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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Testimony:

Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on 
Homeland Security, House of Representatives:

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 
Tuesday, September 13, 2011: 

Visa Security:

Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Overstay Enforcement and 
Address Risks in the Visa Process:

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

GAO-11-910T:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-11-910T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, by a 
Nigerian citizen with a valid U.S. visa renewed concerns about the 
security of the visa process. Further, unauthorized immigrants who 
entered the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed 
their authorized periods of admission—overstays—could pose homeland 
security risks. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has certain 
responsibilities for security in the visa process and for addressing 
overstays. DHS staff review visa applications at certain Department of 
State overseas posts under the Visa Security Program. DHS also manages 
the Visa Waiver Program through which eligible nationals from certain 
countries can travel to the United States without a visa. This 
testimony is based on GAO products issued in November 2009, August 
2010, and from March to May 2011. As requested, this testimony 
addresses the following issues: (1) overstay enforcement efforts, (2) 
efforts to implement a biometric exit system and challenges with the 
reliability of overstay data, and (3) challenges in the Visa Security 
and Visa Waiver programs. 

What GAO Found:

Federal agencies take actions against a small portion of the estimated 
overstay population, but strengthening planning and assessment of 
overstay efforts could improve enforcement. Within DHS, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Counterterrorism and 
Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is the lead agency responsible for 
overstay enforcement. CTCEU arrests a small portion of the estimated 
overstay population in the United States because of, among other 
things, ICE’s competing priorities, but ICE expressed an intention to 
augment its overstay enforcement resources. From fiscal years 2006 
through 2010, ICE reported devoting about 3 percent of its total field 
office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was 
considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay 
enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations directorate, 
which apprehends and removes aliens subject to removal from the United 
States. In April 2011, GAO reported that by developing a time frame 
for assessing needed resources and using the assessment findings, as 
appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts. Moreover, in 
April 2011, GAO reported that CTCEU tracked various performance 
measures, but did not have a mechanism to assess the outcomes of its 
efforts. GAO reported that by establishing such a mechanism, CTCEU 
could better ensure that managers have information to assist in making 
decisions. 

DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to match 
available information (e.g., fingerprints) provided by foreign 
nationals upon their arrival and departure from the United States and 
faces reliability issues with data used to identify overstays. GAO 
reported that while the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indicator Technology Program’s biometric entry capabilities were 
operating at ports of entry, exit capabilities were not, and DHS did 
not have a comprehensive plan for biometric exit implementation. DHS 
conducted pilots to test two scenarios for an air exit solution in 
2009, and in August 2010, GAO concluded that the pilots’ limitations, 
such as limitations not defined in the pilot evaluation plan like 
suspending exit screening at departure gates to avoid flight delays, 
curtailed DHS’s ability to inform a decision for a long-term exit 
solution. Further, in April 2011, GAO reported that there is not a 
standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States 
through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure 
forms. Such a mechanism could help DHS obtain more complete departure 
data for identifying overstays. 

GAO identified various challenges in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver 
programs related to planning and assessment efforts. For example, in 
March 2011, GAO found that ICE developed a plan to expand the Visa 
Security Program to additional high-risk posts, but ICE had not fully 
adhered to the plan or kept it up to date. Further, ICE had not 
identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional 
security of Visa Security Program review at those high-risk posts that 
do not have a program presence. In addition, DHS implemented the 
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory 
requirement intended to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took 
steps to minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added 
by the new requirement. However, DHS had not fully evaluated security 
risks related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers 
without verified ESTA approval. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO has made recommendations in prior reports that, among other 
things, call for DHS to strengthen management of overstay enforcement 
efforts, mechanisms for collecting data from foreign nationals 
departing the United States, and planning for addressing certain Visa 
Security and Visa Waiver programs’ risks. DHS generally concurred with 
these recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address 
them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-910T]. For more 
information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or 
stanar@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland 
Security's (DHS) programs and efforts to strengthen the security of 
the visa process, including efforts to identify and take enforcement 
against overstays--individuals who were admitted to the United States 
legally on a temporary basis--either with a visa, or in some cases, as 
visitors who were allowed to enter without a visa--but then overstayed 
their authorized periods of admission.[Footnote 1] The attempted 
bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 on December 25, 2009, by a 
Nigerian citizen in possession of a valid U.S. visa renewed concerns 
about the security of the visa process. Each year, millions of 
visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis. From 
fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010, the Department of State 
issued over 36 million nonimmigrant visas for business travel, 
pleasure, tourism, medical treatment, or for foreign and cultural 
exchange student programs, among other things.[Footnote 2] In 
addition, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010, over 98 
million visitors were admitted to the United States under the Visa 
Waiver Program, which allows nationals from certain countries to apply 
for admission to the country as temporary visitors for business or 
pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. consulate abroad. 
[Footnote 3]

Further, the most recent estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center 
approximated that in 2006, out of an unauthorized resident alien 
population of 11.5 million to 12 million in the United States, about 4 
million to 5.5 million were overstays.[Footnote 4] In February 2008, 
we reported that most overstays are likely motivated by economic 
opportunities to stay in the United States beyond their authorized 
periods of admission.[Footnote 5] Individuals overstaying their 
authorized periods of admission could pose homeland security concerns. 
For example, in some instances overstays have been identified as 
terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activity, such as 5 of the 
19 September 11, 2001, hijackers. Further, according to DHS data, of 
approximately 400 individuals reported by the Department of Justice as 
convicted in the United States as a result of international terrorism- 
related investigations conducted from September 2001 through March 
2010, approximately 36 were overstays.[Footnote 6]

DHS has certain responsibilities for strengthening security in the 
visa process, including identifying and taking enforcement action to 
address overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) is tasked with, among other duties, inspecting all people 
applying for entry to the United States to determine their 
admissibility to the country and screening Visa Waiver Program 
applicants to determine their eligibility to travel to the United 
States under the program. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) is the lead agency for enforcing immigration law in the interior 
of the United States and is primarily responsible for overstay 
enforcement, and within ICE, the Counterterrorism and Criminal 
Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is primarily responsible for overstay 
investigations. The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) within DHS's National 
Protection and Programs Directorate supports the identification of 
nonimmigrant overstays. In 2002, DHS initiated the US-VISIT Program to 
develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect biometric 
data from aliens traveling through U.S. ports of entry. In 2004, US-
VISIT initiated the first step of this program by collecting biometric 
data on aliens entering the United States. Further, the Department of 
State is responsible for issuing visas to foreign nationals seeking 
admission to the United States. In addition, DHS has responsibility 
for managing the Visa Security Program and the Visa Waiver Program. 
Specifically, ICE oversees the Visa Security Program under which it 
deploys officials to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to 
strengthen the visa process by working with Department of State 
officials in reviewing visa applications.[Footnote 7] DHS is also 
responsible for establishing visa policy, including policy for the 
Visa Waiver Program.

As requested, my testimony will cover the following key issues: (1) 
efforts to take enforcement action against overstays and reported 
results; (2) DHS's efforts to implement a biometric exit system and 
the reliability of data used to identify overstays; and (3) challenges 
and weaknesses in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver programs. This 
testimony is based on our prior work on overstay enforcement efforts, 
the US-VISIT program, the Visa Security Program, and the Visa Waiver 
Program. We issued reports from these efforts in April 2011, August 
2010 and November 2009, March 2011, and May 2011, 
respectively.[Footnote 8] For these reports, we examined program 
documentation, such as standard operating procedures, guidance for 
investigations, and implementation plans. We also interviewed DHS and 
Department of State officials. Additional details on the scope and 
methodology are available in our published reports. We conducted this 
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards.

In summary, DHS has taken action to strengthen security in the visa 
process, but operational and management weaknesses have hindered the 
effectiveness of these efforts. First, ICE investigates and arrests a 
small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United 
States because of, for example, competing enforcement priorities. ICE 
also reported allocating a small percentage of its investigative work 
hours to overstay investigations since fiscal year 2006, but the 
agency has expressed an intention to augment the resources it 
dedicates to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward. However, ICE 
does not yet have a target time frame for completing its planning 
efforts for augmenting overstay enforcement resources, and it lacks 
mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts. 
Second, DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric entry 
and exit system for collecting biometric data on foreign nationals 
when they depart the United States. In the absence of such a system, 
DHS uses primarily biographic data to identify overstays. However, 
unreliable data hinder DHS's efforts to accurately identify overstays. 
Third, ICE has deployed agents to certain embassies and consulates as 
part of the Visa Security Program, but has not performed mandated 
training, has faced staffing challenges, and has not fully adhered to 
its program expansion plan. DHS has taken action to strengthen the 
security of the Visa Waiver Program, but has not fully analyzed 
program risks or completed required reports on participating 
countries' security risks in a timely manner. We made a number of 
recommendations to DHS to strengthen its efforts in these areas, such 
as improving its management and assessment of overstay enforcement 
efforts, planning for a biometric exit capability and mechanisms for 
collecting data from foreign national departing the United States at 
land ports of entry, and addressing risks in the Visa Security and 
Visa Waiver programs. DHS concurred with these recommendations and has 
actions planned or under way to address them.

Federal Agencies Take Actions against a Small Portion of the Estimated 
Overstay Population:

ICE Investigates Few In-Country Overstays, but Its Efforts Could 
Benefit from Improved Planning and Performance Management:

As we reported in April 2011, ICE CTCEU investigates and arrests a 
small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due to, 
among other things, ICE's competing priorities; however, these efforts 
could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management. 
CTCEU, the primary federal entity responsible for taking enforcement 
action to address in-country overstays, identifies leads for overstay 
cases; takes steps to verify the accuracy of the leads it identifies 
by, for example, checking leads against multiple databases; and 
prioritizes leads to focus on those the unit identifies as being most 
likely to pose a threat to national security or public safety. CTCEU 
then requires field offices to initiate investigations on all 
priority, high-risk leads it identifies.

According to CTCEU data, as of October 2010, ICE field offices had 
closed about 34,700 overstay investigations that CTCEU headquarters 
assigned to them from fiscal year 2004 through 2010.[Footnote 9] These 
cases resulted in approximately 8,100 arrests (about 23 percent of the 
34,700 investigations), relative to a total estimated overstay 
population of 4 million to 5.5 million.[Footnote 10] About 26,700 of 
those investigations (or 77 percent) resulted in one of these three 
outcomes:[Footnote 11] (1) evidence is uncovered indicating that the 
suspected overstay has departed the United States; (2) evidence is 
uncovered indicating that the subject of the investigation is in-
status (e.g., the subject filed a timely application with the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to change his or 
her status and/or extend his or her authorized period of admission in 
the United States); or (3) CTCEU investigators exhaust all 
investigative leads and cannot locate the suspected overstay.[Footnote 
12] Of the approximately 34,700 overstay investigations assigned by 
CTCEU headquarters that ICE field offices closed from fiscal year 2004 
through 2010, ICE officials attributed the significant portion of 
overstay cases that resulted in a departure finding, in-status 
finding, or with all leads being exhausted generally to difficulties 
associated with locating suspected overstays and the timeliness and 
completeness of data in DHS's systems used to identify overstays.

Further, ICE reported allocating a small percentage of its resources 
in terms of investigative work hours to overstay investigations since 
fiscal year 2006, but the agency expressed an intention to augment the 
resources it dedicates to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward. 
Specifically, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported 
devoting from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its total field office 
investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE attributed 
the small percentage of investigative resources it reported allocating 
to overstay enforcement efforts primarily to competing enforcement 
priorities. According to the ICE Assistant Secretary, ICE has 
resources to remove 400,000 aliens per year, or less than 4 percent of 
the estimated removable alien population in the United States. In June 
2010, the Assistant Secretary stated that ICE must prioritize the use 
of its resources to ensure that its efforts to remove aliens reflect 
the agency's highest priorities, namely nonimmigrants, including 
suspected overstays, who are identified as high risk in terms of being 
most likely to pose a risk to national security or public safety. As a 
result, ICE dedicated its limited resources to addressing overstays it 
identified as most likely to pose a potential threat to national 
security or public safety and did not generally allocate resources to 
address suspected overstays that it assessed as noncriminal and low 
risk. ICE indicated that it may allocate more resources to overstay 
enforcement efforts moving forward and that it planned to focus 
primarily on suspected overstays whom ICE has identified as high risk 
or who recently overstayed their authorized periods of admission.

ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal 
overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) 
directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing 
aliens who do not have lawful immigration status from the United 
States. However, ERO did not plan to assume this responsibility until 
ICE assessed the funding and resources doing so would require. ICE had 
not established a time frame for completing this assessment. We 
reported in April 2011 that by developing such a time frame and 
utilizing the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could 
strengthen its planning efforts and be better positioned to hold staff 
accountable for completing the assessment. We recommended that ICE 
establish a target time frame for assessing the funding and resources 
ERO would require in order to assume responsibility for civil overstay 
enforcement and use the results of that assessment. DHS officials 
agreed with our recommendation and stated that ICE planned to identify 
resources needed to transition this responsibility to ERO as part of 
its fiscal year 2013 resource-planning process.

Moreover, although CTCEU established an output program goal and 
target, and tracked various performance measures, it did not have a 
mechanism in place to assess the outcomes of its efforts, particularly 
the extent to which the program was meeting its mission as it relates 
to overstays--to prevent terrorists and other criminals from 
exploiting the nation's immigration system. CTCEU's program goal is to 
prevent criminals and terrorists from exploiting the immigration 
system by proactively developing cases for investigation, and its 
performance target is to send 100 percent of verified priority leads 
to field offices as cases.[Footnote 13] CTCEU also tracks a variety of 
output measures, such as the number of cases completed their 
associated results (i.e., arrested, departed, in-status, or all leads 
exhausted) and average hours spent to complete an investigation. While 
CTCEU's performance target permits it to assess an output internal to 
the program--the percentage of verified priority leads it sends to 
field offices for investigation--it does not provide program officials 
with a means to assess the impact of the program in terms of 
preventing terrorists and other criminals from exploiting the 
immigration system. We reported that by establishing such mechanisms, 
CTCEU could better ensure that managers have information to assist in 
making decisions for strengthening overstay enforcement efforts and 
assessing performance against CTCEU's goals. In our April 2011 report, 
we recommended that ICE develop outcome-based performance measures--or 
proxy measures if program outcomes cannot be captured--and associated 
targets on CTCEU's progress in preventing terrorists and other 
criminals from exploiting the nation's immigration system. DHS 
officials agreed with our recommendation and stated that ICE planned 
to work with DHS's national security partners to determine if measures 
could be implemented.

The Department of State and CBP Have Taken Action to Prevent 
Ineligible Out-of-Country Overstays from Returning to the United States:

In addition to ICE's overstay enforcement activities, in April 2011 we 
reported that the Department of State and CBP are responsible for, 
respectively, preventing ineligible violators from obtaining a new 
visa or being admitted to the country at a port of entry. According to 
Department of State data, the department denied about 52,800 
nonimmigrant visa applications and about 114,200 immigrant visa 
applications from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010 due, at 
least in part, to applicants having previously been unlawfully present 
in the United States for more than 180 days, according to statute. 
[Footnote 14] Similarly, CBP reported that it refused admission to 
about 5,000 foreign nationals applying for admission to the United 
States from fiscal year 2005 through 2010 (an average of about 830 per 
year) specifically because of the applicants' previous status as 
unlawfully present in the United States for more than 180 days. 
[Footnote 15]

DHS Has Not Implemented a Reliable Exit System and Faces Reliability 
Issues with Existing Visa Overstay Data:

DHS Has Not Yet Implemented a Comprehensive Biometric Exit System:

DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to match 
available information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival 
and departure from the United States. In August 2007, we reported that 
while US-VISIT biometric entry capabilities were operating at air, 
sea, and land ports of entry, exit capabilities were not, and that DHS 
did not have a comprehensive plan or a complete schedule for biometric 
exit implementation.[Footnote 16] In addition, we reported that DHS 
continued to propose spending tens of millions of dollars on US-VISIT 
exit projects that were not well-defined, planned, or justified on the 
basis of costs, benefits, and risks.[Footnote 17] Moreover, in 
November 2009, we reported that DHS had not adopted an integrated 
approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needed 
to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution as part of 
the US-VISIT program. We concluded that, without a master schedule 
that was integrated and derived in accordance with relevant guidance, 
DHS could not reliably commit to when and how it would deliver a 
comprehensive exit solution or adequately monitor and manage its 
progress toward this end. We recommended that DHS ensure that an 
integrated master schedule be developed and maintained. DHS concurred 
and reported, as of July 2011, that the documentation of schedule 
practices and procedures is ongoing, and that an updated schedule 
standard, management plan, and management process that are compliant 
with schedule guidelines are under review.

More specifically, with regard to a biometric exit capability at land 
ports of entry, we reported in December 2006 that US-VISIT officials 
concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit 
capability could not be implemented without incurring a major impact 
on land facilities.[Footnote 18] In December 2009, DHS initiated a 
land exit pilot to collect departure information from temporary 
workers traveling through two Arizona land ports of entry. Under this 
pilot, temporary workers who entered the United States at these ports 
of entry were required to register their final departure by providing 
biometric and biographic information at exit kiosks located at the 
ports of entry. DHS planned to use the results of this pilot to help 
inform future decisions on the pedestrian component of the long-term 
land exit component of a comprehensive exit system.

With regard to air and sea ports of entry, in April 2008, DHS 
announced its intention to implement biometric exit verification at 
air and sea ports of entry in a Notice of Proposed Rule Making. 
[Footnote 19] Under this notice, commercial air and sea carriers would 
be responsible for developing and deploying the capability to collect 
biometric information from departing travelers and transmit it to DHS. 
DHS received comments on the notice and has not yet published a final 
rule. Subsequent to the rule making notice, on September 30, 2008, the 
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2009, was enacted, which directed DHS to test two 
scenarios for an air exit solution: (1) airline collection and 
transmission of biometric exit data, as proposed in the rule making 
notice and (2) CBP collection of such information at the departure 
gate.[Footnote 20] DHS conducted two pilots in 2009, and we reported 
on them in August 2010. Specifically, we reported that the pilots 
addressed one statutory requirement for a CBP scenario to collect 
information on exiting foreign nationals. However, DHS was unable to 
address the statutory requirement for an airline scenario because no 
airline was willing to participate. We reported on limitations with 
the pilots, such as the reported scope and approach of the pilots 
including limitations not defined in the pilot evaluation plan like 
suspending exit screening at departure gates to avoid flight delays, 
that curtailed their ability to inform a decision for a long-term air 
exit solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of 
information on air exit's operational impacts.[Footnote 21] We 
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security identify 
additional sources of information beyond the pilots, such as comments 
from the Notice of Proposed Rule Making, to inform an air exit 
solution decision. DHS agreed with the recommendation and stated that 
the pilots it conducted would not serve as the sole source of 
information to inform an air exit solution decision. In July 2011, DHS 
stated that it continues to examine all options in connection with a 
final biometric air exit solution and has recently given consideration 
to using its authority to establish an advisory committee to study and 
provide recommendations to DHS and Congress on implementing an air 
exit program.

More Reliable, Accessible Data Could Improve DHS's Efforts to Identify 
and Share Information on Overstays:

In the absence of a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for 
identifying and tracking overstays, US-VISIT and CTCEU primarily 
analyze biographic entry and exit data collected at land, air, and sea 
ports of entry to identify overstays. In April 2011, we reported that 
DHS's efforts to identify and report on visa overstays were hindered 
by unreliable data. Specifically, CBP does not inspect travelers 
exiting the United States through land ports of entry, including 
collecting their biometric information, and CBP did not provide a 
standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States 
through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure 
forms. Nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of 
entry turn in their forms on their own initiative. According to CBP 
officials, at some ports of entry, CBP provides a box for 
nonimmigrants to drop off their forms, while at other ports of entry 
departing nonimmigrants may park their cars, enter the port of entry 
facility, and provide their forms to a CBP officer. These forms 
contain information, such as arrival and departure dates, used by DHS 
to identify overstays. If the benefits outweigh the costs, a mechanism 
to provide nonimmigrants with a way to turn in their arrival and 
departure forms could help DHS obtain more complete and reliable 
departure data for identifying overstays. We recommended that the 
Commissioner of CBP analyze the costs and benefits of developing a 
standard mechanism for collecting these forms at land ports of entry, 
and develop a standard mechanism to collect them, to the extent that 
benefits outweigh the costs. CBP agreed with our recommendation and 
stated it planned to complete a cost-effective independent evaluation.

Further, we previously reported on weaknesses in DHS processes for 
collecting departure data, and how these weaknesses impact the 
determination of overstay rates. The Implementing Recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Act required that DHS certify that a system is in 
place that can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of 
foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports in order for DHS to 
expand the Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 22] In September 2008, we 
reported that DHS's methodology for comparing arrivals and departures 
for the purpose of departure verification would not inform overall or 
country-specific overstay rates because DHS's methodology did not 
begin with arrival records to determine if those foreign nationals 
departed or remained in the United States beyond their authorized 
periods of admission.[Footnote 23] Rather, DHS's methodology started 
with departure records and matched them to arrival records. As a 
result, DHS's methodology counted overstays who left the country, but 
did not identify overstays who have not departed the United States and 
appear to have no intention of leaving. We recommended that DHS 
explore cost-effective actions necessary to further improve the 
reliability of overstay data. DHS reported that it is taking steps to 
improve the accuracy and reliability of the overstay data, by efforts 
such as continuing to audit carrier performance and work with airlines 
to improve the accuracy and completeness of data collection. Moreover, 
by statute, DHS is required to submit an annual report to Congress 
providing numerical estimates of the number of aliens from each 
country in each nonimmigrant classification who overstayed an 
authorized period of admission that expired during the fiscal year 
prior to the year for which the report is made.[Footnote 24] DHS 
officials stated that the department has not provided Congress annual 
overstay estimates regularly since 1994 because officials do not have 
sufficient confidence in the quality of the department's overstay 
data--which is maintained and generated by US-VISIT. As a result, DHS 
officials stated that the department cannot reliably report overstay 
rates in accordance with the statute.

In addition, in April 2011 we reported that DHS took several steps to 
provide its component entities and other federal agencies with 
information to identify and take enforcement action on overstays, 
including creating biometric and biographic lookouts--or electronic 
alerts--on the records of overstay subjects that are recorded in 
databases. However, DHS did not create lookouts for the following two 
categories of overstays: (1) temporary visitors who were admitted to 
the United States using nonimmigrant business and pleasure visas and 
subsequently overstayed by 90 days or less; and (2) suspected in- 
country overstays who CTCEU deemed not to be a priority for 
investigation in terms of being most likely to pose a threat to 
national security or public safety. Broadening the scope of electronic 
lookouts in federal information systems could enhance overstay 
information sharing. In April 2011, we recommended that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border 
Protection, the Under Secretary of the National Protection and 
Programs Directorate, and the Assistant Secretary of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement to assess the costs and benefits of creating 
biometric and biographic lookouts for these two categories of 
overstays. Agency officials agreed with our recommendation and have 
actions under way to address it. For example, agency officials stated 
that they have met to assess the costs and benefits of creating 
lookouts for those categories of overstays.

Additional Steps Needed to Address Risks in the Visa Security and Visa 
Waiver Programs:

Visa Security Program:

As we reported in March 2011, the Visa Security Program faces several 
key challenges in implementing operations at overseas posts. For 
example, we reported that Visa Security Program agents' advising and 
training of consular officers, as mandated by section 428 of the 
Homeland Security Act, varied from post to post, and some posts 
provided no training to consular officers. We contacted consular 
sections at 13 overseas posts, and officials from 5 of the 13 consular 
sections we interviewed stated that they had received no training from 
the Visa Security Program agents in the last year, and none of the 
agents we interviewed reported providing training on specific security 
threats. At posts where Visa Security Program agents provided training 
for consular officers, topics covered included fraudulent documents, 
immigration law, human smuggling, and interviewing techniques. In 
March 2011, we recommended that DHS issue guidance requiring Visa 
Security Program agents to provide training for consular officers as 
mandated by section 428 of the Homeland Security Act. DHS concurred 
with our recommendation and has actions under way to address it.

Further, in March 2011 we reported that Visa Security Program agents 
performed a variety of investigative and administrative functions 
beyond their visa security responsibilities, including criminal 
investigations, attaché functions, and regional responsibilities. 
According to ICE officials, Visa Security Program agents perform non- 
program functions only after completing their visa security screening 
and vetting workload. However, both agents and Department of State 
officials at some posts told us that these other investigative and 
administrative functions sometimes slowed or limited Visa Security 
Program agents' visa security-related activities. We recommended that 
DHS develop a mechanism to track the amount of time spent by Visa 
Security Program agents on visa security activities and other 
investigations, in order to determine appropriate staffing levels and 
resource needs for Visa Security Program operations at posts overseas 
to ensure visa security operations are not limited. DHS did not concur 
with our recommendation, stating that ICE currently tracks case 
investigation hours through its data system, and that adding the 
metric to the Visa Security Program tracking system would be 
redundant. However, DHS's response did not address our finding that 
ICE does not have a mechanism that allows the agency to track the 
amount of time agents spend on both investigation hours and hours 
spent on visa security activities. Therefore, we continue to believe 
the recommendation has merit and should be implemented.

Moreover, we found that ICE's use of 30-day temporary duty assignments 
to fill Visa Waiver Program positions at posts created challenges and 
affected continuity of operations at some posts. Consular officers we 
interviewed at 3 of 13 posts discussed challenges caused by this use 
of temporary duty agents. The Visa Security Program's 5-year plan also 
identified recruitment of qualified personnel as a challenge and 
recommended incentives for Visa Security Program agents as critical to 
the program's mission, stating, "These assignments present significant 
attendant lifestyle difficulties. If the mission is to be 
accomplished, ICE, like State, needs a way to provide incentives for 
qualified personnel to accept these hardship assignments." However, 
according to ICE officials, ICE had not provided incentives to 
facilitate recruitment for hardship posts.[Footnote 25] ICE officials 
stated that they have had difficulty attracting agents to Saudi 
Arabia, and ICE agents at post told us they have little incentive to 
volunteer for Visa Security Program assignments. Thus, we recommended 
that DHS develop a plan to provide Visa Security Program coverage at 
high-risk posts where the possibility of deploying agents may be 
limited. DHS agreed with our recommendation and is taking steps to 
implement it.

In addition, ICE developed a plan to expand the Visa Security Program 
to additional high-risk visa-issuing posts, but ICE had not fully 
adhered to the plan or kept it up to date. The program's 5-year 
expansion plan, developed in 2007, identified 14 posts for expansion 
between 2009 and 2010, but 9 of these locations had not been 
established at the time of our March 2011 report, and ICE had not 
updated the plan to reflect the current situation. Furthermore, ICE 
had not fully addressed remaining visa risk in high-risk posts that 
did not have a Visa Security Program presence. ICE, with input from 
the Department of State, developed a list of worldwide visa-issuing 
posts that are ranked according to visa risk. Although the expansion 
plan stated that risk analysis is the primary input to Visa Security 
Program site selection and that the expansion plan represented an 
effort to address visa risk, ICE had not expanded the Visa Security 
Program to some high-risk posts. For example, 11 of the top 20 high-
risk posts identified by ICE and Department of State were not covered 
by Visa Security Program at the time of our review. The expansion of 
the Visa Security Program may be limited by a number of factors--
including budget limitations and objections from Department of State 
officials at some posts--and ICE had not identified possible 
alternatives that would provide the additional security of Visa 
Security Program review at those posts that do not have a program 
presence. In May 2011, we recommended that DHS develop a plan to 
provide Visa Security Program coverage at high-risk posts where the 
possibility of deploying agents may be limited. DHS concurred with our 
recommendation and noted actions under way to address it, such as 
enhancing information technology systems to allow for screening and 
reviewing of visa applicants at posts worldwide.

Visa Waiver Program:

As we reported in May 2011, DHS implemented the Electronic System for 
Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement intended 
to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to minimize the 
burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement. 
[Footnote 26] However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks 
related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers 
without verified ESTA approval. DHS developed ESTA to collect 
passenger data and complete security checks on the data before 
passengers board a U.S. bound carrier. DHS requires applicants for 
Visa Waiver Program travel to submit biographical information and 
answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. 
Travelers whose ESTA applications are denied can apply for a U.S. 
visa. In developing and implementing ESTA, DHS took several steps to 
minimize the burden associated with ESTA use. For example, ESTA 
reduced the requirement that passengers provide biographical 
information to DHS officials from every trip to once every 2 years. In 
addition, because of ESTA, DHS has informed passengers who do not 
qualify for Visa Waiver Program travel that they need to apply for a 
visa before they travel to the United States. Moreover, most travel 
industry officials we interviewed in six Visa Waiver Program countries 
praised DHS's widespread ESTA outreach efforts, reasonable 
implementation time frames, and responsiveness to feedback but 
expressed dissatisfaction over ESTA fees paid by ESTA applicants. 
[Footnote 27]

In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA 
approval for almost 98 percent of the Visa Waiver Program passengers 
prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percent--about 364,000 
travelers--traveled under the Visa Waiver Program without verified 
ESTA approval. In addition, about 650 of these passengers traveled to 
the United States with a denied ESTA. As we reported in May 2011, DHS 
had not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent 
they pose a risk to the program. DHS officials told us that, although 
there was no official agency plan for monitoring and oversight of 
ESTA, the ESTA office was undertaking a review of each case of a 
carrier's boarding a Visa Waiver Program traveler without an approved 
ESTA application; however, DHS had not established a target date for 
completing this review. DHS tracked some data on passengers that 
travel under the Visa Waiver Program without verified ESTA approval 
but did not track other data that would help officials know the extent 
to which noncompliance poses a risk to the program. Without a 
completed analysis of noncompliance with ESTA requirements, DHS was 
unable to determine the level of risk that noncompliance poses to Visa 
Waiver Program security and to identify improvements needed to 
minimize noncompliance. In addition, without analysis of data on 
travelers who were admitted to the United States without a visa after 
being denied by ESTA, DHS cannot determine the extent to which ESTA is 
accurately identifying individuals who should be denied travel under 
the program. In May 2011, we recommended that DHS establish time 
frames for the regular review and documentation of cases of Visa 
Waiver Program passengers traveling to a U.S. port of entry without 
verified ESTA approval. DHS concurred with our recommendation and 
committed to establish procedures to review quarterly a representative 
sample of noncompliant passengers to evaluate, identify, and mitigate 
potential security risks associated with the ESTA program.

Further, in May 2011 we reported that to meet certain statutory 
requirements, DHS requires that Visa Waiver Program countries enter 
into three information-sharing agreements with the United States; 
however, only half of the countries had fully complied with this 
requirement and many of the signed agreements have not been 
implemented.[Footnote 28] Half of the countries entered into 
agreements to share watchlist information about known or suspected 
terrorists and to provide access to biographical, biometric, and 
criminal history data. By contrast, almost all of the 36 Visa Waiver 
Program countries entered into an agreement to report lost and stolen 
passports. DHS, with the support of interagency partners, established 
a compliance schedule requiring the last of the Visa Waiver Program 
countries to finalize these agreements by June 2012. Although 
termination from the Visa Waiver Program is one potential consequence 
for countries not complying with the information-sharing agreement 
requirement, U.S. officials have described it as undesirable. DHS, in 
coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, developed 
measures short of termination that could be applied to countries not 
meeting their compliance date.

In addition, as of May 2011, DHS had not completed half of the most 
recent biennial reports on Visa Waiver Program countries' security 
risks in a timely manner. In 2002, Congress mandated that, at least 
once every 2 years, DHS evaluate the effect of each country's 
continued participation in the program on the security, law 
enforcement, and immigration interests of the United States. The 
mandate also directed DHS to determine based on the evaluation whether 
each Visa Waiver Program country's designation should continue or be 
terminated and to submit a written report on that determination to 
select congressional committees.[Footnote 29] According to officials, 
DHS assesses, among other things, counterterrorism capabilities and 
immigration programs. However, DHS had not completed the latest 
biennial reports for 18 of the 36 Visa Waiver Program countries in a 
timely manner, and over half of these reports are more than 1 year 
overdue. Further, in the case of 2 countries, DHS was unable to 
demonstrate that it had completed reports in the last 4 years. DHS 
cited a number of reasons for the reporting delays. For example, DHS 
officials said that they intentionally delayed report completion 
because they frequently did not receive mandated intelligence 
assessments in a timely manner and needed to review these before 
completing Visa Waiver Program country biennial reports. We 
recommended that DHS take steps to address delays in the biennial 
country review process so that the mandated country reports can be 
completed on time. DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported 
that it would consider process changes to address our concerns with 
the timeliness of continuing Visa Waiver Program reports.

This concludes my prepared testimony statement. I would be pleased to 
respond to any questions that members of the Subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments:

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact 
Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. In addition, 
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals 
who made key contributions to this testimony are Rebecca Gambler, 
Assistant Director; Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott; Frances Cook; David 
Hinchman; Jeremy Manion; Taylor Matheson; Jeff Miller; Anthony Moran; 
Jessica Orr; Zane Seals; and Joshua Wiener.

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Visitors who are allowed to seek admission without a visa include 
citizens of Canada and the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda (and 
certain residents of other adjacent islands, such as the Bahamas) 
under certain circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program 
participants (see footnote 3). In-country overstays refer to 
nonimmigrants who have exceeded their authorized periods of admission 
and remain in the United States without lawful status, while out-of-
country overstays refer to individuals who have departed the United 
States but who, on the basis of arrival and departure information, 
stayed beyond their authorized periods of admission.

[2] Temporary visitors to the United States generally are referred to 
as "nonimmigrants." For a listing and descriptions of nonimmigrant 
categories, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R. § 
214.1(a)(1)-(2). Generally, nonimmigrants wishing to visit the United 
States gain permission to apply for admission to the country through 
one of two ways. First, those eligible for the Visa Waiver Program 
apply online to establish eligibility to travel under the program 
prior to departing for the United States (unless they are seeking 
admission at a land port of entry, in which case eligibility is 
established at the time of application for admission). Second, those 
not eligible for the Visa Waiver Program and not otherwise exempt from 
the visa requirement must visit the U.S. consular office with 
jurisdiction over their place of residence or, in certain 
circumstances, the area in which they are physically present but not 
resident, to obtain a visa. Upon arriving at a port of entry, 
nonimmigrants must undergo inspection by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers, who determine whether or not they may be admitted 
into the United States. 

[3] In order to qualify for the Visa Waiver Program, a country must 
meet various requirements, such as entering into an agreement with the 
United States to report lost or stolen passports within a strict time 
limit and in a manner specified in the agreement. Currently, 36 
countries participate in the Visa Waiver Program: Andorra, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom. 

[4] Pew Hispanic Center, Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant 
Population (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2006).

[5] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland 
Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-458T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2008).

[6] For more information on these convictions, see Department of 
Justice, National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed 
International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Convictions (Washington, 
D.C.: March 2010).

[7] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 
2135) established DHS and gave the Secretary of Homeland Security 
authority to issue regulations with respect to the issuance and 
refusal of visas. Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act authorizes 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to assign DHS employees to consular 
posts overseas to support the visa process through various functions. 
See 6 U.S.C. § 236(e).

[8] GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, 
Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts but Would 
Have Costs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411] 
(Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2011); Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot 
Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air Exit Options, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860] (Washington, D.C.: 
Aug. 10, 2010); Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying 
Stages of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 19, 2009); Border Security: DHS's Visa Security Program Needs to 
Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-315] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 31, 2011), and Visa Waiver Program: DHS Has Implemented the 
Electronic System for Travel Authorization, but Further Steps Needed 
to Address Potential Program Risks, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-335] (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2011).

[9] CTCEU also investigates suspected Visa Waiver Program overstays, 
out-of-status students and violators of the National Security Entry- 
Exit Registration System, a program that requires certain visitors or 
nonimmigrants to register with DHS for national security reasons. For 
the purpose of this discussion, these investigations are referred to 
collectively as "overstay" investigations. In addition to CTCEU 
investigative efforts, other ICE programs within Enforcement and 
Removal Operations may take enforcement action against overstays, 
though none of these programs solely or directly focus on overstay 
enforcement. For example, if the Enforcement and Removal Operations 
Criminal Alien Program identifies a criminal alien who poses a threat 
to public safety and is also an overstay, the program may detain and 
remove that criminal alien from the United States. 

[10] The most recent estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center 
approximated that, in 2006, out of an unauthorized resident alien 
population of 11.5 million to 12 million in the United States, about 4 
million to 5.5 million were overstays. Pew Hispanic Center, Modes of 
Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population (Washington, D.C.: May 
22, 2006). 

[11] Investigations resulting and not resulting in arrest do not total 
34,700 due to rounding. 

[12] With regard to the second outcome, that the subject is found to 
be in-status, under certain circumstances, an application for 
extension or change of status can temporarily prevent a visitor's 
presence in the United States from being categorized as unauthorized. 
See Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, Domestic Operations 
Directorate, USCIS, "Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful 
Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act," 
memorandum, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2009. 

[13] Verified leads are leads that CTCEU has determined to be accurate 
and viable by analyzing information from government and commercial 
databases containing information related to immigration status. For 
example, these procedures are intended to verify that an individual 
suspected of overstaying has not departed the country or been granted 
an extension of stay by USCIS. 

[14] State Department data indicate that a total of about 36.5 million 
nonimmigrant visas and about 2.7 million immigrant visas were issued 
from fiscal year 2005 through 2010. 

[15] CBP data indicates that, in total, about 1.3 million foreign 
nationals were determined to be inadmissible to the United States by 
the CBP Office of Field Operations from fiscal year 2005 through 2010. 
As is the case with the State Department, CBP is unable to isolate and 
quantify the number of aliens it has determined to be inadmissible 
because of the aliens having overstayed by 180 days or less, because 
actions taken against these aliens are recorded under grounds of 
inadmissibility that may apply to, but are not limited to, overstays. 

[16] The purpose of US-VISIT is to provide biometric (e.g., 
fingerprint) identification--through the collection, maintenance, and 
sharing of biometric and selected biographic data--to authorized DHS 
and other federal agencies.

[17] GAO, Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Program's Longstanding Lack of Strategic Direction and Management 
Controls Needs to Be Addressed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1065] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 
2007). 

[18] GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces, Strategic, 
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-248] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 6, 2006). 

[19] 73 Fed. Reg. 22,065 (Apr. 24, 2008). 

[20] Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3668-70 (2008). 

[21] GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited 
Understanding of Air Exit Options, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 
2010). 

[22] 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(8). 

[23] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve 
Management of the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate 
Program Risks, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-967] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2008). 

[24] 8 U.S.C. § 1376(b). 

[25] The Department of State has designated roughly two thirds of its 
268 overseas posts as hardship posts. Staff working in such locations 
often encounter harsh environmental and living conditions that can 
include inadequate medical facilities, limited opportunities for 
spousal employment, poor schools, high levels of crime, and severe 
climate.

[26] See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(h)(3).

[27] In September 2010, the U.S. government began to charge ESTA 
applicants a $14 fee when they applied for ESTA approval, including 
$10 for the creation of a corporation to promote travel to the United 
States and $4 to fund ESTA operations.

[28] See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(2)(D), (F).

[29] See the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002.

[End of section] 

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