 107,000. During 
our site visit, Manchester's City Clerk told us that for the November 
2004 general election, the city had about 57,000 registered voters. In 
terms of population, the City of Manchester is the largest city in New 
Hampshire and is located in the largest county. Pursuant to the Census 
Bureau Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, the City 
of Manchester is not currently required to provide bilingual voting 
materials to any particular group of language minority voters. As a 
result, the city provides voting materials in English only. For the 
November 2004 general election, the county had 12 precincts operating 
on Election Day. The city used paper optical scan ballots to record 
Election Day and absentee votes, which were counted in each precinct 
using optical scan counters. 

Town of Madbury, New Hampshire: 

The Town Clerk is responsible for overseeing election administration 
for the Town of Madbury, from registration through recounts. At the 
time of our visit, the town had no full-time staff working on election 
administration activities, but had nine part-time workers, including 
the Town Clerk, assigned to administer elections. The 2000 Census 
showed that the Town of Madbury had a population of about 1,500. During 
our site visit, Madbury election officials told us that for the 
November 2004 general election, the town had about 1,200 registered 
voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under 
the Voting Rights Act, the Town of Madbury is not currently required to 
provide bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language 
minority voters. As a result, the town provides voting materials in 
English only. For the November 2004 general election, the town had one 
precinct operating on Election Day. The town used hand-counted paper 
ballots to record Election Day and absentee votes. 

Middlesex County, New Jersey: 

Responsibility for election administration for the County of Middlesex 
is divided between two entities--the County Clerk's Office and the 
Board of Elections. The County Clerk's Office is responsible for 
sending out absentee ballots, designing ballots, and certifying 
elections to the state. The Board of Elections has responsibility for 
voter registration, poll workers, polling places, vote counting and 
recounting, and voting equipment. At the time of our visit, the Board 
of Elections had 21 full-time staff and 4 part-time commissioners 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Middlesex County had a population of about 750,000. During our 
site visit, election officials told us that about 427,000 residents of 
the county are registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 
Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Middlesex County 
is currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to a 
particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the county 
provides voting materials in English and Spanish. For the November 2004 
general election, the county had 597 precincts operating on Election 
Day. The county used DRE voting systems on Election Day. Paper ballots 
were used to record absentee and provisional votes, and were counted 
centrally using optical scan counters. In addition, paper ballots were 
used to record emergency votes, and were hand counted in a central 
location. This county was included in our site visits to local 
jurisdictions for our October 2001 report on election 
processes.[Footnote 280] 

Passaic County, New Jersey: 

Responsibility for election administration for Passaic County is 
divided among three entities--the Board of Elections, the County 
Clerk's Office, and the Superintendent of Elections Office. The Board 
of Elections has responsibility for poll workers, polling places, vote 
counting, and recounts. The County Clerk's Office has responsibility 
for ballot design, accepting absentee ballot applications and sending 
out ballots, and certifying the election to the state. The 
Superintendent of Elections has responsibility for voter registration 
and voting equipment. At the time of our visit, there were 5 full-time 
staff in the Board of Elections Office, 3 full-time staff in the County 
Clerk's Office, and 25 full-time staff in the Superintendent of 
Elections Office working on election administration activities. The 
2000 Census showed that Passaic County had a population of about 
490,000. During our site visit, Passaic County election officials told 
us that for the 2004 general election, the county had about 255,000 
registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's 
determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Passaic County is currently 
required to provide bilingual voting materials to a particular group of 
language minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting 
materials in English and Spanish. For the November 2004 general 
election, the county had 288 precincts operating on Election Day. The 
county used DRE voting systems on Election Day. Paper ballots were used 
to record absentee and provisional votes, and were counted centrally 
using optical scan machines. In addition, emergency ballots were 
available for "emergency" situations, such as DRE malfunction or power 
loss, and were hand-counted in the precinct. 

Clark County, Nevada: 

The Registrar of Voters, appointed by the County Manager, is 
responsible for overseeing election administration in Clark County, 
from registration through recounts. At the time of our visit, Clark 
County had 38 full-time staff working on election administration 
activities. The 2000 Census showed that Clark County had a population 
of about 1.4 million. During our site visit, Clark County election 
officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the county had 
about 684,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 
Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Clark County is 
currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to a 
particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the county 
provides voting materials in English and Spanish. For the November 2004 
election, the county had 1,042 precincts operating on Election Day. The 
county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early 
at designated early voting locations prior to Election Day. For the 
November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting systems for 
Election Day, early voting, and provisional voting. Absentee and 
provisional votes, other than those cast on Election Day, were recorded 
on paper ballots and counted centrally using optical scan counters. 

Washoe County, Nevada: 

The Registrar of Voters, appointed by the County Manager, is 
responsible for overseeing election administration in Washoe County, 
from registration through recounts. At the time of our visit, Washoe 
County had eight full-time staff working on election administration 
activities. The 2000 Census showed that Washoe County had a population 
of about 339,000. During our site visit, Washoe County election 
officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the county had 
about 234,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 
Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Washoe County is 
not currently required under the Voting Rights Act to provide bilingual 
voting materials to any particular group of language minority voters. 
Nonetheless, the county provided voting materials in English and 
Spanish. For the November 2004 general election, the county had 236 out 
of 489 precincts operating on Election Day. The county also offered its 
registered voters the opportunity to vote early at designated early 
voting locations prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general 
election, the county used DRE voting systems for Election Day and early 
voting. Paper ballots were used to record absentee and provisional 
votes, and were counted centrally using optical scan machines. 

Bernalillo County, New Mexico: 

The Elections Administrator is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Bernalillo County, from registration through 
recounts. At the time of our visit, Bernalillo County had 29 full-time 
staff working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census 
showed that Bernalillo County had a population of about 557,000. During 
our site visit, Bernalillo County election officials told us that for 
the 2004 general election, the county had about 357,000 registered 
voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under 
the Voting Rights Act, Bernalillo County is currently required to 
provide bilingual voting materials to particular groups of language 
minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in 
English and Spanish, and provides interpreters in three Native American 
languages, Navajo, Tiwa, and Keres, which have no written form. In 
addition, the county has a Native American coordinator who works with 
the various pueblos to discuss specific issues. For the November 2004 
general election, the county had 413 precincts operating on Election 
Day. The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to 
vote early at designated early voting locations prior to Election Day. 
For the November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting 
systems for Election Day and early voting. Absentee ballots were 
counted centrally using optical scan machines. Provisional votes were 
recorded on paper ballots and hand-counted centrally. This county was 
included in our site visits to local jurisdictions for our October 2001 
report on election processes.[Footnote 281] 

Santa Fe County, New Mexico: 

The Bureau of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Santa Fe County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Santa Fe County had eight full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Santa Fe County had a population of about 129,000. During our site 
visit, Santa Fe County election officials told us that for the 2004 
general election, the county had about 95,000 registered voters. 
Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the 
Voting Rights Act, Santa Fe County is currently required to provide 
bilingual voting materials to particular groups of language minority 
voters. As a result, voting materials were provided in English and 
Spanish. The county also provides oral translation and audiotapes in 
Native American languages, some of which have no written form. For the 
November 2004 general election, the county had 87 precincts, including 
one absentee voting precinct for purposes of counting absentee ballots, 
operating on Election Day. The county also offered its registered 
voters the opportunity to vote early at designated early voting 
locations prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general 
election, the county used DRE voting systems for Election Day. In 
addition, absentee ballots were counted centrally using optical scan 
machines. Provisional votes were recorded on paper ballots and 
centrally hand-counted. This county was included in our site visits to 
local jurisdictions for our October 2001 report on election 
processes.[Footnote 282] 

Carteret County, North Carolina: 

The Board of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Carteret County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Carteret County had two full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Carteret County had a population of about 59,000. During our site 
visit, Carteret County election officials told us that for the 2004 
general election, the county had about 42,000 registered voters. 
Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the 
Voting Rights Act, Carteret County is not currently required to provide 
bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language minority 
voters. Nonetheless, the county provided some voting materials, such as 
polling place posters, in English and Spanish. Election ballots and 
other materials were provided in English only. For the November 2004 
general election, the county had 34 precincts operating on Election 
Day. The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to 
vote early at the Board of Elections' office prior to Election Day. For 
the November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting systems 
for Election Day and early voting. Optical scan ballots were used to 
record absentee and provisional votes, and were centrally counted using 
optical scan machines. 

Guilford County, North Carolina: 

The Board of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Guilford County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Guilford County had 14 full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Guilford County had a population of about 421,000. During our site 
visit, Guilford County election officials told us that for the 2004 
general election, the county had about 275,000 registered voters. 
Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the 
Voting Rights Act, Guilford County is not currently required to provide 
bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language minority 
voters. Nonetheless, the county provided ballots in English and voting 
instructions in English and Spanish. For the November 2004 general 
election, the county had 159 precincts operating on Election Day. The 
county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early 
at designated early voting locations prior to Election Day. For the 
November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting systems for 
most Election Day and early voting ballots. Optical scan ballots were 
used to record absentee and provisional votes, and were centrally 
counted using optical scan machines. 

Cuyahoga County, Ohio: 

The Board of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Cuyahoga County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Cuyahoga County had about 86 full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Cuyahoga County had a population of about 1.4 million. During our 
site visit, Cuyahoga County election officials told us that for the 
2004 general election, the county had about 1 million registered 
voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under 
the Voting Rights Act, Cuyahoga County is not currently required to 
provide bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language 
minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in 
English only. For the November 2004 general election, the county had 
1,436 precincts operating on Election Day. The county used punch card 
ballots for Election Day, absentee, and provisional voting that were 
counted in a central location. This county was included in our site 
visits to local jurisdictions for our October 2001 report on election 
processes.[Footnote 283] 

Mahoning County, Ohio: 

The Board of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Mahoning County, from registration through recounts. 
At the time of our visit, Mahoning County had 12 full-time staff 
working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 
that Mahoning County had a population of about 258,000. During our site 
visit, Mahoning County election officials told us that for the 2004 
general election, the county had about 195,000 registered voters. 
Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the 
Voting Rights Act, Mahoning County is not currently required to provide 
bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language minority 
voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in English 
only. For the November 2004 general election, the county had 312 
precincts operating on Election Day. The county used DRE voting systems 
for Election Day and Election Day provisional voting. Optical scan 
ballots were used to record absentee votes and were centrally counted 
using optical scan machines. 

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania: 

The Allegheny County Elections Division is responsible for the day-to- 
day activities of and overseeing election administration, from 
registration through recounts. At the time of our visit, the county 
Elections Division had 45 full-time staff working on election 
administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Allegheny County 
had a population of about 1.3 million. According to Pennsylvania's 
Department of State's Web site, Allegheny County had about 919,000 
registered voters for the 2004 general election. Pursuant to the Census 
Bureau Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Allegheny 
County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting materials 
to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the 
county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 2004 
general election, the county had 1,317 precincts operating on Election 
Day. For the November 2004 general election, the county used lever 
machines for Election Day voting. Paper ballots were used to record 
absentee and provisional votes. Absentee ballots were hand-counted at 
the precincts, and provisional ballots were hand-counted in a central 
location. 

Montgomery County, Pennsylvania: 

The Voter Services Office is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Montgomery County, from registration through 
recounts. At the time of our visit, Montgomery County had 18 full-time 
staff working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census 
showed that Montgomery County had a population of about 750,000. During 
our site visit, Montgomery County election officials told us that for 
the 2004 general election, the county had about 565,000 registered 
voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director's determinations under 
the Voting Rights Act, Montgomery County is not currently required to 
provide bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language 
minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in 
English only. For the November 2004 general election, the county had 
407 precincts operating on Election Day. The county used DRE voting 
systems for Election Day. Paper ballots were used to record absentee 
and provisional votes. Absentee ballots were hand-counted in each 
precinct and recounted by county staff to obtain the official count. 
Provisional ballots were hand-counted in a central location. This 
county was included in our site visits to local jurisdictions for our 
October 2001 report on election processes.[Footnote 284] 

Clark County, Washington: 

The County Auditor is responsible for overseeing election 
administration in Clark County, from registration through recounts. At 
the time of our visit, Clark County had eight full-time staff working 
on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that 
Clark County had a population of about 345,000. During our site visit, 
Clark County election officials told us that for the 2004 general 
election, the county had about 208,000 registered voters. Pursuant to 
the Census Bureau Director's determinations under the Voting Rights 
Act, Clark County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting 
materials to any particular group of language minority voters. As a 
result, the county provides voting materials in English only. For the 
November 2004 general election, the county had 180 precincts operating 
on Election Day. The county used punch card ballots to record Election 
Day, absentee, and provisional votes. These votes were counted in a 
central location. This county was included in our site visits to local 
jurisdictions for our October 2001 report on election 
processes.[Footnote 285] 

King County, Washington: 

The Director of Records, Elections and Licensing Services is 
responsible for overseeing election administration in King County, from 
registration through recounts. At the time of our visit, King County 
had 38 full-time staff working on election administration activities. 
The 2000 Census showed that King County had a population of about 1.7 
million. In terms of population, it has the largest population in 
Washington state. During our site visit, King County election officials 
told us that for the 2004 general election, the county had about 1 
million active registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 
Director's determinations under the Voting Rights Act, King County is 
currently required to provide bilingual voting to a particular group of 
language minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting 
materials in English and Chinese. For the November 2004 general 
election, the county had 2,616 precincts operating on Election Day. The 
county used paper ballots on Election Day and for absentee and 
provisional votes. Election Day ballots were counted at the precincts 
using optical scan machines. Absentee and provisional ballots were 
counted centrally using optical scan machines. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to: 

* identify changes to election systems since the November 2000 general 
election, including steps taken to implement provisions of the Help 
America Vote Act (HAVA) and: 

* describe the issues and challenges encountered by election officials 
in the 2004 general election. 

For both objectives, we (1) conducted a Web-based survey of the 50 
states and the District of Columbia on state laws and other actions 
taken at the state level related to major stages of election 
administration--voter registration, absentee and early voting, 
conducting elections, and vote counting; (2) sent a mail questionnaire 
to election officials in a representative sample of local election 
jurisdictions nationwide; and (3) visited 28 local election 
jurisdictions in 14 states to obtain information about their 
experiences during the November 2004 general election. To obtain 
additional information about local election jurisdiction experiences, 
we attended the Election Center's 21st Annual National Conference in 
August 2005. The Election Center is a national association of state and 
local election officials. 

To identify questions to ask in our surveys and during our site visits 
to local jurisdictions about changes and issues and challenges, we 
reviewed prior GAO reports and relevant studies. The studies included 
those done by national or state organizations and state or local 
governments to assess the November 2004 general election. We also 
attended several hearings held by the Election Assistance Commission 
regarding election administration issues and attended the winter 2005 
joint meeting of the National Association of Secretaries of State and 
National Association of State Election Directors. Overall, we did our 
work between March 2005 and February 2006 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. 

State Survey: 

Our state survey sought to update information on selected state 
statutory requirements included in our 2001 elections report and 
inquired about other changes that included actions taken to implement 
HAVA. To develop our survey of state election officials, we reviewed 
existing studies about the election process, including previous and 
ongoing GAO work. Social science survey specialists designed a draft 
questionnaire in close collaboration with GAO subject matter experts, 
and we conducted pretests with representatives of 5 states to help 
further refine our questions, develop new questions, clarify any 
ambiguous portions of the survey, and identify any potentially biased 
questions. These pretests were conducted in person and by telephone 
with election officials from states with varying election system 
characteristics. 

Prior to fielding our state survey, we contacted the Secretaries of 
State, Chairs of Election Boards, or other responsible state-level 
officials to confirm the contact information for the director of 
elections for each state. We launched our Web-based survey on August 
15, 2005, and received all responses by November 7, 2005. Log-in 
information for the Web-based survey was e-mailed to directors of 
elections. We sent one follow-up e-mail message to all nonrespondents 
after the questionnaire had been online for 2 weeks. After another 4 
weeks, we contacted by telephone or e-mail all those who had not 
completed the questionnaire. A representative of the Council of State 
Governments also coordinated with us to encourage a select number of 
nonresponding states to complete the survey. We obtained responses from 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia for a 100 percent response 
rate. Even so, the number of responses to individual questions may be 
fewer than 51, depending upon how many states were eligible to or chose 
to respond to a particular question. 

Because our state survey was not a sample survey, but rather a census 
of all states, including the District of Columbia, there are no 
sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any 
survey may introduce nonsampling errors. For example, differences in 
how a particular question is interpreted or the sources of information 
available to respondents can introduce unwanted variability into the 
survey results. We included steps in both the data collection and data 
analysis stages for the purpose of minimizing such nonsampling errors. 
As indicated above, social science survey specialists designed a draft 
questionnaire, and versions of the questionnaire were pretested with 5 
members of the population. We examined the survey results and performed 
computer analyses to identify inconsistencies and other indications of 
error. A second, independent analyst checked the accuracy of all 
computer analyses. 

Mail Survey of Local Jurisdictions: 

To obtain national information from local election officials on changes 
to election systems since 2000 and election administration, we 
conducted a mail survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide. 
Overall, there are about 10,500 local government jurisdictions 
responsible for conducting elections nationwide. States can be divided 
into two groups according to how they delegate election 
responsibilities to local jurisdictions. The first group is composed of 
41 states that delegate election responsibilities primarily to 
counties, with a few of these states delegating election 
responsibilities to some cities, and 1 state that delegates these 
responsibilities to election regions. We included the District of 
Columbia in this group of states. The first group contains about one- 
fourth of the local election jurisdictions nationwide. The second group 
is composed of 9 states that delegate election responsibilities to 
subcounty governmental units, known by the U.S. Census Bureau as minor 
civil divisions (MCD). This group of states contains about three- 
fourths of the local election jurisdictions nationwide. The division of 
the 50 states and the District of Columbia by how election 
responsibilities are organized is as follows (states in bold delegate 
election responsibilities to some cities independently from counties). 

* County-level states: Alaska (four election regions), Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of 
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming: 

* Minor civil division-level states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin: 

While only about one-fourth of election jurisdictions nationwide are in 
states that delegate election responsibilities primarily to counties, 
according to Census 2000, 88 percent of the U.S. population lived in 
these states. The U.S. population distribution between the two state 
groups is shown in table 28. 

Table 28: Population in Each State Group: 

State group: County-level states; 
Population in 2000: 247,277,791; 
Percentage: 88. 

State group: Minor civil division-level states; 
Population in 2000: 34,143,449; 
Percentage: 12. 

State group: Total; 
Population in 2000: 281,421,240; 
Percentage: 100. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data. 

[End of table] 

2001 Local Election Jurisdiction Mail Survey: 

After the 2000 general election, GAO also conducted a mail survey of 
local election jurisdictions nationwide. The sample frame for GAO's 
2001 survey consisted of (1) all county election jurisdictions, or 
their equivalents, in 39 states that delegate election responsibilities 
primarily to counties;[Footnote 286] (2) the largest MCD in each county 
(based on 1999 Census population estimates) in the 9 states that 
delegate election responsibilities to MCDs; (3) the District of 
Columbia; and (4) Alaska. Survey results were generalized to this 
sample frame, which covered 90 percent of the U.S. population. 

The sample frame for the 2001 survey was stratified into three groups-
-jurisdictions that used electronic voting machines; 
those that used optical scan; and those that used any other method, 
including punch cards, lever machines, and hand-counted paper ballots. 
To determine the population of jurisdictions that used each type of 
voting method, we used two databases from Election Data 
Services[Footnote 287]--one for counties nationwide and one for New 
England MCDs---supplemented by data we obtained from other sources. We 
created separate strata for DRE and optical scan because these were the 
two types of methods usually considered at the time as options by 
jurisdictions purchasing new voting equipment. 

Where possible, the results of some questions in the 2001 survey were 
compared with results in the 2005 local election jurisdiction survey. 
Differences in overall estimates from the 2001 and 2005 surveys of 
local election jurisdictions are, in part, likely due to differences in 
the sample designs of the two surveys and how MCDs were selected. 
Because of these sample design differences, comparing only election 
jurisdictions that are counties provides a stronger basis for making 
direct comparisons between the two surveys' results. The estimates 
compared in this report are of the county local election jurisdictions 
only; for this reason, some estimates from the 2001 survey are slightly 
different than the overall sample estimates provided in our prior 
report. For these comparisons, the 95 percent confidence interval is 
plus or minus 5 percentage points or less for the 2001 survey estimates 
and plus or minus 8 percentage points or less for the 2005 survey 
estimates. 

2005 Local Election Jurisdiction Mail Survey: 

Unlike for the 2001 GAO election survey, for the 2005 survey GAO 
constructed its own sample frame. The initial list for each state group 
was constructed from the 2000 decennial census data. Census population 
data were available for all counties and county equivalents (cities 
that are independent from counties and boroughs, municipalities, and 
other census areas in Alaska); the county equivalents for Alaska were 
assigned to their respective election regions. Census population data 
were also available for all MCDs. We used jurisdiction population size 
to define sample strata because these census data were readily 
available for all counties and MCDs nationwide. Ideally, it would have 
been useful to define the sample using national data on all registered 
voters or all eligible voters. However, we did not use numbers of 
registered voters to define the strata because census data on 
registered voters were not available at the county and MCD level 
nationwide. And we did not use numbers of eligible voters (individuals 
18 years and over) to define the strata because census data allowing us 
to exclude noncitizens and felons, groups that are not eligible to 
vote, from the 18 years and over population, were also not available at 
the county and MCD levels nationwide. 

The large imbalance between the distribution of population and election 
jurisdictions between the two groups of states created unique 
challenges in designing a survey sample that, at the same time, is 
representative of all election jurisdictions nationwide and covers the 
entire U.S. population. Because about three-fourths of all election 
jurisdictions are in the MCD states, in large part, a survey of a 
representative sample of jurisdictions nationwide is a survey of the 
MCD jurisdictions and the election processes, procedures, and practices 
that result from the laws of the 9 states in which they are located. 
And, because of the large number of MCD jurisdictions in Minnesota, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin, these 3 states play a big role in the 
sample.[Footnote 288] Contrariwise, a survey that is representative of 
the U.S. population nationwide, and not of local election jurisdictions 
nationwide, similar to GAO's 2001 election survey, would place heavy 
emphasis on the 41 county-level states in which 88 percent of the U.S. 
population lives. In a sample like this, about 88 percent of the 
sampled jurisdictions would come from the county-level states, and 
about 12 percent would come from the MCD states. So neither the MCD 
jurisdictions nor their states would receive as much emphasis in the 
sample. Therefore, we designed a survey sample that would allow us to 
provide survey results that can be generalized to all local election 
jurisdictions nationwide, as well as for local election jurisdictions 
by population size. 

We surveyed a stratified random probability sample of 788 local 
election jurisdictions nationwide. The sampling unit was the 
geographically distinct local election jurisdiction at the county, 
city, or MCD level of local government (or, in Alaska, the election 
region). The population of election jurisdictions was divided into the 
two state groups--county-level states and MCD-level states, and each 
state group was then divided into strata according to jurisdiction 
population size using Census 2000 data. County-level states were 
divided into 4 strata, and MCD-level states were divided into 6 strata. 
The allocation of units, or jurisdictions, to strata was done in two 
stages (see table 29). In the first stage, 533 units were allocated 
across the 9 strata in proportion to the number of jurisdictions in the 
population in each stratum. We used only 9 strata because 1 stratum 
(stratum 5) did not have any jurisdictions. Sample allocation at this 
stage allowed us to have a random sample of all local election 
jurisdictions nationwide. In the second stage, we allocated an 
additional 255 sample units to the 5 strata having the largest 
population, with all jurisdictions in county-level states having a 
population greater than 1 million being selected. Sample allocation at 
this stage allowed us also to have a random sample of local 
jurisdictions nationwide according to population size--large, medium, 
and small. To group jurisdictions by population size, we combined 
jurisdictions in like-sized population strata in county-level and MCD- 
level states. We defined large jurisdictions as those with a population 
greater than 100,000 (strata 1, 2, and 6), medium jurisdictions as 
those with a population of more than 10,000 to 100,000 (strata 3 and 
7), and small jurisdictions as those with a population of 10,000 or 
less (strata 4, 8, 9, and 10). Thus, our survey results can be 
generalized to all local election jurisdictions nationwide, as well as 
to jurisdictions by population size category. 

Table 29: Local Election Survey Sample Allocation: 

Stratum: 1; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: County/city--greater than 1 million population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 28; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 1; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 27; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 28. 

Stratum: 2; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: County/city--100,001 to 1 million population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 422; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 21; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 136; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 157. 

Stratum: 3; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: County/city--10,001 to 100,000 population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 1,716; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 87; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 65; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 152. 

Stratum: 4; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: County/city--1 to 10,000 population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 648; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 33; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 0; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 33. 

Stratum: 5; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--greater than 1 million population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 0; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 0; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 0; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 0. 

Stratum: 6; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--100,001 to 1 million population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 25; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 1; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 7; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 8. 

Stratum: 7; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--10,001 to 100,000 population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 673; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 33; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 20; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 53. 

Stratum: 8; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--1,001 to 10,000 population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 3,053; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 155; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 0; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 155. 

Stratum: 9; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--301 to 1,000 population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 2,341; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 119; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 0; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 119. 

Stratum: 10; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--0 to 300 population; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 1,585; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 83; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 0; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 83. 

Stratum: Total; 
Total number of jurisdictions in population: 10,491; 
Number in stage 1 allocation: 533; 
Number in: stage 2 allocation: 255; 
Total number of jurisdictions sampled: 788. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data for the population 
counts and GAO for sample allocations. 

[End of table] 

As indicated above, GAO constructed an initial sample frame for each 
state group using 2000 decennial census data. To check the 
comprehensiveness and correctness of this list, information about 
election jurisdictions was obtained from state election Web sites in 
nearly all states. In making these checks, we determined that the 
census data did not coincide with all local election jurisdictions in 7 
states--Hawaii, Virginia, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin. All of these states, except Wisconsin, had counties or MCDs 
that were not identified as election jurisdictions, and Maine and 
Wisconsin had election jurisdictions that were not census MCDs. 
Therefore, we adjusted the original sample frame to reflect the 
election jurisdictions in these 7 states as best we could determine. 
Additionally, during the course of fielding this survey, we learned 
that the 5 counties, or boroughs, that constitute New York City are not 
separate election jurisdictions, but are a single election jurisdiction 
governed by the New York City Board of Elections. We adjusted our 
sample frame based on census data again to reflect this circumstance. 
Two states, Minnesota and Michigan, did not provide comprehensive 
listings of election jurisdictions on their state election Web sites. 
However, from the Minnesota Municipal Clerks and Finance Officers' 
Association and the Minnesota Association of Townships, we obtained 
lists of Minnesota MCD election officials; and from the Michigan 
Townships Association Web site, the Michigan Association of Municipal 
Clerks, and a listing of Michigan local government Web sites contained 
in an online document from the University of Michigan, we obtained 
Internet links to Michigan MCDs that enabled us to identify local 
election officials in this state. From all of these data sources, GAO 
constructed a complete list of local election jurisdictions in the 
United States. The information from state election Web sites and other 
sources was used also to obtain contact information for the head 
official in local election jurisdictions selected to be in our survey 
sample. For some local election jurisdictions officials whose contact 
information was not readily available, we called or e-mailed state 
election officials, county or city hall administration offices, or 
jurisdiction membership organizations in order to learn appropriate 
names and addresses. A contractor was used to call all jurisdictions in 
the sample to confirm or correct, as necessary, this contact 
information. 

We had to make adjustments in how we surveyed the election 
jurisdictions in two states--Minnesota and Texas. During questionnaire 
development, we learned that election functions in Minnesota are split 
between county-level government and MCDs. For example, registration is 
handled exclusively by county officials, and county auditors may 
delegate other functions, such as absentee voting, to MCDs. There are 
some functions that MCDs are responsible for handling, such as polling 
place matters. Therefore, we also surveyed election officials in the 67 
Minnesota counties that had MCDs selected to be in our sample--our 
sample included no MCDs from the remaining Minnesota counties. We 
created separate versions of our questionnaire for Minnesota county and 
MCD election officials. GAO staff reviewed and combined the responses 
from counties with the responses from their included MCDs to create a 
single completed questionnaire per Minnesota MCD in our sample. Also, 
during the course of fielding this survey, we learned that some Texas 
counties split election responsibilities between the county clerk and 
the tax assessor-collector. In the few Texas counties in our sample 
with these split responsibilities, we sent a copy of the main 
questionnaire to each official, and again used only a single completed 
questionnaire for the county. 

Our survey period was from mid-August until mid-December 2005. A 
contractor was used to make up to two follow-up telephone calls to all 
nonrespondents to encourage them to return a completed questionnaire. 
In all, we received 632 usable questionnaires for an overall response 
rate of 80 percent. The response rates by strata are presented in table 
30. As can be seen, the response rates were high in all strata, with 
the lowest response rate being 69 percent in stratum 2. And according 
to our groupings of jurisdictions by population size, the response 
rates for large jurisdictions was 72 percent, for medium jurisdictions 
it was 82 percent, and for small jurisdictions it was 83 percent. We 
believe that these response rates combined with relatively small 
sampling errors, presented below, allow us to describe the issues and 
challenges encountered by local election jurisdictions, both in total 
and by population size categories, in the 2004 general election with an 
acceptable level of precision. 

Table 30: Local Election Jurisdiction Survey Response Rates, Overall 
and by Sample Strata: 

Stratum: 1; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: County/city--greater than 1 million population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 28; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 24; 
Response rate: 86%. 

Stratum: 2; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: County/city--100,001 to 1 million population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 157; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 108; 
Response rate: 69%. 

Stratum: 3; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: County/city--10,001 to 100,000 population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 152; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 121; 
Response rate: 80%. 

Stratum: 4; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: County/city--1 to 10,000 population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 33; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 26; 
Response rate: 79%. 

Stratum: 5; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--greater than 1 million population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 0; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 0; 
Response rate: 0. 

Stratum: 6; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--100,001 to 1 million population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 8; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 7; 
Response rate: 88%. 

Stratum: 7; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--10,001 to 100,000 population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 53; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 48; 
Response rate: 91%. 

Stratum: 8; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--1,001 to 10,000 population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 155; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 126; 
Response rate: 81%. 

Stratum: 9; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--301 to 1,000 population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 119; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 96; 
Response rate: 81%. 

Stratum: 10; 
Stratum: [Empty]; 
Stratum: MCD--0 to 300 population; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 83; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 76; 
Response rate: 92%. 

Stratum: Total; 
Number of jurisdictions sampled: 788; 
Number of jurisdictions returning usable questionnaires: 632; 
Response rate: 80%. 

Source: GAO: 

[End of table] 

All sample surveys are subject to sampling error--that is, the extent 
to which the survey results differ from what would have been obtained 
if the whole population had been observed. Measures of sampling error 
are defined by two elements, the width of the confidence intervals 
around the estimate (sometimes called the precision of the estimate) 
and the confidence level at which the intervals are computed. Because 
we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our 
sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have 
drawn. As each sample could have provided different estimates, we 
express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample's 
results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 5 
percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual 
population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As 
a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence 
intervals based on the mail survey includes the true values in the 
sample population. Unless otherwise noted, the maximum sampling error 
for estimates of all jurisdictions is plus or minus 5 percentage 
points, plus or minus 7 percentage points for large jurisdictions, plus 
or minus 7 percentage points for medium population size jurisdictions; 
and plus or minus 5 percentage points for small population size 
jurisdictions. 

In addition to the reported sampling errors, as indicated earlier, the 
practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, 
commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, differences in 
how a particular question is interpreted, the information sources 
available to respondents, or the types of sample members who do not 
respond can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We 
took extensive steps in questionnaire development, data collection, and 
the editing and analysis of the survey data to minimize nonsampling 
errors. As with the questionnaire for our state survey, social science 
survey specialists designed the draft questionnaire for local 
jurisdictions in close collaboration with GAO subject matter experts. 
An early draft was reviewed by an expert in the election field who is 
also a long-time local election administrator. We pretested the 
questionnaire in person and by telephone with officials in election 
jurisdictions in 7 states. From this review and these pretests, we made 
revisions, as necessary. We also consulted with election officials in 
several counties in Minnesota when developing separate questionnaire 
versions for Minnesota counties and MCDs. Our questionnaire was sent to 
all jurisdictions in booklet form. A copy of the main mail 
questionnaire is included in appendix III. All returned questionnaires 
were reviewed and edited, and we called respondents to obtain 
information for blank responses or where clarification was needed. For 
example, many jurisdictions returned a questionnaire that had two or 
more adjacent pages left blank. We called these jurisdictions to 
determine whether the questions on these pages had not been answered 
accidentally or intentionally. We then obtained answers to these 
questions from those respondents willing to provide answers. Also, when 
necessary, we called Minnesota election officials to resolve conflicts 
that occurred when we were combining questionnaire data from Minnesota 
MCDs and associated counties into a single completed questionnaire per 
MCD. All questionnaire data were double key-entered into an electronic 
file in batches (that is, the entries were 100 percent verified), and a 
random sample of each batch was selected for further verification for 
completeness and accuracy. Computer analyses were also performed to 
identify any inconsistencies in response patterns or other indications 
of errors. All computer syntax was peer-reviewed and verified by 
separate programmers to ensure that the syntax had been written and 
executed correctly. 

Visits to Selected Local Election Jurisdictions: 

To obtain a more detailed understanding of the stages of the election 
process, challenges associated with it in local jurisdictions, and how 
local election officials address those challenges, we visited and 
interviewed officials in a nonprobability sample of 28 local election 
jurisdictions in 14 states nationwide. We obtained and reviewed 
available documentation on the requirements, people, processes, and 
technology of election administration within each jurisdiction. 
Although the information obtained from the visits to these 28 
jurisdictions cannot be generalized to other local election 
jurisdictions, these jurisdictions were chosen based on a wide variety 
of characteristics, including voting methods used, geographic 
characteristics, and aspects of election administration. Regarding 
election administration, we sought to have a mix of jurisdictions where 
the following varied: registration time frames, absentee voting 
requirements (i.e., excuse versus no excuse), whether early voting was 
offered, whether voters were required to provide identification to 
vote, and whether recounts for federal or state offices occurred. We 
did not select jurisdictions we visited on the basis of size, but as 
appropriate, we identify the size of a jurisdiction we visited using 
the same groupings we used for our nationwide mail survey. The 
jurisdictions we visited are shown in table 31. 

Table 31: Local Election Jurisdictions Visited: 

State: Colorado; 
Jurisdiction visited: El Paso County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Larimer County. 

State: Connecticut; 
Jurisdiction visited: City of Hartford. 
Jurisdiction visited: City of New Haven. 

State: Florida; 
Jurisdiction visited: Broward County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Leon County. 

State: Georgia; 
Jurisdiction visited: Dougherty County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Muscogee County. 

State: Illinois; 
Jurisdiction visited: Champaign County. 
Jurisdiction visited: City of Chicago. 

State: Kansas; 
Jurisdiction visited: Johnson County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Wyandotte County. 

State: New Hampshire; 
Jurisdiction visited: Town of Madbury. 
Jurisdiction visited: City of Manchester. 

State: New Jersey; 
Jurisdiction visited: Middlesex County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Passaic County. 

State: Nevada; 
Jurisdiction visited: Clark County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Washoe County. 

State: New Mexico; 
Jurisdiction visited: Bernalillo County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Santa Fe County. 

State: North Carolina; 
Jurisdiction visited: Carteret County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Guilford County. 

State: Ohio; 
Jurisdiction visited: Cuyahoga County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Mahoning County. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
Jurisdiction visited: Allegheny County. 
Jurisdiction visited: Montgomery County. 

State: Washington; 
Jurisdiction visited: Clark County. 
Jurisdiction visited: King County. 

Source: GAO: 

[End of table] 

We visited these 28 local election jurisdictions between July and 
October 2005. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: 
Voter Registration Deadlines for States and the District of Columbia: 

The following table presents information on voter registration 
deadlines in the 50 states and the District of Columbia as reported by 
state election officials in our state survey. In our state survey, we 
provided states the deadline they had reported to us for submitting a 
registration application for the November 2000 general election and 
asked if the deadline for submitting a registration application 
remained the same or had changed for the November 2004 general 
election. As shown in bold text, three states (Maryland, Nevada, and 
Vermont) reported that their states had changed their registration 
deadlines for the November 2004 general election. 

Table 32: States Reporting on November 2004 General Election 
Registration Deadlines: 

State: Alabama; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 10 
days before election. 

State: Alaska; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: Arizona; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 29. 

State: Arkansas; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: California; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 15. 

State: Colorado; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 29. 

State: Connecticut; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 14. 

State: Delaware; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 20 
days prior to a general election and 21 days prior to a primary 
election. 

State: District of Columbia; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: Florida; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 29. 

State: Georgia; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): The 
fifth Monday before a general primary, general election, presidential 
preference primary, or special election unless special election or 
special primary is held on date other than uniform election date, in 
this case deadline would be fifth day after the date of the call for 
the special primary or election. 

State: Hawaii; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30-
9 October, 1 month prior to election. 

State: Idaho; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 25 
days before an election if mailed, 24 days for in-person Election Day 
registration at polling precincts. 

State: Illinois; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 28 
days before a general and primary election. 

State: Indiana; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 29. 

State: Iowa; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Must be delivered by 5 p.m., 10 days before a state primary or general 
election, 11 days before all others, or postmarked 15 or more days 
before an election. 

State: Kansas; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 15 
days prior to any election. 

State: Kentucky; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): No 
state response to this question. 

State: Louisiana; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: Maine; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Registration by mail or delivered by a person other than the voter had 
to be received by the registrar of voters by the 10th business day 
before the election. Registration permitted in person up to and on 
Election Day. 

State: Maryland; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 21 
days before the election (the deadline was reduced from 25 days before 
the election). 

State: Massachusetts; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 20. 

State: Michigan; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: Minnesota; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Delivered by 5 p.m. 21 days before an election. Election Day 
registration at polling precincts. 

State: Mississippi; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: Missouri; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 28-
always fourth Wednesday prior to an election. In some years this is 28 
days, in some years it may be more than 28 days. 

State: Montana; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: Nebraska; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): For 
applicants submitted other than in person (mail, MVA, public assistance 
agency, etc.) the deadline is the third Friday prior to election. For 
in-person registrations at the local election official's office, the 
deadline is 6 p.m. the second Friday before election. 

State: Nevada; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Deadline for registration by mail (9 p.m. on the fifth Saturday 
preceding any primary or general election) stayed the same. For 
registration in person the deadline was lengthened 10 days (9 p.m. on 
the third Tuesday preceding any primary or general election). 

State: New Hampshire; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Must be received 10 days before an election. Election Day registration 
at polling precincts. 

State: New Jersey; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 29. 

State: New Mexico; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 28. 

State: New York; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 25. 

State: North Carolina; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Postmarked 25 days before an election or received 25 days before an 
election in the elections office or designated voter registration 
agency by 5 p.m. 

State: North Dakota; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): No 
voter registration. 

State: Ohio; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): No 
state response to this question. 

State: Oklahoma; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 24. 

State: Oregon; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Postmarked or received 21 days before an election. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: Rhode Island; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: South Carolina; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: South Dakota; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Postmarked 30 days before an election or delivered 15 days before an 
election. 

State: Tennessee; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Postmarked or received 30 days before an election. 

State: Texas; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30. 

State: Utah; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Postmarked 20 days before an election; 
in person at a county clerk's office or at a county clerk designated 
"satellite" registration location 8 days before an election. 

State: Vermont; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Noon on the second Monday before the election (changed from the second 
Saturday before the election). 

State: Virginia; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 28 
days prior to the general or primary election. 

State: Washington; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30 
days before an election or delivered in person up to 15 days before an 
election at a location designated by the county elections officer. 

State: West Virginia; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 21 
days before the election. 

State: Wisconsin; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 
Postmarked or accepted by second Wednesday preceding election, or 
completed in the local voter registration office 1 day before the 
election. Election Day registration at polling precincts. 

State: Wyoming; 
2004 general election registration deadline (days before election): 30-
Election Day registration at polling precincts. 

Source: GAO 2005 state survey. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Characteristics of Early Voting Jurisdictions Visited: 

GAO's review of the November 2004 general election included visits to 
14 early voting election jurisdictions in 7 states, selected as part of 
a nonprobability sample of local election jurisdictions.[Footnote 289] 
The election jurisdictions varied widely in their provisions of early 
voting locations, equipment, workers, and calendar days and hours. As 
shown in the table below, for example, election jurisdictions in 
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, and North Carolina had one early voting 
location, while others had multiple sites such as 3 in Johnson County, 
Kansas; 5 in Larimer County, Colorado; 14 in Broward County, Florida; 
and 63 in Clark County, Nevada. The broad range of early voting 
locations involved the use of as few as one voting machine in Georgia 
and North Carolina counties we visited to several hundred voting 
machines used in counties visited in New Mexico and Nevada. The cadre 
of poll workers staffing early voting sites included as few as eight or 
nine workers in Georgia, Kansas, and North Carolina counties; 
dozens in jurisdictions such as Larimer County, Colorado; 
Bernalillo County, New Mexico; and hundreds in Broward County, Florida; 
Clark County, Nevada; and Guilford County, North Carolina. The period 
for early voting ranged from 5 days in Georgia to 28 days in New 
Mexico. Early voting hours varied extensively, but early voting was 
generally available during weekday business hours and sometimes on 
Saturday and Sunday. 

Table 33: Selected Information on Jurisdictions We Visited That Had 
Early Voting: 

State: Colorado; 
County: El Paso; 
Total number of locations: 3; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 3; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
3; 
Voting machines: 69; 
Poll workers: 14; 
Early voting calendar days: 15; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.-5 p.m; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: 8 a.m.- 4:30 p.m. 

State: Colorado; 
County: Larimer; 
Total number of locations: 5; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 5; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
0[A]; 
Voting machines: 5; 
Poll workers: 92; 
Early voting calendar days: 15; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.-5 p.m; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: 8 a.m.-5 p.m. 

State: Florida; 
County: Broward; 
Total number of locations: 14; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 14; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
14; 
Voting machines: 183; 
Poll workers: 220; 
Early voting calendar days: 15; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8:30 a.m.-6 p.m. M-F; 10 a.m.-
3 p.m. Sat; 1 p.m.-4 p.m. Sun; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: 8:30 a.m.-6 p.m. M-F; 10 a.m.- 3 
p.m. Sat; 1 p.m.-4 p.m. Sun. 

State: Florida; 
County: Leon; 
Total number of locations: 1; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 1; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
0[A]; 
Voting machines: 1; 
Poll workers: 15; 
Early voting calendar days: 15; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8:30 a.m.-5:30 p.m. M-F; 9 
a.m.-5 p.m. Sat; 9 a.m.-5 p.m. Sun; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: N/A[B]. 

State: Georgia; 
County: Dougherty; 
Total number of locations: 1; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 1; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
1; 
Voting machines: 7; 
Poll workers: 8; 
Early voting calendar days: 5; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8:30 a.m.-5 p.m; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: N/A[B]. 

State: Georgia; 
County: Muscogee; 
Total number of locations: 1; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 1; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
1; 
Voting machines: 9; 
Poll workers: 20; 
Early voting calendar days: 5; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.-5 p.m; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: N/A[B]. 

State: Kansas; 
County: Johnson; 
Total number of locations: 3; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 3; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
3; 
Voting machines: 6; 
Poll workers: 24; 
Early voting calendar days: 20; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.-7 p.m. M-F; 8 a.m.-5 
p.m. Sat. (generally); 
Early voting hours: Other locations: 11 a.m.-7 p.m. M-F; 9 a.m.- 5 p.m. 
Sat. (generally). 

State: Kansas; 
County: Wyandotte; 
Total number of locations: 1; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 1; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
0[A]; 
Voting machines: 4; 
Poll workers: 8; 
Early voting calendar days: 20; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.-5 p.m; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: N/A[B]. 

State: Nevada; 
County: Clark; 
Total number of locations: 63; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 63; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
63; 
Voting machines: 390; 
Poll workers: 347; 
Early voting calendar days: 17; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: Various; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: Various. 

State: Nevada; 
County: Washoe; 
Total number of locations: 11; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 11; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
11; 
Voting machines: 85; 
Poll workers: 29; 
Early voting calendar days: 17; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.- 6 p.m. (generally); 
Early voting hours: Other locations: 8 a.m.-6 p.m. (generally). 

State: New Mexico; 
County: Bernalillo; 
Total number of locations: 13; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 13; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
13; 
Voting machines: 283; 
Poll workers: 55; 
Early voting calendar days: 28[C]; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.-5 p.m. M-F; 
(generally); 
Early voting hours: Other locations: 12 p.m.-8 p.m. T-F; 
10 a.m.-5p.m. Sat. (generally). 

State: New Mexico; 
County: Santa Fe; 
Total number of locations: 5; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 5; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
0[A]; 
Voting machines: 5; 
Poll workers: 20; 
Early voting calendar days: 17[C]; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 12 p.m.-8 p.m. T - F; 10 a.m.-
6 p.m. Sat; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: 12 p.m. - 8 p.m. T-F; 10 a.m. - 6 
p.m. Sat. 

State: North Carolina; 
County: Carteret; 
Total number of locations: 1; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 1; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
1; 
Voting machines: 13; 
Poll workers: 9; 
Early voting calendar days: 19; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.-5 p.m. M-F; 8 a.m.-1 
p.m. Sat; 
Early voting hours: Other locations: N/A[B]. 

State: North Carolina; 
County: Guilford; 
Total number of locations: 13; 
Locations accessible to voters with disabilities: 13; 
Locations with voting machines accessible to voters with disabilities: 
13; 
Voting machines: 114; 
Poll workers: 116; 
Early voting calendar days: 19; 
Early voting hours: Election/Main Office: 8 a.m.-5 p.m. M-F 
(generally); 
Early voting hours: Other locations: 10 a.m.- 6:30 p.m. M-F; 10 a.m.-1, 
3, or 4 p.m. Sat. (generally). 

Source: GAO interviews of local election jurisdiction officials. 

[A] To vote early, voters with disabilities completed a paper ballot 
which an election worker fed into a precinct count optical scan 
machine. 

[B] N/A-not applicable because jurisdiction had only 1 location for 
early voting. 

[C] New Mexico statute provides that a voter may vote early up to 28 
days prior to an election at the office of the county clerk or at an 
alternate location. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Selected State Statutory Requirements for Absentee 
Voting: 

This appendix presents selected state statutory requirements for 
absentee voting. Table 34 summarizes certain mail-in absentee voting 
requirements in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The 
statutory changes are in bold to highlight differences between 
requirements in the November 2000 and 2004 general elections, including 
excuse requirements and notary or witness requirements. Table 35 
summarizes the deadlines for returning mail-in absentee ballot 
applications and absentee ballots in the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. Some of the states reporting that an excuse was required to 
vote absentee also reported providing voters with other means to vote 
prior to Election Day without requiring an excuse. According to our 
state survey, of the 30 states that reported requiring an excuse to 
vote absentee, 8 states reported that they offered voters the option of 
early voting without requiring an excuse. Oregon reported, on our state 
survey, that it offered all-mail voting. 

Table 34: Selected State Requirements for Domestic Absentee Voting, 
November 2000 and 2004 General Elections: 

State: Alabama; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Alaska; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Arizona; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Arkansas; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: California; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Colorado; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Connecticut; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Delaware; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty];  
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Florida; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No;  
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Georgia; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Hawaii; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Idaho; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No;  
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Illinois; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Indiana; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Iowa; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Kansas; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Kentucky; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Louisiana; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Maine; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Maryland; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Massachusetts; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Michigan; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Minnesota; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty];  
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Mississippi; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Missouri; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Montana; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Nebraska; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Nevada; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: New Hampshire; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: New Jersey; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: New Mexico; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: New York; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: North Carolina; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: North Dakota; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Ohio; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Oklahoma; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Oregon; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Rhode Island; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: South Carolina; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: South Dakota; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Tennessee; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Texas; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Utah; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Vermont; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No;  
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Virginia; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Washington; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: West Virginia; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Wisconsin; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No;  
Witness or notary required: 2000: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: Yes; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]. 

State: Wyoming; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2000: No; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: No; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: District of Columbia; 
Excuse required: 2000: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: Yes; 
Excuse required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: No; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: No. 

State: Total; 
Excuse required: 2000: 33; 
Excuse required: 2000: 18; 
Excuse required: [Empty]; 
Excuse required: 2004: 30; 
Excuse required: 2004: 21; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: 13; 
Witness or notary required: 2000: 38; 
Witness or notary required: [Empty]; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: 12; 
Witness or notary required: 2004: 39. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials and GAO, Elections: 
Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation, GAO-02-3 
(Washington, D.C.: October 2001). 

[End of table] 

Information in bold shows states with changes in excuse or witness or 
notary requirement. 

Table 35: States' Mail-in Absentee Ballot Application and Mail-in 
Absentee Ballot Deadlines for Inside the United States, November 2004 
General Election: 

State: Alabama; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 5 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day and postmarked by day 
prior to Election Day. 

State: Alaska; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 10 days after Election Day and 
postmarked by Election Day. 

State: Arizona; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 11 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by 7 p.m. 

State: Arkansas; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day no later than 7:30 p.m. 

State: California; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Colorado; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 11 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by 7 p.m. 

State: Connecticut; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Delaware; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 1 day before Election Day by noon. 

State: Florida; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: No deadline; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by 7 p.m. 

State: Georgia; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 4 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by 7 p.m. 

State: Hawaii; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Idaho; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 6 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by 8 p.m. 

State: Illinois; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 5 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Indiana; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: Varies by county, type of 
voter, and delivery method, but earliest deadline is 8 days before 
Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: In time for the board to deliver the 
ballot to the precinct on Election Day. 

State: Iowa; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 4 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Either (1) Election Day, received by 
close of polls, or (2) postmarked no later than the day before close of 
polls and received not later than 12 p.m. on the Monday following the 
election. 

State: Kansas; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 4 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Kentucky; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Louisiana; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 4 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 1 day before Election Day. 

State: Maine; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Maryland; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 1 day after Election Day by 4 p.m. if 
postmarked before Election Day. 

State: Massachusetts; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by the close of polls. 

State: Michigan; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 3 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Minnesota; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day. 

State: Mississippi; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 1 day before Election Day by 5 p.m. 

State: Missouri; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 6 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Montana; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Nebraska; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 6 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Nevada; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: New Hampshire; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: No deadline; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by 5 p.m. 

State: New Jersey; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by the closing of the 
polls. 

State: New Mexico; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by 7 p.m. 

State: New York; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 7 days after Election Day and 
postmarked before Election Day. 

State: North Carolina; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 1 day before Election Day by 5 p.m. 

State: North Dakota; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Postmarked by midnight of the day 
before Election Day (if no postmark legible, must be received within 2 
days after Election Day). 

State: Ohio; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of the polls. 

State: Oklahoma; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 6 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day no later than 7 p.m. 

State: Oregon; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: No deadline; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day not later than 8 p.m. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 4 days before Election Day by 5 p.m. 

State: Rhode Island; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 21 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day not later than 9 p.m. 

State: South Carolina; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 4 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by closing of the polls. 

State: South Dakota; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: Election Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day. 

State: Tennessee; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 5 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Texas; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by close of polls. 

State: Utah; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 20 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 6 days after Election Day and 
postmarked before Election Day. 

State: Vermont; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day. 

State: Virginia; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 5 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day. 

State: Washington; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Postmarked no later than Election 
Day. 

State: West Virginia; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 6 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Either (1) received Election Day by 
close of polls or (2) postmarked no later than Election Day and 
received before canvassing begins (generally the fifth day after a 
general election). 

State: Wisconsin; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 4 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day. 

State: Wyoming; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 1 day before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: Election Day by 7:00 p.m. 

State: District of Columbia; 
Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline: 7 days before Election 
Day; 
Mail-in absentee ballot deadline: 10 days after Election Day and 
postmarked not later than Election Day. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials. 

Note: All of the reported state mail-in ballot deadlines remained the 
same for the November 2000 and 2004 general elections except for 
Nebraska. Nebraska reported that the mail-in absentee ballot deadline 
for the November 2000 general election was no later than 2 days after 
Election Day. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling Places and 
Alternative Voting Methods: 

This appendix presents additional information on the accessibility of 
polling places and alternative voting methods. 

State Provisions Concerning Accessibility for the 2000 General 
Election: 

In October 2001, we issued a report that examined state and local 
provisions and practices for voting accessibility, both at polling 
places and with respect to alternative voting methods and 
accommodations. For that report, our analysis included a review of 
state statutes, regulations, and written policies pertaining to voting 
accessibility for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. We noted 
that all states and the District of Columbia had laws or other 
provisions concerning voting access for individuals with disabilities, 
but the extent and manner in which these provisions addressed 
accessibility varied from state to state.[Footnote 290] Table 36 
presents state provisions concerning the accessibility of polling 
places, and table 37 presents provisions related to alternative voting 
methods, as reported in our October 2001 report. 

Table 36: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places: 

State provisions: Polling place accessibility;

State provisions: All polling places must/should be accessible; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 36; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 7; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
8. 

State provisions: State provisions contain one or more polling place 
accessibility standards; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 23; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 19; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
9. 

State provisions: Inspection of polling places to assess accessibility 
is required; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 15; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 14; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
22. 

State provisions: Reporting by counties to state on polling place 
accessibility is required; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 10; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 10; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
31. 

State provisions: Voting booth areas and equipment; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: [Empty]; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: [Empty]; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
[Empty]. 

State provisions: Voting booth areas must/should accommodate 
wheelchairs; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 17; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 16; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
18. 

State provisions: Voting systems must/should accommodate individuals 
with disabilities; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 13; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 11; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
27. 

State provisions: Aids for visually impaired voters; 

State provisions: Braille ballot or methods of voting must/should be 
provided; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 3; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 3; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
45. 

State provisions: Ballots with large type must/may be provided; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 2; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 2; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
47. 

State provisions: Magnifying instruments must/may be provided; 
Number of states with provisions: Statute or regulation: 7; 
Number of states with provisions: Policy only[A]: 15; 
Number of states with provisions: Number of states with no provision: 
29. 

Source: GAO-02-107, p. 17; GAO analysis of statutes, regulations, and 
other written provisions in 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
Provision categories were identified based on our review of these legal 
and policy documents. 

[A] Policies for a particular provision were identified only if a state 
did not have either a statute or a regulation for that provision. 

[End of table] 

Table 37: State Provisions for Alternative Voting Methods and 
Accommodations: 

Methods and accommodations: Absentee voting by mail; 
Number of states: Permitting: 51; 
Number of states: No provision: 0; 
Number of states: Prohibited: 0. 

Methods and accommodations: Permanent absentee voting; 
Number of states: Permitting: 17; 
Number of states: No provision: 34; 
Number of states: Prohibited: 0. 

Methods and accommodations: Curbside voting on Election Day; 
Number of states: Permitting: 28; 
Number of states: No provision: 19; 
Number of states: Prohibited: 4. 

Methods and accommodations: Ballot can be taken to voter's residence on 
or before Election Day; 
Number of states: Permitting: 21; 
Number of states: No provision: 25; 
Number of states: Prohibited: 5. 

Methods and accommodations: Early voting; 
Number of states: Permitting: 39; 
Number of states: No provision: 12; 
Number of states: Prohibited: 0. 

Source: GAO-02-107, p. 21; GAO analysis of statutes, regulations, and 
other written provisions provided by election officials in 50 states 
and the District of Columbia. 

[End of table] 

State Provisions For the November 2004 General Election: 

Table 38 presents information from our 2005 survey of state election 
officials about provisions concerning accessibility and accommodations 
for individuals with disabilities for the November 2004 general 
election. 

Table 38: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places 
and Accommodations for Individuals with Disabilities for the November 
2004 General Election: 

Provision: Polling place accessibility standards[A]; 
Required: 41; 
Allowed: 6; 
Not allowed: 0; 
Not addressed: 2; 
Not applicable: 1[B]; 
Required or allowed: 47. 

Provision: Inspections of polling place accessibility; 
Required: 28; 
Allowed: 16; 
Not allowed: 0; 
Not addressed: 6; 
Not applicable: 1[B]; 
Required or allowed: 44. 

Provision: Reporting by local jurisdictions to the state on polling 
place accessibility; 
Required: 32; 
Allowed: 8; 
Not allowed: 0; 
Not addressed: 9; 
Not applicable: 2[ B]; 
Required or allowed: 40. 

Provision: Accommodation of wheelchairs in voting areas; 
Required: 39; 
Allowed: 4; 
Not allowed: 0; 
Not addressed: 7; 
Not applicable: 1[B]; 
Required or allowed: 43. 

Provision: Curbside voting available on Election Day; 
Required: 17; 
Allowed: 13; 
Not allowed: 18; 
Not addressed: 2; 
Not applicable: 1[B]; 
Required or allowed: 30. 

Provision: Ballot can be taken to voter's residence on or before 
Election Day; 
Required: 5; 
Allowed: 20; 
Not allowed: 18; 
Not addressed: 8; 
Not applicable: 0; 
Required or allowed: 25. 

Provision: Notification of voters of any inaccessible polling 
places[C]; 
Required: 16; 
Allowed: 11; 
Not allowed: 1; 
Not addressed: 16; 
Not applicable: 6[ B]; 
Required or allowed: 27. 

Provision: Provision of ballot or methods of voting in Braille[D]; 
Required: 1; 
Allowed: 13; 
Not allowed: 2; 
Not addressed: 33; 
Not applicable: 1; 
Required or allowed: 14. 

Provision: Provision of ballots with large type; 
Required: 5; 
Allowed: 17; 
Not allowed: 3; 
Not addressed: 26; 
Not applicable: 0; 
Required or allowed: 22. 

Provision: Provision of magnifying instruments[D]; 
Required: 8; 
Allowed: 34; 
Not allowed: 0; 
Not addressed: 7; 
Not applicable: 1[B]; 
Required or allowed: 42. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials. 

[A] Election officials in one state responded that they did not know. 

[B] Oregon conducts Election Day voting by mail; 
thus, provisions for polling place accessibility are not applicable. 

[C] Election officials in one state did not respond to this question. 

[D] Election officials in one state did not respond to this question. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix X: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements 
for Local Jurisdictions to Use Federal Standards for Voting Systems: 

The following table summarizes reported state requirements for 
compliance with voluntary federal standards for voting equipment that 
will be used for the first time in the 2006 general election in the 50 
states and the District of Columbia. In our survey of state election 
officials, we asked states to identify from a list of federal standards 
or guidelines any or all that they would require local jurisdictions to 
comply with for new voting equipment for the November 2006 general 
election. According to our state survey, states are requiring local 
jurisdictions to apply a variety of federal standards to their voting 
systems. 

Table 39: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements for 
Use of Voluntary Federal Standards for New Voting Systems for the 
November 2006 General Election: 

State: Alabama; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: x; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Alaska; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Arizona; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: x; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/ guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Arkansas; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: California; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: x. 

State: Colorado; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Connecticut; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Delaware[B]; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: x; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: x; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Florida; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Georgia; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Hawaii; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: x; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Idaho; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Illinois; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: x; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Indiana; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Iowa; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Kansas; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: x; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/ guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Kentucky; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: x. 

State: Louisiana; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Maine; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: x. 

State: Maryland; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Massachusetts; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: x; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/ guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Michigan; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Minnesota; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: x; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/ guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Mississippi; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Missouri; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Montana; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Nebraska; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Nevada; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: New Hampshire[B]; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: New Jersey; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: New Mexico; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: New York; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: x; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: North Carolina; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: North Dakota; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Ohio; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
x; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Oklahoma[B]; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Oregon; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/ guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Rhode Island; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: x. 

State: South Carolina[C]; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: South Dakota; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: x; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Tennessee; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Texas; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/ guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Utah; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Vermont; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: x. 

State: Virginia; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Washington; 
1990 FEC standards: x; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: West Virginia; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Wisconsin; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Wyoming; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: District of Columbia; 
1990 FEC standards: [Empty]; 
2002 FEC standards: x; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: [Empty]; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
[Empty]; 
Will use federal standards/guidelines but version was not specified: 
[Empty]; 
Not yet determined: [Empty]. 

State: Totals; 
1990 FEC standards: 11; 
2002 FEC standards: 29; 
Draft EAC guidance[A]: 5; 
Hybrid of one or more of 1990 and 2002 FEC standards and EAC guidance: 
10; 
Will use federal standards/ guidelines but version was not specified: 
6; 
Not yet determined: 5. 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials. 

[A] At the time of our 2005 state survey, the proposed EAC guidelines 
were open to public comment for a period of 90 days. On December 13, 
2005, EAC adopted the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which 
will take effect in December 2007. 

[B] Three states (Delaware, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma) indicated in 
their response that they do not require that local jurisdictions comply 
with federal standards or guidance. 

[C] South Carolina did not respond to any of the response categories. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix XI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

Contacts: 

For questions regarding this report, please contact Norman Rabkin at 
(202) 512-8777 (rabkinn@gao.gov), Bill Jenkins at (202) 512-8757 
(jenkinswo@gao.gov]), or Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3870 
(hiter@gao.gov). 

Acknowledgments: 

Additional staff making major contributions to this report were Linda 
Watson, Project Manager and Assistant Director; David Alexander; Pille 
Anvelt; Orin B. Atwater; Carl Barden; Amy Bernstein; Susan Bernstein; 
Fred Berry; Stefanie Bzdusek; Grace Coleman; Willie Commons; John Dale; 
Lester Diamond; Neil Doherty; Michele Fejfar; Alice Feldesman; Joanne 
Fiorino; Dan Garcia; Dan Gordon; Rich Griswold; Brandon Haller; 
Geoffrey Hamilton; Mike Holland; Valerie Hopkins; Ashfaq Huda; Mary 
Catherine Hult; Cathy Hurley; Sairah Ijaz; Monica Kelly; Mohammad Khan; 
George Kovachick; Ron La Due Lake; Frank Maguire; Matthew R. Michaels; 
Jan Montgomery; Paula Moore; Jean Orland; Brandon S. Pettis; Tomas 
Ramirez; Emmy Rhine; Amy Sheller; Jay Spaan; Derek Updegraff; Ashanta 
Williams; and Ellen Wolfe. 

We gratefully acknowledge the substantial time and cooperation of the 
election officials whom we visited in the following locations: 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; Bernalillo County, New Mexico; Broward 
County, Florida; Carteret County, North Carolina; Champaign County, 
Illinois; Chicago, Illinois; Clark County, Nevada; Clark County, 
Washington; Cuyahoga County, Ohio; Dougherty County, Georgia; El Paso 
County, Colorado; Guilford County, North Carolina; Hartford, 
Connecticut; New Haven, Connecticut; Johnson County, Kansas; King 
County, Washington; Larimer County, Colorado; Leon County, Florida; 
Madbury, New Hampshire; Mahoning County, Ohio; Manchester, New 
Hampshire; Middlesex County, New Jersey; Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania; Muscogee County, Georgia; Passaic County, New Jersey; 
Santa Fe County, New Mexico; Washoe County, Nevada; and Wyandotte 
County, Kansas. 

[End of section] 

Glossary: 

This glossary is provided for reader convenience. It is not intended as 
a definitive, comprehensive glossary of election-related terms. 

Absentee and Early Voting: 

These are programs that, in general, permit eligible persons to vote 
prior to Election Day. Absentee voting is generally conducted by mail 
in advance of Election Day and early voting is generally in-person 
voting in advance of Election Day at specific polling locations. 

Acceptance Testing: 

Acceptance testing is the examination of voting systems and their 
components by the purchasing election authority in a simulated-use 
environment to validate performance of delivered units in accordance 
with procurement activities. 

Audit Testing: 

Audit testing reviews and reconciles election records to confirm 
correct conduct of an election or uncover evidence of problems with 
voting equipment or election processes. 

Ballot: 

This is the official presentation of all of the contests to be decided 
in a particular election. 

Canvassing: 

This is the process of reviewing votes by precinct, resolving problem 
votes, and counting all types of votes (including absentee and 
provisional votes) for each candidate and issue on the ballot and 
producing an official total for each. 

Central Count Tabulation: 

Ballots are counted at a central location. 

Certification: 

Certification is the point in the election process at which the vote 
count is finalized and made official. There are generally two stages of 
the certification process for statewide elections: First, the local 
election jurisdiction certifies the vote count to the state, and 
second, the state certifies the final vote count. 

Certification Testing: 

Certification testing validates the compliance of the voting equipment 
with federal standards or state-specific requirements prior to (or as a 
condition of) system acceptance. Under NASED, national testing was 
called qualification testing. 

Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List: 

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 requires most states to implement a 
single, uniform, centralized, and interactive computerized statewide 
voter registration list to serve as the official voter registration 
list for the conduct of all elections for federal office in each such 
state. 

Contested Elections: 

These generally involve either an administrative or a judicial process 
specified under state provisions whereby certain individuals (e.g., a 
voter, a group of voters, or candidates) initiate an action challenging 
an election on the basis of certain state-specified reasons that may 
include, for example, ineligibility of the person elected, illegal 
votes, fraud, or errors by election officials. 

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE): 

There are two types of DREs, push-button and touch screen. For push- 
button machines, voters press a button next to the candidate's name or 
ballot issue, which then lights up to indicate the selection. 
Similarly, voters using touch screen DREs make their selections by 
touching the screen next to the candidate or issue, which is then 
highlighted. When voters are finished on a push-button or a touch 
screen DRE, they cast their votes by pressing a final "vote" button on 
the machine or screen. 

Election Administration: 

This is the people, processes, and tasks associated with registering 
voters and preparing for and conducting elections. 

Election Assistance Commission (EAC): 

HAVA established this commission with wide-ranging duties to help 
improve the administration of federal elections. The commission is to 
be involved with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to 
states on implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national 
clearinghouse of state experiences implementing such guidelines and in 
the operation of voting systems in general, conducting studies, and 
helping to develop optional testing and standards for election 
equipment. 

Election Day Activities: 

Activities carried out on Election Day include opening and closing 
polling places, verifying voter qualifications, assisting voters in 
casting their ballots, resolving problems that may arise during the 
day, and safeguarding the ballots. 

Election Day Preparation: 

Tasks carried out in preparation for Election Day include recruiting 
and training poll workers, arranging for polling places, educating 
voters, designing ballots, and preparing voting equipment for use in 
casting and tabulating votes. 

Election Fraud: 

Election fraud includes conduct that corrupts the electoral process for 
(1) registering voters; (2) obtaining, marking, or tabulating ballots; 
or (3) canvassing and certifying election results. Types of fraudulent 
conduct may include, among other things, voting by ineligibles, voting 
more than once, voter impersonation, intentional disruption of polling 
places either physically or by corrupting tabulating software, or 
destroying ballots or voter registrations. 

Election Jurisdictions: 

These are counties, cities, townships, and villages that have 
responsibility for election administration. 

Election Management System: 

This is a system that integrates the functions associated with readying 
vote-casting and -tallying equipment for a given election with other 
election management functions. 

Federal Election Commission (FEC): 

In 1975, Congress established FEC to administer and enforce the Federal 
Election Campaign Act--the statute that governs the financing of 
federal elections. To carry out this role, FEC discloses campaign 
finance information; enforces provisions of the law, such as limits and 
prohibitions on contributions; and oversees the public funding of 
presidential elections. 

Federal Voting Equipment Standards: 

In 1990, FEC issued voluntary federal voting equipment standards that 
identified minimum functional and performance requirements for 
electronic voting systems and specified test procedures to be used to 
ensure that voting equipment met these requirements. FEC later revised 
the standards in 2002 to address new or additional functional and 
technical voting system capabilities. With the passage of HAVA in 2002, 
the responsibility for issuing standards passed to EAC. In December 
2005, EAC issued the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which include 
additions and revisions for system functional requirements, performance 
characteristics, documentation requirements, and test evaluation 
criteria for the national certification of voting systems. 

Integration Testing: 

Integration testing determines whether vote-casting, tallying, and 
election management systems function together for the election. 
Integration testing is conducted before the election. 

Lever Machines: 

Lever machines are mechanical; the ballot is composed of a rectangular 
array of levers, which can be physically arranged either horizontally 
or vertically. Voters cast their votes by pulling down those levers 
next to the candidates' names or ballot issues of their choice. After 
voting, the voter moves a handle that simultaneously opens the privacy 
curtain, records the vote, and resets the levers. 

Minor Civil Divisions (MCD): 

These are subcounty governmental units, as designated by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. 

Optical Scan: 

An optical scan voting system is composed of computer-readable ballots, 
appropriate marking devices, privacy booths, and a computerized 
tabulation machine. The ballots can vary in size and list the names of 
the candidates and the issues. Voters record their choices using an 
appropriate writing instrument to fill in boxes or ovals or to complete 
an arrow next to the candidate's name or the issue. Optical scan 
ballots are counted by being run through a computerized tabulation 
machine. 

Overvotes: 

These are votes for more choices than are permitted for the contest. 

Paper Ballots: 

Voters generally complete their paper ballots in the privacy of a 
voting booth and record their choices by placing marks in boxes 
corresponding to the candidates' names and the ballot issues. After 
making their choices, voters drop the ballots into sealed ballot boxes. 
Paper ballots are manually counted and tabulated. 

Parallel Testing: 

Parallel testing verifies the accurate performance of voting equipment 
through random selection and systematic evaluation of operational 
equipment. Parallel testing is conducted during the election. 

Precinct Count Tabulation: 

Votes are cast and counted at the precinct. 

Provisional Voting: 

Provisional voting is generally used by states to address certain voter 
eligibility issues encountered at the polling place on Election Day. A 
provisional ballot cast by an individual with an eligibility issue 
would typically not be counted until the individual's eligibility to 
vote under state law has been verified. HAVA specifies that states 
permit individuals to cast provisional ballots under certain 
circumstances. These circumstances include instances when voters assert 
they are registered in the jurisdiction in which they desire to vote 
and that they are eligible to vote in an election for federal office 
but their names do not appear on the polling place registration list. 

Punch Card: 

Punch card voting equipment generally consists of a ballot, a vote- 
recording device that keeps the ballot in place and allows the voter to 
punch holes in it, a privacy booth, and a computerized tabulation 
device. The voter inserts a machine-readable card with prescored 
numbered boxes representing ballot choices into the vote-recording 
device and uses a stylus to punch out the appropriate prescored boxes. 
The ballot must be properly aligned in the vote-recording device for 
the holes in the ballot card to be punched all the way through. Punch 
card ballots are counted by being run through a computerized tabulation 
machine. 

Readiness Testing: 

Also referred to as logic and accuracy testing, readiness testing 
checks that the voting equipment is functioning properly, usually by 
confirming that predictable outputs are produced from predefined 
inputs. Readiness testing is typically conducted in the weeks leading 
up to Election Day. 

Recount: 

Some states authorize certain persons (e.g., defeated candidates and 
voters) to request an election recount under specified circumstances. 
These circumstances can include, for example, when there is a tie vote, 
when the margin of victory is within a specified percentage or number 
of votes, or when inaccuracies in the vote count are alleged. The scope 
and method of such recounts can vary to include, for example, partial 
recounts of certain precincts, complete recounts of all ballots, 
machine recounts, and hand recounts for the office or issue in 
question. Some states provide for mandatory (or automatic) recounts 
that are, for example, mandated in a specified percentage or number of 
precincts irrespective of victory margins, or triggered by a tie vote, 
or a margin of victory within a specified percentage or number of 
votes. 

Registration: 

For the 2004 election, most states and the District of Columbia 
required individuals to apply to register prior to Election Day and be 
registered with the appropriate local election officials before such 
individuals could vote. Some states had same-day registration and 
allowed individuals to register to vote at the polls on Election Day. 
One state, North Dakota, did not have a voter registration requirement. 
Voter registration includes the processes, people, and technology 
involved in registering eligible new voters and in compiling and 
maintaining voter registration lists. 

Spoiled Ballot: 

This is a ballot that has been voted but will not be cast. 

System Verification Testing: 

System verification testing is testing before the election to verify 
that the voting equipment is operating properly on Election Day. 

Undervotes: 

Undervotes are votes for fewer choices than permitted, such as not 
voting for President. An undervote may or may not be an error. A voter 
might have tried to vote for a candidate but failed to mark the ballot 
unambiguously or might have chosen not to vote for any candidate for a 
particular office. 

U.S. Election Systems: 

Those federal and state constitutional provisions, statutes, 
regulations, people, processes, and technology associated with the 
framework of, preparation for, and conduct of elections. 

Vote Tabulation: 

Vote tabulation is the counting of the ballots cast at the polling 
places on Election Day and those cast in person or by mail prior to 
Election Day; determining whether and how to count ballots that cannot 
be read by the vote-counting equipment; certifying the final vote 
counts; and performing recounts, if required. 

Voter Education: 

Voter education is essentially education about elections, and the 
primary target is the voter. It includes information about how to 
register, vote absentee or early, and use the voting method employed in 
the state or jurisdiction, as well as information needed to vote on 
Election Day. Voter education is usually identified as a function of 
the election authority. It may also be fostered by public interest 
organizations. Political parties may provide information about 
candidates, but this type of information is not included under our 
definition of voter education. 

Voter Intent: 

The determination of voter intent can be an issue under certain 
circumstances, such as when a voter has improperly or unclearly marked 
his ballot (for example, with a punch card ballot, not making a clean 
punch) and the state provides for resolving the situation by 
determining the "intent of the voter." State direction to election 
officials in making such a determination can be set out as a general or 
a specific standard by which the election official should judge such a 
ballot. 

Voter-Verifiable Paper Trail (VVPT): 

This is a human-readable printed record of all of a voter's selections, 
presented to the voter to view and check for accuracy. 

Voting Equipment: 

All devices used to display the ballot, accept voter selections, record 
voter selections, and tabluate the votes. 

Voting Method: 

The classes or types of machines used in a voting system. There are 
five types of voting methods used in U.S. elections: paper ballot, 
lever machine, punch card, optical scan, and DRE. 

Voting System: 

A voting system is the people, processes, and technology associated 
with any specific method of casting and counting votes, such as optical 
scan. Technology includes the mechanical, electromechanical, or 
electronic equipment, software, firmware, and documentation required to 
program, control, and support voting equipment. 

440384: 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 
(2002). 

[2] See appendix I for a list of GAO reports on elections since 1983. 

[3] GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across 
the Nation, GAO-02-3, (Washington, D.C.: October 2001). 

[4] Appendix V provides more detailed information about our scope and 
methodology. 

[5] GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials, GAO-06- 
451SP (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006); and GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey 
of Local Election Jurisdictions, GAO-06-452SP (Washington, D.C.: June 
6, 2006). 

[6] Our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions was designed 
to have maximum sampling errors of +/-5 percentage points for the 
complete sample. 

[7] GAO, Elections: Absentee Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas 
Citizens Increased for the 2004 General Election, but Challenges 
Remain, GAO-06-521 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2006). 

[8] GAO-02-3. 

[9] Six states are exempt from this requirement, in general, either 
because they permit voter registration on Election Day (Idaho, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) or because they do 
not require voter registration (North Dakota). 

[10] As used in this report, a vote count audit is an automatic 
recount, in full or in part, of the vote tabulation, irrespective of 
the margin of victory, in order to ensure accuracy before 
certification. 

[11] For the questions in our local survey related to types of testing, 
jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day 
were excluded. 

[12] We estimate that 91 percent of jurisdictions considered parallel 
testing to be not applicable. 

[13] Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 

[14] See appendix I for a list of these reports. One of the most 
comprehensive is GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and 
Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 
2001). 

[15] GAO, Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election 
Administration, GAO-01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2001). 

[16] 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10. 

[17] 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6. 

[18] Under HAVA, states with no voter registration requirements for 
voters with respect to federal elections on and after the date of 
HAVA's enactment (e.g., North Dakota) are not subject to the act's 
computerized statewide voter registration list requirement. 

[19] Under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter registration 
requirements for voters with respect to federal elections (North 
Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with respect 
to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to 
HAVA's provisional voting requirements. 

[20] Jurisdictions call their poll workers by different titles, 
including clerks, wardens, election judges, inspectors, captains, and 
precinct officers and often have a chief poll worker for each polling 
place. 

[21] There are two types of DREs, push-button, and touch screen. For 
push-button machines, voters press a button next to the candidate's 
name or ballot issue, which then lights up to indicate the selection. 
Similarly, voters using touch screen DREs make their selections by 
touching the screen next to the candidate or issue, which is then 
highlighted. When voters are finished on a push-button or touch screen 
DRE, they cast their votes by pressing a final "vote" button on the 
machine or screen. 

[22] Voters subject to this provision are those who have registered to 
vote in a jurisdiction by mail and have not previously voted in an 
election for federal office in the state or those who have not 
previously voted in such an election in the jurisdiction and the 
jurisdiction is located in a state that does not have a statewide 
computerized voter registration list, as required by HAVA. 

[23] The Election Assistance Commission approved the Voluntary Voting 
System Guidelines in December, 2005. 

[24] These HAVA voting system standards pertain to, among other things, 
voter ballot verification prior to casting a vote, permanent paper 
records with a manual audit capacity, federal standards for error 
rates, alternative language accessibility, and accessibility for 
individuals with disabilities. In addition, HAVA requires that voting 
systems purchased with specified HAVA funds on or after January 1, 
2007, must meet HAVA voting system standards for disability access. 

[25] Historically, Wisconsin has not required voters in all 
jurisdictions to register to vote. Only municipalities with populations 
exceeding certain specified thresholds were required to register 
voters. Changes made in 2003 to Wisconsin's election laws will require 
voter registration in every municipality regardless of population size. 
This registration requirement first applies to the 2006 spring primary 
election. 

[26] The United States Election Assistance Commission, 2004 Election 
Day Survey; How We Voted: People, Ballots, and Polling Places. 
September 2005. 

[27] Under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter registration 
requirements for voters with respect to federal elections (e.g., North 
Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with respect 
to federal elections (as in Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to 
HAVA's provisional voting requirements. 

[28] GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials, GAO-06- 
451SP (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006); and GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey 
of Local Election Jurisdictions, GAO-06-452SP (Washington, D.C.: June 
6, 2006). 

[29] Measures of sampling error are defined by two elements: the width 
of the confidence intervals around the estimate (sometimes called the 
precision of the estimate) and the confidence level at which the 
intervals are computed. Because we followed a probability procedure 
based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of 
samples that we might have drawn. As each sample could have provided 
different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our 
particular sample results as a 95-percent confidence interval (e.g., 
plus or minus 5 percentage points). This is the interval that would 
contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we 
could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of 
the confidence intervals based on the mail survey includes the true 
values in the sample population. 

[30] Pub. L. No. 107-252,116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 

[31] HAVA section 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483(a)). North 
Dakota did not have voter registration requirements for persons with 
respect to federal elections as of the date of HAVA's enactment and, 
under HAVA, is therefore not subject to the act's requirement to create 
and maintain a computerized statewide voter registration list. 

[32] In 1993, the National Voter Registration Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg 
to 1973gg-10), among other things, expanded the number of locations and 
opportunities of citizens to apply to register to vote in federal 
elections at MVAs and other public organizations, such as public 
assistance agencies and armed forces recruiting centers. 

[33] This HAVA-required statewide voter registration list is, among 
other things, to be defined, maintained, and administered at the state 
level. In addition, this list is to serve as a secure, centralized, and 
interactive database that is coordinated with other state agency 
databases and grants state and local election official immediate 
electronic access to information contained in the list. 

[34] These HAVA identification requirements also apply to individuals 
who register to vote in a jurisdiction by mail or have not previously 
voted in a jurisdiction when the jurisdiction is located in a state 
that does not have a HAVA compliant statewide voter registration list. 

[35] Throughout this chapter, the use of the term "voter registration 
list" refers specifically to the names of registered voters compiled by 
state and local officials in accordance with HAVA provisions. The term 
"voter registration system" refers more broadly to computer systems 
(stand-alone or Internet-or network-based) where voter registration 
lists reside in accordance with appropriate security and privacy 
measures. 

[36] GAO-02-3. 

[37] Nine states (Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia) did not 
seek a waiver. 

[38] Seven states (Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) required, at the time of our review, 
full Social Security numbers on applications for voter registration. 
HAVA provides that for states using full Social Security numbers on 
applications in accordance with section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, 
the HAVA voter registration verification requirements are optional. 
Georgia's right to require full Social Security numbers under this 
Privacy Act provision, however, has been the subject of recent 
litigation. In January 2005 a federal district court found that Georgia 
did not qualify to use full Social Security numbers under this Privacy 
Act provision (Schwier v. Cox, Civil No. 1:00-CV-2820, (N.D. Ga. 
January 31, 2005)). The district court determined, in part, that 
Georgia must correspondingly revise its voter registration forms and 
instructions and expressly inform applicants that they are not required 
to provide their Social Security numbers. On February 16, 2006, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court's January 2005 ruling (Schwier v. Cox, 439 F. 3d 1285 (2006)). 

[39] In 1993, the National Voter Registration Act, among other things, 
limited the circumstances under which states could remove the names of 
registrants from registration lists for federal elections and required 
states to take certain steps to accurately maintain such voter 
registration lists by removing the names of certain types of ineligible 
persons. 

[40] United States v. New York State Board of Elections, Civil No. 06- 
CV-0263 (N.D. NY, March 1, 2006). 

[41] HAVA section 303(a)(5) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483(a)(5)). 

[42] The authority of one of these states (Georgia) to require full 
Social Security numbers has been the subject of recent litigation. In 
February 2006 a federal appeals court affirmed a January 2005 federal 
district court ruling that Georgia did not have the authority, under 
the Privacy Act of 1974, to require voter applicants to disclose their 
Social Security numbers on voter registration forms. Schwier v. Cox, 
439 F. 3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2006). 

[43] GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local 
Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05- 
478 (Washington, D.C.: June 2005). 

[44] HAVA's list maintenance provisions require states to compare the 
statewide registration list with state records on felons and deaths to 
identify ineligible voters as well as to identify duplicate 
registrations. 

[45] HAVA section 303(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483). 

[46] 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6. 

[47] GAO-05-478. 

[48] 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(g). 

[49] GAO-05-478. 

[50] One state responded that it did not know whether its system would 
include checking for duplicates. 

[51] These are the 9 states that implemented the HAVA requirement to 
have statewide voter registration lists in place by the earlier 
deadline of January 1, 2004. 

[52] GAO-05-478. 

[53] HAVA section 305 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15485). 

[54] According to EAC, a bottom-up system remains static until the 
state electronically provides the next updated version; registration 
information held solely in a local database is not part of the official 
registration list until it is electronically transmitted to the state 
and added to the list. 

[55] HAVA section 303(a)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483(a)(3)). 

[56] Election fraud includes conduct that corrupts the electoral 
process for (1) registering voters; (2) obtaining, marking, or 
tabulating ballots; or (3) canvassing and certifying election results. 
Types of fraudulent conduct may include, among other things, voting by 
ineligibles, voting more than once, voter impersonation, intentional 
disruption of polling places either physically or by corrupting 
tabulating software, or destroying ballots or voter registrations. 

[57] The National Voter Registration Act required the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) to develop a mail voter registration application form 
for elections for federal office. NVRA also requires states to accept 
and use this federal mail voter registration application form for the 
registration of voters in elections for federal office. Pursuant to 
HAVA, various FEC functions, including those relating to the federal 
mail voter registration form application were transferred to the 
Election Assistance Commission. 

[58] The total number of states does not add to 50 because North Dakota 
does not require voters to register to vote and therefore does not have 
voter registration forms. 

[59] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +11 or - 
13 percentage points. 

[60] GAO, Election Reform: Nine States' Experiences Implementing 
Federal Requirements to Establish Computerized Voter Registration 
Lists, GAO-06-247 (Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

[61] HAVA section 303(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483(b)). 

[62] Acceptable forms of identification to meet this HAVA requirement 
include, for example, a current and valid photo identification, a copy 
of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, 
or other government document that shows the name and address of the 
voter. 

[63] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[64] HAVA sections 304 and 305 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§§ 15484, and 
15485, respectively). For example, Arizona submitted an inquiry to 
Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division asking whether it was 
permissible under HAVA for a state to mandate that a potential voter 
show identification at the polls prior to receiving a provisional 
ballot. The Civil Rights Division responded, in part, in September 
2005, that while HAVA requires states to allow voters who meet certain 
specified conditions the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot, 
states are free to prescribe their own rules for deciding whether to 
count those ballots. (September 1, 2005, letter to the State of Arizona 
from the Civil Rights Division). 

[65] Three states (California, Texas, and Washington) reporting that 
existing legislation or executive action addressed HAVA first-time 
voter identification requirements also reported enacting additional 
legislation or taking executive action to address such HAVA 
requirements. 

[66] The 10 states are Alabama, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Three of 
these states, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Tennessee, require full Social 
Security numbers on applications for voter registration. 

[67] GAO-02-3. 

[68] Federal Election Commission, The Impact of the National Voter 
Registration Act on Federal Elections 1999-2000 and 2001-2002. These 
reports surveyed 44 states, and the District of Columbia, that were 
subject to NVRA provisions for the administration of elections for 
federal office. 

[69] HAVA section 302 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15482). 

[70] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-7 
percentage points. 

[71] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-6 
percentage points. 

[72] GAO, Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on 
Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote, 
GAO-05-997 (Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 

[73] We surveyed 14 jurisdictions altogether, but Wisconsin, 
represented by 2 jurisdictions on this question, was not, at the time 
of our survey, subject to NVRA, and therefore the MVA question did not 
apply. 

[74] GAO-02-3. 

[75] The task force, composed of local election officials, was convened 
by the nonprofit Election Center, also known as the National 
Association of Election Officials, following the 2000 federal election 
to study and address questions about the election. The task force was 
reconvened in 2005 to examine the 2004 election. 

[76] GAO-02-3. 

[77] GAO-05-997. 

[78] With respect to federal voter registration forms, the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993 provides that the chief election 
official of a state shall make such forms available through 
governmental and private entities, with particular emphasis on making 
them available for organized voter registration programs. 42 U.S.C. § 
1973gg-4(b). 

[79] Legislative Audit Bureau, State of Wisconsin. An Evaluation: Voter 
Registration, Report 05-12 (Madison, Wisconsin: September 2005). 

[80] In some states, election officials appoint registration deputies 
who assist with voter registration. Some registration deputies are 
municipal officials and are permitted to work for interest groups or 
political parties. 

[81] EAC, using various news media sources, identified 17 states deemed 
to be most competitive in the 2004 presidential contest. These 
"battleground or highly contested" states included Arkansas, Arizona, 
Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. We visited 8 of these 17 states during our 
site visits; alternatively, 16 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited were 
located in these battleground states. 

[82] GAO-05-997. 

[83] GAO-05-478. 

[84] The 95 percent confidence interval is +/-13 percentage points. 

[85] The 95 percent confidence interval is +/-14 percentage points. 

[86] GAO-05-478. 

[87] This total includes the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 

[88] Some states require voters to provide an excuse to cast an 
absentee ballot. This subject is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 

[89] Oregon conducts its entire election by mail. 

[90] GAO-02-3. 

[91] GAO-02-3. 

[92] GAO-02-3. 

[93] 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6. 

[94] See GAO, Elections: Absentee Voting Assistance to Military and 
Overseas Citizens Increased for the 2004 General Election, but 
Challenges Remain, GAO-06-521 (Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2006), for 
more information. 

[95] FVAP provides overseas miliary and civilian voters a broad range 
of nonpartisan information and assistance to facilitate their 
participation in the electoral process. 

[96] The seven states are Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Nevada, 
New Mexico, and North Carolina. 

[97] The statutory framework for early voting and absentee voting 
varies among the states--with some states, for example, providing early 
voting within the context of the state's absentee voting provisions, 
while others provide for absentee voting in the context of the state's 
early voting provisions. 

[98] Kansas election officials reported that early voting in Kansas is 
called advance voting. Any registered voter may choose to vote an 
advance ballot by mail or in person with in-person voting in the county 
election office up to 20 days before any election, according to the 
election officials. 

[99] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-9 
percentage points. 

[100] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +7 or - 
5 percentage points. 

[101] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +8 or - 
6 percentage points. 

[102] The election official said that he closed all but two locations 
because he wanted to have enough time before Election Day to make sure 
that he got all of the data off the DRE machines (which were new) and 
have them ready to be transported to Election Day polling places. 

[103] Florida statutory provisions in place for the November 2004 
general election provided, in part, that each political party and each 
candidate may have one watcher in each polling room at any one time 
during an election. Such statutory provisions further provided, among 
other things, that no watcher shall be permitted to come closer to the 
official's table or the voting booths than is reasonably necessary to 
properly perform his or her functions, but each shall be allowed within 
the polling room to watch and observe the conduct of electors and 
officials. 

[104] Jurisdictions call their poll workers by different titles, 
including clerks, wardens, election judges, inspectors, captains, and 
precinct officers and often have a chief poll worker for each polling 
place. 

[105] See GAO-02-3. 

[106] HAVA section 201 et seq. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15321 et seq.) 

[107] HAVA section 303(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)). 

[108] HAVA section 301(a)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(3)). 

[109] HAVA section 302(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15482(b)). 

[110] Prior to the establishment of EAC, the Federal Election 
Commission's Office of Election Administration served as a national 
clearinghouse for information regarding the administration of federal 
elections. 

[111] See GAO-02-3. 

[112] The second report covers voting by absent uniformed service 
voters and citizens residing outside of the United States. On September 
21, 2004, EAC released Best Practices for Facilitating Voting by U.S. 
Citizens Covered by UOCAVA, which was compiled in consultation with the 
U.S. Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program. This 
report describes methods to enhance absentee voter registration by 
UOCAVA voters and ensure the timely receipt of their ballots. 

[113] HAVA requirements to present ID at the time of voting for mail 
registrants are, in general, not applicable to certain types of voters 
such as, for example, persons who have previously submitted required ID 
with their mail registration, and those entitled to vote by absentee 
ballot under UOCAVA. 

[114] Election officials in 6 other jurisdictions we visited reported 
encountering some problems, such as poll worker confusion or 
administrative burdens associated with mailing postcards to all voters 
who needed to show identification at polling places. Election officials 
in 1 jurisdiction we visited told us that this HAVA requirement was not 
implemented until 2005. 

[115] Other federal laws affecting voting for individuals with 
disabilities include the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Pub. 
L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)), which, in general, provides 
civil rights protection to individuals with disabilities similar to 
those provided to individuals on the basis of race, color, sex, 
national origin, age, and religion, and the Voting Accessibility for 
the Elderly and Handicapped Act (Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 
(1984)), which, in general, requires registration facilities and 
polling places for federal elections to be physically accessible to the 
elderly and those with disabilities. 

[116] For more information, see GAO, Voters with Disabilities: Access 
to Polling Places and Alternative Voting Methods, GAO-02-107 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

[117] In our October 2001 report we reported that these potential 
impediments would primarily affect individuals with mobility 
impairments. We also reported that polling places generally provide 
accommodations, such as curbside voting, voting stations designed for 
people with disabilities, and voter assistance inside the voting room. 

[118] The 5 states that reported having plans were Kansas, Louisiana, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. The 4 states that reported having no plans 
or were uncertain about their plans were Delaware, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, and Tennessee. 

[119] Unless otherwise noted, the maximum sampling error for estimates 
of all jurisdictions is plus or minus 5 percentage points (rounded); +/
-7 percentage points (rounded) for large population size jurisdictions; 
+/-7 percentage points (rounded) for medium population size 
jurisdictions; and +/-5 percentage points (rounded) for small 
population size jurisdictions. 

[120] See GAO-02-107. 

[121] See GAO-02-107. 

[122] See GAO-02-3. 

[123] For this reason, some estimates from the 2001 survey are slightly 
different than the overall sample estimates provided in our prior 
report. For these comparisons, the 95 percent confidence interval is +/
-5 percent or less for the 2001 survey estimates and +/-8 percent or 
less for the 2005 survey estimates. See appendix V for further details 
about the sampling differences between the 2001 and 2005 local election 
jurisdiction surveys. 

[124] In addition, some of the increase may be because of changes in 
how the question was worded. However, as noted above, HAVA authorized 
the payment of funding to states for voter education programs, and 
according to our survey of state election officials, most states 
reported obligating or spending HAVA funds for voter education. 

[125] Oregon conducts all-mail voting on Election Day; identification 
requirements for in-person voting are not applicable. The District of 
Columbia also reported on our survey that this requirement was not 
applicable. 

[126] These states were Florida, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, 
and South Dakota. 

[127] These 9 states are Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
Since our survey, more recent actions by states include, for example, 
Ohio's enactment of legislation, effective in May 2006, requiring 
voters to provide identification prior to voting. 

[128] In October 2005 a federal district court order (Common Cause/GA 
v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005)) granted a preliminary 
injunction enjoining and restricting the state from enforcing or 
applying certain provisions of the 2005 Georgia amendments. Plaintiffs 
in the case allege, in general, that such amendments unduly burden the 
right to vote. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court on February 10, 2006, 
for further proceeding in light of subsequent Georgia amendments to its 
voter identification laws enacted in January 2006. 

[129] These estimates include only county election jurisdiction 
subgroup comparisons between the 2001 and 2005 surveys. See appendix V 
for further details about the sampling differences between these 
surveys. 

[130] See GAO-02-3. 

[131] The differences between size categories were not statistically 
significant. We estimate that 23 percent of large jurisdictions, 20 
percent of medium jurisdictions, and 13 percent of small jurisdictions 
had difficulties recruiting poll workers with needed language skills. 

[132] See GAO-02-3. 

[133] See GAO-02-3. 

[134] The total does not add to 50 because 1 state did not respond to 
this question on our survey. 

[135] See GAO-02-3. 

[136] See GAO-02-107. 

[137] The 95 percent confidence interval for both the large and medium 
percentages is greater than the +/-7 percent sampling error for their 
respective samples. 

[138] See GAO-02-3. 

[139] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is greater 
that the +/-5 percent sampling error for the complete sample. 

[140] Other jurisdictions outside of Colorado are considering vote 
centers. For example, the Indiana Secretary of State formed a 
bipartisan delegation of legislators and local election officials to 
conduct a study of vote centers and their applicability to Indiana. 

[141] Three states (Kentucky, Nevada, and Washington) reported that 
they were not involved in ballot design; local jurisdictions designed 
ballots. One state did not respond to this question on our survey. 

[142] See GAO-02-3. 

[143] On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that all of 
the jurisdictions that provided ballots in a language other than 
English provided ballots in Spanish. Our survey results also showed 
that some large jurisdictions provided ballots in other languages, such 
as Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Tagalog, for the November 2004 
general election. 

[144] EAC, using various news media sources, identified 17 states 
deemed to be most competitive in the 2004 presidential contest. These 
"battleground or highly contested" states included Arkansas, Arizona, 
Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. We visited 8 of these 17 states during our 
site visits; alternatively, 16 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited were 
located in these battleground states. 

[145] See GAO-02-3. 

[146] The 95 percent confidence interval for the large percentage is 
greater than the +/-7 percent sampling error for the sample. 

[147] As previously noted, during our site visits we visited 8 of the 
17 states defined by EAC as battleground states. 

[148] GAO-02-3. 

[149] HAVA section 302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15482). 

[150] Under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter registration 
requirements for voters with respect to federal elections (North 
Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with respect 
to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to 
HAVA's provisional voting requirements. 

[151] GAO-02-3. 

[152] See GAO-02-3, table 22, for a list and description of measures, 
including provisional voting requirements, in the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia to address instances of voter names not appearing 
on registration lists for the 2000 general election. 

[153] U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of 
November 2000, U.S. Department of Commerce, February 2002. 

[154] Although many states had some form of provisional balloting prior 
to the passage of HAVA, 44 of the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia were required to permit certain individuals to cast 
provisional ballots for the 2004 general election. Under HAVA, 6 states 
were exempt from HAVA's provisional voting requirements. States that 
had either no voter registration requirements for voters with respect 
to federal elections (North Dakota) or polling place registration on 
Election Day with respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 
1994, are not subject to HAVA's provisional voting requirements. 

[155] HAVA section 305 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15485). 

[156] HAVA section 304 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15484). For example, 
Arizona submitted an inquiry to Department of Justice's Civil Rights 
Division asking whether it was permissible under HAVA for a state to 
mandate that a potential voter show identification at the polls prior 
to receiving a provisional ballot. The Civil Rights Division responded, 
in part, on September 1, 2005, that while HAVA requires states to allow 
voters who meet certain specified conditions the opportunity to cast a 
provisional ballot, states are free to prescribe their own rules for 
deciding whether to count those ballots. (September 1, 2005, letter to 
the state of Arizona from the Department of Justice's Civil Rights 
Division). 

[157] Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New 
York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia reported using 
existing legislative or executive action to meet HAVA requirements. 

[158] Arizona, California, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Washington reported meeting HAVA requirements with a combination of new 
and existing state actions. 

[159] Wyoming is also exempt from HAVA's provisional voting 
requirements. States are exempt because they had either (1) no voter 
registration requirements for voters with respect to federal elections 
(North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with 
respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming), in effect on and after August 1, 1994. Despite 
the exemption, Wyoming reported enacting legislation to authorize some 
measure of provisional voting to be consistent with HAVA. 

[160] Two additional jurisdictions we visited were in New Hampshire, 
which is not subject to HAVA provisional voting requirements. 

[161] In each of these jurisdictions paper ballots were used for some 
provisional voting--for those casting a provisional vote Election Day 
in the election office in Ohio and those casting a provisional ballot 
during early voting in the Nevada jurisdiction. Voters in Nevada, 
including early voters, who were first-time voters who registered by 
mail and did not provide identification when they registered and could 
not provide required identification when at the polls, were allowed to 
cast a provisional ballot. Election officials in the other Nevada 
jurisdiction also told us they used DRE for provisional voting but not 
on Election Day. This jurisdiction used DREs for provisional early 
voting and optical scan paper ballots on Election Day. 

[162] HAVA mandates all states to require identification from first- 
time voters who registered by mail unless a copy of the identification 
is included with their mail-in voter registration application. 

[163] To be eligible for a presidential ballot, a person must be a 
citizen at least 18 years old and have not forfeited electoral 
privileges because of a disfranchising crime. 

[164] Jurisdictions in Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North 
Dakota were not asked questions about provisional voting because they 
are not subject to HAVA's provisional voting requirements and do not 
provide for provisional voting. Maine was inadvertently not asked to 
answer these questions. 

[165] For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, in ruling on the counting of provisional votes under Ohio law, 
held that ballots cast in a precinct where the voter does not reside 
and which would be invalid under state law for that reason are not 
required by HAVA to be counted as valid votes. Sandusky County 
Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 568 (6TH Cir. 2004). 

[166] The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is greater 
than the +/-5 percent sampling error for the complete sample. 

[167] Jurisdictions in Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and 
North Dakota were not included in this estimate. 

[168] Lack of agreement for terms was a data quality issue pointed out 
by the Election Assistance Commission for the commission's Election Day 
survey, with some responses providing the same number for Election Day 
ballots cast and ballots counted. The U.S. Election Assistance 
Commission. 2004 Election Day Survey: How We Voted: People, Ballots and 
Polling Places. September 2005. 

[169] HAVA section 302(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)). 

[170] National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2004, Review and 
Recommendations by the Nation's Elections Administrators. May 2005. 

[171] EAC surveyed all 50 states (which, in turn, worked with local 
election officials), the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, 
American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, in the fall of 2004 and 
with follow-up requests in 2005. 

[172] U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2004 Election Day Survey. 
September 2005. 

[173] Electionline.org, Briefing: Solution or Problem? Provisional 
Ballots in 2004. March 2005. Electionline.org is produced by the 
Election Reform Information Project. 

[174] GAO-02-3. 

[175] The estimate for large jurisdictions has a 95 percent confidence 
interval of 0 to +2 percentage points. 

[176] HAVA section 301(a)(6) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(6)). 

[177] Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Chelan County Super. 
Ct., June 6, 2005) (transcript of oral decision). 

[178] GAO-02-3. 

[179] These 9 states were Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. 

[180] GAO, Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and 
Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key 
Activities Need to Be Completed, GAO-05-956 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
21, 2005). 

[181] The Election Center is a nonprofit organization composed of 
government employees whose profession it is to serve in voter 
registration and elections administration (e.g., voter registrars, 
elections supervisors, elections directors). The Election Center in 
October 2005 completed an audit of King County's elections operations 
following the November 2004 general election. The audit was initiated 
in response to a mandate from King County's governing council 
requesting that such an audit be completed. 

[182] Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Chelan County Super. 
Ct., June 6, 2005) (transcript of oral decision). 

[183] GAO-05-478. 

[184] The King County Canvassing Board's authority to recanvass these 
ballots was litigated in late 2004. The Washington State Supreme Court 
eventually ruled that the county canvassing board could, in its 
discretion, recanvass the 573 uncounted ballots (eventually totaling 
735 after another 162 ballots were discovered) in certain 
circumstances, thereby allowing the recanvassing of the ballots and 
inclusion in the total tally of votes. Wash. State Republican Party v. 
King County, 103 P.3d 725 (2004); See also In Re Election Contest filed 
by Coday, 2006 Wash. LEXIS 185 (Wash. Mar. 9, 2006.) 

[185] Election Center, King County Elections Operations (Houston, 
Texas, 2005). 

[186] As described in the glossary of this report, the five types of 
voting methods are paper ballot, lever machine, punch card, optical 
scan, and direct recording electronic (DRE). All except paper ballot 
are considered automated methods. The punch card, optical scan, and DRE 
methods utilize computers to automate voting or tabulation. Of these 
three, punch card and optical scan equipment typically automate vote 
counting, while DREs automate both vote casting and counting. Optical 
scan and DRE are considered the more technology-based voting methods. 

[187] We estimate that 91 percent of jurisdictions considered parallel 
testing to be not applicable. 

[188] We defined the predominant voting method as one that processed 
the largest number of ballots regardless of when the vote was cast: on 
general Election Day, as a provisional vote, during absentee voting, or 
during early voting. 

[189] Jurisdictions could identify more than one voting method to be 
acquired. 

[190] Some jurisdictions may be planning to acquire equipment for more 
than one voting method. 

[191] We also estimate that about one-fourth of jurisdictions did not 
know whether they planned to acquire DRE or optical scan voting 
equipment in time for the 2006 general election. 

[192] HAVA § 301(a)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(3)). 

[193] GAO-02-3. 

[194] The percentage of jurisdictions reported for the November 2000 
general election was based on GAO analysis of data from Election Data 
Services and states; the current estimate of jurisdictions is based on 
our 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. Some of the 
differences may be due to differences in these methods. 

[195] HAVA § 102 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15302). HAVA § 101(b) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15301(b)) and HAVA § 102(a)(2) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 15302(a)(2)) govern the use of HAVA Title I funds. 

[196] HAVA § 101(b)(1)(F) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15301). 

[197] HAVA § 301(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(1)). 

[198] HAVA § 301(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(2)). HAVA 
requirements for maximum error rates in counting ballots are discussed 
in the section on voting system performance, which follows. 

[199] GAO-02-3. 

[200] The 95 percent confidence interval for this value is between 100 
percent and 89 percent. 

[201] The 95 percent confidence interval for DREs is +13 or -15 
percentage points. 

[202] Jurisdictions that used optical scan, punch card, and paper 
ballot voting methods were not included in our survey responses on 
manual audit capabilities because they already provide a key component 
for manual audits--a paper record created by the voter. Jurisdictions 
that used lever machines were not included in survey responses because 
the machines are no longer manufactured. 

[203] The 95 percent confidence interval for VVPT in DRE jurisdictions 
is +9 or -6 percentage points. 

[204] The 95 percent confidence interval for printing of ballot images 
in DRE jurisdictions is +6 or -5 percentage points. 

[205] The 95 percent confidence interval for internal paper records 
that were not voter-verifiable in DRE jurisdictions is +/-13 percentage 
points. 

[206] GAO-02-3. 

[207] Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on 
Election Day were excluded from this survey question. 

[208] Federal Election Commission, Performance and Test Standards for 
Punchcard, Marksense, and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems, 
Jan. 1990. 

[209] GAO, Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment 
Standards, GAO-02-52 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.15, 2001). 

[210] Federal Election Commission, Voting System Performance and Test 
Standards, 2002. 

[211] HAVA § 301(a)(5) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(5)). 

[212] The law did not specify whether the accuracy standards are to be 
measured in a test environment or an operational environment. However, 
the standard itself specifies a test environment. 

[213] Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on 
Election Day were excluded from this survey question. 

[214] Fourteen percent of the jurisdictions that adopted standards for 
the 2004 election did not know the source of the performance standards 
that they had adopted. Responses for these categories do not add to 100 
percent because respondents were allowed to select multiple items for 
this question. 

[215] GAO-02-3. 

[216] Differences in overall estimates from the 2001 and 2005 GAO 
surveys of local election jurisdictions are, in part, likely due to 
differences in the sample designs of the two surveys and how local 
election jurisdictions that were minor civil divisions were selected. 
Because of these sample design differences, comparing only election 
jurisdictions that are counties provides a stronger basis for making 
direct comparisons between the two surveys' results. The estimates 
compared in this report are of the county local election jurisdictions 
only; for this reason, some estimates from the 2001 survey are slightly 
different than the overall sample estimates provided in our prior 
report (GAO-02-3). For these comparisons, the 95 percent confidence 
interval is +/-5 percentage points or less for the 2001 survey 
estimates and +/-8 percentage points or less for the 2005 survey 
estimates. 

[217] An estimated 38 percent of respondents selected "not applicable" 
to the question on accuracy of voting equipment in their survey 
response. 

[218] An estimated 25 percent of respondents selected "not applicable" 
to the question on spoiled/ruined ballots in their survey response. 

[219] An estimated 66 percent of respondents selected the response "not 
applicable" for the survey questions on measurement of pieces of 
equipment that failed and equipment downtime. 

[220] The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/
-6 percentage points. 

[221] Percentages represent the combination of "satisfied" or "very 
satisfied" responses for each survey question item. 

[222] GAO-02-3. 

[223] GAO-05-956. 

[224] HAVA § 301(a)(2)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(2)(B)). 

[225] HAVA § 221 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15361). 

[226] HAVA § 231 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15371). 

[227] HAVA § 231 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15371). 

[228] EAC was to be appointed by March 2003, but the appointment of EAC 
commissioners did not occur until December 13, 2003. The $1.2 million 
in funding received for fiscal year 2004 supported limited activities. 
Significant startup funding was not received until fiscal year 2005, 
when its budget was increased to $13.8 million. The largest portion of 
EAC's 2005 budget (31 percent) was allocated to improving voting 
technology, including $2.8 million for National Institute of Standards 
and Technology support to develop the Voluntary Voting System 
Guidelines. 

[229] GAO-02-3. 

[230] Threats and risks to voting systems include loss of electronic 
voting data, loss or theft of ballots, and unauthorized access to 
software. 

[231] Common security controls included (1) identification names and 
passwords to control access to voting equipment and software, (2) 
redundant storage media for recovery in the event of power or equipment 
failure, (3) encryption to ensure privacy of votes and confidentiality 
of election results, (4) audit trails to document the integrity of the 
voting process, and (5) hardware locks and seals to prevent 
unauthorized access to voting equipment components. 

[232] Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on 
Election Day were excluded from this survey question. 

[233] Jurisdictions may have identified more than one group with 
assigned security responsibilities. 

[234] Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on 
Election Day were excluded from this survey question. 

[235] We were unable to reliably estimate percentages for jurisdictions 
whose predominant voting methods were central count punch card or 
precinct count punch card voting methods for all but one of these 
security controls. We estimate that 95 percent of jurisdictions whose 
predominant voting method was central count punch card used hardware 
locks and seals. 

[236] Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on 
Election Day were excluded from this survey question. 

[237] Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on 
Election Day were excluded from this survey question. 

[238] An estimated 57 percent of respondents selected "not applicable" 
for written policies and procedures for electronic transmission of 
voted ballots for counting in their survey response. 

[239] The 95 percent confidence interval for jurisdictions using DREs 
was +13 or -9 percentage points. An estimated 38 percent of respondents 
from jurisdictions whose predominant method was DRE selected "not 
applicable" in their survey response to written policies and procedures 
for electronic transmission of voted ballots for counting. 

[240] Election officials in three of the jurisdictions that we visited 
reported having security plans but did not provide them for this study. 

[241] The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is +14 or -15 
percentage points. 

[242] The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan 
is +/-10 percentage points. 

[243] The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical 
scan is +/-9 percentage points. 

[244] Prior to the November 2004 general election, NASED conducted the 
qualification program to test voting systems against the federal 
voluntary voting system standards. In 2005, EAC assumed this 
responsibility. 

[245] After the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines become effective in 
December 2007, voting systems will no longer be tested by federally 
accredited laboratories to prior versions of the federal standards. 

[246] GAO-05-956. 

[247] GAO-05-956. 

[248] Several of the problems included in our 2005 report on voting 
system security and reliability have been discussed in this report. 

[249] EAC, Best Practices Tool Kit (July 2004), http://www.eac.gov/bp/ 
docs/BestPracticesToolKit.doc. 

[250] California Institute of Technology/Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Immediate Steps to Avoid Lost Votes in the 2004 
Presidential Elections: Recommendations for the Election Assistance 
Commission (July 2004). 

[251] For example, GAO, Federal Information Systems Controls Audit 
Manual, GAO/AIMD-12.19.6 (Washington, D.C.: January 1999); NIST, 
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information 
Technology Systems, SP 800-14 (September 1996) and Security 
Considerations in the Information System Development Life Cycle, SP 800-
64, Revision 1 (June 2004); and International Systems Security 
Engineering Association, Systems Security Engineering Capability 
Maturity Model, ISO/IEC 21827, version 3.0 (June 2003). 

[252] The Federal Election Commission used the general term "voting 
system standards" for its 2002 publication Voting Systems Performance 
and Test Standards. Consistent with HAVA terminology, EAC refers to its 
revision of these standards as Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. For 
this report, we refer to the contents of both of these documents as 
standards. 

[253] GAO-05-956. 

[254] The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +6 
or -7 percentage points. 

[255] GAO-02-3. 

[256] GAO-05-956. 

[257] GAO-02-3. 

[258] GAO-05-956. 

[259] Initial state responses were obtained from our 2005 state survey; 
we later obtained clarifications by phone or electronic mail from 19 
states. 

[260] GAO-02-3. 

[261] These estimates include only county election jurisdiction 
subgroup comparisons between 2001 and 2005 surveys. See the scope and 
methodology in appendix V for further details about sampling 
differences. 

[262] Zero tapes record the vote counts stored in a piece of voting 
equipment for each of the contests prior to voter inputs, when all 
counts should be zero. 

[263] Both EAC's Best Practices Tool Kit and the 2005 Voluntary Voting 
System Guidelines recommend development of parallel testing procedures 
for all types of automated voting equipment. 

[264] We estimate that 91 percent of jurisdictions considered parallel 
testing to be not applicable. 

[265] The 95 percent confidence interval for large jurisdictions is +/
-8 percentage points. The 95 percent confidence interval for small 
jurisdictions is +/-7 percentage points. 

[266] Percentages for the other voting methods had confidence intervals 
greater than +/-10 percent or were unreliable. 

[267] GAO-05-956. 

[268] The 95 percent confidence interval for this item is +9 or -6 
percentage points. 

[269] GAO-02-3. 

[270] Percentages represent the aggregation of responses for all 
sources of remote access. Percentages exclude jurisdictions that use 
only hand-counted paper ballots. 

[271] GAO-05-956. 

[272] GAO-01-1026. 

[273] We asked election officials about the number of precincts in 
their jurisdiction for the November 2004 general election. Some 
officials indicated whether the total number included absentee ballot 
precincts, while others did not. In most jurisdictions we visited, the 
number of precincts was not the same as the number of polling places 
operating on Election Day. 

[274] 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a. 

[275] Determinations made by the Census Bureau Director are to be based 
upon a prescribed statutory formula. The most recent determinations 
made as to which jurisdictions are to be covered were published on July 
26, 2002, at 67 Fed. Reg. 48,871 (2002). 

[276] In this context, the term "voting materials" means registration 
or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials 
or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots. 

[277] For more information, see GAO, Elections: Perspectives on 
Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

[278] See GAO-02-3. 

[279] See GAO-02-3. 

[280] See GAO-02-03. 

[281] See GAO-02-3. 

[282] See GAO-02-3. 

[283] See GAO-02-3. 

[284] See GAO-02-3. 

[285] See GAO-02-3. 

[286] We did not include any election jurisdictions in Oregon because 
statewide voting in Oregon for the November 2000 election was conducted 
entirely by mail and absentee balloting. 

[287] Election Data Services is a private company that collects 
election-related data from state and local jurisdictions, such as the 
number of registered voters and voting methods used in local election 
jurisdictions. We used several methods to check the reliability of data 
in these databases and found the databases to be sufficiently reliable 
for our purposes in this survey. 

[288] There are more than 6,100 MCD jurisdictions in these 3 states 
combined. 

[289] Election responsibility for these jurisdictions resided at the 
county level. 

[290] For more information, see GAO, Voters with Disabilities: Access 
to Polling Places and Alternative Voting Methods, GAO-02-107 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

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