Title: Preventing A Dirty Bomb Description: Radioactive materials are commonly used for medical, industrial, or research purposes. But in the hands of terrorists, even in small amounts, they can be used to make a dirty bomb. In a new report, we looked at federal efforts to prevent radioactive materials from falling into the wrong hands. We'll learn more from GAO's Allison Bawden. Related work: GAO-24-107014, Preventing A Dirty Bomb: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Has Not Taken Steps to Address Certain Radiological Security Risks Released: October 2024 {Music} [Allison Bawden:] If you send a dirty bomb, radioactive materials could be socially and economically devastating on the order of tens of billions of dollars. [Holly Hobbs:] Hi, and welcome to GAO's Watchdog Report, your source for fact-based, nonpartisan news and information from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I'm your host, Holly Hobbs. Radioactive materials are commonly used for medical, industrial, or research purposes. But in the hands of terrorists, even in small amounts, they can be used to make a dirty bomb. Beyond the threat to human life, a dirty bomb explosion would likely result in significant economic harm--as well as cause public panic, property, and other damage. In a new report, we looked at federal efforts to prevent radioactive materials from falling into the wrong hands. We'll learn more about this work from GAO's Allison Bawden, an expert in radiological security. Thanks for joining us. [Allison Bawden:] Thanks for having me. [Holly Hobbs:] So, Allison, how serious of a threat is this? [Allison Bawden:] So federal agencies all agree there is a general and enduring threat of a terrorist using a dirty bomb. In 2023, President Biden said that the security of radioactive materials was one of the most enduring national security priorities. And that's because there are literally tens of thousands of these sources in use for valuable commercial and medical purposes. But it really takes just one bad actor with access to a source to wreak some havoc. For example, in 2019, a man in Arizona stole several sources and threatened to disperse them in a nearby shopping mall. But fortunately, he was apprehended before that could happen. Over the last 10 years, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported over 4,000 nuclear material events, which include instances of lost or stolen radioactive materials that could be misused. [Holly Hobbs:] So what's currently being done to make sure radioactive materials don't fall into the hands of terrorists? [Allison Bawden:] Well, there are really three agencies that play different roles in protecting the American public from the misuse of radiological material. First, the Department of Homeland Security has all kinds of different efforts out there to screen cargo at ports, to support state and local law enforcement in detecting material that may be loose, and in providing threat assessments to the rest of the government. The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration also helps license holders replace material if they can use alternatives that are not radiological in nature. And it provides support to disposing of sources when they're no longer in use. But all of those activities really rest on the regulatory framework that's provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or the NRC. NRC licenses these materials and depending on their quantity, provides security requirements to those licenses that they must follow. So for large quantities, there are pretty stringent security requirements. Those large quantities are known as category 1 or 2 quantities. And for lesser quantities--category 3 and below--there are also security requirements, though they may be less stringent. [Holly Hobbs:] So these federal agencies are collaborating to protect us. How are they planning their efforts? [Allison Bawden:] The agencies do a good job of collaborating. There is a task force that's run by the NRC that reports to Congress every 4 years on radioactive material security and efforts that are being taken to ensure that security. Department of Homeland Security also convenes agencies to share relevant intelligence and threat analysis. And the NNSA works with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to determine how best to offer assistance, such as identifying hospitals that may need support in replacing radiological material. With regard to risks, officials from all three of the agencies agree that insiders pose the biggest risk. Basically, what if an employee sort of snaps one day and steals these materials to which they already have access? So that seems to be broadly agreed upon the largest threat. [Holly Hobbs:] And how are they weighing threats or determining what the most serious risks are? [Allison Bawden:] A key component of understanding the risk of a dirty bomb is identifying what kind of consequences a community might face in the event of a radiological incident like that. A radioactive dirty bomb could cause tens of billions of dollars in socioeconomic consequences as entire areas could be declared contaminated, to say nothing of what ensues from panic immediately following such an event, like through evacuation or other kinds of just sort of social chaos. We found that these consequences differ very little, whether the radiological source that was used in a dirty bomb is large, a category 1 or 2 source, or a smaller category 3 source. So, in planning their programs, NNSA and DHS consider these types of socioeconomic consequences as primary. NRC, however, takes a different approach in developing its regulatory framework for radioactive materials. It's really based on radiation hazards. So specifically, whether exposure to radioactive material would result in what's known as--and I'll do some air quotes here--prompt fatalities or deterministic health effects. So, basically if exposure would lead directly to human deaths or radiation sickness. NRC does not include socioeconomic consequences when it calculates regulatory costs and benefits. And those cost benefit analyses are what are used to, for example, set security requirements. [Holly Hobbs:] So the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC, it's assessing risk on how many people will die. But the other agencies--they're looking at that, and then also these economic and social impacts. Does the difference in what they're looking at impact their collaboration at all? [Allison Bawden:] It goes without saying that NRC's current regulations have significantly contributed to keeping us safe--as have NNSA's security enhancement efforts, and DHS' and the intelligence community's efforts to detect and deter bad actors. The difference in NRC's approach results in agencies working at cross-purposes to an extent. For example, DHS and NNSA have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on programs to reduce the risk posed by some radioactive materials that NRC's regulations leave vulnerable. Specifically, these are the category 3 materials. In 2022, we reported on the results of an undercover investigation where we were able to purchase multiple quantities of category 3 materials using completely fraudulent licenses. If we had tried to buy category 2 materials, our licenses would have had to be verified by the regulator. But under NRC's regulatory framework, category 3 licenses do not need to be independently verified. We could have bought more category 3 quantities of material to aggregate them to a category 2 quantity. So, our position is that if NRC considered socioeconomic consequences in its regulatory framework security requirements like license verification would also apply for category three materials. {MUSIC} [Holly Hobbs:] So Allison just told us that the NRC doesn't take into account social and economic risks of a dirty bomb when regulating radioactive materials, which may leave lower quantities of materials--or category 3--less regulated than others. So, Allison, what more do we think the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC, should be doing to better regulate radioactive materials? [Allison Bawden:] We've made 18 recommendations to NRC in a decade, and they've implemented 7. The bulk of our recommendations are to strengthen security measures for materials that pose less of a radiation hazard, but just as much of a hazard in terms of their ability to cause social and economic devastation. Simple, cheap measures like tracking those materials and licenses in the systems NRC already uses to track other, more hazardous materials, are sort of low hanging fruit. We'd also like NRC to fundamentally reconsider its security regulations. NRC needs to formally acknowledge radioactive materials' ability to cause significant social and economic damage if used in a dirty bomb, and to reconsider its security requirements in light of this risk. This would mean revising some regulations, at least for some materials. [Holly Hobbs:] And you just said that we made 18 recommendations, and the NRC has acted on less than half of them. What can GAO do to maybe incentivize them taking more action? [Allison Bawden:] We're elevating several of our unimplemented recommendations to the Congress, for it to consider directing NRC in law to make changes. If the Congress agrees, Congress could direct these changes. [Holly Hobbs:] And last question--what's the bottom line of this report? [Allison Bawden:] If you send a dirty bomb, radioactive materials could be socially and economically devastating. NRC security requirements for radioactive materials consider health risks, but not socioeconomic risks, which is a different approach than other agencies take. Because, at this point, NRC has ceased acting on these matters; we're asking Congress to consider directing NRC to act. [Holly Hobbs:] That was Allison Bawden talking about our new report on radioactive materials. Thanks for your time, Allison. [Allison Bawden:] Thank you so much. [Holly Hobbs:] And thank you for listening to the Watchdog Report. 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