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Testimony:

Before the Subcommittees on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & 
Development and Infrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, House of Representatives:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT:

Wednesday, April 21, 2004:

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:

Establishing Effective Information Sharing with Infrastructure 
Sectors:

Statement of Robert F. Dacey Director, Information Security Issues:

GAO-04-699T:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-699T, testimony before the Subcommittees on 
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and on 
Infrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities that are called for 
in federal policy and law are intended to enhance the security of the 
cyber and physical public and private infrastructures that are 
essential to our nation’s security, economic security, and public 
health and safety. As our reliance on these infrastructures increases, 
so do the potential threats and attacks that could disrupt critical 
systems and operations. Effective information-sharing partnerships 
between industry sectors and government can contribute to CIP efforts.

Federal policy has encouraged the voluntary creation of Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) to facilitate the private sector’s 
participation in CIP by serving as mechanisms for gathering and 
analyzing information and sharing it among the infrastructure sectors 
and between the private sector and government. This testimony discusses 
the management and operational structures used by ISACs, federal 
efforts to interact with and support the ISACs, and challenges to and 
successful practices for ISACs’ establishment, operation, and 
partnerships with the federal government.

What GAO Found:

Federal awareness of the importance of securing the nation’s critical 
infrastructures—and the federal government’s strategy to encourage 
cooperative efforts among state and local governments and the private 
sector to protect these infrastructures—have been evolving since the 
mid-1990s. Federal policy continues to emphasize the importance of the 
ISACs and their information-sharing functions. In addition, federal 
policy established specific responsibilities for the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies involved with the 
private sector in CIP. The ISACs themselves, although they have similar 
missions, were developed to serve the unique needs of the sectors they 
represent, and they operate under different business models and funding 
mechanisms.

According to ISAC representatives and a council that represents many of 
them, a number of challenges to their successful establishment, 
operation, and partnership with DHS and other federal agencies remain. 
These challenges include increasing the percentage of entities within 
each sector that are members of its ISAC; building trusted 
relationships and processes to facilitate information sharing; 
overcoming barriers to information sharing, clarifying the roles and 
responsibilities of the various government and private sector entities 
that are involved in protecting critical infrastructures; and funding 
ISAC operations and activities. According to a DHS official, these 
issues are being considered, and the department is developing a plan 
that will document the current information-sharing relationships among 
DHS, the ISACs, and other agencies; goals for improving those 
information-sharing relationships; and methods for measuring progress 
toward these goals.

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers by Sector:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-699T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Robert F. Dacey at 
202-512-3317 or Daceyr@gao.gov

[End of section]

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of private-sector 
information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) and their efforts to 
help protect our nation's critical infrastructures. Critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) activities called for in federal policy 
and law are intended to enhance the security of cyber and physical, 
public and private infrastructures that are essential to national 
security, national economic security, or national public health and 
safety. Beginning with Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), 
issued in May 1998, federal policy has encouraged the voluntary 
creation of ISACs to facilitate private-sector participation and serve 
as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately sanitizing 
and disseminating information to and from infrastructure sectors and 
the federal government. Subsequent federal CIP policy, including 
several national strategies, has continued to emphasize the importance 
of the ISACs and their information-sharing functions.[Footnote 1] 
Further, CIP policy has established specific responsibilities for the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies with 
respect to public/private collaboration to help protect private 
infrastructure sectors.

In my testimony today, I will discuss the management and operational 
structures used by the ISACs, including their estimated sector 
participation, business and funding models, and information sharing and 
analysis mechanisms. I will then discuss activities by DHS and other 
federal agencies with responsibilities for specific infrastructure 
sectors to interact and support the ISACs. Lastly, I will discuss some 
of the ISAC-identified challenges to and successful practices for their 
establishment, operation, and partnership with the federal government.

As agreed, this testimony includes initial results of our ongoing 
analysis of private-sector ISACs, which was requested by your 
subcommittees. In conducting this work, we contacted officials from the 
15 different ISAC organizations that had been established at the time 
of our review: Chemical, Electricity, Energy, Emergency Management and 
Response, Financial Services, Food, Information Technology, Multi-
State, Public Transit, Real Estate, Research and Education Networking, 
Surface Transportation, Telecommunications, Highway, and Water. 
Through structured interviews with these officials, we obtained and 
analyzed information to describe the ISACs' current organization and 
operational models, funding mechanisms, sector representation and 
membership criteria, as well as their challenges and successful 
practices in establishing effective information-sharing relationships 
within their sectors and with the federal government. We also contacted 
officials of the Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council to discuss 
their efforts to establish an ISAC for the healthcare sector. Further, 
we contacted officials of the ISAC Council, which was created by 11 
ISACs to address common issues, and we obtained and analyzed its series 
of white papers on a range of ISAC-related issues and challenges. 
Within the federal government, we obtained and analyzed information on 
efforts to work with the private sector by DHS and other agencies 
assigned responsibilities for specific industry sectors, including the 
Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, and the 
Treasury and the Environmental Protection Agency. We did not validate 
the accuracy of the data provided by the ISACs, DHS, or other agencies. 
We performed our work from November 2003 to April 2004, in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

Beginning with PDD 63, federal policy has encouraged the voluntary 
creation of ISACs as key information-sharing mechanisms between the 
federal government and critical infrastructures. While PDD 63 suggested 
certain ISAC activities, CIP policy has essentially left the actual 
design and function of the ISACs to the entities that formed them. As a 
result, although their overall missions are similar, the current ISACs 
were established and developed based on the unique characteristics and 
needs of their individual sectors. They operate under different 
management and operational structures and, among other things, have 
different business models and funding mechanisms. For example, most are 
managed or operated as private entities, and some, such as the Water 
and Chemical ISACs, are part of associations that represent their 
sectors. Others have partnered with government agencies, such as the 
Telecommunications ISAC, which is a government/industry operational and 
collaborative body sponsored by DHS's National Communications Systems/
National Coordinating Center (NCC). Different funding mechanisms used 
by the ISACs include fee-for-service, association sponsorship, federal 
grants, and/or voluntary or in-kind operations by ISAC participants. 
ISACs that use fee-for-service funding include the Financial Services, 
Information Technology, and Water ISACs, that offer tiered memberships 
with fees based on the level of service provided.

DHS and the sector-specific agencies have undertaken a number of 
efforts to address the public/private partnership called for by federal 
CIP policy and continue to work on their cooperation and interaction 
with the ISACs and with each other. For example, in January 2004, DHS 
held a 2-day conference to describe the information it is analyzing and 
its use in the partnership with the private sector and to discuss 
information sharing between the federal government and the private 
sector. Also, in February, the department established the Protected 
Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program, which enables the 
private sector to voluntarily submit infrastructure information to the 
government that can be protected from disclosure according to 
provisions of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002.

According to ISAC representatives and a council that represents many of 
the ISACs, a number of challenges to their successful establishment, 
operation, and partnership with DHS and other federal agencies remain. 
These challenges include increasing the percentage of sector entities 
that are members of the ISACs; building trusted relationships and 
processes to facilitate information sharing; overcoming barriers to 
information sharing--including the sensitivity of the information, 
legal limits on disclosure (such as Privacy Act limitations on 
disclosure of personally identifiable information), and contractual and 
business limits on how and when information is disclosed--and 
clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the various government and 
private-sector entities involved in protecting the critical 
infrastructures; and funding ISAC operations and activities. According 
to a DHS official, these issues are being considered and should be 
clarified through the department's development of a plan that documents 
the current information-sharing relationships between DHS, the ISACs, 
and other agencies; goals for improving that information-sharing 
relationship; and methods for measuring progress.

Background:

As reliance on our nation's critical infrastructures grows, so do the 
potential threats and attacks that could disrupt critical systems and 
operations. In response to the potential consequences, federal 
awareness of the importance of securing our nation's critical 
infrastructures, which underpin our society, economy, and national 
security, has been evolving since the mid-1990s. For example, 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), issued in 1998, described 
the federal government's strategy for cooperative efforts with state 
and local governments and the private sector to protect the systems 
that are essential to the minimum operations of the economy and the 
government from physical and cyber attack. In 2002, the Homeland 
Security Act created the Department of Homeland Security, which was 
given responsibility for developing a national plan; recommending 
measures to protect the critical infrastructure; and collecting, 
analyzing, and disseminating information to government and private-
sector entities to deter, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. 
More recently, HSPD-7, issued in December 2003, defined federal 
responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection, superseding 
PDD 63.

CIP Policy Has Continued to Evolve:

Federal awareness of the importance of securing our nation's critical 
infrastructures has continued to evolve since the mid-1990s. Over the 
years, a variety of working groups has been formed, special reports 
written, federal policies issued, and organizations created to address 
the issues that have been raised. Key documents that have shaped the 
development of the federal government's CIP policy include:

* Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63),

* The Homeland Security Act of 2002,

* The National Strategies for Homeland Security, to Secure Cyberspace 
and for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 
Assets, and:

* Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7 (HSPD-7) and 9 (HSPD-9).

Presidential Decision Directive 63 Established an Initial CIP Strategy:

In 1998, the President issued PDD 63, which described a strategy for 
cooperative efforts by government and the private sector to protect the 
physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of 
the economy and the government. PDD 63 called for a range of actions 
that were intended to improve federal agency security programs, improve 
the nation's ability to detect and respond to serious computer-based 
and physical attacks, and establish a partnership between the 
government and the private sector. Although it was superseded in 
December 2003 by HSPD-7, PDD 63 provided the foundation for the 
development of the current sector-based CIP approach.

To accomplish its goals, PDD 63 established and designated 
organizations to provide central coordination and support, including 
the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), an organization 
within the FBI, which was expanded to address national-level threat 
assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation 
and response.

To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, PDD 63 identified eight 
infrastructures and five functions. For each of the infrastructures and 
functions, the directive designated lead federal agencies, referred to 
as sector liaisons, to work with their counterparts in the private 
sector, referred to as sector coordinators. Among other 
responsibilities, PDD 63 stated that sector liaisons should identify 
and access economic incentives to encourage sector information sharing 
and other desired behavior.

To facilitate private-sector participation, PDD 63 also encouraged the 
voluntary creation of information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) 
to serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately 
sanitizing and disseminating information to and from infrastructure 
sectors and the federal government through NIPC. PDD 63 also suggested 
several key ISAC activities to effectively gather, analyze, and 
disseminate information--activities that could improve the security 
postures of the individual sectors and provide an improved level of 
communication within and across sectors and all levels of government. 
These activities are: establishing baseline statistics and patterns on 
the various infrastructures; serving as a clearinghouse for information 
within and among the various sectors; providing a library of historical 
data for use by the private sector and government, and reporting 
private-sector incidents to NIPC.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 Established the Department's CIP 
Responsibilities:

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed by the President on November 
25, 2002, established DHS. To help accomplish its mission, the act 
established five undersecretaries, among other entities, with 
responsibility over directorates for management, science and 
technology, information analysis and infrastructure protection, border 
and transportation security, and emergency preparedness and response.

The act made the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
(IAIP) Directorate within the department responsible for CIP functions 
and transferred to it the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities 
of several existing organizations with CIP responsibilities, including 
NIPC (other than the Computer Investigations and Operations Section).

IAIP is responsible for accessing, receiving, and analyzing law 
enforcement information, intelligence information, and other threat and 
incident information from respective agencies of federal, state, and 
local governments and the private sector, and for combining and 
analyzing such information to identify and assess the nature and scope 
of terrorist threats. IAIP is also tasked with coordinating with other 
federal agencies to administer the Homeland Security Advisory System to 
provide specific warning information along with advice on appropriate 
protective measures and countermeasures. Further, IAIP is responsible 
for disseminating, as appropriate, information analyzed by DHS, within 
the department, to other federal agencies, state and local government 
agencies, and private-sector entities.

Moreover, as stated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, IAIP is 
responsible for (1) developing a comprehensive national plan for 
securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United 
States and (2) recommending measures to protect the key resources and 
critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other 
federal agencies and in cooperation with state and local government 
agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.

National Strategies Establish Information-Sharing Initiatives:

The National Strategy for Homeland Security identifies information 
sharing and systems as one foundation for evaluating homeland security 
investments across the federal government. It also identifies 
initiatives to enable critical infrastructure information sharing and 
to integrate sharing across state and local government, private 
industry, and citizens. Consistent with the original intent of PDD 63, 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security states that, in many cases, 
sufficient incentives exist in the private market for addressing the 
problems of CIP. However, the strategy also discusses the need to use 
all available policy tools to protect the health, safety, or well-being 
of the American people. It mentions federal grant programs to assist 
state and local efforts, legislation to create incentives for the 
private sector, and, in some cases, regulation.

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provides an initial 
framework for both organizing and prioritizing efforts to protect our 
nation's cyberspace. It also provides direction to federal departments 
and agencies that have roles in cyberspace security and identifies 
steps that state and local governments, private companies and 
organizations, and individual Americans can take to improve our 
collective cybersecurity. The strategy warns that the nation's private-
sector networks are increasingly targeted and will likely be the first 
organizations to detect attacks with potential national significance. 
According to the cyberspace strategy, ISACs, which possess unique 
operational insight into their industries' core functions and will help 
provide the necessary analysis to support national efforts, are 
expected to play an increasingly important role in the National 
Cyberspace Security Response System[Footnote 2] and the overall 
missions of homeland security. In addition, the cyberspace strategy 
identifies DHS as the central coordinator for cyberspace efforts and 
requires it to work closely with the ISACs to ensure that they receive 
timely and threat and vulnerability data that can be acted on and to 
coordinate voluntary contingency planning efforts. The strategy 
reemphasizes that the federal government encourages the private sector 
to continue to establish ISACs and, further, to enhance the analytical 
capabilities of existing ISACs. Moreover, the strategy stresses the 
need to improve and enhance public/private information sharing about 
cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities and to encourage broader 
information sharing on cybersecurity among nongovernmental 
organizations with significant computing resources. The National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace also states that the market is to provide 
the major impetus to improve cybersecurity and that regulation will not 
become a primary means of securing cyberspace.

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets provides a statement of national policy 
to remain committed to protecting critical infrastructures and key 
assets from physical attacks. It outlines three key objectives to focus 
the national protection effort: (1) identifying and assuring the 
protection of the most critical assets, systems, and functions; 
(2) assuring the protection of infrastructures that face an imminent 
threat; and (3) pursuing collaborative measures and initiatives to 
assure the protection of other potential targets. The National Strategy 
for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 
also states that further government leadership and intense 
collaboration between public-and private-sector stakeholders is needed 
to create a more effective and efficient information-sharing process to 
enable our core protective missions. Some of the specific initiatives 
include:

* defining protection-related information requirements and 
establishing effective, efficient information-sharing processes;

* promoting the development and operation of critical sector ISACs, 
including developing advanced analytical capabilities;

* improving processes for domestic threat data collection, analysis, 
and dissemination to state and local governments and private industry; 
and:

* completing implementation of the Homeland Security Advisory System.

The National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
and Key Assets reiterates that additional regulatory directives and 
mandates should be necessary only in instances where the market forces 
are insufficient to prompt the necessary investments to protect 
critical infrastructures and key assets.

Current Federal Agency CIP Responsibilities:

In December 2003, the President issued HSPD-7, which established a 
national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and 
prioritize critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect 
them from terrorist attack. It superseded PDD 63. HSPD-7 defines 
responsibilities for DHS, sector-specific agencies (formerly referred 
to as lead agencies) that are responsible for addressing specific 
critical infrastructure sectors, and other departments and agencies. It 
instructs federal departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and 
coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, 
and mitigate the effects of attacks.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is assigned several 
responsibilities, including:

* coordinating the national effort to enhance critical infrastructure 
protection;

* identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of 
critical infrastructure, emphasizing protection against catastrophic 
health effects or mass casualties;

* establishing uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and 
methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection and 
risk management activities within and across sectors; and:

* serving as the focal point for cyberspace security activities, 
including analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability 
reduction, mitigation, and recovery efforts for critical infrastructure 
information systems.

To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, HSPD-7 designated sector-
specific agencies for the critical infrastructure sectors identified in 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security (see table 1). These 
agencies are responsible for infrastructure protection activities in 
their assigned sectors, which include:

* coordinating and collaborating with relevant federal agencies, state 
and local governments, and the private sector to carry out their 
responsibilities;

* conducting or facilitating vulnerability assessments of the sector;

* encouraging the use of risk management strategies to protect against 
and mitigate the effects of attacks against the critical 
infrastructure;

* identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of 
critical infrastructure;

* facilitating the sharing of information about physical and cyber 
threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, 
and best practices; and:

* reporting to DHS on an annual basis on their activities to meet these 
responsibilities.

Further, the sector-specific agencies are to continue to encourage the 
development of information-sharing and analysis mechanisms and to 
support sector-coordinating mechanisms. HSPD-7 does not suggest any 
specific ISAC activities.

Table 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors Identified by the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security and HSPD-7:

Sector: Agriculture; Description: Provides for the fundamental need for 
food. The infrastructure includes supply chains for feed and crop 
production; Sector-specific agency: Department of Agriculture.

Sector: Banking and Finance; Description: Provides the financial 
infrastructure of the nation. This sector consists of commercial banks, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, government-sponsored enterprises, 
pension funds, and other financial institutions that carry out 
transactions including clearing and settlement; Sector-specific 
agency: Department of the Treasury.

Sector: Chemicals and hazardous materials; Description: Transforms 
natural raw materials into commonly used products benefiting society's 
health, safety, and productivity. The chemical industry represents a 
$450 billion enterprise and produces more than 70,000 products that are 
essential to automobiles, pharmaceuticals, food supply, electronics, 
water treatment, health, construction, and other necessities; Sector-
specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.

Sector: Defense industrial base; Description: Supplies the military 
with the means to protect the nation by producing weapons, aircraft, 
and ships and providing essential services, including information 
technology and supply and maintenance; Sector-specific agency: 
Department of Defense.

Sector: Emergency services; Description: Saves lives and property from 
accidents and disaster. This sector includes fire, rescue, emergency 
medical services, and law enforcement organizations; Sector-specific 
agency: Department of Homeland Security.

Sector: Energy; Description: Provides the electric power used by all 
sectors, including critical infrastructures, and the refining, storage, 
and distribution of oil and gas. The sector is divided into electricity 
and oil and natural gas; Sector-specific agency: Department of Energy.

Sector: Food; Description: Carries out the post-harvesting of the food 
supply, including processing and retail sales; Sector-specific agency: 
Department of Agriculture and Department of Health and Human Services.

Sector: Government; Description: Ensures national security and freedom 
and administers key public functions; Sector-specific agency: 
Department of Homeland Security.

Sector: Information technology and telecommunications; Description: 
Provides communications and processes to meet the needs of businesses 
and government; Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland 
Security.

Sector: Postal and shipping; Description: Delivers private and 
commercial letters, packages, and bulk assets. The U.S. Postal Service 
and other carriers provide the services of this sector; Sector-
specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.

Sector: Public Health and Healthcare; Description: Mitigates the risk 
of disasters and attacks and also provides recovery assistance if an 
attack occurs. The sector consists of health departments, clinics, and 
hospitals; Sector-specific agency: Department of Health and Human 
Services.

Sector: Transportation; Description: Enables movement of people and 
assets that are vital to our economy, mobility, and security with the 
use of aviation, ships, rail, pipelines, highways, trucks, buses, and 
mass transit; Sector-specific agency: Department of Homeland Security.

Sector: Drinking water and water treatment systems; Description: 
Sanitizes the water supply with the use of about 170,000 public water 
systems. These systems depend on reservoirs, dams, wells, treatment 
facilities, pumping stations, and transmission lines; Sector-specific 
agency: Environmental Protection Agency.

Source: GAO analysis based on the President's National Strategy 
documents and HSPD-7.

[End of table]

In January, the President issued HSPD-9, which established a national 
policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist 
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-9 defines 
responsibilities for DHS, lead federal agencies, or sector-specific 
agencies, responsible for addressing specific critical infrastructure 
sectors, and other departments and agencies. It instructs federal 
departments and agencies to protect the agriculture and food system 
from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by:

* identifying and prioritizing sector-critical infrastructure and key 
resources for establishing protection requirements,

* developing awareness and early warning capabilities to recognize 
threats,

* mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production and processing 
nodes,

* enhancing screening procedures for domestic and imported products, 
and:

* enhancing response and recovery procedures.

In addition, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and other 
appropriate federal department and agencies, are assigned 
responsibilities including:

* expanding and continuing vulnerability assessments of the agriculture 
and food sectors and:

* working with appropriate private-sector entities to establish an 
effective information-sharing and analysis mechanism for agriculture 
and food.

Prior GAO Recommendations:

We have made numerous recommendations over the last several years 
related to information-sharing functions that have been transferred to 
DHS. One significant area of our work concerns the federal government's 
CIP efforts, which is focused on sharing information on incidents, 
threats, and vulnerabilities and providing warnings related to critical 
infrastructures both within the federal government and between the 
federal government and state and local governments and the private 
sector. Although improvements have been made in protecting our nation's 
critical infrastructures and continuing efforts are in progress, 
further efforts are needed to address the following critical CIP 
challenges that we have identified:

* developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to 
facilitate CIP information sharing that clearly delineates the roles 
and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, defines 
interim objectives and milestones, sets timeframes for achieving 
objectives, and establishes performance measures;

* developing fully productive information-sharing relationships within 
the federal government and among the federal government and state and 
local governments and the private sector;

* improving the federal government's capabilities to analyze incident, 
threat, and vulnerability information obtained from numerous sources 
and share appropriate timely, useful warnings and other information 
concerning both cyber and physical threats to federal entities, state 
and local governments, and the private sector; and:

* providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase 
information sharing with the federal government.

ISAC Structures and Operations Reflect Sector Needs and Evolving Goals:

PDD 63 encouraged the voluntary creation of ISACs and suggested some 
possible activities, as discussed earlier; however, their actual design 
and functions were left to the private sector, along with their 
relationships with the federal government. HSPD-7 continues to 
encourage the development of information-sharing mechanisms and does 
not suggest specific ISAC activities. As a result, the ISACs have been 
designed to perform their missions based on the unique characteristics 
and needs of their individual sectors and, although their overall 
missions are similar, they have different characteristics. They were 
created to provide an information sharing and analysis capability for 
members of their respective infrastructure sectors in order to support 
efforts to mitigate risk and provide effective response to adverse 
events, including cyber, physical, and natural events. In addition, the 
ISACs have taken several steps to improve their capabilities and the 
services they provide to their respective sectors.

Management and Operational Structures Vary, but Provide Similar Basic 
Capabilities:

The ISACs have developed diverse management structures and operations 
to meet the requirements of their respective critical infrastructure 
sectors. To fulfill their missions, they have been established using 
various business models, diverse funding mechanisms, and multiple 
communication methods.

Business model--ISACs use different business models to accomplish their 
missions. Most are managed or operated as private entities, including 
the Financial Services, Chemical, Electricity Sector, Food, Information 
Technology, Public Transit, Real Estate, Surface Transportation, 
Highway, and Water ISACs. Many are established as part of an 
association that represents a segment of or an entire critical 
infrastructure sector. For example, the Association of Metropolitan 
Water Authorities manages the contract for the Water ISAC and the 
American Chemistry Council manages and operates the Chemical ISAC 
through its CHEMTRAC.[Footnote 3] In addition, the North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC), [Footnote 4] a nonprofit 
corporation that promotes electric system reliability and security, 
operates the Electricity Sector ISAC using internal expertise.

The legal structure of the ISACs continues to evolve. The Financial 
Services ISAC has evolved from a limited liability corporation in 1999 
to a 501(c)6 non-stock corporation and is managed by a board of 
directors that is comprised of representatives from the Financial 
Services ISAC's members. According to the Financial Services ISAC 
Board, the change to be a 501(c)6 non-stock corporation, as mentioned 
above, was made to simplify the membership agreement and to make the 
process for obtaining public funding easier. The Energy ISAC also 
changed from a limited liability corporation to a 501(c)3 nonprofit 
charitable organization to eliminate membership barriers.

Also, government agencies have partnered with the private sector to 
operate certain ISACs. For example, DHS's National Communications 
Systems/ National Coordinating Center (NCC) for Telecommunications 
sponsors the Telecommunications ISAC, which is a government/industry 
operational and collaborative body.[Footnote 5] DHS provides for the 
Telecommunications ISAC facilities, tools and systems, the NCC manager, 
and the 24x7 watch operations staff. The private sector provides 
representatives who have access to key corporate personnel and other 
resources. In addition, DHS's United States Fire Administration 
operates the Emergency Management and Response ISAC. New York State, 
through its Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure 
Coordination, is coordinating efforts of the Multi-state ISAC. The New 
York State Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure 
Coordination is currently studying best practices and lessons learned 
to assist in developing a structure that will include representation by 
member states.

Six of the ISACs included in our study use contractors to perform their 
day-to-day operations. According to an Association of Metropolitan 
Water Agencies (AMWA) official, they chose a contractor to operate the 
Water ISAC because the contractor had the appropriate expertise. In 
addition, the contractor's personnel had government clearances and the 
ability to operate a secure communication system and facility. In 
addition, ISACs use contractors to supplement their operations. For 
example, a formal contract provides for the daily staffing and 
performance of the Emergency Management and Response ISAC's tasks. It 
chose this model because of federal requirements and the shortage of 
positions for federal full-time employees at the United States Fire 
Administration. The Telecommunications ISAC contracted for analysts to 
operate its 24 x 7 watch operations under the management of a 
government official.

ISACs also differ in the nature of the hazards that they consider: 
cyber, physical, or all hazards (including natural events such as 
hurricanes). For example, during events of the power outage in August 
2003 and Hurricane Isabel in September 2003, the Financial Services 
ISAC was contacted by DHS to determine the Banking and Finance sector's 
preparedness and the impact of those events. However, the Multi-state 
ISAC will remain focused on cyber threats because other state 
organizations are in place to address physical and natural disaster 
events.

Funding--ISACs fund their activities using a variety of methods--fees-
for-service, association sponsorship, federal grants, and voluntary, or 
in-kind operations by existing participants. For example, the Financial 
Services, Information Technology, and Water ISACs use a tiered fee-for-
service model for members. This model establishes different tiers of 
membership based on the level of service provided. These tiers 
typically include some basic level of service that is provided at 
minimal or no cost to the member and additional tiers that provide--for 
a fee--more personalized service and access to additional resources. To 
help ensure that cost is not a deterrent to membership and that the 
ISAC's coverage of its sector is extensive, the Financial Services ISAC 
recently, as part of its next-generation ISAC effort, shifted to a 
tiered fee-for-service approach. It offers five levels of service that 
vary in cost--Basic (no charge), Core ($750 per year), Premier ($10,000 
per year), Gold ($25,000 per year), and Platinum ($50,000)--for 
ascending levels of information and analytical capabilities. In 
addition, there is a partner-level license agreement for select 
industry associations ($10,000) for distribution to eligible 
association members of Urgent and Crisis Alerts. For example, the 
Information Technology ISAC recently started to work on a tiered basis 
with fees set annually at $40,000; $25,000; $5,000; $1,000; and free. 
The Water ISAC also uses a tiered approach, with membership fees 
ranging from $7,500 to $750 annually. The Surface Transportation ISAC 
assesses an annual fee from its Class I railroad members of 
approximately $7,500.

Some industry associations that operate ISACs fund them from budgets. 
For example, the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
funds the Electricity Sector ISAC, and the American Trucking 
Association funds the Highway ISAC from their budgets. The American 
Chemistry Council fully funds the Chemical ISAC through the previously 
existing Chemical Transportation Emergency Center, known as CHEMTRAC. 
The ten trade associations that are members of it fund the Real Estate 
ISAC.

In addition, some ISACs receive funding from the federal government for 
such purposes as helping to start operations, funding memberships, and 
providing expanded capabilities. Examples include the following:

* The Public Transit ISAC initially received a $1.2 million grant from 
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to begin operations. Members 
pay no an annual fee and there are no membership requirements from the 
association that started the ISAC--the American Public Transportation 
Association.

* For FY 2004, the Water ISAC received a $2 million grant from EPA to 
cover annual operating costs, including the expansion of memberships to 
smaller utilities.

* The Financial Services ISAC received $2 million dollars from the 
Department of the Treasury to enhance its capabilities, including 
technology to broaden membership service.

* The Highway ISAC received initial funding from DHS's Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) to start the ISAC.

* The Energy ISAC received federal grants to assist entities within its 
separate sectors to be members.

* DHS provides funding for the operation of the Telecommunications ISAC 
that is combined with in-kind services provided by the corporate 
participants. DHS also fully operates the Emergency Management and 
Response ISAC.

States also provide funding for ISACs. For example, the Multi-state 
ISAC is funded by and functions as part of the New York State Cyber 
Security Analysis Center. In addition, the Research and Education 
Networking ISAC is supported by Indiana University.

Sharing mechanisms--ISACs use various methods to share information with 
their members, other ISACs, and the federal government. For example, 
they generally provide their members access to electronic information 
via e-mail and Web sites. For example, the Chemical ISAC members 
receive e-mail alerts and warnings in addition to the information that 
is posted to the ISAC's Web site. The Highway ISAC provides members on 
its Web site with links to IT resources.

Some ISACs also provide secure members-only access to information on 
their Web sites. For example, the Financial Services ISAC's Web site 
offers multiple capabilities for members at the premier level and 
above, including, among other things, access to news, white papers, 
best practices, and contacts. The Energy ISAC offers its members access 
to a secure Web site.

In addition, some ISACs hold conference calls for their members. For 
example, the Chemical ISAC holds biweekly conference calls with DHS. 
The Financial Services ISAC also conducts threat intelligence 
conference calls every two weeks for premier members and above with 
input from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and 
DHS. These calls discuss physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities 
and incidents that have occurred during the previous two weeks, and 
they provide suggestions on what may be coming. The Financial Services 
ISAC is capable of organizing crisis conference calls within an hour of 
the notification of a Crisis Alert, and it hosts regular biweekly 
threat conference calls for remediation of vulnerabilities (viruses, 
patches).

ISACs also use other methods to communicate. For example, they may use 
pagers, phone calls, and faxes to disseminate information. In addition, 
the Telecommunications ISAC uses the Critical Infrastructure Warning 
Information Network (CWIN).[Footnote 6] The Financial Services ISAC 
also sponsors twice yearly members' only conferences to learn and share 
information.

ISAC Coverage and Participation Varies:

According to the ISAC Council, its membership possesses an outreach and 
connectivity capability to approximately 65 percent of the U.S. private 
critical infrastructure. However, the ISACs use various matrices to 
define their respective sectors' participation in their activities. For 
example, the Banking and Finance sector has estimated that there are 
more than 25,000 financial services firms in the United States. Of 
those, according to the Financial Services ISAC Board, roughly 33 
percent receive Urgent and Crisis Alerts through license agreements 
with sector associations; these firms account for the vast majority of 
total commercial bank assets, the majority of assets under management, 
and the majority of securities/ investment bank transactions that are 
handled by the sector, but less than half the sector's insurance 
assets. According to an American Public Transportation Association 
official, the Public Transit ISAC covers a little less than 5 percent 
of the public transit agencies; however, those agencies handle about 60 
to 70 percent of the total public transit ridership. Further, according 
to NERC officials, virtually all members of NERC are members of the 
Electricity Sector ISAC. As for the Energy ISAC, officials stated that 
its 80-plus members represent approximately 85 percent of the energy 
industry. Membership in the Information Technology ISAC also represents 
85 to 90 percent of the industry, including assets of Internet 
equipment hardware, software, and security providers. For other ISACs, 
such as Chemical and Real Estate, officials stated that it is difficult 
to determine the percentage of the sector that is included.

Table 2 provides a summary of the characteristics of the ISACs that we 
included in our review. In addition to these ISACs, the Healthcare 
sector is continuing to organize, including efforts to establish an 
ISAC. According to:

DHS officials, the Emergency Law Enforcement ISAC that was formally 
operated by the NIPC and transferred to IAIP is not currently staffed 
and will be considered in current efforts to organize the Emergency 
Services sector.

Table 2: Summary of ISAC Characteristics:

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Agriculture; None at this 
time; 

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Banking & Finance; 
Financial Services (est. Oct. 1999); 
Coverage: 200 members, including commercial banks, securities firms, 
and insurance companies; Represents 90% of the financial sector's 
assets; 
Funding model: Funded by and operated with tiered membership fees; 
Contractor operated; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; Watch desk 
analyzes and categorizes threats, incidents, and warnings based on the 
sector's needs; 
Sharing mechanisms: Text-based alerts, through a notification system, 
backed up by telephone; Biweekly threat intelligence conference call 
with DHS and SAIC.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Chemicals & Hazardous 
Materials; Chemical (est. April 2002); 
Coverage: 538 individual members representing the chemical industries; 
285 businesses; Represents 90% of chemical sector; 
Funding model: Funded and operated by ACC's Chemical Transportation 
Emergency Center; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Currently working to develop an 
analysis center; 
Sharing mechanisms: E-mails alerts and warnings; Chemistry ISAC Web 
site; Biweekly conference calls with DHS; Secure communications network 
with DHS.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Defense Industrial Base; 
None at this time.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Emergency Services; 
Emergency Management & Response (est. Oct. 2000); 
Coverage: 10 FEMA Regions; 6 major stakeholders of EMR sector; 
Represents 100% of the essential components of the EMR Sector; 
Funding model: Funded by FEMA's Office of Cyber Security with 
supplementation from USFA; Contractor operated; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Developing 24x7 operations; Analyzes and 
disseminates actionable intelligence on threats, attacks, 
vulnerabilities, anomalies, and security best practices; 
Sharing mechanisms: Electronic messaging; Telephone and when necessary, 
a secure telephone unit.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Energy; Electric (est. Oct. 
2000); 
Coverage: More then 90% of NERC members are members of the ISAC 
including large and small electric utilities, regional electric utility 
companies, and power marketers; 
Funding model: Funded and managed/ operated by NERC; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; The ES-ISAC and NERC have created 
the Indications, Analysis, and Warnings Program (IAW) that provides a 
set of guidelines for reporting operational and cyber incidents that 
adversely affect the electric power infrastructure; 
Sharing mechanisms: Secure telephone, fax, and Web server; E-mail; 
Satellite telephones; Information such as incident reports and 
warnings, vulnerability assessments, and related documents are posted 
on the public Web site.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Energy; Energy (est. Nov. 
2001); 
Coverage: 80 plus members from the oil and gas sector; Represents 85% 
of the oil and gas sector; 
Funding model: Funded by grants from DOE; Contractor operated; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Analyzes threats, vulnerabilities, 
and incident information; Provides security information and solutions; 
Sharing mechanisms: Conference calls; Fax, Email, pager; Detailed 
information on warnings provided on a membership only, secure Web site.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Food (est. Feb. 2002); 
Coverage: Over 40 food-industry trade associations and their members; 
Funding model: No current funding. Operated by volunteer labor from 
each member association; 
Hazards covered: Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; No analysis capability, due to 
members' privacy concerns. Depends on DHS for analysis; 
Sharing mechanisms: E- mail; Watch Commander List; Currently working to 
develop a secure e- mail system.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Government; State Gov. 
(est. Jan. 2003); 
Coverage: 49 states (excluding Kansas) and the District of Columbia; 
Funding model: Funded and operated by New York State; States provide 
time and resources as appropriate; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical & Natural (as it relates to cyber); 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Issues bulletins, advisories, and 
alerts; 
Sharing mechanisms: Monthly conference calls; E-mail; Telephone.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Information Technology & 
Telecommunications; (est. Dec. 2000); 
Coverage: 90% of all desktop operating systems; 85% of all databases; 
50% of all desktop computers; 85% of all routers; 65% of software 
security; 
Funding model: Funded and operated by foundational member 
contributions, will soon implement membership fees (tiered); Contractor 
operated; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Analyzes cyber alerts and 
advisories and reports physical issues; 
Sharing mechanisms: CWIN; Encrypted e-mail; SSL-protected Web sites; 
Cellular phones; VoIP telephony; GETS system for priority calls.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Information Technology & 
Telecommunications; Telecom (est. Jan. 2000); 
Coverage: 95% of wireline providers; Over 60% of wireline vendors; 95% 
of wireless providers; 90% of wireless vendors; 42% of Internet Service 
subscribers; 90% of Internet Service networks; 6 of the top system 
integrators in the U.S. Federal IT market; 15% of Domain Name Service 
root and global Top Level Domain operators; 
Funding model: Funded by NCS; Operated by NCC; Agencies bear the costs 
of their own personnel; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; Natural; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Analyzes data to avoid crises that 
could affect the entire telecom infrastructure; 
Sharing mechanisms: E-mail; Telephone; Fax; Meetings; CWIN.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Information Technology & 
Telecommunications; Research & Education Networking (est. Feb. 2003); 
Coverage: 200 Universities; All U.S. universities and colleges that are 
connected to national R&E networks have basic membership; 
Funding model: Funded and operated by Indiana University; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Receives and disseminates 
information regarding network security vulnerabilities and threats in 
the higher education community; 
Sharing mechanisms: Public information restricted to aggregate views of 
the network; Information identifying institutions or individuals not 
reported publicly; Detailed and sensitive information shared only with 
affected institutions.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Postal & Shipping; None at 
this time.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Public Health & Healthcare; 
HealthCare; None at this time.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Transportation; Public 
Transit (est. Jan. 2003); 
Coverage: Approximately 100 of the major national transit 
organizations; 
Funding model: Federally funded; Contractor operated; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operations 24x7; Collects, analyzes, and 
disseminates security information; 
Sharing mechanisms: E-mail tree; Secure e-mail; Public Transit Web 
site; Links to HSOC, and DOT and TSA's Operation Centers.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Transportation; Surface 
Transportation (est. May 2002); 
Coverage: Includes the major North American freight railroads and 
Amtrak; Represents 95% of the U.S. freight railroad industry and 
Amtrak; 
Funding model: Funded by membership fees and a grant from the Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA); Contractor operated; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical Natural; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Conducts mid-to long-term technical 
analysis on all threats; 
Sharing mechanisms: Surface Transportation Web site; Secure telephone.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Transportation; Highway 
(est. March 2003); 
Coverage: Over 90% of the largest for-hire motor carriers; Represents 
60% economic activity with over 50% of long haul; 
Funding model: Funded and operated by the American Trucking Association 
(ATA); 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Developing 24x7 operations; Channels warnings, 
threat information, and advisories to the industry and to drivers 
through its call center; 
Sharing mechanisms: Highway ISAC Web site; Highway watch center; Blast 
fax; E- mail; Print media communications; Amber alerts.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Drinking Water & Water 
Treatment Systems; Water (est. Dec. 2002); 
Coverage: 275-300 small and large water utilities; Represents 45% of 
water utilities with secure portals; Represents 85% of the water 
utilities that receive e-mail alerts; 
Funding model: Funded by tired membership fees and a grant from EPA; 
Contractor operated; Receives contributions from AMWA; 
Hazards covered: Cyber; Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Analyzes threat and incident 
information for its potential impact on the sector; 
Sharing mechanisms: Encrypted e-mail; Secure portal; Secure electronic 
bulletin boards and chat rooms.

Critical Infrastructures and their ISAC(s): Other Sectors That Have 
Established ISACs;   Real Estate (est. April 2003); 
Coverage: 10 trade associations representing hotels, realtors, shopping 
centers, and others; 
Funding model: Funded by trade associations; Contractor operated; 
Hazards covered: Physical; 
Analysis capability: Operates 24x7; Depends on DHS for threat 
analysis; 
Sharing mechanisms: 2-way communications network and Web site; 
Conference calls with top executives from various sectors as needed. 

[End of table]

Sector Coordinator Roles Differ:

As discussed earlier, federal CIP policy establishes the position of 
sector coordinator for identified critical infrastructure sectors to 
initiate and build cooperative relationships across an entire 
infrastructure sector. In most cases, sector coordinators have played 
an important role in the development of their respective infrastructure 
sectors' ISACs. In many cases the sector coordinator also manages or 
operates the ISAC.

* The North American Electric Reliability Council, as sector 
coordinator for the electricity segment of the energy sector, operates 
the Electricity Sector ISAC.

* The Association of American Railroads, as a sector coordinator for 
the transportation sector, manages the Surface Transportation ISAC.

* The Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, as the sector 
coordinator for the water and wastewater sector, manages the Water 
ISAC.

In addition, regarding the telecommunications ISAC, sector coordinators 
participate as members of the ISAC. For example, the Cellular 
Telecommunications and Internet Association, the United States Telecom 
Association, and the Telecommunications Industry Association are all 
members of the NCC, which operates the telecommunications ISAC. In the 
case of the Financial Services ISAC, no formal relationship exists 
between the Banking and Finance Sector Coordinator, the Financial 
Services Sector Coordinating Council, and the ISAC; however, according 
to Financial Services ISAC officials, there is a good relationship 
between them.

Other ISACs were created and are operated without a formal sector 
coordinator in place, including the Chemical, Emergency Management and 
Response, and Food ISACs.

Council Established to Improve ISACs' Efficiency and Effectiveness:

Eleven ISACs created an ISAC Council to work on various operational, 
process, and other common issues to effectively analyze and disseminate 
information and, where possible, to leverage the work of the entire 
ISAC community. The ISACs initiated this effort without federal 
sponsorship. Currently, the participating ISACs include Chemical, 
Electricity, Energy, Financial Services, Information Technology, 
Public Transit, Surface Transportation, Telecommunications, Highway, 
and Water. In addition, the Multi-state and Research and Education 
Networking ISACs are participants.

In February 2004, the council issued eight white papers to reflect the 
collective analysis of its members and to cover a broad set of issues 
and challenges, including:

* Government/Private-Sector Relations. Explains the need for DHS to 
clarify its expectations and to develop roles and responsibilities for 
the ISACs.

* HSPD-7 Issues and Metrics. Describes specific issues related to the 
private sector that DHS should address when responding to HSPD-7.

* Information Sharing and Analysis. Identifies future goals that the 
ISACs may want to work on achieving, including developing an 
implementation plan.

* Integration of ISACs into Exercises. Discusses the importance of the 
ISACs and the private infrastructure sectors being involved in 
government exercises that demonstrate responses to possible incidents.

* ISAC Analytical Efforts. Describes the various levels of capabilities 
that individual ISACs may want to consider supporting, including cyber 
and physical analysis.

* Policy and Framework for the ISAC Community. Identifies common policy 
areas that need to be addressed to provide effective, efficient, and 
scalable information sharing among ISACs and between ISACs and the 
federal government.

* Reach of Major ISACs. Describes and identifies the degree of outreach 
that the ISACs have achieved into the U.S. economy. As of September 
2003, the ISAC Council estimated that the ISACs had reached 
approximately 65 percent of the critical infrastructures they 
represent.

* Vetting and Trust. Discusses the processes for sharing information 
and the need to develop trust relationships among individual ISAC 
members and among the various ISACs.

Federal Efforts to Establish Cooperation and Interaction with the ISACs 
Continue:

As outlined in HSPD-7 and presented in table 1, DHS and other federal 
agencies are designated as sector-specific agencies for the critical 
infrastructure sectors identified. In addition, DHS is responsible for 
coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of 
the critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States and 
has established organizational structures to address its CIP and 
information-sharing responsibilities. DHS and the sector-specific 
agencies have undertaken a number of efforts to address the public/
private partnership that is called for by federal CIP policy, and they 
continue to work on their cooperation and interaction with the ISACs 
and with each other.

DHS Actions to Improve Information-Sharing Relationships:

The functions DHS provides to each ISAC differ, and its coordination 
and levels of participation vary for each sector-specific agency. 
However, the department has undertaken a number of efforts with the 
ISACs and sector-specific agencies to implement the public/private 
partnership called for by federal CIP policy.

DHS has established functions within the department to support the 
ISACs and other CIP efforts. IAIP, as the DHS component directly 
responsible for CIP activities, carries out many of these functions. 
The Infrastructure Coordination Division within IAIP plays a key role 
in coordinating with the ISACs concerning information sharing. 
Nonetheless, ISACs may interact with multiple components of the 
department. For example, the ISACs may discuss cyber issues with the 
National Cyber Security Division. According to a DHS official, the 
department does not intend to establish a single point of contact for 
ISACs within the department. Rather, the department plans to develop 
policies and procedures to ensure effective coordination and sharing of 
ISAC contact information among the appropriate DHS components. In 
addition, the Infrastructure Coordination Division is in the process of 
staffing analysts who are responsible for working with each critical 
infrastructure sector. The analysts would serve as the primary point of 
contact for the sectors and would address information sharing, 
coordination, information protection, and other issues raised by the 
sectors.

Further, according to DHS officials, TSA, within the department's 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate, is working with 
organizations in the private sector to establish information-sharing 
relationships. For example, Surface Transportation ISAC analysts stated 
that they have a good working relationship with TSA, and TSA's 
Operations Center has office space designated for them.

In addition, other DHS actions include the following:

* Last summer, DHS, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 
Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) initiated efforts to organize the agriculture and 
food critical infrastructure sectors to raise awareness and improve 
security efforts. An introductory conference was held with about 100 
leading sector corporations and associations to make the business case 
for participating in CIP efforts, including the importance of enhancing 
security and sharing information within the sectors.

* In December, DHS hosted a 2-day CIP retreat with ISAC 
representatives, sector coordinators, and high-level DHS and White 
House Homeland Security Council officials. Participants discussed the 
needs, roles, and responsibilities of public-and private-sector 
entities related to information sharing and analysis, incident 
coordination and response activities, critical infrastructure 
information requests, and level of DHS funding. During this retreat, 
DHS participated in the first meeting of the Operational Clarity and 
Improvement Task Group, which was formed by the ISAC Council and sector 
coordinators to address the need for a common conceptual framework and 
to clarify current and future efforts to protect the nation's critical 
infrastructure.

* In January, DHS's IAIP Directorate held a 2-day conference to 
describe the information it is analyzing and the use of that 
information in the partnership with the private sector to discuss 
information sharing between the federal government and the private 
sector.

* In February, the department established the Protected Critical 
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program, which enables the private 
sector to voluntarily submit infrastructure information to the 
government. DHS's IAIP Directorate is responsible for receiving 
submissions, determining if the information qualifies for protection 
and, if it is validated, sharing it with authorized entities for use as 
specified in the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002.

In addition to the efforts listed above, DHS officials stated that they 
provide funding to some of the ISACs. For example, DHS has agreed to 
fund tabletop exercises for the Financial Services, Telecommunications, 
and Electricity Sector ISACs. DHS anticipates that the tabletop 
exercises will be completed by August 2004. Also, DHS expects to fund a 
cross-sector tabletop exercise. According to the Financial Services 
ISAC, funding for their tabletop exercise is $250,000.

Another effort that DHS has undertaken is to maintain regular contact 
with the ISACs. For example, a DHS analyst specializing in the chemical 
sector stated that the Chemical ISAC is in daily contact with DHS and 
that it participates in DHS-sponsored biweekly threat meetings. The 
department also conducts weekly conference calls with several ISACs, 
other DHS components, and private-sector organizations to discuss 
threats and viruses.

Sector-Specific Agencies Have Taken Action to Assist the ISACs:

HSPD-7 designates federal departments and agencies to be sector-
specific agencies. These federal agencies, among other things, are to 
collaborate with the private sector and continue to encourage the 
development of information-sharing and analysis mechanisms. In 
addition, sector-specific agencies are to facilitate the sharing of 
information about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, 
incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices. Another 
directive, HSPD-9, establishes a national policy to defend the 
agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies. Some sector-specific agencies have taken steps 
to help the ISACs to increase their memberships and breadth of impact 
within their respective sectors and to improve their analytical and 
communications capabilities.

* Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As noted earlier, EPA is the 
sector-specific agency for the water sector. According to EPA 
officials, its Office of Water (Water Security Division), which has 
been designated as the lead for drinking water and wastewater CIP 
efforts, is currently revising EPA's Office of Homeland Security's 
Strategic Plan. In addition, the division is working on a General 
Strategic Plan, to identify measurable goals and objectives and 
determine how the division will accomplish that work. Further, these 
officials stated that for fiscal year 2004, EPA issued a $2 million 
grant to the Water ISAC to enhance its capabilities, for example, to 
fund 24x7 operations and to increase and support ISAC membership. They 
also stated that EPA issued $50 million in grants to assist the largest 
drinking water utilities in conducting vulnerability assessments. There 
are also state grants to build communications networks for 
disseminating information, particularly to smaller utility companies. 
EPA's Water Security Division also makes publicly available various 
resources related to water security including, among other things, 
emergency response guidelines, risk assessment and vulnerability 
assessment methodologies, and a security product guide. The division 
has also developed a "Vulnerability Assessment Factsheet" that gives 
utility companies additional guidance on vulnerability assessments. 
Moreover, the Water Security Division holds biweekly conference calls 
with water associations to promote communications between EPA and the 
private sector, and it provides EPA publications and other information 
to the Water ISAC through e-mail distribution lists. In addition, the 
division has 10 regional offices that work with the states.

* Department of the Treasury (Treasury). As the sector-specific agency 
for the Banking and Finance sector, Treasury's Office of CIP and 
Compliance Policy is responsible for CIP-related efforts. It has 
developed policy for its role as a sector-specific agency. The policy 
includes steps to identify vulnerabilities with the assistance of the 
institutions, identify actions for remediation, and evaluate progress 
in reducing vulnerabilities. A major effort by Treasury was having 
consultants work with the Financial Services ISAC's board of directors 
to evaluate ways to improve the overall reach and operations of the 
ISAC. According to Treasury officials, this effort, in part, led to a 
$2 million grant from Treasury to the ISAC for developing the "next 
generation" Financial Services ISAC. The one-time grant was earmarked 
for enhancing the ISAC's capabilities. Regarding interaction with the 
Financial Services ISAC, Treasury informally shares high-level threat 
and incident information with the sector through the ISAC. The 
department also chairs the Financial and Banking Information 
Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC), a group of regulators who coordinate 
regulatory efforts to improve the reliability and security of financial 
systems. This group has done a number of things to raise awareness and 
improve the reliability of the institutions. For example, under the 
sponsorship of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, there are 
regional outreach briefings that address why the private sector needs 
to partner with the federal government to improve its security. 
Moreover, FBIIC has sponsored the 3,600 priority telecommunications 
circuits for financial institutions under the National Communications 
System's Telecommunications Service Priority and Government Emergency 
Telecommunications Service programs.

* Department of Energy (DOE). As the sector-specific agency for the 
Energy and Electricity sectors, DOE's Office of Energy Assurance is 
responsible for fulfilling the roles of critical infrastructure 
identification, prioritization, and protection for the energy sector, 
which includes the production, refining, and distribution of oil and 
gas, and electric power--except for commercial nuclear power 
facilities. However, DOE does not address situational threats such as 
natural disasters or power outages with its ISACs because, in part, the 
ISACs are determining whether it is their role to address these types 
of threats. Information sharing with the ISACs is an informal process, 
and no written policy exists. For example, DOE is collecting threat 
information related to hackers and computer security, but the 
department is not disseminating it to the ISACs or to private industry. 
The Office of Energy Assurance hopes to clarify and expand on this 
subject in its International Program Plan, which is currently in draft 
form.

* Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). As mentioned earlier, 
HHS is the sector-specific agency for the public health and healthcare 
sector, and it shares that role with USDA for the food sector. 
Currently, there is no ISAC for the healthcare sector. Efforts to 
organize the healthcare sector have been ongoing. In July 2002, HHS 
officials and other government and industry participants were invited 
to the White House conference center to discuss how they wanted to 
organize the sector. A Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC) 
was formed, and HHS requested that MITRE, its contractor, lend 
technical support to the new group as it continues to organize the 
sector and establish an ISAC. In addition, HHS officials stated that 
the department provided $500,000 for ISAC efforts in fiscal year 2003 
and budgeted $1 million for fiscal year 2004. HHS officials stated that 
the department would likely be agreeable to continuing to provide 
funding for an ISAC. They also stated that an ISAC could be operational 
within the next year. In the meantime, HHS is sharing information with 
the industry through an e-Community group that MITRE has set up on a 
secure Web site.

Agriculture and Food were only recently designated as critical 
infrastructure sectors and, as with the healthcare sector, efforts to 
organize the sectors are in the beginning stages. HHS has worked with 
the Food Marketing Institute-operated Food ISAC since it was 
established, but the department has focused more of its efforts on 
organizing the agriculture and food sectors. As we mentioned earlier, 
HHS helped initiate efforts to organize the sector by holding an 
introductory conference last summer for about 100 leading sector 
corporations and associations to make the business case for 
participating in CIP efforts. Recently, the department cohosted a 
meeting with DHS and USDA in which industry participants were asked how 
they wished to organize into an infrastructure sector, including 
addressing the existence and expansion of the current Food ISAC. As a 
result of this meeting, participants agreed to establish a council of 
about 10-15 private-sector food and agriculture organizations to 
represent the sector. A federal government council will be created to 
interact with the private sector and with state and local governments. 
The government council will initially include several federal 
government agencies and state and local entities. According to HHS 
officials, the timeframe for organizing the sector and setting up an 
expanded Food ISAC has not been determined, but officials anticipated 
this occurring by fall of 2004.

* Department of Agriculture (USDA). As mentioned above, USDA shares 
with HHS the sector-specific agency designation for the food sector. 
USDA participated in a conference held last summer and a recent meeting 
with the industry. In addition to those events, USDA's Homeland 
Security Council Working Group is involved in enhancing the agriculture 
sector's information-sharing and analysis efforts, which may include 
replacing or improving the current Food ISAC. Another USDA effort uses 
training to reach out to the industry and raise awareness. For example, 
USDA is providing training to private-sector veterinarians and animal 
hospitals on recognizing possible signs of bioterrorism activity.

Although no longer a sector-specific agency for the transportation 
sector, DOT, through its Federal Transit Administration, has provided a 
grant to the Public Transportation ISAC to provide for memberships at 
no cost.

Challenges to ISAC Establishment and Partnership with the Federal 
Government:

Our discussions with the ISACs and the series of ISAC Council white 
papers confirmed that a number of challenges remain to the successful 
establishment and operation of ISACs and their partnership with DHS and 
other federal agencies. Highlighted below are some of the more 
significant challenges identified, along with any successful ISAC 
practices and related actions that have been taken or planned by DHS or 
others.

Increasing Sector Participation and Reach:

Many of the ISACs report that they represent significant percentages of 
their industry sectors; at least one--the Electricity ISAC--reports 
participation approaching 100 percent. The ISAC Council estimates that 
the overall ISAC community possess an outreach and connectivity 
capability to reach approximately 65 percent of the private critical 
infrastructure. The Council also recognizes the challenge of increasing 
sector participation, particularly to reach smaller entities that need 
security support, but have insufficient resources to actively 
contribute and pay for such support. Officials in DHS's IAIP 
acknowledge the importance of reaching out to critical infrastructure 
entities, and are considering alternatives to address this issue.

The Financial Services ISAC provides a notable example of efforts to 
respond to this challenge. Specifically, officials for this 
organization reported that, as of March 2003, its members represented a 
large portion of the sector's assets, but only 0.2 percent of the 
number of entities with small financial services firms and insurance 
companies, in particular, were underrepresented. To increase its 
industry membership, this organization established its next generation 
ISAC, which provides different levels of service--ranging from a free 
level of basic service to fees for value-added services--to help ensure 
that no entity is excluded because of cost. Further, it has set goals 
of delivering urgent and crisis alerts to 80 percent of the Banking and 
Finance sector by the end of 2004 and to 99 percent of the sector by 
the end of 2005. To help achieve these goals, the Financial Services 
ISAC has several other initiatives under way, including obtaining the 
commitment of the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council 
(FSSCC--the sector coordinator and primary marketing arm for this ISAC) 
to drive the marketing campaign to sign up its members for the 
appropriate tier of service; encourage membership through outreach 
programs sponsored by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the 
FSSCC in 24 cities; and to work with individual sector regulators to 
include in their audit checklists whether a firm is a member of the 
ISAC. The Financial Services ISAC believes that its goals are 
attainable and points to its industry coverage, which it says had 
already increased to 30 percent in March 2004--only three months after 
its new membership approach began in December 2003.

Other issues identified that were related to increasing sector 
participation and reach included the following,

* Officials at two of the ISACs we contacted considered it important 
that the federal government voice its support for the ISACs as the 
principal tool for communicating threats.

* The ISAC Council has suggested that a General Business ISAC may need 
to be established to provide baseline security information to those 
general businesses that are not currently supported by an ISAC.

* Many of the industries that comprise our nation's critical 
infrastructures are international in scope. Events that happen to a 
private infrastructure or public sector organization in another country 
can have a direct effect in the United States, just as events here 
could have effects in other countries. Therefore, an ISAC may need to 
increase its reach to include the reporting and trust of international 
companies and organizations.

Building Trusted Relationships:

A key element in both establishing an ISAC and developing an effective 
public/private partnership for CIP is to build trusted relationships 
and processes. From the ISAC perspective, sharing information requires 
a trusted relationship between the ISAC and its membership, such that 
companies and organizations know their sensitive data is protected from 
others, including competitors and regulatory agencies. According to the 
ISAC Council, the ISACs believe that they provide a trusted 
information-sharing and analysis mechanism for private industry in that 
they manage, scrutinize, establish, and authenticate the identity and 
ensure the security of their membership, as well as ensuring the 
security of their own data and processes. Other steps taken by ISACs to 
safeguard private companies' information, which may help to foster 
trusted relationships, included sharing information with other entities 
only when given permission to do so by the reporting entity and 
providing other protections, such as distributing sensitive information 
to subscribers through encrypted e-mail and a secure Web portal.

Building trusted relationships between government agencies and the 
ISACs is also important to facilitating information sharing. In some 
cases, establishing such relationships may be difficult because sector-
specific agencies may also have a regulatory role; for example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency has such a role for the Water sector 
and HHS' Food and Drug Administration has it for portions of the Food 
and Agriculture sectors.

Information Sharing Between the Private Sector and Government:

Sharing information between the federal government and the private 
sector on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities continues to be a 
challenge. As we reported last year, much of the reluctance by ISACs to 
share information has focused on concerns over potential government 
release of that information under the Freedom of Information Act, 
antitrust issues resulting from information sharing within an industry, 
and liability for the entity that discloses the information.[Footnote 
7] However, our recent discussions with the ISACs--as well as the 
consensus of the ISAC Council--identified additional factors that may 
affect information sharing by both the ISACs and the government.

The ISACs we contacted all described efforts to work with their sector-
specific agencies, as well as with other federal agencies, ISACs, and 
organizations. For example, the Public Transit ISAC said that it 
provides a critical link between the transit industry, DOT, TSA, DHS, 
and other ISACs for critical infrastructures and that it collects, 
analyzes, and distributes cyber and physical threat information from a 
variety of sources, including law enforcement, government operations 
centers, the intelligence community, the U.S. military, academia, IT 
vendors, the International Computer Emergency Response Community, and 
others. Most ISACs reported that they believed they were providing 
appropriate information to the government but, while noting 
improvements, still had concerns with the information being provided to 
them by DHS and/or their sector-specific agencies. These concerns 
included the limited quantity of information and the need for more 
specific, timely, and actionable information. In particular, one ISAC 
noted that it receives information from DHS simultaneously with or even 
after news reports, and that sometimes the news reports provide more 
details.

In its recent white papers, the ISAC Council also has identified a 
number of barriers to information sharing between the private sector 
and government. These included the sensitivity of the information (such 
as law enforcement information), legal limits on disclosure (such as 
Privacy Act limitations on disclosure of personally identifiable 
information), and contractual and business limits on how and when 
information is disclosed (e.g., the Financial Services ISAC does not 
allow any governmental or law enforcement access to its database). But 
the Council also emphasized that perhaps the greatest barriers to 
information sharing stem from practical and business considerations in 
that, although important, the benefits of sharing information are often 
difficult to discern, while the risks and costs of sharing are direct 
and foreseeable. Thus, to make information sharing real, it is 
essential to lower the practical risks of sharing information through 
both technical means and policies, and to develop internal systems that 
are capable of supporting operational requirements without interfering 
with core business. Consequently, the technical means used must be 
simple, inexpensive, secure, and easily built into business processes.

According to the Council, the policy framework must reduce perceived 
risks and build trust among participants. Further, the Council 
identified three general areas that must be addressed in policy for the 
information-sharing network to assure network participants that there 
is good reason to participate and that their information will be dealt 
with appropriately. These areas concern policies related to what 
information is shared within ISACs, across ISACs, and to and from 
government; actions to be performed at each node in the information-
sharing network, including the kinds of analysis to be performed; and 
the protection of shared information and analysis in terms of both 
limitations on disclosure and use and information security controls.

The white papers also described the processes that are believed to be 
needed to ensure that critical infrastructure and/or security 
information is made available to the appropriate people with reasonable 
assurance that it cannot be used for malicious purposes or 
indiscriminately redistributed so as to become essentially public 
information. These processes and other information-sharing 
considerations and tasks identified by the Council included the 
following:

* The ISAC information-sharing process needs to recognize two types of 
information categories--classified and sensitive but unclassified. 
However, the majority of information sharing must focus on the 
unclassified "actionable element" that points the recipient to a 
problem and to remediation action.

* Each ISAC is responsible for initially validating the trust 
relationship with its member organizations and for periodically 
reassessing that trust relationship. The security structure must 
understand and continually be in dialogue with its vetted members and 
must manage this trusted relationship.

* Each individual who receives shared information must have a 
background check completed by and at a level of comprehensiveness 
specified by the sponsoring organization.

* Consequences and remediation must be developed and understood to 
address situations in which information is disclosed improperly--either 
intentionally or unintentionally.

* The government's data and information requirements for the sectors 
and the sectors' requirements for the government need to be defined.

* The government should establish a standing and formal trusted 
information-sharing and analysis process with the ISACs and sector 
coordinators as the trusted nodes for this dissemination. This body 
should be brought in at the beginning of any effort, and DHS products 
should be released to this group for primary and priority dissemination 
to their respective sectors.

Building this trusted information-sharing and analysis process is also 
dependent on the protections the government provides for the sensitive 
data shared by ISACs and private companies. As discussed earlier, DHS 
recently issued the interim rule for submitting protected critical 
infrastructure information, which provides restrictions on the use of 
this information and exempts it from release under the Freedom of 
Information Act. However, it remains to be seen whether these 
protections will encourage greater private-sector trust and information 
sharing with the federal government.

Identifying Roles and Responsibilities:

Federal CIP law and policies, including the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and HSPD-7, establish 
CIP responsibilities for federal agencies, including DHS and others 
identified as sector-specific agencies for the critical infrastructure 
sectors. However, the ISACs believe that the roles of the various 
government and private-sector entities involved in protecting critical 
infrastructures must continue to be identified and defined. In 
particular, officials for several ISACs wanted a better definition of 
the role of DHS with respect to them. Further, officials for two ISACs 
thought other agencies might more appropriately be their sector-
specific agencies. Specifically, the Energy ISAC would like its sector-
specific agency to be DHS and not the Department of Energy, which is 
also the regulatory agency for this sector. On the other hand, the 
Highway ISAC thought its sector-specific agency should be the 
Department of Transportation--the regulatory agency for its sector--and 
not DHS.

The ISAC Council also identified the need for DHS to establish the 
goals of its directorates and the relationships of these directorates 
with the private sector. The Council also wants clarification of the 
roles of other federal agencies, state agencies, and other entities--
such as the National Infrastructure Advisory Council.

Obtaining Government Funding:

Ten of the ISACs we contacted, plus the Healthcare sector, emphasized 
the importance of government funding for purposes including creating 
the ISAC, supporting operations, increasing membership, developing 
metrics, and providing for additional capabilities. According to ISAC 
officials, some have already received federal funding: the Public 
Transit ISAC initially received a $1.2 million grant from the Federal 
Transit Administration to begin operations, and the Water ISAC received 
a $2 million grant from EPA for fiscal year 2004 to cover annual 
operating costs and expand memberships to smaller utilities. In 
addition, the Financial Services ISAC received $2 million from the 
Department of the Treasury to help establish its next-generation ISAC 
and its new capabilities, including adding information about physical 
threats to the cyber threat information it disseminates.

Despite such instances, funding continues to be an issue, even for 
those that have already received government funds. For example, the 
Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council, which is the sector coordinator 
for the healthcare industry, is currently looking to the federal 
government to help fund the creation of a Healthcare ISAC. Also, 
officials at the Public Transit ISAC noted that funding is an ongoing 
issue that is being pursued with DHS. Officials at the Financial 
Services ISAC, who notes that the ISAC's goal is to become totally 
self-funded through membership fees by 2005, are also seeking 
additional government funding for other projects.

The ISAC Council has also suggested that baseline funding is needed to 
support core ISAC functionalities and analytical efforts within each 
sector. The Council's suggestions include that the government should 
procure a bulk license for the ISACs to receive data directly from some 
vulnerability and threat sources and access to analytical or modeling 
tools and that the funding for an ISAC analyst to work at DHS to 
support analysis of sector-specific information or intelligence 
requirements.

According to the Financial Services ISAC, DHS has agreed to fund 
tabletop exercises for some ISACs. For example, according to DHS 
officials, exercises are occurring this week involving the Banking and 
Finance sector and exercises for other sectors are currently being 
explored. In addition, energy sector-related exercises were held 
earlier in the year. DHS officials also stated that funding 
considerations for the critical infrastructure sectors and the ISACs 
would be based on their needs.

Utilizing Sector Expertise:

In our discussions with ISAC officials, several, such as officials from 
the Surface Transportation and the Telecommunications ISACs, 
highlighted their analysis capabilities and, in particular, their 
analysts' sector-specific knowledge and expertise and ability to work 
with DHS and other federal agencies. The ISAC Council also emphasized 
that analysis by sector-specific, subject matter experts is a critical 
capability for the ISACs, intended to help identify and categorize 
threats and vulnerabilities and then identify emerging trends before 
they can affect critical infrastructures. Sector-specific analysis can 
add critical value to the information being disseminated, with products 
such as 24/7 immediate, sector-specific, physical, cyber, all threat 
and incident report warning; sector-specific information and 
intelligence requirements; forecasts of and mitigation strategies for 
emerging threats; and cross-sector interdependencies, vulnerabilities, 
and threats.

The Council also emphasized that although government analytical efforts 
are critical, private-sector analytical efforts should not be 
overlooked and must be integrated into the federal processes for a more 
complete understanding. The private sector understands its processes, 
assets, and operations best and can be relied upon to provide the 
required private-sector subject matter expertise.

In a few cases, the integration of private-sector analytical 
capabilities with DHS does occur. For example, the Telecommunications 
ISAC, as part of DHS's National Communication System, has watch 
standers that are part of the DHS operations center and share 
information, when the information owner allows it and when it is 
appropriate and relevant, with the other analysts. In addition, a 
Surface Transportation ISAC analyst also participates in the DHS 
operations center on a part-time basis to offer expertise and 
connection to experts in the field in order to clarify the impact of 
possible threats.

Participation in National Homeland Security Exercises:

The ISAC Council highlighted the need for ISAC participation in the 
national-level homeland security exercises that are conducted by the 
federal government, such as DHS's May 2003 national terrorism exercise 
(TOPOFF 2), which was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the 
nation's domestic incident management capability. However, according to 
the Council, there has been little or no integration of active private 
industry and infrastructure into such exercises. For example, private 
industry participation in TOPOFF 2 was simulated. The Council believes 
that with such participation, both national and private-sector goals 
could be established during the creation of the exercise and then 
addressed during the exercise.

The Council did identify examples where the private sector is being 
included in exercises, such as efforts by the Electronics Crime Unit of 
the U.S. Secret Service to reach out to the private sector and support 
tabletop exercises to address the security of private infrastructures. 
Further, according to a DHS official, the department has agreed to fund 
tabletop exercises for members of several ISACs, including Financial 
Services, Chemical, and Electricity, as well as a cross-sector tabletop 
exercise.

Additional Challenges:

Additional challenges identified by our work and/or emphasized by the 
ISAC Council included the following.

* Obtaining Security Clearances to Share Classified Information. As we 
reported last year, several ISACs identified obtaining security 
clearances as a challenge to government information sharing with the 
ISACs. Seven of the 15 ISACs with which we discussed this issue 
indicated either that some of their security clearances were pending or 
that additional clearances would be needed.

* Identifying Sector Interdependencies. Federal CIP policy has 
emphasized the need to identify and understand interdependencies 
between infrastructure sectors. The ISAC Council also highlighted the 
importance of identifying interdependencies and emphasized that they 
require partnerships between the sectors and the government and could 
only be modeled, simulated, or "practiced" once the individual sectors' 
dynamics are understood sufficiently. The current short-term focus for 
the ISACs is to review the work done by the government and the sectors 
regarding interdependencies. Similarly, a DHS official acknowledged the 
importance of identifying interdependencies, but that it is a longer-
term issue.

* Establishing Communications Networks. Another issue raised through 
the ISAC Council's white papers was the need for a government-provided 
communications network for secure information sharing and analysis. 
Specifically, the Council suggested that although functionality would 
be needed to satisfy the ISAC s' requirements, DHS's Critical 
Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CWIN) could be used as an 
interim, first-phase communications capability. According to the 
Council, some of the ISACs are conducting routine communications checks 
at the analytical level in anticipation of expanded use of CWIN. In 
discussing this issue with a DHS official, he said that ISAC access to 
a secure communications network would be provided as part of the 
planned Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN). DHS recently announced a 
contract to initiate the implementation of HSDN, which is be a private, 
certified, and accredited network that provides DHS officials with a 
modern IT infrastructure for securely communicating classified 
information. According to DHS, this network will be designed to be 
scalable in order to respond to increasing demands for the secure 
transmission of classified information among government, industry, and 
academia to help defend against terrorist attacks.

DHS Information-Sharing Plan:

At the time of our study, the relationship and interaction among DHS, 
the ISACs, sector coordinators, and other sector-specific agencies was 
still evolving, and DHS had not yet developed any documented policies 
or procedures. As we discussed earlier, HSPD-7 requires the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to establish uniform policies for integrating 
federal infrastructure protection and risk management activities within 
and across sectors. According to a DHS official, the department is 
developing a plan (referred to as a "roadmap") that documents the 
current information-sharing relationships among DHS, the ISACs, and 
other agencies; goals for improving that information-sharing 
relationship; and methods for measuring the progress in the 
improvement. According to this official, the plan is to define the 
roles and responsibilities of DHS, the ISACs, and other entities, 
including a potential overlap of ISAC-related responsibilities between 
IAIP and the Transportation Security Administration. Further, the 
official indicated that, in developing the plan, DHS would consider 
issues raised by the ISAC Council.

In summary, since first encouraged by federal CIP policy almost 6 years 
ago, private-sector ISACs have developed and evolved into an important 
facet of our nation's efforts to protect its critical infrastructures. 
They face challenges in increasing their sector representation and, for 
some, ensuring their long-term viability. But they have developed 
important trust relationships with and between their sectors--trust 
relationships that the federal government could take advantage of to 
help establish a strong public/private partnership. Federal agencies 
have provided assistance to help establish the ISACs, and more may be 
needed. However, at this time, the ISACs and other stakeholders, 
including sector-specific agencies and sector coordinators, would 
benefit from an overall strategy, as well as specific guidance, that 
clearly described their roles, responsibilities, relationships, and 
expectations. DHS is beginning to develop a strategy, and in doing so, 
it will be important to consider input from all stakeholders to help 
ensure that a comprehensive and trusted information-sharing process is 
established.

Messrs. Chairmen, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to 
answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittees may have 
at this time.

If you should have any questions about this testimony, please contact 
me at (202) 512-3317 or Ben Ritt, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-
6443. We can also be reached by e-mail at daceyr@gao.gov and 
rittw@gao.gov, respectively.

Other individuals making key contributions to this testimony included 
William Cook, Joanne Fiorino, Michael Gilmore, Barbarol James, Lori 
Martinez, and Kevin Secrest.


FOOTNOTES

[1] The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003); The National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003); and Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 
and Protection (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003). 

[2] The National Cyberspace Security Response System is a public/
private architecture, coordinated by the Department of Homeland 
Security, for analyzing and warning; managing incidents of national 
significance; promoting continuity in government systems and private-
sector infrastructures; and increasing information sharing across and 
between organizations to improve cyberspace security. It includes 
governmental entities and nongovernmental entities, such as private-
sector ISACs. 

[3] The American Chemistry Council represents the leading companies 
engaged in the business of chemistry. CHEMTREC® (Chemical 
Transportation Emergency Center) is the American Chemistry Council's 
24-hour emergency communications center. It was established in 1971 to 
provide emergency responders technical assistance in safely mitigating 
a distribution incident. 

[4] The North American Electric Reliability Council's (NERC) membership 
includes small and large electric utilities, regional utility 
companies, power marketers, and other entities responsible for power 
generation, transmission, control, and marketing and distribution in 
the United States, Canada, and a portion of Mexico.

[5] The National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications is open to 
companies that provide telecommunications or network services, 
equipment, or software to the communications and information sector; 
select, competitive local exchange carriers; Internet service 
providers; vendors; software providers; telecommunications 
professional organizations and associations; or companies with 
participation or presence in the communications and information sector. 
Membership is also allowed for National Coordinating Center member 
federal departments and agencies, and for national security/emergency 
preparedness users.

[6] CWIN provides connectivity and 24x7 alert and notification 
capability to government and industry participants. It is engineered to 
provide a reliable and survivable network capability, and it has no 
logical dependency on the Internet or the Public Switched Network.

[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Efforts of the Financial Services Sector to Address Cyber Threats, 
GAO-03-173 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003); and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for Selected Agencies and 
Industry Sectors, GAO-03-233 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003).