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GAO: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation: 

For release on delivery expected at: 

10 a.m. EDT, Wednesday, July 11, 2007: 

Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: 

Progress and Challenges: 

GAO-07-1099T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1099T, a testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by 
weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and 
monitor changes in weather (including severe weather such as 
hurricanes), climate, the oceans, and the environment. Two current 
acquisitions are the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program—which is to replace two 
existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems—and the planned 
$7 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-
R) program, which is to replace the current series of satellites due to 
reach end of their useful lives in approximately 2012. GAO was asked to 
summarize its past work on the progress and challenges facing these key 
environmental satellite acquisitions. 

What GAO Found: 

Both the NPOESS and GOES-R satellite acquisitions are costly, 
technically complex, and critically important to weather forecasting 
and climate monitoring. NPOESS was originally estimated to cost about 
$6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program, with its first 
satellite launch planned for April 2009. Over the last few years, 
NPOESS experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical 
difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure 
the program thereby decreasing the program’s complexity by reducing the 
number of sensors and satellites, increasing its estimated cost to 
$12.5 billion, and delaying the launches of the first two satellites to 
2013 and 2016 (see table below). Since that time, the program office 
has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition and 
establishing an effective management structure; however, important 
tasks remain to be done and significant risks remain. 

The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and 
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a 
much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, 
GAO reported that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall 
GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one 
of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. However, 
analyses of GOES-R cost—which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4 
billion—led the agency, in September 2006, to reduce the program’s 
scope from four to two satellites and to discontinue one of the 
critical sensors. Program officials now report that they are 
reevaluating that decision and may further revise the scope and 
requirements of the program in coming months. GAO also reported that 
NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite 
programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound cost estimates 
and adequate system engineering capabilities. GAO currently has work 
under way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges. 

Table: Summary of Changes to NPOESS Program: 

Key area: Life cycle range; 
Program before restructuring: 1995-2020; 
Program after restructuring: 1995-2026. 

Key area: Estimated life cycle cost; 
Program before restructuring: $8.4 billion; 
Program after restructuring: $12.5 billion. 

Key area: Launch schedule; 
Program before restructuring: First satellite by November 2009, Second 
satellite by June 2011; 
Program after restructuring: First satellite by January 2013, Second 
satellite by January 2016. 

Key area: Number of satellites; 
Program before restructuring: 6 (in addition to NPP); 
Program after restructuring: 4 (in addition to NPP). 

Key area: Number of orbits; 
Program before restructuring: 3(early morning, midmorning, and 
afternoon); 
Program after restructuring: 2 (early morning and afternoon; will rely 
on European satellites for midmorning orbit data). 

Key area: Number and complement of instruments; 
Program before restructuring: 13 instruments (10 sensors and 3 
subsystems); 
Program after restructuring: 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2 
subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to provide fewer capabilities. 

Key area: Number of data records; 
Program before restructuring: 55; 
Program after restructuring: 39 (6 are to be degraded products). 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[End of table] 

What GAO Recommends: 

In April 2007, GAO made recommendations to the NPOESS program to 
complete important tasks and mitigate significant risks to the program. 
In September 2006, GAO made recommendations to the GOES-R program to 
improve its management capabilities. Implementation of these 
recommendations should reduce risks for these critical acquisitions. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1099T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact David A. Powner at (202) 
512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to 
discuss our work on two major operational environmental satellite 
programs: the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program and the planned $7 
billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-R) 
program. 

Operational environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are 
used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map 
and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the 
environment. NPOESS--a tri-agency program managed by the Department of 
Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the 
Department of Defense/US Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA)--is expected to be a state-of-the-art, 
environment monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing 
polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. The GOES-R series, 
managed by NOAA with assistance from NASA, is to replace the current 
series of satellites which will likely begin to reach the end of their 
useful lives in approximately 2012. This new series is expected to mark 
the first major technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 
1994. The NPOESS and GOES-R programs are considered critical to the 
United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 
weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as 
hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the years 2026 and 
2028 respectively. 

At your request, we are summarizing the results of our previous work on 
operational environmental satellite programs, including NPOESS and the 
GOES-R program.[Footnote 1] In preparing this testimony, we relied on 
the work supporting our prior reports. Those reports contain detailed 
overviews of our scope and methodology. All of the work on which this 
testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

NOAA is involved in two major satellite acquisition programs, NPOESS 
and GOES-R, and both are costly, technically complex, and critically 
important to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. NPOESS was 
originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life 
of the program, with its first satellite launch planned for April 2009. 
Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced escalating costs, schedule 
delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 
decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program's 
complexity by reducing the number of sensors and satellites, increasing 
its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the launches of the 
first two satellites to 2013 and 2016, respectively. Since that time, 
the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite 
acquisition and establishing an effective management structure; 
however, important tasks remain to be done and significant risks 
remain. Specifically, key acquisition documents that were originally 
due in September 2006 are still not completed, the program office is 
not yet fully staffed, and the early July turnover of the program 
executive officer increases the program's risk. Additionally, technical 
risks remain in the development of key system sensors and the ground- 
based data processing system. In April 2007, we made recommendations to 
complete key acquisition documents, increase staffing at the program 
office, and delay reassignment of the program executive. Implementation 
of these recommendations should reduce risk on this critical 
acquisition. 

The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and 
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a 
much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, we 
reported that NOAA had issued contracts for the preliminary design of 
the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a 
contract to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the 
satellites. However, analyses of GOES-R cost--which in May 2006 was 
estimated to reach $11.4 billion--led the agency, in September 2006, to 
reduce the program's scope from four to two satellites and to 
discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program officials now report 
that they are reevaluating that decision and may further revise the 
scope and requirements of the program in coming months. We also 
reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from 
past satellite programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound 
cost estimates and adequate system engineering capabilities. We made 
recommendations to the program to improve its capabilities for managing 
this program and agency officials agreed with these recommendations and 
initiated efforts to implement them. We currently have work under way 
to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges. 

Background: 

Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting operational 
environmental satellites have been used by the United States to provide 
meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting. 
NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service 
(NESDIS) is responsible for managing the existing civilian 
geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate 
programs, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites 
and the Polar Operational Environmental Satellites (POES), 
respectively. The Air Force is responsible for operating a second polar-
orbiting environmental satellite system--the Defense Meteorological 
Satellite Program (DMSP). 

Polar-orbiting environmental satellites obtain environmental data that 
are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized 
weather products. These satellite data are also the predominant input 
to numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for 
forecasting weather 3 or more days in advance--including forecasting 
the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models 
are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that 
communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate their 
effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor 
environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought 
conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a 
variety of studies such as climate monitoring. Figure 1 illustrates the 
current operational polar satellite configuration consisting of two 
POES and two DMSP satellites. 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source; GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

[End of figure] 

Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in 
a relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a 
constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in 
space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily 
focused on the United States (see fig. 2). These satellites are 
uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data to 
meteorologists and their audiences on the earth's atmosphere, its 
surface, cloud cover, and the space environment. They also observe the 
development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and severe 
thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or 
avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the satellites' 
ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric 
conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA's weather 
forecasting operations. 

Figure 2: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage: 

[See PDF for image] 

Sources: NOAA (data), MapArt (map). 

[End of figure] 

Satellite Acquisition Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, 
Cost Overruns, and Schedule Delays: 

Satellite acquisition programs are often technically complex and risky 
undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical 
problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We and others have 
reported on a historical pattern of repeated missteps in the 
procurement of major satellite systems, including NPOESS, the GOES I-M 
series, the Air Force's Space Based Infrared System High Program (SBIRS-
High), and the Air Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite 
System (AEHF).[Footnote 2] Table 1 lists key problems experienced with 
these programs. While each of the programs faced multiple problems, all 
of them experienced insufficient maturity of technologies, overly 
aggressive schedules, insufficient subcontract management, and 
inadequate system engineering capabilities for overseeing contractors. 

Table 1: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space Systems: 

Insufficient technical readiness prior to critical decision points. 

Problem: Inadequate preliminary studies prior to the decision to award 
a development contract; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: X; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: [Empty]. 

Problem: Insufficient technical maturity prior to the decision to move 
to production; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: X; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates. 

Optimistic assumptions including:  

Problem: savings from heritage systems; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: X; 
SBIRS- High: X; 
AEHF: [Empty]. 

Problem: readiness of technology maturity; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: X; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Problem: constant and available industrial base; 
NPOESS: [Empty]; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: [Empty]. 

Problem: no weight growth; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Problem: no requirements growth; 
NPOESS: [Empty]; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: [Empty]; 
AEHF: X. 

Problem: savings from lot buys versus single-unit purchase; 
NPOESS: [Empty]; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: [Empty]. 

Problem: overly aggressive schedule; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: X; 
SBIRS- High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Poor program and contractor management. 

Problem: Quality and subcontractor issues; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: X; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Problem: Inadequate systems engineering capabilities; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: X; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Problem: Inadequate earned value management capabilities; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Problem: Insufficient management reserve; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: [Empty]; 
AEHF: X. 

Problem: Ineffective contract award fee structure; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: X; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: [Empty]. 

Poor senior executive level oversight. 

Problem: Infrequent meetings; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: [Empty]; 
AEHF: [Empty]. 

Problem: Inability to make timely decisions; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: [Empty]; 
AEHF: [Empty]. 

Problem: Other; 
NPOESS: [Empty]; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: [Empty]; 
AEHF: [Empty]. 

Problem: Unstable funding stream; 
NPOESS: X; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS- High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Problem: Unstable requirements; 
NPOESS: [Empty]; 
GOES I-M: [Empty]; 
SBIRS-High: X; 
AEHF: X. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and DOD data. 

[End of table] 

NPOESS: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations: 

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would 
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the 
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of 
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 3] The 
converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States' 
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather 
forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To 
manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated 
Program Office, located within NOAA. 

Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain 
activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the 
converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the 
acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the 
development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged 
system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA 
funds specific technology projects and studies. The NPOESS program 
office is overseen by an Executive Committee, which is made up of the 
Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air 
Force. 

NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to 
cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its 
inception in 1995 through 2018. The program was to provide satellite 
development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite 
data processing. When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and 
development contract was awarded in August 2002, the estimated cost was 
$7 billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of 
six satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration 
of 13 instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3 
subsystems (see table 2). 

Table 2: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical 
sensors are in bold): 

Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder (ATMS); 
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the 
atmosphere and is to be used with infrared sounding data from NPOESS's 
cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily global atmospheric 
temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles. 

Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor; 
Description: Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols 
(liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the atmosphere, such 
as sea spray, smog, and smoke). 

Instrument: Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder (CMIS); 
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain 
rate, ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the 
clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at 
different atmospheric levels. 

Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS); 
Description: Collects measurements of the earth's radiation to 
determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and 
pressure in the atmosphere. 

Instrument: Data collection system; 
Description: Collects environmental data from platforms around the 
world and delivers them to users worldwide. 

Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor; 
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave 
radiation released by the earth back into space on a worldwide scale to 
enhance long-term climate studies. 

Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite (OMPS); 
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and 
distribution of ozone in the earth's atmosphere. 

Instrument: Radar altimeter; 
Description: Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and 
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface 
height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to 
provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction 
models. 

Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system; 
Description: Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based 
users in distress. 

Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite; 
Description: Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects 
of space weather on technological systems, including satellites and 
radio links. 

Instrument: Survivability sensor; 
Description: Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other 
instruments in case of an attack. 

Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor; 
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance 
data. 

Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS); 
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide 
information on the earth's clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land 
surfaces. 

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS program office data. 

[End of table] 

In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory 
Project or NPP) was planned to be launched several years before the 
first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with 
launching new sensor technologies and to ensure continuity of climate 
data with NASA's Earth Observing System satellites. 

NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical 
Problems over Several Years: 

Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced continued cost increases 
and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made about the 
program's direction and capabilities. In 2003, we reported that changes 
in the NPOESS funding stream led the program to develop a new program 
cost and schedule baseline.[Footnote 4] After this new baseline was 
completed in 2004, we reported that the program office increased the 
NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion to $8.1 billion, delaying 
key milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, and 
extending the life of the program until 2020.[Footnote 5] In mid- 
November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to experience problems 
in the development of a key sensor, resulting in schedule delays and 
anticipated cost increases. This was due in part, to problems at 
multiple levels of management--including subcontractor, contractor, 
program office, and executive leadership. Recognizing that the budget 
for the program was no longer executable, the NPOESS Executive 
Committee planned to make a decision in December 2005 on the future 
direction of the program--what would be delivered, at what cost, and by 
when. This involved deciding among options involving increased costs, 
delayed schedules, and reduced functionality. We noted that continued 
oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making were more 
critical than ever, and we urged the committee to make a decision 
quickly so that the program could proceed. 

However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, NPOESS 
cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires 
DOD to certify the program to Congress.[Footnote 6] This placed any 
decision about the future direction of the program on hold until the 
certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program 
office implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year 2006 to 
continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal 
year 2006 funding. 

Nunn-McCurdy Process Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS 
Program: 

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major 
defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase 
thresholds.[Footnote 7] The law requires the Secretary of Defense to 
notify Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun 
its project baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the program 
to Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent 
or more.[Footnote 8] In late November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25 
percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program. 
Certifying the program entailed providing a determination that (1) the 
program is essential to national security, (2) there are no 
alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater military 
capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program's cost 
are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the program is 
adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri-agency teams-
-made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts--to work on each of the four 
elements of the certification process. 

In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies) 
certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 
billion through 2026.[Footnote 9] This decision approved a cost 
increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and 
delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly 3 to 
5 years. The new program also entailed establishing a stronger program 
management structure, reducing the number of satellites to be produced 
and launched from 6 to 4, and reducing the number of instruments on the 
satellites from 13 to 9--consisting of 7 environmental sensors and 2 
subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS satellites in the early 
morning and afternoon orbits and relying on European satellites for 
midmorning orbit data.[Footnote 10] Table 3 summarizes the major 
program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision. 

Table 3: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program: 

Key area: Life cycle range; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995-2020; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995-2026. 

Key area: Estimated life cycle cost; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $8.4 billion; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $12.5 billion. 

Key area: Launch schedule; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by October 2006; First 
NPOESS by November 2009; Second NPOESS by June 2011; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by January 2010; First 
NPOESS by January 2013; Second NPOESS by January 2016. 

Key area: Management structure; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director 
reports to a tri-agency steering committee and the tri-agency Executive 
Committee; Independent program reviews noted insufficient system 
engineering and cost analysis staff; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director is 
responsible for day-to-day program management and reports to the 
Program Executive Officer; Program Executive Officer oversees program 
and reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee. 

Key area: Number of satellites; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 6 (in addition to NPP); 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 4 (in addition to NPP). 

Key area: Number of orbits; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 3 (early morning, midmorning, 
and afternoon); 
Program after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: 2 (early morning and 
afternoon; will rely on European satellites for midmorning orbit data). 

Key area: Number and complement of instruments; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 13 instruments (10 sensors 
and 3 subsystems); 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2 
subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to provide fewer capabilities. 

Key area: Number of EDRs; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 55; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 39 (6 are to be degraded 
products). 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[End of table] 

The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for 
the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by 
January 2010,[Footnote 11] launching the first NPOESS satellite (called 
C1) by January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called 
C2) by January 2016. These revised milestones deviated from prior plans 
to have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES 
satellite should anything go wrong during that launch. 

Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the 
final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need 
to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until 
NPP data becomes available--almost 2 years later. Although NPP was not 
intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move it to a 
different orbit so that its data would be available in the event of a 
premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not 
provide all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS 
spacecraft. If the health of the existing constellation of satellites 
diminishes--or if NPP data is not available, timely, and reliable--then 
there could be a gap in environmental satellite data. 

In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification 
decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and 
reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, of the 13 
original sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged, 3 were replaced with less 
capable sensors, 1 was modified to provide less functionality, and 4 
were cancelled. Table 4 shows the changes to NPOESS sensors, including 
the 4 identified as critical sensors. 

Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in bold): 

Instrument: ATMS; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged; 
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first 
and third NPOESS satellites. 

Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Cancelled; 
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on 
future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it.[A]. 

Instrument: CMIS; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced; 
Change description: CMIS sensor was cancelled, and the program office 
is to procure a less complex Microwave imager/sounder for inclusion on 
the second, third, and fourth NPOESS satellites. 

Instrument: CrIS; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged; 
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first 
and third NPOESS satellites. 

Instrument: Data collection system; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged; 
Change description: Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS 
satellites. 

Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced; 
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, and is to be replaced on the 
first NPOESS satellite (and no others) by an existing sensor with fewer 
capabilities called the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System. 

Instrument: OMPS; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Modified; 
Change description: One part of the sensor, called OMPS (nadir), is to 
be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites; the 
remaining part, called OMPS (limb), was cancelled on the NPOESS 
satellites, but will be included on NPP[ A]. 

Instrument: Radar altimeter; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: Cancelled; 
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on 
future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it[.A]. 

Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged; 
Change description: Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS 
satellites. 

Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced; 
Change description: Sensor is to be replaced by a less capable, less 
expensive, legacy sensor called the Space Environment Monitor on the 
first and third NPOESS satellites. 

Instrument: Survivability sensor; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: Cancelled; 
Change description: Subsystem contract was cancelled, but could be 
reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to 
fund it[.A]. 

Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Cancelled; 
Change description: Sensor contract was cancelled, but could be 
reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to 
fund it[.A]. 

Instrument: VIIRS; 
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged; 
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on all four 
NPOESS satellites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[A] Although direct program funding for these instruments was 
eliminated, the instruments could be reintegrated on NPOESS satellites 
should other parties choose to fund them. The Nunn-McCurdy decision 
requires the program office to allow sufficient space on the spacecraft 
for these instruments and to provide the funding needed to integrate 
them. 

[End of table] 

The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the 
resulting weather and environmental products, called environmental data 
records or EDRs. In selecting sensors for the restructured program, the 
agencies placed the highest priority on continuing current operational 
weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected 
environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the 
revised NPOESS system has significantly less capability for providing 
global climate measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the 
number of EDRs was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced 
quality. The 39 EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land 
surface temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface 
winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle size and 
distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the 
atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in the space 
environment. The 6 EDRs that are of a reduced quality include ozone 
profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting energy in the 
space environment. 

NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps 
Remain To Be Completed: 

Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of 
the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in 
restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks 
remain to be done. Restructuring a major acquisition program like 
NPOESS is a process that involves identifying time-critical and high- 
priority work and keeping this work moving forward, while reassessing 
development priorities, interdependencies, deliverables, risks, and 
costs. It also involves revising important acquisition documents 
including the memorandum of agreement on the roles and responsibilities 
of the three agencies, the acquisition strategy, the system engineering 
plan, the test and evaluation master plan, the integrated master 
schedule defining what needs to happen by when, and the acquisition 
program baseline. Specifically, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision 
required the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator 
of NASA to sign a revised memorandum of agreement by August 6, 2006. It 
also required that the program office, Program Executive Officer, and 
the Executive Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents 
including the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by 
September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once 
these are completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with 
its prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be 
delivered, by when, and at what cost. 

The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the 
acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim 
program plans guiding the contractor's work activities in 2006 and 2007 
and has made progress in implementing these plans. The program office 
and contractor also developed an integrated master schedule for the 
remainder of the program--beyond fiscal year 2007. This integrated 
master schedule details the steps leading up to launching NPP by 
September 2009, launching the first NPOESS satellite in January 2013, 
and launching the second NPOESS satellite in January 2016. Near-term 
steps include completing and testing the VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors; 
integrating these sensors with the NPP spacecraft and completing 
integration testing; completing the data processing system and 
integrating it with the command, control, and communications segment; 
and performing advanced acceptance testing of the overall system of 
systems for NPP. 

However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be 
completed. Although the program office made progress in revising key 
acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan, the test 
and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy plan, it has 
not yet obtained the approval of the Secretaries of Commerce and 
Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the memorandum of agreement 
among the three agencies, nor has it obtained the approval of the 
NPOESS Executive Committee on the other key acquisition documents. As 
of June 2007, these approvals are over 9 months past due. Agency 
officials noted that the September 1, 2006, due date for the key 
acquisition documents was not realistic given the complexity of 
coordinating documents among three different agencies. 

Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency 
agreement and will allow the program office to move forward in 
completing other activities related to restructuring the program. These 
other activities include completing an integrated baseline review with 
the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work activities, 
and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and production 
contract. Program costs are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming 
negotiations on contract changes--an event that the Program Director 
expects to occur in July 2007. Completion of these activities will 
allow the program office to lock down a new acquisition baseline cost 
and schedule. Until key acquisition documents are finalized and 
approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to 
complete important restructuring activities in time to move forward in 
fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline in place. This places the 
NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases. 

Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management 
Structure, but Executive Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems 
Remain: 

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective 
management structure, but--almost a year after this structure was 
endorsed during the Nunn-McCurdy certification process--the Integrated 
Program Office still faces staffing problems. Over the past few years, 
we and others have raised concerns about management problems at all 
levels of the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor 
management, program office management, and executive-level 
management.[Footnote 12] Two independent review teams also noted a 
shortage of skilled program staff, including budget analysts and system 
engineers. Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in 
establishing an effective management structure--including establishing 
a new organizational framework with increased oversight by program 
executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and 
program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance. 
However, DOD's plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in 
the summer of 2007 increase the program's risks. Additionally, the 
program lacks a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing 
needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. As a result, the program 
office has experienced delays in getting core management activities 
under way and lacks the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management 
activities. 

NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective 
Management Structure and Increasing Oversight Activities, but Executive 
Turnover Will Increase Program Risks: 

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective 
management structure and increasing the frequency and intensity of its 
oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and others have 
raised concerns about management problems at all levels of management 
on the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor 
management, program office management, and executive-level management. 
In response to recommendations made by two different independent review 
teams, the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and 
early 2006 for revising its management structure. 

In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a 
Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program 
Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to the 
program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the 
Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and 
the Program Director proposed a revised organizational framework that 
realigned division managers within the Integrated Program Office 
responsible for overseeing key elements of the acquisition and 
increased staffing in key areas. In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy 
certification decision approved this new management structure and the 
Integrated Program Office implemented it. Figure 3 provides an overview 
of the relationships among the Integrated Program Office, the Program 
Executive Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions 
within the program office. 

Figure 3: Overview of New NPOESS Management Structure: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: NOAA. 

[End of figure] 

Operating under this new management structure, the program office 
implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and 
program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and 
mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value 
management techniques to monitor contractor performance. In addition to 
these program office activities, the Program Executive Officer 
implemented monthly program reviews and increased the frequency of 
contacts with the Executive Committee. The Program Executive Officer 
briefs the Executive Committee in monthly letters, apprising committee 
members of the program's status, progress, risks, and earned value, and 
the Executive Committee now meets on a quarterly basis--whereas in the 
recent past, we reported that the Executive Committee had met only five 
times in 2 years.[Footnote 13] 

Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an 
effective management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We 
recently reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due 
in part to frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we suggested 
that addressing this will require DOD to consider matching officials' 
tenure with the development or delivery of a product.[Footnote 14] In 
March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to 
reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in the summer 
2007 as part of this executive's natural career progression. As of June 
2007, the Program Executive Officer has held this position for 19 
months. Given that the program is currently still being restructured, 
and that there are significant challenges in being able to meet 
critical deadlines to ensure satellite data continuity, such a move 
adds unnecessary risk to an already risky program. 

NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks a Programwide 
Staffing Process: 

The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a staffing 
process that identifies programwide staffing requirements and plans for 
filling those needed positions. Sound human capital management calls 
for establishing a process or plan for determining staffing 
requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning to fill 
critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially important 
for NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple independent review 
teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past problems. 
Specifically, these review teams noted shortages in the number of 
system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor 
and contractor engineering activities and in the number of budget and 
cost analysts needed to assess contractor cost and earned value 
reports. To rectify this situation, the June 2006 certification 
decision directed the Program Director to take immediate actions to 
fill vacant positions at the program office with the approval of the 
Program Executive Officer. 

Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure, the 
program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a 
budget officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm division chief, 
and a contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc basis, individual 
division managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire 
staff for key positions. However, the program office lacks a 
programwide process for identifying and filling all needed positions. 
As a result, division managers often wait months for critical positions 
to be filled. For example, in February 2006, the NPOESS program 
estimated that it needed to hire up to 10 new budget analysts. As of 
September 2006, none of these positions had been filled. As of April 
2007, program officials estimated that they still needed to fill 5 
budget analyst positions, 5 systems engineering positions, and 10 
technical manager positions. The majority of the vacancies--4 of the 5 
budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems engineering positions, and 8 of 
the 10 technical manager positions--are to be provided by NOAA. NOAA 
officials noted that each of these positions is in some stage of being 
filled--that is, recruitment packages are being developed or reviewed, 
vacancies are being advertised, or candidates are being interviewed, 
selected, and approved. 

The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the 
right personnel in place to facilitate this process, and it did not 
even begin to develop a staffing process until November 2006. Program 
officials noted that the tri-agency nature of the program adds unusual 
layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative functions because 
each agency has its own hiring and performance management rules. In 
November 2006, the program office brought in an administrative officer 
who took the lead in pulling together the division managers' individual 
assessments of needed staff and has been working with the division 
managers to refine this list. This new administrative officer plans to 
train division managers in how to assess their needs and to hire needed 
staff, and to develop a process by which evolving needs are identified 
and positions are filled. However, there is as yet no date set for 
establishing this basic programwide staffing process. As a result of 
the lack of a programwide staffing process, there has been an extended 
delay in determining what staff is needed and in bringing those staff 
on board; this has resulted in delays in performing core activities, 
such as establishing the program office's cost estimate and bringing in 
needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a programwide 
staffing process is in place, the program office risks not having the 
staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities. 

In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that NOAA 
implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the NPOESS 
program office reported that several critical positions were filled in 
April and May 2007. However, we have not yet evaluated NOAA's 
accelerated hiring model and, as of June 2007, about 10 key positions 
remained to be filled. 

Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks 
Remain: 

Major segments of the NPOESS program--the space segment and ground 
systems segment--are under development; however, significant problems 
have occurred and risks remain. The program office is aware of these 
risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could 
affect the program's overall cost and schedule. Given the tight time 
frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP 
spacecraft, and developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based 
data processing systems, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated 
Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive 
Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and 
risks. 

Space Segment--Progress Made, but Key Sensors Continue to Face Major 
Risks: 

The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four sensors 
are of critical importance--VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS--because they 
are to be launched on the NPP satellite in September 2009. Initiating 
work on another sensor, the Microwave imager/sounder, is also important 
because this new sensor--replacing the cancelled CMIS sensor--will need 
to be developed in time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Over 
the past year, the program made progress on each of the sensors and the 
spacecraft. However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced 
major problems. The status of each of the components of the space 
segment is described in table 5. 

Table 5: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of 
April 2007: 

Space segment component: VIIRS; 
Risk level: High; 
Status: VIIRS development has continued in 2006 and in early 2007. In 
December 2006, the contractor completed environmental tests of VIIRS's 
engineering design unit (a prototype) and identified three problems.[A] 
While these problems were being studied, the program office approved 
the delivery of the engineering unit to the subcontractor responsible 
for integration and testing on NPP. In late February 2007, program 
officials determined that the contractor was able to mitigate all but 
one of the problems, and they approved the flight unit to proceed to 
system level integration with a goal of resolving the final problem 
before a technical readiness review milestone. VIIRS flight unit is 
scheduled to be delivered to NPP by July 2008. 

Space segment component: CrIS; 
Risk level: High; 
Status: Development of CrIS was put on hold in October 2006 when the 
flight unit designated to go on NPP experienced a major structural 
failure during its vibration testing. As of March 2007, a failure 
review board established by the contractors and the NPOESS program 
office identified causes for failure and has planned an approach to 
completing flight unit development and delivery for NPP. The review 
board has also initiated inspections of all sensor modules and 
subsystems for damage. The program office expects to restart acceptance 
testing in July 2007, and the CrIS flight unit is expected to be 
delivered to NPP by February 2008. 

Space segment component: OMPS; 
Risk level: Moderate; 
Status: As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification in June 2006, one 
element of the OMPS sensor, called OMPS (limb), was removed from the 
program. In February 2007, program officials agreed to reintegrate OMPS 
(limb) on NPP if NOAA and NASA would fund it. This funding was approved 
in early April 2007. OMPS is currently on schedule for delivery to NPP 
by May 2008; however, there are concerns that the OMPS flight unit 
delivery will be so late in the integration testing process that there 
could be an insufficient schedule margin should a problem arise. 

Space segment component: ATMS; 
Risk level: Low; 
Status: The ATMS flight unit for NPP was developed by a NASA contractor 
and delivered to the program in October 2005. NASA integrated the 
flight unit on the spacecraft and is awaiting delivery of the other 
sensors in order to complete integration testing. 

Space segment component: Microwave imager/ sounder; 
Risk level: Not yet rated; 
Status: A new microwave imager/sounder sensor is being planned to 
replace the cancelled CMIS sensor. It is planned to be ready for the 
launch on the second NPOESS satellite. In October 2006, the program 
office issued a request for information seeking industry ideas for the 
design of the new sensor. The program office anticipates awarding a 
contract to develop the sensor by October 2008. 

Space segment component: Spacecraft; 
Risk level: Low; 
Status: The development of the spacecrafts for NPP and NPOESS are on 
track. The NPP spacecraft was completed in June 2005. Integration 
testing will be conducted once the NPP sensors are delivered; Early 
issues with the NPOESS spacecraft (including issues with antennas and a 
data storage unit) have been resolved; however, risks remain that could 
delay the completion of the spacecraft. A key risk involves delays in 
the delivery of the solar array, which may arrive too late to be 
included in some key testing. Other risks associated with the 
electrical power subsystem are taking longer than anticipated to 
resolve. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

[A] The three problems are (1) band-to-band co-registration, an issue 
in which band registration shifts with different temperatures; (2) 
cross-talk, which involves information from sensor cells leaking into 
other cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which the 
instrument's focus changes with changes in temperature. 

[End of table] 

Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and CrIS is 
of particular importance because these components are to be 
demonstrated on the NPP satellite, currently scheduled for launch in 
September 2009. Any delay in the NPP launch date could affect the 
overall NPOESS program, because the success of the program depends on 
the lessons learned in data processing and system integration from the 
NPP satellite. Additionally, continued sensor problems could lead to 
higher final program costs. 

Ground Segment--Progress Has Been Made, but Work Remains: 

Development of the ground segment--which includes the interface data 
processing system, the ground stations that are to receive satellite 
data, and the ground-based command, control, and communications system-
-is under way and on track. However, important work pertaining to 
developing the algorithms that translate satellite data into weather 
products within the integrated data processing segment remains to be 
completed. Table 6 describes each of the components of the ground 
segment and identifies the status of each. 

Table 6: Status of Ground Segment Components, as of April 2007: 

Ground segment component/description: Interface Data Processing System 
(IDPS): A ground-based system that is to process the sensors' data so 
that they are usable by the data processing centers and the broader 
community of environmental data users. IDPS will be deployed at the 
four weather data processing centers; 
Risk level: Moderate; 
Status: IDPS is being developed in a series of builds. Currently, IDPS 
build 1.4 has been delivered for testing and recently passed two key 
data transfer tests. Contractors are currently working to develop IDPS 
build 1.5, which is expected to be the build that will be used with 
NPP. However, work remains in three areas: system latency, algorithm 
performance, and calibration and validation planning; Latency--IDPS 
must process volumes of data within 65 minutes to meet NPP 
requirements. The contractor has made progress in reducing the latency 
of the system's data handling from 93 minutes to 73 minutes and is 
working to reduce it by 8 minutes more by resolving data management 
issues, increasing the number of processors, and increasing algorithm 
efficiency; Algorithm performance--IDPS algorithms are the mathematical 
functions coded into the system software that transform raw data into 
data products, including sensor data records and environmental data 
records. IDPS build 1.4 contains provisional algorithms, which are 
being refined as the sensors complete various stages of testing. 
Because some sensors are delayed, full characterization of those 
sensors in order to refine the algorithms has also been delayed and may 
not be completed in time for the delivery of IDPS build 1.5 in early 
2009. If this occurs, agency officials plan to improve the algorithms 
in build 1.5 during a planned maintenance upgrade prior to NPP launch; 
Calibration/validation--Calibration/ validation is the process for 
tweaking algorithms to provide more accurate observations. The 
contractor has documented a detailed schedule for calibration and 
validation during IDPS development and is developing a postlaunch task 
list to drive prelaunch preparation efforts. However, much work and 
uncertainty continue to exist in the calibration and validation area. A 
program official noted that, while teams can do a lot of preparation 
work, including building the infrastructure to allow sensor testing and 
having a good understanding of the satellite, sensors, and available 
data for calibration, many issues need to take place after launch. 

Ground segment component/description: Ground stations for receiving 
satellite data: 15 unmanned ground stations around the world (called 
SafetyNet™) are to receive satellite data and send these to the four 
data processing centers; 
Risk level: Low; 
Status: NOAA is working with domestic and foreign authorities to gain 
approval to operate ground stations to receive satellite data. 
According to agency officials, the full complement of ground stations 
will not be in place in time for the C1 launch: however, the ground 
stations will be phased in by the launch of C2. To date, the program 
office has reached agreement with 4 of 15 ground station sites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[End of table] 

Managing the risks associated with the development of the IDPS system 
is of particular importance because this system will be needed to 
process NPP data. 

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Risk: 

Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program to 
ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather and 
environmental observations, in our April 2007 report,[Footnote 15] we 
made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and to 
the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the responsible executives 
within their respective organizations approve key acquisition 
documents, including the memorandum of agreement among the three 
agencies, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master 
plan, and the acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible but no later 
than April 30, 2007. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Air Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed 
Program Executive Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the 
NPOESS Preparatory Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled to 
occur by July 2008. We also made two additional recommendations to the 
Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written process 
for identifying and addressing human capital needs and for streamlining 
how the program handles the three different agencies' administrative 
procedures and (2) establish a plan for immediately filling needed 
positions. 

In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was important to 
finalize key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and DOD proposed 
extending the due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007. DOD 
subsequently extended the due dates to September and October 2007 and 
March 2008 in the case of the test and evaluation master plan. Because 
the NPOESS program office intends to complete contract negotiations in 
July 2007, we remain concerned that any further delays in approving the 
documents could delay contract negotiations and thus increase the risk 
to the program. 

In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendation 
to develop and implement a written process for identifying and 
addressing human capital needs and to streamline how the program 
handles the three different agencies' administrative procedures. The 
department also agreed with our recommendation to plan to immediately 
fill open positions at the NPOESS program office. Commerce noted that 
NOAA identified the skill sets needed for the program and has 
implemented an accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA 
positions in the NPOESS program. Commerce also noted that NOAA has made 
NPOESS hiring a high priority and has documented a strategy--including 
milestones--to ensure that all NOAA positions are filled by June 2007. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the 
Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program 
Director responsible for executing the acquisition program would remain 
in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the 
Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between the Air 
Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that a selection would be made 
before the departure of the current Program Executive Officer to 
provide an overlap period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure 
continuity. However, over the last few years, we and others (including 
an independent review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have 
reported that ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the 
NPOESS program's cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that 
reassigning the Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing 
critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the 
program at further risk. 

In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director 
remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this 
position does not ensure continuity in the functions of the Program 
Executive Officer. The current Program Executive Officer is experienced 
in providing oversight of the progress, issues, and challenges facing 
NPOESS and coordinating with Executive Committee members as well as the 
Defense acquisition authorities. Additionally, while the Program 
Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between agencies, the 
memorandum of agreement documenting this arrangement is still in draft 
and should be flexible enough to allow the current Program Executive 
Officer to remain until critical risks have been addressed. 

Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between the 
selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of the 
current one, time is running out. The current Program Executive Officer 
is expected to depart in early July 2007, and as of early July 2007, a 
successor has not yet been named. NPOESS is an extremely complex 
acquisition, involving three agencies, multiple contractors, and 
advanced technologies. There is not sufficient time to transfer 
knowledge and develop the sound professional working relationships that 
the new Program Executive Officer will need to succeed in that role. 
Thus, we remain convinced that given NPOESS current challenges, 
reassigning the current Program Executive Officer at this time is not 
appropriate. 

GOES-R: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations: 

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several 
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites 
every few years (see table 7). To date, NOAA has procured three series 
of GOES satellites and is planning to acquire a fourth series, called 
GOES-R. 

Table 7: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES: 

Series name: Original GOES[B]; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1970-1987; 
Satellites: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 

Series name: GOES I-M; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1985-2001; 
Satellites: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 

Series name: GOES-N; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1998-2011; 
Satellites: 13, O, P, Q[C]. 

Series name: GOES-R; 
Procurement duration[A]: 2007-2020; 
Satellites: R, S, T, U[D]. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite 
launch. 

[B] The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate 
contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES- 
2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and 
GOES-7. 

[C] NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

[D] NOAA recently decided to drop satellites T and U from this series, 
but is now reconsidering that decision. 

[End of table] 

Original GOES Satellites: 

In 1970, NOAA initiated its original GOES program based on experimental 
geostationary satellites developed by NASA. While these satellites 
operated effectively for many years, they had technical limitations. 
For example, this series of satellites was "spin-stabilized," meaning 
that the satellites slowly spun while in orbit to maintain a stable 
position with respect to the earth. As a result, the satellite viewed 
the earth only about 5 percent of the time and had to collect data very 
slowly, capturing one narrow band of data each time its field-of-view 
swung past the earth. A complete set of sounding data took 2 to 3 hours 
to collect. 

GOES I-M Series: 

In 1985, NOAA and NASA began to procure a new generation of GOES, 
called the GOES I-M series, based on a set of requirements developed by 
NOAA's National Weather Service, NESDIS, and NASA, among others. GOES I-
M consisted of five satellites, GOES-8 through GOES-12, and was a 
significant improvement in technology from the original GOES 
satellites. For example, GOES I-M was "body-stabilized," meaning that 
the satellite held a fixed position in orbit relative to the earth, 
thereby allowing for continuous meteorological observations. Instead of 
maintaining stability by spinning, the satellite would preserve its 
fixed position by continuously making small adjustments in the rotation 
of internal momentum wheels or by firing small thrusters to compensate 
for drift. These and other enhancements meant that the GOES I-M 
satellites would be able to collect significantly better quality data 
more quickly than the older series of satellites. 

GOES-N Series: 

In 1998, NOAA began the procurement of satellites to follow GOES I-M, 
called the GOES-N series. This series used existing technologies for 
the instruments and added system upgrades, including an improved power 
subsystem and enhanced satellite pointing accuracy. Furthermore, the 
GOES-N satellites were designed to operate longer than its 
predecessors. This series originally consisted of four satellites, GOES-
N through GOES-Q. However, the option for the GOES-Q satellite was 
cancelled based on NOAA's assessment that it would not need the final 
satellite to continue weather coverage. In particular, the agency found 
that the GOES satellites already in operation were lasting longer than 
expected and that the first satellite in the next series could be 
available to back up the last of the GOES-N satellites. As noted 
earlier, the first GOES-N series satellite--GOES-13--was launched in 
May 2006. The GOES-O and GOES-P satellites are currently in production 
and are expected to be launched in July 2008 and July 2011, 
respectively. 

Planned GOES-R Series: 

NOAA is currently planning to procure the next series of GOES 
satellites, called the GOES-R series. NOAA is planning for the GOES-R 
program to improve on the technology of prior GOES series, both in 
terms of system and instrument improvements. The system improvements 
are expected to fulfill more demanding user requirements and to provide 
more rapid information updates. Table 8 highlights key system-related 
improvements that GOES-R is expected to make to the geostationary 
satellite program. 

Table 8: Summary of Key GOES-R System Improvements: 

Key feature: Total products; 
GOES-N (current): 41; 
GOES-R: ~152. 

Key feature: Downlink rate of raw data collected by instruments (from 
satellite to ground stations); 
GOES-N (current): 2.6 Mbps; 
GOES-R: 132 Mbps. 

Key feature: Broadcast rate of processed GOES data (from satellite to 
users); 
GOES-N (current): 2.1 Mbps; 
GOES-R: 17-24 Mbps. 

Key feature: Raw data storage (the length of time that raw data will be 
stored at ground stations); 
GOES-N (current): 0 days; 
GOES-R: 30 days. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to increase the 
clarity and precision of the observed environmental data. Originally, 
NOAA planned to acquire 5 different instruments. The program office 
considered two of the instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager and the 
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite--to be the most critical because they 
would provide data for key weather products. Table 9 summarizes the 
originally planned instruments and their expected capabilities. 

Table 9: Expected GOES-R Series Instruments, as of June 2006: 

Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric 
information of the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key 
features include: 
* monitoring and tracking severe weather; 
* providing images of clouds to support forecasts, and; 
* providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage 
simultaneously. 

Planned instrument: Hyperspectral Environmental Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide information about the earth's surface 
to aid in the prediction of weather and climate monitoring. Key 
features include: 
* providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support 
forecasts and climate monitoring; 
* monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality, 
coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms, and; 
* providing higher resolution and faster coverage. 

Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in 
the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance and 
disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key features 
include: 
* measuring magnetic fields and charged particles; 
* providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low energy electrons 
and protons, and; 
* enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, 
telecom services, astronauts, and airlines. 

Planned instrument: Solar Imaging Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range 
of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as well 
as estimate the measure of temperature and emissions. Key features 
include: 
* providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor 
solar storms and; 
* providing improved imager capability. 

Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Description: Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over 
the United States and provide a more complete dataset than previously 
possible. Key features include: 
* detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms and; 
* providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on 
polar satellites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

After our report was issued, NOAA officials told us that the agency 
decided to cancel its plans for the development of the Hyperspectral 
Environmental Suite, but expected to explore options to ensure the 
continuity of data provided by the current GOES series. Additionally, 
NOAA reduced the number of satellites in the GOES-R series from four to 
two satellites. 

The GOES-R Series Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System 
Requirements and Cost Estimates May Change: 

NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R 
system, which was initially estimated to cost $6.2 billion and 
scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. At the 
time of our most recent review in September 2006,[Footnote 16] NOAA had 
issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R 
system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of 
these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. In addition, to 
reduce the risks associated with developing new instruments, NOAA 
issued contracts for the early development of two instruments and for 
the preliminary designs of three other instruments. 

However, analyses of the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the 
program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion--led the agency to 
consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. 
In September 2006, NOAA officials reported that the agency had made a 
decision to reduce the scope and complexity of the GOES-R program by 
reducing the number of satellites from 4 to 2 and canceling a 
technically complex instrument--called the Hyperspectral Environmental 
Suite. As of July 2007, agency officials reported that they are 
considering further changes to the scope of the program, which are 
likely to affect the overall program cost. We have work under way to 
evaluate these changes. 

Steps Taken to Reduce GOES-R Risk, More Work Remains: 

NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite 
programs, but more remains to be done. As outlined previously, key 
lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic 
cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness 
of the system's components prior to key decisions, (3) provide 
sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4) 
perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. 
NOAA established plans to address these lessons by conducting 
independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies of key 
technologies, placing resident government offices at key contractor 
locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight committee. 
However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons. 
Specifically, at the time of our review, NOAA had not yet developed a 
process to evaluate and reconcile the independent and government cost 
estimates. In addition, NOAA had not yet determined how it will ensure 
that a sufficient level of technical maturity will be achieved in time 
for an upcoming decision milestone, nor had it determined the 
appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately track and oversee 
the program using earned value management.[Footnote 17] Until it 
completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES- 
R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and 
performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. 

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce GOES-R Acquisition 
Risk: 

To improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the GOES-R procurement, 
in our September 2006 report,[Footnote 18] we made recommendations to 
the Secretary of Commerce to direct its NOAA Program Management Council 
to establish a process for objectively evaluating and reconciling the 
government and independent life cycle cost estimates once the program 
requirements are finalized; to establish a team of system engineering 
experts to perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline 
Imager instrument to determine the level of technical maturity achieved 
on the instrument before moving the instrument into production; and to 
seek assistance in determining the appropriate levels of resources 
needed at the program office to adequately track and oversee the 
contractor's earned value management data. In written comments at that 
time, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendations and 
provided information on its plans to implement our recommendations. 

In summary, both the NPOESS and GOES-R programs are critical to 
developing weather forecasts, issuing severe weather warnings for 
events such as hurricanes, and maintaining continuity in environmental 
and climate monitoring. Over the last several years, the NPOESS program 
experienced cost, schedule, and technical problems, but has now been 
restructured and is making progress. Still, technical and programmatic 
risks remain. The GOES-R program has incorporated lessons from other 
satellite acquisitions, but still faces challenges in establishing the 
management capabilities it needs and in determining the scope of the 
program. We have work under way to evaluate the progress and risks of 
both NPOESS and GOES-R in order to assist with congressional oversight 
of these critical programs. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer 
any questions that you or members of the committee may have at this 
time. 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, 
please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. 
Other key contributors to this testimony include Carol Cha, Kathleen S. 
Lovett, and Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director). 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Restructuring is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain, 
GAO-07-498 (Washington, D.C. April 27, 2007); Polar-orbiting 
Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but 
Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO-07-910T (Washington, D.C. June 7, 
2007); Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain 
in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-
993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Additional Action Needed to Incorporate 
Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-1129T 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). 

[2] GAO-07-498; GAO-06-993; GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System 
Acquisition Risks and Keys to Addressing Them, GAO-06-776R (Washington, 
D.C.: June 1, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 
Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction 
on Hold, GAO-06-573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting 
Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost 
Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off 
Decisions, GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); Polar- 
orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and 
Schedule Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); 
Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains 
at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 31, 2003); Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their 
Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO-03-825R (Washington, 
D.C.: June 2, 2003); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon 
Programs, GAO-03-476 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); Weather 
Satellites: Action Needed to Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary 
Satellite Program, GAO/NSIAD-91-252 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1991). 
Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task 
Force, Report on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs 
(May 2003). 

[3] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2 (May 5, 1994). 

[4] GAO; Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could 
Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T 
(Washington, D.C., July 15, 2003) 

[5] GAO-04-1054 

[6] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost 
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06- 
573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006). 

[7] 10 U.S.C § 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy. 

[8] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 (e)(2). 

[9] DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified program 
would cost $11.5 billion. The acquisition portion includes satellite 
development, production, and launch, but not operations and support 
costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion for 
operations and support after launch, this brings the program life cycle 
cost to $12.5 billion. 

[10] The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological 
Satellites' MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting 
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are 
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. 

[11] According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy 
certification decision specifies NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA 
plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce the possibility of a 
climate data continuity gap. 

[12] GAO-06-249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector 
General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave 
NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001/ 
2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In addition, two independent teams 
reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led Independent Review Team 
investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on NPP, and 
a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader 
NPOESS program. The teams briefed the NPOESS Executive Committee on 
their findings in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively. 

[13] GAO-06-249T 

[14] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions 
and Keys to Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 
2006). 

[15] GAO-07-498 

[16] GAO-06-993. 

[17] Earned value management is a method that compares the value of 
work accomplished during a given period with that of the work expected 
in that period. 

[18] GAO-06-993. 

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