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Testimony:

Before the Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, House of 
Representatives:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:

Thursday, July 10, 2003:

Contract Reform:

DOE's Policies and Practices in Competing Research Laboratory 
Contracts:

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director, Natural Resources and 
Environment:

DOE Laboratory Contracts:

GAO-03-932T:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-932T, testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Energy, Committee on Science, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study:

DOE is the largest civilian-contracting agency in the federal 
government, and relies primarily on contractors to operate its sites 
and carry out its diverse missions. For fiscal year 2003, DOE will 
spend about 90 percent of its total annual budget, or $19.8 billion, 
on contracts, including $9.4 billion to operate 16 of its research 
laboratories (called federally funded research and development 
centers). Since 1990, GAO has identified DOE’s contract management as 
high-risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 1994, DOE 
began reforming its contracting practices to, among other things, 
improve contractor performance and accountability. As part of that 
effort, DOE has at times used competition in awarding contracts to 
manage and operate its research laboratories. In September 2002, GAO 
reported on the status of contract reform efforts in DOE. (Contract 
Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to Ensure 
Initiatives Have Improved Results) [Sep. 2002, GAO-02-798]

This testimony discusses some of the findings in that report. GAO was 
asked to testify on DOE’s rationale for deciding whether to compete a 
laboratory research contract, the extent to which DOE has competed 
these contracts, and the role of competition and other mechanisms in 
improving contractor performance.

What GAO Found:

DOE has competed its research laboratory contracts in three main 
situations—when the contractor operating the laboratory is a for-
profit entity, when mission changes warrant a review of the 
capabilities of other potential contractors, or when the incumbent 
contractor’s performance is unsatisfactory. DOE guidance requires that 
to extend a contract noncompetitively, the department must present a 
convincing case for doing so to the Secretary of Energy. Among other 
things, DOE must certify that competing the contract is not in the 
best interests of the government and must describe the incumbent 
contractor’s past successful performance. 

Of the 16 research laboratory contracts currently in place, DOE has 
competed 6. The remaining 10 contracts have not been competed since 
the contractors began operating the sites--in some cases, since the 
1940s. DOE recently decided to compete 2 of the 10 contracts that had 
never before been competed—contracts to operate the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Argonne West Laboratory, 
located at the Idaho National Laboratory. DOE decided to compete the 
Los Alamos contract because of concerns about the contractor’s 
performance, and to compete the Argonne West contract as part of an 
overall effort to separate the Idaho National Laboratory’s nuclear 
energy research mission from the environmental cleanup mission at the 
Idaho site.

Competing contracts is one of several mechanisms DOE can use to 
address contractor performance problems or strengthen contract 
management. However, just competing a contract does not ensure that 
contractor performance will improve. Other aspects of DOE’s contract 
reform initiative intended to improve contractor performance included 
greater use of fixed-price contracts instead of cost-reimbursement 
contracts and establishing or strengthening performance-based 
incentives in existing contracts. In addition, GAO has reported that 
DOE must (1) effectively oversee its contractors’ activities in 
carrying out projects and (2) use appropriate outcome measures to 
assess overall results and apply lessons learned to continually 
improve its contracting practices. GAO’s recent evaluation of DOE’s 
contract reform efforts indicates that DOE is still working to put 
these management practices and outcome measures in place.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-932T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro 
(202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy's 
(DOE) use of competition and other mechanisms to help ensure effective 
contractor performance in managing and operating its research 
laboratories. DOE is the largest civilian-contracting agency in the 
federal government, relying primarily on contractors to operate its 
sites and carry out its diverse missions. These missions include not 
only conducting research but also maintaining the nuclear weapons 
stockpile, and cleaning up radioactive and hazardous waste. For fiscal 
year 2003, DOE will spend about 90 percent of its total annual budget, 
or $19.8 billion, on contracts, including $9.4 billion to operate 16 of 
its research laboratories.

For over a decade, we, DOE's Office of Inspector General, and others 
have criticized DOE's contracting practices, including its failure to 
hold its contractors accountable for results. DOE's longstanding 
approach had been to develop a broadly defined statement of work, 
provide considerable direction to the contractor, and reimburse 
virtually all costs. This approach placed limited emphasis on cost 
control or accountability for results. Furthermore, poor contractor 
performance led to schedule delays and cost increases on many of the 
department's major projects. Since 1990, such problems have led us to 
designate DOE contract management--defined broadly to include both 
contract administration and management of projects--as a high-risk area 
for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

In 1994, DOE began its contract reform initiative to improve 
contractors' performance. Through this initiative DOE intended, among 
other things, to strengthen contracting practices, hold contractors 
more accountable for their performance, and demonstrate progress in 
achieving the agency's missions. DOE implemented numerous changes, such 
as performance based-contracts with results-oriented measures and a 
greater use of competition in awarding contracts, including contracts 
to manage and operate its research laboratories known as Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC). According to the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation, FFRDCs are entities that engage in 
activities sponsored by a government agency or agencies to conduct or 
manage basic or applied research and development. Contracts to operate 
such facilities differ from other contracts because the government 
contemplates a long-term relationship with the FFRDC contractor and the 
contractor has access to government data, employees, and facilities 
beyond that common in a normal contractual relationship.

My testimony today will discuss (1) DOE's rationale for deciding 
whether to compete a FFRDC contract, (2) the extent to which DOE has 
competed these contracts, and (3) the role of competition and other 
mechanisms in improving contractor performance. Although we have not 
conducted a review solely related to FFRDC contracts, our past work on 
DOE's contract reform initiative, especially our September 2002 
report,[Footnote 1] focused in part on DOE's use of competition as a 
tool to improve contractor performance, including the contractors that 
manage and operate DOE's laboratories. My testimony today is based on 
the findings in that report as well as related information we have 
developed as part of our ongoing oversight of DOE's contracting 
activities.

In summary we found the following:

* DOE has competed its FFRDC contracts in three main situations: when 
the contractor operating the laboratory is a for-profit entity, when 
mission changes warrant a review of the capabilities of other potential 
contractors, or when the incumbent contractor's performance is 
unsatisfactory. DOE guidance on contracting reflects a strong emphasis 
on competition that exists, in part, as a result of its contract reform 
initiative. Statutes and regulations give DOE considerable flexibility 
in deciding whether to compete or noncompetitively extend a FFRDC 
contract. However, for noncompetitive extensions, DOE guidance requires 
the department to present a convincing case to the Secretary. Among 
other things, DOE must certify that competing the contract is not in 
the best interests of the government and must describe the incumbent 
contractor's past successful performance.

* Of the 16 FFRDC contracts in place, DOE has competed 6. It has not 
competed the remaining 10 contracts since the contractors began 
operating the sites--in some cases, since the 1940s. DOE recently 
decided to compete 2 of the 10 contracts that had never before been 
competed--contracts to operate the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 
New Mexico and the Argonne West Laboratory, located at the Idaho 
National Laboratory. DOE decided to compete the (1) Los Alamos contract 
because of concerns about the contractor's performance and (2) Argonne 
West contract as part of an overall effort to separate the Idaho 
National Laboratory's ongoing research mission from the environmental 
cleanup mission at the Idaho site.

* Competing contracts is one of several mechanisms DOE can use to 
address contractor performance problems or strengthen contract 
management. However, just competing a contract does not ensure that 
contractor performance will improve. Other aspects of DOE's contract 
reform initiative intended to improve contractor performance included 
greater use of fixed-price contracts instead of cost-reimbursement 
contracts and establishing or strengthening performance-based 
incentives in existing contracts. In addition, we have reported that 
DOE must (1) effectively oversee its contractors' activities in 
carrying out projects and (2) use appropriate outcome measures to 
assess overall results and apply lessons learned to continually improve 
its contracting practices. Our recent evaluation of DOE's contract 
reform efforts indicates that DOE is still working to put these 
management practices and outcome measures in place.

Background:

DOE has a large complex of sites around the country dedicated to 
supporting its missions: sites that were used to produce or process 
materials and components for nuclear weapons and laboratories that 
conduct research on nuclear weapons, defense issues, basic science, and 
other topics. These sites and laboratories are often located on 
government-owned property and facilities, but are usually operated by 
organizations under contract to DOE, including universities or 
university groups, non-profit organizations, or other commercial 
entities.

DOE contracting activities are governed by federal laws and 
regulations. Although federal laws generally require federal agencies 
to use competition in selecting a contractor, until the mid-1990s, DOE 
contracts for the management and operation of its sites generally fit 
within an exception that allowed for the use of noncompetitive 
procedures. Those contracts were subject to regulation that established 
noncompetitive extensions of contracts with incumbent contractors as 
the norm and permitted competition only when it appeared likely that 
the competition would result in improved cost or contractor performance 
and would not be contrary to the government's best interests. In the 
mid-1990s, DOE began a series of contracting reforms to improve its 
contractors' performance. A key factor of that initiative has been the 
increasing use of competition as a way to select management and 
operating contractors for DOE sites. Although DOE initially focused the 
increased use of competition on its contracts with for-profit 
organizations, the laboratories operated by universities and other 
nonprofit organizations have not been completely insulated from these 
changes.

Contract administration in DOE is carried out by the program offices, 
with guidance and direction from DOE's Office of Procurement and 
Assistance Management. The management and operating contracts at DOE's 
FFRDC laboratories are administered primarily by the National Nuclear 
Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within DOE; or DOE's 
Offices of Science, Environmental Management, or Nuclear Energy, 
Science, and Technology.

DOE Has Competed FFRDC Contracts for Three Main Reasons:

DOE has had three main reasons for competing its FFRDC contracts 
instead of extending the contracts noncompetitively: when the 
contractor operating the laboratory is a for-profit entity, when 
mission changes warrant a review of the capabilities of other potential 
contractors, or when the incumbent contractor's performance is 
unsatisfactory. Without one of these conditions, DOE has generally 
extended these contracts without competition.

DOE has considerable flexibility in deciding whether to compete a 
management and operating contract for one of its FFRDC laboratories. 
Although federal procurement law specifies a clear preference for 
competition in awarding government contracts, the Competition in 
Contracting Act of 1984 provided for certain conditions under which 
full and open competition is not required. One of these noncompetitive 
conditions occurs when awarding the contract to a particular source is 
necessary to establish or maintain an essential engineering, research, 
or development capability to be provided by an educational or other 
nonprofit institution or a FFRDC.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation, which implements federal law, 
defines government-wide policy and requirements for FFRDCs, including 
the establishment, use, review, and termination of the FFRDC 
relationship. Under this regulation (1) there must be a written 
agreement of sponsorship between the government and the FFRDC; (2) the 
sponsoring governmental agency must justify its use of the FFRDC; (3) 
before extending the agreement or contract with the FFRDC, the 
government agency must conduct a comprehensive review of the use and 
need for the FFRDC; and (4) when the need for the FFRDC no longer 
exists, the agency may transfer sponsorship to another government 
agency or phase out the FFRDC.

DOE's 1996 acquisition guidance describes the procedures DOE program 
offices must follow to support any recommendation for a non-competitive 
extension of any major site contract, including a FFRDC contract. This 
guidance indicates a clear preference for competition and requires DOE 
program offices to make a convincing case to the Secretary before a 
noncompetitive contract extension is allowed. This preference for 
competition is an outcome of DOE's contract reform initiative, which 
concluded that DOE needed to expand the use of competition in awarding 
or renewing contracts. Among other things, the 1996 guidance specifies 
that, before a noncompetitive contract extension can occur, DOE must 
provide:

* a certification that full and open competition is not in the best 
interest of the department,

* a detailed description of the incumbent contractor's past 
performance,

* an outline of the principal issues and/or significant changes to be 
negotiated in the contract extension, and:

* in the case of FFRDCs, a showing of the continued need for the 
research and development center in accordance with criteria established 
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

In November 2000, DOE's Office of Procurement and Assistance Management 
issued additional guidance on how to evaluate an incumbent contractor's 
past performance when deciding whether to extend or compete an existing 
contract. The guidance states that DOE contracting officers must review 
an incumbent contractor's overall performance including technical, 
administrative, and cost factors, and it outlines the information 
required to support the performance review and the expected composition 
of the evaluation team. When reporting the results of a performance 
evaluation, the team should address all significant areas of 
performance and highlight the incumbent contractor's strengths and 
weaknesses. The evaluation team's report serves as the basis for 
determining whether extending a contract is in the best interests of 
the government and is subject to review and concurrence by the 
responsible assistant secretary and DOE's Procurement Executive.

DOE Has Competed or Plans to Compete Half of Its 16 FFRDC Contracts:

In September 2002, we reported that DOE had taken several steps to 
expand competition for its site management and operating FFRDC 
contracts. First, DOE reassessed which sites it should continue to 
designate as federally funded research and development centers. As a 
result of the reassessment, DOE removed 6 of the 22 sites from the 
FFRDC designation. DOE subsequently competed the contracts for two of 
these--the Knolls and Bettis Atomic Power Laboratories in New York and 
Pennsylvania. DOE restructured the other four contracts and, because of 
the more limited scope of activities, no longer regards them as major 
site contracts. The six site contracts that DOE has dropped from FFRDC 
status since 1992 are listed in table 1.

Table 1: Sites Where DOE Has Eliminated the FFRDC Designation:

Site: Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, Pennsylvania; Year FFRDC status 
terminated: 1992.

Site: Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Washington; Year 
FFRDC status terminated: 1992.

Site: Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute, New Mexico; Year FFRDC 
status terminated: 1995.

Site: Energy Technology Engineering Center, California; Year FFRDC 
status terminated: 1995.

Site: Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, New York; Year FFRDC status 
terminated: 1992.

Site: Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Education, Tennessee; Year 
FFRDC status terminated: 1999.

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

[End of table]

For the 16 remaining FFRDC contracts that DOE sponsors, DOE has 
competed 6 of them and is planning to compete two additional contracts 
in 2004 and 2005. The 16 current FFRDC sites and the competitive status 
of the site contract are shown in table 2.

Table 2: DOE's FFRDC Sites and Contract Status:

Site: Sites with contracts that have not been competed:

Site: Ames National Laboratory, Iowa; Site contractor: Iowa State 
University; Contract status: Initiated in 1943.

Site: Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois; Site contractor: 
University of Chicago; Contract status: Initiated in 1946. DOE plans to 
compete the Argonne West (Idaho) portion of the contract in 2004.

Site: Fermi National Laboratory, Illinois; Site contractor: 
Universities Research Association; Contract status: Initiated in 1967.

Site: Jefferson Laboratory, Virginia; Site contractor: Southeastern 
Universities Research Association; Contract status: Initiated in 1984.

Site: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, California; Site 
contractor: University of California; Contract status: Initiated in 
1947.

Site: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California; Site 
contractor: University of California; Contract status: Initiated in 
1952.

Site: Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico; Site contractor: 
University of California; Contract status: Initiated in 1943. DOE plans 
to compete the contract in 2005.

Site: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Washington; Site 
contractor: Battelle Memorial Institute; Contract status: Initiated in 
1964.

Site: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, New Jersey; Site contractor: 
Princeton University; Contract status: Initiated in 1975.

Site: Stanford Linear Accelerator Facility, California; Site 
contractor: Stanford University; Contract status: Initiated in 1976.

Site: Sites with competed contracts:

Site: Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York; Site contractor: 
Brookhaven Science Associates; Contract status: Competed in 1997.

Site: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho; 
Site contractor: Bechtel BWTX Idaho, LLC; Contract status: Competed in 
1999. DOE plans to restructure the site contract and compete it in 
2004.

Site: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Colorado; Site contractor: 
Midwest Research Institute; Contract status: Competed in 1998.

Site: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee; Site contractor: UT-
Battelle, LLC; Contract status: Competed in 1999.

Site: Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico; Site contractor: Sandia 
Corporation; Contract status: Competed in 1993.

Site: Savannah River Site, South Carolina; Site contractor: 
Westinghouse Savannah River Company; Contract status: Competed in 
1996.

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

[End of table]

DOE's decision to compete the six FFRDC sites shown in table 2 is 
consistent with the department's overall policy on determining when 
competition is appropriate. For example, DOE competed the contract for 
the Brookhaven National Laboratory in 1997, after terminating the 
previous contract for unsatisfactory performance by the incumbent 
contractor. DOE competed the contract for the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory in 1998 to incorporate additional private sector expertise 
into the management team for the site. This competition resulted from 
an expanded mission at the site to develop innovative renewable energy 
and energy efficient technologies and to incorporate these technologies 
into cost effective new products. For the remaining four FFRDC 
contracts that DOE has competed, the operator of the laboratory was a 
for-profit entity.

When DOE has decided not to compete its FFRDC contracts but to extend 
them noncompetitively, its decisions have not been without controversy. 
For example, in 2001, DOE extended the management and operating 
contracts with the University of California for the Los Alamos and 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. The University of California 
has operated these sites for 50 years or more and has been the sites' 
only contractor. In recent years, we and others have documented 
significant problems with laboratory operations and management at these 
two laboratories--particularly in the areas of safeguards, security, 
and project management.[Footnote 2] Congressional committees and others 
have called for DOE to compete these contracts. Until recently, 
however, DOE did not compete them. Instead, DOE chose to address the 
performance problems using contract mechanisms, such as specific 
performance measures and interim performance assessments. In our 
September 2002 report, we commented that if the University of 
California did not make significant improvements in its performance, 
DOE may need to reconsider its decision not to compete the contracts.

In April 2003, the Secretary of Energy decided to open the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory contract to competition when the current contract 
expires in September 2005. The Secretary made this decision based on 
"systemic management failures" that came to light in 2002. The 
management failures included inadequate controls over employees' use of 
government credit cards, inadequate property controls and apparent 
theft of government property, and the firing of investigators 
attempting to identify the extent of management problems at the 
laboratory.

DOE has also decided to restructure the FFRDC contracts supporting work 
at the Idaho National Laboratory. Currently the laboratory has two 
FFRDC contracts--(1) a site management contract that includes 
activities ranging from waste cleanup to facility operations activities 
and (2) a contract to operate Argonne National Laboratory, which 
includes the Argonne West facility at the Idaho site. DOE plans to 
restructure the two contracts so that one focuses on the nuclear energy 
research mission and the other focuses on the cleanup mission at the 
site. DOE also plans to include the activities at Argonne West in the 
contract competition for the site's research mission and to remove the 
Argonne West scope of work from DOE's existing contract with the 
University of Chicago to operate Argonne National Laboratory. DOE 
believes this contract restructuring will help revitalize the nuclear 
energy research mission at the Idaho Site and accelerate the 
environmental cleanup.

DOE is continuing to examine the nature of its relationship with FFRDC 
contractors and the implications of that relationship for its 
contracting approach. DOE established FFRDCs in part to gain the 
benefits of having a long-term association with the research community 
beyond that available with a normal contractual relationship. However, 
more recent events are causing DOE to rethink its approach. As 
discussed above, DOE has been criticized for not competing laboratory 
contracts where the contractors are performing poorly. Furthermore, 
annual provisions in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations 
Acts since fiscal year 1998 have required DOE to compete the award and 
extension of management and operating contracts, including FFRDC 
contracts, unless the Secretary waives the requirement and notifies the 
Subcommittees on Energy and Water of the House Committee on 
Appropriations 60 days before contract award.

Given these concerns, in 2003 the Secretary of Energy commissioned an 
independent panel to determine what criteria DOE should consider when 
deciding whether to extend or compete a laboratory management and 
operating contract. The panel is expected to help DOE determine, among 
other things, the conditions under which competition for laboratory 
contracts is appropriate, the appropriate criteria for deciding to 
compete or extend laboratory contracts, the benefits and disadvantages 
derived from competing laboratory contracts, and whether different 
standards and decision criteria should apply depending on whether the 
contractor is non-profit, an educational institution, an academic 
consortium, or a commercial entity.

Competing Its Contracts Is One of Several Mechanisms DOE Has to Address 
Contractor Performance, but Effective Oversight and Improved Outcome 
Measures Are Also Needed:

Competing contracts is one of several mechanisms DOE can use to address 
contractor performance problems or strengthen contract management. 
However, competing a contract does not ensure that contractor 
performance will improve. Other steps DOE has taken as part of its 
contract reform initiative to address contractor performance issues 
include changing the type of contract, such as from a cost-
reimbursement to a fixed-price contract, or establishing or 
strengthening performance-based incentives in the contract. For 
example, in September 2002, we reported that DOE now requires 
performance-based contracts at all of its major sites. DOE has also 
increased over time the proportion of contractors' fees tied to 
achieving those performance objectives. However, DOE has struggled to 
develop effective performance measures and continues to modify and test 
various performance measures that more directly link performance 
incentives to a site's strategic objectives.

Even these changes to DOE's contracts do not by themselves ensure that 
contractor performance will improve. We have reported that DOE must 
also (1) effectively oversee its contractors' activities in carrying 
out projects and (2) use appropriate outcome measures to assess overall 
results and apply lessons learned to continually improve its 
contracting practices. Effectively overseeing contractor activities 
involves, among other things, ensuring that appropriate and effective 
project management principles and practices are being used. Since June 
1999, DOE has been working to implement recommendations by the National 
Research Council on how to improve project management at DOE. In 2003, 
the National Research Council reported that DOE has made progress in 
improving its management of projects but that effective management of 
projects was not fully in place.

Regarding the use of outcome measures to assess overall results, in 
September 2002, we reported that DOE did not have outcome measures or 
data that could be used to assess the overall results of its contract 
reform initiatives. We recommended that DOE develop an approach to its 
reform initiatives, including its contracting and project management 
initiatives, that is more consistent with the best practices of high-
performing organizations. DOE is still working to put a best-practices 
approach in place.

As we reported in 2001, improving an organization's performance can be 
difficult, especially in an organization like DOE, which has three main 
interrelated impediments to improvement--diverse missions, a confusing 
organizational structure, and a weak culture of 
accountability.[Footnote 3] However, DOE expects to spend hundreds of 
billions of dollars in future years on missions important to the well-
being of the American people, such as ensuring the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear weapon stockpile. Therefore, the department 
has compelling reasons to ensure that it has in place an effective set 
of contracting and management practices and controls.

Thank you, Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. This 
concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to respond to any questions 
that you may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments:

For further information on this testimony, please contact Ms. Robin 
Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to this 
testimony included Carole Blackwell, Bob Crystal, Doreen Feldman, Molly 
Laster, Carol Shulman, Stan Stenersen, and Bill Swick.

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Contract Reform: DOE Has Made 
Progress, but Actions Needed to Ensure Initiatives Have Improved 
Results, GAO-02-798 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2002).

[2] For, example, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of 
Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities, 
GAO/T-RCED-99-159 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 1999); U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: Improvements Needed in DOE's 
Safeguards and Security Oversight, GAO/RCED-00-62 (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 24, 2000); and A Special Investigative Panel, President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, Science at its Best, Security at its 
Worst: A Report on Security Problems of the U.S. Department of Energy 
(Washington, D.C.: June 1999).

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of Energy: Fundamental 
Reassessment Needed to Address Major Mission, Structure, and 
Accountability Problems, GAO-02-51 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2001).