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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
U.S. Senate: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, March 30, 2011: 

Border Security: 

DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and 
Northern Borders: 

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

GAO-11-508T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-508T, a testimony before the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

As part of its mission, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) component, is to 
secure U.S borders against threats of terrorism; the smuggling of 
drugs, humans, and other contraband; and illegal migration. At the end 
of fiscal year 2010, DHS investments in border security had grown to 
$11.9 billion and included more than 40,000 personnel. To secure the 
border, DHS coordinates with federal, state, local, tribal, and 
Canadian partners. This testimony addresses DHS (1) capabilities to 
enforce security at or near the border, (2) interagency coordination 
and oversight of information sharing and enforcement efforts, and (3) 
management of technology programs. This testimony is based on related 
GAO work from 2007 to the present and selected updates made in 
February and March 2011. For the updates, GAO obtained information on 
CBP performance measures and interviewed relevant officials. 

What GAO Found: 

CBP significantly increased personnel and resources for border 
security at and between the ports of entry (POE), and reported some 
success in interdicting illegal cross-border activity; however, 
weaknesses remain. At the POEs, for example, CBP reported that 
deployment of imaging technology to detect stowaways or cargo had 
increased seizures of drugs and other contraband, and between the 
POEs, increased staffing, border fencing, and technology have resulted 
in some success in reducing the volume of illegal migration and 
increasing drug seizures. However, as GAO reported from 2007 through 
2011, weaknesses in POE traveler inspection procedures and 
infrastructure increased the potential that dangerous people and 
illegal goods could enter the country; and that currency and firearms 
could leave the country and finance drug trafficking organizations and 
sponsors of terrorism. CBP used a performance measure to reflect 
results of its overall border enforcement efforts, which showed few 
land border miles where they have the capability to deter or apprehend 
illegal activity at the immediate border in fiscal year 2010. DHS is 
developing a new methodology and performance measures for border 
security and plans to implement them in fiscal year 2012. 

As GAO reported in 2010, federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian 
law enforcement partners reported improved DHS coordination to secure 
the border, but critical gaps exist. For example, interagency forums 
helped in establishing a common understanding of border security 
threats, while joint operations helped to achieve an integrated and 
effective law enforcement response. However, significant gaps remained 
in sharing information and resources useful for operations, such as 
daily patrols in vulnerable areas, like National Parks and Forests. As 
GAO reported, and made related recommendations, improved coordination 
provides opportunity to enhance border security efforts on the 
southwest and northern borders, including those to deter alien 
smuggling. 

CBP’s Border Patrol component is moving ahead with a new technology 
deployment plan to secure the border, but cost and operational 
effectiveness and suitability are not yet clear. In January 2011, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new direction to deploying 
technology to assist in securing the border. The decision ended the 
Secure Border Initiative Network technology program—one part of a 
multiyear, multibillion dollar effort aimed at securing the border 
through technology such as radar, sensors, and cameras and 
infrastructure such as fencing. Under a new plan, called Alternative 
(Southwest) Border Technology, Border Patrol is to develop terrain- 
and population-based solutions using existing proven technology, such 
as camera-based surveillance systems. However, the analysis DHS 
performed to arrive at an appropriate mix of technology in its new 
plan raises questions. For example, the analysis cited a range of 
uncertainties in costs and effectiveness, with no clear-cut cost 
effective technology alternative among those considered, as GAO 
reported in preliminary observations in March 2011. GAO will continue 
to assess this issue and report its results later this year. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. However, 
GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to strengthen border 
security, including enhancing measures to protect against the entry of 
terrorists, inadmissible aliens, and contraband; improving interagency 
coordination; and strengthening technology acquisition and deployment 
plans. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has 
actions underway or planned in response. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/AO-11-508T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202) 
512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the 
Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to address the Department of Homeland 
Security's (DHS) efforts to secure U.S. land borders with Mexico and 
Canada against threats of terrorism; the smuggling of drugs, humans, 
and other contraband; and illegal migration since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). At the end of fiscal year 2004, 
the first full year DHS existed as an agency, it had about 10,500 
agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and about 17,600 
officers inspecting travelers at air, land, and sea ports of entry 
(POE),[Footnote 1] amounting to a total of about $5.9 billion (for 
personnel, infrastructure, and technology) that had been appropriated 
to secure the entire U.S. border.[Footnote 2] At the end of fiscal 
year 2010, both the number of personnel and amount of resources 
dedicated to border security had significantly increased, with almost 
20,000 agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and 20,600 
officers assigned to air, land, and sea ports of entry, amounting to 
about $11.9 billion appropriated to secure the entire U.S. border (for 
personnel, infrastructure, and technology).[Footnote 3] DHS has also 
reported that about $4.4 billion has been invested since fiscal year 
2006 in border technology and infrastructure under the Secure Border 
Initiative (SBI) program--a multiyear, multibillion dollar effort to 
help secure U.S. borders using a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras 
(called SBI Network, or SBInet) along with border fencing, roads, and 
lighting. 

DHS reported that the increased resources have resulted in fewer 
numbers of apprehensions, and that this stronger enforcement presence 
was one of several reasons fewer people were attempting to illegally 
cross the border. However, challenges remain at and between the POEs 
as DHS data show that several hundred thousand violators enter the 
country illegally and undetected through the nation's POEs and several 
hundred thousand persons illegally cross the border between the POEs. 
DHS also remains challenged to stem the increasing threat from 
smuggling of drugs, firearms, and currency which Mexican drug-
trafficking organizations, terrorist organizations, and other groups 
use with malevolent intent. Overall, DHS reported achieving an 
acceptable level of border control across less than half of the 
southwest border and less than 2 percent of the northern border during 
fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 4] DHS is in the process of developing a 
new methodology and performance measures for assessing border security 
and it expects to complete this effort by fiscal year 2012. 

DHS's efforts to secure the border at and between the POEs are the 
primary responsibility of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's 
(CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) and Office of Border Patrol 
(Border Patrol) components, respectively. OFO is responsible for 
processing the flow of people and goods that enter the country through 
air, land, and sea POEs where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods 
to determine whether they may be legally admitted into the country. 
Border Patrol works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and 
contraband into the United States between the ports of entry using a 
"defense-in-depth" approach to border security operations that 
provides for layers of agents who operate not only at the border, but 
also in key enforcement zones, such as at traffic checkpoints located 
25 miles or more from the border on U.S. roads. Other DHS components 
also play a role. DHS' U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
is responsible for investigating cross-border illegal activity and 
criminal organizations that transport persons and goods across the 
border. On the northern border, DHS' U.S. Coast Guard executes its 
maritime security mission on and over major waterways, including the 
Great Lakes, using marine and air assets. For all borders, CBP's 
Office of Air and Marine operates a fleet of air and marine assets in 
support of federal border security efforts. Other federal, state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies also expend resources for 
border security. DHS has established various memoranda of 
understanding and agreement across these multiple levels of government 
to enhance information sharing and achieve an integrated response 
among law enforcement agencies operating in common geographic areas. 

Over the years, we have reviewed a variety of DHS border security 
programs and operations and issued a number of reports. Today I will 
discuss some of the key issues from these reports as well as 
recommendations we have made in the following areas: 

(1) DHS capabilities to enforce border security at or near the border, 

(2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security 
information-sharing and enforcement efforts, and: 

(3) DHS management of technology programs. 

My statement today is based on our body of work from 2007 to the 
present that examined DHS efforts to secure the U.S. border (see 
Related GAO Products at the end of this statement), with selected 
updates in February and March 2011. Our reports and testimonies 
incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from officials from 
various components of DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the 
Department of Interior (DOI), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
state and local law enforcement agencies, and Canadian law enforcement 
agencies responsible for border security at and between the ports of 
entry along the southwest and northern borders. For the updates, we 
obtained information on CBP's performance measures for POEs and 
interviewed CBP officials regarding changes in performance goals for 
detecting illegal entries at land border POEs. More detailed 
information about our scope and methodology, including data 
reliability, can be found in our reports and testimonies. Our work was 
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

CBP Reported Some Success in Stemming Illegal Activity, but 
Improvements to Operations and Infrastructure Could Help Enforce 
Security Closer to the U.S. Border: 

CBP has increased personnel--by 17 percent over its 2004 levels--and 
resources for border security at the POEs and reported some success in 
interdicting illegal cross-border activity. At the POEs, for example, 
CBP reported that deployment of imaging technology had increased 
seizures of drugs and other contraband. Between the POEs, Border 
Patrol reported that increased staffing and resources have resulted in 
some success in reducing the volume of illegal migration and 
increasing drug seizures. However, weaknesses in POE traveler 
inspection procedures and infrastructure increased the potential that 
dangerous people and illegal goods could enter the country, and that 
currency and firearms could leave the country. Border Patrol continues 
to face challenges in efforts to address the increasing threat from 
cross-border drug smuggling activity, with many drug seizures and 
apprehensions occurring some distance from the border. CBP does not 
have externally reported performance measures that reflect the results 
of its overall enforcement efforts at the border. In fiscal year 2010, 
before it discontinued the public reporting of performance measures 
showing border security progress, Border Patrol reported few border 
miles where it had the capability to deter or apprehend illegal 
activity at the immediate border. DHS is developing a new methodology 
and performance measures for border security and plans to implement 
them in fiscal year 2012. 

Improvements in POE Inspection Programs, Staffing, and Facilities 
Provide Opportunity to Reduce Risk That Terrorists and Inadmissible 
Aliens Could Enter the Country but Challenges Remain: 

CBP reported that $2.7 billion was appropriated in fiscal year 2010 
for border security at POEs, with a workforce of 20,600 CBP officers 
and 2,300 agriculture specialists. These CBP officers inspected 352 
million travelers and nearly 106 million cars, trucks, buses, trains, 
vessels, and aircraft at over 330 air, sea, and land POEs. To 
facilitate inspections, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
(WHTI) generally requires all citizens of the United States and 
citizens of Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda traveling to the United States 
as nonimmigrant visitors to have a passport or other accepted document 
that establishes the bearer's identity and nationality to enter the 
country from within the Western Hemisphere. CBP also deployed 
technology to assist officers in detecting illegal activity, providing 
1,428 radiation portal monitors to screen for radiological or nuclear 
materials and mobile surveillance units, thermal imaging systems, and 
large-and small-scale Non-intrusive Inspection technology imaging 
systems to detect stowaways and materials such as explosives, 
narcotics, and currency in passenger vehicles and cargo. CBP reported 
that these resources have resulted in greater enforcement at the 
border. For example, CBP reported that deployment of imaging 
technology at POEs to detect stowaways or materials in vehicles and 
cargo had resulted in over 1,300 seizures, which included 288,000 
pounds of narcotics. In fiscal year 2010, CBP reported turning away 
over 227,000 aliens[Footnote 5] who attempted to enter the country 
illegally; apprehending more than 8,400 people wanted for a variety of 
charges, to include serious crimes such as murder, rape, and child 
molestation; and seizing over 870,000 pounds of illegal drugs, $147 
million in currency (inbound and outbound), more than 29,000 
fraudulent documents, and more than 1.7 million prohibited plant 
materials, meat, and animal byproducts. 

Despite technology and other improvements in the traveler inspection 
program, our work has shown that vulnerabilities still exist. We 
reported in January 2008 that weaknesses remained in CBP's inbound 
traveler inspection program and related infrastructure which increased 
the potential that dangerous people and illegal goods could enter the 
country.[Footnote 6] For example, CBP analyses indicate that several 
thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the United 
States in fiscal year 2006. The weaknesses included challenges in 
attaining budgeted staffing levels because of attrition and lack of 
officer compliance with screening procedures, such as those used to 
determine citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering the 
country as required by law and CBP policy.[Footnote 7] Contributing 
factors included lack of focus and complacency, lack of supervisory 
presence, and lack of training. In this regard, the extent of 
continued noncompliance is unknown, and CBP management faces 
challenges in ensuring its directives are carried out. Another 
challenge was that CBP headquarters did not require field managers to 
share the results of their periodic audits and assessments to ensure 
compliance with the inspection procedures, hindering the ability of 
CBP management to efficiently use the information to overcome 
weaknesses in traveler inspections. To mitigate infrastructure 
weaknesses, such as the lack of vehicle barriers, CBP estimated in 
2007 that it would need about $4 billion to make capital improvements 
at all 163 of the nation's land crossings. CBP was also challenged by 
the fact that some POEs are owned by other governmental or private 
entities, adding to the time and complexity in addressing 
infrastructure problems. DHS concurred with our recommendations that 
CBP enhance internal controls in the inspection process, establish 
measures for training provided to CBP officers and new officer 
proficiency, and implement performance measures for apprehending 
inadmissible aliens and other violators; and indicated that CBP was 
taking steps to address the recommendations. 

CBP's public outreach campaign has led to a high rate of compliance 
with WHTI's document requirements, averaging more than 95 percent 
nationally throughout fiscal year 2010. CBP conducts queries against 
law enforcement databases for more than 95 percent of the traveling 
public, up from 5 percent in 2005. We reported in June 2010, however, 
that CBP officers at POEs are unable to take full advantage of the 
security features in WHTI documents because of time constraints, 
limited use of technology in primary inspection, and the lack of 
sample documents for training.[Footnote 8] For example, while CBP had 
deployed technology tools for primary inspectors to use when 
inspecting documents, it could make better usage of fingerprint data 
to mitigate the risk of imposter fraud with border crossing cards, the 
most common type of fraud. We are currently reviewing the training of 
CBP officers at POEs for the House Homeland Security Committee and the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and plan 
to report the results of this work later this year. 

In June 2009 and March 2011, we reported results of our review of 
CBP's Outbound Enforcement Program intended to stem illegal cross-
border smuggling of firearms and large volumes of cash used by Mexican 
drug-trafficking organizations, terrorist organizations, and other 
groups with malevolent intent.[Footnote 9] Under the program, CBP 
inspects travelers leaving the country at all 25 land ports of entry 
along the southwest border. On the northern border, inspections are 
conducted at the discretion of the Port Director. Available evidence 
indicated that many of the firearms fueling Mexican drug violence 
originated in the United States, including a number of increasingly 
lethal weapons, and the U.S. government faced several challenges in 
combating illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stemming 
their flow to Mexico. DOJ's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives and DHS's ICE are the primary agencies implementing efforts 
to address this issue. However, we reported in June 2009 that these 
agencies did not effectively coordinate their efforts, in part because 
the agencies lack clear roles and responsibilities and had been 
operating under an outdated interagency agreement.[Footnote 10] 
Additionally, these agencies generally had not systematically 
gathered, analyzed, and reported data that could be useful to help 
plan and assess results of their efforts to address arms trafficking 
to Mexico. Further, until June 2009, when the administration included 
a chapter on combating illicit arms trafficking to Mexico in its 
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, various efforts 
undertaken by individual U.S. agencies were not part of a 
comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing the problem. 
DHS agreed with our recommendation that DHS and DOJ, among other 
agencies, improve interagency coordination, data gathering and 
analysis, and strategic planning and described steps it was 
undertaking to implement them. DOJ did not comment on the report. 

We previously reported that stemming the flow of bulk cash has been a 
difficult and challenging task.[Footnote 11] From March 2009 through 
February 22, 2011, as part of the Outbound Enforcement Program, CBP 
officers seized about $67 million in illicit bulk cash leaving the 
country at land POEs, almost all of which was seized along the 
southwest border. However, the National Drug Intelligence Center 
estimates that criminals smuggle $18 billion to $39 billion a year 
across the southwest border, and that the flow of cash across the 
northern border with Canada is also significant. CBP challenges we 
reported included limited hours of operation, technology, 
infrastructure, and procedures to support outbound inspection 
operations. For example, as of March 2011, license plate readers were 
available at 48 of 118 outbound lanes on the southwest border but none 
of the 179 outbound lanes on the northern border. CBP is in the early 
phases of this program and has not yet taken some actions to gain a 
better understanding of how well the program is working, such as 
gathering data for measuring program costs and benefits. 

Our March 2011 testimony also included information about regulatory 
gaps related to the stored value industry, including exemptions from 
anti-money laundering requirements for certain types of financial 
institutions and the lack of cross-border reporting requirements with 
regard to the use of stored value, such as prepaid cards.[Footnote 12] 
For example, individuals must report transporting more than $10,000 in 
currency or monetary instruments when crossing the U.S. border, but 
the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCen) does not have a similar requirement in place for individuals 
transporting stored value across U.S. borders. The Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD 
Act) required the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, to issue regulations in final form 
implementing the Bank Secrecy Act, regarding the sale, issuance, 
redemption, or international transport of stored value, including 
stored value cards. In doing so, the Credit CARD Act stated that 
Treasury may issue regulations regarding the international transport 
of stored value to include reporting requirements pursuant to the 
statute applicable to the transport of currency or monetary 
instruments. CBP and FinCEN concurred with our recommendations that 
they gather cost-benefit data and develop a plan to better manage 
rulemaking, respectively, and described actions they were taking to 
implement them. 

Border Patrol Reported Some Success in Reducing Illegal Migration, but 
Challenges Remained in Stemming Cross-Border Smuggling of Illegal 
Drugs between the POEs: 

CBP reported that $3.6 billion was appropriated in fiscal year 2010 
for border security efforts between the POEs, and that the Border 
Patrol is better staffed now than at any time in its 86-year history, 
having doubled the number of agents from 10,000 in fiscal year 2004 to 
more than 20,500 in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 13] CBP also 
constructed 649 miles of pedestrian and vehicle fencing on the 
southwest border covering 33 percent of the border,[Footnote 14] and 
increased its investment in traffic checkpoints, the last layer of 
defense in Border Patrol's effort to apprehend illegal activity that 
has crossed the border undetected. Border Patrol reported that 
apprehensions had decreased nationwide by 36 percent from fiscal year 
2008 (nearly 724,000) to fiscal year 2010 (approximately 463,000), 
[Footnote 15] indicating in its view that fewer people were attempting 
to illegally cross the border. However, during the same time that 
apprehensions decreased, marijuana drug seizures increased almost 50 
percent from over 1.6 million pounds in fiscal year 2008 to about 2.4 
million pounds in fiscal year 2010, and CBP has been challenged to 
link its investments to changes in border control.[Footnote 16] 

We reported in May 2010 that CBP had not accounted for the impact of 
its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border 
security.[Footnote 17] Border fencing was designed to prevent people 
on foot and vehicles from crossing the border and to enhance Border 
Patrol agents' ability to respond to areas of illegal entry. CBP 
estimated that the border fencing had a life cycle of 20 years and 
over these years, a total estimated cost of about $6.5 billion to 
deploy, operate, and maintain the fencing and other infrastructure. 
According to CBP, during fiscal year 2010, there were 4,037 documented 
and repaired breaches of the fencing and CBP spent at least $7.2 
million to repair the breaches, or an average of about $1,800 per 
breach. CBP reported an increase in control of southwest border miles, 
but could not account separately for the impact of the border fencing 
and other infrastructure. In our May 4, 2010, testimony, we concluded 
that until CBP determines the contribution of border fencing and other 
infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to address the 
impact of its investment; and reported that in response to a prior 
recommendation, CBP was in the process of conducting an analysis of 
the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security.[Footnote 18] 

Traffic checkpoints contributed to furthering the Border Patrol 
mission to protect the border. In 2008, they accounted for about 35 
percent of Border Patrol drug seizures along the southwest border and 
17,000 apprehensions of illegal aliens, including 3 individuals 
identified as persons linked to terrorism. However, we reported in 
August 2009 that Border Patrol did not have measures to determine if 
these checkpoints were operating effectively and efficiently,[Footnote 
19] and weaknesses in checkpoint design and operation increased the 
risk that illegal activity may travel to the U.S. interior undetected. 
Border Patrol officials said that several factors impeded higher 
levels of performance, including insufficient staff, canine teams, and 
inspection technology. Other challenges included insufficient guidance 
to ensure that new checkpoints were appropriately sized, lack of 
management oversight and guidance to ensure consistent data collection 
practices, and a lack of performance measures to determine if 
checkpoints were operating efficiently and effectively with minimal 
adverse impact on local communities. CBP agreed with our 
recommendations to take several actions to strengthen checkpoint 
design and staffing, and improve the measurement and reporting of 
checkpoint effectiveness, including community impact and identified 
actions planned or underway to implement the recommendations. 

DHS Performance Measures Show Response to Illegal Border Activity Most 
Often Occurs after Entry into the United States: 

As of fiscal year 2011, CBP no longer has externally reported 
performance goals or measures that reflect its overall success in 
detecting illegal entries and contraband at and between the POEs, but 
the measures for fiscal year 2010 showed few land border miles are at 
a level of control where deterrence or apprehensions of illegal 
entries occurs at the immediate border. Border Patrol is in the 
process of developing a new methodology and performance measures, 
however, for assessing border security between the POEs. Further, OFO 
has multiple performance measures in place, but it does not have an 
external measure that captures the results of its overall enforcement 
efforts at POEs. In fiscal year 2009, however, OFO used a statistical 
model to report that over 99 percent of travelers in passenger 
vehicles passing through the southwest and northern land border POEs 
were compliant with U.S. laws, rules, and regulations. For the less 
than 1 percent of travelers who comprised the noncompliant population, 
OFO officials reported in the CBP Fiscal Year 2009 Performance and 
Accountability Report a goal to apprehend at least 28 percent of 
serious criminal activities--such as transporting illegal drugs, guns, 
or other banned substances in fiscal year 2009, the last year this 
information was publicly available. OFO officials said that they 
considered this an effective performance measure and that at the end 
of fiscal year 2009, the land border POEs had achieved that goal. 
[Footnote 20] 

As we reported in December 2010 and February 2011, and through 
selected updates, the Border Patrol is in the process of developing 
new performance measures for assessing border security between the 
POEs.[Footnote 21] However, up until fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol 
used a security performance measure of border miles under control to 
assess security between the POEs, which reflected its ability to deter 
or detect and apprehend illegal entries at the border or after they 
occur. As we testified in February 2011 about our preliminary 
observations on this measure, Border Patrol indicated that in fiscal 
year 2010, 873 of the nearly 2,000 southwest border miles and 69 of 
the nearly 4,000 northern border miles between Washington and Maine 
were at an acceptable level of control. Within this border security 
classification, Border Patrol further distinguished between the 
ability to deter or detect and apprehend illegal entries at the 
immediate border versus after entry--at distances of up to 100 miles 
or more away from the immediate border--into the United States. 
[Footnote 22] Our preliminary analysis of these Border Patrol data 
showed that the agency reported a capability to deter or detect and 
apprehend illegal entries at the immediate border across 129 of the 
873 southwest border miles and 2 of the 69 northern border miles. Our 
preliminary analysis also showed that Border Patrol reported the 
ability to deter or detect and apprehend illegal entries after they 
crossed the border for an additional 744 southwest border miles and 67 
northern border miles. 

As we previously observed in December 2010 and February 2011, and 
through selected updates, Border Patrol determined in fiscal year 2010 
that border security was not at an acceptable level of control for 
1,120 southwest border miles and 3,918 northern border miles, and that 
on the northern border there was a significant or high degree of 
reliance on enforcement support from outside the border zones for 
detection and apprehension of cross-border illegal activity.[Footnote 
23] For two-thirds of these southwest miles, Border Patrol reported 
that the probability of detecting illegal activity was high; however, 
the ability to respond was defined by accessibility to the area or 
availability of resources. One-fourth of these northern border miles 
were also reported at this level. The remaining southwest and northern 
border miles were reported at levels where lack of resources or 
infrastructure inhibited detection or interdiction of cross-border 
illegal activity. 

In our February 2011 testimony regarding our observations on Border 
Patrol security measures, and through selected updates, we noted that 
in fiscal year 2011 DHS discontinued the public reporting of 
performance measures showing border security progress, while it 
develops and implements a new methodology and measures for border 
security.[Footnote 24] In the meantime Border Patrol is reporting on 
the number of agents and joint operations on the southwest border and 
the number of apprehensions. CBP does not have an estimate of the time 
and effort needed to secure the southwest border; however, the agency 
expects new border security measures to be in place by fiscal year 
2012 which will enable it to make such an estimate. DHS, CBP, and 
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the new approach to 
border security between the POEs is expected to be more flexible and 
cost-effective, and that Border Patrol officials expect that they will 
be requesting fewer resources to secure the border. 

DHS Law Enforcement Partners Reported Improved Results for Interagency 
Coordination and Oversight of Border Security Intelligence and 
Enforcement Operations but Gaps Remained: 

Federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement partners 
reported improved DHS coordination to secure the border. For example, 
interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a common 
understanding of border security threats, while joint operations 
helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement 
response. However, critical gaps remained in sharing information and 
resources useful for operations, such as daily patrols in vulnerable 
areas, including National Parks and Forests. Our past work has shown 
that additional actions to improve coordination could enhance border 
security efforts on the southwest and northern borders, including 
those to deter alien smuggling. 

DOI and USDA Reported Improved DHS Coordination to Secure Federal 
Borderlands, but Critical Gaps Remained in Sharing Intelligence and 
Communications for Daily Operations: 

Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal 
lands protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the 
southwest and northern borders and can cause damage to natural, 
historic, and cultural resources, and put agency personnel and the 
visiting public at risk. We reported in November 2010 that information 
sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement 
officials had increased in recent years.[Footnote 25] Interagency 
forums were used to exchange information about border issues and 
interagency liaisons facilitated exchange of operational statistics. 
However, critical gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements 
to ensure law enforcement officials had access to daily threat 
information and compatible secure radio communications needed to 
better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response 
to illegal activity. This was important in Border Patrol's Tucson 
sector on the southwest border, where apprehensions on federal lands 
had not kept pace with the estimated number of illegal entries, 
indicating that threats caused by drug smugglers and illegal migration 
may be increasing. 

Federal land managers in the Tucson sector said they would like 
additional guidance to determine when illegal cross-border activity 
poses a sufficient public safety risk to restrict or close access to 
federal lands. In Border Patrol's Spokane sector on the northern 
border, coordination of intelligence information was particularly 
important due to sparse law enforcement presence and technical 
challenges that precluded Border Patrol's ability to fully assess 
cross-border threats, such as air smuggling of high-potency marijuana. 
The agencies agreed with our recommendations that DOI and USDA 
determine if more guidance is needed for federal land closures and 
that DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and accountability as needed 
to further implement interagency agreements for coordinating 
information and integrating operations. In January 2011, CBP issued a 
memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol 
agents emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to 
address border security threats on federal lands. This action is a 
positive step toward implementing our recommendations and we encourage 
DHS, DOI, and USDA to take the additional steps necessary to monitor 
and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements in 
order to enhance border security on federal lands. 

Northern Border Partners Reported Interagency Forums Improved 
Coordination, but DHS Oversight Was Needed to Resolve Interagency 
Conflict in Roles and Responsibilities: 

DHS has stated that partnerships with other federal, state, local, 
tribal, and Canadian law enforcement agencies are critical to the 
success of northern border security efforts. We reported in December 
2010 that DHS efforts to coordinate with these partners through 
interagency forums and joint operations were considered successful, 
according to a majority of these partners we interviewed.[Footnote 26] 
In addition, DHS component officials reported that federal agency 
coordination to secure the northern border was improved. However, DHS 
did not provide oversight for the number and location of forums 
established by its components and numerous federal, state, local, and 
Canadian partners cited challenges related to the inability to 
resource the increasing number of forums, raising concerns that some 
efforts may be overlapping. In addition, federal law enforcement 
partners in all four locations we visited as part of our work cited 
ongoing challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, Border Patrol and 
Forest Service, and ICE and DOJ's Drug Enforcement Administration in 
sharing information and resources that compromised daily border 
security related to operations and investigations. DHS had established 
and updated interagency agreements to address ongoing coordination 
challenges; however, oversight by management at the component and 
local level has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of 
these agreements. 

We also reported that while Border Patrol's border security measures 
reflect that there is a high reliance on law enforcement support from 
outside the border zones, the extent of partner law enforcement 
resources that could be leveraged to fill Border Patrol resource gaps, 
target coordination efforts, and make more efficient resource 
decisions are not reflected in Border Patrol's processes for assessing 
border security and resource requirements. We previously reported in 
November 2008 that DHS was not fully responsive to a legislative 
reporting requirement to identify resources needed to secure the 
northern border.[Footnote 27] Specifically, the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress that 
addresses the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provides 
recommendations and required resources to address them.[Footnote 28] 
DHS agreed with our recommendations to provide guidance and oversight 
for interagency forums and for component compliance with interagency 
agreements, and develop policy and guidance necessary to integrate 
partner resources in border security assessments and resource planning 
documents. DHS also reported that it was taking action to address 
these recommendations. 

Selected Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies Reported Federal 
Information Sharing Occurred, but Consistent Coordination Could Help 
Identify Terrorist Threats and Other Criminal Activity at the Border: 

Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation's borders against 
crimes and potential terrorist threats. In many border communities, 
the individuals who are best positioned to observe and report 
suspicious activities that may be related to these threats are local 
and tribal law enforcement officers. We reported in December 2009 that 
15 of 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies in southwest or 
northern communities we contacted during our work said they received 
information directly from Border Patrol, ICE, or from DOJ's Federal 
Bureau of Investigation that was useful for enhancing their 
situational awareness of crimes along the border and potential 
terrorist threats.[Footnote 29] However, 5 of the 20 agencies reported 
that they did not receive information from the federal agencies, in 
part, because information-sharing partnerships and related mechanisms 
to share information did not exist. In addition, officials from 13 of 
the 20 agencies in border communities said that they did not clearly 
know what suspicious activities federal agencies wanted them to 
report, how to report them, or to whom because federal agencies had 
not provided necessary guidance. We recommended that DHS and DOJ more 
fully identify the information needs of and establish partnerships 
with local and tribal officials along the borders, identify promising 
practices in developing border intelligence products, and define the 
suspicious activities that local land tribal officials in border 
communities are to report and how to report them. DHS agreed with the 
recommendations and indicated that it was taking action to implement 
them. DOJ did not comment. 

Leveraging a State Justice Agency's Investigative Strategy Could 
Provide DHS with Additional Opportunity to Deter Alien Smuggling: 

Alien smuggling along the southwest border is a growing threat to the 
security of the United States and Mexico due, in part, to the 
expanding involvement of Mexican drug trafficking organizations and 
aliens who illegally enter the region from countries of special 
interest to the United States such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and 
Pakistan. Violence associated with alien smuggling has also increased 
in recent years, particularly in Arizona. In October 2007, the 
National Drug Intelligence Center reported that the success of 
expanding border security initiatives and additional Border Patrol 
resources are likely obstructing regularly used smuggling routes and 
fueling an increase in violence, particularly against law enforcement 
officers in Arizona.[Footnote 30] 

We reported in May 2010 and testified in July 2010, that ICE may be 
missing an opportunity to leverage techniques used by the Arizona 
Attorney General to disrupt alien smuggling operations.[Footnote 31] 
Specifically, an Arizona Attorney General task force seized millions 
of dollars and disrupted alien smuggling operations by following cash 
transactions flowing through money transmitters that serve as the 
primary method of payment to those individuals responsible for 
smuggling aliens. By analyzing money transmitter transaction data, 
task force investigators identified suspected alien smugglers and 
those money transmitter businesses that were complicit in laundering 
alien smuggling proceeds. An overall assessment of whether and how 
these techniques may be applied by ICE in the context of disrupting 
alien smuggling could help ensure that it is not missing opportunities 
to take additional actions and leverage resources to support the 
common goal of countering alien smuggling. We recommended that ICE 
assess the Arizona Attorney General's financial investigations 
strategy to identify any promising investigative techniques for 
federal use. ICE concurred with our recommendation and outlined 
specific steps it was taking to implement it. 

Border Patrol Moving Ahead with New Technology Deployment Plan to 
Secure the Border, but Cost and Operational Effectiveness and 
Suitability Are Not Yet Clear: 

In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new 
direction in deploying technology to assist in securing the border, 
ending the SBInet program as originally conceived because it did not 
meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards. Since fiscal year 
2006, DHS had allocated about $1.5 billion for SBInet that would 
provide a mix of sensors, radars, and cameras on fixed towers that 
could gather information along the border and transmit this 
information to terminals in command centers to provide agents with 
border situational awareness. Our previous reports on CBP's SBI 
program have outlined program challenges and delays.[Footnote 32] 
Specifically, the initial segment of SBInet technology, Project 28, 
encountered performance shortfalls and delays, including the 
following: users were not involved in developing the requirements, 
contractor oversight was limited, and project scope and complexity 
were underestimated. Program uncertainties, such as a lack of fully 
defined program expectations, continued to delay planned SBInet 
deployments following Project 28. In addition, the deployment of 
related infrastructure, such as towers and roads, experienced 
challenges, such as increased costs, unknown life-cycle costs, and 
land acquisition issues. 

As part of her decision to end SBInet, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security directed CBP to proceed with a new plan to deploy a mix of 
technology to protect the border called Alternative (Southwest) Border 
Technology. Under this plan, CBP is to focus on developing terrain-and 
population-based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such 
as camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region. 
Accordingly, the plan is to incorporate a mix of technology, including 
an Integrated Fixed Tower surveillance system similar to that used in 
the current SBInet system (i.e., a tower with cameras and radar that 
transmit images to a central location), beginning with high-risk areas 
in Arizona. 

According to this new plan, DHS is to deploy other technologies, 
including Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile 
Surveillance Systems (MSS), and hand-held equipment for use by Border 
Patrol agents. For fiscal year 2011, DHS plans to use about $159 
million to begin buying RVSSs, MSSs, unattended ground sensors, and 
hand-held devices for Arizona. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget 
request calls for $242 million to fund three of five planned 
deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower systems in Arizona although, 
depending on funding, the earliest DHS expects the deployments to 
begin is March 2013 with completion anticipated by 2015 or later. The 
estimated cost for the overall plan's Arizona component, called the 
Arizona Technology Plan, is about $734 million, of which $575 million 
is for the Integrated Fixed Tower component. 

To arrive at an appropriate mix of technology in its plan, DHS 
performed an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA).[Footnote 33] In March 
2011, we provided preliminary observations regarding this analysis. 
[Footnote 34] Specifically, we noted that on the basis of our ongoing 
review of available information to date, there were several areas that 
raise questions about how the AOA results were used to inform Border 
Patrol judgments about moving forward with technology deployments, 
including the Integrated Fixed Tower system. For example, the AOA 
cited a range of uncertainties in costs related to the operational 
effectiveness of the four technology alternatives considered (mobile, 
fixed tower, agent equipment, and aerial alternatives) in each of the 
four geographic analysis areas, meaning there was no clear-cut cost-
effective technology alternative for any of the analysis areas. Yet, 
the AOA observed that a fixed tower alternative may represent the most 
effective choice only in certain circumstances. Further, we have 
questions about how the AOA analyses were factored into planning and 
budget decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology deployments 
in Arizona. Specifically, we have not yet examined the Border Patrol's 
operational assessment to determine how the results of the AOA were 
considered in developing technology deployment planning in Arizona 
and, in turn, the fiscal year 2012 budget request. The cost and 
effectiveness uncertainties noted above raise questions about the 
decisions that informed the budget formulation process. We are 
continuing to assess this issue for the House Homeland Security 
Committee and will report the final results later this year. 

Deployment of DHS U.S.-VISIT Program Technology Provides Opportunity 
to Identify Illegal Migration Through Visa Overstays: 

DHS took action to better monitor and control the entry and exit of 
foreign visitors to the United States by establishing the U.S. Visitor 
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, that 
tracks foreign visitors using biometric information (such as 
fingerprints) and biographic information. DHS has incrementally 
delivered US-VISIT capabilities to track foreign entries, and a 
biometrically enabled entry capability has been fully operational at 
about 300 air, sea, and land POEs since December 2006. In November 
2009, we reported that, according to DHS, US-VISIT entry operations 
have produced results. For example, as of June 2009, the program 
reported that it had more than 150,000 biometric hits in entry 
resulting in more than 8,000 people having adverse actions, such as 
denial of entry, taken against them.[Footnote 35] 

Since 2004, however, we have identified a range of DHS management 
challenges to fully deploy a biometric exit capability intended, in 
part, to track foreigners who had overstayed their visas and remained 
illegally in the United States. For example, in November 2009 we 
reported that DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to 
scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be 
accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution.[Footnote 36] 
Most recently, in August 2010 we reported that the DHS pilot programs 
to track the exit of foreign visitors at air POEs had limitations 
curtailing the ability to inform a decision for a long-term exit 
solution at these POEs.[Footnote 37] We made recommendations to ensure 
that US-VISIT exit was planned, designed, developed, and implemented 
in an effective and efficient manner. DHS generally agreed with our 
recommendations and outlined actions designed to implement them. 

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and members of the 
committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 
answer any questions you may have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact 
Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. In addition, 
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals 
who made key contributions to this testimony are Cindy Ayers, Seto 
Bagdoyan, and Mike Dino, Assistant Directors; as well as Joel Aldape, 
Frances Cook, Kevin Copping, Katherine Davis, Justin Dunleavy, Rick 
Eiserman, Michele Fejfar, Barbara Guffy, Nancy Kawahara, Brian Lipman, 
Dawn Locke, and Taylor Matheson. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key 
Southwest Border Technology Programs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2011. 

Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for Strengthening the 
Federal Government's Efforts to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 9, 2011. 

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures 
for the Southwest Border. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
15, 2011. 

Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency 
Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97]. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 
2010. 

Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a 
Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 18, 2010. 

Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government's 
Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73]. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 
2010. 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and 
Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-6]. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 
2010. 

Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited 
Understanding of Air Exit Options. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860]. Washington, D.C.: August 10, 
2010. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Border Security Fencing, 
Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2010 Expenditure Plan. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-877R]. Washington, 
D.C.: July 30, 2010. 

Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien Smuggling along the 
Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative Resources and Measuring 
Program Performance. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-919T]. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 
2010. 

Border Security: Improvements in the Department of State's Development 
Process Could Increase the Security of Passport Cards and Border 
Crossing Cards. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-589]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2010. 

Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative Resources 
and Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-328] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 24, 2010): 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed 
Investment in Key Technology Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-340]. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010. 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying 
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T]. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 
2010. 

Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism 
Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement, but Additional 
Efforts are Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-41]. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 
2009. 

Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of 
Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13]. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 
2009. 

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the 
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896]. Washington, D.C.: September 
9, 2009. 

Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but 
More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could 
Improve Effectiveness. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-824]. Washington, D.C.: August 2009. 

Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to 
Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-709]. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 
2009. 

Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by 
Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address 
Vulnerabilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-93]. 
Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in 
Delivering Key Technology Investments. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]. Washington, D.C.: September 
22, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 10, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying 
Lessons Learned to Future Projects. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
27, 2008. 

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 
Exist at Our Nation's Port of Entry. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-329T]. Washington, D.C.: January 3, 
2008. 

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 
Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-219]. Washington: D.C.: November 5, 
2007. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet 
Program Implementation. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T]. Washington, D.C.: October 
24, 2007. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] POEs are the facilities that provide for the controlled entry into 
or departure from the United States for persons and materials. 
Specifically, a POE is any officially designated location (seaport, 
airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are 
assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and 
enforce customs laws. 

[2] The number of border agents includes only those assigned to 
northern and southwest border sectors. The number of officers assigned 
to POEs does not include those performing trade or agricultural 
inspections. The $5.9 billion includes all funds appropriated to DHS 
for border security in fiscal year 2004. 

[3] The $11.9 billion is the amount of funds DHS reported as 
appropriated for border security for fiscal year 2010. 

[4] According to Border Patrol, an acceptable level of border control 
is established when it has the capability (i.e., resources) to deter 
or detect and apprehend incursions at the immediate border or after 
entry. 

[5] OFO reported that of the total inadmissible aliens, 78,936 were at 
the southwest land border and 36,710 were at the northern border. The 
remaining inadmissible aliens were at sea ports (68,112) and air ports 
(43,891). 

[6] GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler 
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-329T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 
2008). 

[7] The Immigration and Nationality Act, implementing regulations, and 
CBP policies and procedures for traveler inspection at all POEs 
require officers to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of 
individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(a); 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a), (b), (f)(1). 

[8] GAO, Border Security: Improvements in the Department of State's 
Development Process Could Increase the Security of Passport Cards and 
Border Crossing Cards, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-589] (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 
2010). 

[9] GAO, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking 
to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-709] (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 
2009), and Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for 
Strengthening the Federal Government's Efforts to Stem Cross-Border 
Currency Smuggling, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T], (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 
2011). 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-709] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T]. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T] and GAO, 
Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government's 
Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 
2010). 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T]. 

[13] Of the 20,558 agents in place in fiscal year 2010, 17,535 agents 
were dedicated to the southwest border, 2,263 were dedicated to the 
northern border, 246 agents were dedicated to the southeast coastal 
border, and 514 agents were dedicated to other locations. 

[14] The length of the border with Mexico is defined by the U.S. 
International Boundary and Water Commission at 1,954 miles. The length 
of the land border is 675 miles, while the length of the border along 
the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers is 1,279 miles. 

[15] Apprehensions decreased on the southwest border from 705,005 to 
447,731; on the northern border from 7,925 to 7,431; and on the 
southeast coastal border from 10,895 to 8,220. 

[16] Marijuana drug seizures on the southwest border increased from 
over 1.6 million pounds to over 2.4 million pounds, on the northern 
border from over 9,500 pounds to over 12,700 pounds, and on the 
southeast coastal border from over 730 pounds to nearly 1,300 pounds. 

[17] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying 
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T] (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 
2010). 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-651T]. 

[19] GAO, Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's 
Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance 
Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-824] (Washington, D.C.: August 
2009). 

[20] OFO's Executive Director of Planning, Program Analysis, and 
Evaluation said that the results of this performance measure for 
fiscal year 2009 were designated for official use only, so we could 
not publicly report the proportion of illegal activity that is 
apprehended at the border. 

[21] GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control 
Measures for the Southwest Border, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 
2011), and Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of 
Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 17, 2010). 

[22] These differences stem from Border Patrol's "defense in depth" 
approach to border security operations that provides for layers of 
agents who operate not only at the border but also in other areas of a 
Border Patrol sector. 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-307T]. 

[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T]. 

[25] GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure 
a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 18, 2010). 

[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97]. 

[27] GAO, Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform 
Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to 
Address Vulnerabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-93] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25, 
2008). 

[28] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 731(a)-(b), 121 Stat. 266, 351. 

[29] GAO, Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and 
Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, 
but Additional Efforts are Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-41] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 
2009). 

[30] U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, 
National Drug Threat Assessment 2008 (Johnstown, Pa.: October 2007). 

[31] GAO, Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative 
Resources and Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-328] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 24, 2010) and Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien 
Smuggling along the Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative 
Resources and Measuring Program Performance, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-919T] (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 
2010). 

[32] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays 
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 9, 2009); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected 
Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 
2007); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of 
Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 
2008); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment 
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008); and Secure Border Initiative: DHS 
Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology 
Investment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008). 

[33] Performing an AOA is a key first step in the acquisition process 
intended to assess the operational effectiveness, costs, and risks of 
alternative system solutions for addressing a validated mission need. 

[34] GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of 
Key Southwest Border Technology Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 
2011). 

[35] GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages 
of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 19, 2009). 

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13]. 

[37] GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited 
Understanding of Air Exit Options, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 
2010). 

[End of section] 

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Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

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Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
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U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
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Washington, D.C. 20548: