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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces and Seapower and 
Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, March 17, 2010: 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: 

Overarching Guidance Is Needed to Advance Information Sharing: 

Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

GAO-10-500T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-500T, a testimony before the Subcommittees on Air 
and Land Forces and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has numerous intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems—including manned and 
unmanned airborne, space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems—that 
play critical roles in support of current military operations. The 
demand for these capabilities has increased dramatically. Today’s 
testimony addresses (1) the challenges the military services and 
defense agencies face processing, exploiting, and disseminating the 
information collected by ISR systems and (2) the extent to which the 
military services and defense agencies have developed the capabilities 
required to share ISR information. This testimony is based on GAO’s 
January 2010 report on DOD’s ISR data processing capabilities. GAO 
reviewed and analyzed documentation, guidance, and strategies of the 
military services and defense agencies in regard to processing, 
exploiting, and disseminating ISR data as well as information-sharing 
capabilities. GAO also visited numerous commands, military units, and 
locations in Iraq and the United States. 

What GAO Found: 

The military services and defense agencies face long-standing 
challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data, 
and DOD has recently begun some initiatives to address these 
challenges. First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability 
to collect ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan, although its capacity for 
processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited. Second, 
transmitting data from ISR collection platforms to ground stations 
where analysts process, exploit, and then disseminate intelligence to 
users requires high-capacity communications bandwidth. However, 
bandwidth can be limited in a theater of operations by the satellite 
and ground-based communication capacity, and this in turn affects the 
ability to send, receive, and download intelligence products that 
contain large amounts of data. Third, shortages of analytical staff 
with the required skill sets hamper the services’ and defense agencies’
abilities to exploit all ISR information being collected, thus raising 
the risk that important information may not be available to commanders 
in a timely manner. DOD is developing and implementing initiatives to 
enhance its processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities, 
such as increasing personnel, but its initiatives are in the early 
stages of implementation and it is too soon to tell how effective they 
will be in addressing current challenges. 

DOD is taking steps to improve the sharing of intelligence information 
across the department, but progress is uneven among the military 
services. DOD began plans for its Distributed Common Ground/Surface 
System (DCGS), an interoperable family of systems that will enable 
users to access shared ISR information in 1998. DOD subsequently 
directed the military services to transition their service-unique 
intelligence data processing systems into DCGS and each of the 
military services is at a different stage. While the Air Force and the 
Navy each plan to have a fully functional version of DCGS by the end 
of fiscal years 2010 and 2013, respectively, the Army does not expect 
to have a fully functional system until 2016. The Marine Corps has not 
yet established a completion date for the full operational capability 
of its DCGS. To facilitate the sharing of ISR data on this system, DOD 
developed the DCGS Integration Backbone, which provides common 
information standards and protocols. Although the services are 
responsible for managing their DCGS programs and conforming to 
information-sharing standards, according to the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and military service officials, 
DOD has not developed overarching guidance, such as a concept of 
operations that provides direction and priorities for sharing 
intelligence information within the defense intelligence community. 
Without this overarching guidance, the services lack direction to set 
their own goals and objectives for prioritizing and sharing ISR 
information and therefore have not developed service-specific 
implementation plans that describe the prioritization and types of ISR 
data they intend to share. Moreover, the inability of users to fully 
access existing information contributes to the increasing demand for 
additional ISR collection assets. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In the January 2010 report, GAO recommended that DOD develop 
overarching guidance for sharing intelligence information and that the 
military services develop plans with timelines that prioritize and 
identify the types of ISR data they will share. DOD agreed with these 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-500T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss GAO's recently issued report 
on the Department of Defense's (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) data processing capabilities.[Footnote 1] DOD's 
numerous ISR systems--including manned and unmanned airborne, space- 
borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems--play critical roles in 
supporting military operations as well as commanders' force protection 
requirements. In Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders at all levels depend 
on timely and accurate ISR information on their adversaries' tactics, 
capabilities, and vulnerabilities to plan military operations. The 
success of ISR systems has led to a dramatic increase in demand for 
more ISR systems to collect data, and DOD continues to invest in ISR 
assets, requesting approximately $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 for 
new unmanned aircraft system capabilities alone. However, a November 
2008 Joint Defense Science Board/Intelligence Science Board Task Force 
report on integrating sensor-collected intelligence[Footnote 2] 
concluded that the rapid increase in collected information overwhelms 
current ISR capabilities and much of the collected data is never 
analyzed. 

We have previously reported on DOD's challenges associated with ISR 
integration, requirements, tasking, and governance. For example, in 
December 2005, we reported that some sensors, communications 
equipment, and weapons associated with one type of unmanned aircraft 
were not always compatible with other unmanned aircraft.[Footnote 3] 
In April 2007, we testified that although DOD had initiatives under 
way to improve integration of ISR assets, it had not comprehensively 
identified future ISR requirements, set funding priorities, or 
established mechanisms to measure ISR integration progress.[Footnote 
4] In July 2007, we reported that DOD had not been able to fully 
optimize the use of its unmanned aircraft system assets because it 
lacked an approach to allocating and tasking them that considered the 
availability of all assets in determining how best to meet warfighter 
needs and that DOD lacked metrics to fully evaluate the success of its 
unmanned aircraft system missions.[Footnote 5] Moreover, in March 
2008, we reported that DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap did not include a 
long-term view of what capabilities were required to achieve strategic 
goals and did not provide detailed information that would make it 
useful as a basis for deciding alternative investments. [Footnote 6] 
In July 2009, we reported that while several unmanned aircraft 
programs had achieved airframe commonality, most were pursuing service-
unique subsystems, sensors, communications equipment, and weapons and 
ground control stations.[Footnote 7] Further, we are also evaluating 
DOD's efforts to support its increasing inventory of unmanned aircraft 
systems, including whether it has sufficient plans and strategies for 
providing the necessary personnel, facilities, communications 
infrastructure, training, and other elements. 

My testimony today is based on our January 2010 report on ISR 
processing capabilities[Footnote 8] and will discuss (1) the 
challenges the military services and defense agencies face processing, 
exploiting, and disseminating the information collected by ISR systems 
and (2) the extent to which the military services and defense agencies 
have developed the capabilities required to share ISR information. I 
will conclude with some observations regarding our recommendations and 
DOD's response to our recommendations. 

In conducting our audit work to support our January 2010 report, we 
reviewed and analyzed policies, guidance, strategies, and assessments 
of the military services and defense agencies in regard to processing, 
exploiting, and disseminating ISR data as well as their information 
sharing capabilities. We also interviewed officials at the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Joint Staff; all 
four military services; the National Security Agency; the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and numerous commands, military units, 
and locations in Iraq and the United States. Our work on that report 
was conducted from September 2008 to December 2009 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

To be most useful to the warfighter, intelligence data must be 
collected, analyzed, and shared appropriately in a timely manner. 
[Footnote 9] The intelligence data processing cycle is commonly 
described in five phases: (1) planning and direction, (2) collection, 
(3) processing and exploitation, (4) dissemination, and (5) evaluation 
and feedback. However, in implementation the cycle is tailored to 
mission needs, so the phases may not always be performed in order. For 
example, information collected from an unmanned aircraft system may be 
disseminated directly to the user, without undergoing detailed 
processing and exploitation. Figure 1 depicts the intelligence data 
processing cycle. My testimony today focuses on the processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination of ISR information, shown in figure 1 
as steps 3 and 4 of the intelligence data processing cycle. 

Figure 1: The Intelligence Data Processing Cycle: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration of cycle] 

Phase 1: Planning and Direction: 
Identifying the intelligence need. 

Phase 2: Collection: 
Tasking collection assets & acquiring raw data; 
* Geospatial intelligence; 
* Signals intelligence; 
* Measurement and signature intelligence; 
* Open source intelligence. 

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination: 
Phase 3: Processing & Exploitation; 
Phase 4: Dissemination: 
Transforming raw data into a usable form and getting ISR information 
to the right people. 

Phase 5: Evaluation and Feedback: 
Evaluating intelligence operations and products and provide feedback. 

Source: GAO analysis of the intelligence process. 

[End of figure] 

Analysts who are responsible for processing, exploiting, and 
disseminating ISR data can only use collected intelligence data if 
data are visible to them. Making ISR data discoverable in this way can 
be accomplished through meta-data tagging--a process in which data are 
described through other data (meta-data) that are usually produced at 
the time the data of interest are created. For example, a camera may 
create meta-data for a photograph, such as date, time, and lens 
settings. The photographer may add further meta-data, such as the 
names of the subjects. The process by which information is meta-data 
tagged depends on the technical capabilities of the systems collecting 
the information. Most ISR systems do not automatically meta-data tag 
the ISR data when they are transferred from the sensor to the ground 
station for processing and exploitation because most of these systems 
were developed prior to DOD's emphasis on enforcing meta-data 
standards. Since the sensors on these legacy systems are not able to 
meta-data tag automatically, it is up to each of the military services 
to prioritize the cataloging of the ISR data manually after collection. 

Military Services and Defense Agencies Face Long-standing Challenges 
with Using ISR Data and Recognize the Need to Address These Challenges: 

The military services and defense agencies face three long-standing 
challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data. 
First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability to collect 
ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, its capacity for 
processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited and has not kept 
pace with the increase in collection platforms and combat air patrols. 
For example, the Air Force has substantially increased the number of 
combat air patrols that ISR collection platforms are performing in the 
U.S. Central Command theater of operations. Specifically, the number 
of combat air patrols flown by the Air Force's Predator and Reaper 
unmanned aircraft systems has increased from 13 to 36 since 2007. 
Moreover, in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,[Footnote 10] 
DOD stated that it will continue to expand the Predator and Reaper 
combat air patrols to 65 by fiscal year 2015. This increase in data 
collection will also increase the burden on the Air Force's ground 
processing system, which processes, exploits, and disseminates the ISR 
information collected by these platforms. 

Second, transmitting data from ISR collection platforms to ground 
stations where analysts process, exploit, and then disseminate 
intelligence to users requires high-capacity communications bandwidth. 
However, bandwidth can be limited in a theater of operations by the 
satellite and ground-based communication capacity. An insufficient 
amount of bandwidth affects the ability to send, receive, and download 
intelligence products that contain large amounts of data. For example, 
intelligence products derived from ISR geospatial data have high 
bandwidth requirements--the higher the resolution of the product, the 
longer the transmission time via a given bandwidth. DOD officials have 
acknowledged that limited bandwidth is a continual challenge in Iraq 
because of the warfighter's reliance on geospatial data. GAO and 
others have reported that DOD continues to face a growing need for 
communications bandwidth in combat operations.[Footnote 11] 

Third, the military services and defense agencies are challenged by 
shortages in the numbers of analytical staff available to exploit all 
of the electronic signals[Footnote 12] and geospatial ISR information 
being collected, raising the risk that important information may not 
be analyzed and made available to commanders in a timely manner. For 
example, according to U.S. Central Command officials, the command 
exploits less than one-half of the electronic signals intercepts 
collected from the Predator. According to DOD officials, finding 
native speakers of the collected languages to successfully translate 
and exploit data collected in those foreign languages is difficult, 
and training language analysts takes time and is difficult to manage 
with the deployment schedule. In addition, language analysts who 
translate and exploit electronic signals intelligence data must 
qualify for security clearances that require rigorous background 
examinations. The National Security Agency has experienced 
difficulties in hiring language analysts who can obtain clearances and 
have the appropriate skill levels in both English and the language for 
translation. 

DOD has recognized the need to enhance its processing, exploitation, 
and dissemination capabilities and is developing and implementing 
initiatives to do so, but its initiatives are in the early stages of 
implementation and it is too soon to tell how effective they will be 
in addressing current challenges. For example, in the short term, DOD 
has placed its priority for processing, exploitation, and 
disseminating electronic signals intelligence on the information 
collected in Afghanistan because the Commander of U.S. Central Command 
has designated those missions as a high priority. In the long term, 
DOD has taken several actions intended to sustain, expand, and improve 
processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. For example, 
DOD has studies, such as an ISR force-sizing study, under way which 
include examining how to improve the management of its processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. However, DOD has not set 
dates for when all of these studies will be complete and it is too 
soon to know whether they will lead to the desired effect of increased 
support to the warfighter for current operations. The Air Force and 
the National Security Agency also have plans to increase analyst 
personnel in response to the increase in ISR collection. The Air 
Force, reacting to scheduled increases in Predator and Reaper combat 
air patrols, is planning to add personnel who process, exploit, and 
disseminate ISR data. The National Security Agency also has taken 
steps to address shortages in language analyst personnel. For example, 
to better target its hiring effort for language analysts the agency is 
using U.S. Census Bureau data to locate centers of populations that 
contain the language skills needed to translate and exploit the 
foreign languages that are collected. According to National Security 
Agency officials, these efforts have helped increase the number of 
language analysts available to process and exploit collected signals 
intelligence data. DOD is also working on developing technical 
solutions to improve processing, movement, and storage of data. For 
example, files from wide-area sensors have to be saved to a computer 
disk and flown back to the United States for exploitation and 
dissemination because current networks in the theater of operations 
cannot handle the large amounts of data these sensors collect. U.S. 
Joint Forces Command is currently designing and testing technology 
already in use by the commercial entertainment industry to improve 
storage, movement, and access to full motion video data from wide-area 
sensors. 

DOD Is Taking Steps to Improve Intelligence Information Sharing, but 
Progress Is Uneven: 

Although DOD has recognized the need for maximizing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the information it collects and has been taking steps 
to increase information sharing across the defense intelligence 
community, progress has been uneven among the military services. DOD 
began plans for its Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS), 
an interoperable family of systems that will enable users to access 
shared ISR information, in 1998. DOD subsequently directed the 
military services to transition their service-unique intelligence data 
processing systems into DCGS and each of the military services is at a 
different stage. As shown in table 1, the Air Force and the Navy each 
plan to have a fully functional version of DCGS by the end of fiscal 
years 2010 and 2013, respectively, and the Army does not expect to 
have a fully functional system until 2016. The Marine Corps has not 
yet established a completion date for the full operational capability 
of its DCGS. 

Table 1: Status of Military Services' DCGS Programs: 

Military service: Air Force; 
Reached milestone B[A]: Yes; 
Full operational capability date: 2010. 

Military service: Navy; 
Reached milestone B[A]: Yes; 
Full operational capability date: 2013. 

Military service: Army; 
Reached milestone B[A]: Yes; 
Full operational capability date: 2016. 

Military service: Marine Corps; 
Reached milestone B[A]: No; 
Full operational capability date: Undetermined. 

Source: GAO analysis of military services' data. 

[A] Milestone B is the second major decision point in the acquisition 
process and comes after the technology development phase. 

[End of table] 

DOD has developed a system of standards and protocols, called the DCGS 
Integration Backbone (DIB), which serves as the foundation for 
interoperability between each of the four military services' DCGS 
programs. However, the services have not completed the process of 
prioritizing and tagging the data they want to share in accordance 
with these standards and protocols or developed timelines to do so. As 
a result, the services are not sharing all of their collected ISR data. 

* Although the Air Force has the capability to share some Air Force- 
generated ISR information with other DOD users through the DIB 
standards and protocols, it has not developed timelines or taken steps 
to prioritize the types of additional data that should be shared with 
the defense intelligence community. 

* The Army also has the capability to share some of its intelligence 
data with other users, but has experienced difficulties tagging all of 
its data because of its large inventory of legacy ISR systems. 
Moreover, the Army has not established timelines for sharing data. 

* The Navy and Marine Corps are not currently tagging all of the ISR 
data they intend to share and have neither developed timelines nor 
taken steps to prioritize the types of data that should be shared with 
the defense intelligence community. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has responsibility for 
ensuring implementation of DOD intelligence policy, including 
monitoring the services' progress toward interoperability. Although 
the services are responsible for managing their DCGS programs and 
conforming to information-sharing standards, according to Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and military service 
officials, DOD has not developed overarching guidance, such as a 
concept of operations that provides needed direction and priorities 
for sharing intelligence information within the defense intelligence 
community. Without this overarching guidance, the services lack 
direction to set their own goals and objectives for prioritizing and 
sharing ISR information and therefore have not developed service- 
specific implementation plans that describe the prioritization and 
types of ISR data they intend to share with the defense intelligence 
community. For example, a concept of operations could provide 
direction to the military services and defense agencies to select data 
to prioritize for meta-data tagging and sharing, such as electronic 
signals intelligence data. As a result, it is not clear how much of 
the collected data are not being shared. Until DOD identifies what 
types of ISR information should be shared and assigns priorities for 
sharing data, it is unclear whether mission-critical information will 
be available to the warfighter. In addition, the inability of users to 
fully access existing information in a timely manner is a contributing 
factor to the increasing demand for additional ISR collection assets. 

Therefore, in our January 2010 report, we recommended that the 
Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: 

* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to develop guidance, 
such as a concept of operations that provides overarching direction 
and priorities for sharing intelligence information across the defense 
intelligence community. 

* Direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to develop 
service-specific implementation plans, consistent with the concept of 
operations, which set timelines and outline the prioritization and 
types of ISR data they will share with the defense intelligence 
community through the DIB. 

In written comments on our report, DOD agreed with our recommendations 
overall and stated that there is guidance either issued or in 
development to address our recommendations. However, this guidance 
does not fully address the intent of our recommendations, and we 
believe additional guidance is necessary. 

Concluding Remarks: 

DOD officials cite ISR as vital to mission success in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and Congress has responded by funding additional ISR 
assets. However, until all participants in the defense enterprise 
successfully share ISR information, inefficiencies will hamper the 
effectiveness of efforts to support the warfighter, and ISR data 
collection efforts may be unnecessarily duplicative. While the focus 
of my testimony has been on the processing, exploiting, and 
disseminating of ISR data, our prior work has also shown that 
collection taskings are fragmented in theater and visibility into how 
ISR assets are being used is lacking. These challenges increase the 
risk that operational commanders may not be receiving mission-critical 
ISR information, which can create the perception that additional 
collection assets are needed to fill gaps. 

Mr. Chairmen and members of the subcommittees, this concludes my 
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you 
may have at this time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Davi 
M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. In addition, 
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals 
who made key contributions to this testimony are Margaret G. Morgan 
and Marc J. Schwartz, Assistant Directors; Grace A. Coleman; Gregory 
A. Marchand; Erika A. Prochaska; Kimberly C. Seay; and Walter K. 
Vance. In addition, Amy E. Brown; Amy D. Higgins; Timothy M. Persons; 
and Robert Robinson made significant contributions to the January 2010 
report that supported this testimony. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Establishing 
Guidance, Timelines, and Accountability for Integrating Intelligence 
Data Would Improve Information Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-265NI] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 
2010). This report is not available through GAO's Web site. Copies of 
this report are available upon request by calling (202) 512-6000, toll 
free (866) 801-7077, or TDD (202) 512-2537. 

[2] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, Report of the Joint Defense Science Board/ 
Intelligence Science Board Task Force on Integrating Sensor-Collected 
Intelligence (Washington, D.C., November 2008). 

[3] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively 
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-49] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 13, 2005). 

[4] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary 
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New 
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-596T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 
2007). 

[5] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased 
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2007). 

[6] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can 
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development 
of Future ISR Requirements, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 
2008). 

[7] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater 
Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-520] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 30, 2009). 

[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-265NI]. 

[9] The process of converting data into usable intelligence and 
disseminating it to users in a suitable format is commonly referred to 
as processing, exploitation, and dissemination. 

[10] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(Washington, D.C., Feb. 1, 2010). 

[11] GAO, Department of Defense Actions to Modify its Commercial 
Communications Satellite Services Procurement Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-480R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 
2006), and Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain 
Use of Best Practices, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-730T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 
2007). Congressional Research Service, Defense Program Issue: Global 
Information Grid, Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) (Washington, D.C., Jan. 
9, 2006), and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Report of the Joint Defense 
Science Board/Intelligence Science Board Task Force on Integrating 
Sensor-Collected Intelligence. 

[12] Signals intelligence is information derived from intercepted 
communications and electronic and data transmissions. 

[End of section] 

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