This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-813T entitled 'Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service' which was released on July 13, 2011. This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. United States Government Accountability Office: GAO: Testimony: Before the Subcommittees of the House Committee on Homeland Security: For Release on Delivery: Expected at 10:00 a.m. ET: Wednesday, July 13, 2011: Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service: Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director: Physical Infrastructure Issues: GAO-11-813T: GAO Highlights: Highlights of GAO-11-813T, a testimony before the Subcommittees of the House Committee on Homeland Security. Why GAO Did This Study: As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS has a budget of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200 full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards that help accomplish the agency’s facility protection mission. This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and discusses challenges FPS faces in carrying out its mission with regard to (1) risk management, (2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency. GAO also addresses the extent to which FPS has made progress in responding to these challenges. To perform this work, GAO used its key facility protection practices as criteria, visited FPS regions and selected GSA buildings, reviewed training and certification data for FPS’s contract guards, and interviewed officials from DHS, GSA, guard contractors, and guards. What GAO Found: FPS continues to face challenges in carrying out its mission. Specifically: * The absence of a risk management program hampers FPS’s ability to protect federal facilities. For many years, GAO has advocated the importance of a risk management approach. GAO reported in August 2010 that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead, FPS uses a facility-by-facility approach which assumes that facilities with the same security level have the same risk regardless of their location. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS’s security goals, as GAO has recommended, there is limited assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and effective manner. * FPS has not fully addressed several key human capital issues. FPS continues to operate without a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, as GAO recommended in 2009. Further, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal staffing levels should be because FPS headquarters does not collect data on its workforce’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. FPS has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector-based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities. * FPS faces longstanding challenges in managing its contract guard workforce. Weaknesses in FPS’s contract guard program hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. GAO reported in 2009 and 2010 that FPS cannot ensure that its contract guards have required training and certifications. FPS is in the process of addressing GAO recommendations. For example, FPS revised its x-ray and magnetometer training for its inspectors and guards. * FPS has not reviewed its fee design or determined an appropriate funding mechanism. FPS increased its basic security fee four times in 6 years to try to cover costs, but has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate design. FPS’s current fee structure has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency costs and continues to be a topic of congressional interest and inquiry. FPS has yet to evaluate whether its fee-based structure or an alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for funding the agency, as GAO recommended in 2008 and 2011. FPS has made some progress in improving its ability to protect federal facilities. For example, in response to GAO recommendations, FPS is developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which could enhance its ability to comprehensively assess risk at federal facilities and improve oversight of its contract guard program. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process to address 21 of the 28 recommendations GAO has made related to the challenges above, although none are yet fully implemented. According to FPS officials, this is in part because of changes in the agency’s leadership, organization, funding, staffing levels, and delays in developing several new management systems, such as RAMP. What GAO Recommends: DHS and FPS have generally concurred with GAO’s past recommendations. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process, for example, to address risk management, strategic human capital planning, and oversight of its contract guard program. View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-813T] or key components. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512- 2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. [End of section] Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis, Ranking Members Clarke and Richardson, and Members of the Subcommittees: We are pleased to be here to discuss the challenges the Federal Protective Service (FPS) faces in carrying out its mission to protect federal facilities, particularly with regard to (1) risk management, (2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency. We will also discuss FPS's assessment of its performance and the extent to which FPS has made progress in responding to these challenges. Recent events have exposed weaknesses with FPS's ability to protect federal facilities, including GAO's covert testing at federal facilities in 2009, FPS's ongoing penetration testing at federal facilities, and FPS's contract security guards allowing components of an active bomb to remain in a federal building in Detroit, Michigan, for three weeks in March 2011 before a bomb squad was called. As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FPS is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA).[Footnote 1] FPS has a budget of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200 full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards (also known as protective service officers) that help accomplish the agency's facility protection mission. FPS's primary responsibilities include (1) conducting risk assessments of federal facilities and recommending countermeasures aimed at preventing incidents at facilities; and (2) undertaking law enforcement activities, including responding to incidents at federal facilities. This testimony is based on our past reports and testimonies.[Footnote 2] Work conducted for these reports and testimonies included assessing FPS's facility protection efforts using our key security practices as a framework.[Footnote 3] We also visited selected FPS regions and selected GSA buildings to assess FPS activities firsthand. Additionally, we reviewed training and certification data for 663 randomly selected guards in 6 of FPS's 11 regions. Because of the sensitivity of some of the information in our prior work, we cannot specifically identify in this testimony the locations of the incidents discussed. For all of our work, we reviewed related laws and directives; interviewed officials and analyzed documents and data from DHS and GSA; and interviewed tenant agency representatives, contractors, and guards. These reviews took place between April 2007 and May 2011. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Additional information on scope and methodology is provided in the previously issued products. The Absence of a Risk Management Program Hampers FPS's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities: For many years we have advocated the use of a risk management approach that entails managing risk through actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, allocating resources based on risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. Risk assessment, an important element of a risk management approach, helps decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate the effects of the risks. FPS meets its mission to protect GSA's federal facilities by assessing the risks that face those facilities and identifying the appropriate countermeasures to mitigate those risks. Despite the importance of this mission, FPS has not implemented an effective risk management program. In August 2010, we reported that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements.[Footnote 4] Instead, FPS uses a facility-by-facility approach to risk management: we reported in 2010 that FPS assumes that all facilities with the same security level have the same risk regardless of their location. For example, a level IV facility in a metropolitan area is generally treated the same as one in a rural area.[Footnote 5] This building-by-building approach prevents FPS from comprehensively identifying risk across the entire portfolio of GSA's facilities and allocating resources based on risk. [Footnote 6] Both our and DHS's risk management frameworks include processes for assessing comprehensive risk across assets in order to prioritize countermeasures based on the overall needs of the system. In response to our recommendations in this area, FPS began developing a new system, the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP). According to FPS, RAMP will support all components of the risk assessment process, including gathering and reviewing building information; conducting and recording interviews with GSA and tenant agencies; assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to develop a detailed risk profile; recommending appropriate countermeasures; and producing facility security assessment (FSA) reports. FPS also plans to use RAMP to track and analyze workforce data, contract guard program data, and other performance data, such as the types and definitions of incidents and incident response times. We are finalizing our ongoing review of FPS's efforts to develop and implement RAMP as well as FPS's transition to DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) and expect to report on these issues soon. FPS Has Not Fully Addressed Several Key Human Capital Issues: Over the last 3 years we have reported on the challenges FPS has faced in the human capital area since moving to DHS from GSA in 2003. As mandated by Congress, in 2009 FPS increased the size of its workforce to 1,200 full time employees.[Footnote 7] However, FPS continues to operate without a strategic human capital plan. We recommended in 2009 that FPS develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts.[Footnote 8] We have identified human capital management as a high-risk issue throughout the federal government, including within DHS. A human capital plan is important to both align FPS's human capital program with current and emerging mission and programmatic goals, and develop effective processes for training, retention, and staff development. In 2009, we reported that the absence of such a plan has contributed to inconsistent human capital activities among FPS regions and headquarters, as several regions told us they have implemented their own processes for performance feedback, training, and mentoring. In addition, we found that FPS's workforce planning is limited because FPS headquarters does not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities. Without such information, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal staffing levels should be or identify gaps in its workforce needs and determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies to fill these gaps. FPS concurred with our recommendation and drafted a workforce analysis plan in June 2010. According to FPS, the plan must be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before it is subject to approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security. FPS also has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector- based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities. In 2007, FPS essentially eliminated its police officer position and moved to an all inspector-based workforce. FPS also decided to place more emphasis on physical security activities, such as completing FSAs, and less emphasis on law enforcement activities, such as proactive patrol. We reported in 2008 that these changes may have contributed to diminished security and increases in inspectors' workload.[Footnote 9] Specifically, we found that when FPS is not providing proactive patrol at some federal facilities, there is an increased potential for illegal entry and other criminal activity. Moreover, under its inspector-based workforce approach, FPS is relying more on local police departments to handle crime and protection issues at federal facilities; however, we previously reported that at approximately 400 federal facilities across the United States, local police may not have the authority to respond to incidents inside those facilities.[Footnote 10] We recommended in 2008 that FPS clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies in responding to incidents at GSA facilities.[Footnote 11] While FPS agreed with this recommendation, FPS has decided not to pursue agreements with local law enforcement officials, in part because of local law enforcement officials' reluctance to sign such agreements. In addition, FPS believes that the agreements are not necessary because 96 percent of the properties in its inventory are listed as concurrent jurisdiction facilities where both federal and state governments have jurisdiction over the property. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that these agreements would, among other things, clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies when responding to crime or other incidents. We are currently reviewing to what extent FPS is coordinating with state and local police departments to ensure adequate protection of federal facilities and will issue a report next year. FPS Faces Longstanding Challenges in Managing Its Contract Guard Workforce: FPS's contract guard program is the most visible component of the agency's operations and the agency relies on its guards to be its "eyes and ears" while performing their duties. Guards are responsible for controlling access to federal facilities by checking the identification of government employees and the public who enter federal facilities, and operating security equipment to screen for prohibited items. Since 2009, we have identified weaknesses in FPS's contract guard program which hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. For example, we reported in 2009 and in 2010 that FPS does not have a reliable system to ensure that its 13,000 guards have the training and certifications required to stand post at federal facilities or comply with post orders once they are deployed.[Footnote 12] In 2009, we also identified substantial security vulnerabilities related to FPS's guard program.[Footnote 13] In April and May 2009, GAO investigators conducted covert tests and were able to successfully pass components of an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards at 10 Level IV facilities in 4 major metropolitan areas. In addition, FPS's penetration testing--similar to our covert testing--shows that guards continue to have problems with detecting prohibited items. [Footnote 14] For example, in March 2011, FPS contract guards allowed components for an active bomb to remain in a Level IV federal building in Detroit, Michigan for 3 weeks before a bomb squad was called to remove them. We also found in 2010 that although some guard contractors did not comply with the terms of their contracts, FPS did not take any enforcement action against them.[Footnote 15] According to FPS guard contracts, a contractor has not complied with the terms of the contract if, for example, the contractor has a guard working without valid certifications or background suitability investigations, or falsifies a guard's training records. If FPS determines that a contractor does not comply with these contract requirements, it can-- among other things--assess a financial deduction for nonperformed work, elect not to exercise a contract option, or terminate the contract for default or cause. We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with expired certification and training records to determine what action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract noncompliance.[Footnote 16] According to the documentation in the contract files, FPS did not take any enforcement action against the contractors for not complying with the terms of the contract. Instead, FPS exercised the option to extend the contracts for these 7 contractors. Additionally, although FPS requires an annual performance evaluation of each guard contractor and at the conclusion of contracts exceeding $100,000, FPS did not always evaluate the performance of its contractors as required, and some evaluations were incomplete and not consistent with contractors' performance. In response to our recommendations, FPS has taken several steps to improve the oversight of its contract guard program. Since July 2009, FPS has increased its penetration tests in some regions and the number of guard inspections it conducts at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. Additionally, FPS began the process of providing additional x-ray and magnetometer training for its workforce. Under the new requirement, inspectors must receive 30 hours of x-ray and magnetometer training and guards are required to take 16 hours. Previously, guards were required to receive 8 hours of training on x- ray and magnetometer machines. Finally, FPS expects to use RAMP, once it is developed, to determine whether its 13,000 guards have met its training and certification requirements and to conduct guard inspections. As stated earlier, we are finalizing our review of FPS's RAMP. FPS Has Not Reviewed Its Fee Design or Determined an Appropriate Funding Mechanism: We reported in May 2011 that FPS increased its basic security fee 4 times in 6 years to try to cover costs (an increase of over 100 percent).[Footnote 17] However, FPS has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate fee design. We found that timely, substantive fee reviews are especially critical for fee-funded agencies to ensure that fee collections and operating costs remain aligned. FPS has broad authority to design its security fees, but the current fee structure has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency costs, is not well understood or accepted by tenant agencies, and continues to be a topic of congressional interest and inquiry.[Footnote 18] In 2008, we recommended that FPS evaluate whether its use of a fee- based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund the agency. Although FPS agreed with this recommendation it has not begun such an analysis. Based on our updated work in 2011, we recommended that such an analysis include the examination of both alternative fee structures and a combination of fees and appropriations as well as the options and trade-offs discussed in our 2011 report.[Footnote 19] FPS agreed with this recommendation. FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance: We have reported that FPS is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities.[Footnote 20] To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect federal facilities, FPS has identified some output measures. These measures include determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to an incident, and the percentage of FSAs completed on time. As we reported in 2010, while output measures are helpful in assessing performance, outcome measures can provide FPS with broader information on program results, such as the extent to which its decision to move to an inspector-based workforce will enhance security at federal facilities.[Footnote 21] Outcome measures could also help identify the security gaps that remain at federal facilities and determine what action may be needed to address them. In addition, we reported in 2010 that FPS does not have a reliable data management system that will allow it to accurately track these measures or other important measures such as the number of crimes and other incidents occurring at GSA facilities.[Footnote 22] Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal employees and facilities, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk management decisions. For example, weaknesses in one of FPS's countermeasure tracking systems make it difficult to accurately track the implementation status of recommended countermeasures such as security cameras and x-ray machines. Without this ability, FPS has difficulty determining whether it has mitigated the risk of federal facilities to crime or a terrorist attack. FPS concurred with our recommendations and states that its efforts to address them will be completed in 2012 when its automated information systems are fully implemented. FPS Has Begun Some Initiatives, but Most GAO Recommendations Have Not Been Fully Implemented: FPS has begun several initiatives that, once fully implemented, should enhance its ability to protect the more than 1 million federal employees and members of the public who visit federal facilities each year. Since 2008, we have made 28 recommendations to help FPS to address its challenges with risk management, strategic human capital planning, oversight of its contract guard workforce, and its fee-based funding structure. DHS and FPS have generally agreed with these recommendations. As of July 2011, as shown in Table 1, FPS was in the process of addressing 21 of them, although none were fully implemented. Of the remaining 7, 5 were recommendations from our May 2011 report, and we would not necessarily expect them to be fully implemented yet. According to FPS officials, the agency has faced difficulty in implementing many of our recommendations because of changes in its leadership, organization, funding, and staffing levels. In addition, FPS officials stated that its progress in implementing our recommendations has been affected by delays in developing several new management systems, such as RAMP. Table 1: Status of GAO Recommendations to the Federal Protective Service: GAO Report: Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Would Improve Federal Protective Service's and Federal Agencies' Planning and Budgeting for Security, GAO-11-492, May 2011: Recommendation: Conduct regular reviews of FPS's security fees and use this information to inform its fee setting; Status: Not implemented. Recommendation: Include systemwide capital investments when estimating costs and include them when setting basic security fee rates; Status: Not implemented. Recommendation: Make information on the estimated costs of key activities as well as the basis for these cost estimates readily available to affected parties to improve the transparency and credibility--and hence the acceptance by stakeholders--of the process for setting and using the fees; Status: Not implemented. Recommendation: Assess and report to Congress on: (1) the current and alternative fee structures, to include the options and trade-offs discussed in this report, and if appropriate, and (2) options to fund FPS through a combination of fees and direct appropriations, to include the options and trade-offs discussed in this report; Status: Not implemented. Recommendation: Evaluate and report to Congress on options to mitigate challenges agencies face in budgeting for FPS security costs, such as: (1) an alternative account structure for FPS to increase flexibility, while retaining or improving accountability and transparency or (2) an approved process for estimating fee rates; Status: Not implemented. Recommendation: Collect and maintain an accurate list of points of contact of customer agency officials responsible for budget and billing activities as well as facility designated points of contact as we previously recommended in 2010; Status: In process. GAO Report: Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility Security Committees Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities, GAO-10-901, August 2010; Recommendation: Develop and implement procedures that, among other things, outline the facility security committees' organization structure, operations, decision-making authority, and accountability; Status: In process. GAO Report: Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards, GAO-10-341, April 2010: Recommendation: Identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial and financially feasible for protecting federal facilities; Status: In process. Recommendation: Rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors' and guards' performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not complying with the terms of the contract; Status: In process. Recommendation: Complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS and Federal Acquisition Regulations requirements; Status: In process. Recommendation: Issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract files have required documentation; Status: In process. Recommendation: Develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal facilities outside metropolitan areas; Status: In process. Recommendation: Provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance to its contract guards; Status: In process. Recommendation: Develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable, comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a real-time basis; Status: In process. Recommendation: Verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the information needed to effectively oversee its guard program; Status: In process. GAO Report: Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility Protection, GAO-10-142, October 2009: Recommendation: Provide the Secretary with regular updates, on a mutually agreed-to schedule, on the status of RAMP and the National Countermeasures Program, including the implementation status of deliverables, clear timelines for completion of tasks and milestones, and plans for addressing any implementation obstacles; Status: In process. Recommendation: In conjunction with the National Countermeasures Program, to develop a methodology and guidance for assessing and comparing the cost-effectiveness of technology alternatives; Status: In process. Recommendation: Reach consensus with GSA on what information contained in the building security assessment is needed for GSA to fulfill its responsibilities related to the protection of federal buildings and occupants, and accordingly, establish internal controls to ensure that shared information is adequately safeguarded; guidance for employees to use in deciding what information to protect with sensitive but unclassified designations; provisions for training on making designations, controlling, and sharing such information with GSA and other entities; and a review process to evaluate how well this information sharing process is working, with results reported to the Secretary regularly on a mutually agreed-to schedule; Status: In process. GAO Report: Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants, GAO-09-749, July 2009: Recommendation: Improve how FPS headquarters collects data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities to help it better manage and understand current and future workforce needs; Status: In process. Recommendation: Use these data in the development and implementation of a long-term strategic human capital plan that addresses key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, including establishing programs, policies, and practices that will enable the agency to recruit, develop, and retain a qualified workforce; Status: In process. Recommendation: Collect and maintain an accurate and comprehensive list of all facility-designated points of contact, as well as a system for regularly updating this list; Status: In process. Recommendation: Develop and implement a program for education and outreach to all customers to ensure they are aware of the current roles, responsibilities, and services provided by FPS; Status: In process. GAO Report: Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities, GAO-08-683, July 2008: Recommendation: Develop and implement a strategic approach to manage its staffing resources including determining the optimum number of employees needed to accomplish its facility protection mission and allocate these resources based on risk management principles; Status: In process. Recommendation: Clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies in regard to responding to incidents at GSA facilities; Status: In process. Recommendation: Improve FPS's use of the fee-based system by developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing security services to tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee structure takes into consideration the varying levels of risk and service provided at GSA facilities; Status: Not implemented. Recommendation: Evaluate whether FPS's current use of a fee-based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund the agency; Status: Not implemented. Recommendation: Develop and implement specific guidelines and standards for measuring its performance, including outcome measures to assess its performance and improve the accountability of FPS; Status: In process. Recommendation: Improve how FPS categorizes, collects, and analyzes data to help it better manage and understand the results of its efforts to protect GSA facilities; Status: In process. Source: GAO: Note: We reviewed information from FPS regarding our recommendations and, based on this information, categorized our recommendations accordingly. "In process" indicates that FPS has actions ongoing but has not completed them. "Not implemented" indicates that FPS has not yet taken any action to address our recommendations. [End of table] Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis, Ranking Members Clarke and Richardson, and members of the Subcommittees, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittees may have at this time. Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant Director; Colin Fallon; Chelsa Gurkin; Alicia Loucks; Jackie Nowicki, Assistant Director; Justin Reed; and Susan Michal-Smith. [End of section] Related GAO Products: Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Would Improve Federal Protective Service's and Federal Agencies' Planning and Budgeting for Security. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492]. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2011. Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective Service's Workforce Analysis and Planning Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-802R]. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2010. Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Use of Contract Guards Requires Reassessment and More Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-614T]. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2010. Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341]. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2010. Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-506T]. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2010. Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility Protection. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142]. Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009. Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial Steps to Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1047T]. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2009. Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-749]. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2009. Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2009. Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-897T]. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2008. Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-914T]. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008. Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008. Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective Service's Efforts to Protect Federal Property. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-476T]. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2008. [End of section] Footnotes: [1] In this testimony, we refer to property that is owned by the federal government and under the control and custody of GSA as GSA- owned property. [2] See related GAO products at the end of this statement. [3] GAO, Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility Security Committees Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901] (Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2010). [4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901]. [5] The level of security FPS provides at each of the 9,000 federal facilities varies depending on the building's security level. Based on the Department of Justice's (DOJ) 1995 Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines, there are five types of security levels. A level I facility is typically a small storefront-type operation such as a military recruiting office which has 10 or fewer employees and a low volume of public contact. A level II facility has from 11 to 150 employees, a level III facility has from 151 to 450 federal employees and moderate to high volume of public contact, a level IV facility has over 450 employees, a high volume of public contact, and includes high risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies. FPS does not have responsibility for Level V facilities which include the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Interagency Security Committee has recently promulgated new security level standards that will supersede the 1995 DOJ standards. [6] GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683] (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008). See also [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901]. [7] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Division D, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659-3660 (2008). This requirement for FPS to maintain a minimum number of full time equivalent positions has been included in subsequent appropriations acts. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2156-2157 (2009), and Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 142-143 (2011). [8] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-749] (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2009). [9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]. [10] At approximately 400 federal facilities nationwide, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction of its facilities, whereby the federal government has all of the legislative authority within the land area in question and the local police have no residual police power. [11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]. [12] GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T] (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2009). See also GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341] (Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2010). [13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. [14] FPS employs Operation Shield to systematically assess the effectiveness of FPS countermeasures, including Protective Service Officers, at federal facilities. [15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341]. [16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. [17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492]. [18] Pub. L. No. 109-295, title II, 120 Stat. 1355, 1361 (Oct. 4, 2006). [19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492]. [20] GAO, Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility Protection, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142] (Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009). [21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142]. [22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142]. [End of section] GAO's Mission: The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 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