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GAO: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives:



For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT Thursday, June 20, 

2002: 



Statement of John H. Anderson, Jr., Managing Director, Physical 

Infrastructure Issues:



GAO-02-840T:



Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,



We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Federal Transit 

Administration’s (FTA) efforts to help fund transit projects. As you 

know, since the early 1970s, the federal government has provided a 

large share of the nation’s capital investment in urban mass 

transportation. Much of this investment has come through FTA’s New 

Starts program, [Footnote 1] which helps pay for designing and 

constructing certain rail, bus, and trolley projects through full 

funding grant agreements. [Footnote 2] The maximum amount of federal 

funds available to a project cannot exceed 80 percent of the estimated 

net cost. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21 ST CENTURY (TEA-21), 

[Footnote 3] enacted in 1998, authorized about $6.1 billion in 

“guaranteed” [Footnote 4] funding for the New Starts program through 

fiscal year 2003. Although the level of New Starts funding is higher 

than it has ever been, the demand for these resources is also extremely 

high. TEA-21 identified over 190 projects nationwide as eligible to 

compete for New Starts funding and directed FTA to prioritize projects 

for funding by evaluating, rating, and recommending potential projects 

on the basis of specific financial and project justification criteria.



We are here today to discuss the federal government’s support for 

constructing or extending transit systems through FTA’s New Starts 

Program and the availability of lower cost mass transit approaches. 

Given the high demand for new and expanded transit facilities across 

the nation, communities need to examine approaches that stretch the 

federal and local dollar yet still provide high quality transit 

services for the public. My testimony today summarizes the results of 

our recent reports [Footnote 5] on (1) the status of the New Starts 

program, and (2) the potential of Bus Rapid Transit systems as an 

option for transit agencies to consider.



In summary:



*Although FTA has been faced with an impending transit budget crunch 
for 

several years, it is likely to end the TEA-21 authorization period with 

about $310 million in unused New Starts commitment authority if its 

proposed fiscal year 2003 budget is enacted. [Footnote 6] This is a 

result of several factors: (1) in fiscal year 2001, the Congress 

substantially increased FTA’s authority to commit future federal funds, 

thus allowing FTA to commit an additional $500 million to transit 

projects beyond the TEA-21 authorization period; (2) in fiscal year 

2002, FTA stopped providing funding for projects in preliminary 

engineering activities, which freed up about $150 million per year for 

projects; and (3) FTA released $157 million committed to a suspended 

project and funded fewer projects than anticipated in fiscal years 2002 

and 2003 by applying stricter eligibility criteria. Despite the 

likelihood of ending the TEA-21 period with unused commitment 

authority, FTA’s current commitments, plus several projects that are 

likely to receive grant agreements soon, could significantly limit the 

funding of future projects. This could create an even more competitive 

environment for future New Starts projects seeking approval and funding 

than in the recent past. The administration and others have proposed 

limiting the amount of federal funds for New Starts projects to less 

than 80 percent in order to fund more projects; however, the effect of 

such a reduction on proposed projects is unclear at this time.



*Bus Rapid Transit is a promising approach to providing improved 
transit 

service at a lower capital cost. Bus Rapid Transit is designed to 

provide major improvements in the speed and reliability of bus service 

through barrier-separated busways, buses on High-Occupancy Vehicle 

(HOV) Lanes, or improved service on arterial streets. Our 2001 report 

on Bus Rapid Transit compared existing Bus Rapid Transit service in the 

United States with existing Light Rail systems [Footnote 7] and found 

that Bus Rapid Transit service generally had lower capital costs. The 

capital costs of Bus Rapid Transit in the cities we reviewed averaged 

$13.5 million per mile for busways, $9.0 million per mile for buses on 

HOV lanes, and $680,000 per mile for buses on city streets, when 

adjusted to 2000 dollars. [Footnote 8] For Light Rail lines, capital 

costs averaged about $34.8 million per mile, ranging from $12.4 million 

to $118.8 million per mile, when adjusted to 2000 dollars. [Footnote 9] 

In cities we reviewed that had both types of service, neither Bus Rapid 

Transit nor Light Rail had a consistent advantage in terms of operating 

costs. In general, we found that Bus Rapid Transit compared favorably 

to Light Rail systems in terms of operating speed and ridership 

capacity. Bus Rapid Transit provides a more flexible approach than 

Light Rail because buses can be rerouted more easily to accommodate 

changing travel patterns to eliminate transfers; operate on busways, 

HOV lanes and city arterial streets; and new routes can be implemented 

in stages. Transit officials believed that because Light Rail is 

permanent in a given corridor it could influence economic development 

over time, justifying its higher capital cost. However, transit 

officials also noted that buses have a poor public image. As a result, 

many transit planners are designing Bus Rapid Transit systems that 

offer service that will be an improvement over standard bus service.



Background:



To obtain a full funding grant agreement, a project must first progress 

through a local or regional review of alternatives, develop preliminary 

engineering plans, and obtain FTA’s approval for final design. 

[Footnote 10]0 TEA-21 requires that FTA evaluate projects against 

“project justification” and “local financial commitment” criteria 

contained in the act (see fig. 1). FTA assesses the project 

justification and technical merits of a project proposal by reviewing 

the project’s mobility improvements, environmental benefits, cost-

effectiveness, and operating efficiencies. In assessing a project’s 

local financial commitment, FTA assesses the project’s finance plan for 

evidence of stable and dependable financing sources to construct, 

maintain, and operate the proposed system or extension.



Figure 1: FTA’s New Starts Evaluation and Rating Process:



[A] The local share is the percentage of a project’s capital cost to be 

funded from sources other than federal funds.



[B] According to FTA, this optional criterion gives grantees the 

opportunity to provide additional information about a project that may 

add confidence of the project’s overall success.



Source: FTA.



Although FTA’s evaluation requirements existed prior to TEA-21, the act 

requires FTA to (1) develop a rating for each criterion as well as an 

overall rating of “highly recommended,” “recommended,” or “not 

recommended” and use these evaluations and ratings in approving 

projects’ advancement toward obtaining grant agreements; and (2) issue 

regulations on the evaluation and rating process. TEA-21 also directs 

FTA to use these evaluations and ratings to decide which projects to 

recommend to the Congress for funding in a report due each February. 

These funding recommendations are also reflected in DOT’s annual budget 

proposal. In the annual appropriations act for DOT, the Congress 

specifies the amounts of funding for individual New Starts projects.



Historically, federal capital funding for transit systems, including 

the New Starts program, has largely supported rail systems. Under TEA-

21 the FTA Capital Program has been split 40 percent/40 percent/20 

percent among New Starts, Rail Modernization, and Bus Capital grants. 

Although fixed- guideway bus projects are eligible under the New Starts 

program, relatively few bus-related projects are now being funded under 

this program.



Status of the New Starts Program:



Although FTA has been faced with an impending transit budget crunch for 

several years, the agency is likely to end the TEA-21 authorization 

period with about $310 million in unused commitment authority if its 

proposed fiscal year 2003 budget is enacted. This will occur for 

several reasons. First, in fiscal year 2001, the Congress substantially 

increased FTA’s authority to commit future federal funding (referred to 

as contingent commitment authority). This allowed FTA to make an 

additional $500 million in future funding commitments. Without this 

action, FTA would have had insufficient commitment authority to fund 

all of the projects ready for a grant agreement. Second, to preserve 

commitment authority for future projects, FTA did not request any 

funding for preliminary engineering activities in the fiscal year 2002 

and 2003 budget proposals. According to FTA, it had provided an average 

of $150 million a year for fiscal years 1998 through 2001 for projects’ 

preliminary engineering activities. Third, FTA took the following 
actions 

that had the effect of slowing the commitment of funds or making funds 

available for reallocation:



*FTA tightened its review of projects’ readiness and technical 
capacity. 

[Footnote 11]1 As a result, FTA recommended fewer projects for funding 

than expected for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. For example, only 2 of 

the 14 projects that FTA officials estimated last year would be ready 

for grant agreements are being proposed for funding commitments in 

fiscal year 2003.



*FTA increased its available commitment authority by $157 million by 

releasing amounts associated with a project in Los Angeles for which 

the federal funding commitment had been withdrawn. [Footnote 12]2:



Although the New Starts program will likely have unused commitment 

authority through fiscal year 2003, the carry-over commitments from 

existing grant agreements that will need to be funded during the next 

authorization period are substantial. FTA expects to enter the period 

likely covered by the next authorization (fiscal years 2004 through 

2009) [Footnote 13]3 with over $3 billion in outstanding New Starts 

grant commitments. In addition, FTA has identified five projects 

estimated to cost $2.8 billion that will likely be ready for grant 

agreements in the next 2 years. If these projects receive grant 

agreements and the total authorization for the next program is $6.1 

billion---the level authorized under TEA-21--most of those funds will 

be committed early in the authorization period, leaving numerous New 

Starts projects in the pipeline facing bleak federal funding 

possibilities.



Some of the projects anticipated for the next authorization are so 

large they could have considerable impact on the overall New Starts 

program. For example, the New York Long Island Railroad East Side 

Access project may extend through multiple authorization periods. The 

current cost estimate for the East Side Access project is $4.4 billion, 

including a requested $2.2 billion in New Starts funds. By way of 

comparison, the East Side Access project would require about three 

times the total and three times the federal funding of the Bay Area 

Rapid Transit District Airport Extension project, which at about $1.5 

billion was one of the largest projects under TEA-21.



In order to manage the increasing demand for New Starts funding, 

several proposals have been made to limit the amount of New Starts 

funds that could be applied to a project, allowing more projects to 

receive funding. For instance, the President’s fiscal year 2002 budget 

recommended that federal New Starts funding be limited to 50 percent of 

project costs starting in fiscal year 2004. (Currently, New Starts 

funding--and all federal funding--is capped at 80 percent.) [Footnote 

14]4 A 50 percent New Starts cap would, in part, reflect a pattern that 

has emerged in the program. Currently, few projects are asking for the 

maximum 80 percent federal New Starts share, and many have already 

significantly increased the local share in order to be competitive 

under the New Starts program. In the last 10 years, the New Starts 

share for projects with grant agreements has been averaging about 50 

percent. In April 2002, we estimated that a 50 percent cap on the New 

Starts share for projects with signed full funding grant agreements 

would have reduced the federal commitments to these projects by $650 

million. Federal highway funds such as Congestion Mitigation and Air 

Quality funds can still be used to bring the total federal funding up 

to 80 percent. However, because federal highway funds are controlled by 

the states, using these funds for transit projects necessarily requires 

state-transit district cooperation. The potential effect of changing 

the federal share is not known. Whether a larger local match for 

transit projects could discourage local planners from supporting 

transit is unknown, but local planners have expressed this concern. 

According to transit officials, some projects could accommodate a 

higher local match, but others would have to be modified, or even 

terminated. Another possibility is that transit agencies may look more 

aggressively for ways to contain project costs or search for lower cost 

transit options.



Bus Rapid Transit Shows Promise as a Means for Expanding Transit at a 

Lower Capital Cost:



With demand high for New Starts funds, a greater emphasis on lower cost 

options may help expand the benefits of federal funding for mass 

transit; Bus Rapid Transit shows promise in this area. Bus Rapid 

Transit involves coordinated improvements in a transit system’s 

infrastructure, equipment, operations, and technology that give 

preferential treatment to buses on urban roadways. Bus Rapid Transit is 

not a single type of transit system; rather, it encompasses a variety 

of approaches, including 1) using buses on exclusive busways; or 2) 

buses sharing HOV lanes with other vehicles; and 3) improving bus 

service on city arterial streets. Busways--special roadways designed 

for the exclusive use of buses--can be totally separate roadways or 

operate within highway rights-of-way separated from other traffic by 

barriers. Buses on HOV-lanes operate on limited-access highways 

designed for long-distance commuters. Bus Rapid Transit on Busways or 

HOV lanes is sometimes characterized by the addition of extensive park 

and ride facilities along with entrance and exit access for these 

lanes. Bus Rapid Transit systems using arterial streets may include 

lanes reserved for the exclusive use of buses and street enhancements 

that speed buses and improve service. During the review of Bus Rapid 

Transit systems that we completed last year, we found at least 17 

cities in the United States were planning to incorporate aspects of Bus 

Rapid Transit into their operations.



FTA has begun to support the Bus Rapid Transit concept and expand 

awareness of new ways to design and operate high capacity Bus Rapid 

Transit systems as an alternative to building Light Rail systems. 

Because Light Rail systems operate in both exclusive and shared right-

of-way environments, the limits on their length and the frequency of 

service are stricter than heavy rail systems. [Footnote 15]5 Light Rail 

systems have gained popularity as a lower-cost option to heavy rail 

systems, and since 1980, Light Rail systems have opened in 13 cities.



Our September 2001 report showed that all three types of Bus Rapid 

Transit systems generally had lower capital costs than Light Rail 

systems. On a per mile basis, the Bus Rapid Transit projects that we 

reviewed cost less on average to build than the Light Rail projects, on 

a per mile basis. We examined 20 Bus Rapid Transit lines and 18 Light 

Rail lines and found Bus Rapid Transit capital costs averaged $13.5 

million per mile for busways, $9.0 million per mile for buses on HOV 

lanes, and $680,000 per mile for buses on city streets, when adjusted 

to 2000 dollars. [Footnote 16]6 For the 18 Light Rail lines, capital 

costs averaged about $34.8 million per mile, ranging from $12.4 million 

to $118.8 million per mile, when adjusted to 2000 dollars. On a capital 

cost per mile basis, the three different types of Bus Rapid Transit 

systems have average capital costs that are 39 percent, 26 percent, and 

2 percent of the average cost of the Light Rail systems we reviewed.



The higher capital costs per mile for Light Rail systems are 

attributable to several factors. First, the Light Rail systems contain 

elements not required in the Bus Rapid Transit systems, such as train 

signal, communications, and electrical power systems with overhead 

wires to deliver power to trains. Light Rail also requires additional 

materials needed for the guideway--rail, ties, and track ballast. In 

addition, if a Light Rail maintenance facility does not exist, one must 

be built and equipped. Finally, Light Rail vehicles, while having 

higher carrying capacity than most buses, also cost more--about $2.5 

million each. [Footnote 17]7 In contrast, according to transit industry 

consultants, a typical 40-foot transit bus costs about $283,000, and a 

higher-capacity bus costs about $420,000. However, buses that 

incorporate newer technologies for low emissions or that run on more 

than one fuel can cost more than $1 million each.



We also analyzed operating costs for six cities that operated both 

Light Rail and some form of Bus Rapid Transit service. [Footnote 18]8 

Whether Bus Rapid Transit or Light Rail had lower operating costs 

varied considerably from city to city and depended on what cost measure 

was used. In general, we did not find a systematic advantage for one 

mode over the other on operating costs.



The performance of the Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems can be 

comparable. For example, in the six cities we reviewed that had both 

types of service, Bus Rapid Transit generally operated at higher 

speeds. In addition, the capacity of Bus Rapid Transit systems can be 

substantial; we did not see Light Rail having a significant capacity 

advantage over Bus Rapid Transit. For example, the highest ridership we 

found on a Light Rail line was on the Los Angeles Blue Line, with 

57,000 riders per day. The highest Bus Rapid Transit ridership was also 

in Los Angeles on the Wilshire-Whittier line, with 56,000 riders per 

day. Most Light Rail lines in the United States carry about half the 

Los Angeles Blue Line ridership.



Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail each have a variety of other 

advantages and disadvantages. Bus Rapid Transit generally has the 

advantages of (1) being more flexible than Light Rail, (2) being able 

to phase-in service rather than having to wait for an entire system to 

be built, and (3) being used as an interim system until Light Rail is 

built. Light Rail has advantages, according to transit officials, 

associated with increased economic development and improved community 

image, which they believe justify higher capital costs. However, 

building a Light Rail system can have a tendency to provide a bias 

toward building additional rail lines in the future.



Transit operators with experience in Bus Rapid Transit systems told us 

that one of the challenges faced by Bus Rapid Transit is the negative 

stigma potential riders attach to buses. Officials from FTA, academia, 

and private consulting firms also stated that bus service has a 

negative image, particularly when compared with rail service. 

Communities may prefer Light Rail systems in part because the public 

sees rail as faster, quieter, and less polluting than bus service, even 

though Bus Rapid Transit is designed to overcome those problems. FTA 

officials said that the poor image of buses was probably the result of 

a history of slow bus service due to congested streets, slow boarding 

and fare collection, and traffic lights. FTA believes that this 

negative image can be improved over time through bus service that 

incorporates Bus Rapid Transit features.



Barriers to More Extensive Use of Bus Rapid Transit:



A number of barriers exist to funding improved bus systems such as Bus 

Rapid Transit. First, an extensive pipeline of projects already exists 

for the New Starts Program. Bus Rapid Transit is a relatively new 

concept, and many potential projects have not reached the point of 

being ready for funding consideration because many other rail projects 

are further along in development. As of March 2002, only 1 of the 29 

New Starts projects with existing, pending or proposed grant agreements 

uses Bus Rapid Transit, and 1 of the 5 other projects near approval 

plans to use Bus Rapid Transit. Some Bus Rapid Transit projects do not 

fit the exclusive right-of-way requirements of the New Starts Program 

and thus would not be eligible for funding consideration. FTA also 

administers a Bus Capital Program with half the funding level of the 

New Starts Program; however, the existing Bus Capital Program is made 

up of small grants to a large number of recipients, which limits the 

program’s usefulness for funding major projects. Although FTA is 

encouraging Bus Rapid Transit through a Demonstration Program, this 

program does not provide funding for construction but rather focuses on 

obtaining and sharing information on projects being pursued by local 

transit agencies. Eleven Bus Rapid Transit projects are associated with 

this demonstration program.



In summary, as we approach the end of the TEA-21 authorization period, 

there is a long list of potential transit projects vying for limited 

New Starts funding. The New Starts program will likely start the next 

authorization period with a considerable number of future commitments, 

which could significantly increase competition for funding. Bus Rapid 

Transit, because of its lower capital costs, has the potential to 

expand the benefits of limited federal funding. In addressing their 

transportation problems, communities will ultimately formulate 

proposals on the basis of a number of factors, including cost; 

ridership; environmental impacts; and a community’s needs, public 

attitudes, and perceived ability to obtain federal funding. We believe 

that because of its potential merits and cost advantages, Bus Rapid 

Transit should be given serious consideration as options are explored 

and evaluated.



Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.



Contacts and Acknowledgments:



For information about this testimony, please contact John Anderson at 

(202) 512-2834 or andersonj@gao.gov. This statement is available on 

GAO’s home page at http://www.gao.gov. Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony were Robert Ciszewski, Susan Fleming, 

Ron Stouffer, Stacey Thompson, and Glen Trochelman.



FOOTNOTES



[1] Other federal funds available through the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) highway and transit programs can be used to 

develop, plan, or construct these projects.



[2] A full funding grant agreement establishes the terms and conditions 

of federal financial participation in the project and the maximum 

amount of federal New Starts financial assistance for the project. The 

grant agreement also defines a project’s scope, including the length of 

the system and the number of stations; its schedule, including the date 

when the system is expected to open for service; and its cost.



[3] Public Law 105-178 (June 9, 1998).



[4] “Guaranteed” funds are subject to a procedural mechanism designed 

to ensure that minimum amounts of funding are available each year.



[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: FTA’s New Starts 

Commitments for Fiscal Year 2003 , GAO-02-603 (Washington, D.C. Apr. 

30, 2002); and U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Bus Rapid 

Transit Shows Promise, GAO-01-984 (Washington, D.C. Sept. 17, 2001).



[6] In calculating the total amount of authority to make funding 

commitments, FTA considers the amount of “guaranteed” funds provided by 

TEA-21 for projects not already approved for a grant agreement plus its 

authority to make contingent commitments beyond the current 

authorization period, subject to future authorizations and 

appropriations.



[7] Light Rail transit is a metropolitan-electric railway system 

characterized by its ability to operate in a variety of environments, 

such as streets, subways, or elevated structures. Because Light Rail 

systems can operate on streets with other traffic, they typically use 

an overhead source for their electrical power, and passengers board 

from the street or platforms.



[8] Project capital costs typically include the costs to plan, design, 

and construct a project.



[9] All costs were adjusted to year 2000 dollars for comparison.



[10] The alternatives analysis stage provides information on the 

benefits, costs, and impacts of alternative strategies leading to the 

selection of a locally preferred solution to the community’s mobility 

needs. During the preliminary engineering phase, project sponsors 

refine the design of the proposal, taking into consideration all 

reasonable design alternatives--which results in estimates of costs, 

benefits, and impacts. Final design is the last phase of project 

development before construction and may include right-of-way 

acquisition, utility relocation, and the preparation of final 

construction plans and cost estimates.



[11] FTA uses a number of milestones to determine whether a project 

is sufficiently developed to be considered for a grant agreement. For 

example, FTA determines whether the necessary real estate has been 

acquired, utility arrangements have been made, and local funding 

sources are in place. According to FTA, this ensures that the project 

has no outstanding issues it must address.



[12] We recommended in August 2001 that FTA adopt the practice of 

releasing commitment authority attributable to projects for which the 

federal funding commitment had been withdrawn and specifically, that it 

release the $647 million reserved for two segments of the Los Angeles 

project. FTA has proposed a funding commitment for one of the 

previously suspended segments (Eastside); however, because the other 

suspended segment (Midcity) is not a candidate for a funding commitment 

at this time, FTA has released the associated commitment authority, 

increasing its available commitment by $157 million.



[13] This assumes that the next authorization period covers 6 

years.



[14] According to FTA, total federal participation in any given 

transit project would remain capped at 80 percent. The proposed cap 

would limit only the percentage of New Starts funds available for 

projects. Transit projects could use other federal funds available 

(e.g., flexible highway funding) to secure total federal support for up 

to 80 percent of the project’s costs.



[15] Heavy rail transit systems, such as in New York City, Chicago, 

and Washington, D.C., are defined by their operation on a totally 

separated right-of-way and use a third rail on the ground to power the 

trains. Heavy rail systems require platform boarding, typically have 

longer distances between stations, and have greater capacity than Light 

Rail systems.



[16] Project capital costs typically include the costs to plan, 

design, and construct a project.



[17] Generally, the seating capacity of a single Light Rail vehicle 

is about 110 passengers; a 40-foot bus can seat about 50 passengers, 

and an articulated bus can seat about 70 passengers.



[18] The six cities were Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, 

Pittsburgh, San Diego, and San Jose.