This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-997T 
entitled 'Rail Transit: Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight 
Program' which was released on July 19, 2006. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines, Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT: 

Wednesday, July 19, 2006: 

Rail Transit: 

Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight Program: 

Statement of Katherine Siggerud, Director Physical Infrastructure: 

GAO-06-997T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-997T, a report to Subcommittee on Highways, 
Transit and Pipelines, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation’s 
transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily. 
Unlike most transportation modes, safety and security oversight of rail 
transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies 
following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In 
addition, in 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act, giving the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
authority for security over all transportation modes, including rail 
transit. 

This testimony is based on ongoing work for this subcommittee’s 
committee—the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I 
describe (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) 
what is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and 
security; and (3) challenges facing the program. I also provide 
information about oversight of transit systems that cross state 
boundaries. To address these issues, we reviewed program documents and 
interviewed stakeholders including officials from FTA, TSA, the 
National Transportation Safety Board, and the American Public 
Transportation Association. We also surveyed state oversight and 
transit agencies covered by FTA’s program, interviewing 24 of the 25 
oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit agencies across the country. 

What GAO Found: 

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate 
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires 
states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of 
rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies 
are responsible for overseeing transit agencies, including reviewing 
transit agencies’ safety and security plans. While oversight agencies 
are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, the 
TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. 

Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit 
agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several 
transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such 
as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is 
ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA 
has not definitively shown the program’s benefits and has not developed 
performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as 
required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program 
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to 
its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, 
resulting in a lack of information to track the program’s trends. FTA 
officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance 
measures and goals to help determine the program’s impact, especially 
since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. 
However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that 
the program’s new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a 
top priority. 

FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. 
First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, 
officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not 
having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight 
agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical 
training would help address this variation. Second, transit and 
oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are 
to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail 
inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could 
result in duplication of effort. 

Figures: Examples of Rail Transit Systems subject to FTA State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: Pennsylvania DOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco 
Municipal Railway; GAO. 

[End of Figure] 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-997T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud on 
(202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the mechanisms in 
place to oversee the safety and security of the nation's rail transit 
system. This system moves more than 7 million daily passengers, and, 
according to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, accounts 
for less than 6 percent of all public transportation accidents while 
providing almost 32 percent of all passenger trips, making it one of 
the safest forms of public transportation. However, safety and security 
are still concerns. Although safe, the number of fatalities and 
accidents has varied over the past few years. For example, between 1999 
and 2005, fatalities have ranged from 26 to 57 per year, with an 
approximate average of 40 per year. In addition, recent acts of 
terrorism on European and Indian transit systems illustrate the need to 
maintain high levels of safety and security for transit. 

The focus of my testimony today is FTA's State Safety Oversight 
program. In 1991, Congress required FTA to (1) issue regulations 
requiring states to designate an oversight agency to oversee the safety 
and security of rail transit agencies, and (2) withhold federal funds 
if a state did not comply with the regulations. Through the resulting 
State Safety Oversight program, FTA requires states to designate an 
oversight agency to implement FTA safety and security oversight over 
rail transit agencies. 

My testimony today (1) describes how the State Safety Oversight program 
is designed, (2) identifies what is known about the impact of the 
program on rail transit safety and security, and (3) identifies any 
challenges to the State Safety Oversight program. It also provides 
information on how the State Safety Oversight program functions in 
areas where transit systems cross state lines (see app. I). My comments 
are based on our ongoing work for this subcommittee's committee--the 
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We plan to 
release this work soon. To obtain information on how the program is 
designed and identify what is known about the impact of the program, we 
reviewed program guidance and interviewed a wide range of stakeholders 
including FTA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the American Public 
Transportation Association (APTA), an industry group. To identify 
challenges facing the program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the 
25 state safety oversight agencies across the country and 37 of the 42 
operating rail transit agencies.[Footnote 1] We also visited 8 
oversight agencies and 17 transit agencies--of these 17 transit 
agencies, 2 will soon begin operations and 3 cross state boundaries. We 
conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary: 

* FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate 
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires 
states to designate a state safety oversight agency and develops and 
oversees the implementation of rules and guidance on safety and 
security that the designated agencies are to use to oversee transit 
operations; however, it does not fund state agencies' ongoing 
oversight. The designated state oversight agencies directly oversee 
transit agencies' activities including their safety and security plans. 
Most commonly, these oversight agencies are state transportation 
departments, but public utility commissions and regional transportation 
authorities also serve in this role. Transit agencies develop and 
implement safety and security plans, assess hazardous conditions, 
report certain incidents to the oversight agency, conduct self audits, 
and keep the state oversight agency apprised of corrective actions. 
Finally, federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) also have a role in 
transit security. 

* Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State 
Safety Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and 
improving the safety and security of rail transit systems; however, 
there is limited information showing its impact on safety and security. 
For example, transit agency officials cite the importance of having 
state oversight agency staff help them identify larger, systemic 
issues. Although many officials support the program, FTA's methods for 
obtaining information on transit safety and security (i.e., transit and 
oversight agency data and FTA audits of the oversight agencies) do not 
include performance measures and related program goals. FTA issued 
annual reports from 1999 through 2003 that track transit accident, 
crash, fatality, and other safety data, but FTA officials have found it 
difficult to identify performance measures for the program and set 
performance goals, because of the relatively low number of fatalities 
and incidents and the varying design of rail transit systems. 
Furthermore, in the past 8 years, FTA has audited all oversight 
agencies in operation before 2004 at least once; however, FTA has not 
conducted audits as often as it envisioned when it started the program 
(i.e., once every 3 years). This reduced schedule limits FTA's ability 
to conduct oversight, including collecting information on the safety 
oversight agencies and making informed and timely revisions to the 
program. According to FTA officials, they did not keep to their stated 
audit schedule because they were reassessing the priorities for the 
program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. They also 
noted that they continued conducting "safety and security readiness 
reviews" to ensure that new transit systems would be able to safely and 
securely begin passenger operations. Recent changes in FTA's program 
regulations and leadership provide an opportunity to address this lack 
of information, performance measures, and program goals, and to resume 
its stated audit schedule. 

* FTA faces challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, 
the level of state oversight-staff expertise and number of oversight 
staff (and thus their potential ability to oversee transit agencies), 
varies widely across the country. For example, one oversight agency 
requires its staff have at least 5 years of rail transit experience 
while another oversight agency assigned a state department of 
transportation planner to work on safety and security oversight as a 
collateral duty. Although no officials identified a safety or security 
problem resulting from lack of staff expertise, most transit and 
oversight agency officials with whom we spoke believe that federal 
funding for training and an FTA-developed curriculum--including 
training on how to oversee safety and security--would improve the 
qualifications and effectiveness of state oversight agency personnel. 
Furthermore, FTA's approach contrasts with the approach other 
Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies, such as FRA and the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) take, 
which is to provide free training or use agency funds to pay for state 
agency personnel's attendance at training sessions, in some 
instances.[Footnote 2] A second challenge to implementing the program, 
according to officials from 20 of 24 state oversight agencies and 14 of 
37 transit agencies, is the uncertainty about the role of TSA in FTA's 
program since Congress designated TSA the lead agency on security 
matters in 2001. Although TSA has regulatory authority over security 
activities in transportation, its rail program is still developing, and 
several oversight and transit agency officials with whom we spoke were 
concerned about the potential for duplication of effort given that 
state safety oversight agencies and TSA both review and comment on 
transit systems' security plans. TSA and FTA recognize this concern and 
have begun discussions on how to coordinate their oversight efforts. 

Background: 

In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),[Footnote 3] which added Section 28 to 
the Federal Transit Act.[Footnote 4] ISTEA required FTA to establish a 
state-managed safety and security oversight program for rail transit 
agencies. As a result, on December 27, 1995,[Footnote 5] FTA published 
a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety 
Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA's rule), to improve the 
safety and security of rail transit agencies. FTA's rule required state 
oversight agencies to have approved transit agencies' safety plans by 
January 1, 1997, and security plans by January 1, 1998. At the time of 
the FTA rule's publication, 5 of 19 states affected by the FTA rule had 
oversight programs in place for rail transit safety and security, and 
no oversight agency met all the requirements in FTA's rule. During the 
first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to develop 
compliant programs that addressed FTA's requirements. Ten years after 
FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA published a revision to it in the 
Federal Register on April 29, 2005, which required that oversight 
agencies had to comply with the revised FTA rule by May 1, 2006. 

FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the 
State Safety Oversight program--and hired the current Program Manager 
in March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties 
in addition to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff 
within the Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to 
transit and oversight agencies and additional tasks. FTA regional 
personnel are not formally involved with the program's day-to-day 
activities, though officials from FTA Regional Offices help address 
specific compliance issues that occasionally arise and help states with 
new transit agencies establish new oversight agencies. FTA also relies 
on contractors to do many of the day-to-day activities, ranging from 
developing and implementing FTA's audit program of state oversight 
agencies to developing and providing training classes on system safety. 

The revised FTA rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway 
systems operating in their jurisdictions. As specified in the FTA rule, 
a rail fixed guideway system is defined as: "any light, heavy, or rapid 
rail system; monorail, inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated 
guideway that is not regulated by FRA and: 

* is included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles or 
receives funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49 
U.S.C. 5336); or: 

* has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be 
included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive 
funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 
5336)." 

Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included 
in the State Safety Oversight program. 

Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Pennsylvania DOT, Seattle Monorail; San Francisco Municipal 
Railway; GAO. 

[End of figure] 

FTA's program generally differs from other agencies within DOT, such as 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FRA, and PHMSA. These 
agencies promulgate their own technical standards that govern how 
vehicles or facilities must be operated or constructed, while FTA does 
not prescribe technical standards, though the state oversight agencies 
can develop technical standards. 

Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program: 

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate 
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. Under the 
program, FTA is responsible for developing the regulations and guidance 
governing the program, auditing state safety oversight agencies to 
ensure the regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance 
and other information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in 
only limited instances under the program. State oversight agencies 
directly oversee the safety and security of rail transit systems by 
reviewing safety and security plans, performing audits, and 
investigating accidents. Rail transit agencies are responsible for 
developing safety and security plans, reporting incidents to the 
oversight agencies, and following all other regulations state oversight 
agencies set for them. In addition to FTA, federal agencies such as 
FRA, DHS's Office of Grants and Training, and TSA also have regulatory 
or funding roles related to rail transit safety and security. 

FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program: 

FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety 
approach in developing the State Safety Oversight program.[Footnote 6] 
Federal and state agencies and rail transit agencies collaborate to 
ensure the rail transit system is operated safely and each of these 
agencies has some monitoring responsibility, either of themselves or 
another entity. FTA oversees and administers the program. As the 
program administrator, FTA is responsible for developing the rules and 
guidance that state oversight agencies are to use to perform their 
oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA also is responsible for 
informing oversight and transit agencies of new program developments, 
facilitating and informing the transit and oversight agencies of 
training available through FTA or other organizations, facilitating 
information sharing among program participants, and providing technical 
assistance. 

FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk- 
management approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and 
risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that 
each state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they 
oversee. This is consistent with our position that agencies make risk- 
based decisions on where their assets can best be used, both in 
transportation security and safety. However, FTA recognizes that some 
parts of the State Safety Oversight program are not risk-based, 
including requiring minimum standards for all transit agencies in the 
program, no matter their size or ridership.[Footnote 7] 

While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies 
with regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through 
reviews of oversight agency reports and audits, state oversight 
agencies comply with the program requirements. For example, according 
to the FTA rule, when a state proposes to designate an oversight 
agency, FTA may review the proposal to ensure the designated agency has 
the authority to perform the required duties without any apparent 
conflicts. FTA has recommended in two instances that a state choose a 
different agency because the oversight agency that the state proposed 
appeared to be too closely affiliated with the transit agency and did 
not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA is responsible for 
reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit. FTA officials 
ensure they include all the required information--such as descriptions 
of program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions; they then 
compile this information for a program annual report, and look for 
industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. Furthermore, FTA 
is responsible for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure 
they are complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits 
evaluate how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of 
the FTA rule, including whether or not the oversight agency is 
investigating accidents properly, if it is conducting its safety and 
security reviews properly, and if it is reporting to FTA all the 
information that is required. 

Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the operation of 
their oversight programs. However, states may use FTA Section 5309 (New 
Starts program) funds--normally used to pay for transit-related capital 
expenses--to defray the cost of setting up their oversight agency 
before a transit agency begins operations. Also, FTA officials stated 
this year that FTA used a portion of the funding originally designated 
for FTA audits to pay for one person from each oversight agency to 
attend training on the revisions to FTA's rule, which oversight 
agencies had to comply with by May 1, 2006. 

State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit 
Agencies: 

In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are 
responsible for directly overseeing rail transit agencies. According to 
the FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight 
function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any "New 
Starts" project involving a new rail transit system, or before the 
transit agency applies for FTA formula funding. States have designated 
several different types of agencies to serve as oversight agencies. 
Most frequently--in 17 cases--states have designated their departments 
of transportation to serve in this role. In three instances-- 
California, Colorado, and Massachusetts--states have designated 
utilities commissions or regulators to oversee rail transit safety and 
security. According to state officials, since these bodies already had 
regulatory and oversight authority, it was a natural extension of their 
powers to add rail transit oversight to their responsibilities. Two 
states have designated emergency management or public safety 
departments to oversee their rail transit agencies. Officials in one 
state, Illinois, have designated two separate oversight agencies, both 
local transportation funding authorities, to oversee the two rail 
transit agencies operating in the state. In the Washington, D.C. 
(District of Columbia), region, the rail transit system runs between 
two states and the District of Columbia. These states and the District 
of Columbia established the Tri-State Oversight Committee as the 
designated oversight agency.[Footnote 8] Finally, one state, New York, 
has given its oversight authority to its Public Transportation Safety 
Board (PTSB). PTSB officials said they have authority similar to the 
public utilities commissions discussed above, but have no other mission 
than ensuring and overseeing transit safety in New York. See appendix 
II for a table showing each oversight agency and the rail transit 
agencies they oversee. 

The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit 
agencies varies widely. While FTA's rule gives state oversight agencies 
authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the 
oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies 
authority to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit 
agencies or shutting down their operations. However, we found five 
states where the states granted their oversight agencies some punitive 
authority over the rail transit agencies they oversee. Officials from 
oversight agencies that have the authority to fine or otherwise punish 
rail transit agencies all stated that they rarely, if ever, use that 
authority, but each stated that they believed it gives their actions 
extra weight and forced transit agencies to acquiesce to the oversight 
agency more readily than they otherwise might. The majority of 
oversight agencies, 19 of the 24 with which we spoke, have no such 
punitive authority, though officials from some oversight agencies 
stated they may be able to withhold grants their oversight agencies 
provide to the transit agencies they oversee.[Footnote 9] Although 
officials from several of these agencies stated that they believe they 
would be more effective if they did have enforcement authority, under 
the current program this authority would be granted by individual 
states. 

While the states have designated a number of different types of 
agencies with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a 
basic set of rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the 
program, oversight agencies are responsible for the following: 

* Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail 
transit agency responsibilities, providing "guidance to the regulated 
rail transit properties concerning processes and procedures they must 
have in place to be in compliance with the State Safety Oversight 
program." 

* Reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans and annual 
reports. 

* Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at 
least a triennial basis. 

* Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed, and 
tracking and eliminating hazardous conditions that the transit agency 
reports to the oversight agency outside the audit process. 

* Investigating accidents that meet a certain damage or severity 
threshold and developing a corrective action plan for the causes 
leading to the accident. 

* Submitting an annual report to FTA detailing their oversight 
activities, including results of accident investigations and the status 
of ongoing corrective actions. 

FTA's rule also lays out several specific requirements that oversight 
agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as developing 
separate system safety and security plans, performing internal safety 
and security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a hazard management 
process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight agencies within 2 
hours. The locations and types of transit agencies participating in the 
program are shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in 
State Safety Oversight Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: FTA's National Transit Database. 

[End of figure] 

Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and 
Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight 
Program: 

In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit 
agencies, two entities within DHS are involved in transit safety 
security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),[Footnote 
10] passed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, gave TSA authority for security over all transportation modes, 
including authority to issue security regulations.[Footnote 11] While 
TSA's most public transportation security duties are its airport 
screening activities, TSA has taken steps to enhance all rail security, 
including rail transit. For example, in May 2004, TSA issued security 
directives to rail transit agencies to ensure all agencies were 
implementing a consistent baseline of security. Also, TSA has hired 100 
rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress.[Footnote 12] While 
the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are still being 
determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and enforce 
compliance with the security directives by passenger rail agencies, as 
well as increase security awareness among rail transit agencies, 
riders, and others. 

In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, another DHS agency, the 
Office of Grants and Training plays a role in ensuring rail transit 
security through supporting security initiatives. The Office of Grants 
and Training (formerly known as the Office of Domestic Preparedness) is 
the primary federal source of security funding for rail transit 
systems, as well as for state and local jurisdictions; this security 
funding goes toward the purchase of equipment, support planning and the 
execution of exercises, and the provision of technical assistance to 
prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism. The Office of 
Grants and Training has provided over $320 million to rail transit 
providers through the Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit 
Security Grant Program. 

FRA, within DOT, also plays a role in ensuring transit agencies operate 
safely. In general, FRA exercises its jurisdiction over parts of a rail 
transit system that share track with the general railroad system, or 
places where a rail transit system and the general railroad system 
share a connection (e.g., a grade crossing).[Footnote 13] According to 
FRA, if a rail transit vehicle were to operate on the same tracks and 
at the same time as general railroads, this would make the rail transit 
agency operating the vehicle use much sturdier (and more expensive) 
vehicles. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have requested waivers 
from FRA and, according to an FRA official, as of June 2006, FRA 
granted waivers to 10 of the 11 rail transit agencies that applied for 
them.[Footnote 14] 

Finally, NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit 
safety, though it has no formal role in FTA's oversight program. NTSB 
has authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads, 
including rail transit agencies. NTSB officials stated they generally 
will investigate only the more serious accidents, such as those 
involving fatalities or injuries, or those involving recurring safety 
issues. Often, NTSB accident investigations of rail transit accidents 
will result in recommendations to federal agencies or rail transit 
agencies to eliminate the condition that led to the accident. 

Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; 
However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document 
the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and 
Security: 

The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom 
we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety 
and security in their organizations. These officials provided 
illustrations about how the program enhanced safety or security; 
however, they have limited statistical evidence that the oversight 
program improved safety or security. FTA has obtained a variety of 
information on the program from sources such as national transit data, 
annual reports from oversight agencies, and its own audits of the 
oversight agencies. However, these data are not linked to any program 
goals or performance measures. FTA officials recognize the need for 
performance measures for its safety and security programs and are 
taking steps in 2006 to begin to address this need. Finally, although 
FTA expected to audit the oversight agencies every 3 years, it has not 
conducted these audits as frequently as it had planned (it has 
conducted eight audits since September 2001). However, program 
officials stated they are committed to getting "back on track" to meet 
the planned schedule. 

Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as 
Worthwhile and Valuable: 

Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA's 
State Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it 
helps them maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit 
officials with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees 
their safety and security is worthwhile. One transit agency official 
explained that the oversight agency helps them identify larger, 
systemic issues. In addition, the program provides support to exert 
extra influence on a transit agency's board of directors or senior 
management to get safety or security improvements implemented faster 
and improve the safety and security of their equipment. For example, 
one oversight agency helped its transit agency's safety department 
address problems with train operators running red light signals by 
helping convincing the transit agency's senior management to replace 
all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals that were brighter 
and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials believe that FTA's 
program is an effective method for overseeing safety and security. 
Several officials said that they felt having a state or local (rather 
than national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety and security 
improvements and consistent working relationships with the oversight 
staff. 

In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 
state safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the 
State Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for 
improving transit systems' safety and security. Several officials 
commented that the program provides an incentive to examine safety and 
security issues and avoid complacency. Furthermore, several officials 
commented that they believed the current system worked well and that 
the program provides consistency, endowing the state safety oversight 
agencies with enough authority to accomplish their tasks. Also, 
officials said that having the states carry out the program provides on-
going oversight in addition to formal audits, which helps maintain a 
constant oversight of safety and security issues. 

Finally, several transit and oversight agency officials stated that, 
because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved 
safety in their rail system, but it was difficult to show statistics 
proving this. For example, the California oversight agency found an 87 
percent drop in rail transit collisions at the San Francisco transit 
agency (MUNI) from 1997, when the oversight agency began oversight, to 
2005.[Footnote 15] Although FTA changed its definition of a reportable 
accident during this time period--making it impossible to determine 
exactly what impact external oversight had on MUNI safety--both MUNI 
and the oversight agency staff stated they were confident the oversight 
efforts had been a major factor in reducing accidents. 

APTA officials with whom we spoke were concerned that, although the 
State Safety Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety 
and security, the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged 
industry officials to surpass minimum standards and continue striving 
for improved safety and security.[Footnote 16] However, transit 
officials with whom we spoke often discussed the benefits of a federal 
program. In addition, officials from 17 transit agencies reported that 
their respective state safety oversight agencies imposed requirements 
above those required in FTA's requirement. 

FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information, but Does Not Have the 
Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and 
Security: 

One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight 
program's impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects 
through the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to 
submit. The reports include information on many different issues 
including program resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous 
conditions, and any corrective actions taken resulting from audits or 
accident investigations. FTA officials stated they have used the 
oversight agencies' reports to publish their own annual reports on 
transit safety; however, the information was not tied to any program 
goals or performance measures. In addition, the 2003 report is the most 
recent one FTA has issued. 

According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better 
information and performance measures for its safety and security 
programs and has not published a report since the 2003 report because 
it has been looking into improving the type of safety and security data 
it can collect, and how it can use the information to track program 
performance and progress toward yet to be defined goals. FTA's 2006 
business plan for its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to 
continue developing and implementing a data-driven performance analysis 
and tracking system to help ensure management decisions are informed by 
data and focus on performance and accountability. As part of these 
efforts, FTA officials explained they are working with a contractor who 
is working with oversight and transit agencies to identify measures 
that they can use to develop performance measures for the State Safety 
Oversight program. 

Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies 
that FTA had planned to conduct every 3 years. However, the agency has 
not met this schedule. Although the audits provide detailed information 
on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought together 
information from these audits to provide information on the safety and 
security of transit systems across the country. FTA tracks the 
deficiencies and areas of concern and follows up with oversight agency 
staff to assure that each state safety oversight agency resolves the 
suggested corrective actions. Given this lack of consistent audits, we 
are unsure if FTA has obtained enough information to provide a current 
picture of transit system safety and security, or a framework to 
identify potential challenges that oversight and transit agency 
officials may face in implementing the program. FTA has audited each 
state oversight agency that existed prior to 2004 at least one time 
since the program began; two agencies were audited twice. However, FTA 
largely discontinued the audit program after the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks and acknowledged that the agency's priorities shifted 
in the wake of the terrorist attacks. However, officials indicated they 
continued to evaluate the readiness of rail transit projects to safely 
and securely enter operations. In addition, according to FTA officials, 
FTA is not conducting audits in fiscal year 2006 so it can use the 
money and time to help states comply with the revised FTA rule, and has 
planned a detailed outreach effort--including a workshop for oversight 
agency officials--to help ensure compliance. FTA plans to return to its 
triennial audit schedule in fiscal year 2007, with 10 audits scheduled 
for the first year to get back on the triennial schedule. 

FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

Despite the program's popularity with participants, FTA faces 
challenges in implementing the program's revised rule and continuing to 
manage the program. First, several oversight agency officials stated 
they are not confident they have adequate numbers of staff to 
effectively oversee rail transit system safety and security, and they 
are unsure the current training available to them is sufficient. Also, 
we found the level of staffing and expertise of oversight agency staff 
varies widely across the country. A second challenge FTA faces in 
implementing the program is that many transit and oversight agency 
personnel are confused about how security issues in the program will be 
handled, and what agencies will be responsible for what actions, as TSA 
takes on a greater role in rail transit security. 

Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are 
Adequately Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff: 

While a majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with 
whom we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight 
program, many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that 
they were adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, officials 
from 18 of 24 oversight agencies with which we spoke stated they 
believed additional training would help them provide more efficient and 
effective safety and security oversight. We found that the level of 
expertise of oversight agency staff varied widely across the country. 
For example, 11 of the 24 oversight agencies with which we spoke had 
oversight staff that had no career or educational background in transit 
safety or security. Conversely, another 11 oversight agencies required 
their staff to have certain levels of experience or education. For 
example, New York's Public Transportation Safety Board requires its 
staff to have 5 years of experience in transit safety. According to 
some oversight agency officials who had no previous transit safety or 
security background, they had to rely on the transit agency staff they 
were overseeing to teach them about transit operations, safety, and 
security. These officials stated that if they left their positions, any 
new staff taking over for them would face a similar challenge. 

Therefore, several oversight agency staff cite the lack of a training 
curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness. 
For example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated that the 
training they had received in transit operations, accident 
investigations, and other areas was beneficial, but they had not 
received any training on how to perform oversight functions. Although 
many oversight agency officials acknowledged that they felt the 
training that had been made available to them either by FTA, the 
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), or the National Transit 
Institute (NTI) had been adequate,[Footnote 17] officials from 17 of 24 
oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that they were somewhat 
unsure of which courses they should take to be effective in their 
oversight role. 

Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency 
staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state 
oversight agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay 
staff to travel to these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay 
their own tuition and travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA 
or TSI.[Footnote 18] Officials from 10 of the 24 oversight agencies 
with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as one reason why they could 
not attend training they had hoped to attend. Also, officials from all 
24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA provided some funding for 
them to travel to training or paid tuition for training they wanted to 
attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to spend their limited 
resources on direct oversight activities, such as staff overtime, 
travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring contractors. 
Several oversight agency officials also cited the example of other DOT 
agencies that provide free training or pay for state staff to travel to 
attend training. For example, 30 states participate in FRA's State Rail 
Safety Participation Program. These states have inspectors who FRA has 
certified to enforce FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their initial 
and ongoing classroom training and state staff's travel to this 
training. In addition, the federal agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA, 
authorizes state-employed inspectors to inspect pipelines in many 
states. PHMSA also recently paid for two inspectors from each state to 
attend training when it instituted a new inspection approach. Officials 
from both FRA and PHMSA stated that providing funding to states to 
train their employees helps the federal agencies more effectively carry 
out their enforcement activities, easing the states' burden of paying 
to enforce federal regulations. For the first time, FTA paid for 
oversight agencies' personnel to travel to attend a special meeting in 
June 2006 in St. Louis, where FTA provided technical assistance and 
shared best practices in meeting the requirements of the revised FTA 
rule. FTA officials agree that they have not provided training 
specifically pertaining to oversight activities or provided a 
recommended training curriculum to oversight agencies, but stated that 
it would not be difficult to take these steps. 

FTA officials told us that they considered addressing the lack of 
consistency in oversight agency staff qualifications when they were 
revising FTA's rule in 2005; however, they stated they did not have the 
legal authority to direct states to require certain education, 
experience, or certifications for oversight agency staff. Furthermore, 
these officials noted that, despite the lack of formal requirements, 
FTA checks to ensure oversight agency personnel are adequately trained 
during its audits, and have recommended in five instances that 
oversight agency staff take additional training. They also stated that 
FTA could issue guidance or recommendations to oversight agencies about 
the level of training their oversight staff should have. 

In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure 
they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a transit 
agency's operations. Officials at 14 of 24 oversight agencies with whom 
we spoke stated that more staff would help them do their job more 
effectively. Officials from 11 oversight agencies told us they devoted 
the equivalent of less than one person working half-time on oversight, 
and, in some cases, described oversight as a "collateral duty." See 
table 1 for the amount of personnel oversight agency representatives 
estimated their agencies dedicate to oversight responsibilities. While 
in some of these instances, the transit agencies overseen are small, 
some of the transit agencies with the highest ridership levels have 
similar levels of oversight. For example, one state that estimated it 
devotes 0.1 full-time equivalent (FTE) to oversight program functions 
is responsible for overseeing a major transit agency that averages 
nearly 200,000 daily passenger trips. This state supplements its staff 
time with the services of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial 
audits of the transit agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting 
0.5 FTE to oversight functions is responsible for overseeing five 
transit agencies (including two systems not yet in operation) in 
different cities, making it difficult to maintain active oversight when 
their responsibilities are so spread out. As FTA resumes its audit 
schedule, it would be practical for FTA to focus on this issue. (See 
app. II for information on estimated FTE and transit system information 
for each state safety oversight agency and related transit agency). 

Table 1: Estimated FTEs Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee Transit 
Agency Safety and Security: 

Estimated FTEs: Number of oversight agencies; 
0.5 or less: 11; 
0.6-1: 5; 
1.1-3: 6; 
3.1-5: 1; 
Over 5: 1; 
Total: 24. 

Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses. 

[End of table] 

Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's Emerging 
Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program: 

Another challenge facing the program is how TSA and its rail inspectors 
might affect oversight of transit security. As I mentioned earlier, TSA 
has regulatory authority over transportation security, and, according 
to TSA officials, has hired 100 rail inspectors, who are to monitor and 
enforce compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May 
2004. However, of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we 
spoke, officials at 20 agencies stated they did not have a clear 
picture of who was responsible for overseeing transit security issues. 
Similarly, officials at 14 of 37 transit agencies were also unsure of 
lines of responsibility regarding transit security oversight. Several 
state oversight agencies were particularly concerned that TSA's rail 
inspectors would be duplicating their role in overseeing transit 
security. One oversight agency official stated it would be more 
efficient if TSA and oversight agency staff audited transit agencies' 
security practices at the same time. 

TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies; 
FTA program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both indicate that they 
are committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating 
their respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as 
soon as possible. However, as TSA is still developing its program, 
currently there is no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety 
Oversight program, and TSA has not determined the roles and 
responsibilities for its rail inspectors. While FTA's rule discusses 
requirements for a transit agency's security plan, it does not discuss 
TSA's specific role in the program, and both TSA and FTA officials 
state that exactly how TSA would participate in the program was still 
to be determined. However, the officials added that they are working 
together to ensure inspection activities are coordinated, thereby 
fostering consistency and minimizing disruption to rail transit agency 
operations. For example, in May 2006, TSA's director of the rail 
inspector program reported that it had designated 26 rail inspectors as 
liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, these TSA rail inspectors 
attended a training session where FTA presented information on the 
State Safety Oversight program, and they have contacted 13 oversight 
agencies to begin discussions on how they can coordinate activities. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I plan to include 
recommendations to address these challenges in the report we plan to 
issue next week. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or 
other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. 

Contact Information: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Katherine 
Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Individuals making key 
contributions to this testimony include Ashley Alley, Catherine 
Colwell, Colin Fallon, Michele Fejfar, Joah Iannotta, Stuart Kaufman, 
Joshua Ormond, Tina Paek, Stephanie Purcell, and Raymond Sendejas. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems: 

Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States--the 
Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink 
in St. Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
(WMATA) in Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia)--cross state lines 
and require the collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the 
State Safety Oversight program; alternatively, states can agree that 
one state will be responsible for oversight of the transit system. Each 
of these multi-state transit systems has a different structure to 
handle oversight responsibilities. The oversight programs in 
Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed strategies to centralize 
decision making, streamline collaboration, and respond promptly to 
safety and security audit findings. In contrast, the Tri-State 
Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the oversight agency in the 
District of Columbia area, requires majority decision making by the six 
committee members of the agency, including at least one member from 
each jurisdiction. However, WMATA has experienced difficulty obtaining 
funding, responding to FTA information requests, and ensuring audit 
findings are addressed. 

Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and 
Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently: 

Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure and each 
performs oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, 
authority to serve as the oversight agency was delegated to one of the 
two state agencies--namely, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation (PennDOT) agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of 
Transportation (NJDOT) to serve as the sole oversight agency for the 
PATCO heavy rail transit line. MetroLink in St. Louis is subject to 
oversight from both Illinois (through the St. Clair County Transit 
District) and Missouri (through the Missouri Department of 
Transportation); the two organizations share oversight duties. Finally, 
TOC, which is composed of multiple representatives from each 
jurisdiction (including Virginia, Maryland, and the District of 
Columbia), provides oversight for WMATA. 

The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders 
daily and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO's 
track is in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. 
Until early 2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared 
by Pennsylvania and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port 
Authority (DRPA), a regional transportation and economic development 
agency serving both Southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. 
When DRPA implemented organizational and functional changes, DRPA 
leadership no longer believed that DRPA could perform its role as the 
designated oversight agency without facing conflicting interests. As a 
result, Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreed to have NJDOT replace DRPA 
as the oversight agency. This arrangement allows the oversight agency 
to take corrective action without seeking additional levels of approval 
from Pennsylvania, although the oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania 
informed of its activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides some support to 
NJDOT by having PennDOT perform oversight functions for the stations, 
passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports 
any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted during the 
performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through meetings or 
other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be performed by 
the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or directly by 
New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time staff members 
and one part-time staff member to its oversight program, and while 
these staff members must oversee several transit systems, including 
PATCO, their sole responsibilities are for safety and oversight 
functions. 

The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis 
International Airport in St. Louis and Scott Air Force Base outside 
Shiloh, Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the 
system included about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles 
of track in Illinois. Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois 
officials agreed to allow the Missouri Department of Transportation to 
provide safety and security oversight for the entire system. However, 
in 2001, MetroLink opened a 17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which 
roughly equalized the amount of track in both states. Because of this, 
the states agreed that it was appropriate for Illinois to play a 
greater role in safety and security oversight, and Illinois designated 
the St. Clair County Transit District as its oversight agency. St. 
Clair is one of the few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight 
agency. The involvement of two separate oversight agencies could create 
challenges to effective implementation, but the agencies have taken 
steps to ensure close coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri 
oversight agencies have agreed to use only one uniform safety and 
security standard across the entire MetroLink system.[Footnote 19] 
According to area officials, this arrangement creates consistency 
throughout the system and allows both agencies to perform their 
oversight functions in a consistent manner. In addition, the agencies 
use a single contractor who is responsible for the triennial audit. All 
other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri oversight 
agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies coordinate 
very closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, there 
is one full-time employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his 
time to safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several 
employees who devote smaller percentages of their individual time to 
the program, but the Managing Director is primarily responsible for 
coordinating with Missouri. MetroLink, in turn, indicated that 
responding to state safety oversight directives is a priority, and the 
agency works quickly to implement changes. 

WMATA operates a heavy rail system within the District of Columbia, 
Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of Columbia decided 
to carry out their oversight responsibilities through a collaborative 
organization managed by TOC. TOC is composed of six representatives-- 
two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. All of 
the representatives have other primary duties, and their activities on 
TOC are collateral to these other daily duties, as is the case with 
staff at several other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any 
dedicated staff, and TOC members have limited rail operational 
experience. To gain access to additional experience and expertise in 
rail oversight, TOC contracts with a consultant to provide technical 
knowledge, perform required audits of WMATA, and ensure that audit 
recommendations are completed. In addition, TOC funding comes from, and 
must be approved by, each of the jurisdictions every year. The 
Washington Council of Governments processes TOC funds and handles their 
contracting procedures. These issues result in a lengthy process for 
TOC to receive its yearly funding and process its expenses. 

Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Their Administrative 
Challenges in Different Ways: 

The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have 
attempted to streamline their decision making, while TOC has a more 
collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed 
strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration, 
albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New 
Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO's 
territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency's 
staff. New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety 
Oversight program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates 
communication, and provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with 
on the implementation of any new safety or security processes. Although 
St. Louis has two agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight 
agencies have made it a priority to ensure that they are providing 
consistent information to the transit agency, and they are coordinating 
their activities so MetroLink is not burdened by multiple contacts 
about the same issue. To do this, the Missouri and Illinois 
representatives stay in close contact with each other. Both oversight 
agencies stated they have in-house staff dedicated to safety and 
security oversight, and the agencies have very good working 
relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis could 
face challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and 
new employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In 
addition, officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had 
disagreements over safety or security standards, or how to enforce the 
existing standards, it would be highly problematic. However, officials 
in the Illinois and Missouri oversight agencies, as well as at 
MetroLink, thought that the current arrangements have produced one set 
of standards, good communication, and effective coordination. Both 
MetroLink and oversight agency staff in St. Louis credited each other 
with creating an environment where this system of having multiple 
oversight agencies could work well. 

In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making 
decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have 
contributed to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA 
information requests. On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would 
perform TOC's audit in late July 2005. FTA requested information prior 
to the audit to facilitate the time it spent on-site. TOC did not 
submit the requested State Safety Oversight program materials despite 
several FTA requests and an extension by FTA to move the audit to a 
later date. At the end of August, FTA initiated its audit even though 
it had not received requested information, but was not able to complete 
the audit until the end of September, when it received all requested 
materials. FTA's Final Audit Report to TOC cited 10 areas for 
improvement and provided TOC 60 days to resolve these issues. According 
to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within the time period. FTA held a 
follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to check on the status of the 
remaining areas for improvement. As of June 2006, FTA was evaluating 
how many of the remaining audit findings remained open, although FTA 
stated that TOC had created a detailed set of internal operating 
procedures to address many of FTA's findings and concerns. In addition, 
TOC representatives stated that some of the areas for improvement FTA 
found were complicated issues, such as reviewing WMATA's accident 
investigation procedures and approving modifications, and could not be 
addressed within the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC staff 
emphasized that, although WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to TOC 
audit recommendations or information requests, they were pleased with 
their relationship with WMATA and that WMATA was responsive to TOC. 
Similarly, FTA officials stressed that they recognized and appreciated 
the effort TOC had undertaken in addressing FTA's findings. 

TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track 
outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on 
at least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, 
TOC members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to 
FTA's initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds 
for the year and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working 
with the consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and 
maintained their files. According to TOC officials, since the process 
for acquiring additional funding would require approval from all three 
jurisdictions represented on TOC, it was not feasible to obtain 
additional funding quickly. In addition, TOC cannot take any action 
without a majority of its members, and at least one member from each 
jurisdiction, approving the action. Reaching such majority agreements 
can be time consuming since all members of TOC have other primary 
responsibilities. This is especially a concern when quick decisions are 
necessary, such as responding to FTA's audit recommendations. 

TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission, 
including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy 
process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of 
corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they 
believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and 
oversight agencies, due to their location in the District of Columbia, 
and their proximity to FTA's headquarters staff. To address these 
challenges, the chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend 
additional time overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to 
streamline the administrative and funding processes that TOC must 
navigate. Hiring a full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member 
to serve in a full-time capacity, could help solve some of these 
issues. However, funding this position could be a challenge, and the 
administrator would need to have decision-making authority to be 
effective and act quickly. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They 
Oversee: 

State: Singe State Systems: Arkansas; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Arkansas State Highway 
and Transportation Department (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Central Arkansas Transit Authority 
(0.08); 
City center served: Little Rock, AR; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 159,458; 2.8. 

State: Singe State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Bay Area Rapid Transit (7); 
City center served: San Francisco, CA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 99,296,028; 209. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (1.5); 
City center served: Los Angeles, CA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 74,242,912; 141.6. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): San Francisco Municipal Railway 
(7); 
City center served: San Francisco, CA; 
Type of system: Light rail, trolley, and cable car; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 53,768,895; 81.7. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): San Diego Trolley, Inc. (0.9); 
City center served: San Diego, CA; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 29,334,362; 96.6. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Sacramento Regional Transit 
District (N/A); 
City center served: Sacramento, CA; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 12,008,620; 58.4. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Santa Clara Valley Transit 
Authority (N/A); 
City center served: San Jose, CA; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 6,780,431; 58.4. 

State: Single State Systems: Colorado; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Colorado Public 
Utilities Commission (1.2); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Denver Regional Transit District 
(1.25); 
City center served: Denver, CO; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 11,142,220; 31.6. 

State: Single State Systems: Florida; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of 
Transportation (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metro-Dade Transit Authority 
(N/A); 
City center served: Miami, FL; 
Type of system: Heavy rail and automated guideway; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 26,479,423; 53.5. 

State: Single State Systems: Florida; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of 
Transportation (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Jacksonville Transportation 
Authority (N/A); 
City center served: Jacksonville, FL; 
Type of system: Automated guideway; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 736,510; 5.4. 

State: Single State Systems: Florida; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of 
Transportation (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Hillsborough Area Regional Transit 
(0.85); 
City center served: Tampa, FL; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 565,002; 4.8. 

State: Single State Systems: Georgia; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Georgia Department of 
Transportation (0.1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit 
Authority (6); 
City center served: Atlanta, GA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 70,984,053; 96.1. 

State: Single State Systems: Illinois; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Regional Transportation 
Authority (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Chicago Transit Authority (11); 
City center served: Chicago, IL; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 186,759,524; 206.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Louisiana; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Louisiana Department of 
Transportation (0.1)[ A]; 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Orleans Regional Transit 
Authority (N/A); 
City center served: New Orleans, LA; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 5,667,952; 25.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Maryland; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Maryland Department of 
Transportation (1.3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Maryland Transit Administration; 
(5); 
City center served: Baltimore, MD; 
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 18,059,117; 87. 

State: Single State Systems: Massachusetts; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Massachusetts Department 
of Telecommunication and Energy (2.67); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (5.1); 
City center served: Boston, MA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail, light rail, and trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 215,787,440; 127.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Michigan; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Michigan Department of 
Transportation (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Detroit Transit Corporation (1.1);
City center served: Detroit, MI; 
Type of system: Automated guideway; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,340,646; 2.9. 

State: Single State Systems: Minnesota; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Minnesota Department of 
Public Safety (0.1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Hiawatha Metro Transit (1-1.5); 
City center served: Minneapolis, MN; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 7,901,668; 24.4. 

State: Single State Systems: New Jersey; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit Newark City 
Subway (0.5); 
City center served: Newark, NJ; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 14,312,676; 99.9[B]. 

State: Single State Systems: New Jersey; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit Hudson-Bergen 
Light Rail (N/A); 
City center served: Jersey City, NJ; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty]. 

State: Single State Systems: New Jersey; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit River Line (2); 
City center served: Trenton, NJ; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty]. 

State: Single State Systems: New York; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): New York Public 
Transportation Safety Board (3.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New York City Transit (15); 
City center served: New York City, NY; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,803,536,486; 493.8. 

State: Single State Systems: New York; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): New York Public 
Transportation Safety Board (3.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Niagara Frontier Transit Authority 
(0.5); 
City center served: Buffalo, NY; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 5,373,321; 12.4. 

State: Single State Systems: Ohio; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Ohio Department of 
Transportation (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Greater Cleveland Regional Transit 
Authority (1.2); 
City center served: Cleveland, OH; 
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 8,236,840; 68.5. 

State: Single State Systems: Oregon; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Oregon Department of 
Transportation (1.2); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Portland Tri-Met (10); 
City center served: Portland, OR; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 34,755,147; 92.9[B]. 

State: Single State Systems: Oregon; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Oregon Department of 
Transportation (1.2); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Portland Streetcar (0.5); 
City center served: Portland, OR; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty]. 

State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit 
Authority (2); 
City center served: Philadelphia, PA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail, light rail, and trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 113,252,100; 141.1. 

State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Port Authority of Allegheny County 
(0.3); 
City center served: Pittsburgh, PA; 
Type of system: Light rail and inclined plane; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 8,072,099; 45.8. 

State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Cambria County Transit Authority 
(1); 
City center served: Johnstown, PA; 
Type of system: Inclined plane; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 86,031; 0.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Puerto Rico; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Puerto Rico State 
Emergency and Disaster Management Agency (3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Puerto Rico Highway and 
Transportation Authority Tren Urbano (1.6); 
City center served: San Juan, Puerto Rico; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 2,182,668; (N/A). 

State: Single State Systems: Tennessee; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Tennessee Department of 
Transportation (0.25); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Chattanooga Area Rapid Transit 
Authority (N/A); 
City center served: Chattanooga, TN; 
Type of system: Inclined plane; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 435,780; 2. 

State: Single State Systems: Tennessee; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Tennessee Department of 
Transportation (0.25); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Memphis Area Transit Authority 
(0.3); 
City center served: Memphis, TN; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,015,448; 10. 

State: Single State Systems: Texas; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of 
Transportation (0.4); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Galveston Island Transit (0.25); 
City center served: Galveston, TX; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 47,706; 4. 

State: Single State Systems: Texas; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of 
Transportation (0.4); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Dallas Area Rapid Transit (0.75); 
City center served: Dallas, TX; 
Type of system: Light rail and trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 17,487,057; 87.7. 

State: Single State Systems: Texas; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of 
Transportation (0.4); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metropolitan Transit Authority of 
Harris County (2); 
City center served: Houston, TX; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 10,233,638; 14.8. 

State: Single State Systems: Utah; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Utah Department of 
Transportation (0.8); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Utah Transit Authority (1.5); 
City center served: Salt Lake City, UT; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 13,101,791; 37.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Washington; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Washington State 
Department of Transportation (0.35); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Sound Transit Tacoma Link (N/A); 
City center served: Tacoma, WA; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 884,895; 3.6. 

State: Single State Systems: Washington; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Washington State 
Department of Transportation (0.35); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Seattle Center Monorail (0.02); 
City center served: Seattle, WA; 
Type of system: Automated guideway; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,506,240[C]; 1.8. 

State: Single State Systems: Wisconsin; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation (0.3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Kenosha Transit (0.85); 
City center served: Kenosha, WI; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 68,209; 1.9. 

State: Multi-state systems: Illinois and Missouri; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): St. Clair County Transit 
District (0.25-0.5) and Missouri Department of Transportation (0.9); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Bi-State Development Agency - St. 
Louis Metro (2); 
City center served: St. Louis, MO; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 15,648,233; 75.8. 

State: Multi-state systems: New Jersey and Pennsylvania; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Port Authority Transit Corporation 
(1); 
City center served: Philadelphia, PA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 9,362,839; 31.5. 

State: Multi-state systems: Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.2); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority (1); 
City center served: Washington, DC; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 259,430,055; 206.6. 

Sources: GAO interviews and National Transit Database. 

Notes: Full-time equivalent (FTE) data comes from our interviews with 
oversight agencies and transit agencies. The data do not include 
contractor staff that assist transit or oversight agencies, though 
several agencies reported using contractors. Data on ridership is 
current as of 2005, and includes the total number of passengers 
boarding the rail system annually (also known as "unlinked passenger 
trips") as provided by FTA. Directional route miles--the miles of track 
in each direction over which transportation vehicles travel while 
carrying passengers--are current as of 2004, and were obtained from 
data published by FTA in the National Transit Database. The data in 
this table are presented for background purposes and were not verified. 
FTA defines trolley operations as "light rail" for statistical 
purposes. However, to differentiate between vintage trolley operations 
and modern light rail operations, we have created separate categories 
for them in this chart. 

N/A = Not available: 

[A] Because we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE 
data was provided by FTA. 

[B] Annual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles 
represent the total for all systems within a transit agency. 

[C] According to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this 
table represents a year when the monorail was out of service for an 
extended period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. In 
prior years the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded 
about 2 million. 

[End of table] 

[End of Section] 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] One oversight agency and five transit agencies declined to 
participate in our review. 

[2] PHMSA requires new inspectors to complete applicable Transportation 
Safety Institute (TSI) training courses in a 3-year period. 

[3] P.L. 102-240. 

[4] Codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330. 

[5] Codified at 49 CFR Part 659. 

[6] A system-safety approach involves the application of technical and 
managerial skills to identify, analyze, assess, and control hazards and 
risks. 

[7] FTA states that to ensure a minimum standard is met, a focus on 
universally applied rules is necessary. Therefore, FTA officials stated 
that they felt it was inappropriate to use a risk-based approach in 
this area of the program. 

[8] The Tri-State Oversight Committee has six representatives--two each 
from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 

[9] Officials from 16 oversight agencies stated that they provide some 
form of grant funding to transit agencies they oversee and that they 
could, potentially, withhold those grants to force a transit agency to 
take a particular safety action. However, no oversight agency officials 
stated that they had taken this step. 

[10] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[11] ATSA initially created TSA within DOT. The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred TSA to 
DHS. 

[12] These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of 
2005 and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with 
$12 million in funding for rail security activities. 

[13] FRA clarified its position on safety jurisdiction over shared- 
track situations. See 65 Fed. Reg. 42529 (Jul. 10, 2000). 

[14] FTA provided documentation showing that FRA told the one rail 
transit agency that did not receive its waiver that its application was 
unnecessary--what the agency proposed was already allowed under FRA 
regulations. 

[15] Prior to the existence of the FTA State Safety Oversight program, 
California law dictated that the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) had oversight authority over rail transit agencies, but exempted 
municipally operated systems. Since the City of San Francisco operates 
MUNI, it was not subject to CPUC oversight. However, since 49 CFR Part 
659 required that California designate an agency to oversee all rail 
transit systems receiving federal funds, the governor of California 
designated CPUC to oversee MUNI in 1997. 

[16] Prior the implementation of the State Safety Oversight program, 
according to APTA, most transit agencies were self-regulated and 
submitted to occasional APTA-sponsored safety audits as a way of 
obtaining outside feedback about their safety practices and areas for 
potential improvement. APTA charged transit agencies for their 
participation in these audits. 

[17] TSI is a part of DOT's Research and Innovative Technology 
Administration. NTI, which FTA funds, is affiliated with Rutgers 
University and dedicated to training employees of the public 
transportation industry. 

[18] FTA and TSI provide their courses free of charge to transit and 
oversight agencies but do charge a nominal fee for course books and 
materials. FTA and TSI also respond to requests to teach courses in 
field locations, potentially reducing travel costs for participants. 

[19] In the most recent revision to 49 CFR Part 659, the Rail Fixed 
Guideway Systems; State Safety Oversight rule, governing the State 
Safety Oversight program, FTA mandated that in areas where transit 
agencies ran through multiple states, the states coordinate to ensure 
they use the same program standard for the transit agency to meet. This 
way one transit agency does not have to meet two separate standards in 
different parts of their system. 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. 
To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, 
go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202) 
512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 
Washington, D.C. 20548: