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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

October 2013: 

Maritime Security: 

DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small 
Vessel Security Strategy: 

GAO-14-32: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-32, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million small 
vessels operating in the United States in 2012. Terrorists, smugglers, 
and other criminals can use small vessels as platforms for their 
activities because small vessels are generally unregulated and largely 
anonymous. Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of 
distinguishing between legitimate small vessel operators and the 
relatively few individuals estimated to be engaged in illicit 
activities. DHS issued its SVSS in April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS 
Implementation Plan in January 2011 to help guide actions to mitigate 
the security risks arising from small vessels. Given the importance of 
small vessel security, GAO was asked to review DHS’s efforts in 
developing and implementing the SVSS Implementation Plan. 

This report examines what actions, if any, DHS and its components have 
taken to address small vessel security concerns, and the extent to 
which they have implemented action items in the SVSS Implementation 
Plan. GAO analyzed DHS documents; interviewed DHS officials; and 
visited two ports selected on the basis of the volume of small vessel 
traffic and security initiatives in place, among other things. While 
the results of the port visits cannot be generalized across all ports, 
they provided insights on small vessel security issues and operations. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components—such as 
the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—have 
started or completed initiatives to address small vessel security 
risks, but DHS is not tracking the progress being made to address 
action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) 
Implementation Plan. “Small vessels” are characterized as any 
watercraft—-regardless of method of propulsion—-less than 300 gross 
tons, and used for recreational or commercial purposes. DHS component 
officials GAO met with identified examples of key initiatives that 
they have completed or have under way to enhance small vessel 
security, including an initiative to help CBP better track small 
vessels arriving from foreign locations and another to assist the 
Coast Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites. 
Although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS is to assess and 
update the plan, DHS has not determined the progress its components 
and other relevant stakeholders—such as the Department of Defense—are 
making in completing the action items and has no current plans to do 
so. DHS officials stated that this is due, in part, to budget 
constraints that make this a low priority. DHS officials stated that 
updating the SVSS Implementation Plan would be valuable, and doing so 
is particularly important since more than one component could be 
responsible for action items in the plan. Accordingly, by 
systematically gathering information from its components and other 
relevant stakeholders to regularly update the progress they are making 
in addressing the action items in the plan, DHS could help prioritize 
initiatives given constrained budgets and better identify successes 
and lessons learned, among other things. 

Figure: The Results of a Small Vessel Attack on the USS Cole: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Department of Defense. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DHS regularly update the progress its components 
and other relevant stakeholders are making in addressing action items 
in the SVSS Implementation Plan. DHS concurred with the recommendation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-32]. For more 
information, contact Stephen Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 
caldwells@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DHS and Its Components Are Taking Actions, but DHS Is Not Tracking 
Progress in Addressing the SVSS Implementation Plan: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Stakeholders Involved in Small Vessel Security: 

Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components' Initiatives to Address Small 
Vessel Security: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of Key DHS Components' Roles and Responsibilities 
Regarding Small Vessel Security: 

Table 2: Number of Participants, Float Plans, and Vessels Registered 
in the Small Vessel Reporting System, May 2010 through May 2013: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The Results of a Small Vessel Attack on the USS Cole: 

Figure 2: Coast Guard Vessels Escorting a Cruise Ship and a Liquid 
Natural Gas Tanker: 

Figure 3: A Floating Security Barrier (Foreground): 

Figure 4: A Citizen Awareness Program Poster: 

Figure 5: Portable Radiation Detectors: 

Abbreviations: 

CBP: Customs and Border Protection: 

CSS: Coastal Surveillance System: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: 

MSRAM: Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model: 

OIG: Office of Inspector General: 

PRND: preventive radiological/nuclear detection: 

RIID: Radioisotope Identification Device: 

SVRS: Small Vessel Reporting System: 

SVSS: Small Vessel Security Strategy: 

S&T: Science and Technology: 

WCMP: West Coast Maritime Pilot: 

[End of section] 

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 31, 2013: 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million 
small vessels operating in the United States in 2012.[Footnote 1] 
Terrorists, smugglers, and other criminals can use small vessels as 
platforms for their activities because small vessels are generally 
unregulated and largely anonymous. Consequently, law enforcement 
agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between the vast number 
of legitimate small vessel operators and the comparatively few 
individuals that are estimated to be engaged in illicit activities. On 
any given day, small vessels share waterways with commercial and 
military vessels, operating at hundreds of U.S. ports and waterways. 
According to the Coast Guard's Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, 
and Stewardship, a small vessel represents one of the greatest risks 
from terrorism in the maritime domain.[Footnote 2] Further, small 
vessels have the potential to be used to smuggle terrorists or weapons 
of mass destruction into the United States. According to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the consequences of a weapon of 
mass destruction attack in the United States could be catastrophic, 
and potentially include the loss of life, direct and indirect economic 
costs, and adverse environmental effects, including the contamination 
of the impact area with subsequent loss of its use for decades. 
[Footnote 3] 

Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to 
attack targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband 
to enter the United States, DHS issued its Small Vessel Security 
Strategy (SVSS) in April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS Implementation 
Plan in January 2011 to help guide its efforts to mitigate the 
security risks arising from small vessels.[Footnote 4] The SVSS and 
Implementation Plan identify several DHS components that have a key 
role in addressing small vessel security, including the U.S. Coast 
Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), DHS's Science and 
Technology (S&T) Directorate, and DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office (DNDO), as well as other federal stakeholders.[Footnote 5] For 
more information on the roles and responsibilities of these DHS 
components, see appendix I. Given the importance of small vessel 
security, you asked us to review DHS's efforts in developing and 
implementing the SVSS Implementation Plan. This report addresses the 
following question: 

* What actions, if any, have DHS and its components taken to address 
small vessel security concerns, and to what extent have they 
implemented action items from the SVSS Implementation Plan? 

To answer this question, we analyzed DHS documents, such as the SVSS, 
the SVSS Implementation Plan, and the Report of the DHS National Small 
Vessel Security Summit.[Footnote 6] We also reviewed relevant federal 
legislation, such as the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 
[Footnote 7] as well as corresponding regulations and guidance. We 
compared DHS's actions for tracking the SVSS Implementation Plan with 
(1) Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 
8] (2) provisions in DHS's SVSS, (3) key management practices, 
[Footnote 9] and (4) useful practices for performance management and 
measurement.[Footnote 10] Further, we interviewed headquarters 
officials responsible for developing or addressing the action items in 
the SVSS Implementation Plan from the DHS Office of Policy, as well as 
four DHS components--the Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T.[Footnote 
11] In these meetings, we also discussed key initiatives that each of 
the four DHS components' have in place to address small vessel 
security and reviewed related documents on these initiatives. Although 
these initiatives relate to the overarching goals of the SVSS, each 
initiative is not directly aligned with a specific action item in the 
SVSS Implementation Plan.[Footnote 12] Accordingly, we focused on 
describing these key initiatives identified by the DHS components, not 
the individual action items in the plan. In addition, we conducted 
visits to two ports--San Diego, California and Miami, Florida--to 
interview port security stakeholders and observe small vessel security 
activities. We selected these ports on the basis of various factors, 
including the (1) relatively high volume of small vessel traffic and 
(2) initiatives initiated at these ports by DHS components to address 
small vessel security risks. At these ports, we interviewed officials 
from local Coast Guard units, as well as from CBP's Office of Field 
Operations and Office of Air and Marine. Further, we interviewed 
representatives from the U.S. Navy, two local law enforcement 
agencies, two port authorities, and six industry associations--who 
were selected because they worked with DHS components regarding small 
vessel security issues and operations. While we cannot generalize the 
results of our interviews and observations to all ports, officials we 
interviewed and observations we made provided us with a general 
overview and perspective on small vessel security issues and 
operations at the selected locations. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to October 
2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Small Vessels Pose Security Risks: 

Larger vessels--such as cruise ships, container ships, and oil and 
natural gas tankers--can travel among small vessels that operate with 
little scrutiny or notice, and some of these larger vessels have 
suffered waterborne attacks overseas by terrorists or pirates who 
operated from small vessels. Although there have not been any small 
vessel attacks in the United States, terrorists have used small 
vessels to facilitate their attacks, such as those on the USS Cole in 
2000 (see fig. 1), the French oil tanker Limburg in Yemen in 2002, and 
the Japanese tanker M Star in 2010. Our prior work has found that the 
use of small vessels to deliver improvised explosive devices was one 
of the most significant concerns for larger vessels.[Footnote 13] The 
concern about small vessel attacks is exacerbated by the fact that 
some larger vessels, such as cruise ships, sail according to precise 
schedules and preplanned itineraries that could provide information to 
terrorists in preparing for and carrying out an attack against a 
vessel. Small vessels have also been successfully employed by pirates 
to hijack international cargo vessels, and at least three cruise ships 
have been attacked by pirates aboard small vessels who were armed with 
automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. 

Figure 1: The Results of a Small Vessel Attack on the USS Cole: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: Department of Defense. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, DHS reported that small vessels have the potential to be 
used to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States. 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, from 1993 through 
2012, there were 2,331 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking of 
nuclear and other radioactive material.[Footnote 14] Although these 
incidents do not all involve the use of small vessels, the former 
commandant of the Coast Guard testified that small vessels pose a 
greater threat than cargo containers for smuggling nuclear materials. 
[Footnote 15] In addition, DHS reported that there is limited ability 
to screen small vessels for weapons of mass destruction, and as a 
result, small vessels could be used by terrorists to transport such 
weapons.[Footnote 16] In January 2009, we reported that DNDO had 
developed and tested equipment for detecting nuclear material on small 
vessels, but that efforts to use this equipment in a port area had 
been limited to pilot programs.[Footnote 17] We further reported that 
DNDO had not established a detailed plan to address gaps and 
vulnerabilities and recommended that DHS develop a plan to help ensure 
the future success of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and 
vulnerabilities and that this plan should focus on, among other 
things, small vessels. To address this recommendation, DHS issued a 
strategic plan in December 2010 and an implementation plan in April 
2012. 

Small Vessels Are Generally Unregulated: 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime 
enforcement efforts have been primarily focused on large commercial 
vessels (over 300 gross tons), while federal efforts to address small 
vessels are more limited. In particular, large commercial vessel 
security is governed by Coast Guard regulations issued pursuant to the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and other relevant 
legislation.[Footnote 18] For example, certain larger vessels are 
required to submit information--in advance of U.S. arrival or 
departure--on crew members, passengers, cargo, and vessel operations. 
[Footnote 19] This advance information allows the Coast Guard and CBP 
to conduct risk-based analyses and gain a greater awareness of large 
commercial vessel operations, their passengers, and their crews. In 
addition, certain large commercial vessels are also required to carry 
and operate transponders--such as an automatic identification system--
which broadcast information on the vessels and their locations, 
allowing authorities to track their movements.[Footnote 20] In 
contrast, small vessels are generally exempt from these requirements. 
[Footnote 21] As a result, the federal government has limited 
knowledge regarding the owners and locations of small vessels. 
[Footnote 22] 

Although small vessels are generally unregulated, the federal 
government has put in place some requirements for these vessels. For 
example, small vessel operators traveling to foreign ports or places 
are required to report to CBP upon their return to the United States. 
[Footnote 23] However, CBP estimates that a small percentage of the 
international small vessel traffic returning to the United States 
actually report this information. According to CBP, this low level of 
compliance is due, in part, to a lack of (1) public awareness of the 
reporting requirements, and (2) inspections to emphasize and ensure 
compliance. CBP has taken actions to help address this issue as part 
of its Small Vessel Reporting System initiative, which is discussed 
later in this report. At the international level, the International 
Maritime Organization issued guidelines in 2008 regarding the security 
of small vessels that are not subject to the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code, but these guidelines are voluntary. 
[Footnote 24] 

In March 2009, we reported on the challenges of tracking small vessels 
using available technologies.[Footnote 25] For example, we reported 
that although the Coast Guard and other agencies may have technology 
systems that can track small vessels within some ports, these did not 
always work in bad weather or at night. Further, we reported that even 
with systems in place to track small vessels, there is agreement among 
maritime stakeholders that it is difficult to detect threatening 
activity by small vessels without prior knowledge of a planned attack. 
Ultimately, DHS documents report that the U.S. government has only 
limited knowledge about international recreational boaters and their 
travel patterns. 

According to the SVSS, in the United States, there is a tradition and 
expectation among small vessel operators to generally have 
unrestricted access to U.S. waterways. In addition, small vessel 
operators have expressed concerns about the cost of requirements that 
would allow the government to track their movements. For example, DHS 
conducted outreach efforts with the small vessel community while 
developing the SVSS, and DHS reported that small vessel operators and 
national recreational vessel associations expressed concern that the 
cost of transponders would present an objectionable burden for 
recreational boaters. Accordingly, DHS faces a challenge in balancing 
the collection of information necessary for the proper assessment of 
risks posed by small vessels with the freedom of the seas expected by 
small vessel operators. 

Development of the SVSS and SVSS Implementation Plan: 

In June 2007, DHS held an initial small vessel security summit to 
engage private, commercial, and government stakeholders in discussions 
on a range of issues involving the security risks posed by small 
vessels in the U.S. maritime environment.[Footnote 26] During this 
summit, the stakeholders that attended provided numerous 
recommendations to DHS, including a recommendation that DHS develop a 
national strategy regarding small vessel security. In response to this 
recommendation, DHS convened the Small Vessel Security Working Group 
in August 2007, which consisted of representatives from DHS 
components, such as the Coast Guard, CBP, and the Transportation 
Security Administration, as well as participation by representatives 
from the Departments of Justice and Defense. The working group 
developed the SVSS in April 2008 to address the potential for small 
vessels to be used (1) to smuggle terrorists or weapons, including 
weapons of mass destruction, into the United States; (2) as a standoff 
weapon platform; or (3) as a direct attack method to deliver a 
waterborne improvised explosive device.[Footnote 27] The four 
overarching goals--which include more specific objectives--of the SVSS 
are to: 

* develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel 
community and public and private sectors in order to enhance maritime 
domain awareness;[Footnote 28] 

* enhance maritime security and safety based on a coherent plan with a 
layered, innovative approach; 

* leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect; determine 
intent; and, when necessary, interdict small vessels; and: 

* enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between 
federal, state, local and tribal partners and the private sector, as 
well as international partners. 

DHS subsequently issued the SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011. 
[Footnote 29] In developing the plan, the SVSS Working Group relied on 
subject matter experts at DHS components to provide input on what 
action items should be included. From these efforts, DHS includes a 
total of 132 action items in the plan, organized according to the four 
overarching SVSS goals. Each of the action items provides a 
description of the action to be taken and the lead federal department 
or component responsible for coordinating and implementing the action. 
Examples of action items include the following: 

* increase systematic visits to maritime facilities to build 
relationships, improve knowledge of threat conditions at marinas, and 
deter criminals; 

* partner and coordinate with foreign countries, particularly in the 
Caribbean region, on radiological and nuclear detection and 
interdiction; 

* explore research and development of a permanent sensor system to 
detect and track noncooperative vessels; and: 

* improve federal, state, tribal, and local interagency information 
sharing, joint targeting, collaboration on boardings, and related 
operations. 

Based on input from the DHS components' subject matter experts, the 
SVSS Implementation Plan also includes information on the general time 
frames, estimated relative costs, and anticipated impacts that each 
action item may have in achieving the goals of the SVSS.[Footnote 30] 

After DHS issued the SVSS Implementation Plan, each federal agency or 
component was responsible for separately determining the feasibility 
of the relevant action items and deciding which ones to implement 
after taking into account its specific mission, priorities, and the 
resources available.[Footnote 31] The SVSS Implementation Plan states 
that it is intended to be a guidance document to provide greater 
specificity about how preexisting programs may be developed and 
coordinated to achieve the goals and objectives outlined in the SVSS. 

DHS and Its Components Are Taking Actions, but DHS Is Not Tracking 
Progress in Addressing the SVSS Implementation Plan: 

DHS Components Have Various Initiatives to Address Small Vessel 
Security Concerns: 

DHS components have completed some initiatives and have other 
initiatives under way to address small vessel security concerns. Some 
of these initiatives go back more than a decade, and include security 
measures that the components have implemented to protect vessels and 
infrastructure from small vessel attacks, including the enforcement of 
security zones around certain vessels--such as ferries--or 
infrastructure. Another security measure is the escort of larger 
vessels--such as cruise ships and liquid natural gas tankers--into a 
port, as shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Coast Guard Vessels Escorting a Cruise Ship and a Liquid 
Natural Gas Tanker: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard (left photograph; GAO (right photograph. 

[End of figure] 

More recently, DHS components developed initiatives to address small 
vessel security concerns that relate to the four goals of the SVSS--
although many initiatives began prior to issuance of the SVSS 
Implementation Plan. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that many of 
the initiatives in the plan are not new or uniquely dedicated to 
terrorist threats or small vessels, and that a number of the 
initiatives are ongoing in the various federal agencies responsible 
for facilitating maritime safety, security, recreation, and commerce. 
[Footnote 32] Further, more than one DHS component may be responsible 
for addressing a single action item in the SVSS Implementation Plan, 
and a single action item could be addressed through several 
initiatives. In addition, DHS officials stated that initiatives often 
aligned with multiple action items in the plan.[Footnote 33] 

DHS component officials we met with identified the following key 
initiatives that they have completed or have under way to enhance 
small vessel security. These initiatives relate to the goals of the 
SVSS and are linked to multiple action items in the SVSS 
Implementation Plan. For additional information on these four 
initiatives, see appendix II. 

* Focused Lens. Originally piloted by the Coast Guard in 2008, Focused 
Lens is an ongoing initiative intended to assist Coast Guard units in 
preventing small vessel attacks in their areas of operation by 
identifying and directing additional resources and efforts toward the 
most likely points of origin for a small vessel attack, such as 
marinas and boat ramps. 

* Small Vessel Reporting System. In May 2010, CBP developed this 
voluntary, online program to enable small vessel operators to expedite 
the reporting of their foreign voyages to and planned arrivals in the 
United States. This program is intended to allow CBP to assess the 
risks for known small vessels and associated passengers in advance of 
arrival in the United States and, as a result, make it easier to 
identify suspicious or unknown small vessels. 

* West Coast Maritime Pilot. Under this pilot, DNDO provided equipment 
and training to a variety of federal, state, local, and tribal 
agencies to enhance their ability to detect and interdict the 
smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials onboard small vessels. 
The pilot ran from September 2007 to December 2010, and according to 
DNDO officials, has integrated the lessons learned and standard 
operating procedures developed to expand assistance efforts in other 
regions around the country. 

* Coastal Surveillance System. DHS S&T is developing a system that is 
designed to integrate information from publicly available data sources 
and sensors to improve (1) maritime domain awareness by tracking 
vessels in real time and (2) the interdiction of vessels involved in 
illegal or illicit activities by identifying anomalies or suspicious 
behavior. 

In addition to specific initiatives, DHS officials and port security 
stakeholders cited general efforts that they believed have helped to 
improve coordination among federal, state, and local agencies--one of 
the goals of the SVSS. For example, federal and local port security 
stakeholders at one of the ports we visited stated that their joint 
operations center has helped them coordinate security operations, such 
as the security boarding of small vessels. According to Coast Guard 
officials, the Coast Guard performed 11,399 small vessel security 
boardings in 2012, and with the assistance of other port security 
stakeholders, an additional 789 small vessels security boardings were 
conducted that year.[Footnote 34] In addition, in one of the ports we 
visited, the Coast Guard and local law enforcement officials developed 
a memorandum of understanding to conduct joint boardings of small 
vessels. Local law enforcement and port authority officials at the two 
ports we visited stated that enhanced coordination with federal 
agencies has improved the overall level of communication and 
cooperation related to small vessel security operations. 

DHS Is Not Tracking Progress on the SVSS Implementation Plan: 

Although DHS components have various initiatives under way, DHS does 
not know the extent to which its components or other relevant 
stakeholders have made progress in addressing SVSS Implementation Plan 
action items because DHS is not systematically gathering information 
on their efforts. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS is to 
assess and update the plan annually and focus on realigning the plan 
with the activities under way by its components and other federal 
agencies. The SVSS Implementation Plan directs that this review is 
also to (1) eliminate short-term action items that have been completed 
over the previous year; (2) transition action items from long-term to 
short-term status, as appropriate; and (3) augment the plan with new 
action items. Since the SVSS Implementation Plan was issued in 2011, 
however, neither DHS nor its components are tracking progress on the 
action items in the plan. 

Officials we spoke with from four of the key DHS components that have 
responsibility for leading the majority of the action items in the 
SVSS Implementation Plan (the Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T) 
stated that while they are tracking efforts and initiatives of their 
component-specific missions that may address risks posed by small 
vessels, they are not systematically tracking these efforts as they 
relate to the specific action items listed in the plan. After the SVSS 
Implementation Plan was issued, the Coast Guard conducted a one-time 
review in November 2011 of the action items in the plan where it was 
identified as a lead or colead. This review included information on 
the status of preexisting or planned Coast Guard initiatives that were 
related to each action item and which action items were determined to 
not be implementable. 

DHS officials we spoke with stated that there is no plan to update the 
SVSS Implementation Plan because it is not a priority, given budget 
constraints, and it is too early to measure the effectiveness of 
action items in the plan. According to a senior DHS Policy official, 
although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS should assess 
and update the plan annually, given these constraints, an annual 
review is too frequent. The senior DHS official added that per the 
Secretary of Homeland Security's direction, DHS components are 
focusing on maintaining their ongoing operations under constrained 
budgets, and so efforts to update the SVSS Implementation Plan are not 
currently a priority. For example, Coast Guard officials we met with 
stated that, in many instances, the ability to expand certain efforts 
in scope or scale so as to more effectively address small vessel 
security risks may be dependent on the funding of particular port 
programs or the availability of related grant funding, which can be 
affected by budget constraints. Coast Guard officials added that 
America's Waterway Watch--a program highlighted in the SVSS 
Implementation Plan that provides outreach to the public, including 
the small vessel community, on awareness of threats and how to report 
suspicious activity--may not receive funding in DHS's fiscal year 2014 
appropriation. 

DHS officials also stated that because the SVSS Implementation Plan 
was issued in early 2011, it is too early to expect a majority of the 
action items to be completed or, especially for the long-term action 
items, to have been implemented. These officials stated that 
accomplishing the SVSS's goals and objectives through implementation 
of the many action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan will require 
a significant investment of time and resources, along with buy-in from 
state and local maritime security stakeholders. Accordingly, it could 
take years to fully implement some of the action items and determine 
whether they are effective. Further, according to DHS officials, not 
all action items listed in the SVSS Implementation Plan may be 
feasible or implemented at all port locations nationally. For example, 
Coast Guard officials we met with stated that while the placement of 
floating security barriers is an effective security strategy used by 
the U.S. Navy to protect certain high-value assets (see fig. 3), it 
would not be economically feasible to install such barriers at all 
ports because they would have to be designed for the specific 
characteristics and needs of each port location.[Footnote 35] 

Figure 3: A Floating Security Barrier (Foreground): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

DHS officials involved with the SVSS Working Group, as well as 
officials from four of the DHS components we spoke with, stated that 
receiving updates on progress or lessons learned from efforts to 
implement the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan would be 
valuable information. For example, officials we met with from DHS 
Policy and the Coast Guard stated that they recognize the value in 
updating the progress of the SVSS Implementation Plan to incorporate 
new information about threats, changes in technologies, requirements, 
and lessons learned as programs are assessed, prioritized, and 
implemented. In addition, a Coast Guard port security specialist we 
met with at one of the ports added that updating the progress of the 
plan could help DHS better determine where to focus its research and 
development efforts and prioritize the related funding and resources 
needs. Further, DNDO officials we met with stated that there is value 
in understanding what individual DHS components are implementing 
regarding the SVSS Implementation Plan, as well as the methods and 
techniques that are being used. The DNDO officials added that 
obtaining a common understanding of ongoing efforts to implement 
related initiatives could prevent duplication of effort, provide a 
means of sharing lessons learned among components, and potentially 
save time and resources. DHS S&T officials we met with similarly 
stated that there is value in learning about the overall progress of 
the SVSS Implementation Plan and that, to do this effectively, this 
information needs to be collected in a more systematic way and then be 
made widely available to all the agencies involved. 

Although it may be too early to measure the effectiveness of some 
action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan, updating the progress 
made in addressing the action items could help DHS and its components 
prioritize their efforts given constrained budgets; better identify 
successes and lessons learned; and enhance collaboration with federal, 
state, and local stakeholders regarding small vessel security issues. 
The SVSS Implementation Plan states that, because of risk, the 
unpredictability of budgets, policy changes, and administrative 
priorities, the plan must be reviewed regularly to ensure that it 
remains current and accurate. By engaging in this review process, the 
plan states that it is intended to be a living document that provides 
a strategic overview of participating agencies' implementation of the 
SVSS. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls 
for federal agencies to design and implement control activities to 
enforce management's directives.[Footnote 36] Further, the SVSS 
Implementation Plan calls for DHS to assess and update the plan to 
determine the progress that has been made to address the action items 
in the plan. This provision is a control activity to help ensure the 
achievement of the goals and objectives of the SVSS. The SVSS 
Implementation Plan calls for this review to be conducted annually, 
but given resource constraints and the time it will take to complete 
some of the action items, less frequent but regular assessments may be 
warranted. By systematically gathering information from its components 
and other relevant stakeholders to update the action items in the SVSS 
Implementation Plan on a regular basis, DHS would be better able to 
monitor progress against the plan and the goals and objectives of the 
SVSS. This is particularly important given that more than one agency 
or component may be responsible for addressing action items in the 
plan and because, according to DHS officials, accomplishing the SVSS's 
goals and objectives will require a significant investment of time and 
resources. According to key management practices, for agency efforts 
that require a substantial commitment and that could take years to 
complete, it is essential to track implementation goals to pinpoint 
performance shortfalls and gaps and suggest any needed corrections. 
[Footnote 37] Further, according to useful practices for performance 
management and measurement, having a clear understanding of current 
performance--a baseline--is essential to determining whether new 
initiatives will result in accomplishing the goals and objectives of 
the SVSS.[Footnote 38] 

Conclusions: 

Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to 
attack targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband 
to enter the United States, DHS issued its SVSS Implementation Plan in 
January 2011 to help guide efforts to mitigate the security risks 
arising from small vessels. DHS component agencies have completed some 
initiatives and have other initiatives under way to address the risk 
of a small vessel attack, but DHS is not gathering information on the 
progress its components or relevant stakeholders are making to address 
action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan and has no plans to do 
so. The SVSS Implementation Plan, by design, is to be revised to 
accommodate new information about threats, technologies, requirements, 
and lessons learned as action items are implemented, but DHS has not 
updated the plan since it was issued in 2011. Given that internal 
controls call for federal agencies to design and implement control 
activities to enforce management's directives, DHS could better 
prioritize initiatives and identify successes if it was to regularly 
update the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders are 
making to address the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. 
This information could be particularly useful to DHS components that 
may be operating under more constrained budgets than when the plan was 
first issued. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To improve DHS's ability to monitor progress, prioritize action items, 
and identify successes, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security systematically gather information from the department's 
components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the 
progress they are making in addressing action items in the SVSS 
Implementation Plan. 

Agency Comments: 

In September 2013, we requested comments on a draft of this report 
from the Department of Homeland Security. The department provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as 
appropriate. In addition to its technical comments, DHS provided an 
official letter for inclusion in the report, which can be seen in 
appendix III. In the letter, DHS stated it concurred with the 
recommendation and, by October 31, 2014, plans to complete a review of 
the progress its components are making in addressing SVSS 
Implementation Plan actions. We think this review is an important 
first step, but want to emphasize that such progress reviews should be 
conducted on a periodic basis until the SVSS Implementation Plan 
action items are fully addressed. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees, 
and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Stakeholders Involved in Small Vessel Security: 

This appendix provides details on the numerous stakeholders that play 
a role in small vessel security. These stakeholders include various 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components with regulatory, 
statutory, and management responsibilities that affect small vessel 
security. See table 1 for key DHS components involved in small vessel 
security, including the components that are the lead or colead for the 
majority of the action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy 
(SVSS) Implementation Plan. 

Table 1: Examples of Key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Components' Roles and Responsibilities Regarding Small Vessel Security: 

DHS component/role: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 
CBP's top priority is to keep terrorists and their weapons from 
entering the United States; 
Small vessel security-related responsibilities: 
* Makes final admissibility determinations regarding cargo and persons 
arriving from a foreign port or place; 
* Enforces applicable requirements for commercial vessel operations, 
including requirements to provide and screen inbound and outbound 
cargo declarations and passenger manifests, and provide entry and 
clearance notifications; 
* Employs resources to identify and interdict terrorists and 
terrorists' weapons as far from the U.S. shores as possible; 
* Served as one of the lead DHS components for the development of the 
SVSS and SVSS Implementation Plan. 

DHS component/role: U.S. Coast Guard; 
The Coast Guard's core roles are to protect the public, the 
environment, and U.S. economic and security interests in the U.S. 
maritime domain; 
Small vessel security-related responsibilities: 
* Inspects and assesses the security of U.S. ports in accordance with 
pertinent legislation; 
* Facilitates efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness--including 
the monitoring of all vessels in U.S. waters; 
* Provides operational capabilities to deter, respond to, and mitigate 
small vessel attacks; 
* Served as one of the lead DHS components for the development of the 
SVSS and SVSS Implementation Plan. 

DHS component/role: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO); 
DNDO was established to improve the capability to detect and report 
the presence of nuclear or radiological material; 
Small vessel security-related responsibilities: 
* Develops the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture; 
* Establishes operation protocols to ensure that nuclear detection 
leads to effective response; 
* Conducts research and development program in nuclear detection; 
* Partners with DHS components, including the Coast Guard and CBP for 
the acquisition of radiation and nuclear detection equipment. 

DHS component/role: DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate; 
DHS S&T is the primary research and development arm of DHS; 
Small vessel security-related responsibilities: 
* Drives development and use of technology in support of homeland 
security missions; 
* Develops technologies that are to provide real-world capabilities to 
support the reduction of risk from the exploitation of small vessels 
by terrorists; 
* Develops technologies to support the mission of other DHS components. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by DHS components. 

Note: In addition to the DHS components listed above, DHS's Office of 
Policy--which is the primary policy formulation and coordination 
component for DHS--also helped develop the SVSS and SVSS Implementation 
Plan. 

[End of table] 

To enhance deterrence and improve preparedness, state, local, and 
tribal governments are also involved in small vessel security. For 
example, state and local law enforcement agencies carry out a variety 
of security operations at their respective ports, such as small vessel 
boardings or escorts of vessels into port. Finally, the general 
public, including the small vessel community and fishing associations, 
play a role in small vessel security by identifying and reporting 
suspicious activity to relevant law enforcement agencies. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components' Initiatives to Address Small 
Vessel Security: 

This appendix provides additional details on four key initiatives that 
DHS components have completed or have under way to improve small 
vessel security. Each of these initiatives is led by one of the four 
DHS components with a key role in addressing small vessel security--
the Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS's S&T. The initiatives included in 
this appendix are illustrative of actions DHS components have taken to 
enhance small vessel security and are linked to multiple action items 
in the SVSS Implementation Plan. 

Focused Lens: 

Originally created by the Coast Guard's District Eleven as Operation 
Focused Lens, the initiative was piloted in 2008 to address small 
vessel security risks.[Footnote 39] As a continuing Coast Guard 
initiative, Focused Lens is intended to increase awareness of 
suspicious activity in and around U.S. ports. In particular, Focused 
Lens is intended to assist Coast Guard units in preventing small 
vessel attacks in their areas of operation by directing additional 
resources and efforts toward the most likely points of origin for a 
small vessel attack, such as marinas and vessel ramps. Focused Lens 
relates to the SVSS goals, particularly the goal to develop and 
leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel community and 
public and private sectors. 

Focused Lens is composed of three phases. In phase 1, Coast Guard 
officials are to identify small vessel launch sites in their area of 
operation and assess their attributes, including the size of the 
launch sites and their proximity to people, homes, and businesses, and 
whether the sites have security measures in place, such as video 
cameras and lighting.[Footnote 40] In phase 2, Coast Guard officials 
are to enter the data they collect on launch sites in their area of 
operation into the Coast Guard's Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model 
(MSRAM).[Footnote 41] A MSRAM analyst is to evaluate the data to 
determine the potential of the launch sites to be used by terrorists 
based on the various attributes, and prioritize the launch sites 
accordingly. In phase 3, the Coast Guard is to decide on where to 
conduct security activities (i.e., boarding small vessels, conducting 
surveillance patrols, or promoting citizen awareness programs) based 
on the prioritization of the launch sites. These security activities 
are to be conducted at the discretion of Coast Guard officials in 
their specific areas of operation to prevent and deter terrorist 
activity.[Footnote 42] Even if activities are not routinely conducted, 
MSRAM data can be used to provide the Coast Guard with important 
information on launch sites so that it can prioritize and focus its 
security activities during times of emerging terrorist threat 
conditions. According to Coast Guard documentation, citizen awareness 
programs can help to increase understanding among the general public--
including marina and small vessel operators--regarding the process for 
reporting suspicious activities. See figure 4 for a poster promoting a 
citizen awareness program. 

Figure 4: A Citizen Awareness Program Poster: 

[Refer to PDF for image: copy of poster] 

Poster text: 

America's Waterway Watch: 
Help Keep America's Waterways Safe and Secure. 

Report Suspicious Activity on the Waterfront. Call 911, VHF Channel 
16, or 877-24WATCH. 
[hyperlink, http://www.americaswaterwatch.uscg.mil] 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

[End of figure] 

Since the initiative was first piloted in District Eleven in 2008, the 
Coast Guard has identified Focused Lens as a best practice, and it 
began to expand the initiative in fiscal year 2012. Focused Lens has 
been implemented, or is being implemented, in various locations within 
Coast Guard districts and sectors. According to Coast Guard officials, 
it is left to the discretion of Coast Guard commanding officers 
whether to implement Focused Lens in their area of operation, given 
their competing priorities and limited resources. Coast Guard 
officials stated that Focused Lens may not be feasible to implement in 
some locations, such as areas that include a river that has no 
designated launch sites, and where a vessel could be launched at any 
location along its length. Further, Focused Lens may not be 
implemented in locations where the area of operation is relatively 
small and response teams can respond in a timely manner. For example, 
Coast Guard officials in one of the ports we visited stated that they 
decided not to implement Focused Lens because their area of operation 
was condensed and all launch sites could be reached within a matter of 
minutes. Through regular analysis and refinement, and with feedback 
from its field units, the Coast Guard reports that Focused Lens is 
expected to remain a useful tool for operational decision makers. 

Small Vessel Reporting System: 

CBP developed the Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS)--a voluntary, 
online program for small vessel operators and passengers 
(participants) to report their foreign travels--to better track small 
vessels and make it easier to identify suspicious or unknown vessels. 
To enroll in the SVRS program, participants are to first complete an 
online application and then make an appointment for a face-to-face 
interview with a CBP officer who verifies the information provided 
and, if needed, obtains their digital fingerprints and photograph. 
[Footnote 43] Once enrolled, participants are able to submit float 
plans for their intended international travel online.[Footnote 44] By 
doing so, participants can expedite the process for reporting their 
intended arrivals from foreign locations and may not have to appear in 
person for inspection by CBP officers each time they enter the United 
States.[Footnote 45] 

Since the SVRS enables CBP to capture certain biographical and vessel 
data much earlier than upon a vessel's arrival at the United States 
from a foreign location, CBP can review this information to identify 
potential high-risk small vessels and determine, in advance of the 
vessels' arrival, if a face-to-face inspection may need to be 
conducted. A CBP official we met with who is familiar with the SVRS 
stated that if the SVRS is used by a participant, CBP inspection 
officers will be better able to determine if a face-to-face inspection 
is needed and, if so, what level of resources is needed to conduct an 
inspection upon the participant entering the United States. Further, 
CBP officials we spoke with at one of the ports we visited stated that 
the SVRS enables them to increase the amount of time CBP officers are 
spending in the field to conduct enforcement activities by limiting 
the amount of time officers spend collecting and entering data from 
boaters reporting their arrival by phone. The SVRS relates to the 
goals of the SVSS, particularly the goal of enhancing maritime 
security and safety through the implementation of advanced data 
submission procedures and efforts to increase reporting compliance. 

The SVRS was initially piloted in Miami, Florida, in May 2010. Miami 
was selected as the pilot location because of the large population of 
small vessels operating in that area. The pilot was made available to 
participants already enrolled in a local CBP registered traveler 
program. Later in 2010, the SVRS pilot was expanded to additional CBP 
field offices covering southern Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. In May 2011, CBP further expanded the pilot to include 
five additional field offices--Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, and 
Seattle--and eligibility was also expanded to include all U.S. and 
Canadian citizens, among others.[Footnote 46] As of October 2011, the 
SVRS pilot was deployed to all CBP field offices nationwide with the 
exception of two--El Paso and Tucson--that do not have a nexus to 
water. According to CBP, as of May 28, 2013, the number of 
participants enrolled in the SVRS had grown to 30,190, along with a 
total of 5,862 float plans submitted, and 11,189 vessels registered, 
as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Number of Participants, Float Plans, and Vessels Registered 
in the Small Vessel Reporting System, May 2010 through May 2013: 

Milestone: May 2010, to May 22, 2011; (pilot deployed in South 
Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands); 
U.S. citizens: 8,253; 
Legal permanent residents: 1; 
Canadian citizens: 47; 
Total participants: 8,301; 
Submitted float plans: 822; 
Registered vessels: 3,225. 

Milestone: May 23, 2011, to October 28, 2011; (pilot expanded to 
Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, and Seattle); 
U.S. citizens: 6,659; 
Legal permanent residents: 2; 
Canadian citizens: 488; 
Total participants: 7,149; 
Submitted float plans: 1,428; 
Registered vessels: 2,389. 

Milestone: October 29, 2011, to May 28, 2013; (pilot expanded to all 
CBP field offices nationwide); 
U.S. citizens: 13,892; 
Legal permanent residents: 8; 
Canadian citizens: 840; 
Total participants: 14,740; 
Submitted float plans: 3,612; 
Registered vessels: 5,575. 

Milestones: Totals; 
U.S. citizens: 28,804; 
Legal permanent residents: 11; 
Canadian citizens: 1,375; 
Total participants: 30,190; 
Submitted float plans: 5,862[A]; 
Registered vessels: 11,189. 

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

[A] Of the float plans submitted, 4,634 (79 percent) of them have been 
completed. The remaining 1,228 (21 percent) were float plans that were 
submitted but not used or were for future trips that had not yet taken 
place. 

[End of table] 

As of May 2013, three CBP field office locations--Miami and Tampa, 
Florida, and San Juan, Puerto Rico--accounted for 79 percent of the 
SVRS registrants. CBP officials attributed this to the fact that the 
SVRS pilot originated in these locations and the number of small 
vessels operating in these locations is very high relative to the 
number in other locations. CBP officials added that the number of SVRS 
registrations is not very high in some locations and noted that CBP is 
attempting to address challenges to implementing the SVRS in other 
locations. For example, CBP officials we met with at one of the ports 
we visited stated that, as of April 2013, a total of 14 people had 
enrolled in the SVRS at their location and a few float plans had been 
submitted. The CBP officials stated that they believed these numbers 
were low, in part, because of the lack of publicity regarding the SVRS 
program. CBP officials added that CBP is in the process of increasing 
its efforts to promote the SVRS through various community outreach 
efforts at a number of locations in an attempt to expand public 
awareness and increase use of the SVRS among small vessel operators 
and passengers. Finally, CBP officials told us that because of the 
proximity of many locations along the U.S. border to Canada, a trip 
between the two countries may require only a few minutes to complete. 
As a result, a program to expedite the reporting process is already 
being utilized in this region, thereby negating the need to register 
in the SVRS.[Footnote 47] CBP officials stated that CBP is in the 
process of determining whether modifications can be made to the SVRS 
in an effort to increase its use in this region. 

West Coast Maritime Pilot: 

DNDO conducted the West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) program from 
September 2007 to December 2010. The pilot program--which provided 
equipment and training to a variety of federal, state, local, and 
tribal agencies--was designed to enhance agencies' ability to detect 
and interdict the smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials 
being transported onboard small vessels. DNDO implemented the WMCP 
program in two locations--Puget Sound, Washington, and San Diego, 
California--and coordinated it through local Area Maritime Security 
Committees.[Footnote 48] The objective of the WCMP program was to 
create a layered, preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) 
defense across the participating state and local agencies that would 
enhance the limited resources of federal agencies. The WCMP program 
also sought to develop, implement, and evaluate standard operating 
procedures for detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear 
materials transported onboard small vessels that could then be adapted 
to the needs of other ports or regions. The WCMP program relates to 
the goals of the SVSS, including enhancing maritime security and 
safety based on a coherent plan with a layered, innovative approach. 

In both of the pilot locations, DNDO procured commercially available 
boat-mounted and portable radiation detection equipment (for examples 
of the latter, see fig. 5), trained agency personnel on how to use the 
equipment, and evaluated agencies' maritime PRND operations in 
exercises involving small vessels that were carrying radiological or 
nuclear materials onboard. 

Figure 5: Portable Radiation Detectors: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs] 

Source: DNDO. 

Note: Pictured, from left to right, are (1) the Polimaster PM 1703GN 
PRD, which is designed to be worn on a belt and to alert in the 
presence of radiation levels above a defined threshold; (2) the 
ThermoFisher IdentiFINDER-U RIID (Radioisotope Identification Device--
or RIID--which is designed to detect and localize radiation sources, 
identify specific types of radiation and the specific isotope emitting 
the radiation, and store radiation data for transmission to subject 
matter experts for analysis; and (3) the ORTEC MicroDetective-EX, 
which is a more advanced, high-resolution type of RIID. 

[End of figure] 

According to DNDO's final reports, the WCMP program resulted in the 
successful development of a regionally coordinated, layered, maritime 
PRND capability to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear threats 
transported onboard small vessels at each of the two pilot locations. 
The final report for one of the pilot locations stated that more than 
250 additional radiation detectors were deployed, new training 
materials were developed, and training was provided to over 400 
emergency responders. Further, the final report for the other pilot 
location stated that the number of agency boats conducting PRND 
screenings of small vessels has more than doubled and the number of 
screenings has increased significantly because of leveraging the 
resources and expertise of state, local, and tribal agencies. These 
reports also stated that the participating agencies successfully 
detected the presence of radiological or nuclear materials transported 
on small vessels during exercises.[Footnote 49] Additionally, 
according to DNDO officials, the WCMP program demonstrated that it is 
possible for maritime PRND operations to be integrated into the 
operations of law enforcement and emergency responders with limited 
impact on their duties. 

The final WCMP program reports also highlighted some challenges 
related to the development of maritime PRND capability focused on 
small vessels. For example, although these reports stated that the 
WCMP program exercises proved successful, DNDO officials stated that 
reducing the risk posed by small vessels containing illicit 
radiological or nuclear materials in the real world is a challenge, in 
part because, at any given time, there could be a large number of 
small vessels that would need to be screened. DNDO reported that 
further analysis is needed at the port level to determine the numbers 
and placement of PRND equipment and operational tactics that would be 
most effective.[Footnote 50] 

Since completion of the pilots, DNDO has integrated the lessons 
learned from the WCMP program to expand its maritime PRND program 
assistance efforts in other regions around the country. For example, 
according to DNDO officials, lessons learned from the WCMP program 
were used to develop a regional maritime PRND program in Boston, 
Massachusetts, and similar efforts are under way in Charleston, South 
Carolina; Rochester, New York; and San Francisco, California. DNDO 
also developed generic standard operating procedures for a regional 
maritime PRND program and provided these to the Coast Guard for 
potential distribution to all of the Area Maritime Security Committees 
around the nation. Further, both WCMP programs in Puget Sound and San 
Diego have been sustained with continued use of the equipment from the 
pilot, and, according to DNDO officials, the maritime PRND program in 
Puget Sound continues to grow with additional agencies joining the 
effort and the number of boat-mounted detection systems in the region 
increasing as well. 

Coastal Surveillance System: 

DHS S&T is developing and piloting the Coastal Surveillance System 
(CSS),[Footnote 51] which is intended to improve (1) maritime domain 
awareness by tracking vessels in real time and (2) the interdiction of 
vessels involved in illegal or illicit activities by identifying 
anomalies or suspicious behavior. With respect to small vessels, DHS 
S&T officials stated that the key benefit of the CSS, once fully 
developed, will be its ability to help users--such as CBP, the Coast 
Guard, and law enforcement agencies--distinguish small vessels that 
are not a threat from those that may warrant further action. 
Specifically, DHS S&T officials stated that they believe the CSS will 
be able to improve interdiction effectiveness--the number of boardings 
that result in apprehensions and prosecutions. Accordingly, the CSS 
relates to the goals of the SVSS, particularly the goal to leverage 
technology to enhance the ability to detect; determine intent; and, 
when necessary, interdict small vessels. 

According to DHS S&T documents, the CSS is intended to improve 
maritime domain awareness and interdiction effectiveness by 
integrating a variety of unclassified information on vessels collected 
from publicly available data sources, as well as data collected from 
sensors.[Footnote 52] Through analytical tools, the CSS is intended to 
alert users to suspicious vessels. According to DHS S&T officials, the 
CSS is intended to provide users with an operational picture similar 
to what the Federal Aviation Administration uses to identify the 
location of all airplanes at all times. 

Although the 3-year CSS pilot program was to be initiated in fiscal 
year 2014, DHS S&T officials stated that they were ahead of scheduled 
time frames and deployed the CSS to three DHS field locations in 
December 2012 to obtain early feedback on the system.[Footnote 53] DHS 
S&T officials stated that they are documenting feedback they receive 
on the CSS and are making changes before the pilot is officially 
launched in fiscal year 2014 and the CSS is deployed to other 
entities, including state and local law enforcement agencies and 
international partners. 

Although DHS S&T intends for the CSS to track small vessels, DHS S&T 
officials stated that, as of May 2013, the CSS does not have the 
capability to detect most small vessels, since these vessels are 
generally not required to submit information to systems that would 
feed into the CSS. DHS S&T officials stated that more information 
sources are needed to be able to track small vessels. For example, 
according to an April 2013 CBP assessment of the CSS, the initial 
rollout of the CSS to its Air and Marine Operations Center had limited 
sensor integration to track small vessels. DHS S&T reports that it 
plans to take advantage of technological advances to detect small 
vessels that are being developed under two DHS S&T programs, and 
incorporate these data sources into the CSS over time.[Footnote 54] 
DHS S&T officials identified some examples of technologies DHS S&T is 
in the process of developing or piloting, including the Smart Chart 
Automatic Identification System--a smart phone application that is to 
provide free nautical maps to the user but is to also provide vessel 
positioning information to authorized federal agencies--and the SeaWeb 
acoustic tripwire, which is to deliver an acoustic sensor to detect 
small vessels. DHS S&T officials stated that these are currently in 
different phases of development and are not yet integrated into the 
CSS. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

October 23, 2013: 

Stephen L. Caldwell: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-14-32, "Maritime Security: DHS Could Benefit from
Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy" 

Dear Mr. Caldwell: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in conducting its 
review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note GAO's positive acknowledgment of the 
many initiatives that DHS Components have completed or are under way 
to address small vessel security concerns. Generally conducted under 
the auspices of the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) 
Implementation Plan, these activities are critical to the Department's 
success in fulfilling its missions and have definitely helped 
facilitate increased coordination among federal, state, and local 
agencies, which is one of the goals of the SVSS. 

The draft report contained one recommendation with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security: 

Recommendation: Systematically gather information from the 
department's components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly 
update the progress they are making in addressing action items in the 
SVSS Implementation Plan. 

Response: Concur. The DHS Office of Policy, Office of Policy 
Integration and Implementation, will initiate a review of the progress 
in implementing SVSS Implementation Plan actions as soon as reasonably 
practical, given available resources, and competing priorities and 
demands, as appropriate. DHS Office of Policy program officials and 
subject matter experts agree that collecting additional information on 
existing progress from Components may be beneficial. However, they 
also emphasize that oversight of the Components is best accomplished 
when the Components act within their authority during periods of 
budgetary constraints. Estimated Completion Date: October 31, 2014. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comments on 
this draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant 
Director), Tracey Cross, Julian King, Tracey King, Stanley J. Kostyla, 
Jessica Orr, and Hugh Paquette made significant contributions to the 
work. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Coast Guard: Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Faced in 
Developing and Implementing a Common Operational Picture. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-784T]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2013. 

Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common 
Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-321]. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 
2013. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could 
Advance DHS's Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and 
Other Infrastructure. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-11]. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 
2012. 

Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its 
Cargo Targeting System. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-9]. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 
2012. 

Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1009T]. Washington, D.C.: September 
11, 2012. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed Plans for Its Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying 
Equipment. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-941T]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012. 

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Efforts to Address Port Recovery and 
Salvage Response. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-494R]. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 
2012. 

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management of 
Interagency Operations Centers. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-202]. Washington, D.C.: February 
13, 2012. 

Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but More Training 
Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-14]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 17, 2011. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made but Further Actions Needed to Secure 
the Maritime Energy Supply. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-883T]. Washington, D.C.: August 24, 
2011. 

Maritime Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address 
Risks Posed by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-195]. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 
2011. 

Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but 
Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-207]. Washington, D.C.: 
December 3, 2010. 

Maritime Security Responses to Questions for the Record. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-140R]. Washington, D.C.: October 
22, 2010. 

Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port 
Security. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-940T]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet 
Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or 
Closed Identified Gaps. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-883T]. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2010. 

Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship 
Security, but Some Concerns Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-400]. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 
2010. 

Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would 
Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement 
to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-12]. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 
2009. 

Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, 
but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-337]. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 
2009. 

Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to 
Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but 
Challenges Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-538]. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 
2008. 

Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were 
Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672]. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 
2008. 

Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-
Bound Cargo Containers. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-533T]. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 
2008. 

Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced 
Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in 
Verifying Security Practices. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 
2008. 

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct 
Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's Staffing, 
Practices, and Data. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-12]. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 
2008. 

Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign 
Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance 
Measures Are Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-187]. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 
2008. 

Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in 
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity 
Tankers. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-141]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007. 

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One 
Year Later. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-126T]. 
Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure 
Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 18, 2007. 

Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-804R]. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2007. 

Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in 
Disaster Planning and Recovery. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-412]. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 
2007. 

Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on 
a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-316]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 22, 2007. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] This number is based on Coast Guard statistics compiled in 2011 
and 2012 from its national recreational boating survey. "Small 
vessels" are characterized as any watercraft--regardless of method of 
propulsion--less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or 
commercial purposes. Small vessels include commercial fishing vessels, 
recreational boats and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger 
vessels, and any other small commercial vessels involved in foreign or 
U.S. voyages. 

[2] U.S. Coast Guard, The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime 
Safety, Security, and Stewardship (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007). 

[3] Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2008). 

[4] Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2008), and Small Vessel Security 
Implementation Plan Report to the Public (Washington, D.C.: January 
2011). DHS also issued a sensitive security information version of the 
SVSS Implementation Plan. 

[5] Other federal stakeholders include the Departments of Justice and 
Defense and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 

[6] Homeland Security Institute, Report of the DHS National Small 
Vessel Security Summit (Arlington, Virginia: Oct. 19, 2007). The 
Homeland Security Institute prepared this report for DHS. 

[7] See Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064. 

[8] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). 

[9] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2003). We convened a forum in September 2002 to identify and discuss 
useful practices and lessons learned from major private and public 
sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. The 
participants--who were a cross section of leaders who have experience 
managing large-scale organizational mergers, acquisitions, and 
transformations; academics; and others who have studied these efforts--
identified key practices that have been found at the center of 
successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. These criteria 
remain relevant today, and are applicable to the tracking of the SVSS 
Implementation Plan because of their emphasis on tracking 
implementation goals. 

[10] GAO, Managing for Results: Strengthening Regulatory Agencies' 
Performance Management Practices, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-10] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 
1999). We gathered information from 23 federal and state organizations 
that we or other sources identified as using or planning to use a 
variety of useful practices to enhance specific aspects of their 
performance management and measurement processes. As we concluded in 
1999, we continue to believe these procedures are readily transferable 
to governmental agencies seeking to improve their implementation of 
performance-based management, as they are consistent practices 
identified in our previous work. We have applied these practices in 
other reports assessing federal efforts; see, for example, GAO, 
Aviation Weather: FAA and the National Weather Service Are Considering 
Plans to Consolidate Weather Service Offices, but Face Significant 
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-761] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009). 

[11] Although other DHS components or federal agencies may be listed 
as lead or colead for some of the action items in the SVSS 
Implementation Plan, DHS officials we met with stated that these four 
components were the key ones involved in the development or 
implementation of the plan. Further, these DHS components, along with 
DHS, are listed as the lead or colead for the majority of the action 
items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. These entities are specifically 
listed as the lead or colead for 119 of the 132 action items. 

[12] Initiatives may help to address multiple SVSS goals and action 
items in the SVSS Implementation Plan, rather than one specific action 
item. Further, specific action items in the plan could be addressed 
through several initiatives implemented by multiple DHS components. 

[13] GAO, Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been 
Implemented, but Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-207] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 3, 2010); Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance 
Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-400] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 
2010); and Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address 
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy 
Commodity Tankers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-141] 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007). 

[14] International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Security Achievements 
2002-2012 (Vienna, Austria: May 2013). 

[15] From testimony delivered by Vice Admiral Thad Allen, Chief of 
Staff, United States Coast Guard, during a hearing on the Coast 
Guard's role in border and maritime security, before the Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, U.S. Senate (Apr. 
6, 2006). 

[16] Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy. 

[17] GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should 
Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 29, 2009). 

[18] See Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064. 

[19] 33 C.F.R. § 160.201-.215. 

[20] 33 C.F.R. § 164.46. According to Coast Guard officials, most 
large commercial vessels fall under this provision. 

[21] For example, vessels 300 gross tons or less are generally exempt 
from the notice of arrival and transponder requirements. 33 C.F.R §§ 
164.46(a)(2)(iv).160.203(b)(1). 

[22] States require certain small vessels to be registered, and 
according to Coast Guard officials, 33 states have voluntarily entered 
into memorandums of agreement with the Coast Guard to share their 
registry data through the Vessel Identification System. However, there 
is no federal repository for registration or ownership information 
that encompasses all 50 states. 

[23] 19 C.F.R. § 4.2. This requirement is generally applicable to any 
vessel arriving from a foreign port or place, any foreign vessel 
arriving from a port or place within the United States, or any U.S. 
vessel carrying foreign merchandise for which entry has not been made. 
A foreign port or place includes a hovering vessel or any point in 
customs waters beyond the territorial sea or on the high seas at which 
the vessel has received merchandise. 

[24] The International Maritime Organization is a specialized agency 
of the United Nations that is responsible for developing an 
international regulatory framework addressing, among other things, 
maritime safety and security. 

[25] For more information on vessel tracking systems, see GAO, 
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, 
but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-337] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 
2009). 

[26] The objectives of the 2007 summit--which brought together 
approximately 260 stakeholder and federal observers--were to (1) 
educate small vessel stakeholders on security risks in the U.S. 
maritime domain; (2) provide a national forum for small vessel 
stakeholders to present and discuss their ideas on the development of 
security measures to mitigate gaps in small vessel management and 
control in the maritime domain; (3) provide a national forum for state 
and local government officials, as well as private members of the 
small vessel population, to discuss transportation concerns regarding 
security threats and present their ideas toward addressing those 
threats; and (4) record all issues and concerns from the small vessel 
stakeholders, and complete an after-action report for public, 
industry, and government to support conclusions for national-level 
decisions involving the development of small vessel security measures 
to detect, deter, interdict, and defeat terrorist use of small vessels 
in the U.S. maritime domain. 

[27] The SVSS is to provide a framework to improve maritime security 
and safety through coordinating the efforts of federal, state, local, 
and tribal authorities, as well as with international partners, 
private industry, and recreational boaters. Further, the intent of the 
SVSS is to reduce potential security and safety risks posed by small 
vessels through operations that balance fundamental freedoms, adequate 
security, and continued economic stability. 

[28] Maritime domain awareness is the effective understanding of 
anything in the maritime environment that could affect the security, 
safety, economy, or environment of the United States. 

[29] According to DHS, the SVSS Implementation Plan (1) serves as a 
road map for stakeholders to work together and focus on achieving the 
goals and objectives set forth in the SVSS, (2) lays out ongoing and 
contemplated action items, and (3) is a living document. 

[30] Implementation of the action items in the SVSS Implementation 
Plan is based on two time frames for accomplishing its strategic 
goals. The plan defines short-term action items as those that are 
intended to be evaluated or implemented within 5 years of plan 
approval. The plan defines long-term action items as those that are 
most likely to require more than 5 years to achieve because of 
resource, technological, and statutory challenges. 

[31] The SVSS Implementation Plan states that all action items, 
whether short-or long-term, are expected to be implemented through 
standard U.S. government appropriation processes, budgetary processes, 
and regulatory review procedures. 

[32] Officials we met with from four key DHS components involved in 
the implementation of the SVSS Implementation Plan--the Coast Guard, 
CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T--stated that they are not conducting new 
initiatives or programs as a result of the SVSS Implementation Plan. 
For example, Coast Guard officials stated that implementing the action 
items in the SVSS Implementation Plan did not create separate, new 
programs addressing small vessel risks, but were preexisting programs 
or operations. 

[33] Given the general nature of the action items in the plan, we were 
not able to directly align action items in the plan to component 
initiatives. 

[34] Specifically, the Coast Guard and other government agencies 
jointly performed 254 small vessel security boardings, and other 
government agencies alone performed 535 small vessel security 
boardings. 

[35] According to Coast Guard officials, the decision to use floating 
security barriers is up to individual facilities or port authorities, 
and some ports have purchased these barriers with the use of federal 
grant funding. 

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[37] See, for example, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669]. 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-10]. 

[39] The term "operation" has been dropped for the expansion of 
Focused Lens, as that word generally denotes--especially among 
military and law enforcement agencies--an initiative that has a 
specific end date. Coast Guard District Eleven, headquartered in 
Alameda, California, encompasses the states of California, Arizona, 
Nevada, and Utah; the coastal and offshore waters out over 1,000 
miles; and the offshore waters of Mexico and Central America down to 
South America. 

[40] Phase 1 activities can be conducted by the Coast Guard, the Coast 
Guard Auxiliary (a voluntary organization), or local law enforcement 
officials. Under the pilot initiative, District Eleven identified any 
location that could be used as a launch site. The expansion of Focused 
Lens is limited to identifying and assessing privately owned or public 
access marinas and boat launch ramps, per the guidance of local Coast 
Guard officials. 

[41] MSRAM is the Coast Guard's primary approach to assessing and 
managing security risks. MSRAM is designed to capture the security 
risks facing different types of targets, allowing comparison between 
different targets and geographic areas at the local, regional, and 
national levels. After District Eleven piloted Focused Lens, the Coast 
Guard modified MSRAM to accept launch site attributes, and MSRAM is 
capable of prioritizing launch sites based on security inadequacies, 
the proximity of those sites to and vulnerability of infrastructure, 
and the consequences of a successful attack. 

[42] The Coast Guard does not have a requirement to conduct operations 
in support of Focused Lens. Such operations are left to the Coast 
Guard officials responsible for determining which activities to 
undertake given the MSRAM analysis of launch sites. 

[43] The online enrollment application requires biographical 
information, address, e-mail address, citizenship documentation, and 
vessel registration data if a person is registering as a master of a 
vessel. 

[44] A float plan consists of biographical information of all persons 
traveling, vessel registration information, and itinerary information. 

[45] CBP requires that vessels must report their arrival if they (1) 
arrive or return from a foreign location, (2) are a foreign vessel 
arriving from a port or place within the United States, or (3) a U.S. 
vessel carrying foreign merchandise for which entry has not been made. 
19 C.F.R. § 4.2. Small vessels' crew and passengers seeking U.S. entry 
must physically report to a designated CBP location for a face-to-face 
inspection unless they are enrolled in an alternative inspection 
program, like the SVRS, which allows reporting arrival by telephone or 
other means. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.1. 

[46] Specifically, eligibility was expanded to include all U.S. 
citizens, nationals, and lawful permanent residents; Canadian citizens 
and permanent residents of Canada who are nationals of a Visa Waiver 
Program country or who hold a U.S. visa, a valid passport, and a CBP 
Form I-94/Arrival-Departure Record; Canadian Border Boat Landing 
Program participants (CBP Form I-68 holders); and members of CBP 
trusted traveler programs. Trusted traveler programs provide expedited 
international travel clearance for preapproved, low-risk travelers. To 
qualify for one of these programs, applicants must voluntarily undergo 
a thorough background check and a personal interview with a CBP 
officer. 

[47] The program already in place--the Canadian Border Boat Landing 
Program--allows certain individuals entering the United States by 
small vessels to be inspected just once per year, and to enter the 
United States without inspection at other times. 

[48] To facilitate information sharing with port partners and in 
response to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the 
Coast Guard has established 43 Area Maritime Security Committees 
covering the nation's 361 ports. Pub. L. No. 107-295, § 102(a), 116 
Stat. 2064, 2081 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 70112). These 
committees are typically composed of members from federal, state, and 
local law enforcement agencies and other port stakeholders and are 
responsible for, among other things, identifying critical port 
infrastructure and operations, identifying risks, and providing advice 
to the Coast Guard on mitigation strategies. 

[49] Similar to other radiation detection programs, for the WCMP 
program, secondary screenings are often necessary--in this case 
onboard the small vessels--to identify the specific isotopes and 
whether the materials are for a legitimate use. For example, the 
materials could be legitimate if transported for medical purposes or 
from an authorized industrial source. 

[50] Pacific Northwest National Laboratory produced a study that 
examined the modeling of equipment and assets at the two pilot 
locations--San Diego and Puget Sound. 

[51] CSS is a joint effort by the Naval Research Laboratory, the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific, the Air Marine Operations 
Center, and SRI International, in support of DHS S&T Borders and 
Maritime Security Division. 

[52] Owners of the data sources that feed into the CSS are to have the 
ability to provide access rights to other agencies. 

[53] The CSS is being piloted at CBP's Air and Marine Operations 
Center in Riverside, California; Coast Guard Sector Los Angeles-Long 
Beach; and DHS S&T's Maritime Security Technology Pilot in St. 
Petersburg, Florida. 

[54] Specifically, the Small Dark Vessel project focuses on 
technologies to detect the semi-and fully submersible threats, and the 
Port and Coastal Surveillance Improvement project focuses on 
technologies to detect the go-fast and panga threats. A panga is an 
open, outboard-powered fishing boat common throughout much of the 
developing world, including Central America and Mexico. 

[End of section] 

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