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Vary about Spillover Crime along the Southwest Border' which was 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

February 2013: 

Southwest Border Security: 

Data Are Limited and Concerns Vary about Spillover Crime along the 
Southwest Border: 

GAO-13-175: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-175, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Drug-related homicides have dramatically increased in recent years in 
Mexico along the nearly 2,000-mile border it shares with the United 
States. U.S. federal, state, and local officials have stated that the 
prospect of crime, including violence, spilling over from Mexico into 
the southwestern United States is a concern. GAO was asked to review 
crime rates and assess information on spillover crime along the 
border. Specifically, this report addresses: (1) What information do 
reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on 
spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have 
federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to 
track spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, 
if any, do these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, 
if any, have these agencies taken to address spillover crime? 

GAO analyzed crime data from all of the 24 southwest border counties 
from 2004 through 2011 and federal documentation, such as threat 
assessments and DHS’s plans for addressing violence along the 
southwest border. GAO interviewed officials from DHS and DOJ and their 
components. GAO also interviewed officials from 37 state and local law 
enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and tracking crime 
in the border counties in the four southwest border states (Arizona, 
California, New Mexico, and Texas). While the results of the 
interviews are not generalizable, they provided insights. GAO is not 
making any recommendations. DHS provided comments, which highlighted 
border-related crime initiatives recognized by GAO. 

What GAO Found: 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) Program, the government’s centralized repository for crime data, 
provides the only available standardized way to track crime levels in 
border counties over time. However, UCR data lack information on 
whether reported offenses are attributable to spillover crime, and 
have other limitations, such as underreporting to police. Also, UCR 
data cannot be used to identify links with crimes often associated 
with spillover from Mexico, such as cartel-related drug trafficking. 
Cognizant of these limitations, GAO’s analysis of data for southwest 
border counties with sufficiently complete data show that, generally, 
both violent and property crimes were lower in 2011 than in 2004. For 
example, the violent crime rate in three states’ border counties was 
lower by at least 26 percent in 2011 than in 2004 and in one other 
state lower by 8 percent in 2011 than in 2005. 

Law enforcement agencies have few efforts to track spillover crime. No 
common federal government definition of such crime exists, and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
components, including those with a definition, either do not collect 
data to track spillover crime, or do not maintain such data that can 
be readily retrieved and analyzed. However, several components collect 
violent incident data that could serve as indirect indicators of 
spillover crime. For example, GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) data show that, generally, assaults on agents between 
southwest border ports of entry were about 25 percent lower in 2012 
than in 2006. State and local law enforcement agencies, except for one 
state agency, do not track what might be considered to be spillover 
crime because they lack a common definition and do not systematically 
collect these crime data in a way that can be used to analyze trends. 
Officials from 22 of 37 state and local agencies told GAO that they 
have limited resources to collect additional data. Since April 2012, 
DHS and the Texas Department of Public Safety have coled an effort to 
propose definitions and metrics for border-related crime by March 2013. 

Law enforcement agencies have varying concerns regarding the extent to 
which violent crime from Mexico spills into southwest border 
communities. While DHS and DOJ threat assessments indicate that 
violent infighting between drug cartels has remained largely in 
Mexico, DHS assessments also show that aggressive tactics used by 
traffickers to evade capture demonstrate an increasing threat to U.S. 
law enforcement. Also, officials in 31 of the 37 state and local 
agencies stated that they have not observed violent crime from Mexico 
regularly spilling into their counties; nonetheless, officials in 33 
of the 37 agencies were at least somewhat concerned, for example, for 
the safety of their personnel or residents. 

Law enforcement agencies have undertaken initiatives to target border-
related crime, including one effort to address violent crime spilling 
over from Mexico. For example, in October 2008, DHS developed a 
contingency plan for the possibility that a significant southwest 
border violence escalation may exceed DHS assets’ ability to respond. 
In addition, officials from all state and local law enforcement 
agencies that GAO spoke with said their agencies had undertaken some 
efforts, either individually or in partnership with others, to combat 
criminal activities often associated with spillover crime, such as 
drug and human smuggling. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-175]. For more 
information, contact Cary B. Russell at (202) 512-5431 or 
russellc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Best Available Data Cannot Be Used to Make Insights about Spillover 
Crime but Show a General Decline in Reported Crime Rates in Counties 
with Sufficiently Complete Data along the Southwest Border: 

Few Law Enforcement Agencies Track Spillover Crime along the Southwest 
Border: 

Law Enforcement Agencies Have Varying Concerns about Potential Effects 
of Violent Crime in Mexico on Border Communities: 

Law Enforcement Agencies Have Initiatives that Target Border-related 
Crime, Including a Federal Contingency Plan to Address Violent Crime 
Spilling Over from Mexico: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Southwest Border Counties by State: 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comparison of UCR SRS with NIBRS: 

Appendix IV: UCR Data Tables for Southwest Border Counties, 2004-2011: 

Appendix V: Results from Analyzing UCR SRS and NIBRS Crime Data: 

Appendix VI: Assaults against Border Patrol Agents by Border Patrol 
Sector, Fiscal Years 2006-2012: 

Appendix VII Select Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Efforts 
along the Southwest Border: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security 
Components Combating Drug Cartel–Related Activities along the 
Southwest Border: 

Table 2: Uniform Crime Reporting Summary Reporting System and National-
Incident Based Reporting System Offenses: 

Table 3: Types of Information in Uniform Crime Reporting Summary and 
National-Incident Based Reporting Systems: 

Table 4: Data Tables on Assaults against Border Patrol Agents by 
Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006-2012: 

Table 5: Select Federal Law Enforcement Entities’ Efforts to Combat 
Mexican Drug Cartel-Related Activities along the Southwest Border: 

Table 6: Select State and Local Law Enforcement Efforts to Target 
Border-Related Crime: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Violent and Property Crime Rates in Southwest Border States 
by Border and Nonborder Counties, 2004-2011: 

Figure 2: Assaults against Border Patrol Agents in Southwest Border 
Patrol Sectors by Category, Fiscal Years 2006-2012: 

Figure 3: Violent Crime Rates per 100,000 Population In Southwest 
Border and Nonborder Counties, Combined by State, 2004-2011: 

Figure 4: Total Number of Reported Violent Crimes in Seven Small 
Southwest Border Counties, 2004-2011: 

Figure 5: Property Crime Rates per 100,000 Population for Border and 
Nonborder Counties Combined by State, 2004-2011: 

Figure 6: Total Number of Reported Property Crimes in Small Southwest 
Border Counties, 2004-2011: 

Figure 7: Number of Assaults against Border Patrol Agents by Border 
Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006-2012: 

Abbreviations: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

CRS: Congressional Research Service: 

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

EPIC: El Paso Intelligence Center: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

NIBRS: National Incident-Based Reporting System: 

SRS: Summary Reporting System: 

UCR: Uniform Crime Reporting: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

February 26, 2013: 

The Honorable Bennie Thompson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar: 
Member: 
House of Representatives: 

The U.S. government has identified Mexican drug cartels—whose 
trafficking of drugs, cash, and firearms engenders violence—as an 
organized crime threat to the United States. Drug cartel-related 
violence, including kidnappings and homicides, has dramatically 
increased in recent years in Mexico. Based on data compiled by the 
Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego, homicides 
related to organized crime increased by 523 percent from 2006 (1,152) 
through 2011 (7,178) in the six Mexican states that share the nearly 
2,000-mile border with the United States.[Footnote 1] As an extension 
of its counternarcotics policy, and in response to the possibility 
that violence in Mexico may spread, or spill over, to the United 
States, the U.S. government has been supporting Mexico’s campaign 
against Mexican drug cartels by implementing bilateral security 
initiatives, enhancing border security programs, and introducing 
initiatives to reduce the movement of drugs, money, and weapons to and 
from Mexico. 

Stakeholders view the term “spillover” differently. Depending on the 
stakeholder, the term “spillover” might refer only to Mexican drug 
cartel-related violence or be defined as a broader concept of 
spillover crime, which includes both violent and nonviolent 
activities. Examples of such activities include rape or murder 
committed in connection with crossborder or drug cartel activity; 
keeping smuggled aliens in stash houses and ransoming them back to 
Mexico; smuggling of firearms, drugs, and people; vandalism such as 
littering on smuggling routes; and destroying private property, such 
as cutting fences and killing cattle. In addition, stakeholders have 
varying perspectives on the existence and effects of crime spilling 
over from Mexico into communities along the southwest border. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano 
testified in 2009 that increases in drug cartel-related violence in 
the United States were far below Mexican levels and were limited to 
acts of violence between cartel members and assaults on U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection’s (CBP) Border Patrol agents.[Footnote 2] In 
2011, she stated that while the United States must continue to guard 
against spillover effects of drug cartel-related violence in Mexico, 
border communities were among the safest in America.[Footnote 3] On 
the other hand, some members of Congress and officials from state 
governments and state and local law enforcement agencies have publicly 
asserted that drug cartel-related violent crime is spilling over from 
Mexico into the United States, endangering the lives and property of 
Americans living in U.S. southwest border communities. Federal law 
does not specifically require the collection of data on spillover 
crime, but legislation has been introduced in Congress that would 
require federal agencies to report on incidents of cross-border 
violence or on their ability to track and quantify the level of cross-
border violence occurring along the southwest border.[Footnote 4] 

You asked us to review crime rates and assess information on spillover 
crime from Mexico in communities along the U.S.-Mexico border. This 
report addresses the following questions: (1) What information do 
reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on 
spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have 
federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to 
track spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, 
if any, do these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, 
if any, have these agencies taken to address spillover crime? 

To describe crime rates, we analyzed Summary Reporting System (SRS) 
data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime 
Reporting (UCR) Program—the government’s centralized repository for 
crime data—from January 2004 through December 2011 for the four 
southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). 
[Footnote 5] We selected January 2004 as the initial date because it 
provided us with data for more than 2 years prior to December 2006, 
when Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office and began a major 
military offensive against Mexican drug cartels. We also analyzed UCR’
s National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data, available 
from January 2007 through December 2010, for the single southwest 
border law enforcement agency reporting such data—the sheriff’s office 
in Yuma County, Arizona.[Footnote 6] To assess the reliability of the 
UCR data, we conducted analyses to test for irregularities in the 
data, reviewed FBI documentation on how the data can and cannot be 
used and on the FBI’s procedures for ensuring UCR data quality, and 
interviewed FBI officials knowledgeable about the data. On the basis 
of this assessment, we excluded some counties from our analysis 
because they did not report complete crime data to the FBI. We 
concluded that the data for the remaining counties were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of our review. In addition, to determine 
what other data are systematically collected in southwest border 
counties, we interviewed officials from the state and local law 
enforcement agencies that are responsible for investigating and 
tracking crime occurring in their jurisdictions. At the state level, 
we conducted interviews with officials from the California Highway 
Patrol, and the Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas Departments of Public 
Safety.[Footnote 7] At the local level, we interviewed officials 
representing 21 of the 24 sheriffs’ offices in southwest border 
counties and 12 large municipal police departments in the border 
counties.[Footnote 8] We selected departments from each of four 
states, and we selected large departments because on the basis of our 
review of the UCR SRS data, in general, large departments had more 
reported crimes than did smaller departments. A list of the 24 
southwest border counties can be found in appendix I. In total, we 
interviewed officials from 37 state and law enforcement agencies on 
the southwest border. 

Further, we conducted site visits to five southwest border counties: 
Pima and Santa Cruz Counties in Arizona, and Cameron, Hidalgo, and 
Webb Counties in Texas. We selected these counties because they 
represent diverse urban and rural environments and contain geographic 
features, such as rivers and mountains, which could affect the levels 
and types of crime they experience. As part of our visits, in addition 
to interviewing state and local law enforcement agencies, we met with 
federal officials, such as CBP agents and officers operating between 
and at the ports of entry along the southwest border. The information 
we obtained from these visits is not generalizable to all southwest 
border counties, but it provides insights on the perspectives that law 
enforcement representatives have on crime occurring in southwest 
border communities. 

To describe efforts agencies have taken to track spillover crime, we 
collected information, such as crime reports and documentation on 
categories of data collected, from and conducted interviews with the 
state and local law enforcement agencies identified above, as well as 
with federal agencies that have responsibilities for combating drug 
cartel–related activities along the southwest border. For example, 
these federal agencies include components and intelligence offices 
from DHS, such as CBP and DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis; 
Department of Justice (DOJ), such as Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) and the FBI; and interagency task forces, such as the Border 
Enforcement Security Task Force.[Footnote 9] We asked agencies about 
their efforts to track spillover crime, any challenges they 
encountered in doing so, and whether they collected or tracked other 
data they considered related to spillover crime and violence on the 
southwest border. Specifically, we analyzed CBP data on the number of 
assaults on Border Patrol agents in southwest border patrol sectors 
from fiscal years 2006 through 2012, and the number of assaults on 
Office of Field Operations personnel at southwest border ports of 
entry for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the date ranges for which these 
data were available. To assess the reliability of these data, we 
reviewed relevant documentation, such as procedures for collecting 
data consistently, and interviewed officials responsible for the data. 
On the basis of our efforts, we determined the data to be sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of our report. 

To identify concerns about spillover crime, we reviewed threat 
assessments for the southwest border developed by federal agencies, 
such as DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. In addition, we 
included questions in our interviews with the officials from 37 state 
and local law enforcement agencies about their concerns regarding the 
existence and potential effects of crime from Mexico spilling into 
their communities. In addition, to obtain the perspectives of local 
businesses in southwest border counties about what concerns, if any, 
they may have about spillover crime, we interviewed officials from 
Chambers of Commerce in four of the five counties we visited—-Cameron, 
Hidalgo, Santa Cruz, and Webb Counties.[Footnote 10] While the results 
of these interviews are not generalizeable to all local businesses or 
Chambers of Commerce on the southwest border, they provide 
perspectives about the effects that violence in Mexico might have had 
on the businesses in their communities. 

To describe steps that agencies have taken to address spillover crime, 
we reviewed agency protocols and contingency plans, such as the DHS 
Operations Plan for Southwest Border Violence, from and conducted 
interviews with federal, state, and local agencies and task forces 
identified above. Additional details on our scope and methodology are 
contained in appendix II. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 through February 
2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Federal Border Security and Counternarcotics Efforts: 

The federal government has taken a number of steps to combat threats 
posed by drug cartels, including potential crime and violence directed 
against U.S. citizens and government interests. For example, in 2008, 
the U.S. government began a program—-known as the Mérida Initiative-—
to provide Mexico and the countries of Central America with financial 
and technical assistance for counterdrug efforts, among others. 
[Footnote 11] In March 2009, as a response to the violence in Mexico, 
DHS announced a new southwest border initiative to guard against 
violent crime spillover into the United States by increasing the 
deployment of personnel and technology along the southwest border. In 
addition, in June 2009, the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
issued the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy with 
the goal to substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug 
proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the southwest 
border.[Footnote 12] To accomplish this goal, the strategy listed 
disrupting and dismantling drug-trafficking organizations along the 
southwest border as one of its key objectives. In August 2010, 
President Barack Obama signed an emergency supplemental appropriation 
for border security, which included $600 million in supplemental funds 
for enhanced border protection and law enforcement 
activities.[Footnote 13] The President also separately authorized the 
temporary deployment of up to an additional 1,200 National Guard 
troops to the border to assist law enforcement agencies in their 
efforts to target illicit networks’ trafficking in people, drugs, 
illegal weapons, and money, and the violence associated with these 
illegal activities. Moreover, in May 2011, DHS Secretary Napolitano 
stated that CBP, in partnership with independent third-party 
stakeholders, had begun the process of developing an index to 
comprehensively and systematically measure security along the 
southwest border and quality of life in the region. As we reported in 
May 2012, this index-—the Border Condition Index—-is being developed, 
and accordingly, it is too early to determine how it will be used to 
provide oversight of border security efforts.[Footnote 14] 

Federal, State, and Local Responsibilities: 

At the federal level, five agencies in two departments are responsible 
for securing the border and combating drug cartel–related activities 
along the southwest border. These agencies enforce federal laws 
related to, among other things, immigration, drugs, weapons, and 
organized crime. Additionally, they collect data related to their 
criminal investigations and operations to support prosecutions. 
Specifically, they track violations of federal criminal statutes 
relevant to their responsibilities, including the number of pending 
and closed cases, arrests, convictions, indictments, seizures, and 
forfeitures. Table 1 presents information on these law enforcement 
agencies and their responsibilities. 

Table 1: Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security 
Components Combating Drug Cartel-Related Activities along the 
Southwest Border: 

Organization: DOJ: Drug Enforcement Administration 
Responsibilities: Enforce drug laws; pursue investigations and develop 
intelligence with the goal of identifying, infiltrating, and 
dismantling drug-trafficking organizations and disrupting their 
operations. 

Organization: DOJ: Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Responsibilities: Enforce laws and conduct investigations related to 
combating transnational and national criminal organizations and 
enterprises. 

Organization: DOJ: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
Responsibilities: Enforce laws and pursue investigations related to 
stopping illegal gun trafficking from the United States to Mexico. 

Organization: DHS: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Responsibilities: Enforce U.S. immigration laws and interdict persons 
and contraband crossing the border illegally. Within CBP, the Office 
of Field Operations is responsible for the interdictions at the legal 
border crossing points, and the Border Patrol is responsible for the 
interdictions between those points. 

Organization: DHS: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Responsibilities: Enforce federal laws governing border control, 
customs, trade and immigration. Within U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations is responsible for 
enforcing U.S. laws covering a wide range of domestic and 
international activities arising from the illegal movement of people 
and goods into, within, and out of the United States to combat 
transnational criminal organizations. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency 
officials. 

[End of table] 

In addition to enforcing laws, a number of agencies have intelligence 
components and oversee interagency task forces responsible for 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information related to 
threats from the drug cartels. These components include DHS’s Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis and intelligence offices within CBP and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as well as DOJ’s DEA, 
and the FBI. These entities produce various intelligence products, 
such as threat assessments, related to Mexican drug cartel-related 
activities in support of law enforcement operations. Also, the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy, in the Executive Office of the 
President, is responsible for coordinating the national drug control 
effort, and designates areas within the United Sates that are 
significant centers of illegal drug production, manufacturing, 
importation, or distribution as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. 
Law enforcement agencies in these designated areas collect and share 
intelligence and coordinate interagency task forces to target drug-
trafficking operations. 

At the state and local levels, sheriffs’ offices and municipal police 
departments are responsible for investigating and tracking crime 
occurring in their jurisdictions, based on the laws of their 
respective states. If the investigation determines that the criminal 
violation falls under federal purview, such as an immigration 
violation, the local law enforcement agency may refer the case to the 
appropriate federal agency and might not track such cases in its 
records. The Departments of Public Safety in Arizona, New Mexico, and 
Texas, and the state Department of Justice in California, are 
responsible for overseeing the process for collecting, validating, and 
publishing crime data from local agencies.[Footnote 15] These agencies 
voluntarily submit crime data to the FBI, which is responsible for 
publishing and archiving national crime statistics. 

The UCR Program: 

The FBI oversees the UCR Program, the federal government’s centralized 
repository for crime data. The UCR Program provides a nationwide view 
of crime, and is based on the voluntary submission of a variety of 
statistics by city, county, and state law enforcement agencies. 
[Footnote 16] Begun in 1930, the UCR Program established a system to 
collect summary data, known as SRS data, and now contains 8 types of 
violent and property crimes, referred to as Part I offenses, that are 
reported to law enforcement agencies.[Footnote 17] Violent crimes are 
composed of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes are composed of 
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. If multiple 
offenses are reported for an individual crime incident, only the 
highest-level offense is recorded. Offense data submitted to the FBI 
by local law enforcement agencies show the aggregate counts for 
reported crimes and arrests for the 8 Part I offenses and aggregate 
counts on arrests made for 21 other offenses, such as embezzlement, 
prostitution, and drug abuse violations. These UCR data can be used to 
measure fluctuations in the type and volume of crime for specific 
offenses in a particular jurisdiction for which they have been 
collected. 

The FBI reported that 18,233 law enforcement agencies in the United 
States, representing 97.8 percent of the U.S. population, submitted 
UCR data in 2011. As of November 2012, law enforcement agencies in 46 
states and the District of Columbia were submitting UCR data through a 
state UCR Program, or a district system in the case of the District of 
Columbia. In the remaining 4 states, local law enforcement agencies 
submit UCR data directly to the FBI. State programs are to conform to 
national UCR Program standards, definitions, and quality control 
procedures in order for their data to be submitted to the FBI. The FBI 
is to help state UCR Programs meet these requirements by, among other 
actions, reviewing and editing data submitted by individual agencies 
and providing technical assistance on reporting procedures. 

To meet the needs of the law enforcement community for more detailed 
crime data, the FBI introduced NIBRS in 1988 with the intent that 
local law enforcement agencies will transition from the SRS to NIBRS 
at their own pace. NIBRS collects data on more types of offenses than 
the traditional SRS and includes details on individual incidents, such 
as information on offenders, victims, property, and whether multiple 
offenses are reported in an individual crime incident. NIBRS collects 
offense and arrest data on 46 specific crimes grouped in 22 offense 
categories, which include 8 Part I offenses and other offenses, such 
as extortion and kidnapping. In addition, NIBRS collects arrest data 
for 10 other crimes, such as trespassing and driving under the 
influence. The data can be used to examine linkages among offenses, 
offenders, victims, property, and arrestees. Tables that list offenses 
collected for the UCR SRS and the NIBRS programs and summarize the 
main differences between the two crime data systems can be found in 
appendix III. 

NIBRS allows local law enforcement agencies to report a wider range of 
offenses and arrests. However, the FBI reported that, as of 2011, 
7,819 law enforcement agencies, representing 28 percent of the U.S. 
population, contributed NIBRS data to the UCR Program. According to 
senior FBI officials, because of the voluntary nature of the UCR 
Program, implementation of the NIBRS occurs at the pace commensurate 
with the resources, abilities, and limitations of the contributing law 
enforcement agency. Since participation in the program is limited, the 
FBI converts NIBRS data submitted by law enforcement agencies to the 
format for the SRS data system. 

Best Available Data Cannot Be Used to Make Insights about Spillover 
Crime but Show a General Decline in Reported Crime Rates in Counties 
with Sufficiently Complete Data along the Southwest Border: 

UCR SRS data provide the best available information on crime levels 
and crime trends in southwest border counties. Our interviews with 
officials from 33 of the 36 local law enforcement agencies in the 
southwest border counties determined that SRS data are the only crime 
data that those agencies collect in a systematic way-—that is, in an 
automated form that can be readily retrieved and analyzed.[Footnote 
18] Our analysis determined that the remaining 3 local law enforcement 
agencies also systematically collect SRS data, but we do not know if 
they also systematically collect other crime data because these 
agencies were not available to participate in our interviews. The 
sheriff’s office in Yuma County, Arizona, is the only southwest border 
law enforcement agency that collects NIBRS data. 

The UCR data cannot be used to draw conclusions about the extent to 
which crimes are attributable to spillover from Mexico. The SRS does 
not collect data on all types of crimes committed in the United States 
that have been associated with Mexican drug-trafficking organizations, 
such as particular types of kidnappings or home invasions. Further, 
the SRS does not collect enough information, such as a motivation for 
committing a crime, to identify a link between violent or property 
crime rates and crimes associated with spillover from Mexico, such as 
drug trafficking. Because of its summary nature, the SRS does not 
provide data about individual crime incidents, including details on 
offenses, arrests, victim/offender relationships, or whether multiple 
offenses occurred in an individual crime incident. In addition, UCR 
data might also underreport the actual amount of crime that has 
occurred, since not all crimes are reported to law enforcement. For 
example, law enforcement officials with whom we spoke stated that 
individuals who may have been assaulted or robbed in the course of 
drug trafficking and other illicit activities are hesitant to report 
their involvement to the police. Moreover, senior FBI officials stated 
that NIBRS data, although more comprehensive than SRS data, also might 
not include sufficient detail to provide information on spillover 
crime even if they were more widely available. 

Cognizant of these limitations, we analyzed SRS crime data to 
calculate violent and property crime rates for both border and 
nonborder counties in the four southwest border states: Arizona, 
California, New Mexico, and Texas. Our analyses of SRS data for border 
and nonborder counties showed that in all four states, both violent 
and property crime rates per 100,000 population were generally lower 
in 2011 than in 2004.[Footnote 19] Figure 1 shows the changes in crime 
rates from 2004 through 2011 for southwest border and nonborder 
counties. (Detailed data for figure 1 can be found in appendix IV.) 

Figure 1: Violent and Property Crime Rates in Southwest Border States 
by Border and Nonborder Counties, 2004-2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Interactive graphic: Mouse over the state or 
county names to find out more information about border crime 
statistics] 

Source: GAO analysis of Uniform Crime Reporting data; MapInfo (map). 

Note: We report crime rates per 100,000 population for large border 
counties. Large border counties are: Cochise, Pima, Santa Cruz, and 
Yuma Counties in Arizona; Imperial and San Diego Counties in 
California; Dona Ana and Luna Counties in New Mexico; and, Cameron, El 
Paso, Hidalgo, Maverick, Starr, Val Verde, and Webb Counties in Texas. 
For small counties we report numbers of crimes, instead of crime rates 
per 100,000 population. The small border counties are: Hidalgo County 
in New Mexico; Brewster, Culberson, Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, Kinney, 
Presidio, Terrell, and Zapata Counties in Texas. 

[End of figure] 

With respect to violent crimes, as shown in figure 1, 

* The violent crime rate was lower in border counties than nonborder 
counties for three of the four southwest border states. Comparing all 
border counties combined with all nonborder counties combined within 
each state, the violent crime rate in California and Texas border 
counties was lower than in nonborder counties each year from 2004 
through 2011, and lower in New Mexico border counties each year from 
2005 through 2011. In contrast, the violent crime rate in Arizona 
border counties was higher than in nonborder counties from 2004 to 
2011. 

* The violent crime rate declined over time in both border and 
nonborder counties across all southwest border states. Comparing 2011 
with 2004, the violent crime rate in border counties in 2011 was lower 
by 33 percent in Arizona, 26 percent in California, and 30 percent in 
Texas. In nonborder counties, the decrease was 22 percent, 25 percent, 
and 24 percent, respectively. The violent crime rate in border 
counties in New Mexico was lower by 8 percent in 2011 than in 2005, 
and in nonborder counties the decrease was 19 percent. 

* With two exceptions, the violent crime rate was lower over time in 
large border counties across the southwest border states. The violent 
crime rate in 2011 was lower than in 2004 in 10 of 12 large border 
counties in Arizona, California, and Texas with sufficiently complete 
data for analysis. The violent crime rate in Dona Ana County, New 
Mexico, was lower in 2011 than in 2005. Additionally, across all 7 
small border counties with sufficiently complete data for analysis, the 
total number of violent crimes for these counties in 2011 was also 
lower than in 2004.[Footnote 20] 

With respect to property crimes, as shown in figure 1, 

* The property crime rate in border counties was either lower or 
similar to the rate in nonborder counties in three of the four 
southwest border states.21 Comparing all border counties combined with 
all nonborder counties combined within each state, the property crime 
rate in California border counties was lower than the rate in 
nonborder counties each year from 2009 through 2011. Each year from 
2004 through 2008, the crime rate in California border and nonborder 
counties was similar. The rate in Texas border counties was similar to 
the rate in nonborder counties each year from 2004 through 2011. The 
rate in New Mexico border counties was lower than in nonborder 
counties in all years, 2005 through 2011. 

* The property crime rate declined over time in both border and 
nonborder counties in three of the four southwest border states.22 
Comparing 2011 with 2004, the property crime rate in border counties 
in 2011 was lower by 35 percent in California and 28 percent in Texas. 
In nonborder counties, the decrease was 23 percent and 22 percent, 
respectively. The property crime rate in border counties in New Mexico 
was lower by 7 percent in 2011 than in 2005, and in nonborder counties 
the decrease was 18 percent. 

* The property crime rate was lower over time in large border counties 
across the southwest border states. The property crime rate in 2011 
was lower than in 2004 in all 11 large border counties in Arizona, 
California, and Texas with sufficiently complete data for analysis. 
The property crime rate in Dona Ana County, New Mexico, was lower in 
2011 than in 2005. Additionally, across all 7 small border counties 
with sufficiently complete data for analysis, the total number of 
property crimes for these counties in 2011 was also lower than in 
2004.[Footnote 23] 

Comparing UCR SRS and NIBRS data for the Yuma County sheriff’s office, 
we found comparable decreases in violent crimes. Specifically, we 
found that the total number of violent crimes reported through NIBRS 
was 32 percent lower in 2010 than in 2007, when the office began 
reporting NIBRS data. The number of violent crimes reported in the SRS 
format was 33 percent lower in 2010 than in 2007. (Additional detail 
on our analysis results is presented in appendix V.) Local law 
enforcement officials with whom we spoke provided a range of factors 
that they thought contributed to declining violent and property crime 
rates, including increased law enforcement presence, either federal, 
local or a combination of both, and new infrastructure, such as a 
border fence. 

Few Law Enforcement Agencies Track Spillover Crime along the Southwest 
Border: 

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies: 

Federal law enforcement agencies have few efforts under way to track 
what might be considered to be spillover crime, including violence, 
for several reasons. First, while several federal components 
established a definition of spillover crime, there is no common 
government definition of such crime. For example, in 2009, the DEA 
reported that U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies agreed to 
define spillover violence as deliberate, planned attacks by drug 
cartels on U.S. assets, including people and institutions. This 
definition does not include trafficker-on-trafficker violence. On the 
other hand, according to officials from DHS’s Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis, also in 2009, in partnership with other intelligence 
agencies, DHS developed definitions of spillover violence that include 
violence in the United States directed by Mexican drug cartels and 
violence committed by cartel members or their associates against each 
other. Second, DHS and DOJ components, including those that have a 
formal definition of spillover crime, either do not collect data for 
the purposes of tracking spillover crime, or do not maintain such data 
in an automated format that can be readily retrieved and analyzed. 
However, officials from Arizona and Rio Grande Valley Border 
Enforcement Security Task Forces--multiagency teams led by DHS’s ICE 
to combat cross-border criminal activity--stated that while data are 
not tracked systematically, teams maintain information on violent 
activities related to drug and human smuggling they identify during 
the course of their investigations. Teams use this information, which 
includes home invasions, assaults on individuals during illegal border 
crossings, and robberies of drug traffickers, to inform their 
assessments of violent trends along the U.S.-Mexico border. In 
addition, the Executive Committee for Southwest Border Intelligence 
and Information Sharing, cochaired by the DHS Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis and Texas Department of Public Safety, has been working 
since April 2012 to propose new terms and definitions for various 
facets of border-related crime and violence and identify new metrics 
and indicators to measure such crime. The committee plans to complete 
this effort in March 2013. 

CBP reported that while it does not specifically define spillover 
crime, it does collect and maintain automated, retrievable data on 
assaults against Border Patrol agents and officers at ports of entry. 
CBP recognizes that these data do not directly measure the extent of 
spillover crime but may serve as an indirect indicator of such crime. 
With respect to Border Patrol agents, CBP maintains data on physical 
assaults, assaults with a vehicle, assaults with weapons, assaults 
with rocks, and assaults with instruments other than rocks. CBP data 
show that the total number of assaults against Border Patrol agents in 
southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2012 (549) was about 25 
percent lower than in fiscal year 2006 (729).[Footnote 24] Generally, 
assaults increased from 2006 (729) through 2008 (1,085), decreased 
slightly from 2008 (1,085) through 2010 (1,049), and decreased sharply 
from 2010 (1,049) through 2012 (549). (See figure 2.) 

Figure 2: Assaults against Border Patrol Agents in Southwest Border 
Patrol Sectors by Category, Fiscal Years 2006-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Rocking assaults: 434; 
All other assaults: 295; 
Total assaults: 729. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Rocking assaults: 647; 
All other assaults: 332; 
Total assaults: 979. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Rocking assaults: 769; 
All other assaults: 316; 
Total assaults: 1,085. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Rocking assaults: 756; 
All other assaults: 300; 
Total assaults: 1,156. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Rocking assaults: 793; 
All other assaults: 256; 
Total assaults: 1.049. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Rocking assaults: 427; 
All other assaults: 239; 
Total assaults: 666. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Rocking assaults: 249; 
All other assaults: 300; 
Total assaults: 549. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

Notes: Rocking assaults are thrown rocks, for example, by drug or 
alien smugglers, at Border Patrol agents with the intent of 
threatening or inflicting physical harm. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Patrol has divided 
geographic responsibility for border security operations along the 
southwest border among nine sectors, each of which has a headquarters 
with management personnel. 

[End of figure] 

In each fiscal year from 2006 through 2011, there were more rockings—-
defined as thrown rocks, for example by drug or human smugglers, at 
Border Patrol agents with the intent of threatening or inflicting 
physical harm—-than all other assaults combined in Border Patrol 
sectors along the southwest border. In 2012, when the number of 
rockings was at a 7-year low, there were 51 fewer rockings than all 
other assaults. While the total number of assaults for all sectors 
combined in 2012 is smaller than in 2006, certain southwest border 
sectors show an increase in the number of all assaults other than 
rockings in 2012 from 2006. For example, the Tucson sector experienced 
91 such assaults in 2012 compared with 76 in 2006, and the Rio Grande 
Valley sector experienced 77 such assaults compared with 41 in 2006. 
(Additional analysis of assault trends for fiscal years 2006 through 
2012 by Border Patrol sector is presented in appendix VI.) CBP 
officials cited several factors that could affect a change in the 
number of assaults against Border Patrol agents, including changes in 
the level of illegal activity crossing the border, as well as changes 
in Border Patrol presence along the border. Also, CBP officials 
reported that from September 2004 through November 2012, 3 out of 22 
Border Patrol agent deaths on the southwest border had a nexus to 
cross-border crime, while the remaining deaths mostly resulted from 
vehicular accidents or health issues. 

With respect to officers at ports of entry, CBP maintains data on 
physical assaults, assaults with a vehicle, and assaults with a 
weapon. For the 2 fiscal years that CBP has reliable data, the data 
show that assaults against officers at southwest border ports of entry 
declined from 37 assaults in fiscal year 2011 to 26 assaults in fiscal 
year 2012.[Footnote 25] 

In addition, the FBI reported that its Latin American Southwest Border 
Threat Section—-created to focus on issues specifically related to 
drug cartels-—began in fiscal year 2010 to classify incidents of 
violent crime with links to Mexico, including kidnappings of American 
citizens and nonterrorism-related hostage taking occurring in or 
having a substantial nexus to Mexico or Central and South America. 
According to the FBI, under the new classifications, from October 2009 
through September 2012, it investigated and closed five cases 
involving kidnappings of American citizens and five cases involving 
non-terrorism-related hostage taking. None of these cases occurred in 
the United States. FBI officials cautioned that drug cartel related 
crimes, such as kidnappings and home invasions, are highly 
underreported and are not captured in national crime statistics. 

State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies: 

Only 1 of the 37 state and local law enforcement agencies that we 
interviewed--the Texas Department of Public Safety--stated that it 
tracks spillover crime. There are several reasons spillover crime is 
not more widely measured and tracked across these agencies. First, 
there is no common definition of spillover crime shared by the border 
law enforcement communities, and our interviews with border sheriffs 
and police officials indicated that their opinions on what types of 
incidents constitute spillover crime vary. For example, the Texas 
Border Sheriff’s Coalition defined spillover crime as any action on 
one side of the border that is the result of violence or the threat of 
violence that causes a reaction on the other side of the border, such 
as a law enforcement response, or an economic or social impact. The 
Luna County, New Mexico, sheriff’s office defined spillover crime as 
occurring when a person is injured by any means by an act along the 
border that has a direct nexus to Mexican drug-trafficking 
organizations. The Cochise County, Arizona, sheriff’s office defined 
spillover crime as any crime associated with cross-border trafficking. 
Officials from 27 out of 37 state and local law enforcement agencies 
stated that it would be at least somewhat useful to have a common 
definition of spillover crime, because it would establish types of 
activities that constitute spillover crime and allow agencies to track 
such crime, among other uses.[Footnote 26] However, officials from 22 
of those 27 agencies also stated that accomplishing such a task might 
be challenging.[Footnote 27] The reasons cited included differences of 
opinion among border counties about what incidents represent spillover 
crime and differences in the missions and priorities of federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies. As discussed previously in 
this report, the Texas Department of Public Safety and the DHS Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis are leading an effort by select state and 
local law enforcement agencies to propose new terms and definitions 
and identify metrics for various facets of border-related crime and 
violence by March 2013. 

Second, no state or local law enforcement agency we interviewed in our 
review systematically collects data on what might be considered to be 
spillover crime in a way that can be used to analyze trends. Officials 
from the Texas Department of Public Safety, the single agency that 
said it tracks spillover crime, stated that the department collects 
data on crimes it considers to be related to spillover, such as 
murders, kidnappings, and shootings related to activities of the 
Mexican drug cartels.[Footnote 28] The department manages six 
intelligence centers along the border that, according to officials, 
rely on a variety of sources, including incident reports from sheriffs’
 offices, news reports, and intelligence information from interagency 
task forces, to assess which incidents can be clearly linked to Mexico 
and determined to be spillover crime. However, officials stated that 
spillover incidents reported by the department cannot be used to 
analyze trends over time because they are not collected systematically 
and may be incomplete. For example, the incident reports can vary by 
sheriff’s office in terms of what is reported and how incidents are 
characterized. For example, we found in our interviews with Texas 
border sheriffs’ offices that each office may have different ways of 
capturing information on incidents and may consider different 
incidents to be related to spillover crime. 

While the Texas Department of Public safety is the only state or local 
law enforcement agency we interviewed that reported collecting data 
specifically on spillover crime, 6 out of 37 law enforcement agencies 
we spoke with stated that they collect information on cross-border and 
drug-related activities, which could be elements of spillover crime. 
Specifically, 

* Officials from 3 sheriffs’ offices in Arizona and Texas and 1 police 
department in California stated their agencies collect information on 
incidents that involve aliens without lawful immigration status to 
track cross-border activity. However, the officials noted that the 
data are too general to determine whether a specific crime incident is 
attributable to spillover from Mexico. 

* Officials from the Laredo, Texas, Police Department stated that 
since 2003, the department has tracked incidents of drug smuggling, 
human smuggling, and the types of weapons seized. According to 
officials, while the data contribute to intelligence necessary to 
determine whether a crime is cartel-related, the data do not contain 
sufficient detail to determine whether a specific crime incident is 
attributable to spillover from Mexico. 

* Officials from the San Diego office of the California Highway Patrol 
stated that in 2012 their field office began tracking how often they 
respond to calls from CBP’s Office of Field Operations to investigate 
incidents at the port of entry. However, the officials noted that the 
data could not be a measure for spillover crime because the incident 
may not always result in a crime or an arrest and may not be related 
to cartel activity or involve Mexican nationals. 

Officials from 27 out of 37 state and local law enforcement agencies 
stated that it would be at least somewhat useful to collect spillover 
crime data.[Footnote 29] Some of the reasons given were that the data 
would enhance intelligence, identify trends, and assist the agencies 
in making decisions about deploying resources. In addition, some 
officials said that data on spillover crime could help agencies apply 
for grants. However, the majority also expressed concerns about the 
burden of collecting additional information. Specifically, officials 
from 22 out of 37 state and local agencies stated that they have 
limited technological, financial, and human resources to collect 
additional data. 

Law Enforcement Agencies Have Varying Concerns about Potential 
Effects of Violent Crime in Mexico on Border Communities: 

Federal Concerns: 

Officials from all of the DHS and DOJ components we interviewed stated 
that while they do not believe that spillover violence has been a 
significant problem, they expressed concerns about the potential for 
it to occur in the future because drug cartels employ increasingly 
violent methods to interact with rivals and law enforcement agencies 
in Mexico. Threat assessments conducted by DHS and DOJ during fiscal 
years 2006 through 2012 do not indicate that violence from Mexico 
spilled over the southwest border. For example, the assessments 
indicate that violent infighting among rival Mexican cartels has 
remained largely in Mexico, and crimes such as kidnappings and home 
invasion robberies directed against drug traffickers have remained 
largely isolated instances in U.S. border communities.[Footnote 30] 
However, DHS threat assessments have reported that the threat facing 
U.S. law enforcement personnel from drug-trafficking organizations has 
been increasing, as evidenced by more aggressive tactics used by drug-
trafficking organizations and smugglers to confront or evade law 
enforcement. Examples of such tactics include ramming or impeding 
police vehicles, fleeing at high speeds, and carrying weapons. 

State and Local Concerns: 

Officials from 37 state and local law enforcement agencies and four 
Chambers of Commerce we interviewed expressed varying concerns 
regarding the extent to which violent crime from Mexico spills into 
and potentially affects their border communities. Officials in 31 of 
the 37 state and local law enforcement agencies stated that they have 
not observed violent crime from Mexico regularly spilling into their 
counties; nonetheless, officials from 33 of the 37 agencies said they 
are at least somewhat concerned about the potential for spillover 
crime to occur. Officials noted that there is always potential for the 
high levels of violence in Mexico, such as organized murders and 
kidnappings for ransom, to spread to their border towns. A senior DEA 
official in the El Paso, Texas, region testified in March 2009 that 
the southwest border is the principal arrival zone for most illicit 
drugs smuggled into the United States and is also the predominant 
staging area for the drugs’ distribution throughout the country.
[Footnote 31] 

Further, state and local law enforcement officials expressed concerns 
about safety threats to law enforcement officers and residents who 
might encounter drug and human smugglers transiting through border 
communities, and according to some officials, smugglers are 
increasingly aggressive in evading capture and likely to be armed. For 
example, a New Mexico sheriff stated that while there have not been 
any serious injuries, drug smugglers ram police vehicles to stop a 
pursuit or speed through residential neighborhoods to avoid capture. 
In addition, armed cartel members on the Mexican border sometimes 
engage in gunfights with rival smugglers returning from the United 
States. According to the sheriff, such activities could result in 
vehicular accidents or shootings at U.S. law enforcement officers. An 
Arizona sheriff stated that most of the violence the office sees 
involves trafficker-on-trafficker violence. For example, a crew of 
smugglers might steal drug or human cargo from other smugglers to sell 
it themselves. In addition to the potential for violence during the 
event, there is also a potential for violence because of retaliation 
for the stolen goods. Officials in a California police department 
stated that auto thefts have increased, and officials believe that an 
increasing proportion of these thefts are related to cartel activity 
as cars are stolen to transport drug loads to the final destination 
after being transported over the border. Examples of some crimes that 
local officials attributed to spillover from Mexico include the 
following: 

* A border sheriff in Arizona stated that a rancher was most likely 
murdered in 2010 by a smuggler. 

* Officials in a Texas police department stated that they investigated 
a murder in 2010 that they attributed to spillover crime. 
Investigators in the case determined that the victim was a cartel 
member and the perpetrator was from a rival cartel in Mexico and had 
crossed the border to assassinate the rival cartel member. 

* Officials in a California police department stated that a vehicle in 
Mexico was engaged in a gunfight with the Mexican police and the 
vehicle crossed the border into the United States. 

* A sheriff in a border county in Texas stated that the property crime 
rates in his county had increased in 2008 because over a series of 
months, a group of smugglers from Mexico were burglarizing houses on 
their way back to Mexico. They were eventually arrested and prosecuted. 

According to state and local law enforcement officials, many crimes 
associated with drug-trafficking threats are unreported, since in many 
instances, both the perpetrators and the victims may be involved in 
criminal activity, and the victim may not be in this country legally. 
Further, the sheriff of a rural county in Texas stated that while 
statistics indicate that there is little crime in his county, it may 
be because there are very few law enforcement officials or residents 
to confront or resist smugglers moving through the county, not because 
criminal activity is not occurring.[Footnote 32] Similarly, a sheriff 
from another rural county in Texas stated that he believes that an 
enhanced law enforcement presence in the Rio Grande Valley may force 
illicit activity toward his county because it is less populated than 
other counties and smugglers are less likely to be confronted there. 
Moreover, according to some local law enforcement officials, the 
levels of violent crime in Mexico can have effects on the border 
communities that are not captured in the crime statistics. The 2011 
Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center threat assessment stated 
that the southwest border violence, such as kidnappings and home 
invasions carried out by Mexican criminal organizations, and gang-
related violence, present the most substantial threat to public safety 
in Arizona.[Footnote 33] 

While 33 of 37 law enforcement agencies expressed some concern about 
spillover crime, officials from 11 of the 37 agencies stated that they 
do not treat spillover crime differently than they would any other 
crime. In addition, an Arizona sheriff and a police official from the 
same county stated that they are not more concerned about spillover 
crime because their county has not experienced any incidents of 
kidnappings or extortion, which could be indicators that crime has 
spilled over from Mexico. 

In addition to concerns about crime and violence potentially spilling 
over from Mexico, local law enforcement officials provided a number of 
examples of how the violence in Mexico affects local communities: 

* U.S. citizens that cross the border daily, such as for school or 
employment are vulnerable to extortion or recruitment by cartels. For 
example, police officials in a California border city stated that 
cartel members in Mexico have come into the United States to recruit 
gang members, and a sheriff in a county in New Mexico stated that in 
his county, 400 or more U.S. citizens live in Mexico but attend school 
in the United States. The students may be recruited or coerced to 
smuggle drugs into the United States on their way to school. 

* A Texas sheriff stated that a local college was forced to close 
after bullets from a gunfight originating in Mexico hit the college 
dorm building. 

* Cartels may target public officials and law enforcement for 
corruption. Specifically, we were told of cases from local law 
enforcement in both New Mexico and Arizona in which public officials 
had been corrupted by a Mexican cartel. 

* Sheriff and police department officials in counties in Texas, 
Arizona, and New Mexico stated that cartel members may reside with 
their families in U.S. border communities because they are considered 
to be safe havens. An officer in one police department stated a 
concern that there is a potential for violent altercations in the 
United States between cartel members living in their community that 
represent rival Mexican cartels. 

In addition, we spoke with Chamber of Commerce officials in one 
Arizona and three Texas border counties, and they all stated that they 
have not seen spillover violence from Mexico, but that violence in 
Mexico has nonetheless negatively affected businesses in their border 
communities. Specifically, they said that violence in Mexico has 
resulted in a perception that border communities are not safe and this 
has hindered economic growth and tourism. For example, an official 
from a Chamber of Commerce in one Texas county stated that local 
universities and hospitals have difficulty recruiting students and 
staff. Additionally, Chamber of Commerce officials in all three Texas 
counties said that violence in Mexico and more delays and stricter 
searches at the border have impeded Mexican consumers’ ability to more 
easily cross the border and purchase goods and services from the local 
U.S. businesses. 

Law Enforcement Agencies Have Initiatives that Target Border-related 
Crime, Including a Federal Contingency Plan to Address Violent Crime 
Spilling Over from Mexico: 

At the federal level, officials from DOJ and DHS and their components 
stated that they have undertaken a number of efforts, both 
individually and through interagency partnerships, related to drug 
smuggling and cartel activity with a focus on the southwest border; 
however, all but one of these efforts do not specifically target 
spillover crime. For example, the FBI created a Latin American 
Southwest Border Threat Section to focus on issues specifically 
related to drug cartels. Also, DHS issued Border Violence Protocols in 
2006 that set out the steps that CBP and Mexican government personnel 
are to follow when reporting incidents of border violence, and further 
updated them in 2011 to enhance coordination between the U.S. and 
Mexican agencies.[Footnote 34] Moreover, interagency task forces 
provide a forum for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 
to, among other things, share information and conduct coordinated 
enforcement activities to combat drug smuggling and cartel activity. 
Additional details on these and other efforts are contained in 
appendix VII.[Footnote 35] 

DHS developed the Operations Plan for Southwest Border Violence in 
October 2008 to address the possibility that spillover crime, such as 
a significant violent and spontaneous event that results in unintended 
cascading effects spilling over the border, may exceed DHS’s assets to 
respond in those locations. This contingency plan describes the 
various roles and responsibilities that DHS components are to 
undertake to coordinate an agency-wide response to a variety of 
potential threats of violence that could arise along the southwest 
border, such as credible threats against U.S. facilities or personnel. 
Although the plan is to be updated annually, senior officials at DHS’s 
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning.the office responsible 
for coordinating and facilitating development of the plan among the 
DHS components.stated that the plan has not been revised or updated in 
the 4 years since it was finalized.[Footnote 36] According to these 
officials, DHS components have undertaken related planning efforts, 
such as establishing local-level coordination mechanisms to increase 
coordination and information sharing along the southwest border. In 
addition, officials at DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination and 
Planning stated that they do not plan to update the Operations Plan 
for Southwest Border Violence at this time because DHS has shifted to 
a more strategic approach to planning that will provide the framework 
for all of DHS’s planning efforts. The officials could not provide 
additional details on what the new strategic approach would entail 
because it is still in the early stages of development. To complete 
its framework, DHS is awaiting approval of planning guidance that it 
submitted to the President in June 2012. DHS developed the planning 
guidance pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive 8, a directive that 
called for DHS to develop an integrated set of guidance, programs, and 
processes to enable the nation to meet its national preparedness 
goals. DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination and Planning intends to 
develop DHS’s strategic framework in accordance with the new planning 
guidance and expects to complete the framework by October 2014. The 
officials said they will then decide whether to update the Southwest 
Border Violence Operations Plan so it follows the new planning 
guidance or replace the operations plan with other plans developed 
under the strategic framework. 

At the state and local levels, officials from all law enforcement 
agencies that we spoke with stated that their agencies had undertaken 
some efforts, either individually or in partnership with other 
agencies, to combat criminal activities often associated with 
spillover crime, such as drug and human smuggling. Generally, these 
efforts aim to increase state and local law enforcement agencies’ 
capacity to combat criminal activities associated with spillover 
crime, such as forming units that focus on such crime, participating 
in federal grant programs, coordinating enforcement activities, and 
facilitating information sharing. Specific examples of state and local 
law enforcement efforts are contained in appendix VII. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of our report to, DHS, DOJ, and the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy for their review and comment. DHS 
provided written comments, which are reprinted in full in appendix 
VIII. In its comments, DHS stated that it was pleased with our 
discussion of the initiatives that law enforcement agencies have 
undertaken to target border-related crime, including a DHS contingency 
plan for responding to a significant southwest border violence 
escalation and interagency task forces that combat drug smuggling and 
cartel activity. In addition, DHS reiterated its commitment to working 
with many partners across the federal government, public and private 
sectors, and internationally, to mitigate spillover crime along the 
southwest border. DOJ and the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
did not provide official written comments. All three agencies provided 
technical comments which we have incorporated where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy and other interested parties. In addition, the 
report is available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
acknowledged in appendix IX. 

Signed by: 

Cary Russell: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Southwest Border Counties by State: 

There are 24 U.S. counties that share a border with Mexico. These 
counties are arranged below by state, in an alphabetical order. 

Arizona: 
1. Cochise County; 
2. Pima County; 
3. Santa Cruz County; 
4. Yuma County. 

California: 
5. Imperial County; 
6. San Diego County. 

New Mexico: 
7. Dona Ana County; 
8. Hidalgo County; 
9. Luna County. 

Texas: 
10. Brewster County; 
11. Cameron County; 
12. Culberson County; 
13. El Paso County; 
14. Hidalgo County; 
15. Hudspeth County; 
16. Jeff Davis County; 
17. Kinney County; 
18. Maverick County; 
19. Presidio County; 
20. Starr County; 
21. Terrell County; 
22. Val Verde County; 
23. Webb County; 
24. Zapata County. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report addresses the following questions: (1) What information do 
reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on 
spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have 
federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to 
track spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, 
if any, do these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, 
if any, have these agencies taken to address spillover crime? 

To address the first question, we analyzed Summary Reporting System 
(SRS) data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR) Program-—the government’s centralized repository 
for crime data-—from January 2004 through December 2011 for the four 
southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). 
[Footnote 37] We selected January 2004 as the initial date because it 
provided us with data for more than 2 years prior to December 2006, 
when Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office and began a major 
military offensive against Mexican drug cartels. We also analyzed UCR’
s National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data, available 
from January 2007 through December 2010, for the single southwest 
border law enforcement agency reporting such data—the sheriff’s office 
in Yuma County, Arizona.[Footnote 38] To assess the reliability of the 
UCR data, we conducted analyses to test for irregularities in the 
data, reviewed FBI documentation on how the data can and cannot be 
used and on the FBI’s procedures for ensuring UCR data quality, and 
interviewed FBI officials knowledgeable about the data. On the basis 
of this assessment, we excluded some counties from our analysis 
because they did not report complete crime data to the FBI. We 
concluded that the data for the remaining counties were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of our review. In addition, we reviewed 
crime reports and documentation on crime databases published by the 
FBI, state agencies, and local law enforcement agencies in the four 
southwest border states. To further determine the types of data that 
are systematically collected, how these data are recorded and used in 
southwest border counties, and what information these data provide on 
spillover crime, we reviewed guidance documents and research reports 
developed by federal agencies, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and Congressional Research Service. Also, we interviewed knowledgeable 
officials from a total of 37 state and local agencies on the southwest 
border that are responsible for investigating and tracking crime 
occurring in their jurisdictions. At the state level, we conducted 
interviews with officials from the California Highway Patrol and the 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas Departments of Public Safety.[Footnote 
39] At the local level, we interviewed officials representing 21 of 24 
sheriffs’ offices in southwest border counties (4 in Arizona, 2 in 
California, 3 in New Mexico, and 12 in Texas), and 12 large municipal 
police departments in these border counties (4 in Arizona, 3 in 
California, 1 in New Mexico, and 4 in Texas).[Footnote 40] We selected 
departments from each of four states, and we selected large 
departments because according to our review of the UCRSRS data, in 
general, large departments had more reported crimes than did smaller 
departments. A list of the 24 southwest border counties can be found 
in appendix I. 

Moreover, to obtain information on spillover crime and efforts by law 
enforcement agencies along the U.S.-Mexico border to combat such 
crime, we conducted site visits to five southwest border counties in 
Arizona and Texas. These visits were to (1) Tucson, Pima County, 
Arizona; (2) Nogales, Santa Cruz County, Arizona; (3) Brownsville, 
Cameron County, Texas; (4) McAllen, Hidalgo County, Texas; and (5) 
Laredo, Webb County, Texas. We selected these locations because they 
represent diverse rural and urban environments, as well as have a 
range of border geographic features, such as rivers, mountains, 
agricultural deltas, and deserts that may pose different challenges 
for crossing the U.S. border from Mexico. These factors might have an 
effect on the levels and types of crime occurring in southwest border 
communities. As part of our visits, we met with federal officials, 
such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents and officers 
operating between and at the ports of entry along the southwest 
border, state law enforcement officials from the Arizona Department of 
Public Safety, and local law enforcement officials, such as sheriffs 
in Santa Cruz and Hidalgo Counties and officials in the Tucson and 
Nogales Police Departments. The information we obtained from these 
visits is not generalizable to all southwest border counties. However, 
the information provides valuable insights into the types of crime 
information that are available to law enforcement agencies and 
perspectives on crime occurring in southwest border communities. 

To address the second question, we collected information, such as 
crime reports and documentation on categories of data collected, from 
and conducted interviews with state and local law enforcement agencies 
identified above, as well as federal agencies and interagency task 
forces that have responsibilities for combating drug cartel–related 
activities along the southwest border. Federal agencies include 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOJ headquarters and field 
offices, including DHS’s CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), Office of Policy, Office of Operations Coordination and 
Planning, and intelligence offices, such as the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis; as well as DOJ’s FBI; Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA); and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 
Interagency task forces— that is, partnerships of federal, state, and 
local law enforcement counterparts—include Arizona’s High Intensity 
Drug Trafficking Area, El Paso Intelligence Center, and Border 
Enforcement Security Task Forces in Arizona and Texas. State and local 
agencies include those identified above, as well as Arizona’s Alliance 
for Countering Transnational Threats, the Arizona Counter Terrorism 
Information Center, and members of the Texas Border Sheriff’s 
Coalition. We asked agencies about their efforts to track spillover 
crime, any challenges they encountered in doing so, and whether they 
collected or tracked other data they considered related to spillover 
crime and violence on the southwest border. Specifically, we analyzed 
CBP data on the number of assaults on Border Patrol agents in 
southwest border patrol sectors from fiscal years 2006 through 2012, 
and the number of assaults on Office of Field Operations personnel at 
southwest border ports of entry for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the 
date ranges for which these data were available. To assess the 
reliability of the CBP data on assaults and other crimes against 
agents and personnel, we reviewed relevant documentation, such as 
procedures for collecting data consistently, and interviewed CBP staff 
responsible for the data. On the basis of our efforts, we determined 
the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. 

To address the third question, we analyzed threat assessments by 
federal agencies, covering the time period from 2004 through 2012, to 
determine the extent to which these agencies identified Mexican drug 
cartel–related threats facing southwest border communities and law 
enforcement agents in those communities. Specifically, we analyzed 4 
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis assessments that focused on 
violence along the entire southwest border covering the time period 
from 2006 through 2011. In addition, we analyzed the total of 12 
Border Patrol threat assessments and Operational Requirements-Based 
Budgeting Process documents containing threat information for the 
Laredo, Tucson, and Rio Grande Valley sectors: 1 assessment in sample 
fiscal years 2004, 2007, 2009, and 2012 per each sector to discern any 
trends in crime and violence along the southwest border over time. 
[Footnote 41] We selected the three Border Patrol sectors to 
correspond to the locations of our site visits. We selected these 
particular years because they approximate release dates of the DHS 
Intelligence and Analysis assessments to help identify potential 
similarities or differences in trends. To obtain additional context on 
potential threats facing southwest border communities, we reviewed 
several other assessments, such as National Drug Intelligence Center 
assessment (2011) and an Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
assessment (2011), and other documentation, such as congressional 
reports and testimonies.[Footnote 42] To obtain perspectives on a 
range of concerns regarding the existence and potential effects of 
spillover crime, in addition to interviews with the officials from 37 
state and local law enforcement agencies and federal officials 
identified above, we interviewed officials from Chambers of Commerce 
in four of the five counties we visited—-Cameron, Hidalgo, Santa Cruz, 
and Webb Counties.[Footnote 43] While the results of these interviews 
are not generalizeable to all local businesses or Chambers of Commerce 
on the southwest border, they provide perspectives about the effects 
that violence in Mexico might have had on the businesses in their 
communities. 

To address the fourth question, we reviewed and analyzed information, 
such as fact sheets and contingency plans, from and conducted 
interviews with all of the federal, state, and local agencies and task 
forces previously discussed. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 through February 
2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comparison of UCR SRS with NIBRS: 

Appendix III provides information about differences between the UCR 
SRS and NIBRS. As shown in table 2, the SRS collects aggregate offense 
information for Part I offenses, and arrest information for Part I and 
Part II offenses. NIBRS collects offense information on each 
occurrence of crimes listed under Group A offenses and arrest 
information for Group A and Group B offenses. 

Table 2: Uniform Crime Reporting Summary Reporting System and National-
Incident Based Reporting System Offenses: 

UCR SRS: 

Part I offenses: 

1. Criminal homicide. 
2. Forcible rape. 
3. Robbery. 
4. Aggravated assault. 
5. Burglary. 
6. Larceny-theft (except motor vehicle theft). 
7. Motor vehicle theft. 
8. Arson. 

Part II offenses: 

1. Other assaults. 
2. Forgery and counterfeiting. 
3. Fraud. 
4. Embezzlement. 
5. Stolen property: buying, receiving, or possessing. 
6. Vandalism. 
7. Weapons: carrying, possessing, etc. 
8. Prostitution and commercialized vice. 
9. Sex offenses. 
10. Drug abuse violations. 
11. Gambling. 
12. Offenses against the family and children. 
13. Driving under the influence. 
14. Liquor laws. 
15. Drunkenness. 
16. Disorderly conduct. 
17. Vagrancy. 
18. Suspicion. 
19. Curfew and loitering laws (persons under 18). 
20. Runaways (persons under 18). 
21. All other offenses. 

NIBRS: 

Group A offenses (Part I offenses underlined): 

1. Arson (underlined). 
2. Assault offenses (underlined). 
3. Bribery. 
4. Burglary/breaking and entering (underlined). 
5. Counterfeiting/forgery. 
6. Destruction/damage/vandalism of property. 
7. Drug/narcotic offenses. 
8. Embezzlement. 
9. Extortion/blackmail. 
10. Fraud offenses. 
11. Gambling offenses. 
12. Homicide offenses (underlined). 
13. Kidnapping/abduction. 
14. Larceny/theft offenses (underlined). 
15. Motor vehicle theft (underlined). 
16. Pornography/obscene materials. 
17. Prostitution offenses. 
18. Robbery (underlined). 
19. Sex offenses, forcible (underlined). 
20. Sex offenses, nonforcible. 
21. Stolen property offenses (receiving, etc.). 
22. Weapons laws violations. 

Group B offenses: 

1. Bad checks. 
2. Curfew/loitering/vagrancy violations. 
3. Disorderly conduct. 
4. Driving under the influence. 
5. Drunkenness. 
6. Family offenses, nonviolent. 
7. Liquor law violations. 
8. Peeping tom. 
9. Trespass of real property. 
10. All other offenses. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ information. 

[End of table] 

Table 3 summarizes the main differences between the two crime data 
systems. 

Table 3: Types of Information in Uniform Crime Reporting Summary and 
National-Incident Based Reporting Systems: 

Summary of types of information in SRS: 

* Consists of monthly aggregate crime counts for 8 Part I offenses. 

* Gives a tally of the incidents. Does not contain information on each 
reported incident. 

* Reports only the most serious crime committed, suppressing counts of 
lesser offenses in multiple-offense incidents (with some exceptions.) 
For example, if a murderer has raped his victim, only murder is 
reported. 

* Does not distinguish between attempted and completed crimes. 

* Does not provide information about simple assault, which is the most 
commonly reported domestic violence offense. 

* Records rape of females only. 

* Collects weapon information for murder, robbery, and aggravated 
assault. 

* Provides counts on arrests for the 8 Part I offenses and 21 other 
offenses. 

Summary of types of information in NIBRS: 

* Consists of individual incident records for 8 Part I offenses and 38 
other offenses. 

* Contains information on each incident reported to police, including: 
- characteristics of victim(s) and offender(s), 
- relationship between the victim and offender, 
- crimes committed, 
- injuries at the incident scene, 
- weapons used, 
- arrests made, and, 
- incident location. 

* Requires officers to report multiple offenses, victims, and 
offenders. This allows researchers to compare and analyze multiple 
incidents. 

* Distinguishes between attempted and completed crimes. 

* Provides information about cases involving simple assault. 

* Records rape of males and females. 

* Collects weapon information for all violent offenses. 

* Provides details on arrests for the 8 Part I offenses and 49 other 
offenses. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ information. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: UCR Data Tables for Southwest Border Counties, 2004-2011: 

a. Violent crime rates per 100,000 for all border counties combined by 
state, 2004-2011: 

State: Arizona; 
2004: 641.3; 
2005: 623.4; 
2006: 572.4; 
2007: 508.2; 
2008: 490.8; 
2009: 440.9; 
2010: 427.7; 
2011: 428.1. 

State: California; 
2004: 467.7; 
2005: 470.5; 
2006: 456.9; 
2007: 459; 
2008: 424.7; 
2009: 420.7; 
2010: 374.9; 
2011: 347.3. 

State: New Mexico; 
2004: N/A; 
2005: 435.4; 
2006: 450.7; 
2007: 435.8; 
2008: 420.0;
2009: 410.0; 
2010: 371.2; 
2011: 399.2. 

State: Texas; 
2004: 480.5; 
2005: 434.0; 
2006: 388.0; 
2007: 391.0; 
2008: 416.2; 
2009: 405.4; 
2010: 365.2; 
2011: 338.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

Notes: N/A stands for not available. Local law enforcement agencies in 
New Mexico border counties did not submit complete data to the FBI in 
2004. 

The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released 
these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement 
agencies were able to revise these data until the end of the calendar 
year 2012. 

[End of table] 

b. Violent crime rates per 100,000 for all nonborder counties combined 
by state, 2004-2011 

State: Arizona; 
2004: 469.0; 
2005: 524.4; 
2006: 495.0; 
2007: 471.7; 
2008: 435.6; 
2009: 389.6; 
2010: 370.4; 
2011: 363.8. 

State: California; 
2004: 557.9; 
2005: 531.6; 
2006: 540.9; 
2007: 528.5; 
2008: 510.0; 
2009: 478.4; 
2010: 446.7; 
2011: 417.3. 

State: New Mexico; 
2004: N/A; 
2005: 709.0; 
2006: 692.3; 
2007: 698.1; 
2008: 683.0; 
2009: 645.2; 
2010: 593.9; 
2011: 577.3. 

State: Texas; 
2004: 547.1; 
2005: 540.7; 
2006: 531.8; 
2007: 523.8; 
2008: 518.2; 
2009: 500.3; 
2010: 459.9; 
2011: 414.8. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

Notes: N/A stands for not available. New Mexico violent crime rate for 
2004 not calculated because comparable data for border counties not 
available. 

The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released 
these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement 
agencies were able to revise these data until the end of the calendar 
year 2012. 

[End of table] 

c. Violent crime rates per 100,000 for large counties (population of 
25,000 or more) by state, 2004-2011 

State: Arizona; 

County: Cochise; 
2004: 737.9; 
2005: 628.7; 
2006: 692.8; 
2007: 582.6; 
2008: 526.0; 
2009: 576.9; 
2010: 534.4; 
2011: 641.3. 

County: Pima; 
2004: 640.2; 
2005: 649.7; 
2006: 591.8; 
2007: 522.5; 
2008: 518.6; 
2009: 439.2; 
2010: 429.3; 
2011: 431.9. 

County: Santa Cruz; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

County: Yuma; 
2004: 609.9; 
2005: 502.4; 
2006: 474.3; 
2007: 444.6; 
2008: 377.5; 
2009: 410.1; 
2010: 376.5; 
2011: 326.7. 

State: California; 

County: Imperial; 
2004: 455.1; 
2005: 511.5; 
2006: 421.7; 
2007: 336.9; 
2008: 289.6; 
2009: 355.4; 
2010: 354.1; 
2011: 268.4. 

County: San Diego; 
2004: 468.4; 
2005: 468.3; 
2006: 458.7; 
2007: 465.7; 
2008: 432.1; 
2009: 424.3; 
2010: 376.0; 
2011: 351.5. 

State: New Mexico; 

County: Dona Ana; 
2004: N/A; 
2005: 442.2; 
2006: 466.5; 
2007: 443.3; 
2008: 429.5; 
2009: 410.4; 
2010: 352.0; 
2011: 369.7. 

County: Luna; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

State: Texas; 

County: Cameron; 
2004: 467.0; 
2005: 489.8; 
2006: 431.3; 
2007: 408.7; 
2008: 422.8; 
2009: 334.3; 
2010: 330.9; 
2011: 293.4. 

County: El Paso; 
2004: 506.4; 
2005: 409.9; 
2006: 379.1; 
2007: 400.3; 
2008: 437.1; 
2009: 436.3; 
2010: 420.7; 
2011: 395.6. 

County: Hidalgo; 
2004: 514.9; 
2005: 463.6; 
2006: 378.7; 
2007: 341.3; 
2008: 360.3; 
2009: 406.6; 
2010: 314.2; 
2011: 295.4. 

County: Maverick; 
2004: 315.6; 
2005: 425.2; 
2006: 361.0; 
2007: 554.5; 
2008: 518.9; 
2009: 207.9; 
2010: 241.4; 
2011: 335.7. 

County: Starr; 
2004: 271.1; 
2005: 213.8; 
2006: 148.4; 
2007: 260.4; 
2008: 287.7; 
2009: 281.1; 
2010: 293.6; 
2011: 242.6. 

County: Val Verde; 
2004: 143.6; 
2005: 132.8; 
2006: 81.7; 
2007: 162.6; 
2008: 194.1; 
2009: 194.0; 
2010: 178.0; 
2011: 202.4. 

County: Webb; 
2004: 532.7; 
2005: 502.5; 
2006: 545.7; 
2007: 565.8; 
2008: 602.1; 
2009: 575.4; 
2010: 508.6; 
2011: 464.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

Notes: N/A stands for not available. Local law enforcement agencies in 
Dona Ana County, New Mexico, did not submit complete data to the FBI 
in 2004. 

The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released 
these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement 
agencies were able to revise these data until the end of the calendar 
year 2012. 

[End of table] 

d. Number of reported violent crimes for small counties (population 
under 25,000) by state, 2004-2011 

State: New Mexico; 

County: Hidalgo; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

State: Texas; 

County: Brewster; 
2004: 22; 
2005: 33; 
2006: 21; 
2007: 27; 
2008: 23; 
2009: 27; 
2010: 15; 
2011: 10. 

County: Culberson;
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 4; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 5; 
2011: 3. 

County: Hudspeth; 
2004: 5; 
2005: 7; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 10; 
2011: 1. 

County: Jeff Davis; 
2004: 3; 
2005: 6; 
2006: 7; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 6; 
2010: 5; 
2011: 3. 

County: Kinney; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 5; 
2008: 4; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 7; 
2011: 0. 

County: Presidio; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

County: Terrell; 
2004: 7; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 4; 
2011: 4. 

County: Zapata; 
2004: 54; 
2005: 33; 
2006: 34; 
2007: 28; 
2008: 46; 
2009: 39; 
2010: 37; 
2011: 21; 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

Note: The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly 
released these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law 
enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of 
the calendar year 2012. 

[End of table] 

e. Property crime rates per 100,000 for all border counties combined 
by state, 2004-2011: 

State: Arizona; 
Local law enforcement agencies did not submit complete data to the FBI. 

State: California; 
2004: 3,306.2; 
2005: 3,323.9; 
2006: 3,199.8; 
2007: 3,093.4; 
2008: 2,880.1; 
2009: 2,372.8; 
2010: 2,251.5; 
2011: 2,145.3. 

State: New Mexico; 
2004: N/A; 
2005: 3,421.7; 
2006: 3,163.4; 
2007: 3,260.3; 
2008: 3,088.7; 
2009: 3,118.0; 
2010: 3,020.0; 
2011: 3,199.4. 

State: Texas; 
2004: 4,594.0; 
2005: 4,268.0; 
2006: 4.014.0; 
2007: 4,080.4; 
2008: 4,115.3; 
2009: 4,128.8; 
2010: 3,758.6; 
2011: 3,324.8. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

Notes: N/A stands for not available. Local law enforcement agencies in 
New Mexico border counties did not submit complete data to the FBI in 
2004. 

The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released 
these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement 
agencies were able to revise these data until the end of the calendar 
year 2012. 

[End of table] 

f. Property crime rates per 100,000 for all nonborder counties 
combined by state, 2004-2011: 

State: Arizona; 
Not computed because comparable data for border counties not available. 

State: California; 
2004: 3,415.2; 
2005: 3,316.4; 
2006: 3,173.3; 
2007: 3,027.8; 
2008: 2,926.2; 
2009: 2,761.7; 
2010: 2,674.3; 
2011: 2,628.1. 

State: New Mexico; 
2004: N/A; 
2005: 4,410.6; 
2006: 4,222.5; 
2007: 3,948.4; 
2008: 4,036.6; 
2009: 3,928.9; 
2010: 3,494.9; 
2011: 3,598.0. 

State: Texas; 
2004: 4,491.4; 
2005: 4,343.0; 
2006: 4,093.3; 
2007: 4,128.3; 
2008: 3,974.0; 
2009: 4,005.3; 
2010: 3,790.0; 
2011: 3,520.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

Notes: N/A stands for not available. New Mexico violent crime rate for 
2004 not calculated because comparable data for border counties not 
available. 

The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released 
these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement 
agencies were able to revise these data until the end of the calendar 
year 2012. 

[End of table] 

g. Property crime rates per 100,000 for large counties (population of 
25,000 or more) by state, 2004-2011: 

State: Arizona; 

County: Cochise; 
2004: 3,498.6; 
2005: 3,384.9; 
2006: 3,903.0; 
2007: 3,575.5; 
2008: 2,934.7; 
2009: 2,827.3; 
2010: 2,523.0; 
2011: 2,519.8. 

County: Pima; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

County: Santa Cruz; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

County: Yuma; 
2004: 3,486.5; 
2005: 3,562.6; 
2006: 3,567.2; 
2007: 3,304.9; 
2008: 2,593.5; 
2009: 2,648.1; 
2010: 2,481.7; 
2011: 2,191.1. 

State: California; 

County: Imperial; 
2004: 3,722.3; 
2005: 4,059.0; 
2006: 4,062.9; 
2007: 3,749.9; 
2008: 3,805.1; 
2009: 3,399.0; 
2010: 3,399.0; 
2011: 3,378.9. 

County: San Diego; 
2004: 3,285.0; 
2005: 3,285.7; 
2006: 3,154.0; 
2007: 3,057.2; 
2008: 2,829.3; 
2009: 2,316.2; 
2010: 2,192.0; 
2011: 2,078.8. 

State: New Mexico; 

County: Dona Ana; 
2004: N/A; 
2005: 3,357.1; 
2006: 3,122.3; 
2007: 3,217.0; 
2008: 3,173.9; 
2009: 3,264.0; 
2010: 3,062.5; 
2011: 3,229.0. 

County: Luna; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

State: Texas; 

County: Cameron; 
2004: 5,422.1; 
2005: 5,004.7; 
2006: 4,701.9; 
2007: 4,857.0; 
2008: 4,864.2; 
2009: 4,769.0; 
2010: 4,549.0; 
2011: 4,111.9. 

County: El Paso; 
2004: 3,293.5; 
2005: 3,115.2; 
2006: 3,211.1; 
2007: 3,079.5; 
2008: 3,109.8; 
2009: 2,915.2; 
2010: 2,589.3; 
2011: 2,375.4. 

County: Hidalgo; 
2004: 5,645.2; 
2005: 5,249.8; 
2006: 4,514.7; 
2007: 4,549.9; 
2008: 4,618.6; 
2009: 4,996.3; 
2010: 4,693.8; 
2011: 3,956.0. 

County: Maverick; 
2004: 3,087.0; 
2005: 2,697.7; 
2006: 3,298.4; 
2007: 3,168.7; 
2008: 3,264.9; 
2009: 3,235.4; 
2010: 2,856.7; 
2011: 2,635.4. 

County: Starr; 
2004: 2,117.8; 
2005: 1,726.5; 
2006: 1,619.6; 
2007: 1,740.3; 
2008: 1,970.8; 
2009: 1,904.2; 
2010: 1,871.5; 
2011: 1,715.6. 

County: Val Verde; 
2004: 2,743.3; 
2005: 2,849.1; 
2006: 2,402.7; 
2007: 2,889.7; 
2008: 2,125.1; 
2009: 1,853.3; 
2010: 1,837.2; 
2011: 1,939.6. 

County: Webb; 
2004: 6,344.3; 
2005: 5,767.6; 
2006: 5,618.0; 
2007: 6,071.2; 
2008: 6,184.7; 
2009: 5,822.3; 
2010: 4,771.8; 
2011: 4,381.1. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

Notes: N/A stands for not available. Local law enforcement agencies in 
Dona Ana County, New Mexico, did not submit complete data to the FBI 
in 2004. 

The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly released 
these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law enforcement 
agencies were able to revise these data until the end of the calendar 
year 2012. 

[End of table] 

h. Number of reported property crimes for small counties (population 
under 25,000) by state, 2004-2011: 

State: New Mexico; 

County: Hidalgo; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

State: Texas; 

County: Brewster; 
2004: 174; 
2005: 158; 
2006: 164; 
2007: 157; 
2008: 138; 
2009: 184; 
2010: 112; 
2011: 179. 

County: Culberson; 
2004: 9; 
2005: 3; 
2006: 4; 
2007: 10; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 11; 
2010: 10; 
2011: 7. 

County: Hudspeth; 
2004: 42; 
2005: 41; 
2006: 32; 
2007: 41; 
2008: 34; 
2009: 22; 
2010: 44; 
2011: 22. 

County: Jeff Davis; 
2004: 11; 
2005: 10; 
2006: 12; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 11; 
2009: 8; 
2010: 9; 
2011: 14. 

County: Kinney; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 5; 
2007: 9; 
2008: 28; 
2009: 27; 
2010: 14; 
2011: 2. 

County: Presidio; 
Local law enforcement agencies in the county did not submit complete 
data to the FBI. 

County: Terrell; 
2004: 15; 
2005: 7; 
2006: 11; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 17; 
2009: 66; 
2010: 30; 
2011: 9. 

County: Zapata; 
2004: 448; 
2005: 292; 
2006: 214; 
2007: 239; 
2008: 145; 
2009: 272; 
2010: 279; 
2011: 264. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

Note: The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly 
released these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law 
enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of 
the calendar year 2012. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Results from Analyzing UCR SRS and NIBRS Crime Data: 

We analyzed UCR SRS crime data in the four southwest border states: 
Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas.[Footnote 44] This appendix 
presents the results of our analyses of SRS crime data broken out by 
violent and property crimes for southwest border counties, separately 
and combined within each state, for the period 2004 through 2011. We 
also present the results of analyses of violent and property crime 
data for nonborder counties, combined within each state, and compare 
the nonborder county crime rates per 100,000 population with border 
county crime rates. We also analyzed available NIBRS data, covering 
the period 2007 through 2010, for the Yuma County, Arizona, sheriff’s 
office.[Footnote 45] The office is the single southwest border law 
enforcement agency that collects NIBRS data. 

Violent Crime along the Southwest Border Reported through the UCR SRS: 

All border and nonborder counties. We analyzed SRS violent crime data 
for all 4 border counties in Arizona, both border counties in 
California, all 3 border counties in New Mexico, and all 15 border 
counties in Texas. We also analyzed these data for all 11 nonborder 
counties in Arizona, all 56 nonborder counties in California, 29 of 30 
nonborder counties in New Mexico, and all 239 nonborder counties in 
Texas.[Footnote 46] The violent crime rate for the New Mexico border 
counties was lower in 2011 than in 2005, but the rate in New Mexico’s 
border counties decreased less than in its nonborder counties. 
[Footnote 47] For the border counties in each of the other states, we 
found that the violent crime rate was lower in 2011 than in 2004, and 
the rate in the border counties decreased more than in the nonborder 
counties. Specifically, as shown in figure 3, 

* The violent crime rate in Arizona’s border counties was higher than 
in Arizona’s nonborder counties in each year from 2004 through 2011. 

However, the crime rate decreased in both, with the rate in border 
counties being 33 percent lower in 2011 than 2004, and the rate in 
nonborder counties being 22 percent lower. 

* The violent crime rate in California’s border counties was lower 
than in California’s nonborder counties in each year from 2004 through 
2011. For border counties, the rate was 26 percent lower in 2011 than 
in 2004. The violent crime rate in California’s nonborder counties 
generally decreased and was 25 percent lower in 2011 than in 2004. 

* The violent crime rate in New Mexico’s border counties was lower 
than in New Mexico’s nonborder counties in each year from 2005 through 
2011. The decrease in crime rate in border counties (8 percent) was 
smaller than the decrease in nonborder counties (19 percent). 

* The violent crime rate in Texas’s border counties was lower than in 
Texas’s nonborder counties in each year from 2004 to 2011. For border 
counties, the rate was 30 percent lower in 2011 than in 2004, while 
the rate for nonborder counties was 24 percent lower. 

Figure 3: Violent Crime Rates per 100,000 Population In Southwest 
Border and Nonborder Counties, Combined by State, 2004-2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 multiple line graphs] 

Arizona: 

Year: 2004; 
Border counties: 641.3; 
Nonborder counties: 469. 

Year: 2005; 
Border counties: 623.4; 
Nonborder counties: 524.4. 

Year: 2006; 
Border counties: 572.4; 
Nonborder counties: 495. 

Year: 2007; 
Border counties: 508.2; 
Nonborder counties: 471.7. 

Year: 2008; 
Border counties: 490.8; 
Nonborder counties: 435.6. 

Year: 2009; 
Border counties: 440.9; 
Nonborder counties: 389.6. 

Year: 2010; 
Border counties: 427.7; 
Nonborder counties: 370.4. 

Year: 2011; 
Border counties: 428.1; 
Nonborder counties: 363.8. 

California: 

Year: 2004; 
Border counties: 467.7; 
Nonborder counties: 557.9. 

Year: 2005; 
Border counties: 470.5; 
Nonborder counties: 531.6. 

Year: 2006; 
Border counties: 456.9; 
Nonborder counties: 540.9. 

Year: 2007; 
Border counties: 459; 
Nonborder counties: 528.5. 

Year: 2008; 
Border counties: 424.7; 
Nonborder counties: 510. 

Year: 2009; 
Border counties: 420.7; 
Nonborder counties: 478.4. 

Year: 2010; 
Border counties: 374.9; 
Nonborder counties: 446.7. 

Year: 2011; 
Border counties: 347.3; 
Nonborder counties: 417.3. 

New Mexico: 

Year: 2005; 
Border counties: 435.4; 
Nonborder counties: 709. 

Year: 2006; 
Border counties: 450.7; 
Nonborder counties: 692.3. 

Year: 2007; 
Border counties: 435.8; 
Nonborder counties: 698.1. 

Year: 2008; 
Border counties: 420; 
Nonborder counties: 683. 

Year: 2009; 
Border counties: 410; 
Nonborder counties: 645.2. 

Year: 2010; 
Border counties: 371.2; 
Nonborder counties: 593.9. 

Year: 2011; 
Border counties: 399.2; 
Nonborder counties: 577.3. 

Texas: 

Year: 2004; 
Border counties: 480.5; 
Nonborder counties: 547.1. 

Year: 2005; 
Border counties: 434; 
Nonborder counties: 540.7. 

Year: 2006; 
Border counties: 388; 
Nonborder counties: 531.8. 

Year: 2007; 
Border counties: 391; 
Nonborder counties: 523.8. 

Year: 2008; 
Border counties: 416.2; 
Nonborder counties: 518.2. 

Year: 2009; 
Border counties: 405.4; 
Nonborder counties: 500.3. 

Year: 2010; 
Border counties: 365.2; 
Nonborder counties: 459.9. 

Year: 2011; 
Border counties: 338.9; 
Nonborder counties: 414.8. 

Source: GAO analysis of Uniform Crime Reporting data. 

Note: The figure does not include New Mexico for 2004 because local 
law enforcement agencies in the 3 New Mexico border counties (Dona 
Ana, Luna, and Hidalgo) submitted incomplete SRS violent crime data to 
the FBI. 

[End of figure] 

Large border counties. We analyzed SRS violent crime data for all 13 
large southwest border counties—that is, counties with populations of 
25,000 or more—that submitted sufficiently complete data to the FBI to 
enable us to calculate the violent crime rate.[Footnote 48] 

Of these, in 10 of the 12 large border Arizona, California, and Texas 
counties, the rate was lower in 2011 than in 2004. In 2 large border 
counties in Texas, the violent crime rate increased (see figure 1). 
Specifically, (1) in Maverick County, Texas, the violent crime rate 
increased by 6 percent; and (2) in Val Verde County, Texas, the 
violent crime rate increased by 41 percent, largely because of an 
increase in aggravated assaults. Although lower in 2011 than in 2004, 
the violent crime rate in Cochise County, Arizona, increased 20 
percent from 2010 to 2011, principally because of an increase in 
aggravated assaults. The violent crime rate in Dona Ana County, New 
Mexico, was lower in 2011 than in 2005. However, the rate increased 5 
percent between 2010 and 2011, largely because of increases in 
robberies and aggravated assaults. Comparing UCR SRS and NIBRS data 
for the Yuma County sheriff’s office-—the single southwest border law 
enforcement agency that reports NIBRS data-—we found comparable 
decreases in violent crimes. Specifically, we found that the total 
number of violent crimes reported through NIBRS was 32 percent lower 
in 2010 than in 2007, when the office began reporting NIBRS data. The 
number of violent crimes reported in the SRS format was 33 percent 
lower in 2010 than in 2007. Overall, the total number of violent crime 
offenses reported by the Yuma County sheriff’s office through NIBRS 
was about 1 percent higher than those reported through the SRS. 

Small border counties. The southwest border has 9 small counties— that 
is, counties with populations of less than 25,000.[Footnote 49] The 
average combined population of these 9 counties from 2004 through 2011 
was about 46,000. Our analysis of SRS violent crime data for 7 of the 
9 counties with sufficiently complete data shows that the total number 
of reported violent crimes in these small counties decreased by 55 
percent, that is, from a total of 93 violent crimes in 2004 to 42 in 
2011 (see figure 4).[Footnote 50] 

Figure 4: Total Number of Reported Violent Crimes in Seven Small 
Southwest Border Counties, 2004-2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Year: 2004; 
Reported Violent Crimes: 93. 

Year: 2005; 
Reported Violent Crimes: 81. 

Year: 2006; 
Reported Violent Crimes: 74. 

Year: 2007; 
Reported Violent Crimes: 72. 

Year: 2008; 
Reported Violent Crimes: 87. 

Year: 2009; 
Reported Violent Crimes: 76. 

Year: 2010; 
Reported Violent Crimes: 83. 

Year: 2011; 
Reported Violent Crimes: 42. 

Source: GAO analysis of Uniform Crime Reporting data. 

Notes: The 7 counties are Brewster, Culberson, Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, 
Kinney, Terrell, and Zapata Counties in Texas. The average combined 
total population for the 7 counties from 2004 through 2011 was about 
36,000. 

[End of figure] 

Reported Property Crime along the Southwest Border through the UCR SRS: 

All border and nonborder counties. We analyzed SRS property crime data 
for both border counties in California, all 3 border counties in New 
Mexico, and all 15 border counties in Texas.[Footnote 51] We also 
analyzed the data for the nonborder counties in California, New 
Mexico, and Texas.[Footnote 52] For the border counties in California 
and Texas, we found that the reported property crime rate in 2011 was 
lower than in 2004, and the rate in the border counties decreased more 
than in the nonborder counties. The rate for New Mexico border 
counties was lower in 2011 than in 2005, but the rate in New Mexico’s 
border counties decreased less than in its nonborder counties. 
[Footnote 53] Specifically, as shown in figure 5, 

* Each year from 2009 through 2011, the property crime rate in 
California’s border counties was lower than the rate in California’s 
nonborder counties; and each year from 2004 to 2008, the rate in 
border and nonborder counties was similar. For border counties, the 
rate was 35 percent lower in 2011 than in 2004. The property crime 
rate in California’s nonborder counties decreased each year and was 23 
percent lower in 2011 than in 2004. 

* The property crime rate in New Mexico’s border counties was lower 
than in New Mexico’s nonborder counties in each year from 2005 to 
2011. The decrease in crime rate in border counties (7 percent) was 
smaller than the decrease in nonborder counties (18 percent). 

* The property crime rate in Texas’s border counties was similar to 
the rate in nonborder counties in nearly all years. However, the crime 
rate decreased in both, with the rate in border counties being 28 
percent lower in 2011 than 2004, and the rate in nonborder counties 
being 22 percent lower. 

Figure 5: Property Crime Rates per 100,000 Population for Border and 
Nonborder Counties Combined by State, 2004-2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 multiple line graphs] 

California: 

Year: 2004:
Border counties: 3,306.2:
Nonborder counties: 3,415.2. 

Year: 2005:
Border counties: 3,323.9:
Nonborder counties: 3,316.4. 

Year: 2006:
Border counties: 3,199.8:
Nonborder counties: 3,173.3. 

Year: 2007:
Border counties: 3,093.4:
Nonborder counties: 3,027.8. 

Year: 2008:
Border counties: 2,880.1:
Nonborder counties: 2,926.2. 

Year: 2009:
Border counties: 2,372.8:
Nonborder counties: 2,761.7. 

Year: 2010:
Border counties: 2,251.5:
Nonborder counties: 2,674.3. 

Year: 2011:
Border counties: 2,145.3:
Nonborder counties: 2,628.1. 

New Mexico: 

Year: 2005:
Border counties: 3,421.7:
Nonborder counties: 4,410.6. 

Year: 2006:
Border counties: 3,163.4:
Nonborder counties: 4,222.5. 

Year: 2007:
Border counties: 3,260.3:
Nonborder counties: 3,948.4. 

Year: 2008:
Border counties: 3,088.7:
Nonborder counties: 4,036.6. 

Year: 2009:
Border counties: 3,118:
Nonborder counties: 3,928.9. 

Year: 2010:
Border counties: 3,020:
Nonborder counties: 3,494.9. 

Year: 2011:
Border counties: 3,199.4:
Nonborder counties: 3,598. 

Texas: 

Year: 2004; 
Border counties: 4,594; 
Nonborder counties: 4,491.4. 

Year: 2005; 
Border counties: 4,268; 
Nonborder counties: 4,343. 

Year: 2006; 
Border counties: 4,014; 
Nonborder counties: 4,093.3. 

Year: 2007; 
Border counties: 4,080.4; 
Nonborder counties: 4,128.3. 

Year: 2008; 
Border counties: 4,115.3; 
Nonborder counties: 3,974. 

Year: 2009; 
Border counties: 4,128.8; 
Nonborder counties: 4,005.3. 

Year: 2010; 
Border counties: 3,758.6; 
Nonborder counties: 3,790. 

Year: 2011; 
Border counties: 3,324.8; 
Nonborder counties: 3,520.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of Uniform Crime Reporting data. 

Note: The figure does not include New Mexico for 2004 because local 
law enforcement agencies in the 3 New Mexico border counties (Dona 
Ana, Hidalgo, and Luna) submitted incomplete SRS property crime to the 
FBI, or Arizona because Tucson, in Pima County, reported property 
crime data improperly, according to the FBI, and Tucson accounts for 
about 40 percent of the total population of Arizona’s border counties. 

[End of figure] 

Large border counties. We analyzed SRS property crime data for the 12 
large southwest border counties that submitted sufficiently complete 
data to the FBI to enable us to calculate the reported property crime 
rate.[Footnote 54] Of these, in all 11 large border counties in 
Arizona, California, and Texas, the SRS data showed that the crime 
rate was lower in 2011 than in 2004, although there was variability in 
the rate in some counties, such as Cochise County, Arizona, and Val 
Verde County, Texas, over the years (see figure 1). The reported 
property crime rate in Dona Ana County, New Mexico, was lower in 2011 
than in 2005. Comparing UCR SRS and NIBRS data for the Yuma County 
sheriff’s office, we found that both showed a decrease in property 
crimes. Specifically, the total number of property crimes reported 
through NIBRS was 27 percent lower in 2010 than in 2007, when the 
office began reporting NIBRS data. The number of property crimes 
reported in the SRS format was 33 percent lower in 2010 than in 2007. 
Overall, the total number of property crime offenses reported through 
NIBRS was about 24 percent higher than those reported through in the 
SRS format. 

Small border counties. Our analysis of SRS data for 7 of 9 counties 
with sufficiently complete data shows that the total number of 
reported property crimes in these small counties decreased by about 29 
percent, that is, from a total of 701 crimes in 2004 to 497 in 2011 
(see figure 6).[Footnote 55] 

Figure 6: Total Number of Reported Property Crimes in Small Southwest 
Border Counties, 2004-2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Year: 2004; 
Reported property crimes: 701. 

Year: 2005; 
Reported property crimes: 511. 

Year: 2006; 
Reported property crimes: 442. 

Year: 2007; 
Reported property crimes: 482. 

Year: 2008; 
Reported property crimes: 375. 

Year: 2009; 
Reported property crimes: 590. 

Year: 2010; 
Reported property crimes: 498. 

Year: 2011; 
Reported property crimes: 497. 

Source: GAO analysis of Uniform Crime Reporting data. 

Notes: The 7 counties are Brewster, Culberson, Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, 
Kinney, Terrell, and Zapata counties in Texas. 

The average combined total population for the 7 counties from 2004 
through 2011 was about 36,000. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Assaults against Border Patrol Agents by Border Patrol 
Sector, Fiscal Years 2006-2012:" 

Analysis of assault trends for fiscal years 2006 through 2012 by 
Border Patrol sector is presented in figure 7 and source data for the 
analysis are presented in table 4. 

Figure 7: Number of Assaults against Border Patrol Agents by Border 
Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Move mouse over the sector name to learn more about the sector. 

Source: GAO (analysis), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (data), 
Mapinfo (map). 

Notes: Rocking assaults are thrown rocks, for example by drug or alien 
smugglers, at Border Patrol agents with the intent of threatening or 
inflicting physical harm. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border 
Patrol has divided geographic responsibility for border security 
operations along the southwest border among nine sectors, each of 
which has a headquarters with management personnel. 

[End of figure] 

Table 4: Data Tables on Assaults against Border Patrol Agents by 
Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006-2012: 

Big Bend Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 0; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 2; 
2007: 5; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 1. 

Del Rio Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 3; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 9; 
2009: 8; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 13; 
2007: 26; 
2008: 10; 
2009: 15; 
2010: 6; 
2011: 8; 
2012: 14. 

El Centro Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 4; 
2007: 102; 
2008: 125; 
2009: 174; 
2010: 176; 
2011: 107; 
2012: 25. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 13; 
2007: 32; 
2008: 23; 
2009: 14; 
2010: 20; 
2011: 17; 
2012: 10. 

El Paso Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 34; 
2007: 40; 
2008: 66; 
2009: 25; 
2010: 106; 
2011: 21; 
2012: 8. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 25; 
2007: 38; 
2008: 22; 
2009: 25; 
2010: 11; 
2011: 16; 
2012: 9. 

Laredo Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 3; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 23; 
2009: 75; 
2010: 18; 
2011: 5; 
2012: 10. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 36; 
2007: 25; 
2008: 21; 
2009: 43; 
2010: 32; 
2011: 21; 
2012: 33. 

Rio Grande Valley Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 14; 
2007: 12; 
2008: 18; 
2009: 48; 
2010: 25; 
2011: 36; 
2012: 48. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 41; 
2007: 39; 
2008: 60; 
2009: 63; 
2010: 68; 
2011: 72; 
2012: 77. 

San Diego Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 140; 
2007: 214; 
2008: 294; 
2009: 203; 
2010: 100; 
2011: 46; 
2012: 73. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 60; 
2007: 40; 
2008: 83; 
2009: 49; 
2010: 30; 
2011: 31; 
2012: 60. 

Tucson Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 116; 
2007: 124; 
2008: 169; 
2009: 189; 
2010: 340; 
2011: 188; 
2012: 73. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 76; 
2007: 86; 
2008: 86; 
2009: 72; 
2010: 81; 
2011: 63; 
2012: 91. 

Yuma Sector: 

Rocking assaults: 
2006: 120; 
2007: 133; 
2008: 65; 
2009: 34; 
2010: 26; 
2011: 22; 
2012: 12. 

All other assaults: 
2006: 29; 
2007: 41; 
2008: 11; 
2009: 16; 
2010: 6; 
2011: 9; 
2012: 5. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Select Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Efforts 
along the Southwest Border: 

Select efforts by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 
to address crime along the southwest border are presented in tables 5 
and 6. 

Table 5: Select Federal Law Enforcement Entities’ Efforts to Combat 
Mexican Drug Cartel-Related Activities along the Southwest Border: 

Organization: DOJ: Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
Efforts: The FBI created a Latin American Southwest Border Threat 
Section to focus on issues specifically related to drug cartels. 
Within this section, “hybrid-squads,” dedicated to combating violent 
crime along the border, are to address crosscutting issues through 
investigations of different types of crimes related to drug-
trafficking organizations and eliminate traditional law enforcement 
stovepipes to focus on the issue more holistically. The FBI also has 
nine border liaison officers who, among other things, are tasked with 
investigating acts of violence that occur in border areas. 

Organization: DHS: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
Efforts: DHS, jointly with the government of Mexico, issued Border 
Violence Protocols in 2006 that set out the steps that CBP and Mexican 
government personnel are to follow when reporting incidents of border 
violence, such as incursions, assaults on U.S. officers or private 
citizens, potential cross-border pursuits, significant arrests and 
seizures, and attacks or threats against critical U.S. infrastructure. 
The protocols, still in effect, were the result of an action plan for 
combating border violence that DHS and the Mexican government 
collaboratively prepared. DHS sought to expand on these protocols by 
issuing Border Violence Prevention Protocols in December 2011. The 
newer protocols set out a number of steps to enhance coordination 
between the United States and Mexico, including producing joint risk 
assessments and conducting coordinated patrols. CBP officials stated 
in June 2012 that they are still in the process of implementing these 
new protocols. 

Organization: Interagency task force: Border Enforcement Security Task 
Force; 
Efforts: The Border Enforcement Security Task Force stems cross-border 
criminal activity and associated violence through efforts that 
identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing a 
significant threat to border security. The task force is led by ICE in 
partnership with its state, local, and foreign law enforcement 
counterparts. There are 14 Border Enforcement Security Task Force 
teams located along the southwest border in Arizona, California, New 
Mexico, and Texas. 

Organization: Interagency task force: High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Area program; 
Efforts: The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program provides 
assistance to federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug-trafficking 
regions of the United States. The purpose of the program is to reduce 
drug trafficking and production in the United States by facilitating 
information sharing and coordinated enforcement activities. 
Participating agencies make up the High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Area Executive Boards, which are composed of an equal number of 
federal and nonfederal (state, local, and tribal) law enforcement 
leaders. There are five southwest border designated areas in 
California, Arizona, New Mexico, West Texas, and South Texas. 

Organization: Interagency task force: Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 
Task Forces; 
Efforts: The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Program aims 
to reduce the availability of drugs, and the violence and other 
criminal activity associated with the drug trade, by disrupting and 
dismantling major drug-trafficking organizations, money-laundering 
organizations, and related criminal enterprises by targeting high-
level cartel members. The program operates nationwide and combines the 
resources of many federal, state, and local agencies. Led by DOJ, 
participating agencies include 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices; the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the DEA; the FBI; 
Internal Revenue Service; U.S. Coast Guard; ICE/Homeland Security 
Investigations; U.S. Marshals Service; the Criminal Division of DOJ; 
and numerous state and local agencies. The program has four “strike 
forces” (San Diego, Arizona, South Texas, and West Texas) that operate 
along the southwest border by colocating federal prosecutors with 
investigative agents from multiple agencies. 

Organization: Interagency task force: Alliance to Combat Transnational 
Threats; 
Efforts: The Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats operates in 
Arizona and New Mexico/West Texas and brings together law enforcement 
agencies to share intelligence, deploy tactical resources, and 
coordinate enforcement activities to “deter, deny, degrade, disrupt, 
and dismantle criminal organizations, and their ability to operate.” 
Led by DHS, participating agencies include CBP; ICE; as well as over 
60 other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

Organization: Interagency task force: Executive Committee for 
Southwest Border Intelligence and Information Sharing; 
Efforts: The Executive Committee serves as a forum to address state 
and local intelligence needs; reinforce best practices; and advise 
local, state, or federal leadership on southwest border intelligence 
and information-sharing issues within the state and local environment. 
Coled by DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Texas 
Department of Public Safety, participating agencies include select 
fusion centers, sheriffs’ offices, and police departments. In April 
2012, the committee formed the Southwest Border Violence and Crime 
Working Group to identify new metrics and indicators to measure border-
related crime and violence, and propose new terms and definitions for 
various facets of such crime. The Working Group plans to complete this 
work by mid-March 2013. 

Organization: Interagency task force: El Paso Intelligence Center; 
Efforts: The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), located in Texas, is 
a national law enforcement intelligence center administered by the DEA 
that provides time-sensitive, actionable information and intelligence 
to over 39,000 federal, state, local, tribal, and international law 
enforcement officers, agents, and analysts who are approved center 
users. Participating agencies at EPIC include representatives from 24 
different federal, state, and local agencies. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Select State and Local Law Enforcement Efforts to Target 
Border-Related Crime: 

Effort: Operation Stonegarden; 
Description: Operation Stonegarden is a federal grant program 
administered by DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide 
funds to state and local agencies to hire additional law enforcement 
personnel; provide overtime pay, travel, and lodging expenses; and 
procure equipment to increase law enforcement presence and enhance 
their capabilities for securing the southwest border. Twenty-three out 
of 37 state and local law enforcement agencies we spoke to stated that 
they receive Operation Stonegarden funding. 

Effort: Deputization across jurisdictional boundaries; 
Description: The Luna County, New Mexico, Sheriff’s Office seeks to 
increase local law enforcement capacity by developing memorandums of 
understanding with neighboring jurisdictions, allowing deputies from 
other counties to operate in their county so they can work together 
and present a larger law enforcement presence along the border. 

Effort: Border Crimes Unit; 
Description: The Pima County, Arizona, Sheriff’s Office formed a 
border crimes enforcement unit in 2008 to deal with an increase in 
crimes related to illegal trafficking of drugs and people. This unit 
is responsible for patrolling rural areas and interdicting drug 
traffickers; undocumented aliens; and those who commit crimes such as 
homicide, assault, rape, and robbery against undocumented aliens. 

Effort: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center; 
Description: This fusion center provides intelligence, investigative, 
and technical support to state, local, tribal, and federal law 
enforcement agencies on a variety of issues, including border 
security. It produces annual threat assessments on crime trends and 
criminal activity in Arizona. The center is a joint effort of the 
Arizona Department of Public Safety, Arizona Department of Homeland 
Security, the FBI, and other participating agencies. 

Effort: Joint Intelligence Operations Centers; 
Description: Led by the Texas Department of Public Safety, the centers 
are responsible for analyzing intelligence and collecting border 
security information; collaborating with state, local, and federal law 
enforcement partners to conduct intelligence-directed border 
enforcement operations; and ensuring information exchange between 
agencies. 

Effort: Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition; 
Description: The coalition is an association of sheriffs from counties 
on or near the Texas-Mexico border. It provides a forum for joint law 
enforcement efforts. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

February 20, 2013: 

Cary Russell: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-13-175, "Southwest Border Security: Data Are 
Limited and Concerns Vary about Spillover Crime along the Southwest 
Border" 

Dear Mr. Russell: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note GAO's recognition of initiatives law 
enforcement agencies have undertaken to target border-related crime, 
including one effort to address violent crime spilling over from 
Mexico. For example, in October 2008, DHS developed a contingency plan 
for the possibility that a significant southwest border violence 
escalation may exceed DHS's ability to respond. In addition, 
interagency task forces provide a forum for federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies to share information and conduct coordinated 
enforcement activities to combat drug smuggling and cartel activity. 
DHS remains committed to working with its many partners—including 
those across the Federal Government, public and private sectors, and 
internationally—to strengthen the Homeland Security enterprise to 
better mitigate and defend spillover crime along the southwest border 
and elsewhere. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Director; 
Cindy Ayers, Assistant Director; Evi Rezmovic, Assistant Director; 
David Alexander; Hiwotte Amare; Eric Hauswirth; Margaret McKenna; Erin 
O’Brien; Yanina G. Samuels; and Julia Vieweg made significant 
contributions to the work. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For more information, see Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in 
Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2010 (University of San Diego: 
February 2011), and Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: 
Data and Analysis Through 2011 (University of San Diego: March 2012). 

[2] Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Threats, 
Vulnerabilities, and Responsibilities, Before the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security). 

[3] Securing the Border: Progress at the Federal Level, Before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th 
Cong. (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security). 

[4] H.R. 2124, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 6368, 112th Cong. (as passed 
by the House, Sept. 19, 2012). 

[5[ The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly 
released these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law 
enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of 
the calendar year 2012. 

[6] NIBRS includes data on individual crime incidents, including 
information about the nature and types of specific offenses in the 
incident, characteristics of the victims and offenders, and the types 
and value of any property stolen and recovered. We did not analyze 
2011 NIBRS data for the Yuma County Sheriff’s Office because the FBI 
said the office was experiencing record management system problems and 
could not provide complete 2011 NIRBS data. 

[7] The California Department of Justice is the agency that collects 
and reports crime data in California. However, in response to our 
interview request, California Department of Justice officials referred 
us to the California Highway Patrol as the agency best qualified to 
discuss what crime data are collected in the California jurisdictions 
along the southwest border. 

[8] Officials from 2 sheriffs’ offices in Texas were not available for 
interviews and 1 sheriff’s office in Texas declined our request for an 
interview. 

[9] The Border Enforcement Security Task Force is led by DHS’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement in partnership with federal, 
state, local, and foreign law enforcement counterparts to stem cross-
border criminal activity and associated violence. There are 14 teams 
located along the southwest border. 

[10] We did not interview officials from a Chamber of Commerce in Pima 
County because the county’s major city, Tucson, is not located 
directly on the border with Mexico. 

[11] According to the State Department, the Mérida Initiative received 
$1.6 billion since its start in fiscal year 2008. 

[12] This strategy was issued pursuant to Section 1110 of the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 
No. 109-469, § 1110, 120 Stat. 3502, 3543-44). 

[13] Among other items, the supplemental appropriation provided $244 
million to hire new and maintain existing levels of Border Patrol 
agents and CBP officers on the southwest border and $80 million for 
new U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and supporting 
investments along the southwest border. It also provided $196 million 
for DOJ to increase federal law enforcement activities in the 
southwest border region. (Pub. L. No. 111-230, 124 Stat. 2485, 2485, 
2486, 2486-87 (2010)). 

[14] In the past, we have reported on a variety of DHS border security 
programs and related performance goals and measures. For a list of our 
reports that examined DHS’s efforts to secure the U.S. borders, please 
see Related Products page in GAO, Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and 
Challenges in Implementation and Assessment Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-688T] (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 
2012). 

[15] The California Department of Justice is the agency that collects 
and reports crime data in California. However, in response to our 
interview request, the agency referred us to the California Highway 
Patrol as the agency best qualified to discuss what crime data are 
collected in the California jurisdictions along the southwest border. 

[16] University and college, tribal, and federal law enforcement 
agencies also submit crime data to the UCR Program. 

[17] In addition to the SRS data, the UCR Program contains statistics 
on the number of sworn officers and civilian law enforcement 
personnel, data on incidents in which law enforcement officers are 
killed or assaulted while performing their duties, and data on 
incidents of hate crimes. 

[18] This includes officials from all 12 police departments and 21 out 
of 24 sheriffs’ offices who we interviewed. In addition, according to 
the officials from state agencies responsible for collecting crime 
data, border counties in Arizona and New Mexico do not systematically 
collect crime data beyond what they submit to the UCR Program. 
Further, border counties in California, in addition to the data they 
submit to the UCR Program, systematically collect data on 
antireproductive rights, deaths in custody, and violent crimes against 
senior citizens, among others. In addition, border counties in Texas 
systematically collect data on family violence. 

[19] We excluded New Mexico from these analyses for 2004 because local 
law enforcement agencies in the 3 border counties (Dona Ana, Luna, and 
Hidalgo) submitted incomplete SRS data to the FBI. One New Mexico 
nonborder county (De Baca) did not report SRS violent or property 
crime data to the FBI. Further, according to UCR Program practice, 
because of limited participation and varying data collection practices 
by law enforcement agencies nationwide, we excluded arson crimes when 
calculating property crime rates. 

[20] We designated large border counties as those with populations of 
25,000 or more. We designated small border counties as those with 
populations of less than 25,000. Based on these designations, there 
are 15 large and 9 small border counties in the four states. The large 
border counties are Cochise, Pima, Santa Cruz, and Yuma Counties in 
Arizona; Imperial and San Diego Counties in California; Dona Ana and 
Luna Counties in New Mexico; and Cameron, El Paso, Hidalgo, Maverick, 
Starr, Val Verde, and Webb Counties in Texas. The small border 
counties are Hidalgo County in New Mexico; Brewster, Culberson, 
Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, Kinney, Presidio, Terrell, and Zapata Counties 
in Texas. When we conducted county-level analyses of violent crime 
rates, we excluded 2 large counties (Santa Cruz, Arizona, and Luna, 
New Mexico) and 2 small counties (Hidalgo, New Mexico, and Presidio, 
Texas) because the SRS data submitted by law enforcement agencies to 
the FBI were incomplete. For the same reason, from 2004 we excluded 1 
large county (Dona Ana, New Mexico). For small counties, we report 
numbers of crimes, instead of crime rates per 100,000 population, 
because, in general, these counties have relatively low numbers of 
reported crimes, and small year-to-year changes in these numbers can 
lead to large percentage changes in the crime rate. 

[21] For state-level analyses-—that is, when we separately combined 
border and nonborder counties within their states for our analyses of 
property crimes—-we excluded Arizona because Tucson, in Pima County, 
reported the data improperly, according to the FBI, and Tucson 
accounts for about 40 percent of the total population of Arizona’s 
border counties. 

[22] As stated previously, for state-level analyses we excluded 
Arizona because Tucson, in Pima County, reported the data improperly, 
according to the FBI, and Tucson accounts for about 40 percent of the 
total population of Arizona’s border counties. 

[23] When we conducted county-level analyses of property crime rates, 
we excluded 3 large counties (Pima and Santa Cruz, Arizona, and Luna, 
New Mexico) and 2 small counties (Hidalgo, New Mexico, and Presidio, 
Texas) because the SRS data submitted by local law enforcement 
agencies to the FBI were incomplete or improperly reported. From 2004, 
we excluded 1 large county (Dona Ana, New Mexico) because SRS data 
were incomplete. 

[24] Border Patrol has divided geographic responsibility for border 
security operations along the southwest border among nine sectors, 
each of which has a headquarters with management personnel; these 
sectors are further divided geographically into varying numbers of 
stations, with agents assigned to patrol defined geographic areas. 

[25] CBP reported that, prior to 2011, it did not systematically 
collect data on assaults against officers at ports of entry. 

[26] Two of the 37 agencies did not provide comments on this issue. 

[27] Two of the 27 agencies did not provide comments on this issue. 

[28] The Texas Department of Public Safety defines spillover crime as 
any crime reported in the NIBRS that occurs in Texas as a result of an 
unsecured border with Mexico. 

[29] Two of the 37 agencies did not provide comments on this issue. 

[30] The assessment reviewed UCR data for 2009, because at the time it 
was the most recent year for which complete data were available. For 
further information on the scope and methodology used to conduct this 
assessment, please see DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
Assessment: The Impact of Mexican Drug Violence on Crime Along the 
U.S. Southwest Border, IA-0240-11 (Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2011). 

[31] Violence along the Southwest Border, Before the House 
Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science 
and Related Agencies, 111th Cong. (Washington, DC.: Mar. 24, 2009) 
(Statement of Joseph Arabit, Special Agent in Charge of Drug 
Enforcement Administration’s El Paso Region). 

[32] We define rural counties as those with populations less than 
25,000. 

[33] The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center is a fusion 
center—-generally, a collaborative effort of federal, state, local, or 
tribal government agencies that combines resources and expertise to 
maximize their ability to respond to criminal or terrorist activity—-
that provides intelligence, investigative, and technical support to 
agencies that are critical to Arizona and the country’s homeland 
security efforts. 

[34] CBP does not maintain data on these incidents, with the exception 
of the assaults against agents and officers, in an automated format 
that can easily be retrieved and analyzed. 

[35] For a comprehensive discussion of federal efforts to combat drug 
cartel activities, see an appendix in CRS, Southwest Border Violence: 
Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, R41075 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 25, 2011). 

[36] According to senior officials at DHS’s Office of Operations 
Coordination and Planning, this plan has never been activated as the 
conditions for activation have not yet been met. 

[37] The FBI provided GAO with the 2011 SRS data when it publicly 
released these data in November 2012. According to the FBI, law 
enforcement agencies were able to revise these data until the end of 
the calendar year 2012. 

[38] NIBRS includes data on individual crime incidents, including 
information about the nature and types of specific offenses in the 
incident, characteristics of the victims and offenders, and the types 
and value of any property stolen and recovered. We did not analyze 
2011 NIBRS data for the Yuma County Sheriff’s Office because the FBI 
said the office was experiencing record management system problems and 
could not provide complete 2011 NIRBS data. 

[39] The California Department of Justice is the agency that collects 
and reports crime data in California. However, in response to our 
interview request, California Department of Justice officials referred 
us to the California Highway Patrol as the agency best qualified to 
discuss what crime data are collected in the California jurisdictions 
along the southwest border. 

[40] Officials from 2 sheriffs’ offices in Texas were not available 
for interviews, and 1 sheriff’s office in Texas declined our request 
for an interview. 

[41] Border Patrol has divided geographic responsibility for border 
security operations along the southwest border among nine sectors, 
which are further divided geographically into varying numbers of 
stations, with agents assigned to patrol defined geographic areas. 
Operational Requirements-Based Budgeting Program documents provide an 
operational assessment for each sector about Border Patrol resources 
needed to address threats and help the agency determine how and where 
to allocate additional agents, technology, and infrastructure. 

[42] The National Drug Intelligence Center was established to 
consolidate drug intelligence from national security and law 
enforcement agencies and produce information on activities of drug-
trafficking organizations. On June 15, 2012, the National Drug 
Intelligence Center closed. The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information 
Center provides intelligence, investigative, and technical support to 
agencies that are critical to Arizona and the country’s homeland 
security efforts. 

[43] We did not interview officials from a Chamber of Commerce in Pima 
County because the county’s major city, Tucson, is not located 
directly on the border with Mexico. 

[44] As we discussed previously in this report, although SRS data 
provide the best available information on crime levels and crime 
trends in southwest border counties, because of its limitations, it 
cannot be used to draw conclusions about the extent to which crimes 
are attributable to spillover from Mexico. 

[45] The FBI converts NIBRS data submitted by law enforcement agencies 
to the format for the SRS data system. 

[46] One New Mexico nonborder county, De Baca, did not report SRS 
violent crime data to the FBI. 

[47] We excluded New Mexico from these analyses for 2004 because local 
law enforcement agencies in the 3 border counties (Dona Ana, Luna, and 
Hidalgo) submitted incomplete SRS violent crime data to the FBI. 

[48] These analyses are based on reported violent crimes in 13 of 15 
large counties along the southwest border. We designated large border 
counties as those with populations of 25,000 or more. The 15 large 
border counties are Cochise, Pima, Santa Cruz, and Yuma Counties in 
Arizona; Imperial and San Diego Counties in California; Dona Ana and 
Luna Counties in New Mexico; and Cameron, El Paso, Hidalgo, Maverick, 
Starr, Val Verde, and Webb Counties in Texas. We excluded 1 large 
border county in New Mexico (Luna) and 1 large border county in 
Arizona (Santa Cruz) because SRS violent crime data local law 
enforcement agencies submitted to the FBI were incomplete. For the 
same reason, we excluded 2004 data for Dona Ana County, New Mexico. 

[49] The 9 small border counties are Hidalgo County in New Mexico and 
Brewster, Culberson, Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, Kinney, Presidio, Terrell, 
and Zapata Counties in Texas. 

[50] For small counties, we report numbers of crimes, instead of crime 
rates per 100,000 population, because, in general, these counties have 
relatively low numbers of reported crimes, and small year-to-year 
changes in these numbers can lead to large percentage changes in the 
crime rate. We excluded Hidalgo County, New Mexico, and Presidio 
County, Texas, because SRS violent crime data local law enforcement 
agencies submitted to the FBI were incomplete. 

[51] We excluded Arizona because Tucson, in Pima County, reported 
property crime data improperly, according to the FBI, and Tucson 
accounts for about 40 percent of the total population of Arizona’s 
border counties. Further, according to UCR Program practice, because 
of limited participation and varying data collection practices by law 
enforcement agencies nationwide, we excluded arson crimes when 
calculating property crime rates. 

[52] One New Mexico nonborder county, De Baca, did not report SRS 
property crime data to the FBI. 

[53] We excluded New Mexico from these analyses for 2004 because local 
law enforcement agencies in the 3 border counties (Dona Ana, Luna, and 
Hidalgo) submitted incomplete SRS property crime data to the FBI. 

[54] These analyses are based on reported property crimes in 12 of 15 
large counties along the southwest border. We excluded 1 border county 
in New Mexico (Luna) because local law enforcement agencies did not 
submit complete SRS property crime data to the FBI. For the same 
reason, we excluded 2004 data for Dona Ana County, New Mexico. Also, 
we excluded 2 of 4 border counties in Arizona (Pima and Santa Cruz) 
because data were incomplete or, according to the FBI, were reported 
improperly. 

[55] We excluded Hidalgo County, New Mexico, and Presidio County, 
Texas, because SRS property crime data local law enforcement agencies 
submitted to the FBI were incomplete. 

[End of section] 

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