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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, 
and Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Wednesday, June 13, 2007: 

Peacekeeping: 

Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN 
Operations: 

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-07-998T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-998T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

As of June 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are 
engaged in UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, 
Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United 
States provided the UN with about $1 billion to support peacekeeping 
operations. Given that thousands of U.S. troops are intensively 
deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping 
operations are an important element in maintaining a secure 
international environment. 

As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the costs of the current UN 
mission in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical 
U.S. operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United 
States and the UN in leading peace operations. 

This testimony is based on our prior report and information we updated 
for this hearing. To estimate U.S. costs, we developed parameters for a 
U.S. mission similar to the UN mission in Haiti, which the Joint Staff 
validated as reasonable. We then applied DOD’s official cost estimating 
model. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would 
implement an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN. 

What GAO Found: 

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as 
it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN 
mission in Haiti. The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months 
of the mission. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated 
$876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to 
cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. 
First, civilian police costs are less in a UN operation because the UN 
pays police a standard daily allowance, while U.S. police are given 
salaries, special pay, and training. Second, U.S. military pay and 
support reflect higher salaries and higher standards for equipment, 
ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. facilities-related costs would be 
twice those of the UN and reflect the cost of posting U.S. civilian 
personnel in a secure embassy compound. When we varied specific 
factors, such as increasing the number of reserve troops deployed, the 
estimated cost for a U.S. operation increased. 

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or 
the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and 
limitations. Traditionally, the United States’ strengths have included 
rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and 
equipped personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in 
shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. 
The UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN 
Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also 
has access to international civil servants, police, and senior 
officials who have nation-building experience and diverse language 
skills. Finally, the UN has fostered a network of agencies and 
development banks to coordinate international assistance with 
peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has traditionally had 
difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified 
command and control over its peacekeeping forces. 

Figure: Cost Estimate for a U.S. Operations and UN MINUSTAH Budget: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost 
data. 

[End of figure] 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-998T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at 
(202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of the work we 
completed for this subcommittee on the cost of a United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping operation versus the cost of a similar U.S. operation. As 
of May 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are 
engaged in UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, 
Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United 
States provided the UN with about $1 billion to support peacekeeping 
operations out of a total peacekeeping budget of about $5.5 billion. 
Given that U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations are a key element in 
maintaining a secure international environment. 

My testimony today focuses on (1) the costs of the current UN mission 
in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. 
operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States 
and the UN in leading peace operations. This testimony is based on our 
prior report[Footnote 1] and information we updated for this hearing. 
We reviewed classified and unclassified information, but we used only 
unclassified information in this statement. We selected the UN mission 
in Haiti as a case study because both the United States and the UN have 
conducted operations in that country, thus providing comparative 
information on their two approaches. However, it is uncertain whether 
the United States would implement an operation in Haiti in the same way 
as the UN, given operational, structural, and doctrinal differences. 
While the results of the review cannot be generalized to other U.S. and 
UN operations, we believe this report provides useful insights into the 
costs and effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping 
missions. 

To compare UN and U.S. costs to implement a comparable peacekeeping 
operation, we obtained budget data for the first 14 months of the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). We developed a scenario for 
a U.S. operation in Haiti that used the same deployment schedule as the 
UN, with the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel 
and aircraft over the same period. Officials from the Joint Staff 
validated this scenario as reasonable. We used DOD's Contingency 
Operation Support Tool to estimate military costs. DOD requires that 
this model be used to generate estimates for all U.S. contingency 
operations, and it is used as the basis for the supplemental 
appropriation requests to Congress.[Footnote 2] To estimate civilian 
costs, we used historical data and formulas from the Department of 
State. To assess the relative strengths and limitations of U.S. and UN 
forces, we analyzed UN and U.S. reports, including information on UN- 
and U.S.-led operations in Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We interviewed 
officials from DOD and State to get their perspectives on the strengths 
and limitations of UN-and U.S.-led operations. We conducted our work in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as 
it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN 
mission in Haiti. The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months 
of the mission, of which the United States was responsible for $116 
million. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated $876 
million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to 
three major elements: civilian police, military pay and support, and 
facilities. First, the estimated cost of deploying U.S. civilian police 
is $217 million or about 8 times the $25 million budgeted by the UN for 
international police officers. Compensation rates for U.S. police 
include higher costs for salaries, special pay and training, whereas 
the UN pays police a standard daily allowance. Second, we estimated 
that U.S. military pay and support would cost $260 million, compared 
with $131 million in the UN budget, and reflects higher salaries and 
higher standards for equipment, ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. 
facilities-related costs would be twice those of the UN, reflecting the 
cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. 
Several factors could affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation, 
including the mix of reserve and active duty troops and the rate of 
troop deployment. When we varied these factors--for example, by 
increasing the number of reserve troops deployed--the estimated cost 
for a U.S. operation increased. 

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or 
the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and 
limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included 
rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and 
equipped personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in 
shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. 
The UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN 
Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also 
has access to international civil servants, police, and senior 
officials who have nation-building experience and diverse language 
skills. Finally, the UN has fostered a network of agencies and 
development banks to coordinate international assistance with 
peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has traditionally had 
difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified 
command and control over its peacekeeping forces. 

Background: 

Both the UN and United States have a long history of conducting 
operations to promote peace and stability. The UN has undertaken more 
than 60 peacekeeping missions since 1948 and states that it has 
negotiated more than 170 settlements that have ended regional 
conflicts. As of June 2007, 15 UN peacekeeping operations were ongoing 
in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas.[Footnote 3] 
As shown in figure 1, the number of military troops and police in UN 
peacekeeping operations has steadily increased from 29,140 personnel in 
1996 to 83,071 in 2007, with a record number of peacekeepers deployed 
around the world by March 2007. The United States has led and 
participated in many peacekeeping operations, such as in Somalia, 
Haiti, and the Balkans; as of April 2007, there were 310 U.S. military 
and police serving in UN operations. In contrast to the relatively few 
U.S. troops and police in UN operations, the United States has about 
146,000 troops in Iraq and about 25,000 in Afghanistan in stability 
operations as of April 2007. 

Figure 1: UN Military and Police Deployed to Peacekeeping Missions: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of UN data. 

[End of figure] 

The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN 
peacekeeping, with payments of more than $1 billion in 2006. In total, 
the United States pays 25 percent or more of the annual peacekeeping 
budget. (Figure 2 provides information about U.S. contributions to UN 
peacekeeping.) The UN annually assesses the United States about 26 
percent of the UN peacekeeping budget (including higher percentages 
before 2006). However, U.S. legislation capped payments in 1995 at 25 
percent, resulting in arrears. Congress has lifted the cap for some 
years.[Footnote 4] According to the Department of State, the amount of 
U.S. arrears for UN peacekeeping since 2005 is $117 million. This 
amount reflects arrears as of June 2007. In addition, the United 
States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, approved many 
UN peacekeeping missions and activities prior to 2005. According to the 
Department of State, U.S. arrears for these peacekeeping efforts total 
$505 million, but State does not have legal authority to pay for them. 

Figure 2: U.S. Payments for UN Peacekeeping: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of UN and State Department data. 

[End of figure] 

Since 1993, the UN has maintained a nearly constant peacekeeping 
presence in Haiti to help stabilize the country, combat crime, and 
support elections (see figure 3). Since 1994, the United States has led 
two military interventions and one humanitarian mission to help 
stabilize the country. The primary task of the current UN mission in 
Haiti is to provide a secure and stable environment, assist the 
transitional government with Haiti's political processes, protect human 
rights, and support the Haitian National Police. Authorization for the 
mission is set to expire in October 2007, but the UN Security Council 
has renewed MINUSTAH's mandate since 2004. UN reports cite MINUSTAH's 
role in attempting to create a relatively stable security environment 
in most of the country. However, the overall situation is still 
volatile and sporadic armed violence continues. 

Figure 3: U.S. and UN Operations in Haiti: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of UN and DOD data. 

Note: Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow were military 
interventions to provide security in Haiti and restore government 
control. Operation New Horizons was a humanitarian mission to develop 
infrastructure and provide medical and dental services. 

[End of figure] 

The UN has spent about $891 million from the inception of MINUSTAH in 
2004 to June 2006. For the UN's current fiscal year for peacekeeping, 
ending June 30, 2007, the UN budgeted about $491 million. (See table 1 
for details on budgeted and actual UN expenditures for MINUSTAH.) The 
current budget of $491 provides for 7,500 military personnel, 1,000 
police in formed units, 897 civilian police, and 1,771 civilian 
officials and staff. 

Table 1: Budgeted and Actual UN Expenditures for MINUSTAH (U.S. 
Dollars): 

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations: 05/01/04 to 06/30/04; 
Budgeted by UN: $49,259,800; 
Expended by UN: $34,556,100. 

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations: 07/01/04 to 06/30/05; 
Budgeted by UN: $379,046,800; 
Expended by UN: $377,235,300. 

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations: Total for first 14 months of 
operation; 
Budgeted by UN: $428,306,600; 
Expended by UN: $411,791,400. 

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations: 07/01/05 to 06/30/06; 
Budgeted by UN: $516,488,500; 
Expended by UN: $479,636,600. 

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations: 07/01/06 to 06/30/07; 
Budgeted by UN: $490,636,200; 
Expended by UN: N/A. 

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations: Total cost for MINUSTAH; 
Budgeted by UN: $1,435,431,300; 
Expended by UN: $891,428,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of UN budgetary data. 

[End of table] 

Estimated Costs for a U.S. Operation Are at Least Twice the Cost of a 
Similar UN Mission: 

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as 
it would the UN to conduct an operation similar to the UN mission in 
Haiti. Virtually the entire difference is attributable to the higher 
cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. The 
difference also reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. 
standards for training, troop welfare, and personnel security. If the 
United States were to deploy a higher percentage of reserves rather 
than active duty troops, deploy more quickly, or operate at a higher 
intensity, U.S. costs would be higher. 

Estimated U.S. Costs Are Higher in Major Categories: 

From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005--the first 14 months of MINUSTAH-- 
the UN budgeted costs for the operation totaled $428 million.[Footnote 
5] This budget assumed a phased deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 
750 police in formed units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 
civilian administrators and staff. It also included the cost of 
operational support, equipment, facilities, and 
transportation.[Footnote 6] Financial responsibilities of the U.S. for 
MINUSTAH for the first 14 months were about $116 million. 

Using the same basic parameters of troop and staff deployment in Haiti 
for 14 months, we estimate that a comparable U.S. operation would cost 
about $876 million, slightly more than twice as much as the UN. Table 2 
details the differences between the UN and a hypothetical U.S. 
operation in major cost categories. 

Table 2: UN and U.S. Costs for a Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti (U.S. 
dollars in millions): 

Major cost categories: Transportation; 
Budgeted UN cost: $94; 
Estimated U.S. cost: $100; 
Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate: -$6. 

Major cost categories: Facilities and related costs; 
Budgeted UN cost: 100; 
Estimated U.S. cost: 208; 
Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate: -108. 

Major cost categories: Medical/health costs; 
Budgeted UN cost: 5; 
Estimated U.S. cost: 22; 
Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate: -17. 

Major cost categories: Military personnel pay and support; 
Budgeted UN cost: 131; 
Estimated U.S. cost: 260; 
Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate: -129. 

Major cost categories: Civilian personnel (non-police); 
Budgeted UN cost: 63; 
Estimated U.S. cost: 46; 
Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate: 17. 

Major cost categories: Civilian police; 
Budgeted UN cost: 25; 
Estimated U.S. cost: 217; 
Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate: -192. 

Major cost categories: Miscellaneous; 
Budgeted UN cost: 10; 
Estimated U.S. cost: 23; 
Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate: -13. 

Major cost categories: Total cost; 
Budgeted UN cost: $428; 
Estimated U.S. cost: $876; 
Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate: -$448. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State Department cost data. 

[End of table] 

As table 2 illustrates, the costs for civilian police, military pay and 
support, and facilities account for most of the difference between the 
two operations. These differences are explained below. 

* Civilian police. The UN budgeted $25 million to deploy 872 civilian 
officers for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would cost the United 
States $217 million to deploy the same number of civilian U.S. police 
officers. The UN provides a daily allowance for police and does not 
reimburse countries contributing police for the officers' salaries. 
U.S. costs, however, include salaries, special pay, benefits, 
equipment, and special training. 

* Military pay and support. The UN budgeted $131 million for pay and 
support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United 
States $260 million for the same number of soldiers. The UN costs are 
based on a monthly payment of up to $1,400 per soldier to contributing 
nations for basic pay and allowances, clothing, equipment, and 
ammunition. U.S. costs include pay and allowances for troops, as well 
as clothing, arms, protective gear, and rations. U.S. costs provide a 
higher standard of living for U.S. soldiers and higher standards for 
equipment, nutrition, health, and morale. 

* Facilities. The UN budgeted $100 million for facilities-related 
costs, while we estimate that the cost to the United States would be 
$208 million. The UN budget includes acquisition and construction of 
troop and civilian housing and equipment and supplies. U.S. facilities 
must meet State Department security standards, which include posting 
civilian staff within secure U.S. embassy or consulate compounds. Also, 
U.S. agencies with staff in these compounds would be required to 
contribute to State's Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program.[Footnote 
7] 

Alternative Military Assumptions Generated Higher U.S. Cost Estimates: 

According to U.S. experts, changes in the underlying planning factors 
significantly affect the estimated cost of a U.S. operation. Based on 
consultations with the joint staff officials and other experts, we 
analyzed how the cost of a U.S. operation would vary if we (1) changed 
the mix of active duty to reserve soldiers from 85 percent active to an 
entirely reserve force, (2) assumed U.S. forces would fully deploy 
within 60 rather than 180 days, and (3) increased the intensity of the 
operation. As figure 4 shows, each of these changes increased the 
estimated costs for a U.S. operation. 

Figure 4: Impact of Three Cost Factors on Base Estimate for a 
Hypothetical U.S. Operation: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost 
data. 

[End of figure] 

Specifically, the changes resulted in these increases in each category: 

* By deploying an all reserve force, the estimated U.S. cost would 
increase by $477 million. The increase is because DOD must begin to pay 
full active duty military salaries to reservists when they are 
activated for an operation. Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
confirmed that this is one of a number of possible scenarios of a U.S. 
operation. 

* By fully deploying U.S. troops in 60 days, U.S. costs would increase 
by about $60 million due to additional military pay and support for all 
troops deployed during the operation's initial months. Joint Staff 
noted this as a possible U.S. option for Haiti. 

* DOD measures the intensity of a military operation, or operational 
tempo, on a scale from 1 to 3. The higher the number, the more heavily 
the forces use equipment and the higher the operations and maintenance 
costs. By increasing the operational tempo from 1.5, which is typical 
for peacekeeping, to 2, U.S. military costs would increase by $23 
million due to increased expenses such as fuel. 

U.S. and UN-Led Operations Each Have Strengths and Limitations: 

Cost is not the only factor in deciding whether the United States or 
the UN should lead a peace operation. The United States and the UN each 
have strengths and limitations that could affect the success of an 
operation. The traditional strengths of a U.S.-led operation stem from 
the well-established U.S. military infrastructure, which provides rapid 
deployment capabilities, unified command and control, and well trained 
and equipped personnel. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have led to shortages in key personnel and strained troop and equipment 
readiness. Also, in some locations a U.S.-led force may not be 
perceived as being impartial. Among the strengths of a UN operation are 
its multinational participation and extensive experience in peace 
operations, but the UN has limitations in deploying a force, ensuring 
it is adequately equipped, and providing strong command and control. 

U.S. Military Has Elements Critical for Peacekeeping, but Faces 
Shortages of Personnel and Equipment: 

Traditionally, U.S. operations have benefited from the advantages of a 
strong and well-established military that has provided quick 
deployment, a unified command and control structure, and direct access 
to well-trained military personnel and equipment. For example, two U.S.-
led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti were recognized as accomplishing 
their objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. In the 1994 
mission in Haiti, the United States provided leadership to 
multinational forces and ensured adequate troops and resources were 
available to carry out the operation. 

The following strengths of the U.S. military have led to successful 
U.S. peacekeeping efforts. 

* Rapid deployment. According to a 2000 UN report, the first 6 to 12 
weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical 
for establishing a stable peace and a credible new operation; 
opportunities lost during this period are hard to regain. UN and U.S. 
officials have stated that a key strength of the U.S. military has been 
its ability to rapidly deploy in part because it has traditionally 
emphasized readiness of the forces as a major objective. DOD 
systematically measures the readiness of its forces and produces the 
Joint Quarterly Readiness Review to monitor its readiness posture. This 
has helped the United States rapidly deploy in past operations. For 
example, in 1994, the United States deployed an operation in Haiti 
within 60 days of the issuance of a UN Security Council Resolution. The 
20,000-member force quickly established itself in 500 locations 
throughout Haiti and achieved its primary goals within 76 days. 

* Unified command and control. According to the UN, clear and cohesive 
command and control, including communications and intelligence are 
critical for effective operations. According to Joint Staff officials, 
operations in Haiti were effective because the United States used its 
cohesive command and control structure, a reliable communication 
system, and good field intelligence. With regard to intelligence, the 
United States can draw upon the extensive resources of the U.S. 
intelligence community, consisting of an array of agencies, 
departments, and offices throughout the U.S. government. For example, 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, with more than 7,500 military and 
civilian employees worldwide, produces and manages foreign military 
intelligence for warfighters, defense policymakers, and force planners 
in support of U.S. military planning and operations. The Central 
Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air 
Force, among other organizations, also provide intelligence support to 
U.S. military operations. 

* Tradition of well trained and equipped personnel. A key element of 
DOD's mission is to train and equip its personnel to a high standard 
and DOD spends considerable amounts to do so. As of 2006, DOD was 
spending more than $17 billion annually for military schools that offer 
nearly 30,000 military training courses to almost 3 million military 
personnel and DOD civilians. With regard to equipment, DOD spends 
billions every year to purchase and maintain equipment. Since fiscal 
year 2002, Congress has appropriated about $38 billion to the Army for 
the reset (repair, replacement, and modernization) of equipment that 
has been damaged or lost as a result of combat operations. In addition, 
DOD uses soldiers and contractors to repair vehicles and other 
equipment where the equipment is located. 

However, ongoing operations in Iraq have challenged U.S. capabilities 
in key areas. Specifically, current shortages of the critical personnel 
skills and equipment needed for operations are a limitation that could 
affect U.S. ability to lead a peacekeeping force. A second limitation 
of a U.S.-led force is perceived lack of impartiality in some 
locations. 

* Current shortages of critical skills and equipment. Our work has 
shown that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have challenged 
DOD's capabilities and created a continuing high demand for certain 
combat specialties, including military police, engineers, and civil 
affairs experts.[Footnote 8] Many of these skills reside heavily in the 
reserve military component due to current force structuring practices. 
DOD policy restricts the duration of deployment and activation of 
reserve forces. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue and the 
number of deployed reservists increases, it is likely to become 
increasingly difficult for DOD to identify reserve personnel in high- 
demand areas who are eligible to deploy. We reported that the Army 
National Guard and Army Reserve, for example, are already stretched to 
a point where their readiness for additional deployments, or homeland 
security crises, has been degraded.[Footnote 9] In a January 2007 
report, we stated that current operations are also taking a heavy toll 
on the condition and readiness of the military's equipment due to 
strain created by the high operational tempo and harsh environmental 
conditions of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 10] 

* Perceived lack of impartiality. In some locations, a U.S.-led force 
may not be perceived by the local people and neighboring countries as 
an impartial and fair force. These two qualities, according to the UN 
and U.S. officials, are key to gaining the confidence and trust of the 
people. State and DOD officials stated that Lebanon is a good example. 
These officials considered several options for assisting Lebanon, 
following the 2006 hostilities with Israel, including a U.S.-led peace 
operation, a NATO-led one, or a modified UN operation. U.S. officials 
concluded that either a U.S. or a NATO-led operation would be perceived 
by some factions in Lebanon and by neighboring countries as a threat 
and a potentially hostile force. Thus, the UN operation was considered 
the most politically feasible option and the UN Security Council, with 
U.S. support, expanded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. 

UN Has Multinational Participation and Extensive Experience, but Has 
Limitations in Rapidly and Effectively Deploying Its Initial Force: 

The UN's strengths in peacekeeping are rooted in the multinational 
character of its operation as well as extensive experience with 
peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN has developed a 
structure for coordinating international organizations involved in 
nation building and has access to a pool of experienced and skilled 
international civil servants, including personnel with diverse language 
capabilities. 

* Multinational participation. As of May 2007, 115 countries had 
military troops or police serving in UN operations. According to State 
and DOD officials, this multinational character and the UN Security 
Council mandate provide international legitimacy and direction for its 
operation. MINUSTAH also demonstrates the multinational character of UN 
operations. During the first year, MINUSTAH was comprised of 7,624 
military staff and police personnel from 41 countries, with the United 
States contributing 29 military and police personnel. 

* Experienced peacekeeping officials. The UN has developed a cadre of 
senior officials who have gained experience with peacekeeping and 
nation-building activities over many missions. The international nature 
of the UN also provides access to a large pool of civil servants and 
security personnel with native language speaking abilities and 
translation skills. As of May 2007, almost 5,700 international civil 
servants were deployed to UN peacekeeping missions with 12,400 local 
civilian staff and some 2,000 UN volunteers supporting these 
operations. 

* Structure for coordinating international assistance. The UN has 
fostered a network of humanitarian agencies and development banks that 
UN peacekeeping missions can draw on to coordinate the extensive 
humanitarian and developmental activities related to operations with 
broad, integrated mandates that include nation building. In Haiti, for 
example, MINUSTAH has established a framework for coordination that is 
integral to the mission's organization. With UN sponsorship, official 
donors in this network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, have pledged over one billion dollars in development 
assistance. 

The UN has several limitations in leading peace operations. Three of 
these are the lack of capacity to deploy quickly, limits on its command 
and control of forces, and considerable variance in the training and 
equipment standards of its multinational force. 

* Limited ability to deploy rapidly. The UN has traditionally had 
difficulties in rapidly deploying the military and civilian positions 
needed for peacekeeping missions. According to the UN, the first 6 to 
12 weeks following a ceasefire are critical for establishing a stable 
peace presence. However, the UN does not have a standing army, a police 
force, or the needed equipment to deploy a force quickly. For example, 
during the first 12 weeks of MINUSTAH, only 30 percent of the 
authorized military troops and police in formed units were deployed by 
the UN to Haiti. 

* Limits on command and control. The UN also has limitations on the 
command and control of its peacekeeping forces. According to DOD 
officials, the participation of multiple nations diffuses the unity of 
command, as each troop contingent is under the command of its national 
authority. The UN force commander is not assured that an individual or 
contingents will follow his orders. Command and control is also an 
issue for disciplinary actions against UN peacekeeping troops involved 
in criminal, sexual, or other misconduct. The UN sets standards of 
behavior, including prohibiting peacekeeping troops from criminal 
activities and sexual exploitation. The involvement of peacekeeping 
personnel in these activities has been documented in several 
operations' and the UN had nearly 1,200 cases of alleged misconduct or 
crimes by peacekeepers in 2003 and 2004. However, troop-contributing 
countries are responsible for disciplinary actions against their own 
troops. According to the UN, there is widespread perception among 
international observers that peacekeeping personnel rarely if ever face 
disciplinary charges. The UN is taking several steps to address this 
problem, such as developing specific standards of behavior for all UN 
troops and a model memorandum of understanding on conduct for all troop 
contributing countries. However, individual countries are still 
responsible for discipline of their own troops. 

* Varying equipment and training levels. The equipment and training of 
military and police personnel provided to UN operations by contributing 
countries often varies. Developing nations are currently the largest 
contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. The UN states 
that, while many developing countries provide well-equipped troops with 
high professional standards, there are also situations in which the 
countries contributing troops cannot meet the equipment standards 
agreed to with the UN. The UN reports that some troops provided by 
contributing countries have arrived without rifles, helmets, or other 
necessary equipment. DOD officials stated that during previous 
operations in Haiti, the United States provided some equipment, 
provisions, and military supplies to UN troops that were deployed with 
insufficient equipment. Training levels vary widely by country with 
some troops having little previous training in peacekeeping operations. 
The United States, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, is 
helping train troops from member UN nations that contribute to UN 
peacekeeping. 

Conclusion: 

The costs, strengths, and limitations of the United States and the UN 
are important factors in considering who should lead a peacekeeping 
operation. A U.S. peacekeeping operation, as illustrated by the 
specific example in Haiti, is likely to be much more expensive than a 
UN operation. This one example cannot be generalized across all 
operations. However, many of the cost elements, such as police and 
military costs, are likely to be more expensive for a U.S.-led 
operation, regardless of location. The higher cost for a U.S. operation 
pays for a force that has traditionally deployed rapidly, operated 
effectively, and maintained high standards for equipment and training. 
However, combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past six 
years have strained U.S. troops, equipment, and readiness, limiting 
U.S. ability to lead a peacekeeping intervention. In some situations, a 
U.S.-led force would not be perceived as an impartial and fair force, 
further limiting its ability to conduct operations. The UN has certain 
strengths in leading a peacekeeping operation, including multinational 
participation and international legitimacy, access to international 
civil servants needed for peacebuilding activities, and a structure for 
coordinating international assistance. However, the UN has 
traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and 
ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer 
any questions you or the members of the subcommittee may have. 

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Joseph A. 
Christoff at (202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement 
were Tetsuo Miyabara, James Michels, Suzanne Perkins, Lynn Cothern, 
Mark Speight, Grace Lui, Charlie Perdue, and Kendall Schaefer. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical 
U.S. Operations in Haiti, GAO-06-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2006). 

[2] Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations, 7000.14-R, 
vol. 12, Ch. 23, para. 2304. 

[3] Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations as of June 2007 include missions 
in Jerusalem, India/Pakistan, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Western Sahara, 
Georgia, Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, 
Liberia, Côte D'Ivoire, Haiti, Sudan, and Timor-Leste. Political 
missions supported by DPKO include missions in Afghanistan, Sierra 
Leone, and Burundi. 

[4] The cap level changed in 2001 due to legislation and remained at 
around 27 percent from 2001 to 2005. The cap returned to 25 percent in 
2006. 

[5] For a detailed discussion of the methodology used to construct the 
U.S. operation cost estimate and alternate scenario cost estimates, see 
appendix I of Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and 
Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti, GAO-06-331 (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 21, 2006). 

[6] The UN cost estimate does not include the general overhead costs 
incurred to support all peacekeeping missions, such as the costs of 
running the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN 
headquarters in New York and the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. 
We likewise did not include DOD overhead costs in the U.S. operation 
estimate. 

[7] The Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program was developed to 
accelerate the building of 150 new secure embassies and consulates 
around the world and to ensure that all agencies with overseas staff 
assign only the number of staff needed to accomplish their overseas 
missions. Each agency's assigned cost is based on its total overseas 
personnel. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2920, Div. B., sec. 
629 (2004). See also GAO, Embassy Construction: Proposed Cost-Sharing 
Program Could Speed Construction and Reduce Staff Levels, but Some 
Agencies Have Concerns, GAO-05-32 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2004). 

[8] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2007). 

[9] GAO, Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force 
Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for 
High-Demand Support Forces, GAO-06-962 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 
2006). 

[10] GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army's 
Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies, GAO-07-439T 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007).

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