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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, March 22, 2007: 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over 
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning: 

Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

GAO-07-639T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-639T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need 
for security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides 
the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March 
2003—known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—concerns were raised about 
how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional 
munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. This 
testimony addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi 
conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate 
risks associated with an adversary’s conventional munitions storage 
sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To 
address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine 
and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD 
officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage 
sites in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that 
proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing 
these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons 
learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq’s 
conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate 
being 5 times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions 
storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some 
remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned 
reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred 
because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional 
munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and 
assumptions. DOD’s OIF planning priorities included quickly taking 
Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. 
The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would 
“capitulate and provide internal security.” According to an Army 
lessons learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to 
limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed 
that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case 
assumptions were proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a 
centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until 
August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. According 
to officials from Multi-National Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional 
munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. forces and others. Not 
securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as 
government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to 
make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many 
people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the 
region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated 
that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose 
any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. 

DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however, 
DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed 
by an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites in future 
operations planning. DOD’s actions generally have emphasized countering 
the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. 
GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this 
emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means 
to counter U.S. military strengths. For example, potential adversaries 
are estimated to have a significant amount of munitions that would 
require significant manpower to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that 
this situation shows both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be 
an anomaly and that information on the amount and location of an 
adversary’s munitions can represent a strategic planning consideration 
for future operations. However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot 
ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of an adversary’s 
conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into future 
operations planning and execution. 

What GAO Recommends: 

The report GAO is releasing today recommends that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) conduct 
a theaterwide survey and risk assessment on unsecured conventional 
munitions in Iraq, (2) report related risk mitigation strategies and 
results to Congress, and (3) incorporate conventional munitions storage 
site security as a strategic planning factor into all levels of 
planning policy and guidance. DOD partially concurred with our 
recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-639T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at 
(202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss GAO's report being 
released today on the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to plan for 
the security of former Iraqi conventional weapons sites and the lessons 
learned for planning future operations. In March 2003, citing the 
failure of Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspectors and other 
concerns, the United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq in an 
operation known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Commander of the 
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was primarily responsible for developing 
and executing the war plan for OIF.[Footnote 1] The war plan's military 
priorities included overthrowing the Iraqi regime by rapidly capturing 
Baghdad and disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
Although WMD stockpiles were not found, Iraq had hundreds of thousands 
of tons of conventional munitions throughout the country at various 
storage sites.[Footnote 2] The widespread looting of some Iraqi 
conventional munitions storage sites during OIF has been the subject of 
media reports. We previously reported on the looting and dispersal of 
radiological sources from a number of sites in Iraq after the invasion 
and DOD's efforts to collect and secure those sources.[Footnote 3] My 
statement today addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over 
conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, and (2) DOD actions to 
mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions 
storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons 
learned. 

The observations I will discuss today are based on the unclassified 
version of our classified report on this topic.[Footnote 4] To examine 
the security over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites provided 
by U.S. forces, we reviewed field unit reporting and intelligence 
products and interviewed DOD officials. We also collected and analyzed 
the various iterations of OIF plans, doctrine, and concepts of 
operations for coverage of the security of conventional munitions 
storage sites. To examine DOD's actions to learn from its experience 
with securing conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq and apply 
these lessons learned to mitigate risks during future operations, we 
interviewed DOD officials about their efforts to identify and document 
lessons learned and examined documents on operations in Iraq. We 
performed our work from November 2005 through October 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage 
sites in Iraq, combined with prewar planning priorities and certain 
prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. 
forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, 
according to DOD sources. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional 
munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being five 
times greater than the lower estimate. Although the amount of looted 
munitions is unknown, field unit reports, numerous intelligence 
assessments, and imagery products showed that many conventional 
munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and 
some may remain vulnerable. In October 2006, we could not verify that 
all sites had been physically secured. According to lessons learned 
reports and knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials, including field 
commanders, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had 
insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage 
sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions that 
proved to be invalid. For example, the OIF war plan assumed that the 
regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal 
security" and resistance was unlikely. Knowledgeable senior-level DOD 
officials stated that these Iraqi army units would have been used to 
secure conventional munitions storage sites. Our analysis of the 
various iterations of the war plan found that the OIF war plan did not 
examine the consequences of these and other important planning 
assumptions being proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a 
centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until 
August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. While DOD 
had destroyed, disposed of or secured 417,000 tons of munitions, Multi- 
National Coalition-Iraq officials told us unsecured munitions continued 
to pose a threat. Not securing these conventional munitions storage 
sites has been costly. For example, looted munitions are being used to 
construct improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed 
many people and maintain the level of violence against U.S. and 
coalition forces and their Iraqi partners, which has hampered the 
achievement of the strategic goal of stability in Iraq. Moreover, 
estimates indicate that the looted munitions will likely continue to 
support terrorist attacks throughout the region. 

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, 
because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, DOD has 
given little focus to mitigating the risk to U.S. forces posed by an 
adversary's conventional munitions storage sites in future operations 
planning. Instead, the department's actions in response to OIF lessons 
learned generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an 
insurgency or terrorists during post-hostility operations. Although 
these actions are good first steps, our review of DOD publications-- 
such as doctrine, policy, guidance, and procedures issued by the joint 
staff--used to guide operational planning and execution found little 
evidence of guidance concerning the security of conventional munitions 
storage sites. Without appropriate joint doctrine, policy, guidance, 
and procedures, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned regarding 
the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites 
will be a strategic planning and priority-setting consideration that is 
integrated into future operations planning and execution, so that these 
munitions do not become the source of materials for making IEDs. 

Our report recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman 
of the Joint Chief of Staff to (1) conduct a theaterwide survey and 
risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq; (2) 
report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and results to Congress; and 
(3) incorporate consideration of conventional munitions storage sites 
security into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including 
joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and other directives. DOD 
partially concurred with our recommendations. 

Background: 

When the United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq on March 
17, 2003, and the Iraqi government no longer functioned, many areas 
experienced widespread looting and the breakdown of public services, 
such as electricity and water in the cities. U.S. and coalition forces 
were then confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and 
infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Given the 
extensive looting, as we reported in 2005, DOD could not assume that 
facilities and items within the facilities would remain intact or in 
place for later collection without being secured.[Footnote 5] Many 
facilities, such as abandoned government research facilities and 
industrial complexes, were no longer under the control of the former 
regime and had been looted. For example, hundreds of tons of explosive 
materials that had been documented by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency prior to March 2003 at the Al Qa Qaa explosives and munitions 
facility in Iraq were lost after April 9, 2003, through the theft and 
looting of the unsecured installations. We also reported that regarding 
radiological sources in Iraq, DOD was not ready to collect and secure 
radiological sources when the war began in March 2003 and for about 6 
months thereafter.[Footnote 6] 

U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional 
Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting: 

According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons 
learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition 
forces were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage 
sites in Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. These 
sources indicated that U.S. and coalition forces were overwhelmed by 
the number and size of conventional munitions storage sites, and DOD 
had insufficient troop levels to secure these sites because of prewar 
planning priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. 
Despite war plan and intelligence estimates of large quantities of 
munitions in Iraq, knowledgeable DOD officials reported that DOD did 
not plan for or set up a program to centrally manage and destroy enemy 
munitions until August 2003, well after the completion of major combat 
operations in May 2003. The costs of not securing these conventional 
munitions storage sites have been high, as looted explosives and 
ammunition from these sites have been used to construct IEDs that have 
killed and maimed people. Furthermore, estimates indicate such 
munitions are likely to continue to support terrorist attacks in the 
region. 

U.S. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conventional 
Munitions Storage Sites, Leaving Those Sites Vulnerable to Looting: 

U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional 
munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure 
these sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat 
operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit 
reports, lessons learned reports, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF 
estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly with 
the higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate. 
The commander of CENTCOM testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Appropriations on September 24, 2003, that "there is more ammunition in 
Iraq than any place I've ever been in my life, and it is all not 
securable."[Footnote 7] 

Furthermore, the sites remained vulnerable from April 2003 through the 
time of our review. For example, an assessment conducted from April 
2003 through June 2003 indicated that most military garrisons 
associated with Iraq's former republican guard had been extensively 
looted and vandalized after the military campaign phase of OIF ended. 
It concluded that the most prized areas for looting were the depots or 
storage areas. The assessment further concluded that the thorough 
nature of the looting and the seemingly targeted concentration on 
storage areas suggested that much of the looting in the areas assessed 
was conducted by organized elements that were likely aided or 
spearheaded by Iraqi military personnel. 

Moreover, in early 2004, 401 Iraqi sites--including fixed garrisons, 
field sites, and ammunition production facilities--were reviewed to 
assess their vulnerability and the likelihood that anticoalition forces 
were obtaining munitions from those sites. Of the 401 sites, a small 
number of sites were considered highly vulnerable because of the large 
quantity of munitions, inadequate security, and a high level of 
looting. The majority of the sites were assessed as having low 
vulnerability--not because they had been secured, but because they had 
been abandoned or totally looted. The review considered virtually all 
the sites to be partially secured at best and concluded that U.S. and 
coalition troops were able to guard only a very small percentage of the 
sites. 

U.S. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequate Security 
Because of OIF Planning Priorities and Assumptions: 

DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S. 
forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate 
security for conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of 
OIF planning priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be 
invalid. According to DOD officials, ground commanders had two top 
priorities during major combat operations that were set forth in the 
February 2003 OIF war plan. First, to overthrow the regime, DOD planned 
for and successfully executed a rapid march on Baghdad that relied on 
surprise and speed rather than massive troop buildup, such as was used 
in 1991 during the first Gulf War. This rapid march to Baghdad 
successfully resulted in the removal of the regime. Another critical 
planning priority was finding and securing the regime's stockpiles of 
WMD, which the administration believed were a threat to coalition 
forces and other countries in the region. The OIF war plan assumed that 
there was a high probability that the regime would use WMD against U.S. 
and coalition forces in a final effort to survive when those forces 
reached Baghdad. As a result, a CENTCOM planner for OIF stated that 
ground commanders had to prioritize limited available resources against 
the volume of tasks, both stated and implied, contained in the war 
plan. 

Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF 
war plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being 
insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage 
sites, including the following: 

* The Iraqi regular army would "capitulate and provide security." The 
OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and security 
forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual surrender or 
desertion. As stated in the OIF war plan, the U.S. Commander, CENTCOM, 
intended to preserve, as much as possible, the Iraqi military to 
maintain internal security and protect Iraq's borders during and after 
major combat operations. According to a study prepared by the Center 
for Army Lessons Learned, this assumption was central to the decision 
to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq.[Footnote 8] On 
May 23, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi 
Army, which the CENTCOM commander assumed would provide internal 
security. 

* Iraqi resistance was unlikely. Although the OIF war plan laid out the 
probability of several courses of action that the regime might take in 
response to an invasion, the plan did not consider the possibility of 
protracted, organized Iraqi resistance to U.S. and coalition forces 
after the conclusion of major combat operations. As a result, DOD 
officials stated that the regime's conventional munitions storage sites 
were not considered a significant risk. 

* Postwar Iraq would not be a U.S. military responsibility. The OIF war 
planning, according to a Joint Forces Command lessons learned report, 
was based on the assumption that the bulk of the Iraqi government would 
remain in place after major combat operations and therefore civil 
functions, including rebuilding and humanitarian assistance, could be 
shifted from military forces to U.S. and international organizations 
and, ultimately, the Iraqis, within about 18 months after the end of 
major combat operations.[Footnote 9] Therefore, DOD initially did not 
plan for an extended occupation of the country or the level of troops 
that would be needed to secure conventional munitions storage sites in 
particular or the country in general. 

Joint assessments further showed that OIF planning assumptions 
contributed to security challenges in Iraq. According to a 2006 report 
by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not 
examine the consequences of those assumptions proving wrong, further 
contributing to insufficient force levels to prevent the breakdown of 
civil order in Iraq.[Footnote 10] The Joint Staff strategic-level 
lessons learned report also discussed the effect inaccurate planning 
assumptions had on force levels. According to this report, overemphasis 
on planning assumptions that could not be validated prior to critical 
decision points resulted in a force structure plan that did not 
consider several missions requiring troops, such as providing security 
for enemy conventional munitions storage sites. 

DOD Did Not Set Up a Program to Centrally Manage and Destroy Iraqi 
Munitions until after the Completion of Major Combat Operations: 

Despite prewar intelligence assessments of large amounts of 
conventional munitions, knowledgeable DOD officials stated that DOD did 
not set up a central office until July 2003 or set up a program to 
centrally manage and destroy Iraqi munitions until after August 2003. 
These steps were taken well after major combat operations were 
completed in May 2003, because the department did not perceive 
conventional munitions storage sites as a threat. The central office 
was initially set up to address operational problems found during an 
assessment of nine Iraqi sites. This assessment found that DOD lacked 
priorities for securing the sites and uniform procedures and practices 
for securing and disposing of munitions. It also uncovered serious 
safety problems in the handling, transportation, storage, and disposal 
of munitions. 

In August 2003, the Engineering and Support Center awarded contracts 
for the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, and the first demolition 
of munitions under the program was conducted in September 2003. The 
program's initial goals were to destroy the stockpiles at six depots 
and to have all enemy ammunition outside the depots destroyed or 
transported to the depots. The program also was tasked with assisting 
in the establishment, management, and transfer of depots to the new 
Iraqi army. According to the Engineering and Support Center, the 
program has received more than $1 billion and has destroyed or secured 
more than 324,000 tons of munitions. This number, combined with 
military disposal operations, has accounted for more than 417,000 tons 
of munitions, leaving an unknown amount of conventional munitions in 
the hands of resistance groups or unsecured. This unknown amount could 
range significantly, from thousands to millions of tons of unaccounted 
conventional munitions. 

According to Multi-National Coalition-Iraq officials, unsecured 
conventional munitions from the former regime continue to pose a risk 
to U.S. forces and others. For example, some conventional munitions 
storage sites in remote locations have not been assessed recently to 
verify whether they pose any residual risk. These officials also stated 
that smaller caches of weapons, munitions, and equipment as well as 
remaining unexploded ordnance, scattered across Iraq, represent a more 
pressing and continuing risk. These officials said that the coalition 
is working to reduce this risk by searching for and finding a growing 
number of caches, but it will be some time before it can clean up all 
the munitions in Iraq. The extent of the threat from smaller caches, 
however, is difficult to quantify because the location or amount of 
munitions hidden or scattered around the country is unknown. 

Costs of Not Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites Have Been 
High: 

As reported by DOD and key government agencies, the human, strategic, 
and financial costs of not securing conventional munitions storage 
sites have been high. Estimates indicate that the weapons and 
explosives looted from unsecured conventional munitions storage sites 
will likely continue to support terrorist attacks throughout the 
region. Government agencies also have assessed that looted munitions 
are being used in the construction of IEDs. IEDs have proven to be an 
effective tactic because they are inexpensive, relatively simple to 
employ, deadly, anonymous, and have great strategic value.[Footnote 11] 
To illustrate, the Congressional Research Service reported in 2005 that 
IEDs caused about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in 
Iraq and are killing hundreds of Iraqis. Moreover, Multinational Forces 
in Iraq reported that the attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi 
partners continued to increase through July 2006, representing at least 
40 percent of all attacks on coalition forces. 

DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on 
Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations: 

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we 
found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security 
of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic 
planning and priority-setting consideration during planning for future 
operations. A critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured 
conventional munitions storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to 
U.S. forces, as illustrated by intelligence assessments that show one 
potential adversary, for example, also has considerable munitions 
stockpiles that would require a sizable occupying force to secure or 
destroy. Despite the strategic implications regarding unsecured 
conventional munitions storage sites, our analysis shows that securing 
those sites generally is not explicitly addressed in military policy 
and guidance, particularly at the joint level. We reviewed 17 DOD 
publications--which Joint Staff officials told us were relevant to our 
review--to determine the extent to which each of those publications 
contained guidance on the security of conventional munitions storage 
sites. A list of these publications can be found in our March 2007 
report.[Footnote 12] In reviewing these documents, we found little 
evidence of guidance regarding conventional munitions storage site 
security. Although several publications addressed defeating IEDs during 
an insurgency after major combat operations have ended or provided 
tactical-level guidance on how to dispose of explosive hazards, 
including munitions, or make those hazards safe, none explicitly 
addressed the security of conventional munitions storage sites during 
or after major combat operations as a tactical, operational, or 
strategic risk. 

Because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, the 
department's actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have 
emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists 
during posthostility operations. The specific actions DOD has taken are 
discussed in our report. These actions are good first steps toward 
broadening DOD's focus beyond the ongoing tactical and operational 
counter-IED efforts used against Saddam loyalists, rejectionists, or 
external terrorist groups in Iraq to planning and executing strategic 
counter-IED campaigns for future operations. However, the actions do 
not directly address the strategic importance of securing conventional 
munitions storage sites during major combat operations so that they do 
not become the source of materials for making IEDs during an occupation 
or become used for other forms of armed resistance. 

Based on our work, a critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured 
conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat 
to U.S. forces during future operations. Furthermore, other potential 
adversaries are also learning lessons from the United States' 
experiences in Iraq and will likely use asymmetric warfare against U.S. 
invading forces. We believe these potential adversaries will likely 
develop military doctrine to avoid direct military confrontation with 
the United States if possible and try to undermine the United States' 
political commitment with unconventional warfare. Therefore, the 
number, size, and geographic separation of an adversary's munitions 
storage sites could pose a significant security challenge during an 
occupying force's follow-on operations. A large amount of munitions in 
such an adversary's country could require an occupying force to 
dedicate significant manpower to secure or destroy the contents of the 
major munitions storage sites. Furthermore, the remnants of an 
adversary's forces, insurgents, or terrorists could draw from any large 
conventional munitions storage network left unsecured by an occupying 
force. 

Conclusions and Recommendations: 

In our report, we concluded that a fundamental gap existed between the 
OIF war plan assumptions and the experiences of U.S. and coalition 
forces in Iraq, contributing to insufficient troops being on the ground 
to prevent widespread looting of conventional munitions storage sites 
and resulting in looted munitions being a continuing asymmetric threat 
to U.S. and coalition forces. The human, strategic, and financial costs 
of this failure to provide sufficient troops have been high, with IEDs 
made with looted munitions causing about half of all U.S. combat 
fatalities and casualties in Iraq and killing hundreds of Iraqis and 
contributing to increasing instability, challenging U.S. strategic 
goals in Iraq. Further, DOD does not appear to have conducted a 
theaterwide survey and assessed the risk associated with unsecured 
conventional munitions storage sites to U.S. forces and others. Such a 
survey and assessment combined with associated risk mitigation 
strategies--such as providing more troops or other security measures-- 
could assist DOD in conserving lives and in meeting its strategic goal 
to leave a stable nation behind when U.S. forces ultimately leave Iraq. 
We recommended that the Joint Chief of Staff conduct a theaterwide 
survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions 
in Iraq and report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results 
of those strategies to Congress. 

We also concluded that in preparing for future operations DOD's actions 
in response to OIF lessons learned primarily have focused on countering 
IEDs and not on the security of conventional munitions storage sites as 
a strategic planning and priority-setting consideration for future 
operations. Although good first steps, these actions do not address 
what we believe is a critical OIF lesson learned, the strategic 
importance of securing conventional munitions storage sites during and 
after major combat operations. Unsecured conventional munitions storage 
sites can represent an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would 
require significant manpower or other resources during and after major 
combat operations to secure. Therefore, since joint doctrine is to 
present fundamental principles as well as contemporary lessons that 
guide the employment of forces, we believe that it is important that 
DOD clearly and explicitly address the security of conventional 
munitions storage sites in revisions to joint doctrine. Therefore we 
recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporate conventional 
munitions storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all 
levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, 
instructions, manuals, and other directives. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the 
department conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding 
unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. DOD stated that while it is 
imperative that a complete and thorough assessment of conventional 
munitions storage sites be conducted, military commanders in theater 
are aware of the significant risk posed by the sites, and similar 
studies and assessments have been conducted over the past 3 years. DOD 
also stated that from a manpower perspective, an in-depth, theaterwide 
survey is not feasible without significantly degrading ongoing efforts 
in Iraq and the region. As the evidence in our report clearly supports, 
we made this recommendation because we did not see any evidence of a 
strategic-level survey or an effective, theaterwide risk mitigation 
strategy to address the commanders' awareness of this significant risk 
or the findings of the studies and assessments regarding security of 
conventional munitions storage sites. Accordingly, the intent behind 
our recommendation is to have DOD assess the risks associated with 
unsecured conventional munitions sites on a strategic, theaterwide 
basis to develop an effective risk mitigation strategy. 

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the 
department report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of 
those strategies to Congress. In commenting on this recommendation, DOD 
stated that risk mitigation is doctrinally sound; however, the 
department and Joint Staff recommend that these briefings to Congress 
remain at the strategic level. In making this recommendation, it was 
not our intention to detract tactical units from the current 
warfighting mission or to suggest congressional oversight is needed for 
each tactical unit. Instead, we are recommending that DOD alert 
Congress of its assessment and the actions being taken to mitigate the 
strategic risk associated with unsecured conventional munitions in 
Iraq. 

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the 
department incorporate the security of conventional munitions storage 
sites as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy 
and guidance and stated that the Joint Staff will incorporate the 
appropriate language in joint doctrine, manuals, and instructions. DOD 
stated that (1) Iraq is a separate case and should not be considered 
the standard for all future operations and (2) war plans must reflect 
proper prioritization based on desired operational effects and 
resources available as it may not always be possible or desirable in a 
resource-and time-constrained environment to secure all sites or 
destroy all munitions. We agree with these statements. The purpose of 
this report was not to suggest that Iraq be the standard for all future 
conflicts or to restrict commanders' planning prerogatives. Instead, 
the report suggests that as DOD incorporates OIF lessons learned into 
joint doctrine, it includes what is a key OIF lesson learned--an 
adversary's stockpile of conventional munitions can be an asymmetric 
threat to U.S. forces. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgements: 

For questions about this statement, please contact Davi D'Agostino at 
(202) 512-5431. Other individuals making key contributions to this 
statement include: Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director, Renee Brown, Donna 
Byers, John Van Schiak, and Nicole Volchko. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] CENTCOM is one of five geographic combatant commands. A combatant 
command is a unified command established by the President of the United 
States with a broad continuing mission under a single commander. 

[2] Conventional munitions are complete devices charged with 
explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition that 
are not nuclear, biological, or chemical for use in military 
operations. 

[3] GAO, Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source 
Recovery Effort and Apply Lessons Learned to Further Recovery Missions, 
GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). 

[4] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage 
Sites to Future Operations Planning, GAO-7-444 (Washington, D.C.: March 
22, 2007). 

[5] GAO-05-672. 

[6] GAO-05-672. 

[7] Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request for Reconstruction of Iraq 
and Afghanistan: Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, 
United States Senate, 108th Cong. 133 (2003). 

[8] Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, On Point: U.S. Army in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

[9] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One) 
(Norfolk, Va.: January 2006). 

[10] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two). 

[11] Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive Devices in 
Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures, RS22330 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 
2005). 

[12] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage 
Sites to Future Operations Planning, GAO-7-444 (Washington, D.C.: March 
22, 2007). 

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