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Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST: 

March 8, 2006: 

Hurricane Katrina: 

GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and 
Recovery: 

Statement of David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

GAO-06-442T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-442T, a testimony before the Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The size and strength of Hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the 
largest natural disasters in our nation’s history. Hurricane Katrina 
raised major questions about our nation’s readiness and ability to 
respond to catastrophic disasters. Hurricane Rita increased demands on 
an already stressed response and recovery effort by all levels of 
government. The two hurricanes provided a sobering picture of the 
overwhelming strains on response and recovery if there are back-to-back 
catastrophic disasters in the same area. GAO has a large body of 
ongoing work on a range of issues relating to all phases of the 
preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

What GAO Found: 

Significant government and private resources were mobilized to respond 
to the hurricanes. However, these capabilities were clearly overwhelmed 
and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the results. Many of the 
lessons emerging from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are similar to those 
we identified more than a decade ago, in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992, which leveled much of South Florida. Four major issues 
have emerged from our preliminary work: 

* The preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina are similar to 
lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters. These include the 
critical importance of (1) clearly defining and communicating 
leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for 
catastrophic response in advance of such events, (2) clarifying the 
procedures for activating the National Response Plan and applying them 
to emerging catastrophic disasters, (3) conducting strong advance 
planning and robust training and exercise programs, and (4) 
strengthening response and recovery capabilities for a catastrophic 
disaster. 
* A risk management decision making approach is vital to develop the 
nation’s capabilities and expertise to respond to a catastrophic 
disaster. Given the likely costs, Congress should consider using such 
an approach in deciding how best to invest in specific capabilities for 
a catastrophic disaster. 
* Because of FEMA’s mission performance during Hurricane Katrina, 
concerns have been raised regarding the agency’s organizational 
placement, including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved 
to other agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, 
or become an independent agency. However, other factors such as 
leadership and resources may be more important to FEMA’s future success 
than organizational placement. 
* Lastly, the federal government will be a major partner in the longer-
term rebuilding of the Gulf Coast, supporting state and local efforts. 
The federal role in rebuilding will be particularly important for 
transportation and health infrastructures and federal facilities. In 
addition, federal programs will face financial difficulties and there 
is uncertainty about catastrophic losses affecting the availability and 
affordability of insurance. Long term rebuilding raises issues 
concerning the need for consensus on what rebuilding should be done, 
who will pay for what, and what oversight is needed to ensure federal 
funds are spent for their intended purposes. 

What GAO Recommends: 

Today, we are making several recommendations to help reform the 
nation’s emergency preparedness, response, and recovery system. For 
example, these include clarifying the roles and responsibilities of key 
federal officials, clarifying various aspects of the National Response 
Plan, and strengthening planning and response capabilities. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Norman J. Rabkin at (202) 
512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Madame Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to 
discuss our work stemming from the catastrophic hurricanes in the Gulf 
Coast last fall. GAO has a large body of ongoing work on a range of 
issues relating to all phases of the preparation, response, recovery, 
and rebuilding efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We 
currently have nearly 40 different engagements underway. Consequently, 
my remarks today are preliminary, but well grounded in the work we have 
done to-date as well as our completed work on prior disasters and 
catastrophes. We also recently provided to this committee a summary of 
the views of several groups regarding potential changes to the national 
emergency response system. In the coming months, we will provide 
Congress with more detailed findings, and a comprehensive summary of 
what went well and why, what did not go well and why, and what specific 
changes, if any, are called for in this nation's emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery system. In addition, based on the 
work reflected in our recent testimony before the committee on fraud 
and abuse related to the Individuals and Households Program, we plan to 
issue recommendations to FEMA intended to strengthen fraud prevention 
controls over the process for applying for disaster benefits, including 
validating an individual's identity and damaged property 
address.[Footnote 1] 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our 
nation's history; its size and strength will have long standing effects 
for years to come. It exacted terrible human costs with the loss of 
significant numbers of lives and resulted in billions of dollars in 
property damage. The fact that Hurricane Rita followed closely on the 
heels of Hurricane Katrina only added to the destruction and suffering. 
It also increased demands of an already stressed response and recovery 
effort by all levels of government, especially in Louisiana. Moreover, 
the two hurricanes provided a sobering picture of the overwhelming 
strains on disaster response and recovery if there are back-to-back 
catastrophic disasters in the same area. 

Significant local, state, and federal resources were mobilized to 
respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, along with significant 
participation from charitable and private sector organizations. 
However, the capabilities of several federal, state, and local agencies 
were clearly overwhelmed, especially in Louisiana. Therefore, there was 
widespread dissatisfaction with the level of preparedness and the 
collective response. As events unfolded in the immediate aftermath and 
ensuing days after Hurricane Katrina's final landfall, responders at 
all levels of government--many victims themselves--encountered 
significant breakdowns in vital areas such as emergency communications 
as well as obtaining essential supplies and equipment. 

The causes of these breakdowns must be well understood and addressed in 
order to strengthen the nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from major catastrophic events in the future--whether 
natural or man-made. Unfortunately, many of the lessons emerging from 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are similar to those we identified more 
than a decade ago, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which 
leveled much of South Florida. The experience of Hurricane Andrew 
raised questions about whether and how national disaster response 
efforts had incorporated lessons from experiences with Hurricane Hugo 
in 1989. All critical players must do much more to learn from past 
mistakes and actually implement recommendations that address prior 
deficiencies in preparing for and responding to catastrophic disasters. 
However, these actions will not be cost-free--posing a range of 
challenges in determining the priority of various action steps and how 
they will be funded. 

GAO staff have visited areas most affected by Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita--Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. They have interviewed 
officials and analyzed information from the various involved federal 
agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security's Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Defense (DOD); 
state and local organizations, including state emergency management 
agencies; state adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives 
from nongovernmental agencies. I have personally toured southern 
Mississippi, southern Louisiana, and the city of New Orleans. I also 
have had discussions with many governmental and other officials, 
including the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; 
the mayor of New Orleans; the principal federal official on the scene; 
the joint task force commander of active duty forces, and the federal 
coordinator for federal support for the Gulf Coast's recovery and 
rebuilding. Additionally, we have closely followed the hearings 
conducted by this Committee, the House's Select Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, and 
other Congressional committees on Hurricane Katrina issues. We have 
studied the House Select Committee report and are carefully reviewing 
the recently issued White House report on lessons learned from the 
federal response to Hurricane Katrina. Finally, we discussed our 
preliminary observations with the Deputy Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security. 

In addition, we have done a great deal of work on prior disasters. In 
1993, we conducted several reviews examining the federal response to 
Hurricane Andrew. The reviews focused on the unique challenges involved 
in responding to "catastrophic disasters."[Footnote 2] These reviews 
defined "catastrophic disasters" as a subset of other disasters 
requiring federal assistance. Unlike the bulk of the disasters 
requiring FEMA to respond, catastrophic disasters can overwhelm the 
ability of state, local and voluntary agencies to adequately provide 
victims with essential services, such as food and water, within 12 to 
24 hours. These prior GAO reports focused on improving the immediate 
response to catastrophic disasters, and we made various recommendations 
within this context. We recommended that, in a catastrophic disaster, 
(1) a single individual directly responsible and accountable to the 
President should be designated to act as the central focal point to 
lead and coordinate the overall federal response when a catastrophic 
disaster has happened or is imminent, (2) FEMA should immediately 
establish a disaster unit to independently assess damage and estimate 
response needs following a catastrophic disaster, and (3) FEMA should 
enhance the capacity of state and local governments to respond to 
catastrophic disasters by (a) continuing to give them increasing 
flexibility to match grant funding with individual response needs, (b) 
upgrading training and exercises for catastrophic disaster response, 
and (c) assessing each state's preparedness for catastrophic disaster 
response. We also recommended that Congress should consider (1) giving 
FEMA and other federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to 
prepare for catastrophic disasters when there is warning and (2) 
removing statutory restrictions on DOD's authority to activate Reserve 
units for catastrophic disaster relief. 

Unfortunately, some of these recommendations were not adopted or in 
effect when Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast. We continue to 
believe, for the most part, these recommendations are still viable, as 
we discuss later in this testimony. For example, current DOD strategy 
calls for reliance on the reserve components (National Guard and 
reserves) for civil support missions. Modifying statutory restrictions 
to allow for the use of the reserves for catastrophic disasters would 
provide greater access to Reserve units in the event they are needed 
for future responses. 

Other work we have conducted related to disaster preparedness and 
management has involved programs to prevent or mitigate disasters or to 
improve the capabilities and readiness of first responders. We have 
identified needed improvements in a number of areas, including 
preparedness for "all-hazards," balancing efforts to prepare for 
emergency incidents resulting from terrorism and natural disasters or 
man-made accidents; support for training, exercises, evaluations, and 
disseminating lessons learned to first responders; and interoperable 
communications for first responders. Similarly, our work on response to 
disasters has identified a number of problems, such as the lack of 
clarity of various federal, state, and local roles in coordinating the 
response and medical and public health response capabilities. 

Today, I will cover several major areas based on our preliminary work 
related to the 2005 hurricane season. In summary: 

* Four key themes underpin many of the challenges encountered in the 
response to Hurricane Katrina and are similar to lessons learned from 
past catastrophic disasters. These include the central importance of 
(1) clearly defining and communicating leadership roles, 
responsibilities, and lines of authority for response in advance of a 
catastrophic disaster, (2) clarifying the procedures for activating the 
National Response Plan and applying them to emerging catastrophic 
disasters, (3) conducting strong advance planning and robust training 
and exercise programs, and (4) strengthening response and recovery 
capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. 

* It is vital to have in place a risk management decision making 
approach to develop federal capabilities and the expertise to use them 
to respond to a catastrophic disaster. Given the likely costs, Congress 
should consider using such an approach in deciding how best to invest 
in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. 

* Because of FEMA's mission performance during Hurricane Katrina, 
concerns have been raised regarding the agency's organizational 
placement, including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved 
to other agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, 
or again become an independent agency. Importantly, other factors, such 
as the experience and training of FEMA leadership and the adequacy of 
its resources may be more important to FEMA's future success than its 
organizational placement. 

* Lastly, the federal government will be a major partner in the longer- 
term rebuilding of the Gulf Coast because of the widespread damage and 
economic impact. In support of state and local efforts, the federal 
role in rebuilding will be particularly important for transportation 
and health care infrastructures and federal facilities. In addition, 
federal programs will face financial difficulties and there is 
uncertainty concerning the impact of catastrophic disasters on the 
availability and affordability of insurance. Long term rebuilding 
raises issues concerning the need for consensus on what rebuilding 
should be done, where and based on what standards, who will pay for 
what, and what oversight is needed to ensure federal funds are spent 
prudently and for their intended purposes. 

Background: 

There are several federal legislative and executive provisions that 
support preparation for and response to emergency situations. The 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the 
Stafford Act)[Footnote 3] primarily establishes the programs and 
processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and 
emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, 
individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA has 
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act. 

Upon a governor's request, the President can declare an "emergency" or 
a "major disaster" under the Stafford Act, which triggers specific 
types of federal relief. The Stafford Act defines an emergency as any 
occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, 
federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and 
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health 
and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any 
part of the United States. Under an emergency declaration, the federal 
government has authority to engage in various emergency response 
activities, debris removal, temporary housing assistance, and the 
distribution of medicine, food, and other consumables. The Stafford Act 
places a $5 million limit on federal emergency assistance, but the 
President may exceed the limit, followed by a report to Congress. 

The Stafford Act defines a "major disaster" as any natural catastrophe 
or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of 
the United States, which the President determines causes damage of 
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance 
under the Stafford Act to supplement the efforts and available 
resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief 
organizations in alleviating damage, loss, hardship, or suffering. 
Under a major disaster declaration, the federal government has the 
authority to engage in the same activities authorized under an 
emergency declaration, but without the $5 million ceiling. In addition, 
major disaster assistance includes a variety of assistance not 
available in the context of an emergency. For example, in a major 
disaster, the federal government may provide unemployment assistance, 
food coupons to low-income households, and repair, restoration and 
replacement of certain damaged facilities, among other things. 

For Hurricane Katrina, the President issued emergency declarations 
under the Stafford Act for Louisiana on August 27, 2005 and Mississippi 
and Alabama on August 28, 2005. The President made major disaster 
declarations for Florida on August 28, 2005, and Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama on August 29, 2005, the same day that 
Hurricane Katrina made final landfall in the affected states. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 4] required the newly 
established DHS to develop a comprehensive National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) and a comprehensive National Response Plan (NRP). NIMS is 
intended to provide a consistent framework for incident management at 
all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity 
of the situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of 
federal, state, and local governments, and various first responder 
disciplines at each level during an emergency event. NIMS established 
the Incident Command System (ICS) as a standard incident management 
organization with five functional areas--command, operations, planning, 
logistics, and finance/administration--for management of all major 
incidents. It also prescribes interoperable communications systems and 
preparedness before an incident happens, including planning, training, 
and exercises. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also required DHS to consolidate 
existing federal government emergency response plans into a single, 
coordinated national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the 
National Response Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-discipline, all- 
hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the 
management of domestic incidents where federal involvement is 
necessary. It is to operate within the framework of NIMS. The NRP only 
applies to incidents of national significance, defined as an actual or 
potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective 
response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, 
tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to 
save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term 
community recovery and mitigation activities. The NRP does not apply to 
the majority of incidents occurring each year that are handled by local 
jurisdictions or agencies through established authorities and existing 
plans under the planning assumption that incidents are typically 
managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and 
jurisdictional level. 

The NRP states that the Secretary of Homeland Security, as the 
principal federal official for domestic incident management, designates 
incidents of national significance, pursuant to the criteria in 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). HSPD-5 requires 
one or more of the following to qualify as an incident of national 
significance: (1) a federal department or agency acting under its own 
authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, (2) the resources of state and local authorities are 
overwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested by the 
appropriate state and local authorities,[Footnote 5] (3) more than one 
federal department or agency has become substantially involved in 
responding to an incident, or (4) the Secretary of Homeland Security 
has been directed to assume responsibility for managing a domestic 
incident by the President. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security provides overall coordination for 
incidents of national significance. Under the NRP, a principal federal 
official (PFO) is to be personally designated by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security for a particular incident and is to be the primary 
point of contact and provide local situational awareness for the 
secretary. Under the NRP, the PFO is to coordinate the activities of 
the senior federal law enforcement official for the incident, the 
federal coordinating officer (FCO) who manages and coordinates federal 
resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and 
emergencies, and other federal officials involved in incident 
management activities acting under their own authorities. The PFO does 
not have directive authority over these officials, but is to play a 
coordinating function under the NRP. The Stafford Act requires that a 
FCO be appointed to coordinate relief for major disasters and 
emergencies declared by the President. The FCO retains this 
coordination authority notwithstanding the appointment of a PFO under 
the NRP. 

The NRP can be partially or fully implemented in anticipation of or in 
response to an incident of national significance. The NRP base plan 
includes planning assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of 
operations, and incident management actions. Annexes (i.e. appendixes) 
to the NRP provide more detailed information on emergency support 
functions such as transportation and communications and functional 
processes and administrative requirements such as financial management 
and international coordination. Incident annexes address contingency or 
hazard situations that require specialized application of the NRP for 
incidents of national significance. 

The Catastrophic Incident Annex of the NRP references "catastrophic 
incidents." The NRP defines a catastrophic incident as any natural or 
manmade incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary 
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the 
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, 
and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident could result in 
sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost 
immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, 
tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and 
significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services 
to such an extent that national security could be threatened. 

The Catastrophic Incident Annex describes an accelerated, proactive 
national response to catastrophic incidents. The annex establishes 
protocols to pre-identify and rapidly deploy key essential resources 
that are expected to be urgently needed or required to save lives and 
contain incidents. Expedited assistance can be provided in one or more 
areas, such as mass care, housing, human services, urban search and 
rescue, and public health and medical support. 

A draft of a more detailed and operationally specific Catastrophic 
Incident Supplement for the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex had not 
been approved at the time of Hurricane Katrina, although the NRP's 120- 
day schedule for implementing the supplement had passed. The draft 
supplement is intended to provide the operational framework for 
implementing the annex. The draft supplement, for example, includes 
operations to be carried out by local, state, and federal responders; 
detailed execution schedules and implementation strategies; functional 
capability overviews (such as coverage for transportation support); and 
key responsibilities of federal departments and agencies. The draft 
supplement language says it is designed for catastrophic incidents that 
occur with little or no notice, without an opportunity for advance 
planning and positioning of resources. The Secretary of Homeland 
Security is to make a catastrophic incident designation to activate the 
provisions of the Catastrophic Incident Annex. Otherwise, the basic 
provisions of the NRP will apply to the incident. The Secretary of 
Homeland Security declared Hurricane Katrina an incident of national 
significance on August 30, 2005, but never declared it a catastrophic 
incident. 

I will now turn to the four major topics I identified at the beginning 
of my testimony. 

Leadership, Planning, Exercises, and Capabilities Underpin Catastrophic 
Preparation, Response, and Recovery: 

Four key themes, based on our preliminary work, underpin many of the 
challenges encountered in the response to Hurricane Katrina and reflect 
certain lessons learned from past catastrophes. These are generally 
consistent with the themes I highlighted in a statement to the House 
Select Committee.[Footnote 6] They include the central importance of 
(1) clearly defining and communicating leadership roles, 
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels 
in advance of a catastrophic disaster, (2) clarifying the procedures 
for activating the National Response Plan and applying them to emerging 
catastrophic disasters, (3) conducting strong advance planning and 
robust training and exercise programs to test these plans in advance of 
a real disaster, and (4) strengthening response and recovery 
capabilities for a catastrophic disaster, including those such as 
emergency communications, continuity of essential government services, 
and logistics and distribution systems underpinning citizen safety and 
security. They have been among the topics covered in this committee's 
hearings and were also highlighted among the many factors in the House 
Select Committee report and the White House report. 

Leadership Roles, Responsibilities, and Lines of Authority Must Be 
Clearly Defined and Communicated in Advance of Catastrophic Disasters: 

In the event of a catastrophic disaster, the leadership roles, 
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels 
must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to 
facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing 
for and in the early hours and days after the disaster. During 
incidents of national significance, including catastrophic disasters, 
the overall coordination of federal incident management activities is 
executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security. Other federal 
departments and agencies are to cooperate with the secretary in the 
secretary's domestic incident management role. 

There are three key roles in the management of a catastrophic disaster. 
First, the Secretary of Homeland Security provides strategic, national 
leadership. The Secretary of Homeland Security is to act as a focal 
point for natural and manmade crises and emergency planning under the 
provisions of the Homeland Security Act. In addition, HSPD-5, signed by 
the President, also names the secretary as the principal federal 
official for domestic incident management. This is consistent with our 
recommendation in 1993 that a single individual directly responsible 
and accountable to the President should be designated to act as the 
central focal point to lead and coordinate the overall federal response 
in the event of a catastrophic disaster.[Footnote 7] At the time of our 
recommendation in 1993, FEMA was an independent agency. President 
Clinton elevated the FEMA director to cabinet status in 1996. 
Subsequent passage of the Homeland Security Act established the DHS 
secretary as the cabinet-level focal point for natural and manmade 
crises and emergency planning. We view this as a strategic role to 
coordinate federal activities and policy from a national standpoint and 
be directly responsible and accountable to the President. 

The second key role is the principal federal official (PFO) whom the 
Secretary of Homeland Security designates to be the secretary's 
representative under the NRP structure and to coordinate the federal 
response at an operational level. The third role is that of a federal 
coordinating officer (FCO) which, under the Stafford Act, is to 
coordinate relief for major disasters and emergencies declared by the 
President. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security initially designated the head of 
FEMA as the PFO, who appointed separate FCOs for Alabama, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi for Hurricane Katrina. However, it appeared there were 
shifting roles and responsibilities of the players in all 3 of these 
roles. Our initial field work indicated this resulted in disjointed 
efforts of many federal agencies involved in the response, a myriad of 
approaches and processes for requesting and providing assistance, and 
confusion about who should be advised of requests and what resources 
would be provided within specific time frames. 

The House Select Committee also found difficulties with roles and 
responsibilities, including federal officials' unfamiliarity with their 
roles and responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. The White House has 
made numerous recommendations, including revising the NRP to address 
situations that render state and local governments incapable of an 
effective response, giving the PFO the authority to execute 
responsibilities and coordinate federal response assets, and requiring 
agencies to develop integrated operational plans, procedures, and 
capabilities for their support to the base NRP and the NRP's emergency 
support functions and support annexes. 

Consistent with the provisions of the Homeland Security Act and the 
Stafford Act, we recommend that DHS clarify and communicate the roles 
of the secretary, the PFO, and the FCO. If legislative changes are 
considered, the roles and responsibilities should be clarified 
accordingly. 

Procedures for Activating the NRP and Applying It to Emerging 
Catastrophic Disasters Should Be Clarified: 

The NRP distinguishes between incidents that require DHS coordination, 
termed Incidents of National Significance, and the majority of 
incidents occurring each year, such as snow storms, that are handled by 
responsible jurisdictions or agencies through other established 
authorities and plans. However, the NRP is not clear regarding what 
triggers an incident of national significance. To illustrate this 
ambiguity, the NRP's Planning Assumptions provide that "all 
presidentially-declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford 
Act are considered Incidents of National Significance," indicating that 
they do not need to be declared as such by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. Elsewhere, the NRP suggest that the Secretary must formally 
declare an incident of national significance in consultation with other 
department and agencies, as appropriate. 

The question of how and when an event becomes an incident of national 
significance was also raised in the White House report on the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina. According to the White House report, the 
NRP did not make clear whether the secretary must formally declare an 
incident of national significance or, alternatively, whether such an 
incident is automatically triggered when one or more of the HSPD-5 
criteria (discussed on page 8) are satisfied, including when the 
President declares a disaster or emergency under the Stafford Act. In 
addition, the White House report questioned whether an event becomes an 
incident of national significance simply by satisfying an HSPD-5 
criterion, or whether additional considerations apply. The White House 
report observed that since the NRP was adopted in December 2004, many 
parts of the NRP had been used to various degrees and magnitudes for 
thirty declared Stafford Act events to coordinate Federal assistance. 
Yet, the Secretary of Homeland Security had never formally declared an 
Incident of National Significance until Tuesday, August 30, 2005, after 
Hurricane Katrina made final landfall. 

We agree that the process and operational consequences of declaring an 
incident of national significance should be further defined and 
clarified. Without such clarification of the NRP, confusion will 
persist regarding DHS's activation of the NRP. We therefore recommend 
that DHS clarify the NRP regarding whether the Secretary of Homeland 
Security must formally declare an incident of national significance to 
activate the NRP, and, if not, whether the secretary must take any 
specific actions when the President, in effect, activates the NRP by 
declaring a Stafford Act emergency or major disaster. 

In addition, we believe that the NRP's provisions regarding the 
proactive response of the federal government to emerging catastrophic 
incidents should be clarified. As I stated earlier, the NRP includes a 
Catastrophic Incident Annex that describes an accelerated, proactive 
national response to catastrophic incidents and establishes protocols 
to pre-identify and rapidly deploy essential resources that are 
expected to be urgently needed to save lives and contain incidents. At 
the time of Hurricane Katrina, a draft of a more detailed and 
operationally specific Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the annex 
had not been approved. Under the language of the draft supplement, the 
annex would only apply to no-notice or short-notice catastrophic 
incidents, not incidents that may evolve or mature to catastrophic 
magnitude, which could be the case with strengthening hurricanes. 

Because it is possible to respond to incidents maturing to catastrophic 
magnitude in a more proactive manner than surprise catastrophic 
incidents, it does not make sense to exclude evolving catastrophic 
incidents from the scope of the annex's coverage. The White House 
report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina also questioned 
this exclusion. As the White House report states, "Ultimately, when a 
catastrophic incident occurs, regardless of whether the catastrophe has 
been a warned or is a surprise event, the Federal government should not 
rely on the traditional layered approach and instead should proactively 
provide, or 'push,' its capabilities and assistance directly to those 
in need." 

A proactive approach to catastrophic disasters when there is warning is 
also in keeping with recommendations we made in 1993 following 
Hurricane Andrew. At that time, from an administrative perspective, we 
recommended that FEMA improve its catastrophic disaster response 
capability by using existing authority to aggressively respond to 
catastrophic disasters, assessing the extent of the damage, and then 
advising state and local officials of identified needs and the federal 
resources available to address them. From a legislative standpoint, we 
recommended that Congress should consider giving federal agencies 
explicit authority to take actions to prepare for catastrophic 
disasters when there is warning. We continue to believe that actions 
such as these are warranted. 

Planning, Training, and Exercises Can Aid Preparation for Catastrophic 
Disasters: 

Madame Chairman, to increase the ability of the nation to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from catastrophic disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina, there should be strong advance planning, both within and among 
responder organizations, as well as robust training and exercise 
programs to test these plans in advance of a real disaster. By their 
very nature, catastrophic disasters involve extraordinary levels of 
mass casualties, damage, or disruption that likely will immediately 
overwhelm state and local responders, circumstances that make sound 
planning for catastrophic events all the more crucial. Our previous 
work on Hurricane Andrew highlighted the importance of such plans to 
focus specifically on catastrophic disasters. 

Our initial review of the NRP base plan and its supporting catastrophic 
annex as well as lessons based on Hurricane Katrina suggest that 
planning must be strengthened to implement their provisions. Therefore, 
we recommend that these documents should be supported and supplemented 
by more detailed and robust operational implementation plans. Such 
operational plans should, for example, further define and leverage any 
military capabilities as might be needed in a catastrophic disaster. 
Prior catastrophic disasters and the actual experience of Hurricane 
Katrina show that DOD is likely to contribute substantial support to 
state and local authorities, including search and rescue assets, 
evacuation assistance, provision of supplies, damage assessment assets, 
and possibly helping to ensure public safety. More detailed planning 
would provide greater visibility and understanding of the types of 
support DOD will be expected to provide following a catastrophic event, 
including the types of assistance and capabilities that might be 
provided, what might be done proactively and in response to specific 
requests, and how the efforts of the active duty and National Guard 
would be integrated. We will be making several recommendations to DOD 
to enhance its planning and response for future events, in the areas of 
identifying specific active duty and National Guard capabilities that 
would likely be available to respond to a catastrophe, and integrating 
the active duty and National Guard response including Guard units 
within and outside of the affected state. Planning also must explicitly 
consider the need for, and management of, the contractor community. 

In addition, regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable 
way to test emergency management plans. In our previous work on 
Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo, we identified the need for the federal 
government to upgrade training and exercises for state and local 
governments specifically geared towards catastrophic disaster response. 
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the potential benefits of applying 
lessons learned from training exercises and experiences with actual 
hurricanes as well as the dangers of ignoring them. During our initial 
fieldwork, we found examples of how an incomplete understanding of NRP 
and NIMS roles and responsibilities could lead to misunderstandings, 
problems, and delays. For example, we were told in Louisiana that in 
one city there did not appear to be clarity in roles and 
responsibilities, with officials not knowing what federal agencies were 
responsible for. In one example in Mississippi, we were told that 
county and city officials were not implementing NIMS due to a lack of 
understanding of its provisions. 

A November 2005 report by DHS's Office of Inspector General (OIG) on 
the April 2005 "Top Officials 3 Exercise" noted that the exercise 
highlighted--at all levels of government--a fundamental lack of 
understanding regarding the principles and protocols set forth in the 
NRP and NIMS, including confusion over the different roles and 
responsibilities performed by the PFO and FCO. The report recommended 
that DHS continue to train and exercise NRP and NIMS at all levels of 
government and develop operating procedures that clearly define 
individual and organizational roles and responsibilities under the NRP. 
We would see this training and exercising effort as recognizing the 
role of joint decision making and not result in a centralized, top-down 
process. 

The 2004 "Hurricane Pam" planning exercise illustrates the benefits and 
consequences of applying and not applying lessons learned from training 
exercises and experiences with actual hurricanes for future 
catastrophic disasters. This catastrophic hurricane exercise, sponsored 
by FEMA, was to develop a response and recovery plan for a major 
hurricane that floods New Orleans and the surrounding parishes and to 
identify any issues that could not be resolved based on current 
capabilities. The weather scenario involved a slow moving category 3 
hurricane sustaining 120 mph winds at landfall and generating a storm 
surge that inundated New Orleans under 15 to 20 feet of water. In 
addition to widespread flooding, the exercise posed impacts of 
extensive evacuations and the resulting need to shelter thousands of 
individuals left homeless after the storm, disposing of tons of debris, 
and recreating school systems. We were told in Louisiana that the 
exercise anticipated many of the events transpiring as the result of 
Hurricane Katrina. The Hurricane Pam exercise and other planning 
activities resulted in some action, but others were incomplete. For 
example, efforts to finalize agreements with hospital and university 
officials to create temporary medical operations staging areas around 
the state did occur. Louisiana revised its contraflow evacuation plan. 
However, plans for evacuating those with special needs and post- 
landfall care and evacuation had not been finalized by the time 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall. The House Select Committee also noted 
that the Hurricane Pam exercise reflected recognition by all levels of 
government of the dangers of a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking New 
Orleans. 

The White House has made several recommendations regarding planning and 
exercises to improve the response to catastrophic disasters such as 
Hurricane Katrina. For example, the White House recommends that all 
federal departments and agencies should develop emergency plans and a 
response capability. Other White House recommendations are intended to 
strengthen training, exercises, and lessons learned. To illustrate, 
recommendations cover (1) strengthening Homeland Security Council 
coordination of federal emergency training, exercises, and lessons 
learned, (2) DHS conducting state and local officials' training and 
exercises, and (3) DHS establishing a national exercise and evaluation 
program. The White House also recommended development of a 
comprehensive homeland security professional development and education 
program. 

We recommend that DHS provide strong oversight of federal, state, and 
local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully 
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a 
jurisdictional and regional basis. This should also include applying 
lessons learned from actual major and catastrophic disasters. We will 
soon be starting work examining DHS's catastrophic planning 
initiatives, including Hurricane Pam, in order to help identify more 
specific recommendations. 

Emergency Management Capabilities Require Greater Emphasis for 
Catastrophic Response and Recovery: 

The experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlights critical 
emergency management capabilities that must be ramped up from normal 
disaster management levels. Our preliminary work suggests that while 
many organizations provided significant support in these areas during 
the response and recovery efforts, several key capabilities were not 
available when needed or with the quantity or quality needed. When 
catastrophic disaster occurs, significantly more capabilities--in terms 
of quantity and quality--are needed. Our work is beginning to identify 
many examples of where the lack of additional response or recovery 
capabilities, or the delay in getting these capabilities to where they 
were needed, caused extended suffering. 

I want to emphasize that across these capabilities, streamlining, 
simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly replace 
"business as usual" and the unquestioned following of long-standing 
policies and operating procedures. We were told of many examples where 
quick action could not occur as agencies followed procedures that 
required extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of 
vital supplies and other assistance. When there is a catastrophic 
disaster, temporarily suspending certain rules and regulations may be 
necessary in order to expedite relief and recovery of the affected 
area, even if such a suspension requires legislation. The key is to 
recognize when flexibility is needed to meet response and recovery 
needs in a catastrophic disaster. 

Continuity of essential government operations: Hurricane Katrina 
exposed difficulties in continuing essential government operations, 
particularly at the local level. In the devastated areas, local 
government infrastructure was destroyed and essential government 
employees, including many first responders, were evacuated or 
victimized by the storms. Local officials in Mississippi and Louisiana 
told us of cases where there was limited continuity of operations for 
public safety and service agencies because both structures and 
equipment were destroyed or too damaged to use. For example, one 
Mississippi county lost all of its public buildings located south of 
Interstate 10. We were also told criminal justice facilities in New 
Orleans and St Bernard parishes were disabled as both jurisdictions had 
to evacuate jails damaged by flood waters. 

Emergency telecommunications: Agencies affected by a catastrophic 
disaster must first be operable, with sufficient communications to meet 
everyday internal and emergency communication requirements. Once 
operable, they then should have communications interoperability whereby 
public safety agencies (police, fire, EMS) and service agencies (public 
works, transportation, hospitals, etc.) can communicate within and 
across agencies and jurisdictions in real time. The storms 
significantly damaged or destroyed communications infrastructure 
affecting public safety and security in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama. This is an area where military capabilities can be utilized. 

Our work on interoperable communications identified problem definition, 
performance goals and standards, and defining the roles of federal, 
state, local government and other entities as the three principal 
challenges to achieving effective interoperable communications for 
first responders. The single greatest barrier to addressing the decades-
old problems of interoperable communications has been the lack of 
effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and intergovernmental 
planning. No one first-responder group or governmental agency can "fix" 
the interoperability problems that face the nation. We believe that our 
2004 recommendations to the Secretary of DHS are still appropriate: (1) 
work with the Federal Communications Commission to develop a nationwide 
database of interoperable communications frequencies and a common 
nomenclature so that first responders from different disciplines and 
jurisdictions can quickly identify shared frequencies when arriving at 
the scene of an incident; (2) establish interoperability requirements 
whose achievement can be measured; and (3) through grants, encourage 
states to establish statewide bodies that will develop a comprehensive 
statewide interoperable communications plan and condition the purchase 
of new equipment on the adoption of such a plan. 

Damage and needs assessment: Damage and needs assessment is the 
capability to immediately conduct damage assessments of infrastructure 
and to estimate services needed by disaster victims. The scope of the 
devastation and the flooding in the New Orleans area made a 
comprehensive damage assessment and estimate of services victims might 
need very difficult. Clearly, the military has significant capability 
through a range of reconnaissance aircraft and satellite imagery. 
However, while some capabilities were employed, there had been no 
advance planning among federal, state, and local responders as to how 
DOD would provide these capabilities in the event of a catastrophic 
disaster. 

Logistics: Logistics is the capability to identify, dispatch, mobilize, 
and demobilize and to accurately track and record available critical 
resources throughout all incident management phases. Our early work 
indicates that logistics systems were often totally overwhelmed by 
Hurricane Katrina. The result was that critical resources apparently 
were not available, properly distributed, or provided in a timely 
manner. In addition, acquisition efforts, while noteworthy given the 
scope of Hurricane Katrina, indicated agencies needed additional 
capabilities to (1) adequately anticipate requirements for needed goods 
and services, (2) clearly communicate responsibilities across agencies 
and jurisdictions, and (3) deploy sufficient numbers of personnel to 
provide contractor oversight.[Footnote 8] 

Evacuation: This capability involves evacuation to areas of safe refuge 
in response to a potential or actual dangerous environment. Our early 
work indicated that some evacuations were considered successful, but 
others encountered serious challenges, including evacuating special 
needs populations. Evacuating those in hospitals and nursing homes due 
to Hurricane Katrina posed a special challenge. For example, although 
the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a mechanism through 
which the federal government can provide assistance with patient 
evacuations, NDMS has agreements with hospitals only and does not 
address the needs of nursing homes.[Footnote 9] 

Search and rescue: Search and rescue is the capability to coordinate 
and conduct urban search and rescue response efforts for all hazards. 
Search and rescue also requires a seamless transition from rescue to 
safe shelter. The Coast Guard, state and local agencies, and military 
assets rescued thousands in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
However, particularly in New Orleans, those rescued may have been taken 
to high ground where, because of flooding or roadway blockage, they 
spent hours or days without shelter, food, or water. 

Mass care (housing and human services): This is the capability to 
provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk 
distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected 
by a large-scale incident, including special needs populations such as 
those with physical or mental disabilities that need additional 
attention. Charities and other organizations such as government 
agencies that provide human services, supported by various federal 
programs, helped meet the mass care needs of the hundreds of thousands 
of evacuees. However, because the American Red Cross does not establish 
shelters in areas that might become flooded or in structures that could 
be compromised by strong winds, some Gulf Coast areas did not have 
sufficient shelter facilities.[Footnote 10] 

Volunteer management and donations: Volunteer management and donations 
is the capability to effectively manage and deploy volunteers and 
unsolicited donations. Federal and charity organization officials we 
spoke to indicated that because of the catastrophic nature of the 
storms, volunteers and donations, in some cases, were not well 
integrated into response and recovery activities. In addition, federal 
agencies involved in managing the international assistance were not 
prepared to coordinate, receive, distribute, or account for the 
assistance. Agency officials involved in the cash and in-kind 
assistance told us the agencies were not prepared to accept 
international assistance for use in the United States and, therefore, 
developed ad hoc processes to address this scenario. We will be making 
several recommendations to the Departments of Homeland Security, 
Defense, and State to improve preparedness in these areas. 

Restoration of lifelines: Restoration of lifelines is the capability to 
manage clearing and restoration activities such as demolition, repair, 
reconstruction, and restoration of essential gas, electric, oil, 
communications, water, wastewater and sewer, transportation and 
transportation infrastructure, and other utilities. Because of the mass 
devastation, restoration is proceeding slowly. 

Economic assistance and services: Economic assistance and services is 
the capability to meet the demands for cash assistance, human services 
programs, educational services, and family and child welfare services. 
Our preliminary work indicated that a number of federal and state 
programs provided assistance and services to eligible individuals and 
families before the catastrophic disaster. Significant ongoing 
assistance after the catastrophic disaster has also been required. 

Secretary Chertoff has announced plans to emphasize several of these 
capabilities in the near term. For example, DHS will acquire a hardened 
set of communications capabilities, including equipment and specialized 
reconnaissance teams to improve awareness about conditions and events 
unfolding during a disaster. It was clear that DHS did not have 
adequate situational awareness of how Hurricane Katrina-caused 
conditions were worsening and thus required additional federal 
response. As was noted during a hearing before this committee, 
technological advances should provide the capability to prevent or 
significantly reduce "the fog of war" during a catastrophe. The 
secretary also has announced plans for better logistics and debris 
removal capabilities. 

The House Select Committee had findings in several of these areas, such 
as medical care and evacuations, communications, emergency shelter and 
temporary housing, and logistics and contracting systems. The White 
House devoted a large number of its recommendations to capabilities. 
For example, White House recommendations cover (1) developing a 
National Emergency Communications Strategy and a modern, flexible, and 
transparent logistics system, (2) reviewing and revising the NRP to 
ensure effective integration of all federal search and rescue assets 
during disaster response, (3) strengthening public health and medical 
command for federal disaster response, and (4) assigning responsibility 
for coordinating the provision of human services during disasters to 
the Department of Health and Human Services. 

Addressing these four themes--leadership; the clarity of the NRP; 
advance planning, training, and exercises; and strengthening 
capabilities for catastrophic events--will require developing 
priorities and making trade-offs, given finite resources. A risk 
management framework could aid agency and congressional decision making 
on these issues. 

Planning for a Catastrophic Disaster Calls for a Risk Management 
Approach: 

It is vital to have in place a risk management decision making approach 
to develop federal capabilities and the expertise to use them to 
respond to a catastrophic disaster. Given the likely costs, Congress 
should consider using such an approach in deciding whether and how to 
invest in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. 

Risk Management Is A Continuous Process: 

We have advocated a comprehensive risk management approach as a 
framework for decision making.[Footnote 11] Risk involves three 
elements: (1) threat, the probability that a specific type of event 
will occur; (2) the vulnerability of people and specific assets to that 
particular event; and (3) the adverse consequences that would result 
from the particular event should it occur. Another closely related 
element is criticality, that is, the relative importance of the assets 
involved, such as equipment, facilities, and operations. 

We define risk management as a continuous process of assessing risks, 
taking actions to reduce, where possible, the potential that an adverse 
event will occur; reducing vulnerabilities as appropriate; and putting 
steps in place to reduce the consequences of any event that does occur. 
Risk management addresses risks before mitigating actions have been 
applied, as well as risk that remains after countermeasures have been 
taken. A risk management framework links strategic goals to plans and 
budgets, assesses the value and risks of various courses of actions as 
a tool for setting priorities and allocating resources, and provides 
for the use of performance measures to assess outcomes and adjust 
future actions as needed. The goal of risk management is to integrate 
systematic concern for risk into the normal cycle of agency decision 
making and implementation. 

Risk Management Can Aid in Investment Decisions for a Catastrophic 
Disaster: 

Risk management can be central to assessing the risk for catastrophic 
disasters. Our risk management framework calls for the management of 
risk based on careful analysis of all available risk information, 
identification of alternatives for reducing risks through preparation 
and response, selection among those alternatives, implementing choices, 
monitoring their implementation, and continually using new information 
to adjust and revise the assessments and actions as needed, all within 
available resources. As I mentioned earlier, we have identified several 
key capabilities that may be needed in the event of a catastrophic 
disaster such as emergency telecommunications, damage and needs 
assessment, and logistics. Given that resources are finite, the 
administration and Congress should consider using a risk management 
approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific capabilities 
for a catastrophic disaster. 

Some of the changes that the government will need to prepare for 
catastrophic disasters are relatively inexpensive. Establishing more 
robust surveillance and warning mechanisms should build on existing 
systems, with communication of known information a key feature. 
Developing more detailed plans for ramping up from a "normal" disaster 
to a catastrophic disaster where warranted will impose additional 
costs. Providing the needed training to ensure the readiness of first 
responders and exercising the catastrophic disaster plans are much more 
costly endeavors, as well as increasing the quantity and quality of the 
federal government's preparedness and response capabilities. 

A catastrophic disaster may be anticipated based on past history and 
the expectation that there will be another catastrophic disaster. 
Expectations, based on a risk management approach, would call for 
building basic capabilities and contingency planning to leverage other 
resources in anticipation of a likely event. For example, a major 
earthquake in a major metropolitan area in California has occurred in 
the past, is expected to occur at some point in the future, and is 
likely to cause significant loss of life and extensive damage to 
critical infrastructure. Flooding along the Mississippi River also has 
occurred and would similarly cause widespread destruction and disrupt 
the transport of goods along this major waterway. Man-made catastrophic 
disasters that involve, for example, a nuclear power plant or liquefied 
natural gas installations could cause catastrophic damage and deaths 
across a wide area. 

Specific Capabilities Can Be Identified: 

Developing preparedness for large-scale disasters is part of an overall 
national preparedness effort that should integrate and define what we 
need to do, where and based on what standards, how we should do it, and 
how well we should do it. DHS developed three documents to address 
these needs. The National Response Plan was designed to identify what 
needs to be done, the National Incident Management System describes how 
to manage what needs to be done in response to an emergency incident, 
and the National Preparedness Goal is designed to define how well we 
should do what needs to be done. Hurricane Katrina was the first major 
test of the NRP. 

These three documents, considered as a group, can be one basis for risk 
analyses to assess the most productive and urgent investments in 
emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The National 
Preparedness Goal, whose development was required by Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), is particularly important. DHS 
issued an interim version of the goal in March 2005 and an expanded 
draft in December 2005. The December 2005 draft National Preparedness 
Goal defines both the 37 major capabilities that first responders 
should possess to prevent, respond, and recover from a wide range of 
major emergency incidents and the most critical tasks associated with 
these capabilities. These critical tasks are appropriately considered 
in risk analysis. An inability to effectively perform these tasks 
would, by definition, have a detrimental impact on effective 
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. 

To identify the needed capabilities, DHS used 15 National Planning 
Scenarios developed by the President's Homeland Security Council that 
included 12 terrorist attacks and 3 natural disasters--an earthquake, a 
hurricane, and a pandemic influenza outbreak. According to DHS, the 
planning scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude 
of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for which the nation 
needs to be prepared. Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be 
expected to perform every preparedness task or have every capability to 
the same degree, possession of critical capabilities could involve 
enhancing and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional 
and federal resources, or some combination of the two. Risk factors 
include population and population density, the presence of critical 
infrastructure and key resources, and location in high terrorist threat 
or high risk natural disaster areas. The National Preparedness Goal 
includes seven national priorities, including implementing the NIMS and 
NRP and expanding regional collaboration. Those seven priorities are 
incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006 homeland security grant 
guidance. The guidance also adds an eighth priority that emphasizes 
emergency operations and catastrophic planning. 

In earlier work on the National Preparedness Goal, we observed that if 
properly planned and executed, the goal and its related products, such 
as program implementation plans and requirements, may help guide the 
development of realistic budget and resource plans for an all-hazards 
national preparedness program.[Footnote 12] However, questions remain 
regarding what should be expected in terms of basic capabilities for 
most disasters compared to the expanded capabilities and mutual aid 
needed from other jurisdictions to meet the demands of a catastrophic 
disaster. 

HSPD-8 called for strengthening preparedness capabilities of federal, 
state, and local entities. However, guidance on implementing the 
National Preparedness Goal appears to have been targeted at state and 
urban area jurisdictions. It does not appear that similar attention has 
been paid to guidance for federal agencies and their progress in 
supporting the National Preparedness Goal's expectations. Consequently, 
we recommend that DHS should take the lead in strengthening guidance 
for federal agencies and monitoring their efforts to meet the National 
Preparedness Goal's provisions for federal agencies. 

Our recommendation is consistent with those of the White House. The 
White House has recommended that future preparedness of the federal, 
state, and local authorities should be based on the risk, capabilities, 
and needs structure of the National Preparedness Goal. More 
specifically, the White House recommends that the National Preparedness 
Goal and its target capabilities list should be used, for example, in 
(1) defining required capabilities and what levels of those 
capabilities are needed, including those within the purview of the 
federal government, (2) developing mutual aid agreements and compacts 
informed by the National Preparedness Goal's requirements, and (3) 
developing strategies to meet required levels of capabilities that 
prioritize investments on the basis of risk. We have work underway to 
assess if the provisions of the National Preparedness Goal will aid 
catastrophic disaster preparedness and NRP implementation. 

A Focus on Assessing Planning and Capabilities Will Be Critical: 

In our work on the National Preparedness Goal, we also observed that 
DHS's assessment and reporting implementation plan, intended to 
accurately identify the status of capabilities at the state, regional, 
and local levels, is vital for establishing a baseline and providing an 
ongoing feedback loop upon which decisions at multiple levels of 
government about preparedness needs will rest. Assessment of 
catastrophic disaster planning and capability needs will be a critical 
piece. 

In the conference report to the Department of Homeland Security Fiscal 
Year 2006 Appropriations Act, the conferees directed DHS to report on 
the status of catastrophic planning, including mass evacuation planning 
in all 50 states and the 75 largest urban areas.[Footnote 13] In 
addition, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users required the Secretary of Transportation 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly review and assess 
federal and state evacuation plans for catastrophic hurricanes 
impacting the Gulf Coast Region.[Footnote 14] 

In response, DHS launched a nationwide review of state, territorial, 
and urban area emergency and evacuation plans. In the first phase of 
the review, each state and territory and urban area was to certify the 
status of its emergency operations plans and identify when plans were 
last updated and exercised. According to the DHS report on the first 
phase's results, 56 states and territories and 72 urban areas 
responded. Fewer than half of those reporting might have adequate 
planning for a catastrophic disaster. Of those jurisdictions reporting 
that their base plan was consistent with federal guidance and voluntary 
standards, 42 percent of the states and territories and 36 percent of 
urban areas were confident that their plan was adequate to manage a 
catastrophe.[Footnote 15] In a second phase of the review, peer review 
teams are to validate the self-assessments, determine requirements for 
planning assistance, collect best practices, and recommend corrective 
actions. DHS plans to complete these peer reviews by the end of April 
2006 and report to the President and Congress before June 1, 2006. The 
White House has recommended DHS establish a program to measure and 
assess the effectiveness of preparedness capabilities on an annual 
basis and recommend appropriate adjustments to the National 
Preparedness Goal, capabilities, and yearly priorities for homeland 
security grants. We are currently examining evacuation planning and 
assistance, including the federal role in the emergency evacuation of 
transportation-disadvantaged populations--including the elderly, 
disabled, and low income individuals--and preparedness for the 
evacuation of hospitals and nursing homes. 

Similar to DHS's overall national preparedness planning, no single 
state or area should be expected to have the same capability to prepare 
for a catastrophic disaster. The stand-up and sustaining of 
capabilities should be based on a risk assessment that would call for 
examining what vulnerabilities from a potential catastrophic disaster 
require attention and how they should be addressed within available 
resources and with contingency planning. Periodic assessments should 
determine if plans remain viable, actual capabilities match planned 
capabilities, and if contingency planning still is appropriate. 

I would suggest that before the Congress and the Administration embark 
on implementing the more expensive aspects of preparing for a 
catastrophic disaster, policymakers should discuss in a timely fashion 
and reach consensus on the following issues: 

* What is known about the likelihood of a catastrophic disaster 
occurrence in specific areas of the nation? For example, what are the 
odds that more category 4 and 5 hurricanes will strike specific areas 
of the Gulf and East Coasts? How likely is it that California or other 
earthquake-prone areas will experience "the big one?" What are the 
chances that a nuclear plant will suffer an incident that results in 
massive radiation exposure? 

* How vulnerable are the areas that would be affected by these 
catastrophic disasters and what would be the consequences, in terms of 
human life, economic impact, and other generally accepted measures? 

* What are the costs and potential benefits of actions governments can 
take to mitigate the occurrence and consequences of these disasters? 
For example, in the case of catastrophic hurricanes, what are the costs 
and benefits of greater and more precise early warnings, better 
resourced and exercised evacuation plans, more pre-positioned equipment 
such as generators and water, more designated shelters and medical care 
resources, enhanced health care operations, and better mutual aid 
planning and specific agreements? 

* Finally, based on all of the above, what are the most prudent courses 
of action for various levels of government and their partners, such as 
private industry and nongovernmental organizations, in preparing for 
and responding to catastrophic disasters? 

These are not easily answered questions. However, given the enormous 
potential costs and the increasing demands on federal discretionary 
funding, these are some of the questions that policymakers should 
explicitly discuss, reach consensus, and periodically reassess as 
events and considerations change. If federal funds will be used to 
increase first responders' capabilities for catastrophic disasters, we 
suggest that the Congress require the use of risk management principles 
to assess state and urban area investments in capabilities to respond 
to a catastrophic disaster. 

Organizational Placement Has Been Raised as a Key FEMA Performance 
Factor: 

Because of FEMA's mission performance during Hurricane Katrina, 
concerns have been raised regarding the agency's organizational 
placement, including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved 
to other agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, 
or again become an independent agency. Importantly, other factors, such 
as the experience of and training provided to FEMA leadership and 
adequacy of resources may be more important to FEMA's future success 
than its organizational placement. 

Factors Other Than Organizational Placement May Impact FEMA's 
Performance: 

Organizational changes, such as separating FEMA from DHS, are often 
viewed as a quick fix to address performance issues. Based on our 
institutional knowledge regarding organizational performance factors, 
organizational changes alone may not adequately address underlying 
systemic conditions that result in an organization's performance 
problem. Conditions underlying FEMA's performance during Hurricane 
Katrina could involve the experience and training of DHS or FEMA 
leadership; the clarity of FEMA's mission and related responsibilities 
and authorities to achieve mission performance expectations; the 
adequacy of its human, financial, and technological resources; and the 
effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related partnerships. 

These factors have been highlighted, for example, by, the House Select 
Committee which noted (1) senior officials were ill prepared due to 
their lack of experience and knowledge of the required roles and 
responsibilities prescribed by the NRP, (2) DHS and FEMA lacked 
adequately trained and experienced staff for the Katrina response, 
observing that FEMA had lost, since 2002, a number of its top disaster 
specialists, senior leaders, and experienced personnel, described as 
"FEMA brain drain," and that even before Hurricane Katrina, FEMA 
suffered from a lack of sufficiently trained procurement professionals, 
and (3) FEMA's logistics systems were unable to support large-scale 
logistical challenges. In addition, White House recommendations covered 
areas such as DHS expertise and experience, development of a national 
crisis communications system, and development of DHS regions that are 
fully staffed, trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate all 
preparedness activities and any emergency that may require a 
substantial federal response. 

Factors such as the experience and training of leadership and the 
adequacy of resources can lead to performance difficulties pointed out 
in the House Select Committee, the White House report, and in testimony 
before this committee. These difficulties would not, we believe, be 
fixed by simply moving FEMA to an independent status. Indeed, we know 
that many of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina were acted on for 
Hurricane Rita, with a much better response effort, indicating that 
organizational change is not the primary key to success. Such factors, 
we believe, should be more carefully assessed and action taken where 
appropriate to strengthen any weaknesses in FEMA's leadership and 
resources. 

Certain Criteria Could Be Used if a Change in FEMA's Organizational 
Placement is Considered: 

However, if an organizational change remains under consideration, our 
past work could be helpful. Before the formation of DHS, I testified 
before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security that 
reorganizations of government agencies frequently encounter start-up 
problems and unanticipated consequences and are unlikely to fully 
overcome obstacles and challenges, and may require additional 
modifications in the future.[Footnote 16] I also presented specific 
criteria to evaluate whether individual agencies or programs should be 
included or excluded from the proposed department. Those criteria 
included, for example, mission relevancy, similar goals and objectives, 
leveraging the effectiveness of other agencies and programs or the new 
department as a whole, and gains in efficiency and effectiveness 
through eliminating duplications and overlaps. I also stated that 
Congress should consider not only the mission and roles that agencies 
fulfill today, but the mission and role that they should fulfill in the 
coming years. 

Some of these criteria are appropriate today for discussing FEMA's 
future, and I would suggest that they might be useful if a change in 
FEMA's organizational placement is under consideration. For example, 
Congress might consider whether or how moving FEMA out of DHS would 
impact DHS's mission, as stated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
of acting as a focal point for natural and manmade crises and emergency 
planning. DHS's Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate-- 
primarily FEMA--was to help ensure the effectiveness of emergency 
response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies. Removing FEMA from DHS might impact the ability of the 
department and its remaining components and FEMA itself in fully 
addressing the close links between preparedness, prevention, response, 
and recovery for all hazards. 

The dispersion of responsibility for all hazards preparedness and 
response across more than one federal agency was a problem we 
identified during the formation of DHS.[Footnote 17] FEMA was 
established in 1979 to consolidate federal emergency preparedness 
mitigation, and response in a single federal agency. Its 
responsibilities were to include, among other things, the coordination 
of civil defense and civil emergency planning and the coordination of 
federal disaster relief. FEMA responded to a wide range of disasters, 
including floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, hazardous material 
accidents, nuclear accidents, and biological, chemical, and nuclear 
attacks.[Footnote 18] However, when Congress created DHS, it separated 
FEMA's responsibilities for preparedness and response activities into 
two directorates. Responsibility for preparedness for terrorism 
disasters was placed in the department's Border and Transportation 
Security Directorate, which included FEMA's Office of National 
Preparedness. Other types of FEMA disaster preparedness and response 
efforts were transferred to the department's Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Directorate. In January 2003, we observed that this 
organizational arrangement would challenge FEMA in ensuring the 
effective coordination of preparedness and response efforts and 
enhancing the provision and management of disaster assistance for 
efficient and effective response.[Footnote 19] 

A division of responsibility remains under the recent DHS 
reorganization resulting from Secretary Chertoff's Second Stage Review 
(2SR), with preparedness efforts--including planning, training, 
exercising, and funding--consolidated into a Preparedness Directorate. 
FEMA reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security for 
response and recovery missions. Secretary Chertoff has explained the 
reorganization would focus FEMA on its historic mission of response and 
recovery. 

If FEMA were to become independent of DHS, then a comprehensive 
approach to preparedness, response, and recovery may become even more 
difficult to maintain. The lack of a single department or agency with 
responsibility for preparedness, response, and recovery also could 
jeopardize clear federal leadership and assistance for state and local 
governments. These entities would have two primary points of contact, 
two points of guidance and regulation, two points of funding 
opportunities, and two points of assistance and oversight. 
Nongovernmental and private sector partners in all hazards preparedness 
would be similarly affected. 

Other organizational changes are also being considered. The White House 
report on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina recommended keeping 
FEMA within DHS, but allows for other organizational changes, such as 
creating new positions and offices within DHS and transferring the 
National Disaster Medical System from DHS to the Department of Health 
and Human Services. 

Lastly, I believe we should bear in mind that the Department of 
Homeland Security is only three years old this month. In my testimony 
on the formation of DHS in 2002, I stated that often it has taken many 
years for the consolidated functions in new departments to effectively 
build on their combined strengths. 

Long Term Rebuilding Efforts Raise Issues for Congressional 
Consideration: 

Madame Chairman, the federal government will be a major partner in the 
longer-term rebuilding of the Gulf Coast because of the widespread 
damage and economic impact. In support of state and local efforts, the 
federal role in rebuilding will be particularly important for 
transportation and health infrastructures and federal facilities. In 
addition, federal programs will face financial difficulties and there 
is uncertainty concerning the impact of catastrophic disasters on the 
availability and affordability of insurance. Long term rebuilding 
raises issues concerning the need for consensus on what rebuilding 
should be done, where and based on what standards, who will pay for 
what, and what oversight is needed to ensure federal funds are spent 
for their intended purposes. 

The Hurricanes' Destruction Resulted in Widespread Adverse Economic 
Disruptions: 

Hurricane Katrina destroyed considerable numbers of residential 
structures; consumer durable goods, such as motor vehicles, household 
furnishings, and appliances; and business structures and equipment, 
particularly in the energy and petrochemical industries. Hurricane Rita 
appears to have had a smaller impact on residential structures and 
consumer durable goods, and its damage to the energy industry may be as 
great as or greater than Hurricane Katrina's. 

Some federal agencies have developed programs to initially identify and 
assess the recovery needs of the region. For example, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), created the Environmental Health Needs 
Assessment and Habitability Taskforce. This taskforce was charged with 
identifying the overarching environmental health issues faced by New 
Orleans to re-inhabit the city. According to the taskforce, the most 
striking feature of the Hurricane Katrina catastrophic disaster in New 
Orleans is the array of key environmental health and infrastructure 
factors affected all at once. All key environmental health and related 
services are being reestablished, and this work needs to be done in a 
very coordinated and well-planned way. Full restoration of drinking 
water systems and wastewater treatment systems will be delayed by the 
many disruptions in the distribution and collection systems and by the 
need for upgrade and repairs in older systems. The task force also 
noted timeline for debris treatment, disposal, containment, and 
transport, as well as for the testing of potentially contaminated soil, 
will also slow or accelerate the rate at which New Orleans can be re- 
inhabited. 

The task force found that restoration of the city's housing 
infrastructure is its most complex issue. Housing is likely the most 
critical issue in re-inhabiting the city because of factors such as the 
large percentage of city housing that was flooded and may not be 
viable, as well as the large proportion of the city population that is 
displaced with some residents a significant distance away from New 
Orleans or not intending to return, according to the task force. EPA 
and other federal partners are continuing to assess and address 
environmental and health issues that will impact the recovery and 
rebuilding of the Gulf Coast. 

The ongoing progress of recovery and rebuilding is being studied by 
several organizations. For example, the Brookings Institute created an 
index of economic and social indicators measuring the impact of 
rebuilding efforts in Orleans Parish, the New Orleans metropolitan 
area, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Brookings' February 1, 2006 report 
noted that over five months since Hurricane Katrina made landfall, New 
Orleans lacks enough essential services to support all of its returning 
residents and the area continues to lose workers. More specifically, 
the report observed that only 32 percent of the city's hospitals are 
open. Only 15 percent of the city's schools have reopened and some of 
those are reporting difficulty accommodating demand. Nearly 750,000 
households remain displaced. Mortgage delinquency rates rose between 
the second and third quarters of 2005. In the state of Louisiana, 
nearly 1 in 4 mortgages is 30 days or more past due. Currently, the New 
Orleans metro area lost 42,000 people in its labor force between 
November and December, while the state of Louisiana lost over 100,000 
people. Although the state of Louisiana created over 11,000 jobs 
between November and December, it lost over 100,000 people in its labor 
force. Mississippi lost 2,000 jobs and about 2,000 of its labor force. 
According to the Brookings' analysis, the slow pace of recovery 
strongly suggests that the city and state will be unable to restore 
essential services on their own, and require direct federal assistance 
to do so. 

Rebuilding Strategies Are Underway: 

In Louisiana and Mississippi, several efforts are underway to develop 
long-term rebuilding strategies in these states. In Louisiana, the 
governor and the mayor of New Orleans have charged different groups 
with guiding various aspects of the rebuilding efforts. Under the 
mayor, the Bring New Orleans Back Commission is intended to help New 
Orleans develop a "Master Plan" to include recommendations for 
rebuilding the city. The commission has issued several final reports, 
including those on urban planning, education, health and social 
services, and infrastructure. At the state level, the Louisiana 
Recovery Authority is the planning and coordinating body created by the 
Governor to assist in implementing the state's vision for the recovery 
of Louisiana. Working in collaboration with local, state and federal 
agencies, the authority serves to address short-term recovery needs and 
guide the long-term planning process. 

In Mississippi, the Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and 
Renewal was formed to develop a strategy for rebuilding the affected 
areas of Mississippi. Developed as an advisory body, the commission is 
intended to solicit the input of local leaders and facilitate decision 
making in their regions. In early January the commission released a 
report with numerous recommendations intended to guide Mississippi's 
post-Katrina rebuilding. The report recommends, for example, that local 
governments immediately adopt revised flood maps and begin assessing 
and revising their flood zone management ordinances and building 
requirements. In addition, the report suggests ways communities can tap 
into federal, state, and private funding sources to accomplish some of 
the report's goals. 

On November 1, 2005, the President issued Executive Order 13390, which 
directed the creation of a central figure in the administration's 
efforts to support the Gulf Coast recovery and rebuilding 
phases.[Footnote 20] Specifically, the President directed the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to establish within the department the position of 
Coordinator of Federal Support for the Recovery and Rebuilding of the 
Gulf Coast region. The federal coordinator, Donald Powell, is 
responsible for developing principles and goals and leading the 
development and monitoring of the implementation of specific federal 
support. The coordinator also serves as the focal point for managing 
information flow, requests for actions, and discussions with the 
Congress, state and local governments, the private sector, and 
community leaders. 

Madame Chairman, we need to make sure that rebuilding in the Gulf Coast 
should not replace that which was built in the past to 20TH century 
standards, but be built for the future and to 21ST century standards. 
State and local officials will have the lead on determining the future 
needs of the Gulf Coast. However, the federal government should be a 
willing partner in the rebuilding strategies so we build better than 
before and in anticipation of future catastrophic events. 

Now, I would like to turn to more specifically discuss rebuilding 
transportation and health infrastructures and federal facilities. 

Transportation Infrastructure Was Significantly Damaged and Poses Major 
Cost and Funding Concerns: 

Transportation infrastructure destruction will have a considerable 
impact on federal programs. The hurricanes destroyed significant 
amounts of the region's transportation infrastructure. The largest 
transportation capital costs will be associated with reconstruction of 
highways and bridges--Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma resulted in 
about $2.7 billion in needed repairs to roads on the federal-aid 
highway system. Hurricane Katrina resulted in the bulk of this cost, 
with about $2.1 billion in highway damage. Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Florida suffered the vast majority of the highway damage. Federal 
Highway Administration (FHWA) officials said that because many roads 
have been submerged, determination of the full extent of highway damage 
will depend on the results of testing. 

FHWA works with the states to develop these estimates, and funding for 
repair and reconstruction comes through FHWA's Emergency Relief 
Program. Under this program, states are reimbursed the cost of repairs 
and reconstruction of the existing highway facilities, and improvements 
are generally not allowed. However, bringing a facility up to current 
highway design standards is allowed. Only roads on the federal-aid 
highway system are eligible for funding. A large backlog of funding 
requests to this program existed prior to the hurricanes, about $650 
million pre-Katrina, resulting in a total state demand for emergency 
funds of about $2.85 billion. In its fiscal year 2006 Defense 
Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $2.75 billion to the FHWA 
Emergency Relief Program. These funds are available for both the 2005 
hurricanes and other emergency projects. We plan to review the FHWA 
Emergency Relief Program and related surface transportation financing 
issues that have arisen as a result of the hurricanes. 

Transit systems in the region sustained considerable damage, especially 
in New Orleans, where most of the transit fleet was lost. This included 
three bus garages, an operations and maintenance facility, much of the 
trolley system, and a majority of the city's bus fleet. In addition, 
the population of Baton Rouge roughly doubled in a matter of days, 
which presented an unprecedented transit problem for that city. While 
no transit program comparable to the FHWA Emergency Relief Program 
exists, FEMA provided $47 million under a mission assignment to help 
provide basic transit services within and between Baton Rouge and New 
Orleans. 

Ports in the region also suffered significant damage. The Port of New 
Orleans estimated reconstruction and relocation needs of $435 million 
to cover damages sustained from Hurricane Katrina, assuming $75 million 
would be funded by insurance claims or FEMA reimbursements. The 
remaining $360 million is unfunded. The Port of Gulfport was also hard 
hit, and while it is still developing estimates, according to the port 
director, reconstruction will likely total between $300 million and 
$400 million. Part of these costs will be covered by insurance and 
revenues from resumed port operations. According to officials from 
other ports in the region, they also sustained damage, though not of 
this magnitude. For example, the Port of Mobile sustained $28 million 
in damages, while other Louisiana ports, such as Port Fourchon and the 
Port of South Louisiana, estimate damages of $7 million and $2 million 
respectively. We have initiated a review of how ports mitigate their 
vulnerability to natural disasters, what lessons have been learned, and 
what the potential federal role may be in mitigating port 
vulnerability. 

A number of railroads suffered damage from Hurricane Katrina. The large 
railroads have nearly completed repairs to their systems, while a 
number of smaller short lines are in the process of repairing lines. 
These costs are currently borne by the railroads themselves, and the 
Department of Transportation does not have estimates of the damages. 
However, a financial statement from the CSX railroad estimated damages 
from Hurricane Katrina to that railroad's assets at over $40 million. 

Numerous airports in the region were affected by the hurricanes. The 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that about $100 million 
will be needed from the Airport Improvement Program to pay for damage. 
In addition, FAA estimated that its facilities sustained about $41 
million in damage, for a total of $141 million. 

Health Care Infrastructure Was Significantly Damaged: 

The health care infrastructure in the New Orleans area, including 
emergency, hospital and clinic facilities, was significantly damaged by 
Hurricane Katrina. The city is struggling to restore some capacity to 
meet the immediate needs of the population currently there. Moreover, 
numerous decisions that will need to be made on how to rebuild the 
health care system. The decisions are complicated by several factors, 
including the need to improve efficiency by moving away from New 
Orleans hospital-centric system and uncertainty about how many people 
will return to New Orleans and where they will settle. 

The damage inflicted by Hurricane Katrina on the New Orleans health 
system was severe. In particular, the Medical Center of Louisiana at 
New Orleans (MCLNO), which included Charity and University Hospitals, 
was forced to close its doors. MCLNO operated the only Level I trauma 
unit along the Gulf Coast. With its closure, the closest Level I trauma 
units are in Shreveport, Louisiana, Houston, Texas, and Birmingham, 
Alabama.[Footnote 21] In addition, MCLNO provided more than 25,000 
inpatient admissions, over 300,000 clinic visits and 135,000 emergency 
visits in fiscal year 2004. It was the primary safety net hospital for 
many local residents, and about half of its patients were uninsured and 
about one-third were covered by Medicaid. Under the Stafford Act, 
Charity Hospital is eligible for federal funds to repair Hurricane 
Katrina related damage. These funds, administered under FEMA's Public 
Assistance Program, would be available to defray a portion of the cost 
to rebuild or repair Charity Hospital. FEMA and Louisiana State 
University, which owns Charity Hospital, have prepared estimates of the 
cost to repair the hospital that differ considerably in their 
assumptions and conclusions, and no decision has been made as to 
whether to rebuild or repair the facility. 

Other health services in New Orleans were also severely damaged, 
including hospitals, emergency services, and safety net clinics. 

Hospitals: The number of staffed hospital beds in the City of New 
Orleans was about 80 percent less in February 2006 than before 
Hurricane Katrina, according to figures submitted daily by hospitals to 
an internet database about their bed capacity.[Footnote 22] Of the nine 
acute care hospitals in the city prior to Katrina, only 3 had re-opened 
at a capacity of approximately 456 staffed beds as of February 22, 
2006. 

Emergency Care: Increasing demand has been reported at the open 
emergency departments and has led to slow unloading of patients from 
ambulances and to patients being housed in the emergency department 
because beds were not available. For example, according to data 
reported by hospitals on February 22, 2006, wait times for emergency 
medical services (EMS) vehicles to offload stable patients into 
emergency departments varied from no wait to as long as 2 hours at two 
facilities, and 38 patients had been admitted and were housed in the 
emergency department. 

Safety Net Clinics: More than three-fourths of the safety net clinics 
in the New Orleans area were closed, and many of those that were open 
had limited capacity, according to data gathered by officials at the 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). For example, prior 
to Katrina, 90 clinics were in operation, including 70 various clinics 
run by MCLNO, with the remainder federally qualified health centers, 
mental health or addictive disorder clinics, or other specialty 
clinics. Post-hurricane, 19 clinics were operating according to DHH 
figures, generally operating at less than 50 percent of pre-Katrina 
capacity. 

In addition to the severe damage sustained by health facilities, 
maintaining and attracting the workforce is also a serious issue for 
local officials. An estimated 3,200 physicians lived in the 
metropolitan area before Hurricane Katrina, with 2,664 of those 
physicians residing in New Orleans itself, according to DHH figures. We 
were unable to obtain an estimate of how many physicians are currently 
in New Orleans. Hospital officials said they faced a shortage of 
support staff, such as food service or janitorial workers, who were 
unable to return due to a lack of housing or were being offered higher 
wages at hotels and restaurants. 

As the city struggles to restore the health system in New Orleans, long-
term decisions on how to rebuild it are affected by questions about 
whether the health system should be rebuilt to its pre-Katrina 
configuration and uncertainties about the returning population. Some 
health policy researchers have noted that the pre-Katrina health system 
in New Orleans needed improvement. Some local officials have also 
suggested that the health care situation prior to the hurricane was 
less than ideal and the city has a chance to rebuild a better system. 
Also, uncertainty about how quickly the population would return to New 
Orleans, as well as who would return and where people will settle, 
poses difficult challenges for local officials to plan the restoration 
of health services, such as how much capacity will be required and 
where to locate services. 

Over the long term, building a new health care system will be vital to 
attract people back to New Orleans and ensure its recovery. State, 
local and federal governments all have important roles to play in the 
recovery process. At the state and local levels, commissions to plan 
for the future health care system have been established, and one has 
completed its work. The Bring New Orleans Back Commission issued 
recommendations shifting the focus, to the degree possible, toward 
ambulatory care, wellness and preventive medicine, health promotion and 
chronic disease prevention and away from institutional care; 
maintaining a university teaching hospital in New Orleans; and building 
capacity for electronic medical records. The commission also noted the 
difficulty of doing effective planning without reliable information on 
the population and what segments of the population will return. The 
Louisiana Recovery Authority included one task force dedicated to 
health care issues. The NRP also gives the Department of Health and 
Human Services a support role under long-term community recovery and 
mitigation to enable community recovery from the long-term consequences 
of a large-scale incident. We will be following HHS' efforts to fulfill 
this role in the coming months. 

Federal Facilities Were Damaged or Destroyed: 

Several federal agencies had their facilities damaged or destroyed by 
the hurricanes and may face significant costs to repair or replace 
them, although these costs are relatively small in relation to those I 
just discussed. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) estimated 
damage to its medical centers in New Orleans and Biloxi at $170 million 
and $50.7 million respectively. VA's Gulfport hospital complex suffered 
catastrophic damage and will not be rebuilt since VA had already 
planned to close it. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
estimated the cost of facility repair at the Stennis Space Center in 
Mississippi and Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans at $84 million 
and $69 million respectively. The General Services Administration 
estimated the cost of repairing its owned and leased facilities and 
leasing alternative space at $60 million. The U.S. Postal Service 
estimated the cost of facility repair from Hurricane Katrina at $57 
million. The Department of Interior estimated damage to facilities, 
which includes damages to buildings, phone systems, electrical systems, 
and information technology systems among other things, at about $41 
million. In addition, there was damage to military bases and to 
shipyard repair facilities. 

Federal Flood Insurance Program Faces Record Claims and Financial 
Difficulties: 

The federal flood insurance program faces major financial difficulties 
challenges as the Gulf Coast recovers. The program is essentially 
bankrupt. FEMA officials estimate that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will 
result in flood insurance claims of about $23 billion, far surpassing 
the total amount of claims paid in the entire history of the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) through 2004. 

These storms have presented, among other challenges for the NFIP, the 
need to adjust a record number of claims, many for properties that were 
inaccessible for weeks after the flooding occurred, and the need to 
borrow funds from the U.S. Treasury to pay the settlements due to 
policyholders. Almost 87,000 loss claims totaling over $8 billion were 
paid for Hurricane Katrina claims in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana through November 30, 2005. By comparison, in 2004, the 
previous record year, the NFIP paid about $1.95 billion in claims on 
flood events, including Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne 
that caused major damage in Florida and other East Coast and Gulf Coast 
states. Though numbers are not finalized, a FEMA official said that by 
the end of December, 2005, more than 70 percent of claims for 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma had been paid totaling more than 
$11 billion. 

The amount paid per claim for flood damage in Hurricane Katrina ranged 
from a high of $130,281 in Mississippi to a low of $17,727 per claim in 
Florida. In Louisiana, where more than three fourths of the claims were 
filed, the average amount paid per claim was $92,549. A FEMA official 
noted that claims for total losses were paid quickly, so the average 
amount paid per claim may be less when all claims are settled. The 
average amount paid per claim for damage from Hurricane Rita was 
$52,185 in Louisiana and $24,489 in Texas. 

The magnitude and severity of the flood losses from Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita overwhelmed the ability of the NFIP to absorb the costs of 
paying claims, providing an illustration of the extent to which the 
federal government is exposed to claims coverage in catastrophic loss 
years. As of March 1, 2006, FEMA's authority to borrow from the U.S. 
Treasury was increased from $1.5 billion prior to the 2004 hurricane 
season to $18.5 billion through fiscal year 2008. While no 
determinations have been made about whether the NFIP will repay any of 
the debt, it is unlikely that the program could generate sufficient 
revenues to cover the enormous losses. 

Until the 2004 hurricane season, FEMA had exercised its borrowing 
authority three times in the last decade when losses exceeded available 
fund balances. In each instance, FEMA repaid the funds with interest. 
According to FEMA officials, as of August 31, 2005, FEMA had 
outstanding borrowing of $225 million with cash on hand totaling $289 
million. FEMA had substantially repaid the borrowing it had undertaken 
to pay losses incurred for the 2004 hurricane season that, until 
Hurricane Katrina struck, was the worst hurricane season on record for 
the NFIP. FEMA's current debt with the U.S. Treasury is almost entirely 
for payment from flood events that occurred in 2005. We currently have 
work underway examining the challenges facing the NFIP and options for 
improving the program. 

Flood maps are the foundation of the NFIP. They identify the areas at 
risk of flooding, and accurate, updated flood maps are a critical 
component for devastated communities in Mississippi and Louisiana, in 
particular, for making decisions about where and how to rebuild. Thus, 
new maps for these areas need to be expedited and completed as soon as 
possible. 

As of January 2006, FEMA had not yet fully implemented provisions of 
the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, including establishing a 
regulatory appeals process for claimants and establishing minimum 
education and training requirements for insurance agents who sell NFIP 
policies. These reforms should also be completed expeditiously, and we 
have recommended that FEMA develop documented plans with milestones for 
implementing the reforms required by the 2004 legislation. 

The Small Business Administration's Disaster Loan Program Also Faces 
Financial Concerns: 

We have initiated work to identify and assess the factors that have 
affected the Small Business Administration's (SBA) ability to respond 
to disaster victims through its disaster loan program in a timely 
manner. As the primary federal lender to disaster victims, including 
individual homeowners, renters, and businesses, SBA's ability to 
process and disburse loans in a timely manner is critical to the 
recovery of the Gulf Coast region. As of February 25, 2006, SBA had 
mailed out more than 1.6 million loan applications, received over 
337,800 completed applications, processed more than 230,900 
applications, and disbursed about $426.8 million in disaster loan 
funds. Although SBA's current goal is to process loan applications 
within seven to 21 days, as of February 25, 2006, SBA faced a backlog 
of about 103,300 applications in loan processing pending a final 
decision, and the average age of these applications is about 94 days. 
At the average rate SBA processed loans during the past month, it will 
take the agency 51 days to process its current backlog. However, this 
figure will be further affected by the number of new loan applications 
that are being received daily. SBA also faces a backlog of more than 
37,100 loan applications that have been approved but have not been 
closed or fully disbursed. As a result, disaster victims in the Gulf 
Region have not been receiving timely assistance in recovering from 
this disaster and rebuilding their lives. 

Based on our preliminary analysis of SBA's disaster loan origination 
process, we have identified several factors that have affected SBA's 
ability to provide a timely response to Gulf Coast disaster victims. 
First, the volume of loan applications SBA mailed out and received has 
far exceeded any previous disaster. Compared with the Florida 
hurricanes of 2004 or the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the hurricanes 
that hit the Gulf Coast in 2005 resulted in roughly 2 to 3 times as 
many loan applications issued.[Footnote 23] Second, although SBA's new 
disaster loan processing system provides opportunities to streamline 
the loan origination process, it has experienced numerous outages and 
slow response times in accessing information. However, we have not yet 
determined the duration and impact of these outages on processing. SBA 
officials have attributed many of these problems to a combination of 
hardware and telecommunications capacity limitations as well as the 
level of service SBA has received from its contractors. Third, SBA's 
planning efforts to address a disaster of this magnitude appear to have 
been inadequate. Although SBA's disaster planning efforts focused 
primarily on responding to a disaster the size of the Northridge 
earthquake, SBA officials said that it initially lacked the critical 
resources such as office space, staff, phones, computers, and other 
resources to process loans for this disaster. SBA has participated in 
disaster simulations only on a limited basis and it is unclear whether 
previous disaster simulations of category 4 hurricanes hitting the New 
Orleans area were considered. 

We are also assessing other factors that have affected SBA's ability to 
provide timely loans to the disaster victims in the Gulf region 
including workforce transformation, exercising its regulatory authority 
to streamline program requirements and delivery to meet the needs of 
disaster victims, coordination with state and local government 
agencies, SBA's efforts to publicize the benefits offered by the 
disaster loan program, and the limits that exist on the use of disaster 
loan funds. 

Uncertainty About Catastrophic Disasters Affects the Availability and 
Affordability of Insurance: 

The magnitude and severity of Hurricane Katrina and other recent 
catastrophes also impacted the insurance industry's willingness and 
ability to provide insurance protection for catastrophic disasters. A 
crucial aspect of being able to successfully provide such coverage is 
the ability to obtain what the industry refers to as credible 
"vulnerability assessments" or risk assessments. To be useful, a risk 
assessment must be able to estimate both the likely "frequency" and 
"severity" of catastrophic events--two key characteristics that 
insurance companies need to assess the probability and financial 
significance of a loss. In addition, based on credible information, 
insurers must be able to estimate both their "probable maximum loss 
(PML)," an estimate of the maximum dollar value that can be lost under 
realistic conditions, and their "maximum foreseeable loss (MFL)," an 
estimate of the maximum dollar loss under a worst-case scenario. Risk 
assessments can be used to provide a basis for making loss projections 
for catastrophes such as hurricanes or earthquakes, although the 
projections may not be accurate. Insurance companies use these 
estimates to determine the amount of coverage and the price at which to 
offer coverage within a geographic area. Potential losses are 
acceptable if the probability that they may occur is understood and 
companies can set prices that fully reflect the consequences of a 
specific risk. When projections fail to anticipate an event, such as an 
earthquake, or underestimate the severity of an event, such as 
Hurricane Katrina, insurance companies may become insolvent, as 
happened in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, or may choose to reduce 
the amount of coverage offered in a given area, as happened for wind 
losses in Florida and for earthquakes in California. 

While the practice of risk assessment has become more sophisticated in 
recent years, the ability of such assessments to estimate losses 
remains inexact, particularly for many potential catastrophes. These 
assessments are typically undertaken by risk modeling companies that 
assist clients, such as insurance companies, with predicting and 
managing the financial impact of catastrophes and weather. In addition, 
as demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina, estimating the amount of losses 
that insurers could pay for an event is also contingent on unforeseen 
circumstances, such as the unusual magnitude and consequences of the 
Hurricane Katrina storm surge. In addition, as a result of Hurricane 
Katrina, hundreds of thousands of buildings may have suffered damage 
from both the hurricane's winds and the storm surge. Because 
determining which factor caused the damage to a given structure is 
difficult and sometimes contentious, estimates of the amount that 
private insurers ultimately will pay to cover the costs of Hurricane 
Katrina are still very preliminary. 

Because catastrophic disasters are likely to occur in the future, and 
because forecasting their probability and severity is an inexact 
science, state insurance regulators have recommended that the federal 
government provide a final layer of insurance protection in the event 
of a "mega-catastrophe." The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) is considering a broad national plan that would 
create a mechanism to handle disasters, especially those larger than 
Hurricane Katrina. The plan proposes a public-private partnership that 
would reward hazard mitigation and spread catastrophic risk broadly 
among individual insureds, insurers, reinsurers, state reinsurance 
funds, and the federal government, according to NAIC. The federal 
government could provide a top layer of protection by acting as a 
reinsurer of last resort or, alternatively, by providing financial 
capacity to a multi-state risk pooling mechanism that could borrow from 
the federal government should catastrophic losses exceed the pool's 
accumulated funds. This plan is similar in scope to the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act (TRIA), which Congress enacted to create a program of 
shared public and private compensation for insured losses attributable 
to acts of terrorism. Under the NAIC plan, however, taxpayers would 
presumably not have to pay for losses. Furthermore, the NAIC plan 
asserts that if state and federal governments insured the top layers of 
catastrophe risk, private insurers would continue to insure the initial 
layer of risk that they might otherwise not insure. 

However, some in the insurance industry oppose additional government 
involvement and others have set forth alternative proposals. Some 
insurance company representatives believe that the private market for 
catastrophic coverage for natural events continues to exist and that 
insurance costs should be based upon free market principles. Still 
others have proposed that insurance companies be permitted to set aside 
additional catastrophic disaster reserves on a pre-tax basis. 
Supporters of tax-deductible reserves argue that the tax-free status 
would give insurers a financial incentive to increase their reserves 
and expand insurers' capacity to cover catastrophic risks and avoid 
insolvency. 

We anticipate undertaking work that would examine the merits of 
involving federal and state governments in alternative methods of 
insuring against catastrophic disasters--for example, by acting in a 
reinsurance capacity. We will continue to monitor legislation and 
proposals aimed at the long-term restoration of the Gulf Coast, such as 
the recently passed Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, which contains a 
variety of tax-related incentives designed to encourage rehabilitation 
in the region. 

The Federal Role and Involvement Will Raise Ongoing Issues: 

As we move forward, long-term rebuilding in the Gulf Coast raises 
issues concerning the need for consensus on what rebuilding should be 
done, where and based on what standards, who will pay for what, and 
what oversight is needed to ensure federal funds are spent for their 
intended purposes. Over 20 years ago, we issued a report describing the 
U.S. government's involvement and experience in four large-scale 
assistance programs (Conrail, Lockheed, New York City, and Chrysler) 
and suggested guidelines for future programs in helping other failing 
firms or municipalities.[Footnote 24] That report described four 
conditions that we suggested the Congress could use as a framework of 
ideas about how to structure future financial assistance programs and 
what program requirements to include to achieve Congressional goals and 
objectives while minimizing the risk of financial loss to the 
government. Congress might consider such guidelines as it considers 
federal assistance to the Gulf Coast for restoration: 

* The scope of the problem should be identified, such as if the problem 
reflects broader industry-wide or regional economic conditions. For the 
Gulf Coast, this would involve financial and economic analyses, perhaps 
utilizing current studies of prior conditions and the ongoing progress 
of recovery and rebuilding. 

* The effect of the problem on the national interest should be clearly 
established, for example, whether the problem presents potentially 
large economy-wide or regional consequences. For example, in the Gulf 
Coast, Congress might consider the costs of municipal and corporate 
collapse and the challenges associated with providing assistance. 

* The legislative goals and objectives associated with the response 
should be clear, concise, and consistent. For example, in the Gulf 
Coast, goals and objectives for rebuilding should be clearly stated, 
working with the state and local groups already tasked with recovery 
planning and with the Administration's Coordinator of Federal Support 
for the Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast region. 

* Lastly, the government's financial interest should be protected. In 
the Gulf Coast, controls might be put in place so there is review of 
the most important financial and operating plans. 

Concluding Observations: 

Madame Chairman and members of the committee, the past several weeks 
have provided significant insights into the Hurricane Katrina 
catastrophic disaster with the release of the House Select Committee 
report, the White House report on the federal response, and the 
testimony provided to this committee. Secretary Chertoff has announced 
immediate actions in preparation for the upcoming hurricane season and 
plans to work with the White House and the Homeland Security Council to 
assess and address the White House recommendations. Findings, lessons 
learned, and observations all paint a complex mosaic of challenges the 
federal, state, and local governments face in preparing for, responding 
to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. This committee's report 
as well as GAO's work will add to the understanding of what happened 
and what needs to be done. 

Moving forward, the challenge will be to determine if the 
recommendations and initial and longer-term actions will truly close 
the gap in needed preparedness or add to the problem through additional 
bureaucracy, complex processes, and inflexible policies. Also, the key 
question remains if the revised policies and procedures, even if sound, 
will be effectively implemented. Will they join those past 
recommendations that were not implemented, resulted in actions that 
were not sustained, or proved to be inadequate? We look forward to 
working with this committee and others to focus our work on these key 
issues. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any 
questions that you or other members of the committee may have at this 
time. 

GAO Contacts: 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further 
information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin at (202)-
512-8777 or at rabkinn@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Recent GAO Products Concerning Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington: 
D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of 
Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06-443R. Washington: 
D.C.: February 16, 2006. 

Investigation: Military Meals, Ready-To-Eat Sold on eBay. GAO-06-410R. 
Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006. 

Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's 
Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and 
Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006. 

Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary 
Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National Flood 
Insurance Program. GAO-06-335T. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006. 

Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee 
Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project. 
GAO-06-322T. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. GAO- 
06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

Army Corps of Engineers: History of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity 
Hurricane Protection Project. GAO-06-244T. Washington, D.C.: November 
9, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting 
for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. Washington, D.C.: 
November 8, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery 
Efforts. GAO-06-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of the 
National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-183T. Washington, D.C.: 
October 20, 2005. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the National 
Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 
2005. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to Enhance 
Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO- 
06-119. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005. 

Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane 
Projection Project. GAO-05-1050T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005. 

Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation's Preparedness, 
Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. Washington, D.C.: 
September 28, 2005. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita: FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant 
Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-403T. (Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006). 

[2] See, for example, GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's 
Response to Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 
23, 1993) and GAO, Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate 
the Need to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy, GAO-93-46 
(Washington, D.C.: May 25, 1993). 

[3] 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206. 

[4] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

[5] The NRP notes that major disasters and emergencies under the 
Stafford Act are examples of this criterion. 

[6] GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's 
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: February 1, 
2006). 

[7] GAO-93-46 summarizes GAO work in 1993 that contains this 
recommendation. 

[8] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on 
Contracting for Response and Recovery Efforts, GAO-06-246T (Washington, 
D.C.: November 8, 2005). 

[9] For additional information, see GAO, Disaster Preparedness: 
Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of Hospitals and Nursing 
Homes Due to Hurricanes, GAO-06-443R (Washington, D.C.: February 16, 
2006). 

[10] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable 
Assistance, GAO-06-297T (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005). 

[11] A summary of GAO's risk management framework specifically related 
to homeland security and combating terrorism can be found in GAO, Risk 
Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize 
Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-
91 (Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005). 

[12] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' 
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 11, 2005). 

[13] H. R. Rep. No. 109-241, at 68 (2006). 

[14] Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, 1934 (2005). 

[15] Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 1 
Report (Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2006). 

[16] GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, 
GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002). 

[17] GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 
Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

[18] GAO-93-186. 

[19] GAO-03-113. 

[20] U.S. President (G.W. Bush), "Establishment of a Coordinator of 
Federal Support for the Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast 
Region," E.O. 13390, Federal Register, vol. 70, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 67327- 
67328. 

[21] MCLNO announced plans to re-establish Level I trauma unit in the 
New Orleans area working in conjunction with another facility. 

[22] The internet database is called "GNOEMS" and was developed by the 
Greater New Orleans Healthcare Taskforce with the assistance of the 
U.S. Public Health Service. 

[23] In comparison, SBA issued loan applications for the Northridge 
earthquake and the Florida hurricanes of 2004, totaling about 570,000 
and 870,000, respectively. For those two disasters, SBA received loan 
applications totaling about 250,000 for Northridge and about 180,000 
for the Florida hurricanes. 

[24] See GAO, Guidelines for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and 
Municipalities, GAO-84-34 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1984).