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Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography 
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Statement for the Record: 

To the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, September 15, 2010: 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: 

Inadequate Communication and Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop 
an Advanced Radiography System to Detect Nuclear Materials: 

Statement for the Record by Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources 
and Environment: 

and: 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 

GAO-10-1041T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-1041T, a statement for the record to the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office (DNDO) is charged with developing and acquiring equipment to 
detect nuclear and radiological materials to support federal efforts 
to combat nuclear smuggling. Also within DHS, Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) has the lead for operating systems to detect nuclear 
and radiological materials entering the country at U.S. ports of 
entry. In 2005, DNDO began working on the cargo advanced automated 
radiography system (CAARS) intending that it be used by CBP to detect 
certain nuclear materials in vehicles and containers at U.S. ports of 
entry. However, in 2007 DNDO decided to cancel the acquisition phase 
of the program and convert it to a research and development program. 
GAO was asked to examine events that led to DNDO’s decision to cancel 
the acquisition phase of the program and provide lessons learned from 
DNDO’s experience. This statement is based on prior GAO reports from 
March 2006 through July 2010 and ongoing work reviewing DHS efforts to 
develop radiography technology. For ongoing work, GAO reviewed CAARS 
planning documents and interviewed DHS, DNDO, and CBP officials. GAO 
provided a draft of the information in this testimony to DHS and 
component agencies, which provided technical comments and which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

What GAO Found: 

From the start of the CAARS program in 2005 until DNDO canceled the 
acquisition phase of the program in December 2007, DNDO pursued the 
acquisition and deployment of CAARS machines without fully 
understanding that they would not fit within existing primary 
inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry. This occurred because during 
the first year or more of the program DNDO and CBP had few discussions 
about operating requirements at ports of entry. When CBP and DNDO 
officials met, shortly before DNDO’s decision to cancel the 
acquisition phase of the program, CBP officials said they made it 
clear to DNDO that they did not want the CAARS machines because they 
would not fit in primary inspections lanes and would slow down the 
flow of commerce through these lanes and cause significant delays. 
Also, the CAARS program was among numerous DHS acquisition programs 
about which GAO reported in 2008 that appropriate oversight was 
lacking. Further, the development of the CAARS algorithms (software)—-
a key part of the machine needed to identify shielded nuclear 
materials automatically—-did not mature at a rapid enough pace to 
warrant acquisition and deployment. Also, the description of the 
progress of the CAARS program used to support funding requests in 
DNDO’s budget justifications was misleading because it did not reflect 
the actual status of the program. For example, the fiscal years 2010 
and 2011 DHS budget justifications both cited that an ongoing CAARS 
testing campaign would lead to a cost-benefit analysis. However, DNDO 
officials told GAO that when they canceled the acquisition part of the 
program in 2007, they also decided not to conduct any associated cost 
benefit analysis. During recent discussions with DNDO officials, they 
agreed that the language in the budget justifications lacked clarity, 
and they have no plans to prepare a cost benefit analysis. 

Based on GAO’s review of the CAARS program and its prior reports on 
DHS development and acquisition efforts, GAO identified lessons 
learned for DHS to consider in its continuing efforts to develop the 
next generation of radiography imaging technology. For example, GAO 
previously reported that agencies can enhance coordination by agreeing 
on roles and responsibilities. In this regard, a draft memorandum of 
agreement among DHS agencies that intends to clarify roles and 
responsibilities in developing technologies and help ensure effective 
coordination has not been finalized. Completing this memorandum could 
give DHS reasonable assurance that problems associated with the CAARS 
program do not recur. In discussions with senior officials from DHS, 
DNDO, CBP and S&T, they all agreed with the need for the memorandum 
and said that they intend to work toward finalizing the draft 
memorandum of agreement. Other lessons GAO identified include (1) 
engage in a robust departmental oversight review process (2) separate 
the research and development functions from acquisition functions (3) 
determine the technology readiness levels before moving forward to 
acquisition, and (4) rigorously test devices using actual agency 
operational tactics before making decisions on acquisition. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1041T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 202-512-3841 
or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide a statement for the record on 
efforts of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to develop the cargo advanced 
automated radiography system (CAARS) to strengthen DHS's ability to 
prevent the smuggling of nuclear materials into the United States. 
Preventing terrorists from using radiological or nuclear materials to 
carry out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. 
As we reported in January 2009, a terrorist could try to smuggle 
nuclear materials into the United States in a variety of ways, 
including hiding them in a car, train, private aircraft or small 
vessel; sending them through the mail; carrying them in personal 
luggage through an airport; walking them across the border; or 
concealing them in maritime cargo containers in the global supply 
chain.[Footnote 1] Maritime cargo containers are of particular concern 
because they can be filled overseas at many different locations and 
are transported through complex logistics networks before reaching 
U.S. ports. As a result, terrorists could try to take advantage of 
such vulnerabilities by placing nuclear materials into a container for 
shipment to the United States. U.S. government officials believe that 
the likelihood of terrorists smuggling nuclear materials into the 
United States in cargo containers is relatively low, but criminals 
have long exploited containers for other illegal purposes, such as 
smuggling weapons, people and illicit substances. 

As we testified before this committee in June, DHS has made 
significant progress over the past several years in both deploying 
radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo 
and conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea 
ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials. [Footnote 2] 
Moreover, DHS reports that while it scans nearly 100 percent of the 
cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders 
and major seaports, it has made less progress scanning for radiation 
in other pathways into the United States such as general aviation and 
small maritime craft. 

DNDO is charged with developing, acquiring, and deploying equipment to 
detect nuclear and radiological materials in order to support the 
efforts of DHS and other federal agencies, such as the departments of 
Energy and State, in combating nuclear smuggling. DNDO is also charged 
with enhancing and coordinating federal, state, and local efforts to 
prevent radiological and nuclear attacks. In doing this, DNDO is 
required to work with other federal agencies to develop a global 
nuclear detection architecture.[Footnote 3] To date, DHS has spent 
nearly $4 billion on various aspects of the architecture but has not 
developed a strategic plan to guide its efforts to develop and 
implement this architecture as we recommended in 2008.[Footnote 4] 
DNDO agreed with this recommendation but has not developed such a plan. 

Also within DHS, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the lead for 
deploying, operating, and maintaining systems to detect nuclear and 
radiological materials entering the country through land borders, 
seaports, and other ports of entry. CBP also has a broad mission to 
detect more traditional contraband, such as drugs and guns; to prevent 
the inflow of inadmissible aliens; and to conduct its operations in a 
way that does not impede the flow of commerce. To detect nuclear 
materials, CBP, in coordination with DNDO, has deployed over 1,400 
radiation portal monitors (RPM) at U.S. ports of entry. Most of the 
RPMs are installed in primary inspection lanes through which nearly 
all traffic and shipping containers must pass. These monitors alarm 
when they detect radiation coming from a package, vehicle, or shipping 
container. CBP then conducts further inspections at its secondary 
inspection locations to identify the cause of the alarm and whether it 
is a reason for concern. 

While these RPMs are sensitive and have been effective at detecting 
radiation, they also have limitations. In particular, in May 2009 we 
reported that RPMs are capable of detecting certain nuclear materials 
only when these materials are unshielded or lightly shielded.[Footnote 
5] In contrast, advanced radiography can be used to detect dense 
material that may be consistent with the presence of certain nuclear 
materials in vehicles and cargo containers, and CBP already uses 
radiography to more closely investigate the contents of a vehicle or 
cargo container that has been selected for secondary inspection at a 
U.S. port of entry. However, according to CBP officials, only a small 
percentage of vehicles or cargo containers are subjected to secondary 
inspections. 

DNDO began working on the CAARS program in 2005 with the intention 
that through advanced radiography and improved algorithms (software), 
CAARS would be used by CBP to automatically detect and identify highly 
shielded nuclear material in vehicles and cargo containers in both 
primary and secondary inspection lanes at U.S. ports of entry. Thus, 
through CAARS, DNDO expected that CBP would be able to detect more 
heavily shielded nuclear material in nearly all vehicles and cargo 
containers going through primary inspection lanes, and therefore, 
close a gap in the nuclear detection architecture. In September 2006, 
DNDO awarded a contract for the CAARS program to research, develop, 
acquire, and deploy advanced radiography imaging technology designed 
to detect highly shielded nuclear material being smuggled through U.S. 
ports of entry. At that time, DNDO expected the program could cost as 
much as $1.5 billion. However, in December 2007, DNDO made what it 
called a "course correction," by canceling the program's acquisition 
and deployment plans and significantly reducing its scope. The CAARS 
program then became a research and development program designed to 
demonstrate the potential capability of the technology. As a result of 
this change, DNDO no longer expected to deploy CAARS machines but 
instead opted to demonstrate the maturity and promise of CAARS 
technology. As part of the CAARS demonstration project, DNDO, with the 
assistance of scientists from the Department of Energy's Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), began testing the capabilities 
of CAARS' prototypes in the fall of 2009 and completed testing in 
March 2010. According to DNDO officials, DNDO plans to report on the 
results of the tests and lay out a way forward regarding the future 
application of CAARS radiography imaging by the end of September 2010. 
Overall, from the inception of the program in 2005 until today, DNDO 
officials reported that the agency has spent about $113 million on the 
CAARS program. 

Since the capabilities of radiography systems are an important part of 
cargo security, you asked us to examine the history of the CAARS 
program. Accordingly, this statement discusses events that led to the 
course correction in the CAARS program, and provides potential lessons 
learned from DNDO's experience with the CAARS program. This statement 
is based on prior reports and testimonies we issued from March 2006 
through July 2010.[Footnote 6] Detailed information on our scope and 
methodology for our prior work can be found in these reports. This 
statement is also based on results from our ongoing work in response 
to your request to review radiography systems within DHS. 

As part of our ongoing review of radiography systems, specifically 
CAARS, from March 2010 to September 2010 we analyzed key CAARS 
planning documents developed in the early stages of program 
development, such as the acquisition plan, program baseline, 
performance specifications, and requests for proposals and reviewed 
subsequent CAARS documents that reflect DNDO's decision to scale back 
the program and removal of the acquisition phase from CAARS contracts. 
We conducted interviews with former and current CAARS program managers 
and other key officials within DNDO, CBP, the DHS Science & Technology 
Directorate (S&T), and the DHS Office of Policy. We also met with 
representatives from contractors that were developing CAARS and 
consulted with subject matter experts from LLNL involved in testing 
those contractors' CAARS prototypes. We provided a draft of the 
information in this testimony to DHS and component agencies, which 
provided technical comments and which we incorporated as appropriate. 
We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

DNDO Planned for the Acquisition and Deployment of CAARS without Fully 
Understanding that It Could Not Feasibly Operate in a U.S. Port 
Environment: 

From the start of the CAARS program in 2005 until the course 
correction in December 2007, DNDO planned the acquisition and 
deployment of CAARS machines without understanding that they would not 
fit within existing primary inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry. 
This occurred because during the first year or more of the program 
DNDO and CBP had few discussions about operating requirements for 
primary inspection lanes at ports of entry. In addition, the CAARS 
program was among numerous acquisition programs about which we 
previously reported that appropriate DHS oversight was lacking. 
Furthermore, the development of the CAARS algorithms--a key part of 
the machine needed to identify shielded nuclear materials 
automatically--did not mature at a rapid enough pace to warrant 
acquisition and deployment. Moreover, the description of the progress 
of the CAARS program used to support funding requests in DNDO's budget 
justifications for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 was misleading 
because it did not reflect the actual status of the program. 

Inadequate Communication: 

From the inception of the CAARS program until the decision in December 
2007 to cancel acquisition of the program, DNDO and CBP had few, if 
any, in-depth discussions about CBP's requirements to be able to use 
radiography in primary inspection lanes. According to DNDO officials, 
they requested information from CBP on its user requirements for the 
CAARS system, but CBP was slow to respond to these requests. DNDO 
continued with its plans to develop CAARS machines because, according 
to DNDO officials, at the time it was thought that a solution was 
urgently needed to be able to detect shielded nuclear materials in 
primary inspection lanes. In discussing this with senior CBP 
officials, they said that DNDO officials did not attempt to meet with 
them during the beginning of the CAARS program. When CBP and DNDO 
officials met, shortly before the course correction, CBP officials 
said they made it clear to DNDO that they did not want the CAARS 
machines because they would not fit in primary inspections lanes and 
would slow down the flow of commerce through these lanes and cause 
significant delays.[Footnote 7] 

In our view, had CBP and DNDO officials met early in the development 
of the program to discuss CBP's needs and operational requirements, as 
stated in DHS's acquisition policy at the time, it is unlikely that 
DNDO would have found reason to move forward with its plan to develop 
and acquire CAARS technology. Nonetheless, in September 2006, DNDO 
awarded contracts to three CAARS vendors. In December 2007, DNDO 
decided to cancel the acquisition of CAARS and limit any further work 
to a research and development effort. In recent joint discussions with 
CBP and DNDO officials, they acknowledged that communication between 
the two agencies could have been improved during the early part of the 
CAARS program. They said they communicate much more routinely now and 
that, in their view, it would be unlikely that the communication 
problems associated with the CAARS program would reoccur. 

Inadequate Oversight: 

DNDO did not follow DHS acquisition protocols for the CAARS program. 
Specifically, in 2008, we reported that CAARS was among numerous major 
DHS acquisition programs that did not have a mission needs statement-- 
a required DHS acquisition document that formally acknowledges that 
the need for an acquisition is justified and supported.[Footnote 8] 
DHS policy also called for programmatic reviews at key decision points 
and required certain analytical documents. However, CAARS did not 
undergo annual department level reviews as called for nor did DNDO 
program officials obtain or prepare basic analytical documents. For 
example, one of these documents, a concept of operations (CONOPS), was 
intended to demonstrate how CBP would use CAARS machines in primary 
inspection areas at the ports. However, as a result of inadequate 
communication and collaboration between CBP and DNDO discussed 
earlier, no CONOPS was developed during the early phase of the CAARS 
program. Ultimately, according to DNDO officials, once DNDO made the 
decision to cancel the acquisition portion of CAARS in December 2007, 
a CONOPS was no longer required. 

Immature Technology: 

According to DNDO officials, at the time of the inception of the CAARS 
program, there was a widespread view within DNDO that something had to 
be done to provide CBP with the capability to detect highly shielded 
nuclear material in primary inspection lanes. DNDO officials 
acknowledged that the agency decided to move forward with the CAARS 
program despite the fact that automatic detection, a key feature of 
CAARS, depended on the rapid development of algorithms that were 
technologically immature. The algorithms are critical because they 
provide the capability for CAARS to automatically detect highly 
shielded nuclear material in primary inspection areas without the need 
for extensive operator review and interpretation of an image--two 
factors that could adversely affect CBP's ability to avoid delays to 
the flow of commerce along with its overall effectiveness in detecting 
highly shielded nuclear material. Although algorithms supporting the 
CAARS technology were technologically immature, DNDO created an 
aggressive production and deployment schedule that was to begin in 
August 2008, the end of DNDO's planned 2-year development period for 
the CAARS program. At the time it decided on this production 
milestone, DNDO officials said it was likely that the algorithms would 
be developed in time to meet the start of planned production. However, 
the technology did not develop as expected and contributed to DNDO's 
decision to cancel the acquisition phase of CAARS. 

Basis of CAARS Funding Requests: 

For fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011, DHS justified annual 
budget requests to Congress by citing significant plans and 
accomplishments of the CAARS program, including that CAARS technology 
development and deployment was feasible, even though DNDO had made the 
decision in December 2007 to cancel the acquisition of CAARS. For 
example, in its fiscal year 2009 budget justification, DHS stated that 
a preliminary DNDO/CBP CAARS production and deployment program had 
been successfully developed and that CAARS machines would be developed 
that would detect both contraband and shielded nuclear material with 
little or no impact on CBP operations. The fiscal years 2010 and 2011 
DHS budget justifications both cited that an ongoing testing campaign 
would lead to a cost benefit analysis, followed by rapid development 
of a prototype that would lead to a pilot deployment at a CBP point of 
entry. Furthermore, the fiscal year 2010 budget justification stated 
that while the CAARS technology was less mature than originally 
estimated, successful development was still feasible. However, DHS's 
description and assessment of the CAARS program in its budget 
justification did not reflect the actual progress of the program. 
Specifically, DNDO officials told us that when they made their course 
correction and canceled the acquisition part of the program in 2007, 
they also decided not to conduct a cost benefit analysis because such 
analyses are generally needed to justify going forward with 
acquisitions. In addition, DNDO completed CAARS testing in March 2010; 
however, as of today, the final test results for two of the three 
CAARS machines are not yet available. Currently, no CAARS machines 
have been deployed. CAARS machines from various vendors have either 
been disassembled or sit idle without being tested in a port 
environment, and CBP is considering whether to allow DNDO to collect 
operational data in a port environment. During recent discussions with 
DNDO officials, they agreed that the language in the budget 
justifications lacked clarity and stated that they are not planning to 
complete a cost benefit analysis since such analyses are generally 
associated with acquisition programs. 

CAARS Offers Lessons Learned Regarding the Importance of Developing 
Requirements, Coordinating with Users, and Managing Acquisitions: 

Based on our review of the CAARS program and our reports on DNDO 
efforts to develop an advanced RPM called the advanced spectroscopic 
portal (ASP),[Footnote 9] we have identified lessons learned for DHS 
to consider in its continuing efforts to develop the next generation 
of radiography imaging technology. 

Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Coordination: 

Despite the importance of coordinating crosscutting program efforts, 
we have reported that weak coordination of those efforts has been a 
long-standing problem in the federal government and has proven to be 
difficult to resolve.[Footnote 10] We have also reported that agencies 
can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. One way we 
reported that agencies can enhance coordination is to agree on roles 
and responsibilities and establish mutually reinforcing or joint 
strategies.[Footnote 11] As discussed, DNDO did not coordinate and 
collaborate with CBP early in the development of the CAARS program to 
identify CBP's needs and requirements. According to DHS budget 
documents, in fiscal year 2011, the responsibility for research and 
development of advanced radiography will shift from DNDO to S&T. 
Leading up to this transition, there is confusion related to roles and 
responsibilities among DNDO, S&T, and CBP. For example, DNDO officials 
said they have requested permission from CBP to collect operational 
data in a port environment on an enhanced radiography machine. 
However, CBP officials stated that they had already purchased, 
operationally tested, and deployed 11 of these machines in secondary 
inspection areas. We recently discussed this issue at a joint meeting 
with DNDO and CBP officials. CBP and DNDO officials agreed that there 
was confusion over this issue, and both agencies agreed with the need 
to collect operational data on this enhanced radiography machine, and 
CBP has begun making arrangements to do so. 

Also, S&T officials said that they are about to contract out for 
radiography imaging technology for CBP that will improve imaging 
capabilities. DNDO officials told us that S&T's efforts will include 
development of radiography capabilities to detect shielded nuclear 
material, while S&T officials told us that this is not an area of 
their focus. As DHS transitions its research and development of 
radiography, DHS officials said that a draft memorandum of agreement 
intended to clarify roles and responsibilities for cooperation and 
coordination among DNDO, CBP, and S&T has not been finalized. 
Completing the memorandum of agreement to clarify roles and 
responsibilities before proceeding with the research, development, and 
deployment of radiography technology could give DHS reasonable 
assurance that problems resulting from a lack of clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities in the CAARS program do not recur. In discussions 
with senior officials from DHS, DNDO, CBP and S&T, they all agreed 
with the need for the memorandum and said that they intend to work 
toward finalizing the draft memorandum of agreement. 

Engage in a Robust Oversight Review Process: 

DNDO officials said that they were aware of the DHS draft management 
directive in 2006 that was intended to guide management and oversight 
of acquisition programs like CAARS but did not follow it. DHS policy 
officials acknowledged that at the time CAARS was in its early stages, 
DHS was continuing the process of organizing and unifying its many 
disparate components and there was not strong oversight over its major 
programs, including CAARS. Policy officials told us the oversight 
review process is more robust today. However, we reported in June 2010 
that DHS acquisitions need further improvement and sustained 
management attention. [Footnote 12] For example, while DHS' current 
management directive includes more detailed guidance than the previous 
2006 management directive for programs to use in preparing key 
documentation to support component and departmental decision making, 
it is not applied consistently and most major programs have not been 
reviewed. 

Separate Research and Development from Acquisition Functions: 

DNDO was simultaneously engaged in a research and development phase 
while planning for an acquisition phase of the CAARS program. In this 
regard, we have previously reported that separating technology 
development from product development and acquisition is a best 
practice that can help reduce costs and deliver a product on time and 
within budget because separation of the technology development phase 
from production in particular helps to ensure that (1) a sound 
business case is made for the product, (2) product design is stable, 
and (3) production processes are mature and the design is reliable. 
[Footnote 13] 

Determine the Technology Readiness Levels Before Acquisition: 

At the time that the CAARS program was in its early stages, DHS and 
DNDO did not have clearly defined ways to define and communicate the 
maturity of technology leading to acquisition. We have previously 
reported on the need for a disciplined and knowledge-based approach of 
assessing technology maturity, such as using technology readiness 
levels.[Footnote 14] In that report, we recommended that technologies 
need to reach a high readiness level before an agency should make a 
commitment to production. DNDO officials acknowledged that CAARS 
algorithm's readiness level was not high enough to warrant entering 
into the acquisition phase. 

Rigorously Test Devices Using Actual Agency Operational Tactics: 

As we testified in June 2009 on DNDO's testing of ASPs, a primary 
lesson to be learned regarding testing is that the push to replace 
existing equipment with the new portal monitors led to an ASP testing 
program that lacked the necessary rigor.[Footnote 15] We reported that 
testing programs designed to validate a product's performance against 
increasing standards for different stages in product development are a 
best practice for acquisition strategies for new technologies and if 
properly implemented, would provide rigor to DHS's testing of other 
advanced technologies. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment: 

For further information about this statement, please contact Gene 
Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov; or Stephen L. Caldwell at 
202-512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Dr. Timothy Persons (Chief 
Scientist), Ned Woodward (Assistant Director), Mike Harmond, Jonathan 
Kucskar, Linda Miller, Ron Salo, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Franklyn Yao 
also made key contributions to this testimony. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products: 

Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port 
Security. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-940T]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet 
Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or 
Closed Identified Gaps, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-883T], Washington D.C.: June 30, 
2010. 

Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would 
Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement 
to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-12]. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 
2009. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of 
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-804T], Washington, D.C.: June 25, 
2009. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced 
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show 
Limits of the New Technology. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-655]. Washington D.C.: May 21, 2009. 

Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve 
Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257]. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 
2009, 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and Deploy 
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors is Likely to Exceed the 
Department's Previous Cost Estimates. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1108R]. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 
2008. 

Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to 
Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but 
Challenges Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-538]. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 
2008: 

Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were 
Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672]. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 
2008. 

Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-
Bound Cargo Containers. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-533T]. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 
2008. 

Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced 
Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in 
Verifying Security Practices. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-240]. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 
2008. 

Supply Chain Security: Examination of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign 
Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance 
Measures Are Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-187]. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 
2008. 

Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs 
Lack Appropriate Oversight. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29]. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 
2008). 

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One 
Year Later. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-126T]. 
Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure 
Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]. Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of 
Mission and Management Functions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-454]. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 
2007. 

International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the In-Bond Cargo System 
Impede Customs and Border Protection's Ability to Address Revenue, 
Trade, and Security Concerns. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-561]. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 
2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Decision to Procure and Deploy the 
Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment is Not Supported by 
Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-581T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 
2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the 
National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in 
Support of DNDO's Testing and Development Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-347R]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 
2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support 
the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors was Not Based 
on Available Performance Data and Did not Fully Evaluate All the 
Monitors' Costs and Benefits. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-133R]. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 
2006. 

Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of 
Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-591T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 
2006. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy 
Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United 
States. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-558T]. 
Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation 
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389]. Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 22, 2006. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should 
Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 29, 2009). 

[2] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but 
Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection 
Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-883T] (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 
2010). 

[3] National Security Presidential Directive-43 (also known as 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-14), sec. 2(d). 

[4] GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T] (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 
2008). 

[5] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced 
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show 
Limits of the New Technology, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-655] (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 
2009). 

[6] See Appendix I for a list of related GAO products. 

[7] DNDO officials later acknowledged that they proceeded in 
developing CAARS with the CBP specifications for using radiography in 
secondary inspection areas--not knowing that these same specifications 
were not suitable for primary inspection lanes. 

[8] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major 
Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 
2008). 

[9] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to 
Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection 
Equipment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007), and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: 
Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection 
Portal Monitors, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-804T] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2009) 

[10] GAO, Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-106] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 29, 2000). 

[11] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices that Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[12] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected 
Complex Acquisitions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-588SP] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2010). 

[13] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-406SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007) and Best Practices: Better 
Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System 
Outcomes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999). 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162]. 

[15] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS 
Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-804T] (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 
2009). 

[End of section] 

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