This page lists publications related to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2005. As new publications are issued, they are added to this list. http://gao.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html Sun, 22 Nov 2009 07:35:51 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1056.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) implemented the post-deployment health reassessment (PDHRA), which is required to be administered to servicemembers 90 to 180 days after their return from deployment. DOD established the PDHRA program to identify and address servicemembers' health concerns that emerge over time following deployments. This report is the second in response to a Senate Armed Services Committee report directing the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review DOD's administration of the PDHRA, and to additional congressional requests. In this report, GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD's central repository contains PDHRA questionnaires for active and Reserve component servicemembers who returned from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan and (2) how DOD monitors the administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers. To conduct this review, GAO performed a quantitative analysis using DOD deployment and PDHRA data, reviewed relevant PDHRA policies, and interviewed DOD officials. DOD policy requires that the military services electronically submit PDHRA questionnaires to DOD's central repository. Based on two separate queries to this repository in 2009, GAO did not find PDHRA questionnaires for a substantial percentage of the 319,000 active and Reserve component servicemembers who returned from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan between January 1, 2007, and May 31, 2008. GAO's first query on April 15, 2009, showed that only 77 percent of this population of interest had questionnaires in the central repository, leaving approximately 74,000 servicemembers without questionnaires in the repository. On September 4, 2009, GAO queried DOD's central repository again to update its April 2009 data and found that DOD's central repository was still missing PDHRA questionnaires for about 72,000 servicemembers, or 23 percent of the servicemembers in GAO's original population of interest. When PDHRA questionnaires are not in DOD's central repository, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that servicemembers to whom the PDHRA requirement applies were given the opportunity to fill out the questionnaire and identify and address health concerns that could emerge over time following deployment. DOD uses four methods to monitor the contractor, Logistics Health, Inc. (LHI), that administers the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers. The four monitoring methods are: (1) reviews of periodic reports from LHI; (2) inspections of LHI's administration of the PDHRA; (3) feedback on LHI's administration of the PDHRA from military service officials; and (4) weekly telephone discussions with LHI staff. These methods are used to help ensure that the objective of the PDHRA program is being met for Reserve component servicemembers. Through these methods, DOD identified a number of potential problems that may pose risks to the PDHRA program objective and to the welfare and safety of Reserve component servicemembers. However, GAO found that when monitoring the administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers, DOD does not maintain clear documentation that is consistent with federal internal control standards. GAO found that the documentation generated by DOD generally did not clearly describe the potential problems, the actions taken to address the problems, and whether these actions had resolved the problems. Overall, this lack of clear documentation does not allow DOD to have reasonable assurance that potential problems related to the administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers have been addressed and resolved. Thu, 19 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10167r.pdf The Army has three government-owned and operated manufacturing arsenals that it considers vital to the Department of Defense's (DOD) industrial base because they provide products or services that are either unavailable from private industry or ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources in case of national defense contingencies or other emergencies. These three arsenals are Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; and Watervliet Arsenal, New York. Pine Bluff's core mission is the production of conventional ammunition and other types of munitions. Rock Island's core mission is weapons manufacturing, and the arsenal is home to the Army's only remaining foundry. Watervliet is the Army's only cannon maker and also produces other armaments and mortars. Historically, the Army's arsenals have generally had vacant or underutilized space. For many years the Army has not provided the capital investment needed to keep pace with modern manufacturing requirements and retain core skills in the arsenal workforce. Additionally, the arsenals have generally had lower workloads during peacetime, but since the onset of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan they have experienced a surge in workloads to provide vital manufacturing capabilities, such as producing armor kits to harden Army personnel vehicles after it was found that the Army's existing vehicles were susceptible to improvised explosive devices. During the defense drawdown of the 1990s, the manufacturing arsenals were struggling from a diminishing and fluctuating workload, high product costs, significant reductions in force, and a fear that their core skills were being lost. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 authorized the Arsenal Support Program Initiative (ASPI), as a demonstration program designed to help maintain the viability of the Army's manufacturing arsenals. The ASPI authority sets forth 11 purposes for the program, including utilizing and employing the arsenals' skilled manufacturing workforce by commercial firms; encouraging private commercial use of underutilized government facilities; reducing the government's cost of ownership and the cost of products produced at the arsenals; and fostering cooperation between the Army, state and local governments, and private companies in the development and joint use of the Army's arsenals. The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed us to review the ASPI program and report to the defense authorization committees. Our objective for this review was to determine the extent to which the Army has addressed the intended purposes set forth in the ASPI authorizing legislation. Additionally, in response to congressional interest, we have provided information that discusses other available authorities that the Army uses or could use to improve the viability of its manufacturing arsenals. In response to direction by the conferees to conduct a business case analysis that examines the cost, return on investment, and economic impact of the ASPI program, the Congressional Budget Office expects to submit its report later this year. Accordingly, our review did not address those aspects of the ASPI program. Although the Army's three manufacturing arsenals have secured tenants that collectively address all but one of the purposes of the ASPI authority, the arsenals have had limited success in attracting ASPI tenants that enhance their core manufacturing missions and related workforce skills. According to the Army, 44 tenants had been secured under the ASPI program through the end of July 2009 (27 at Rock Island, 16 at Watervliet, and 1 at Pine Bluff), and each tenant addressed at least 1 of the 11 ASPI purposes. However, the Army has determined that, of the 44 tenants, only 4 are engaged in activities that have helped to strengthen the arsenals' core manufacturing capabilities or related workforce skills. ASPI site managers are generating operating revenue in the form of rent paid by ASPI tenants and have been more successful in securing commercial tenants needing administrative office space, which tends to be more profitable than leasing manufacturing space. Nonetheless, while ASPI tenants are generating revenue for the arsenals, program and site managers have generally been free to implement the program using a variety of approaches that may not be significantly contributing to the core manufacturing missions of the arsenals because the Army Materiel Command has provided them with only limited guidance. Given the discretion afforded by the ASPI authority--which does not prioritize its 11 purposes or require that all 11 purposes be addressed--the Army has missed an opportunity to ensure that program execution is aligned with its own priorities because Army guidance does not specify which of the authority's 11 purposes the Army considers to be its highest priorities. Further, the guidance does not incorporate the priorities identified in the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which encouraged the Army to recruit more tenants that enhance the arsenals' core missions and workforce skills. Additionally, the Army has not developed a strategy that describes the methods it plans to use to achieve its highest priorities and has not established performance goals and measures for the ASPI program. Our prior work has emphasized that performance goals should be measurable and results-oriented. Although the Army has adopted the 11 ASPI purposes as its broad goals for the program, these goals can not be easily quantified. Similarly, while the Army has developed some metrics to assess the program, existing metrics measure only the number of ASPI contracts secured and cost savings or cost avoidance to the Army, rather than the extent to which the program is making progress toward achieving the broad goals represented by the purposes established in the ASPI authority. Without clearly defined priorities, performance goals, and measures, the Army may be unable to respond to congressional direction or ensure that its own interests are being addressed. Further, the arsenals could be at risk of diminished core manufacturing capabilities that are considered vital to the national defense, and thus these skills and capabilities may not be readily available when needed. We are making three recommendations to improve the Army's execution of the ASPI program to help ensure that it addresses the broad goals of both congressional conferees and the Army by distinguishing its highest priorities among the ASPI purposes and establishing a strategy that includes measurable goals and performance measures to monitor progress the Army has made toward addressing the ASPI purposes. Thu, 05 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10172r.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment at strategic locations around the world to enable it to field combat-ready forces in days, rather than the weeks it would take if equipment had to be moved from the United States to the locations of conflicts. These prepositioned materiel and equipment sets have played an important role in supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a toll on the condition and readiness of military equipment. Over the last few years, we have identified a number of ongoing and long-term challenges regarding DOD's prepositioned stocks. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 added an annual reporting requirement to Title 10 of the United States Code that directs DOD to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment as of the end of each fiscal year, no later than the date of the submission of the President's annual budget request. For this report, our objective was to determine what additional information in future DOD reports on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment could further inform congressional defense committees on these issues. We examined GAO and DOD reports on the services' prepositioned stock programs, reviewed relevant DOD and service policies, and met with DOD and service officials to determine whether additional information could further inform Congress on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment. Although DOD addressed the six required reporting elements in its annual report, DOD's future reports to Congress on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment would benefit from additional information in three areas. Specifically, future reports would be enhanced by additional information on the amount of spare parts the Army maintains in its prepositioned stocks; the materiel condition of the Air Force's material and equipment needed to establish bases; and information on the services' progress to replenish their individual prepositioned sets, such as level of fill and readiness rates, and changes in those sets from the previous year. First, while DOD's report addressed the level of fill for spare parts as required by the mandate, we found that the Army had additional data on spare parts that were not included in DOD's report. First, while DOD's report addressed the level of fill for spare parts as required by the mandate, we found that the Army had additional data on spare parts that were not included in DOD's report. Third, DOD's future reports to Congress on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment would benefit from information on the services' progress to replenish their individual prepositioned sets, such as level of fill and readiness rates, and changes in those sets from the previous year. Wed, 04 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10179.pdf The United States and the Government of Iraq have signed a Security Agreement calling for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. Predicated on that agreement and U.S. Presidential guidance, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has issued a plan for the reduction of forces to 50,000 U.S. troops by August 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of forces by the end of 2011. The drawdown from Iraq includes the withdrawal of approximately 128,700 U.S. troops, over 115,000 contractor personnel, the closure or transfer of 295 bases, and the retrograde of over 3.3 million pieces of equipment. Today's statement will focus on (1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has planned for the drawdown in accordance with timelines set by the Security Agreement and presidential directive; and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown in accordance with established timelines. This statement is based on GAO's review and analysis of DOD and MNF-I plans, and on interviews GAO staff members conducted with DOD officials in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq. It also draws from GAO's extensive body of issued work on Iraq and drawdown-related issues. While DOD's primary focus remains on executing combat missions and supporting the warfighters in Iraq, several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown within designated time frames. In support of these plans, processes have been established to monitor, coordinate, and facilitate the retrograde of equipment from Iraq. DOD's organizations have reported that their efforts to reduce personnel, retrograde equipment, and close bases have thus far exceeded targets; since May 2009, for example, DOD reports that the number of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq has been reduced by 5,300, and another 4,000 are expected to be drawn down in October. However, many more personnel, equipment items, and bases remain to be drawn down. For U.S. forces, contractor personnel, selected vehicles, and bases, the graphic below depicts drawdown progress since May 2009, as well as what remains to be drawn down by August 31, 2010 and December 31, 2011, respectively. Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq, however, may be complicated by crucial challenges that, if left unattended, may hinder MNF-I's ability to meet the time frames set by the President, the Security Agreement, and MNF-I's phased drawdown plan. First, DOD has yet to fully determine its future needs for contracted services. Second, the potential costs and other concerns of transitioning key contracts may outweigh potential benefits. Third, DOD lacks sufficient numbers of contract oversight personnel. Fourth, key decisions about the disposition of some equipment have yet to be made. Fifth, there are longstanding incompatibility issues among the information technology systems that may undermine the equipment retrograde process. And sixth, DOD lacks precise visibility over its inventory of some equipment and shipping containers. While much has been done to facilitate the drawdown effort, the efficient execution of the drawdown will depend on DOD's ability to mitigate these challenges. We will continue to assess DOD's progress in executing the drawdown from Iraq and plan to issue a report. Mon, 02 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10187.pdf This statement discusses ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to track information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reliable, meaningful data on contractors and the services they provide are necessary to inform agency decisions on when and how to effectively use contractors, provide support services to contractors, and ensure that contractors are properly managed and overseen. The importance of such data is heightened by the unprecedented reliance on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan and the evolving U.S. presence in the two countries. The statement focuses on (1) how information on contractor personnel and contracts can assist agencies in managing and overseeing their use of contractors and (2) the status of DOD, State, and USAID's efforts to track statutorily-required information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as our recent recommendations to address the shortcomings we identified in their efforts. This statement is drawn from our October 2009 report on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was mandated by section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for FY2008), and a related April 2009 testimony. Our prior work was prepared in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The need for information on contracts and contractor personnel to inform decisions and oversee contractors is critical given DOD, State, and USAID's extensive reliance on contractors to support and carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The agencies' lack of complete and accurate information on contractors supporting contingency operations may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce unnecessary risk, as illustrated in the following examples: (1) Limited visibility over contractors obscures how extensively agencies rely on contractors to support operations and help carry out missions; (2) Without incorporating information on contractors into planning efforts, agencies risk making uninformed programmatic decisions; (3) A lack of accurate financial information on contracts impedes agencies' ability to create realistic budgets; (4) Lack of insight into the contract services being performed increases the risk of paying for duplicative services; and (5) Costs can increase due to a lack of visibility over where contractors are deployed and what government support they are entitled to. DOD, State, and USAID have made progress in implementing the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT). However, as we reported last month, DOD, State, and USAID's on-going implementation of SPOT currently falls short of providing agencies with information that would help facilitate oversight and inform decision making, as well as fulfill statutory requirements. Mon, 02 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10119.pdf The Army has issued soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan personal body armor, comprising an outer protective vest and ceramic plate inserts. GAO observed Preliminary Design Model testing of new plate designs, which resulted in the Army's awarding contracts in September 2008 valued at a total of over $8 billion to vendors of the designs that passed that testing. Between November and December 2008, the Army conducted further testing, called First Article Testing, on these designs. GAO is reporting on the degree to which the Army followed its established testing protocols during these two tests. GAO did not provide an expert ballistics evaluation of the results of testing. GAO, using a structured, GAO-developed data collection instrument, observed both tests at the Army's Aberdeen Test Center, analyzed data, and interviewed agency and industry officials to evaluate observed deviations from testing protocols. However, independent ballistics testing expertise is needed to determine the full effect of these deviations. During Preliminary Design Model testing the Army took significant steps to run a controlled test and maintain consistency throughout the process, but the Army did not always follow established testing protocols and, as a result, did not achieve its intended test objective of determining as a basis for awarding contracts which designs met performance requirements. In the most consequential of the Army's deviations from testing protocols, the Army testers incorrectly measured the amount of force absorbed by the plate designs by measuring back-face deformation in the clay backing at the point of aim rather than at the deepest point of depression. Army testers recognized the error after completing about a third of the test and then changed the test plan to call for measuring at the point of aim and likewise issued a modification to the contract solicitation. At least two of the eight designs that passed Preliminary Design Model testing and were awarded contracts would have failed if measurements had been made to the deepest point of depression. The deviations from the testing protocols were the result of Aberdeen Test Center's incorrectly interpreting the testing protocols. In all these cases of deviations from the testing protocols, the Aberdeen Test Center's implemented procedures were not reviewed or approved by the Army and Department of Defense officials responsible for approving the testing protocols. After concerns were raised regarding the Preliminary Design Model testing, the decision was made not to field any of the plate designs awarded contracts until after First Article Testing was conducted. During First Article Testing, the Army addressed some of the problems identified during Preliminary Design Model testing, but GAO observed instances in which Army testers did not follow the established testing protocols and did not maintain internal controls over the integrity and reliability of data, raising questions as to whether the Army met its First Article Test objective of determining whether each of the contracted designs met performance requirements. The following are examples of deviations from testing protocols and other issues that GAO observed: (1) The clay backing placed behind the plates during ballistics testing was not always calibrated in accordance with testing protocols and was exposed to rain on one day, potentially impacting test results. (2) Testers improperly rounded down back-face deformation measurements, which is not authorized in the established testing protocols and which resulted in two designs passing First Article Testing that otherwise would have failed. Army officials said rounding is a common practice; however, one private test facility that rounds told GAO that they round up, not down. (3) Testers used a new instrument to measure back-face deformation without adequately certifying that the instrument could function correctly and in conformance with established testing protocols. The impact of this issue on test results is uncertain, but it could call into question the reliability and accuracy of the measurements. (4) Testers deviated from the established testing protocols in one instance by improperly scoring a complete penetration as a partial penetration. As a result, one design passed First Article Testing that would have otherwise failed. With respect to internal control issues, the Army did not consistently maintain adequate internal controls to ensure the integrity and reliability of test data. In one example, during ballistic testing, data were lost, and testing had to be repeated because an official accidentally pressed the delete button and software controls were not in place to protect the integrity of test data. Army officials acknowledged that before GAO's review they were unaware of the specific internal control problems we identified. Fri, 16 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101.pdf The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to provide a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, but as GAO has previously reported, the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining sufficient information to plan and manage their use of contractors. As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and USAID data for Iraq and Afghanistan for FY 2008 and the first half of FY 2009 on the (1) status of agency efforts to track information on contracts and contractor personnel; (2) number of contractor personnel; (3) number of killed and wounded contractors; and (4) number and value of contracts and extent to which they were awarded competitively. GAO reviewed selected contracts and compared personnel data to other available sources to assess the reliability of agency-reported data. In response to a statutory requirement to increase contractor oversight, DOD, State, and USAID agreed to use the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to track information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the exception of USAID in Afghanistan, the agencies are in the process of implementing the system and require contractor personnel in both countries to be entered into SPOT. However, the agencies use differing criteria to decide which personnel are entered, resulting in some personnel not being entered into the system as required. Some agency officials also questioned the need to track detailed information on all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals. Further, SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all required data elements, such as contract dollar value and the number of personnel killed and wounded. As a result, the agencies rely on other sources for contract and contractor personnel information, such as periodic surveys of contractors. DOD, State, and USAID reported nearly 226,500 contractor personnel, including about 28,000 performing security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan, as of the second quarter of FY 2009. However due to their limitations, the reported data should not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions about contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, we found that the data reported by the three agencies were incomplete. For example, in one quarterly contractor survey DOD did not include 26,000 personnel in Afghanistan, and USAID did not provide personnel data for a $91 million contract. The agencies depend on contractors to report personnel numbers and acknowledge that they cannot validate the reported information. USAID and State reported that 64 of their contractors had been killed and 159 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD officials told us they continue to lack a system to reliably track killed or wounded contractor personnel and referred us to the Department of Labor's Defense Base Act (DBA) case data for this information. However, because DBA is a worker's compensation program, Labor's data include cases such as those resulting from occupational injuries and do not provide an appropriate basis for determining how many contractor personnel were killed or wounded while working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the data provide insights into contractor casualties. According to Labor, 11,804 DBA cases were filed for contractors killed or injured in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period, including 218 deaths. Based on our review of 150 randomly selected cases, we estimate that 11 percent of all FY 2008 DBA cases for the two countries resulted from hostile actions. DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating $38.6 billion on nearly 85,000 contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD accounted for more than 90 percent of the contracts and obligations. The agencies reported that 97 percent of the contracts awarded during our review period, accounting for nearly 71 percent of obligations, were competed. Thu, 01 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091040t.pdf The nation's ability to project and sustain military power depends on effective logistics. As the Department of Defense's (DOD) largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supplies almost every consumable item the military services need to operate, from Meals Ready-to Eat to jet fuel. Given current budgetary pressures and the crucial role DLA plays in supporting the military service in the United States and overseas, it is vital that DOD ensure DLA is getting value for the commodities and services it acquires. The committee asked GAO to identify the challenges DOD faces in ensuring DLA gets value for the taxpayer's dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost-efficient and effective manner. This testimony focuses on sound practices GAO has identified regarding obtaining value when contracting and how they can also apply to DLA's acquisition of commodities. GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving DOD's management and oversight of contractors, and DOD has concurred with many of them. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. DOD faces challenges ensuring DLA gets value for the taxpayer's dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost-efficient and effective manner. GAO's previous testimonies before this committee on weapons system acquisition and service contracts highlighted how essential it is that DOD employ sound practices when using contractors to support its missions or operations to ensure the department receives value regardless of the type of product or service involved. These practices include clearly defining its requirements, using the appropriate contract type, and effectively overseeing contractors. With regard to DLA, GAO's prior work has identified the following challenge areas: (1) Accurate Requirements Definition - Without a good understanding of customers' projected needs, DLA is not assured it is buying the right items in the right quantities at the right time. GAO's prior work has identified instances where problems in properly defining requirements can lead to ineffective or inefficient management of commodities. For example, GAO reported in 2005 that while DLA had a model to forecast supply requirements for contingencies, this model did not produce an accurate demand forecast for all items, including Meals Ready-to-Eat. As a result, the demand for these items was underestimated and some combat support units came within a day or two of exhausting their Meals Ready-to-Eat rations. (2) Sound Business Arrangements - Selecting the appropriate type is important because certain contracting arrangements may increase the government's cost risk where others transfer some of that cost risk to the contractor. For example, GAO noted in 2007 that DLA's Defense Energy Support Center was able to purchase fuel and supply products for the forces in Iraq more cheaply than an Army Corps of Engineers contractor because DLA was able to sign long-term contracts with the fuel suppliers. (3) Proper Contract Oversight and Management - Failure to provide adequate contract oversight and management hinders DOD's ability to address poor contractor performance and avoid negative financial and operation impacts. For example, in June 2006, GAO found that DLA officials were not conducting required price reviews for the prime vendor contracts for food service equipment and construction and equipment commodities. Agency officials acknowledged that these problems occurred because management at the agency and supply center level were not providing adequate oversight to ensure that contracting personnel were monitoring prices. DLA has taken some actions to address these challenges. For example, DLA has begun adjusting acquisition strategies to reassign programs to a best procurement approach. DLA has also established contracting officer's representative training requirements to ensure these individuals are properly trained to carry out their responsibilities. Thu, 24 Sep 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091019t.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) and other executive agencies increasingly deploy civilians in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior GAO reports show that the use of deployed civilians has raised questions about the potential for differences in policies on compensation and medical benefits. When these civilians are deployed and serve side by side, differences in compensation or medical benefits may become more apparent and could adversely impact morale. This statement is based on GAO's June 2009 congressionally requested report, which compared agency policies and identified any issues in policy or implementation regarding (1) compensation, (2) medical benefits, and (3) identification and tracking of deployed civilians. GAO reviewed laws, agency policies and guidance; interviewed responsible officials at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the six selected agencies, including DOD and State; reviewed workers' compensation claims filed by deployed civilians with the Department of Labor from January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2008; and conducted a survey of deployed civilians. GAO made ten recommendations for agencies to take actions such as reviewing compensation laws and policies, establishing medical screening requirements, and creating mechanisms to assist and track deployed civilians. At the time of this testimony, the agencies were in various stages of taking action. While policies concerning compensation for deployed civilians are generally comparable, GAO found some issues that affect the amount of compensation--depending on such things as the pay system--and the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of this compensation. For example, two comparable civilian supervisors who deploy under different pay systems may receive different rates of overtime pay because this rate is set by the employee's pay system and grade/band. While a congressional subcommittee asked OPM to develop a benefits package for all civilians deployed to war zones and recommend enabling legislation, at the time of GAO's review, OPM had not yet done so. Also, implementation of some policies may not always be accurate or timely. For example, GAO estimates that about 40 percent of the deployed civilians in its survey reported experiencing problems with compensation, including danger pay. GAO recommended, among other things, that OPM oversee an agency working group on compensation to address differences and, if necessary, make legislative recommendations. OPM generally concurred with this recommendation. Although agency policies on medical benefits are similar, GAO found some issues with medical care following deployment, workers' compensation, and post deployment medical screenings that affect the benefits of deployed civilians. Specifically, while DOD allows its treatment facilities to care for non-DOD civilians following deployment in some cases, the circumstances are not clearly defined and some agencies were unaware of DOD's policy. Civilians who deploy also may be eligible for benefits through workers' compensation. GAO's analysis of 188 such claims revealed some significant delays resulting in part from a lack of clarity about the documentation required. Without clear information on what documents to submit, applicants may continue to experience delays. Further, while DOD requires medical screening of civilians before and following deployment, State requires screenings only before deployment. Prior GAO work found that documenting the medical condition of deployed personnel before and following deployment was critical to identifying conditions that may have resulted from deployment. In June 2009, GAO recommended, among other things, that State establish post-deployment screening requirements and that DOD establish procedures to ensure its post-deployment screenings requirements are completed. Each agency provided GAO with a list of deployed civilians, but none had fully implemented policies to identify and track these civilians. DOD, for example, had procedures to identify and track civilians but concluded that its guidance was not consistently implemented. While the other agencies had some ability to identify and track civilians, some had to manually search their systems. Thus, agencies may lack critical information on the location and movement of personnel, which may hamper their ability to intervene promptly to address emerging health issues. GAO recommended that DOD enforce its tracking requirements and the other five agencies establish tracking procedures. DOD and four agencies concurred with the recommendations; one agency did not. Wed, 16 Sep 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09791r.pdf Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with $888 billion in supplemental and annual appropriations, as of June 2009, primarily for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). DOD's reported annual obligations for OCO have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $162.4 billion in fiscal year 2008. For fiscal year 2009 OCO, Congress provided DOD with about $65.9 billion in the fiscal year 2009 DOD Appropriations Act and about $80.0 billion in a supplemental appropriation enacted in June 2009. A total of $59.6 billion has been obligated through the second quarter of fiscal year 2009 through March 2009. The United States' commitments to OCO will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support OCO in a monthly report commonly called the Contingency Operations Status of Funds Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future OCO budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in OCO since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly cost-of-war reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for overseas contingencies through March 2009. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's cumulative appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of overseas contingencies and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2009 reported obligations from October 2008 through March 2009, the latest data available for OCO by military service and appropriation account. As of March 2009, Congress has appropriated a total of about $888 billion primarily for OCO since 2001. Of that amount, about $65.9 billion was appropriated in the fiscal year 2009 DOD Appropriations Act and about $80 billion was appropriated in the June 2009 supplemental appropriation for a total of about $145.9 billion for use in fiscal year 2009. DOD has reported obligations of about $714.3 billion for OCO from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2008 and for fiscal year 2009 (October 2008 through March 2009). The $173.7 billion difference between DOD's appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to the remaining fiscal year 2009 appropriations; multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous OCO-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated; and obligations for classified and other items, which DOD considers to be non-OCO related, that are not reported in DOD's cost-of-war reports. As part of our ongoing work, we are reviewing DOD's process for reporting its OCO-related obligations. Fri, 10 Jul 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09562.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) and other executive agencies increasingly deploy civilians in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior GAO reports show that the use of deployed civilians has raised questions about the potential for differences in policies on compensation and medical benefits. GAO was asked to compare agency policies and to identify any issues in policy or implementation regarding (1) compensation, (2) medical benefits, and (3) identification and tracking of deployed civilians. GAO reviewed laws and agency policies; interviewed officials responsible for governmentwide guidance at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and for policy at six selected agencies, including DOD and State; reviewed all workers' compensation claims filed by deployed civilians from January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2008 at the Department of Labor; and conducted a generalizeable survey of civilians deployed from the six agencies during this same period. Although policies concerning compensation for deployed civilians are generally comparable across agencies, GAO found some issues that affect the amount of compensation--depending on such things as the agency's pay system or the employee's grade/band--and the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of this compensation. For example, two civilian supervisors with comparable salaries who deploy under different pay systems receive different overtime pay because the overtime rate is determined by the employee's pay system and grade/band level. While a congressional subcommittee asked OPM to develop a benefits package for all deployed civilians to war zones and to recommend enabling legislation, OPM has not yet developed such a package or provided legislation. Also, implementation of some policies may not always be accurate or timely. For example, GAO estimates that approximately 40 percent of the deployed civilians in its survey reported experiencing problems with compensation--including not receiving danger pay--in part because they did not know where to go for assistance. Moreover, in January 2008, Congress gave agency heads discretion to apply the death gratuity provision retroactively for deaths connected with operations in Iraq or Afghanistan on or after October 7, 2001. At the time of GAO's review, agencies had not yet issued formal policy to implement this benefit. Although agency policies on medical benefits are similar, GAO found some issues with medical care following deployment, workers' compensation, and post deployment medical screenings that affect the benefits of deployed civilians. Specifically, while DOD allows its treatment facilities to care for "non-DOD" civilians following deployment in some cases, the circumstances are not clearly identified in guidance and some agencies were unaware of DOD's policy. Civilians who deploy also may be eligible for medical benefits through worker's compensation. GAO's analysis of 188 such claims filed with Labor revealed some significant processing delays resulting in part from lack of clarity about the documentation required to support claims. Without clear information on what documents to submit to support a claim, applicants may continue to experience delays. Further, while DOD requires medical screening before and following deployment for civilians, State requires medical screenings only before deployment. Prior GAO work found that documenting the medical condition of deployed personnel before and following deployment was critical to identifying conditions that may have resulted from deployment. Each agency provided GAO with a list of deployed civilians, but none had fully implemented policies to identify and track these civilians. DOD, for example, had procedures to identify and track deployed civilians but concluded that its guidance was not consistently implemented. While the other agencies had some ability to identify and track civilians, some had to manually search their systems. Thus, agencies may lack critical information on the location and movement of personnel, which may hamper their ability to intervene promptly to address emerging health issues, as GAO has previously reported. Fri, 26 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09692t.pdf Since the 1980s, the V-22, developed to transport combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps and to support other services' operations, has experienced several fatal crashes, demonstrated various deficiencies, and faced virtual cancellation--much of which it has overcome. Although recently deployed in Iraq and regarded favorably, it has not performed the full range of missions anticipated, and how well it can do so is in question. Given concerns about the V-22 program, GAO recently reviewed and on May 11, 2009, reported on MV-22 operations in Iraq; strengths and deficiencies in terms of the capabilities expected of the V-22; and past, current, and future costs. In that report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense require (1) a new alternatives analysis of the V-22 and (2) that the Marine Corps develop a prioritized strategy to improve system suitability, reduce operational costs, and align future budget requests. The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the second recommendation, but not the first. GAO believes both recommendations remain valid. This testimony highlights GAO's findings from that report. In speaking of the V-22, we are actually speaking of two variants of the same aircraft. The MV-22 is used by the Marine Corps; and the CV-22 by the Air Force to support special operations. This statement largely focuses on the MV-22, but also refers to the V-22 and CV-22. As of January 2009, the 12MV-22sin Iraq successfully completedall missions assigned in a low-threat theater of operations--using their enhanced speed and range to deliver personnel and internal cargo faster and farther than the legacy helicopters being replaced. However, challenges to operational effectiveness were noted that raise questions about whether the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the helicopters it is intended to replace. Additionally, suitability challenges, such as unreliable component parts and supply chain weaknesses, led to low aircraft availability rates. Additional challenges have been identified with the MV-22's ability to operate in high-threat environments, carry the required number of combat troops and transport external cargo, operate from Navy ships, and conduct missions in more extreme environments throughout the world. While efforts are underway to address these challenges, it is uncertain how successful they will be as some of them arise from the inherent design of the V-22. The V-22's original program cost estimates have changed significantly. From 1986 through 2007, the program's Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation cost increased over 200 percent--from $4.2 to 12.7 billion--while the cost of procurement increased 24 percent from $34.4 to $42.6 billion. This increase coincided with significant reductions in the number of aircraft being procured--from nearly 1,000 to less than 500--resulting in a 148 percent increase in cost for each V-22. Operations and support costs are expected to rise. An indication is the current cost per flying hour, which is over $11,000--more than double the target estimate for the MV-22. After more than 20 years in development, the MV-22 experience in Iraq demonstrated that the Osprey can complete missions assigned in low-threat environments. Its speed and range were enhancements. However, challenges may limit its ability to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the legacy helicopters it is replacing. If so, those tasks will need to be fulfilled by some other alternative. Additionally, the suitability challenges that lower aircraft availability and affect operations and support costs need to be addressed. The V-22 program has already received or requested over $29 billion in development and procurement funds. The estimated funding required to complete development and procure additional V-22s is almost $25 billion (then-year dollars). In addition, the program continues to face a future of high operations and support cost funding needs, currently estimated at $75.4 billionfor the life cycle of the program. Before committing to the full costs of completing production and supporting the V-22, the uses, cost, and performance of the V-22 need to be clarified and alternatives should be re-considered. Tue, 23 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09526.pdf Since 2003, the United States has provided $49 billion to help rebuild Iraq. To build the capacity of Iraq's central and provincial governments to sustain this effort, the United States is implementing programs including Department of State's (State) Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) National Capacity Development (NCD). The use of key management controls, such as appropriate organizational structure and program monitoring, helps ensure programs achieve their objectives. Through field visits in Iraq, interviews with program officials, analyses of official reports, and examination of a sample of projects, we assessed whether the PRDC and NCD's management controls support the programs' objectives of building the capacity of Iraq's government. We also assessed Iraq's commitment to sustaining these U.S. programs. Through the PRDC program, State and USACE work with Iraqis in the provinces to develop proposals and undertake small-scale projects such as building schools, repairing roads, and developing water facilities. However, weaknesses in State's management controls hinder achieving the program objective to build provincial government capacity. First, the program involves multiple organizations and a complex process but had no clearly identified program manager until May 2009 when State designated one in response to GAO's findings. Second, State lacks a performance monitoring system that measures progress toward building provincial capacity to deliver essential services. Third, the program's guidelines and policies have changed frequently, but State did not adequately communicate or consult with the USACE, the program implementer, about these changes. Finally, USACE's financial controls for the timekeeping process did not ensure adequate documentation of time and attendance records for labor charges on projects. USAID's management controls generally supported the NCD program's objective of building ministry capacity by training Iraqi employees in administrative skills such as planning and budgeting and supporting Iraqi training centers. First, USAID's organizational structure is clear, including who is responsible for overall program management. Second, in response to an audit report, USAID narrowed the NCD program objective to improving ministries' administrative capabilities and clearly linked them to measures of outcome. Some of these measures include Iraqi ministries' execution of their capital budgets, including the number of capital projects approved and the rate of spending on capital projects. USAID reported it was on track to meet or exceed its 2008 targeted results. However, as of March 2009, final data on results were not available. Third, USAID's guidelines and program expectations for NCD are documented, clear, and communicated throughout the organization. However, with regard to financial controls, GAO found that USAID officials did not confirm receipt of goods and services for invoices totaling about $17 million of $79 million, prior to payment. The officials did not always document reasons such as security risks, when confirmation was not possible. Iraq has committed to sustaining U.S.-funded programs and sharing in their costs, but actual budget expenditures for such activities are unclear. For the PRDC program, 16 of the 40 projects in our sample had evidence that the Iraqi government agreed to sustain the project; however, the records did not specify actual financial or budget commitments. For the NCD program, the Iraqi government is supporting the program by providing trainers and allocating funds in their 2009 budgets for training center equipment and other NCD efforts. These funds are to be spent in 2009. We have previously reported that the Iraqi government includes funding in its budgets for investment activities such as operating and maintaining U.S.-funded reconstruction projects and training, but does not subsequently expend these funds. Wed, 03 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09699t.pdf In fiscal year 2008, GAO delivered advice and analyses to the Congress in response to requests from all of the standing committees of the House and the Senate, as well as over 80 percent of their subcommittees. The hard work of our staff yielded significant results across the government, including expert testimony at over 300 congressional hearings, hundreds of improvements in government operations, and billions in financial benefits. GAO submits for congressional consideration a request for a fiscal year 2010 appropriation of $567.5 million to support 3,250 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff. This request represents an increase of $36.5 million, or 6.9 percent, over our fiscal year 2009 funding level, which would support a 3.5 percent increase over our 2009 FTE level. Importantly, almost 70 percent of our requested increase is needed for mandatory pay and uncontrollable cost increases. While our fiscal year 2009 funding level allows us to make progress in responding to new congressional requests sooner, our fiscal year 2010 request would enable GAO to make greater progress in addressing the issues of greatest interest to the Congress and the American public during these challenging times, which is our highest priority. GAO is also requesting authority to use $15.2 million in offsetting collections, as detailed in our budget submission. GAO is an invaluable resource for helping the Congress provide oversight, accountability, and transparency in government. The demand for GAO services continues to remain high as a direct result of the high quality of our work, and this high demand is an indication of the Congress's desire for timely and objective analyses and professional advice. In each of fiscal years 2007 and 2008, GAO received over 1,200 requests and mandates. The number of congressional mandates, our highest-priority work, more than doubled from fiscal year 2007 to 2008. In addition, as evidenced above, our work covers more and more complex issues across a broad range of federal programs, requiring more in-depth analysis to complete. High Congressional Demand for GAO Services This congressional demand for GAO studies also has affected our ability to respond promptly to congressional requests. For instance, in fiscal year 2008, GAO delayed starting work on 21 percent of our accepted requests due to staff unavailability. The average time we took to initiate congressionally requested engagements was almost 5 months in the first half of 2009, compared with less than 3 months in fiscal year 2005. In addition, GAO is providing testimony at an increased number of congressional hearings. We testified at 304 hearings in fiscal year 2008. This was the second highest number for GAO in the last 25 years. We expect to continue receiving a high volume of requests related to either the nation's new challenges, such as the recent developments in the financial markets and economy, or to the many emerging initiatives of the Congress and the administration. Moreover, all Senate committees are required to review programs within their jurisdiction to root out fraud, waste, and abuse in program spending--giving particular scrutiny to issues raised in GAO reports--and develop recommendations for improved government performance. Also, recent changes to House rules require each standing committee or subcommittee to hold at least one hearing on any issue raised by GAO that indicates that federal programs or operations authorized by that committee or subcommittee are at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement. Our January 2009 issuance of the biennial, High-Risk Series: An Update, which identifies federal areas and programs at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, as well as those in need of broad-based transformations, identified 30 at-risk federal programs. Issued to coincide with the start of each new Congress, our high-risk updates have continued to help to focus and sustain attention to these programs so that executive branch officials who are accountable for each program's performance, as well as members of the Congress, have the information needed to complete their oversight responsibilities. The high-risk update report is available on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Thu, 21 May 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09120.pdf Iraqi refugees are one of the largest urban populations the UN has been called on to assist. The UN reports government estimates of up to 4.8 million Iraqis displaced within the last 5 years, with 2 million fleeing, primarily to Syria and Jordan. GAO examined challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee situation. GAO analyzed reports and data; met with officials from the U.S. government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), international organizations, and NGOs; and did fieldwork in Jordan and Syria. To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing partners, which include international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). These activities provided Iraqi refugees and host country populations with education, vocational training, health care, food, and financial support. However, State did not clearly link program achievements to its stated goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. As a result, State has limited information to assess and report its progress in reaching its goal and objectives and improve program effectiveness. Insufficient numbers of staff to monitor projects, difficulties gaining access to projects and refugees, and the lack of reliable data have challenged State's efforts to ensure that projects help the intended beneficiaries. U.S. and international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by the lack of reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi refugees and data on the funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi refugees live interspersed among the local urban populations and are not easily identified. Official government estimates on the number of Iraqi refugees in each country may be overstated. It is also difficult to determine the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs because the U.S. government and UNHCR, the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not report funding for Iraqi refugee programs separately from that provided for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and offered financial incentives to returning refugee families. Although another solution is integration and settlement in host countries, Syria and Jordan consider Iraqi refugees "guests" who should return to Iraq once the security situation improves. The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, with 15,431 refugees resettled in the United States in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to address the Iraqi refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal showed progress in strategic planning, the UN and international community continue to lack a longer-term approach. First, the international community lacks a comprehensive independent assessment of the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the populations that host them. Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses factors that may affect assistance efforts. Third, the international community has lacked a coordination mechanism that involves all stakeholders. Tue, 21 Apr 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09289.pdf Service members found unfit for duty due to a service-related illness or injury may be eligible for military disability retirement. When their disability is not stable, however, they may be placed on the military's Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) and granted temporary benefits for as long as 5 years. GAO was asked to respond to concerns about TDRL caseloads, management, and impact on servicemembers. To address these concerns, we analyzed TDRL data; interviewed military officials; reviewed laws, regulations, and other relevant documents; and conducted 12 focus groups with temporary retirees. This report examines (1) recent trends in the TDRL caseload size, (2) recent trends in the characteristics of those placed on the TDRL, (3) disability retirement outcomes for TDRL placements, (4) the adequacy of TDRL management, and (5) the adequacy of information provided to TDRL retirees. TDRL caseloads within the Department of Defense (DOD) grew by 43 percent, from 9,983 in fiscal year 2003 to 14,285 in fiscal year 2007. Growth in caseloads could be attributable to a combination of increases in the number of cases going through the military's disability evaluation system, higher TDRL placement rates, and low numbers of cases removed from the TDRL relative to new cases added to the list. DOD-wide, servicemembers placed on the TDRL in each calendar year from 2000 through 2007 varied little with respect to their military status, years of service, and disabilities. In each of these years, most TDRL placements had been active duty personnel, although the small proportion who had been reservists grew considerably. Most TDRL placements in each year also had fewer than 20 years of service and, over time, their average years of service declined. The disabilities most prevalent among TDRL placements were musculoskeletal, mental, or neurological in nature. Among those with mental and neurological disabilities, the incidence of post traumatic stress disorder and conditions related to traumatic brain injury increased substantially across the services. Although the experiences of temporary disability retirees varied, some outcomes were more common than others. DOD-wide, very few who were placed on the list between calendar years 2000 and 2003 returned to military service. Further, about half received a final determination within 3 years and, of those who ultimately received permanent disability benefits, 73 percent had final disability ratings that were no different than their initial ratings. Finally, only 7 percent of TDRL placements, DOD-wide, received a final disability rating that qualified them for permanent disability payment amounts higher than their TDRL payments. DOD and the services do not effectively manage key aspects of the TDRL process. The military does not systematically examine physical evaluation board (PEB) stability decisions for accuracy and consistency or routinely compile information on TDRL outcomes to better inform its assessments of stability. According to TDRL administrative staff, ensuring that medical reexaminations are done in TDRL cases at least once every 18 months is often a challenge. However, the military does not monitor the extent to which this requirement is met. Moreover, there is limited use of nonmilitary physicians to perform reexaminations, which could reduce burdens on medical treatment facilities. Finally, military procedures do not ensure consistent enforcement of TDRL rules. Information about the TDRL that the services provide is not always clear or complete and can be difficult to access. PEB findings forms provided to temporary retirees do not fully explain why service members are placed on the list or what is required of them. Temporary retirees reported that counseling related to PEB decisions was inconsistent and lacking in followthrough. Information from military pamphlets, brochures, fact sheets, and Web sites is often incomplete or difficult to find. Temporary retirees participating in our focus groups expressed considerable confusion about and dissatisfaction with their limited access to information and points of contact. Mon, 13 Apr 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09538t.pdf The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to support troops and civilian personnel and carry out reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While recognizing the benefits of using contactors, GAO and others have noted the risks and challenges associated with relying on contractors. To help increase contractor oversight, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed DOD, State, and USAID to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan that identified a database to track information on contractor personnel and contracts performed in the two countries. In their July 2008 MOU, the agencies designated the Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker database (SPOT) as their system for tracking the required information. GAO's testimony addresses how contractor personnel and contract information can aid agencies in managing contracts and the status of SPOT's implementation. It is drawn from GAO's ongoing and prior contingency contracting work. This work involved meeting with agency officials, including those in Iraq, and reviewing agency documents. GAO obtained agency views on previously unreported information, which the agencies generally agreed with. GAO has reported extensively on the management and oversight challenges related to using contractors in contingency operations and the need for decision makers to have contract and contractor personnel information as a starting point to address these challenges. The lack of such information limits agency planning efforts, increases costs, and introduces unnecessary risk. For example, GAO previously determined that by not considering contractor resources when developing an assistance strategy for Afghanistan, USAID's ability to make informed resource allocation decisions was impaired. Similarly, it was estimated in 2006 that DOD's lack of visibility on what government support contractors were entitled to cost an extra $43 million in Iraq as the government provided them free meals and a food allowance. Many of GAO's past recommendations focused on improving agency officials' ability to obtain contract and contractor personnel information. While actions have been taken to address GAO's recommendations, agency officials have noted that their ability to access information on contracts and contractor personnel still needs improvement and SPOT has the potential to bring information together so it can be used to better manage and oversee contractors. Although SPOT is capable of tracking contractor personnel and contracts as agreed to in the MOU, not all of the required information is being entered and the agencies continue to rely on other systems to obtain information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD, State, and USAID now require their contractors in Iraq to enter personnel data into SPOT, but only DOD and State require their contractors to do so in Afghanistan. A critical factor in prompting the use of SPOT was DOD's requirement that contractor personnel have SPOT-generated letters of authorization (LOA) to, among other things, enter Iraq or Afghanistan. However, not all personnel need SPOT-generated LOAs and are being entered into SPOT. USAID officials said that the lack of an LOA requirement for its contractors in Afghanistan is one reason they do not have to be entered into SPOT. Officials from the three agencies also acknowledged that data on Iraqi and Afghan nationals in SPOT are incomplete, which is in part because they typically do not need LOAs and are more difficult to track. Despite the agencies' progress in implementing SPOT, they continue to rely on other systems to obtain information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, DOD relies on a quarterly census of contractor personnel because it is regarded as more complete than SPOT whereas USAID relies entirely on ad hoc queries of its contractors. As the agencies consider how to use SPOT data to inform planning and management decisions, they have raised questions about what information needs to be in the system. For example, USAID officials have questioned the need to track information on contracts for which personnel do not need LOAs. Wed, 01 Apr 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09449r.pdf Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with about $808 billion in supplemental and annual appropriations, as of March 2009, primarily for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD's reported annual obligations for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $162.4 billion in fiscal year 2008. For fiscal year 2009, Congress provided DOD with about $65.9 billion in supplemental appropriations for GWOT as of March 2009 and the President plans on requesting an additional $75.5 billion in supplemental appropriations for GWOT for the remainder of the fiscal year. A total of $31.0 billion has been obligated in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 through December 2008. The United States' commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly report commonly called the Contingency Operations Status of Funds Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires GAO to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly cost-of-war reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through December 2008. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's cumulative appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2009 reported obligations from October 2008 through December 2008, the latest data available for GWOT by military service and appropriation account. As of December 2008, Congress has appropriated a total of about $808 billion primarily for GWOT operations since 2001. Of that amount, about $187 billion has been provided for fiscal year 2008 and about $65.9 billion has been appropriated for use in fiscal year 2009. DOD plans on requesting an additional $75.5 billion in supplemental funds for fiscal year 2009. DOD has reported obligations of about $685.7 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2008 and for fiscal year 2009 (October through December 2008). The $122.3 billion difference between DOD's appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated; and obligations for classified and other items, which DOD considers to be non-GWOT related, that are not reported in DOD's costof- war reports. DOD's reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom have consistently increased each fiscal year since operations began. The increases in reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom are in part due to continued costs for military personnel, such as military pay and allowances for mobilized reservists, and for rising operation and maintenance expenses, such as higher contract costs for housing, food, and services and higher fuel costs. In contrast, DOD's reported obligations for Operation Noble Eagle have consistently decreased since fiscal year 2003, largely because of the completion of repairs to the Pentagon and upgrades in security at military installations that were onetime costs, as well as a reduction in combat air patrols and in the number of reserve personnel guarding government installations. Reported obligations for Operation Enduring Freedom have ranged from $10.3 billion to $20.1 billion each fiscal year since 2003. Recent increases in reported obligations for Operation Enduring Freedom are in part caused by higher troop levels in Afghanistan, the costs associated with training Afghan security forces, and the need to repair and replace equipment after several years of ongoing operations. DOD's reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom have consistently increased each fiscal year since operations began. The increases in reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom are in part due to continued costs for military personnel, such as military pay and allowances for mobilized reservists, and for rising operation and maintenance expenses, such as higher contract costs for housing, food, and services and higher fuel costs. In addition, the need to repair and replace equipment because of the harsh combat and environmental conditions in theater and the ongoing costs associated with the surge strategy announced in January 2007, which provided for the deployment of additional troops, have further increased obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom. In contrast, DOD's reported obligations for Operation Noble Eagle have consistently decreased since fiscal year 2003, largely because of the completion of repairs to the Pentagon and upgrades in security at military installations that were onetime costs, as well as a reduction in combat air patrols and in the number of reserve personnel guarding government installations. Reported obligations for Operation Enduring Freedom have ranged from $10.3 billion to $20.1 billion each fiscal year since 2003. Recent increases in reported obligations for Operation Enduring Freedom are in part caused by higher troop levels in Afghanistan, the costs associated with training Afghan security forces, and the need to repair and replace equipment after several years of ongoing operations. Mon, 30 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09476t.pdf From fiscal year 2001 through July 2008, Congress provided more than $808 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on Terrorism, including military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $49 billion has been provided to U.S. agencies for reconstruction and stabilization in Iraq and $32 billion for similar efforts in Afghanistan since fiscal year 2002. In February 2009, President Obama announced a new U.S. strategy for Iraq and plans to develop a new comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan. This statement is based on GAO's extensive body of work--more than 150 products since 2003--examining U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While U.S. efforts face unique circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan, success in both countries depends on addressing three common challenges: (1) establishing and maintaining a basic level of security, (2) building a sustainable economic foundation, and (3) holding governments accountable for political commitments and building their capacity to govern. These challenges underscore the need for comprehensive U.S. strategies that optimize U.S. strategic interests, host country priorities, and the international community's resources and expertise. In Iraq, much U.S.-funded reconstruction took place prior to July 2007 in an environment of deteriorating security. Oil, electricity, and water projects were subject to insurgent attacks and threats, which raised costs and caused delays. While violence has declined, security conditions remain fragile, according to DOD. Iraq's oil resources provide a foundation for economic growth. However, Iraq's investment in infrastructure has been limited, despite budget surpluses. The government's limited capacity to deliver services poses a challenge as well. The United States has held the government to commitments to pass key legislation and hold elections, but further progress in reconciliation, such as legislation to share oil and gas revenues and resolve claims over disputed territories, is needed. In Afghanistan, a lack of security has put U.S.-funded infrastructure projects, development of Afghan security forces, and other efforts at risk. Projects have been delayed and costs increased. The drug trade helps finance the Taliban and other insurgents and contributes to instability. Given Afghanistan's poor economy, the country's development will depend on foreign assistance. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy, established with U.S. and international support, is underfunded and may not be financially viable. The Afghan government's lack of capacity also hinders the country from meeting its development goals. The ministries do not have the personnel with the expertise to maintain U.S. and other donor-financed infrastructure projects, and corruption exacerbates this problem. As it further defines and develops its strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan, the Administration should incorporate characteristics of an effective national strategy. Both strategies should clearly define the objectives of U.S. efforts and measures to assess progress; identify risks; estimate costs; and integrate U.S., international, and host country efforts. For example, the strategy for Iraq should clarify what conditions the United States expects to achieve to ensure that troops are drawn down responsibly. The U.S. strategy for Afghanistan should estimate the cost of helping the country implement its development strategy. It should also assess the risk to U.S. infrastructure investments if Afghanistan does not obtain the donor assistance and technical capacity to maintain them. Finally, U.S. strategies should guide the development and implementation of interagency operational plans and sector level plans. Wed, 25 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09294sp.pdf To assist the 111th Congress, this report presents a series of issue papers for consideration in developing congressional oversight agendas and determining the way forward in securing and stabilizing Iraq. These papers are based on the continuing work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the more than 130 Iraq-related products we have issued since May 2003. Since fiscal year 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for military efforts primarily in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The majority of this amount has been for military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $49 billion has been provided to U.S. agencies for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including developing Iraq's security forces, enhancing Iraq's capacity to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electricity, and water sectors, among other activities. This report expands on issues discussed on GAO's transition Web site. In January 2007, President Bush announced The New Way Forward in Iraq to stem violence and enable the Iraqi government to foster national reconciliation. To support the strategy, the United States increased its military presence through a surge of brigade combat teams and associated forces. In June 2008, we reported that the United States had made some progress in reducing overall violence in Iraq and working with the Iraqi government to pass legislation promoting national reconciliation. In February 2009, President Obama described a new strategy for Iraq consisting of three parts: (1) the responsible removal of combat brigades, (2) sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq, and (3) comprehensive U.S. engagement across the region. According to DOD, the United States plans to reduce the number of combat troops from about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 128,000 by September 2009--a difference of 12,000 troops representing two brigades and their support units. Under the schedule announced by the President, U.S. force levels would decline further by August 31, 2010, to no more than 50,000 troops. Under the November 2008 bilateral security agreement6 between the United States and Iraq, the United States must remove all of its remaining forces by December 31, 2011. Key issues that should be considered in further defining the new strategy and its supporting operational plans are as follows: (1) The security agreement establishes dates for repositioning U.S. forces in Iraq and removing them from the country--a significant change from the United States' prior, conditions-based strategy for Iraq. A responsible drawdown in Iraq will need to balance the timetable established in the security agreement, military doctrine that calls for the delineation of conditions that must exist before military operations can end, and the wishes of the Iraqi government. (2) If the United States adheres to the timetable contained in the security agreement, DOD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by the end of 2011. The redeployment of these forces and the removal of their equipment and material will be a massive and expensive effort. (3) The large U.S. military presence has provided vital support to civilian operations and has undertaken many traditionally civilian tasks. In moving forward, the United States will need to consider how to transition from a predominantly military presence to a civilian one as U.S. forces draw down. (4) As U.S reconstruction efforts end, Iraq will need to develop the capacity to spend its resources, particularly on investment that will further economic development and deliver essential services to its people. GAO estimates that the Iraqi government had a cumulative budget surplus of $47 billion at the end of 2008. Tue, 24 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09302.pdf Since September 11, 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in addition to funding in DOD's base budget. Prior GAO reports have found DOD's reported GWOT cost data unreliable and found problems with transparency over certain costs. In response, DOD has made several changes to its cost-reporting procedures. Congress has shown interest in increasing the transparency of DOD's cost reporting and funding requests for GWOT. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO assessed (1) DOD's progress in improving the accuracy and reliability of its GWOT cost reporting, and (2) DOD's methodology for reporting GWOT costs by contingency operation. For this engagement, GAO analyzed GWOT cost data and applicable guidance, as well as DOD's corrective actions. While DOD and the military services continue to take steps to improve the accuracy and reliability of some aspects of GWOT cost reporting, DOD lacks a sound approach for identifying costs of specific contingency operations, raising concerns about the reliability of reported information, especially on the cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Specifically, the department has undertaken initiatives such as requiring components to sample and validate their GWOT cost transactions and launching a new contingency cost-reporting system that will automate the collection of GWOT cost data from components' accounting systems and produce a new report comparing reported obligations and disbursements to GWOT appropriations data. Also, the military services have taken several steps to correct weaknesses in the reliability of their cost data. Limitations in DOD's approach to identifying the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom may, in some cases, result in the overstatement of costs, and could lead to these costs being included in DOD's GWOT funding requests rather than the base budget. DOD guidance emphasizes the importance of accurately reporting the cost of contingency operations. However, while the Army and Marine Corps are capturing totals for procurement and certain operation and maintenance costs, they do not have a methodology for determining what portion of these GWOT costs are attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom versus Operation Enduring Freedom and have reported all these costs as attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, the military services have reported some costs, such as those for Navy forward-presence missions, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, even though they are not directly attributable to either operation. In September 2005, DOD expanded the definition of incremental costs for large-scale contingencies, such as those for GWOT, to include expenses beyond direct incremental costs. This expanded definition provides no guidance on what costs beyond those attributable to the operation can be considered incremental and reported. Consequently, the military services have made their own interpretations as to whether and how to include costs not directly attributable to GWOT contingency operations. Without a methodology for determining what portion of GWOT costs is attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, reported costs for Operation Iraqi Freedom may be overstated. Furthermore, unless DOD reconsiders whether expenses not directly attributable to specific GWOT operations should be included as incremental costs, the military services may continue to include these expenses as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, reported costs for both operations may be overstated, and DOD may continue to request funding for these expenses in GWOT funding requests instead of including them as part of the base budget. Expenses beyond those directly attributable to either operation may be more reflective of the enduring nature of GWOT and its cost implications should be part of the annual budget debate. Tue, 17 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/cghome/d09510cg.pdf This is an Acting Comptroller General Presentation delivered to Federal Financial Management conference in Washington, DC on March 12, 2009. Major topics of this presentation include: Financial Markets and Economic Recovery, Modernizing the U.S. Financial Regulatory System, 2009 High Risk List, Financial Institutions and Markets, and Long-Term Challenges. Thu, 12 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf The United States has invested more than $6.2 billion in the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The Department of Defense's (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), with the Department of State (State), leads U.S. efforts to enhance MOI and ANP organizational structures, leadership abilities, and pay systems. This report assesses the status of U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan (1) restructure MOI and ANP, (2) retrain ANP units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP pay systems. GAO reviewed Defense, State, and United Nations (UN) data and met with officials in the United States and Afghanistan. U.S. agencies and Afghanistan have achieved their goals of restructuring and reducing a top-heavy and oversized MOI and ANP officer corps, modifying police wages, and planning a reorganization of MOI headquarters. These efforts are intended to help ensure that the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can manage a national police force. U.S. agencies and MOI cut the officer corps from about 17,800 to about 9,000, reduced the percentage of high-ranking officers, and increased pay for all ranks. MOI is scheduled to implement a U.S.-supported headquarters reorganization. CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP units through its Focused District Development (FDD) program, which is intended to address district-level corruption that impeded previous efforts to retrain individual police. FDD is achieving promising results, according to Defense status reports. In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of FDD-retrained units as capable of conducting missions, 25 percent as capable of doing so with outside support, 31 percent as capable of partially doing so with outside support, and 25 percent as not capable. However, a lack of military personnel is constraining CSTC-A's plans to expand FDD and similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan by the end of 2010. Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500 military personnel needed to expand FDD and similar police development programs. CSTC-A has previously obtained military personnel for ANP training by redirecting personnel from its Afghan army training program. However, the army program's demand for personnel is likely to increase as the Afghan army grows from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel. MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State, but the full extent of the screening is unclear because State did not systematically compile records of its efforts. The screening effort was intended to improve the professionalism and integrity of the officer corps through testing by CSTC-A and background checks by State. At least 9,797 (55 percent) of the nearly 17,800 officers who took the tests passed, according to CSTC-A. State was unable to provide us with statistics concerning the results of background checks because it did not systematically compile its records. U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to validate MOI and ANP personnel rosters and ensure that wages are distributed reliably. Despite progress, these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP cooperation and a shortage of banks. U.S. contractors have validated almost 47,400 MOI and ANP personnel but have been unable to validate almost 29,400 personnel--who were paid in part by $230 million in U.S. contributions to a UN trust fund--because of a lack of cooperation from some ANP commanders. As of January 2009, 97 percent of all reported MOI and ANP personnel had enrolled in an electronic payroll system and 58 percent had enrolled to have their salaries deposited directly into their bank accounts. However, growth of the direct deposit system may be constrained because almost 40 percent of ANP personnel lack ready access to banks. Mon, 09 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09431t.pdf Since 1990, GAO has consistently designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area. A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious, but efforts at reform have had limited impact. Last year, GAO reported that DOD's portfolio of weapon programs experienced cost growth of $295 billion from first estimates, were delayed by an average of 21 months, and delivered fewer quantities and capabilities to the warfighter than originally planned. At a time when DOD faces increased fiscal pressures from ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the federal budget is strained by a growing number of priorities, it is critical that the department effectively manage its substantial investment in weapon system programs. Every dollar wasted or used inefficiently on acquiring weapon systems means that less money is available for the government's other important budgetary demands. This testimony describes the systemic problems that contribute to the cost, schedule, and performance problems in weapon system programs, recent actions that DOD has taken to address these problems, proposed reform legislation that the committee recently introduced, and additional steps needed to improve future performance of acquisition programs. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD's acquisition, requirements, and funding processes. For several years, GAO's work has highlighted a number of strategic- and program-level causes for cost, schedule, and performance problems in DOD's weapon system programs. At the strategic level, DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems, which together define the department's overall weapon system investment strategy, are fragmented. As a result, DOD fails to balance the competing needs of the services with those of the joint warfighter and commits to more programs than resources can support. At the program level, DOD allows programs to begin development without a full understanding of requirements and the resources needed to execute them. The lack of early systems engineering, acceptance of unreliable cost estimates based on overly optimistic assumptions, failure to commit full funding, and the addition of new requirements well into the acquisition cycle all contribute to poor outcomes. Moreover, DOD officials are rarely held accountable for poor decisions or poor program outcomes. Recognizing the need for more discipline in weapon systems acquisition and to implement Congressional direction, DOD recently revised its policy and introduced several initiatives. The revised policy, if implemented properly, could provide a foundation for developing individual acquisition programs with sound, knowledge-based business cases. The policy recommends the completion of key systems engineering activities, establishes early milestone reviews, requires competitive prototyping, and establishes review boards to manage potential requirements changes to ongoing programs. The committee's proposed reform legislation should lead to further improvements in outcomes. Improved systems engineering, early preliminary design reviews, and strengthened independent cost estimates and technology readiness assessments should make the critical front end of the acquisition process more disciplined. Establishing a termination criterion for critical cost breaches could help prevent the acceptance of unrealistic cost estimates at program initiation. Having greater combatant command involvement in determining requirements and greater consultation between the requirements, budget, and acquisition processes could help improve the department's efforts to balance its portfolio of weapon system programs. Legislation and policy revisions may lead to improvements but cannot work effectively without changes to the overall acquisition environment and the incentives that drive it. Resisting the urge to achieve revolutionary but unachievable capabilities, allowing technologies to mature in the technology base before bringing them onto programs, ensuring requirements are well-defined and doable, and instituting shorter development cycles would all make it easier to estimate costs accurately, and then predict funding needs and allocate resources effectively. These measures will only succeed if the department balances its portfolio and adopts an incremental approach to developing and procuring weapon systems. Tue, 03 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09388t.pdf This testimony discusses the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to reduce fuel demand at its forward-deployed locations, particularly those that are not connected to local power grids. In 2008, more than 68 million gallons of fuel, on average, were supplied by DOD each month to support U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Transporting large quantities of fuel to forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistics burden and risk. Long truck convoys moving fuel to forward-deployed locations have encountered enemy attacks, severe weather, traffic accidents, and pilferage. For example, DOD reported that in June 2008 alone, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost due to attacks or other events while delivering fuel to Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan. High fuel demand, coupled with the recent volatility of fuel prices, also have significant implications for DOD's operating costs. The fully burdened cost of fuel--that is, the total ownership cost of buying, moving, and protecting fuel in systems during combat--has been reported to be many times higher than the price of a gallon of fuel itself. While DOD's weapon systems require large amounts of fuel, the department reports that the single largest battlefield fuel consumer is generators, which provide power for base support activities such as air conditioning/heating, lighting, refrigeration, and communications. A 2008 Defense Science Board Task Force report noted that Army generators consume about 26 million gallons of fuel annually during peacetime but 357 million gallons annually during wartime. Today, we are publicly releasing a report that addresses DOD's (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations. Our review focused on locations that were in Central Command's area of responsibility. DOD has efforts under way or planned to reduce fuel demand, but the department lacks an effective approach to enable widespread implementation and sustained attention to fuel demand issues at forward-deployed locations. Many of DOD's efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations are in a research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts by DOD components include the application of foam insulation to tent structures, the development of more fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units, and research on alternative and renewable energy sources for potential use at forward-deployed locations. In addition, during our visits to Kuwait and Djibouti, we found local camp efforts aimed at reducing fuel demand. DOD generally lacks guidance that directs forward-deployed locations to manage and reduce their fuel demand--at the department level, combatant command level, and military service level. While DOD is driven to address energy issues at its U.S. installations largely by federal mandates and DOD guidance, agency officials were unable to identify similar guidance for forward-deployed locations, and they told us that fuel reduction has been a low priority compared with other mission requirements. Our analysis of combatant command and military service guidance related to forward-deployed location construction showed that the existing guidance is largely silent with respect to fuel demand management and energy efficiency. DOD has not established incentives or a viable funding mechanism for fuel reduction projects at its forward-deployed locations, which discourages commanders from identifying fuel demand management as a priority. funding from supplemental appropriations related to the Global War on Terrorism, and delays in receiving this funding can present challenges in covering existing costs, making it difficult for commanders to fund more expensive fuel reduction projects. Without incentives and a viable funding mechanism, commanding officials at DOD's forward-deployed locations are unlikely to identify fuel reduction as a priority for making a significant investment of resources. DOD's current organizational framework does not provide the department visibility for fuel demand issues at its forward-deployed locations. We found that information on fuel demand management strategies and reduction efforts is not shared among locations, military services, and across the department in a consistent manner. Moreover, DOD guidance does not designate any DOD office or official as being responsible for fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations, and we could not identify anyone who is specifically accountable for this function through our interviews with various DOD and military service offices. for DOD, and military department-level operational energy officials. DOD has not yet established a director or strategy for operational energy. In meeting the requirements, DOD has an opportunity to improve visibility and accountability for fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations. Tue, 03 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09263sp.pdf Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, an important ally in the war on terror, with more than $12.3 billion for a variety of activities, in part to address these goals. About half of this amount has been to reimburse Pakistan for military-related support, including combat operations in and around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Despite 6 years of U.S. and Pakistani government efforts, al Qaeda has regenerated its ability to attack the United States and continues to maintain a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. As the United States considers how it will go forward with efforts to assist Pakistan in securing, stabilizing, and developing its FATA and Western Frontier bordering Afghanistan, it is vital that efforts to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national power be completed and that continued oversight and accountability over funds used for these efforts are in place. This report provides background information on Pakistan; the status of U.S. government efforts to develop a comprehensive plan; and information on the goals, funding, and current status of U.S. efforts to use various elements of national power (i.e., military, law enforcement, development and economic assistance, and diplomacy) to combat terrorism in Pakistan. The scope of this report does not include the plans, goals, operations, activities, and accomplishments of the intelligence community. Mon, 23 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09300.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel to sustain its forward-deployed locations--particularly those that are not connected to local power grids. While weapon platforms require large amounts of fuel, DOD reports that the single largest battlefield fuel consumer is generators, which provide power for base support activities such as cooling, heating, and lighting. Transporting fuel to forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistics burden and risk, including exposing fuel truck convoys to attack. GAO was asked to address DOD's (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations. This review focused on locations within Central Command's area of responsibility. GAO visited DOD locations in Kuwait and Djibouti to learn about fuel reduction efforts and challenges facing these locations. DOD components have some efforts under way or planned to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations. Many of these efforts are in a research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts include the application of foam insulation to tent structures, the development of more fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units, and research on alternative and renewable energy sources for potential use at forward-deployed locations. In addition, during visits to Kuwait and Djibouti, GAO met with officials about local camp efforts aimed at reducing fuel demand. DOD lacks an effective approach for implementing fuel reduction initiatives and maintaining sustained attention to fuel demand management at its forward-deployed locations. Moreover, DOD faces difficulty achieving its goals to reduce dependence on petroleum-based fuel and its logistics "footprint," as well as operating costs associated with high fuel usage, because managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations has not been a departmental priority and fuel reduction efforts have not been well coordinated or comprehensive. GAO found that DOD's current approach to managing fuel demand lacks (1) guidance directing locations to address fuel demand, (2) incentives and a viable funding mechanism to invest in fuel reduction projects, and (3) visibility and accountability for achieving fuel reduction. Although it may not be practical for DOD to decrease fuel usage at every forward-deployed location and base commanders must place their highest priority on meeting mission requirements, fuel demand is likely to remain high until the department gives systematic consideration to incorporating fuel demand in construction, maintenance, procurement, and other policy decisions for forward-deployed locations. The 2009 defense authorization act requires DOD to establish a director of operational energy and an energy strategy, providing the department with an opportunity to increase attention on improving fuel demand management. Fri, 20 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09380t.pdf The United States is in the process of developing its strategy for operations in Afghanistan, as well as for the drawdown and continued operations of forces in Iraq. As of December 2008, approximately 32,500 U.S. troops were deployed in Afghanistan. Moreover, DOD may add an additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the war in Afghanistan changed from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency effort. As of December 2008, U.S. troops in Iraq numbered approximately 148,500. DOD also had about 162,400 contractors in Iraq as of mid-2008. Today's testimony addresses (1) key observations regarding the development of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) factors that should be considered as the United States refines its strategy for Iraq and plans to draw down forces; and (3) factors that should be considered as the United States develops a strategy for Afghanistan and plans for increasing forces. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies on Iraq and Afghanistan. Lessons learned from GAO's past work indicate that U.S. strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan should reflect a governmentwide approach and contain a number of key elements, including clear roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms among government agencies, as well as specific goals, performance measures, and time frames that take into account available resources. Given the heavy commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several years, the availability of forces, equipment, and infrastructure will need to be closely examined in developing plans to reposture military forces. Finally, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention will be needed to ensure that U.S. plans are developed and executed in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Clearly, strong oversight by the Congress and senior decision makers will be needed to minimize past problems such as contract mismanagement and insufficient attention to overseeing contractors. In refining its strategy and plans for the drawdown of forces in Iraq, senior leaders will need to consider several operational factors. For example, DOD will need to develop plans to efficiently and effectively relocate thousands of personnel and billions of dollars worth of equipment out of Iraq; close hundreds of facilities; and determine the role of contractors. Furthermore, the capacity of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries may limit the speed at which equipment and materiel can be moved out of Iraq. With regard to Afghanistan, DOD will likely face an array of potential challenges related to people, equipment and infrastructure. For example, the availability and training of personnel will be critical considerations as the force is already significantly stressed from ongoing operations and current training capacity has been primarily focused on operations in Iraq. Additionally, the availability of equipment may be limited because the Army and Marine Corps have already deployed much of their equipment to Iraq and much of the prepositioned assets also have been withdrawn to support ongoing operations. Similarly, DOD will need to assess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities given its current allocation of these assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. Further, the ability to transport personnel and equipment into Afghanistan will be challenged by the limited infrastructure and topography of Afghanistan. Moreover, the extent to which contractors will be used to support deployed U.S. forces must be considered as well as how oversight of these contractors will be ensured. Given all of these factors, sound planning based on a well-developed strategy is critical to ensure lessons learned over the years from Iraq are incorporated in Afghanistan and that competing resources are prioritized effectively between both operations. Thu, 12 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09366t.pdf This testimony discusses the GAO report on accountability for small arms and light weapons that the United States has obtained and provided or intends to provide to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Given the unstable security conditions in Afghanistan, the risk of loss and theft of these weapons is significant, which makes this hearing particularly timely. This testimony today focuses on (1) the types and quantities of weapons the Department of Defense (Defense) has obtained for ANSF, (2) whether Defense can account for the weapons it obtained for ANSF, and (3) the extent to which ANSF can properly safeguard and account for its weapons and other sensitive equipment. During fiscal years 2002 through 2008, the United States spent approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces in order to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government. As part of this effort, Defense--through the U.S. Army and Navy--purchased over 242,000 small arms and light weapons, at a cost of about $120 million. These weapons include rifles, pistols, shotguns, machine guns, mortars, and launchers for grenades, rockets, and missiles. In addition, CSTC-A has reported that 21 other countries provided about 135,000 weapons for ANSF between June 2002 and June 2008, which they have valued at about $103 million. This brings the total number of weapons Defense reported obtaining for ANSF to over 375,000. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in Kabul, which is a joint service, coalition organization under the command and control of Defense's U.S. Central Command is primarily responsible for training and equipping ANSF.3 As part of that responsibility, CSTC-A receives and stores weapons provided by the United States and other international donors and distributes them to ANSF units. In addition, CSTC-A is responsible for monitoring the use of U.S.-procured weapons and other sensitive equipment. Thu, 12 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09362t.pdf Today's testimony addresses the challenges DOD faces to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its weapon systems acquisition and contract management. GAO has designated both areas as high risk areas since the early 1990s. DOD's major weapon systems programs continue to take longer to develop, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned. DOD also continues to face long-standing challenges managing service contracts and contractors. For example, the oversight of service contracts has been recognized as a material weakness in the Army. The current fiscal environment combined with the current operational demands elevates the need to improve weapon systems acquisition and contract management. DOD has taken steps in response to recommendations GAO has made over the past decade. Taken collectively, these actions reflect the commitment of DOD senior leadership. However, to fully address these challenges the department needs to (1) translate policy into practice, (2) ensure steps undertaken result in intended outcomes, and (3) conduct a fundamental reexamination of its reliance on contractors. In preparing this testimony, GAO drew from issued reports, containing statements of scope and methodology used, and testimonies. Several underlying systemic problems at the strategic level and at the program level continue to contribute to poor weapon systems acquisition. The total acquisition cost of DOD's 2007 portfolio of major programs has grown by 26 percent over initial estimates. At the strategic level, DOD does not prioritize weapon system investments, and its processes for matching warfighter needs with resources are fragmented and broken. DOD largely continues to define warfighting needs and make investment decisions on a service-by-service basis and assesses these requirements and their funding implications under separate decision-making processes. Invariably, DOD and the Congress end up continually shifting funds to and from programs--undermining well-performing programs to pay for poorly performing ones. At the program level, weapon system programs are initiated without sufficient knowledge about requirements, technology, and design maturity. Instead, managers rely on assumptions that are consistently too optimistic, exposing programs to significant and unnecessary risks and ultimately cost growth and schedule delays. In December 2008, DOD revised its guidance to improve its acquisition of major weapon systems, consistent with recommendations GAO has made. We have previously raised concerns, however, with DOD's implementation of guidance on weapon systems acquisition. In fiscal year 2008, DOD obligated about $200 billion for contractor-provided services, more than doubling the amount it spent a decade ago when measured in real terms. GAO's previous work has highlighted several examples of the risks inherent in using contractors, including ethics concerns, diminished institutional capacity, potentially greater costs, and mission risks. Further, the lack of well-defined requirements, difficulties employing sound business practices, and workforce and training issues hinder efforts to effectively manage and oversee contracts and contractors. These factors ultimately contribute to higher costs, schedule delays, unmet goals, and negative operational impacts. These issues take on a heightened significance in Iraq and Afghanistan, where DOD estimated that more than 200,000 contractor personnel were engaged as of July 2008, exceeding the number of uniformed military personnel there. As of October 2008, the number of contractor personnel in both countries had increased to over 230,000. DOD has taken several steps in response to GAO's recommendations aimed at improving management and oversight of contractors. These include issuing policy and guidance addressing contract management, identifying skill gaps in DOD's acquisition workforce, improving training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel, and creating a focal point within the department for issues associated with the use of contractors to support deployed forces. DOD, however, has not conducted a comprehensive assessment to determine the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel. Wed, 11 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09267.pdf The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and with the Department of State (State), directs international efforts to train and equip Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As part of these efforts, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Navy spent about $120 million to procure small arms and light weapons for ANSF. International donors also provided weapons. GAO analyzed whether Defense can account for these weapons and ensure ANSF can safeguard and account for them. GAO reviewed Defense and State documents on accountability procedures, reviewed contractor reports on ANSF training, met with U.S. and Afghan officials, observed accountability practices, analyzed inventory records, and attempted to locate a random sample of weapons. Defense did not establishclear guidance for U.S. personnel to follow when obtaining, transporting, and storing weapons for the Afghan National Security Forces, resulting in significant lapses in accountability. While Defense has accountability requirements for its own weapons, including serial number tracking and routine inventories, it did not clearly specify whether they applied to ANSF weapons under U.S. control. GAO estimates USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC could not provide serial numbers, and GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain records on the location or disposition of about 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A also did not maintain reliable records for about 135,000 weapons it obtained for ANSF from 21 other countries. Accountability lapses occurred throughout the supply chain and were primarily due to a lack of clear direction and staffing shortages. During our review, CSTC-A began correcting some shortcomings, but indicated that its continuation of these efforts depends on staffing and other factors. Despite CSTC-A's training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and account for weapons and sensitive equipment. Defense and State have deployed hundreds of trainers and mentors to help ANSF establish accountability practices. CSTC-A's policy is not to issue equipment without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units' ability to account for weapons, mentors have reported major accountability weaknesses, which CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute to a variety of cultural and institutional problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units. Fri, 30 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09128r.pdf Recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations around the world have highlighted the need for U.S. forces to train as they intend to fight. Department of Defense (DOD) training ranges and operating areas are required to be managed and operated to support their long-term viability and utility to meet the national defense mission. The use of military training ranges enhances training by providing realistic, hands-on experience. Sustainable training range management focuses on the practices that allow the military to manage its ranges in a way that ensures their usefulness well into the future. Because the military faces obstacles in acquiring new training lands, the preservation and sustainable management of its current lands must be priorities. New advances in technology, coupled with a shift in force posture, mean that DOD needs to continually update and maintain its training ranges. Military training ranges vary in size from a few acres--for small arms training--to over a million acres for large maneuver exercises and weapons testing, and include broad open ocean areas for offshore training and testing. These ranges face ever increasing limitations and restrictions on land, water, and airspace as residential, commercial, and industrial development continues to expand around and encroach upon once remote military training and testing installations. Section 366(d) of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 requires GAO to submit to Congress an evaluation of DOD's report regarding its training range comprehensive plan and its readiness reporting improvements within 90 days of receiving the report from DOD. We received the report and inventory on September 16, 2008. In 2007, we found that DOD had made improvements to its annual sustainable ranges report, but further improvements could be made. This is our fifth review in response to our mandate in section 366 of the act. It discusses (1) the extent to which DOD's 2008 sustainable ranges report and training range inventory address the elements of section 366 and (2) opportunities for DOD to further improve its sustainable ranges report. DOD continues to make progress in addressing most of the elements of section 366. This year's report describes the progress DOD has made in implementing its range sustainment plan, as required by section 366. Further, DOD's 2008 sustainable ranges report has made progress in addressing the elements of section 366 required for DOD's original fiscal year 2004 report, but the report does not fully address three of these elements. The report updates improvements made in addressing four elements of the act required for DOD's fiscal year 2004 report: (1) the evaluation of the adequacy of resources to meet current and future requirements; (2) DOD's goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress; (3) designation of offices within OSD and the military departments that are responsible for overseeing plans to improve its readiness reporting system. To address the adequacy of its current resources to meet current and future requirements, DOD established standardized criteria and identified common factors to assess range capabilities and encroachment, as we recommended in our 2007 report. DOD officials said that they worked closely with service officials to build a common set of capability attributes and encroachment factors and service-specific mission areas to evaluate them against. In addition, for the first time, DOD's sustainable ranges report also includes three elements of section 366 required to be included in DOD's fiscal year 2004 report: (1) an assessment of current and future training range requirements, (2) an evaluation of virtual and constructive8 assets to meet range requirements, and (3) projected funding requirements for implementing planned range sustainability actions. On the other hand, the report did not put forth any recommendations that the Secretary may have for legislative or regulatory changes to address training constraints, nor did it explain the omission. Additionally, while DOD did not identify training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace for each of its ranges, it included an assessment of such constraints on its major training ranges. As in prior years, DOD officials told us that the large volume of data required to identify capacities, capabilities, and constraints on all of its ranges makes doing so impractical. Finally, DOD did not provide proposals to enhance training range capabilities or address any shortfalls in its resources identified pursuant to the assessment and evaluation under Section 366(a)(2), although each of the services has assessed their current resources to meet current and future requirements, which has allowed them to determine their shortfalls in resources. Mon, 15 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09147r.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment at strategic locations around the world in order to field combat-ready forces in days, rather than the weeks it would take if equipment had to be moved from the United States to the locations of conflicts. DOD's prepositioned stock programs support the National Military Strategy and are an important part of its overall strategic mobility framework. Prepositioned materiel and equipment have played an important role in supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, sustained continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a toll on the condition and readiness of military equipment. In April 2008 we testified that it was unclear when these critical reserve stocks would be reconstituted or how much the total cost would be. The Army and Marine Corps face a number of ongoing and long-term challenges that will affect both the timing and the cost of equipment repair and replacement--particularly to its prepositioned stocks. DOD has reported to Congress that the military services are committed to resetting prepositioned materiel but must balance its efforts within the priorities of reorganization of those prepositioned capabilities and changes in overseas military presence. In June 2008, DOD issued an instruction on the War Reserve Materiel Policy. In the instruction, DOD established a Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group to, among other things, address joint issues concerning war reserve risk assessments provided by the military departments and the Defense Logistics Agency, initiate programs as needed, and make recommendations for war reserves that balance resources against operational risk. Over the last few years, we have identified a number of ongoing and long-term challenges that will affect both the timing and the cost of reconstituting prepositioned stocks. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA) added an annual reporting requirement to Title 10 of the United States Code, directing DOD to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment as of the end of each fiscal year, no later than the date of the submission of the President's annual budget requests. The report is required to address the following six elements: (1) the level of fill for major end items of equipment and spare parts, (2) the materiel condition of equipment in the prepositioned stocks, (3) a list of major end items drawn from prepositioned stocks that fiscal year and a description of how the equipment was used and whether it was returned to the stocks after its use, (4) a timeline for completely reconstituting any shortfall in the prepositioned stocks, (5) an estimate of the funding required to completely reconstitute any shortfall in the prepositioned stocks and a description of the Secretary's plan for carrying out the reconstitution, and (6) a list of any operations plans affected by a shortfall in the prepositioned stocks and a description of the action taken to mitigate any risk created by that shortfall. While DOD addresses the six elements required in its annual report, the services' information varied due to differences in the configuration of their prepositioned materiel and equipment. The law also requires the services to report on the status and condition of spare parts. The Navy and Marine Corps provided data on spare parts, but the Army and Air Force did not do so because they track spare parts differently. In addition to reporting on the status and condition of their prepositioned materiel and equipment, the services reported on the status of equipment drawn from and returned to prepositioned stocks during the reporting period of October 1, 2007, to March 31, 2008, to support ongoing operations or training exercises; timelines ranging from 2010 to 2015 to reconstitute shortfalls in stocks; funding estimates to reconstitute those shortfalls; and the risk to operations plans that would be affected by any shortfall in prepositioned stocks and subsequent mitigation strategies. In future DOD reports on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment, additional information on funding requirements for the services' prepositioned programs and risk to current operations and concept plans could further inform congressional defense committees. The services provided the Joint Staff with an estimate of the amount of funds required to reconstitute shortfalls of prepositioned materiel and equipment as required. However, overall funding estimates on equipment and materiel shortages alone do not provide a means to measure the services' progress toward meeting long-term prepositioning goals or provide the visibility to inform congressional decision making. Consistent with best practices to provide clear funding plans to support decision making, funding estimates should be transparent, comprehensive, easily replicated, and updated to help ensure the validity of the estimate. In addition to the required estimate to reconstitute shortfalls, presenting funding requirements by year and appropriation accounts, similar to DOD's annual budget request presentation, in one report to Congress would provide a more comprehensive, detailed estimate of the services' requirements for prepositioned materiel and equipment. Detailed funding estimates would provide a means to measure the services' progress towards meeting long-term prepositioning goals. While the services listed operations plans affected by shortfalls in prepositioned stocks, as required, additional information on the effect of prepositioned equipment shortfalls on current operations such as ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and concept plans such as plans for the defense of one country against invasion from another country, would provide greater disclosure and visibility over other possible risks. Without information on other possible risks, Congress may not be fully informed on the range of military options available in times of crisis. Mon, 15 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0950.pdf The Department of Defense's (DOD) C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III aircraft play key roles in transporting weapons and other cargo. Since September 2001, these aircraft have delivered over 2.4 million tons of cargo to staging and operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet determining the number and mix to meet current and future airlift requirements has become increasingly challenging given distinct differences between the two aircraft. While the C-5 can carry more cargo, the newer C-17 is more flexible since it can deliver to forward-deployed bases and has a higher mission capable rate. GAO was asked to identify the impact C-5 modernization cost increases have had on the mix of aircraft; assess the current C-5 modernization cost estimate; and identify C-17 production plans and issues related to production line shutdown. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed options DOD considered to meet its current and future strategic airlift requirements, and evaluated C-5 modernization and C-17 production line shut down cost estimates. The Air Force has cut the number of C-5s it plans to fully modernize by more than half because of substantial cost increases in the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP) and plans to acquire more C-17s, with additional congressional funding. Currently, the Air Force plans to provide avionics upgrades to all 111 C-5s, limit RERP to 52 C-5s, and acquire 205 C-17s. However, this mix may change again, based in part on the results of a new mobility capabilities study, the findings of which DOD plans to release in May 2009. While the new study is expected to consider transport needs for the future force, DOD has not identified specific metrics it will use to make strategic airlift decisions--a concern GAO raised about DOD's previous mobility capabilities study and one DOD agreed to address in future studies. The Air Force currently estimates it will spend $9.1 billion on upgrading the C-5s. However, this estimate may be understated because DOD did not apply risk or uncertainty analyses to its RERP major cost drivers. Moreover, the current RERP is underfunded by almost $300 million and may be unachievable if the engine production schedule is not met. At the same time, the Air Force has not priced or budgeted for a new upgrade program it plans to begin in fiscal year 2010 to address certain modernization deficiencies and to add new capabilities. Some future costs, however, may be avoided should the Air Force justify retirement of some older C-5s and forego planned modifications. Careful planning is needed to ensure C-17 production is not ended prematurely and later restarted at substantial cost. Current production plans call for shutting down the C-17 production line in September 2010. However, results from the new mobility capabilities studies and potential C-5 retirements could lead to decisions to extend C-17 production beyond the 205 now authorized. Both the manufacturer and Air Force agree that shutting down and restarting production would not be feasible or cost effective due to the costs to reinstate a capable workforce, reinstall tooling, and reestablish the supplier base. At some point, the C-17 production line will shut down, and DOD will have to pay substantial costs that have not yet been budgeted. The manufacturer and Air Force shutdown estimates differ significantly--about $1 billion and $465 million, respectively--in large part because the manufacturer's estimate included assumptions about demolishing facilities and environmental remediation, while the Air Force's did not. Fri, 21 Nov 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0931.pdf At DOD, a personality disorder can render a servicemember unsuitable for service. GAO was required to report on personality disorder separations and examined (1) the extent that selected military installations complied with DOD's separation requirements and (2) how DOD ensures compliance with these requirements. GAO reviewed a sample of 312 servicemembers' records from four installations, representing the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, that had the highest or second highest number of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom servicemembers separated because of a personality disorder. The review is generalizable to the installations, but not to the services. GAO also reviewed 59 Navy servicemembers' records, but this review is not generalizable to the installation or the Navy because parts of the separation process could have been completed at multiple locations. GAO's review of enlisted servicemembers' records found that the selected military installations GAO visited varied in their documented compliance with DOD's requirements for personality disorder separations. DOD has requirements for separations because of a personality disorder, which is defined as an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates markedly from expected behavior and has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood. The three key requirements established by DOD are that enlisted servicemembers (1) must be notified of their impending separation because of a personality disorder, (2) must be diagnosed with a personality disorder by a psychiatrist or psychologist who determines that servicemembers' personality disorder interferes with their ability to function in the military, and (3) must receive formal counseling about their problem with functioning in the military. For the four installations, compliance with the notification requirement was at or above 98 percent. The compliance rates for the requirement related to the personality disorder diagnosis ranged from 40 to 78 percent. For the requirement for formal counseling, compliance ranged from 40 to 99 percent. GAO's review of the documentation in the enlisted Navy servicemembers' records found that compliance varied by requirement. Ninety-five percent of enlisted Navy servicemembers' records had documentation indicating that enlisted servicemembers had been notified of their impending separation because of a personality disorder. Eighty-two percent had documentation that indicated compliance with the requirement that enlisted servicemembers must be diagnosed with a personality disorder by a psychiatrist or psychologist who determines that the personality disorder interferes with servicemembers' ability to function in the military. Seventy-seven percent had documentation indicating compliance with the requirement for formal counseling. DOD does not have reasonable assurance that its key personality disorder separation requirements have been followed. DOD policy directs the military services to implement and ensure consistent administration of DOD's requirements for separating enlisted servicemembers because of a personality disorder. According to military service officials, the military services delegate to commanders with separation authority at military installations sole responsibility for ensuring that the separation requirements are followed for enlisted servicemembers under their command. When asked about the low rates of compliance for some of the separation requirements that GAO found, military officials responsible for reviewing the servicemembers' records with whom GAO spoke could not explain why these separations were approved if compliance with the separation requirements was not documented in the servicemembers' records. The military services have not established a way to determine whether the commanders with separation authority are ensuring that DOD's key separation requirements are met, and DOD does not have reasonable assurance that its requirements have been followed. Fri, 31 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0922r.pdf As the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq--known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), respectively--have progressed, increasing numbers of OEF/OIF servicemembers have transitioned to veteran status and have begun receiving care from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). VA data show that as of March 2008, over 868,000 OEF/OIF servicemembers, including National Guard and Reserve members, had left active duty and become eligible for VA health care, and over 340,000-- about 40 percent--had accessed VA health care services. Returning OEF/OIF veterans may have a range of health care needs, such as treatment for mental health conditions like posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), treatment for traumatic brain injury (TBI) or other injuries, or counseling to address difficulties readjusting from wartime military service to civilian life. Family members can play an important role in helping and supporting OEF/OIF veterans. For example, family members may notice symptoms the veteran has, such as anxiety or difficulty sleeping, and encourage the veteran to seek care. They may also help the veteran identify health care services and ensure that the veteran receives needed services. Family members may also provide emotional support--such as encouragement and reassurance--to the veteran. For example, they can support the veteran's efforts to reach rehabilitation goals by providing encouragement and helping the veteran stay motivated to participate in rehabilitation therapy. To help the veteran, family members may need a range of education and support from VA. They may need information about symptoms of mental or physical conditions, how those conditions can affect the veteran and the veteran's family, and the health care resources and treatment options that are available. They may also need information on potential readjustment difficulties that the returning veteran may face, as well as ways in which family members can help and support the veteran. At the same time, family members may experience difficulties--such as stress, uncertainty, or strained relationships-- due to the veteran's medical conditions or readjustment difficulties. According to VA officials, educated and supportive family members can help facilitate a veteran's readjustment and recovery. Congress asked GAO to provide information on the education and support available from VA for families of OEF/OIF veterans. In this report, we describe selected national initiatives and local programs VA has in place that address education and support for families of OEF/OIF veterans who are receiving VA health care. In summary, VA has national initiatives and a range of local programs that address education and support for families of OEF/OIF veterans with post-deployment readjustment, mental health, and other health care needs. VA has two national initiatives that address education and support for families of OEF/OIF veterans, but it is too early to tell what impact these initiatives will have on VA's provision of education and support for families of OEF/OIF veterans. In June 2008, VA established an interdisciplinary Caregiver Advisory Board that is to develop a caregiver assistance program that addresses caregiver issues across VA's various health care disciplines and programs. The board's activities are to include the identification of core caregiver needs systemwide, the development of initial recommendations for VA caregiver support services, and the oversight of eight caregiver assistance pilot programs to assess the feasibility and advisability of various mechanisms to expand and improve VA caregiver assistance services. In April 2007, VA established the VA Advisory Committee on OIF/OEF Veterans and Families, which is responsible for reviewing VA services and benefits; providing advice to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on health care, benefits, and family support issues; and making recommendations for tailoring VA services and benefits to meet the needs of OEF/OIF veterans and their families. Issues affecting families, including dependents and survivors, is one of nine priorities the committee is expected to address. The VA medical centers we reviewed offered a range of local programs for families of OEF/OIF veterans. We identified examples of medical center programs that addressed the following five issues: post-deployment counseling, PTSD, serious mental illness, caregiver assistance, and serious injuries. Post-deployment counseling programs included an education and support program for veterans who have recently returned from a combat theater and their families. The PTSD programs we identified at VA medical centers included marriage and couples therapy on an individual basis or in a group setting, as well as other types of group-oriented programs. Programs to address serious mental illness included family psychoeducation pilot programs for families of veterans with illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression. With regard to caregiver assistance, VA announced in December 2007 that it would establish eight caregiver assistance pilot programs at selected VA medical centers nationwide, to examine ways to improve education and provide training and resources for caregivers assisting veterans. Among the VA medical center programs focusing on serious injuries was the Family Care Map pilot program at VA's four Polytrauma Rehabilitation Centers (PRC)--regional centers that provide acute comprehensive medical and rehabilitative care for the severely injured. The Vet Centers we reviewed offered a range of programs for families of OEF/OIF veterans, including group-oriented programs and programs offered on an individual basis, such as couples and family counseling.18 Group-oriented programs addressing issues related to veterans' military service included a relationship enrichment group to provide education and skills to couples to address the impact of PTSD on interpersonal relationships; a parenting class to help veterans and their partners learn effective strategies for successfully raising their children; and a spousal support group providing education about PTSD, TBI, or other deployment-related issues affecting spouses of veterans. Wed, 22 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0949.pdf The events of September 11, 2001, and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have made it critical for military units to identify individuals they encounter and share this information with other units and federal agencies. Biometrics are unique personal aspects such as fingerprints and iris images used to identify an unfamiliar person. Federal agencies with national security missions, such as the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State (DOS), need access to certain biometrics data gathered by the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO was asked to determine to what extent (1) DOD has guidance on the biometrics data to be collected to support military activities, and (2) there may be gaps in biometrics information shared between DOD and DHS. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only report, GAO-08-430NI, issued in May 2008. GAO examined DOD's guidance for field collection of biometrics data, biometrics sharing agreements, and information on national level efforts to enhance data sharing. DOD has issued guidance on the biometrics data collected from individuals who are detained or allowed access to U.S. bases in Iraq, but has not issued guidance on data to be collected during field activities where U.S. forces encounter hostile or questionable individuals such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD has allowed commanders to determine the type of data to collect, such as fingerprints or iris images, during their operations. GAO's analysis showed that allowing for this flexibility results in the collection of different data that are not necessarily comparable to each other. Some units may collect iris images while others collect fingerprints, which are not comparable data. Broader national security implications can arise, such as military personnel's inability to identify someone who has harmed or attempted to harm U.S. or coalition forces. These newly collected data are not necessarily comparable with data collected by other units or with federal databases that store biometrics data, such as the FBI's fingerprint database, DOD's biometric database, or the DHS biometric database. Having a standard set of data would help ensure consistent identification and confirmation of an individual's identity thus allowing forces to compare data across multiple databases in different commands. A standard set of data also would allow for comparison of new biometrics data collected in the field with existing biometrics data. DOD shares biometrics data that it collects on non-U.S. persons with other federal agencies through a variety of inter-agency agreements, but some gaps in data sharing may remain. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the President and Congress have issued policies that require agencies to share counterterrorism information, and agencies have in turn issued their own policies. National efforts to develop policies about such information sharing are still in development. In January 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memo that stated that DOD would immediately adopt the practice of sharing, when asked, unclassified DOD biometrics data records with other U.S. agencies that have counterterrorism missions--this includes data related to terrorism information but excludes data pertaining to U.S. persons. According to a DHS memorandum, DHS is not regularly receiving updates on certain types of DOD biometrics data that it could use. DHS officials told GAO they could use such data in various ways, such as to prohibit individuals from entering the United States who are determined to be inadmissible based on these data and other relevant information. GAO found that DHS officials are consulting with DOD on how to obtain additional biometrics data from DOD. Until national level policies are developed, opportunities to reduce gaps in national security through comprehensive data sharing may be lost unless remaining needs for biometrics data are identified and filled as appropriate and in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and international agreements. Wed, 15 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0986r.pdf U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are designed to help improve stability in Afghanistan and Iraq by increasing the host nation's capacity to govern; enhancing economic viability; and strengthening local governments' ability to deliver public services, such as security and health care. PRTs are a means of coordinating interagency diplomatic, economic, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency efforts among various U.S. agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs are intended to be interim structures; after a PRT has achieved its goal of improving stability, it may be dismantled to allow traditional development efforts to occur. In Afghanistan, the first PRTs were created in 2002 with the mission of facilitating security and reconstruction by helping the central government extend its authority to the provinces. Since then, PRTs have expanded their purpose to include strengthening local governance and community development. In Iraq, PRTs were initiated in 2005 with the mission to increase the capacity of provincial and local governments to govern effectively and, for newer embedded PRTs (ePRT), to support moderates and assist in the military's counterinsurgency efforts. To accomplish their missions, PRTs engage in and fund a variety of activities, such as developing the capacity of local governments through engagement with local stakeholders; promoting budget execution, business development, agriculture, public health initiatives, and governance; and supporting the delivery of basic social services. This report describes (1) the organization, staffing, and funding for PRTs in Afghanistan and (2) the organization, staffing, and funding for PRTs in Iraq. It excludes information marked "Sensitive but Unclassified" in our September 26, 2008, report on PRTs. Due to broad congressional interest in issues related to Iraq and Afghanistan, we completed this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Afghanistan, as of May 2008, the United States was leading 12 of 26 PRTs and 13 other coalition countries were leading the remaining 14 PRTs. All PRTs in Afghanistan are under ISAF's operational command, but individual nations, including the United States, lead PRTs and determine their size and structure. U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan are led by DOD and are composed primarily of U.S. military personnel. As of April 2008, 10 of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs included 88 or more military personnel--the majority of whom provide security and other support for the PRTs--and 3 civilian personnel from State, USAID, and USDA. The total number of U.S. government personnel assigned to U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan increased slightly from 1,023 personnel in 2007 to 1,055 personnel in 2008--which includes 1,021 military personnel from DOD and 34 civilian personnel from State, USAID, and USDA. DOD is responsible for paying nearly all of the costs associated with operating PRTs, such as providing their security and life support. However, DOD officials reported that DOD does not track PRT operating costs separately from other operational costs for Afghanistan. State, USAID, and USDA do not reimburse DOD for its support to civilian PRT officials in Afghanistan. PRTs have one source of programmatic funding available for projects in Afghanistan. PRT commanders can approve the use of funds for projects under DOD's Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) up to $25,000 per project. PRTs in Afghanistan may also coordinate with other U.S.-funded programs, including other commanders' CERP projects and USAID programs, such as the Local Governance and Community Development project. In Iraq, as of August 2008, the United States was leading 28 of 31 PRTs and other coalition countries were leading 3 PRTs. As of August 2008, three types of U.S.-led PRTs were operating in Iraq: 11 PRTs at the provincial level of government; 13 ePRTs embedded with U.S. brigade combat teams and operating in local governments in Baghdad, Anbar, Babil, and Diyala provinces; and 4 Provincial Support Teams (PST), which are smaller PRTs that cannot be based in the intended province due to security concerns. According to State and DOD officials, the number of personnel assigned to PRTs and ePRTs in Iraq increased from an estimated 100 to 125 personnel in early 2007 to about 450 in July 2008. This increase was the result of the Administration's decision in January 2007 to create ePRTs and to increase the size of PRTs in support of The New Way Forward. DOD and civilian agencies have staffed the PRTs with a mix of U.S. government employees--permanent and temporary--and contractors. State reimburses DOD for some operating costs of ePRTs and most PRTs, based on a quarterly estimate for each PRT member. State's reimbursements do not cover the costs of PRT security and transportation provided by the U.S. military. According to DOD, as of April 2008, State had reimbursed $11 million to DOD for operating costs--$5.9 million for fiscal year 2007 and $5.1 million for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. State had also obligated $125 million for PRT movement security from September 2005 through May 2008 for PRTs in Iraq that are not embedded with U.S. military units or do not have access to military movement assets. Wed, 01 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0919.pdf The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to carry out a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan. While recognizing the benefits of using contractors, GAO and others have noted the challenges and risks associated with an increased reliance on contractors and the ability of agencies to manage their growing number of contractors. As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and USAID data on contracting activities in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008 including (1) the number and value of contracts and the extent they were awarded competitively; (2) the number of contractor personnel, including those performing security functions; and (3) the number of contractor personnel who were killed or wounded. GAO also reviewed the status of the three agencies' memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to maintaining data on contracts and contractor personnel. GAO reviewed selected contract files and compared personnel data to other available sources to assess the reliability of the data reported by the agencies. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, and the Department of Labor for comment. State and USAID provided technical comments that were incorporated where appropriate. For the 18-month period GAO reviewed, DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating at least $33.9 billion on almost 57,000 contracts for efforts such as construction, capacity building, security, and a range of support services for U.S. forces and other government personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. About three-fourths of the reported obligations were for contracts with performance in Iraq. Of the total obligations, DOD accounted for almost 90 percent. Most of the three agencies' active contracts were awarded during GAO's review period and of these, about two-thirds were competed to one extent or another. However, during its file reviews in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO found that DOD may have understated the extent to which it competed some contracts. Complete and reliable data were not available for GAO to determine the total number of contractor personnel who worked on DOD, State, and USAID contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD's quarterly census, there were 197,718 contractor personnel working on its contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan as of April 2008. However, DOD did not routinely evaluate the data for accuracy and the number of local nationals working on contracts may be underreported. Neither State nor USAID had systems in place during our review period to track the number of contractor personnel. As a result, they could not provide complete personnel data. For example, while State and USAID had information from their contractors on the number of personnel performing security and demining functions in Afghanistan, they did not have similar information on personnel performing other functions in Afghanistan. According to DOD and State officials, information on killed and wounded contractor personnel was not systematically tracked, which left them unable to provide reliable or complete data. While USAID could not provide specifics on its contractor personnel, USAID informed us that 206 individuals working on its projects, including contractor personnel, had been killed or injured in Iraq and Afghanistan during GAO's review period. Data available from Labor provides insight into the number of contractor personnel killed or injured as a result of hostile actions, accidents, and other causes while working on U.S. government contracts. Based on data provided by Labor, there were 455 reports received of contractors killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during the period of our review and 15,787 reports of injuries. However, there may be additional contractor deaths or injuries that were not reported to Labor. In July 2008, the three agencies signed an MOU in which they agreed to use a DOD database to collect and maintain information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, as the agencies work together to implement the MOU, the agencies' ability to report on the number and value of contracts and the number of contractor personnel should improve. Wed, 01 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081137.pdf In February 2007, a series of articles in The Washington Post about conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center highlighted problems in the military's disability evaluation system. Subsequently, the Department of the Army, Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) undertook initiatives to address concerns with the disability evaluation process. In 2007, the Army took steps to streamline its process, and DOD and VA began piloting a joint evaluation system to address systemic concerns about timeliness and the potential inefficiency of having separate disability evaluation systems. GAO was asked to examine (1) recent actions by the Army to help servicemembers navigate its disability evaluation process and (2) the status, plans, and challenges of DOD and VA's efforts to pilot and implement a joint disability evaluation system. GAO interviewed Army, DOD, and VA officials; visited Army treatment facilities; and reviewed data from these sources. The Army has taken a number of steps to help servicemembers navigate the disability evaluation process through additional support mechanisms and streamlining efforts, but faces challenges in meeting internal goals and demonstrating impact. Most significantly, the Army has begun hiring more staff to facilitate the process for servicemembers, such as legal personnel, and setting staffing goals for key positions, such as for board liaisons and physicians. However, the Army has not met its internal staffing goals for board liaisons and physicians, and continues to face shortages in legal personnel. The Army has also struggled to meet timeliness goals for case processing and has even experienced negative trends over the last year, despite streamlining initiatives. Furthermore, the Army faces particular challenges in meeting timeliness goals for completing reservists' evaluations, due in part to the challenge of obtaining complete personnel and medical documents from nonmilitary sources. Besides staffing initiatives, the Army has also taken steps to help servicemembers better understand and navigate the process. However, we found that these efforts varied by location, and that many servicemembers we spoke with were unaware of the availability of expert legal counsel. To increase transparency of the disability process, one location we visited afforded servicemembers the opportunity to have the written summary of their medical conditions explained to them, but not all Army locations have adopted this practice. In general, the Army faces challenges in demonstrating that its efforts to date have had an overall positive impact on servicemembers' satisfaction, because it has not implemented a survey that adequately targets and queries servicemembers who are undergoing disability evaluations. Under direction from the agencies' joint Senior Oversight Committee, DOD and VA moved quickly to design and pilot a joint disability evaluation process, but gaps remain in their plans to evaluate the pilot and potentially implement a joint process on a larger scale. DOD and VA have established a comprehensive mechanism for measuring key aspects of the pilot. However, they have not yet decided on criteria for determining whether the joint process is worthy of widespread implementation. In addition, although DOD and VA are in the process of developing surveys to measure servicemember and stakeholder satisfaction, sufficient comparative data on servicemember satisfaction may not be available when the pilot is scheduled to end. DOD and VA are also in the process of tracking challenges that have arisen in implementing the pilot, but they have not yet resolved several challenges associated with expanding the joint process if the pilot is deemed successful. Such challenges include determining who will perform the single physical examination when a VA medical center is not nearby. Beyond these concerns, DOD and VA may ultimately need to prepare for challenges that come with implementing large-scale system changes--such as those envisioned by the pilot. These challenges include sustaining management attention to ensure that the changes are implemented well and are producing the intended results. However, the Senior Oversight Committee's planned January 2009 end raises questions about whether management attention will be maintained over the long term. Wed, 24 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081144t.pdf Iraq has an estimated 115 billion barrels of crude oil reserves--the third largest in the world. Oil export revenues are critical to Iraq's economy, accounting for over half of the country's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of revenues. This testimony discusses (1) Iraq's estimated revenues from 2005 through 2008, (2) Iraq's estimated expenditures from 2005 through 2008, (3) Iraq's financial deposits through 2007 and budget surpluses, and (4) U.S. cumulative expenditures on stabilization and reconstruction activities in Iraq since 2003. GAO analyzed relevant data and reviewed documents such as Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) export oil receipts data and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) stand-by arrangement for Iraq. GAO worked with officials from the Department of Treasury and interviewed officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the IMF. GAO also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents, including budget and capital spending reports. Treasury agreed with GAO's findings and stated that Iraq has adequate funds to make and maintain capital investments that deliver service and foster economic growth. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $96 billion in cumulative revenues, of which crude oil export sales accounted for about $90.2 billion or 94 percent. For 2008, Iraq could generate an estimated $73.5 billion to $86.2 billion in revenues, with oil exports accounting for $66.5 billion to $79.2 billion. Projected 2008 oil revenues could be more than twice the average annual amount Iraq generated from 2005 through 2007. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government spent an estimated $67 billion on operating and investment activities. Ninety percent was spent on operating expenses, such as salaries and goods and services, and the remaining 10 percent on investments, such as structures and vehicles. The Iraqi government spent only 1 percent of total expenditures to maintain Iraq- and U.S.-funded investments, such as electricity installations and weapons. From 2005 through 2007, Iraq had an estimated cumulative budget surplus of about $29 billion. For 2008, we estimate that Iraq will have an additional surplus of between $38.2 billion to $50.3 billion, which could result in a cumulative budget surplus of $67 billion to $79 billion. Iraq's 2008 budget surplus could be reduced by expenditures from its $22.3 billion supplemental budget, which Iraq's Council of Representative passed in August 2008. However, based on Iraq's past expenditure performance, the government may not be able to spend all that it has budgeted for 2008. Since fiscal year 2003, the United States has appropriated about $48 billion for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq; it had obligated about $42 billion of that amount, as of June 2008. U.S. agencies spent about $23.2 billion on four critical sectors--security, oil, electricity, and water. As of June 2008, the United States had spent 70 percent of the amount it allocated for these four sectors from fiscal year 2003 through June 2008. Iraq spent 14 percent, or $4.3 billion, of the $30 billion it allocated for similar activities in these sectors from 2005 through June 2008. Iraq's large oil reserves coupled with higher oil prices offer the government of Iraq the potential to increase its contributions to the country's reconstruction efforts and thereby enhance essential services to the Iraqi people. Tue, 16 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081128r.pdf Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with about $807 billion in supplemental and annual appropriations, as of September 2008, primarily for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD's reported annual obligations for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007. The United States' commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. The monthly cost reports are typically compiled within the 45 days after the end of the reporting month in which the obligations are incurred. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through June 2008. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's cumulative appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2008 reported obligations from October 2007 through June 2008, the latest data available for GWOT by military service and appropriation account. As of September 2008, Congress has appropriated a total of about $807 billion primarily for GWOT operations since 2001. Of that amount, about $187 billion has been provided for fiscal year 2008 and about $65.9 billion has been appropriated for use in fiscal year 2009. DOD will likely request additional funds for fiscal year 2009. DOD has reported obligations of about $594.9 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 (October 2007 through June 2008). The $212.1 billion difference between DOD's appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to certain fiscal year 2008 appropriations; multiyear funding for procurement, military construction, and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated; and obligations for classified and other items, which DOD considers to be non-GWOT related, that are not reported in DOD's cost-of-war reports. This difference also includes the $65.9 billion appropriated for fiscal year 2009. As part of our ongoing work, we are reviewing DOD's rationale for reporting its GWOT related obligations. Mon, 15 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08930.pdf The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, a process the Department of Defense (DOD) refers to as "reposturing," will be a massive and expensive effort. As of March 2008, for example, there were about 173,000 pieces of equipment in Iraq, worth about $16.5 billion, that will need to be returned to the United States. The redeployment process following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a much shorter war, lasted at least 14 months. DOD guidance emphasizes the importance of early planning for this redeployment process. GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General's Authority. GAO examined the (1) status of logistical planning for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq and associated assumptions and (2) extent to which DOD established roles and responsibilities for managing and executing retrograde from Iraq. GAO also identified issues that DOD will need to consider in its reposture planning. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the United States and Kuwait. While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq is yet to be determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in fall 2007, and DOD began coordinating these individual planning efforts in May 2008 to develop a logistical framework based on three key assumptions. The result of this planning was an order published by Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) that contained the process for reposturing units, materiel, and equipment and established working groups to continue the planning and seek solutions to emerging challenges. DOD's three key assumptions are: (1) any reposturing initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments of conditions on the ground; (2) there will be sufficient lead time to refine reposture plans once an order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued; and (3) the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no more than 2.5 brigades' worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq each month. While efforts have been made to synchronize planning for reposturing, DOD, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the military services have not yet clearly established all of the roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel and equipment from Iraq. Although CENTCOM has designated U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) as executive agent for synchronizing retrograde of materiel and equipment from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified or coordinated structure exists to account for the roles of the variety of teams and units engaged in retrograde operations. Until recently ARCENT did not have operational control over the two units responsible for retrograding the bulk of equipment in Iraq. We identified the following nine issues that DOD should consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq: (1) agreed-upon guidance for environmental cleanup and the disposition of property, which could affect the time and cost of closing bases in Iraq; (2) guidance and plans for the reposturing of contractors from Iraq; (3) accountability and disposition of contractor-managed government-owned property; (4) the possibility of restrictive conditions on the use of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries; (5) availability of power-washing equipment and stands, called wash racks, and the number of customs inspectors in Kuwait; (6) capacity of military transports and convoy security assets, including limits on the main supply route; (7) increased demand for access to mental health care providers; (8) infrastructure requirements of returning units; and (9) requirements for training and equipment reset to restore readiness. DOD has begun to address these issues. While the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008 directs DOD to brief the congressional defense committees on certain issues related to reposturing, DOD is not required to provide the specific information identified in our report. We believe that without more specific reporting from DOD, Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its oversight responsibilities. Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081031.pdf Iraq has an estimated 115 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, the third largest in the world. Oil export revenues are critical to Iraq's reconstruction, accounting for over 90 percent of the Iraqi government's revenues. In June 2008, GAO reported low 2007 spending rates by the Iraqi government for some critical sectors in the face of declining U.S. investments in these sectors. This report examines (1) Iraq's estimated revenues from 2005 through 2008, (2) Iraq's estimated expenditures from 2005 through 2008, (3) Iraq's financial deposits through 2007 and budget surpluses, (4) U.S. cumulative expenditures on stabilization and reconstruction activities in Iraq since 2003, and (5) factors affecting Iraq's efforts to accelerate spending. GAO analyzed relevant data and reviewed documents, including Central Bank of Iraq oil receipts data, International Monetary Fund's (IMF) reports, translated copies of Iraqi budget and expenditures, and U.S. agency funding data and reports. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy, State, Treasury, and the IMF. This report contains no recommendations. Treasury agreed with the report's findings and stated that Iraq has adequate funds to make and maintain capital investments that deliver services and foster economic growth. State provided technical comments. DOD had no comments. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $96 billion in cumulative revenues, of which crude oil export sales accounted for about $90.2 billion, or 94 percent. For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could generate between $73.5 billion and $86.2 billion in total revenues, with oil exports accounting for between $66.5 billion to $79.2 billion. Projected 2008 oil revenues could be more than twice the average annual amount Iraq generated from 2005 through 2007. These projections are based on actual sales through June 2008 and projections for July to December that assume an average export price from $96.88 to $125.29 per barrel and oil export volumes of 1.89 to 2.01 million barrels per day. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government spent an estimated $67 billion on operating and investment activities. Ninety percent was spent on operating expenses, such as salaries and goods and services, and the remaining 10 percent on investments, such as structures and vehicles. The Iraqi government spent only 1 percent of total expenditures to maintain Iraq- and U.S.-funded investments such as buildings, water and electricity installations, and weapons. While total expenditures grew from 2005 through 2007, Iraq was unable to spend all its budgeted funds. In 2007, Iraq spent 80 percent of its $29 billion operating budget and 28 percent of its $12 billion investment budget. For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could spend between $35.3 billion and $35.9 billion of its $49.9 billion budget. As of December 31, 2007, the Iraqi government had accumulated financial deposits of $29.4 billion, held in the Development Fund for Iraq and central government deposits at the Central Bank of Iraq and Iraq's commercial banks. This balance is the result, in part, of an estimated cumulative budget surplus of about $29 billion from 2005 to 2007. For 2008, GAO estimates a budget surplus of between $38.2 billion to $50.3 billion. If spent, a proposed Iraqi budget supplemental of $22 billion could reduce this projected surplus. Since fiscal year 2003, the United States appropriated about $48 billion for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq; it had obligated about $42 billion of that amount as of June 2008. U.S. agencies spent about $23.2 billion on the critical security, oil, electricity, and water sectors. From 2005 through April 2008, Iraq spent about $3.9 billion on these sectors. U.S. government, coalition, and international officials have identified a number of factors that have affected the Iraqi government's ability to spend more of its revenues on capital investments. These factors included the shortage of trained staff; weak procurement and budgeting systems; and violence and sectarian strife. The United States has funded activities to help build the capacity of key civilian and security ministries to improve Iraq's ability to execute its capital project budget. Tue, 05 Aug 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08966.pdf The U.S. government relies extensively on private security contractors (PSC) for a variety of security services. However, incidents involving PSCs have raised concerns about oversight and legal accountability. Under the authority of the Comptroller General and in response to continuing congressional interest, GAO performed this review to examine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State have strengthened (1) oversight and (2) coordination of private security contractors in Iraq. GAO is also providing information on the legal framework used to hold private security contractor employees legally accountable for their actions in Iraq. GAO reviewed DOD and State Department policies and guidance, and their memorandum of agreement on PSCs; observed operations in Iraq and met with DOD officials there and in the U.S.; and met with officials from the Departments of Justice and State, and private security contractors. Both DOD and the State Department have taken steps to strengthen oversight of private security contractors in Iraq since September 2007. However, staffing and training challenges remain for DOD. DOD has increased the number of personnel in Iraq assigned to provide oversight for DOD's PSCs but has not developed plans or a strategy to sustain this increase. An Army-commissioned report has specifically raised concerns about the lack of personnel available to provide sufficient contracting support to either expeditionary or peacetime missions. In the short term, DOD has increased the number of oversight personnel in Iraq by shifting existing oversight personnel from other locations into Iraq. However, without developing and implementing a strategy for providing and sustaining an increased number of personnel dedicated to oversight of PSCs, it is not clear whether DOD can sustain this increase because of the limited number of oversight personnel in the workforce. Moreover, while DOD has provided some training on PSCs for units deploying, the training has not been updated to reflect the changes made by DOD since September 2007 to increase oversight. As a result, military units may be unaware of their expanded oversight and investigative responsibilities. The State Department has implemented 11 of 18 actions recommended in October 2007 by a panel tasked by the Secretary of State with reviewing that agency's use of private security contractors in Iraq. For example, the State Department has increased the number of diplomatic security personnel stationed in Iraq to provide oversight of contractor activities and has requested and received funding to hire and train 100 additional agents to replace those who were transferred from other State Department programs in the United States to Iraq. According to State Department officials, the additional personnel will help sustain the increased number of agents in Iraq. In addition, as of June 2008, the State Department has equipped 140 of its security vehicles with video recording equipment and plans to equip an additional 93 vehicles. Coordination among DOD, the State Department, and the government of Iraq has significantly improved since September 2007. The State Department coordinates its PSC movements with DOD through liaison officers, and by providing a daily briefing to Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) on upcoming PSC activities. MNF-I 's Armed Contractor Oversight Division facilitates coordination for PSC matters among DOD, State Department, the government of Iraq, and the PSC community. Further, DOD and the State Department signed a memorandum of agreement detailing coordination activities to be undertaken. Various laws hold PSC employees accountable for their actions in Iraq, including U.S. criminal laws that may be applied extraterritorially, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The applicability of these laws depends on the circumstances--e.g., the nature and location of the alleged crime and the nationality of the accused--of any specific incident. The legal framework for holding PSCs accountable also includes Iraqi and international law and contract provisions. Thu, 31 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081021t.pdf In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem the violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government foster conditions for national reconciliation. In The New Way Forward, the Administration articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12- to 18-month period and reasserted the end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. To support this strategy, the United States increased its military presence and financial commitments for Iraq operations. This testimony discusses (1) progress in meeting key security, legislative, and economic goals of The New Way Forward; and (2) past and current U.S. strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated strategy. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, MNF-I, the UN, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed in Baghdad. Since 2003, GAO has issued about 140 Iraq-related products, which provided baseline information for this assessment. The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated in The New Way Forward. Looking forward, many challenges remain, and an updated strategy is essential. In the security area, violence--as measured by the number of enemy-initiated attacks--decreased about 80 percent from June 2007 to June 2008, trained Iraqi security forces have increased substantially, and many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, as of July 2008, 8 of 18 provincial governments do not yet have lead responsibility for security in their provinces, and DOD reported that, in June 2008, less than 10 percent of Iraqi security forces were at the highest readiness level and therefore considered capable of performing operations without coalition support. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. In the legislative area, Iraq has enacted key legislation to return some Ba'athists to government, grant amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. The unfinished Iraqi legislative agenda includes enacting laws that will provide the legal framework for sharing oil revenues, disarming militias, and holding provincial elections. On economic and infrastructure issues, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its reconstruction efforts between 2005 and 2007. Although crude oil production improved for short periods, the early July 2008 average production capacity of about 2.5 million barrels per day was below the U.S. goal of 3 million barrels per day. In addition, while State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are close to being reached, the daily supply of electricity in Iraq met only slightly more than half of demand in early July 2008. Since 2003, the United States has developed and revised multiple strategies to address security and reconstruction needs in Iraq. The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior U.S. plans and the escalating violence that occurred in 2006. However, this strategy and the military surge that was central to it end in July 2008, and many agree that the situation remains fragile. GAO recommends an updated strategy for Iraq for several reasons. First, much has changed in Iraq since The New Way Forward began in January 2007. Violence is down, U.S. surge forces are leaving, and the United States is negotiating a security agreement with Iraq to replace the expiring UN mandate. Second, The New Way Forward only articulates U.S. goals and objectives for the phase that ends in July 2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward are contained in disparate documents rather than a single strategic plan. Furthermore, the classified MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan is not a strategic plan; it is an operational plan with limitations that GAO will discuss during the closed portion of the hearing. Wed, 23 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08884r.pdf About 75 percent of casualties in current combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are attributed to improvised explosive devices (IED). To mitigate the threat from these weapons, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program, which uses a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field the vehicles. In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense affirmed MRAP as DOD's single most important acquisition program. To date, more than $22 billion has been appropriated to acquire more than 15,000 MRAP vehicles, and about 6,600 of the vehicles have been fielded. In view of the importance of this program and the significant cost involved, Congress asked us to (1) describe DOD's approach for and progress in implementing its strategy for rapidly acquiring and fielding MRAP vehicles, and (2) identify the challenges remaining for the program. DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP vehicles. The program established minimal operational requirements and relied heavily on commercially available products. The program also undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the vehicles. To expand limited existing production capacity, the department awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts to nine commercial sources for the purchase of up to 4,100 vehicles per year from each vendor. To evaluate design, performance, producibility, and sustainability, DOD committed to buy at least 4 vehicles from all vendors. According to program officials, subsequent delivery orders were based on a phased testing approach with progressively more advanced vehicle test results and other assessments. To expedite the fielding of the vehicles, mission equipment packages including radios and other equipment were integrated into the vehicles after they were purchased. Finally, DOD designated the MRAP program as DOD's highest priority acquisition, which helped contractors and other industry partners to more rapidly respond to the urgent need and meet production requirements. While the department's concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the vehicles has provided an urgently needed operational capability, it has also increased performance, sustainability, and cost risks. For example, safety and performance testing is not yet complete, and any shortcomings revealed may require design changes or postmanufacturing fixes. Operating, maintaining, and sustaining a fleet of more than 15,000 fielded vehicles manufactured by at least five different vendors could also present significant challenges--especially for the Army, whose fleet will include more than 10,000 vehicles from five manufacturers. Future budgets could be significantly affected by these challenges, particularly since the department is still determining its cost estimate to operate and sustain the current MRAP quantities. At the same time, DOD is seeking to develop a replacement for the ubiquitous high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle and to fund various other high-priority weapon systems across the services. Finally, as threats change, performance requirements--and MRAP's role in DOD's overall tactical wheeled vehicle strategy--could change, further exacerbating these challenges. Tue, 15 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08689.pdf The Afghan government, the United States, and other donors consider road reconstruction a top development priority for Afghanistan. Almost 20 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) $5.9 billion in assistance to Afghanistan has been for roads. The Department of Defense (Defense) has committed about $560 million for roads, of which Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds account for over half. GAO examined (1) the status of road reconstruction and challenges affecting project implementation, (2) U.S. agencies' efforts to evaluate the impact of road projects, and (3) efforts to develop a sustainable road maintenance program. GAO reviewed U.S. and Afghan governments' planning, evaluation, and funding documents and interviewed relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan. The United States and other donors have completed construction of several regional and national highways since 2002, but the status of other roads is uncertain and various challenges have delayed construction. The Afghan government and international donors planned to complete the high-priority regional highways by the end of 2008, and as of February 2008, about 60 percent of these roads were built. USAID has completed its portion, but completion of other portions is not expected until late 2009. Donors have committed to construct over 30 percent of national highways, which connect provincial capitals to the regional highways, and only USAID has completed portions of these highways. Detailed information on the status of provincial and rural roads is lacking. Although Defense reported committing CERP funds for 1,600 kilometers of roads, data on the roads were incomplete and Defense has not reported information on these roads to USAID, as required. Poor security, project implementer limitations, and starting construction with limited planning have contributed to project delays and cost increases. U.S. agencies have not conducted sound impact evaluations to determine the degree to which projects achieved the objective of economic development. Limitations of USAID's funding, data collection, and frameworks to assess results have impeded its ability to evaluate project impact. Defense has not conducted any impact evaluations and lacks clear guidance on project evaluation. However, agency officials have noted some anecdotal examples of road construction impact, such as reduced travel times and increased commerce. Moreover, no other donor has performed impact evaluations. A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established, although it is a goal of the Afghan government and international donors. The Afghan government's support of this goal has been limited due to factors such as a lack of resources and a fragmented institutional organization. As a result, international donors have agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect their investments. While USAID plans to maintain about 1,500 kilometers of roads it built, it did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads. Tue, 08 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08736r.pdf Since fiscal year 2003, Congress has appropriated more than $46 billion dollars for relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of several U.S. agencies that administer U.S.-funded relief and reconstruction programs in Iraq. In particular, DOD manages the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is designed to enable local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population. Thus far, Congress has appropriated more than $3 billion for CERP in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the program's inception, DOD has steadily increased its funding requests in response to theater conditions, and reported obligations have also grown substantially. DOD's funding requests have increased by more than a billion dollars from fiscal years 2004 through 2008. For fiscal year 2008, DOD requested $1.2 billion to fund CERP projects in Iraq and Afghanistan and plans to request an additional $507 million, primarily for CERP in Iraq. Furthermore, DOD's reported obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan have grown from about $179 million in fiscal year 2004 to more than $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2007. In addition, over the same period of time, the number of projects in both countries has grown from about 6,450 to about 8,700. According to DOD regulations, CERP is intended for small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects for the benefit of Iraqi people. The guidance issued by the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) establishes 19 authorized uses for CERP funds, including transportation, electricity, and condolence payments. CERP funds can be used for both construction and non-construction projects. In Iraq, commanders follow Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) standard operating procedures for CERP, which expand upon DOD regulations. MNC-I guidance states that the keys to project selection are to (1) execute quickly, (2) employ many Iraqis, (3) benefit the Iraqi people, and (4) be highly visible. DOD regulations identify the roles and responsibilities that different offices play in managing CERP. The Secretary of the Army serves as the executive agent and is responsible for ensuring that commanders carry out CERP in a manner that is consistent with applicable laws, regulations and guidance. The Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for allocating CERP resources. Public Law No. 108-106 and subsequent laws require DOD to provide Congress with quarterly reports on the source, allocation, and use of CERP funds. The reports are compiled based on information about the projects that was entered by unit officials into the Iraq Reconstruction Management System, a database that tracks projects' status and maintains a historical record of all reconstruction activity in Iraq, including those projects funded by CERP. Because of significant congressional interest, we conducted this work under the authority of the Comptroller General to undertake work at his own initiative and examined the following questions regarding the CERP program in Iraq: (1) To what extent does DOD guidance establish selection criteria for CERP projects? (2) To what extent do commanders in Iraq coordinate CERP with other U. S. government agencies and with the government of Iraq? and (3) To what extent do DOD and MNC-I exercise oversight of CERP projects in Iraq? DOD has established broad selection criteria for CERP projects, which gives significant discretion to commanders in determining the types of projects to undertake. CERP is intended to provide commanders a source of funds that allow them to respond to urgent, small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs that will immediately assist the local Iraqi population. However, DOD guidance provides no definition for small-scale or urgent, which leaves commanders with the responsibility of developing their own definitions. Commanders we interviewed had varying definitions for small-scale. Our review of the quarterly reports to Congress demonstrated the wide spectrum in size and costs of projects. For instance, projects ranged from a waterline repair costing slightly more than $100 to an electrical distribution system costing more than $11 million. In addition, during our visit to Iraq, we observed three projects: a multimillion-dollar sewage lift station, a several hundred thousand dollar sports center and community complex, and a fruit and vegetable stand that had been renovated with a $2,500 grant. Commanders typically defined urgent as restoring a basic human need, such as water and electricity, or projects identified by the local Iraqi government as its most pressing requirement for the area. As a result, the scale, complexity, and duration of projects selected vary across commands. While the majority of CERP projects have cost less than $500,000, the number of projects costing more than $500,000 has increased significantly. According to DOD officials, factors contributing to the increasing number of CERP projects costing more than $500,000 include the lack of other available reconstruction money, improved security in the region and the fact that many of the immediate needs of the Iraq people were addressed during the initial phases of CERP. Commanders reported that they generally coordinated projects with the appropriate U.S. and Iraqi officials, as required by guidance. The officials include Iraqi government personnel as well as military and nonmilitary U.S. officials. MNC-I guidance further states that coordination with local officials is critical to ensure that a project meets a need and will be maintained and that numerous projects have been built that did not meet their intended purpose because of lack of coordination. MNC-I guidance notes that coordination efforts may include synchronizing CERP projects with complementary programs funded by United States Agency for International Development or other nongovernmental organizations within the commander's area of responsibility. While the MNC-I project approval process provides some oversight, the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Army and MNC-I have limited oversight of CERP in Iraq because they (1) do not require units executing projects to monitor them, (2) have not established performance metrics, and (3) have limited knowledge of projects under $500,000. Neither DOD nor MNC-I guidance establishes a requirement for units executing projects to monitor them. MNC-I guidance has a broad requirement for the MNC-I engineer to monitor reconstruction projects, but does not include a requirement for units executing projects to monitor them. No performance metrics exist for CERP. As we have previously reported, federal agencies should develop plans that establish objective, quantifiable, and measurable performance goals that should be achieved by a program. Although MNC-I officials have some visibility over projects costing more than $500,000 because they approve these projects, they have limited visibility and oversight for projects costing less than $500,000. The quarterly reports do not provide information about the number of projects completed during a quarter, the number of projects that have been started but not completed, or the number of projects that have not been sustained or maintained by the Iraqi government or the local population. Mon, 23 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08837.pdf Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global war on terrorism, the majority of this for operations in Iraq. In January 2007, the President announced The New Way Forward to stem violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi government to foster national reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. GAO discusses progress in meeting key goals in The New Way Forward: (1) improve security conditions; (2) develop capable Iraqi security forces; and help the Iraqi government (3) enact key legislation, (4) spend capital budgets, and (5) provide essential services. GAO also discusses U.S. strategies for Iraq. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, the United Nations, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed in Baghdad. Since May 2003, GAO has issued over 130 Iraq-related audits, which provided baseline information for this assessment. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority. The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior strategies that prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. Overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent in Iraq, from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008. Security gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army's declaration of a cease fire. Average daily attacks were at higher levels in March and April before declining in May 2008. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. The number of trained Iraqi forces has increased from 323,000 in January 2007 to 478,000 in May 2008; many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the Department of Defense reported in March 2008 that the number of Iraqi units capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has remained at about 10 percent. Several factors have complicated the development of capable security forces, including the lack of a single unified force, sectarian and militia influences, and continued dependence on U.S. and coalition forces. The Iraqi government has enacted key legislation to return some Ba'athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. However, it has not yet enacted other important legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections. Efforts to complete the constitutional review have also stalled. A goal of The New Way Forward was to facilitate the Iraqis' efforts to enact all key legislation by the end of 2007. Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. More specifically, Iraq's central ministries, responsible for security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007--down from similarly low rates of 14 and 13 percent in the 2 prior years. Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq's efforts to spend its capital budgets. Although oil production has improved for short periods, the May 2008 production level of about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) was below the U.S. goal of 3 mbpd. The daily supply of electricity met only about half of demand in early May 2008. Conversely, State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are close to being reached. The unstable security environment, corruption, and lack of technical capacity have contributed to the shortfalls. The Departments disagreed with our recommendation, stating that The New Way Forward strategy remains valid but the strategy shall be reviewed and refined as necessary. We reaffirm the need for an updated strategy given the important changes that have occurred in Iraq since January 2007. An updated strategy should build on recent gains, address unmet goals and objectives and articulate the U.S. strategy beyond July 2008. Mon, 23 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf Since 2002, the United States has worked to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), directs U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in conjunction with the Department of State (State), the Afghan National Police (ANP). To follow up on recommendations from GAO's 2005 report on the ANSF, GAO analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain criteria we recommended. GAO also examined progress made and challenges faced in developing the ANA and ANP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Defense, State, and contractor documents and met with cognizant officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. In 2005, GAO recommended that Defense and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In 2007, Defense provided a document in response to this recommendation. This 5-page document lacks sufficient detail for effective interagency planning and oversight. For example, while the document includes some broad objectives and performance measures, it identifies few long-term milestones and no intermediate milestones for assessing progress, and it lacks a sustainability strategy. Although Defense and State are partners in police training, the document does not include State's input or describe State's role. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed a field-level plan to develop the ANSF that includes force goals, objectives, and performance measures. While this is an improvement over prior field-level planning, it is not a substitute for a coordinated, detailed Defense and State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. In 2008, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide a long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF, and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. These have not been provided. Without a detailed plan, it is difficult to assess progress and conduct oversight of the cost of developing the ANSF. This is particularly important given the limited capacity of the Afghan government to fund the estimated $2 billion per year ANSF sustainment costs for years into the future. The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002. However, only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as being fully capable of conducting their primary mission and efforts to develop the army continue to face challenges. First, while the army has grown to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000, it has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, while trainers or mentors are present in every ANA combat unit, shortfalls exist in the number deployed to the field. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in about 40 percent of equipment items Defense defines as critical, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. Some of these challenges are due in part to competing U.S. global priorities. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed. Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of over $6 billion, no police unit is fully capable and several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop the police. First, less than one-quarter of the police have mentors present to provide training in the field and verify that police are on duty. Second, police units continue to face shortages in equipment items that Defense considers critical, such as vehicles, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan's weak judicial system hinders effective policing and rule of law, and the ANP consistently experiences problems with pay, corruption, and attacks from insurgents. Defense began a new effort in November 2007 to address these challenges, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at risk. Wed, 18 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08883t.pdf Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support from the Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency, among other activities. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop a capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect the development of a capable ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which comprise the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report titled Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008). Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of more than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by Defense as fully capable of performing its mission and over three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the lowest capability rating. In addition, while the ANP has reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000 personnel, concerns exist about the reliability of this number. Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces. First, the shortage of police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty. Second, the ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality. Third, the ANP faces a difficult working environment, including a weak Afghan judicial sector and consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and, in November 2007, began a new initiative called Focused District Development--an effort to train the police as units--to address them. This effort is too new to fully assess, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the effort at risk. Despite a 2005 GAO recommendation calling for a detailed plan and a 2008 congressional mandate requiring similar information, Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, milestones for completing and sustaining the ANSF, and a sustainment strategy. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page document intended to address GAO's 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not identify the role or involve the participation of State--Defense's partner in training the ANP. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In the absence of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly defines agency roles and responsibilities, a dual chain of command exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of mentors training the police. Defense's 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Without interim milestones, it is difficult to know if current ANP status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 2008. In addition, Defense's 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission. Wed, 18 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08853r.pdf Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental and annual appropriations for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD's reported annual obligations for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007. To continue GWOT operations, the President requested $189.3 billion in appropriations for DOD in fiscal year 2008. As of May 2008, Congress has provided DOD with about $86.8 billion of this request, including $16.8 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Congress has not finalized action on the remaining $102.5 billion. In addition, the President also requested about $66 billion in appropriations for DOD in fiscal year 2009 for GWOT, which was submitted along with DOD's annual budget request. The United States' commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. The monthly cost reports are typically compiled within the 45 days after the end of the reporting month in which the obligations are incurred. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through March 2008. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's cumulative appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2008 reported obligations through March 2008, the latest data available for GWOT by military service and appropriation account. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007, and for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 through December 2007, Congress has provided DOD with a total of about $635.9 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $562 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007 and for the second quarter of fiscal year 2008 through March 2008. The $73.9 billion difference between DOD's GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to certain fiscal year 2008 appropriations and multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated and obligations for classified and other activities, which are not reported in DOD's cost-of-war reports. As part of our ongoing work, we are reviewing DOD's rationale for reporting its GWOT related obligations. Of DOD's total cumulative reported obligations for GWOT through March 2008 (about $562 billion), about $435.1 billion is for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and about $98.9 billion is for operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The remaining about $28 billion is for operations in defense of the homeland as part of Operation Noble Eagle. In fiscal year 2008, through March 2008, DOD's total reported obligations of about $69.8 billion are about half of the total amount of obligations it reported for all of fiscal year 2007. Reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom continue to account for the largest portion of total reported GWOT obligations by operation--about $57 billion. In contrast, reported obligations associated with Operation Enduring Freedom total about $12.7 billion, and reported obligations associated with Operation Noble Eagle total about $89.3 million. Fri, 13 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08546.pdf The increasing need for warfighters for the Global War on Terrorism has meant longer and multiple deployments for soldiers. Medical readiness is essential to their performing needed duties, and an impairment that limits a soldier's capacities represents risk to the soldier, the unit, and the mission. Asked to review the Army's compliance with its guidance, GAO examined the extent to which the Army is (1) adhering to its medical and deployment requirements regarding decisions to send soldiers with medical conditions to Iraq and Afghanistan, and (2) deploying soldiers with medical conditions requiring duty limitations, and assigning them to duties suitable for their limitations. GAO reviewed Army guidance, and medical records for those preparing to deploy between April 2006 and March 2007; interviewed Army officials and commanders at Forts Benning, Stewart, and Drum, selected for their high deployment rates; and surveyed deployed soldiers with medical limitations. Army guidance allows commanders to deploy soldiers with medical conditions requiring duty limitations, subject to certain requirements, but the Army lacks enforcement mechanisms to ensure that all requirements are met, and medical record keeping problems obstruct the Army's visibility over these soldiers' conditions. A soldier diagnosed with an impairment must be given a physical profile form designating numerically the severity of the condition and, if designated 3 or higher (more severe), must be evaluated by a medical board. Commanders must then determine proper duty assignments based on soldiers' profile and commanders' staffing needs. From a random projectable sample, GAO estimates that 3 percent of soldiers from Forts Benning, Stewart, and Drum who had designations of 3 did not receive required board evaluations prior to being deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for the period studied. In some cases, soldiers were not evaluated because commanders lacked timely access to profiles; in other cases, commanders did not take timely actions. The Army also had problems with retention and completeness of profiles; although guidance requires that approved profiles be retained in soldiers' medical records, 213 profiles were missing from the sample of 685 records reviewed. The Army was not consistent in assigning numerical designations reflecting soldiers' abilities to perform functional activities. GAO estimates from a random projectable sample that 7 percent of soldiers from these three installations had profiles indicating their inability to perform certain functional activities, yet carrying numerical designators below 3. While medical providers can "upgrade" numerical designations discretionarily based on knowledge of soldiers' conditions, the upgrades can mask limitations and cause commanders to deploy soldiers without needed board evaluations. While GAO found no evidence of widespread revision in profile designations, some soldiers interviewed or surveyed disagreed with their designations yet were reluctant to express concerns for fear of prejudicial treatment. The Army has instituted a program to provide ombudsmen to whom soldiers can bring medical concerns, but it is targeted at returning soldiers and is not well publicized as a resource for all soldiers with medical conditions. Without timely board evaluations and retention of profile information for deploying soldiers with medical conditions, the Army lacks full visibility and commanders must make medical readiness, deployment, and duty assignment decisions without being fully informed of soldiers' medical limitations. GAO estimates that about 10 percent of soldiers with medical conditions that could require duty limitations were deployed from the three installations, but survey response was too limited to enable GAO to project the extent to which they were assigned to suitable duties. Along with interviews, however, responses suggest that both soldiers and commanders believe soldiers are generally assigned to duties that accommodate their medical conditions. Occasional exceptions have occurred when a profile did not reflect all necessary medical information or a soldier's special skill was difficult to replace. Officials said soldiers sometimes understate their conditions to be deployed with their units, or overstate them to avoid deployment. Tue, 10 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08615.pdf The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 included provisions regarding mental health concerns and traumatic brain injury (TBI). GAO addressed these issues as required by the Act. In this report GAO discusses (1) DOD efforts to implement pre-deployment mental health screening; (2) how post-deployment mental health referrals are tracked; and (3) screening requirements for mild TBI. GAO selected the Army, Marine Corps, and Army National Guard for the review. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed DOD officials and conducted site visits to three military installations where the pre-deployment health assessment was being conducted. DOD has taken positive steps to implement mental health standards for deployment and pre-deployment mental health screening. However, DOD's policies for providers to review medical records are inconsistent. DOD issued minimum mental health standards that servicemembers must meet in order to be deployed to a combat theater and identified the pre-deployment health assessment as a mechanism for ensuring their use in making deployment decisions. DOD's November 2006 policy implementing these deployment standards requires a review of servicemember medical records during the pre-deployment health assessment. However, DOD's August 2006 Instruction on Deployment Health, which implements policy and prescribes procedures for conducting pre-deployment health assessments, is silent on whether such a review is required. Because of this inconsistency, providers determining if Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom servicemembers meet DOD's mental health deployment standards may not have complete medical information. Health care providers at the installations GAO visited where the post-deployment health assessment (PDHA) is conducted manually track whether servicemembers who receive mental health referrals from the PDHA make or complete appointments with mental heath providers. Because health care providers conducting the PDHA and making referrals from the PDHA may not have an ongoing relationship with referred servicemembers, health care providers responsible for tracking referrals at these installations have developed manual systems to track servicemembers to ensure that they made or kept their appointments for evaluations. Tracking is more challenging for Guard and Reserve units because their servicemembers generally receive civilian care. Guard and Reserve units do not know if servicemembers used civilian care to complete their PDHA referrals unless disclosed by the servicemembers, which they may be reluctant to do because of stigma concerns. DOD is addressing the TBI requirement through implementing screening for mild TBI in its PDHA and prior to deployment. DOD has also provided guidance and training for health care providers. DOD in January 2008 added TBI screening to the PDHA, and plans to require screening of all servicemembers for mild TBI prior to deployment beginning in July 2008. The TBI screening questions on the PDHA assess the servicemember's exposure to events that may have increased the risk of a TBI and the servicemember's symptoms. The TBI screening questions to be used prior to deployment are similar to those on the PDHA. Prior to DOD's screening efforts, several installations had been screening servicemembers for mild TBI before or after deployment. An official from the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center told GAO that these initiatives would probably be replaced by the DOD-wide screening. Fri, 30 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08670.pdf Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to provide needed ground forces. Section 354 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number of military readiness issues. In this report, GAO addresses (1) the extent to which DOD's use of nonstandard forces to meet ground force requirements has impacted the force and (2) the extent to which DOD has faced challenges in managing the training and use of these forces, and taken steps to address any challenges. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD policies, guidance, and data and interviewed department, joint, combatant command, and service officials as well as trainers and over 300 deploying, deployed, and redeploying servicemembers. The use of nonstandard forces--individuals in certain temporary positions, and units with missions that require the unit personnel to learn new skills or operate in different environments--has helped DOD fulfill U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements that the Army otherwise would not have been able to fill, but these efforts have also caused challenges across the force. For certain Navy and Air Force occupational specialties, these nonstandard force deployments have challenged the services' abilities to (1) balance the amount of time their forces are deployed with the amount of time they spend at home, and (2) meet other standard mission requirements. Some of the communities that have been most affected by nonstandard force deployments include the engineering, security force, and explosive ordnance disposal communities. In addition, the services have been challenged by emerging requirements for capabilities which do not exist in any of the services' standard forces, such as the transition teams that train local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. These requirements are particularly taxing because the teams are composed primarily of officers and senior noncommissioned officers. Because standard forces do not exist to meet these leadership requirements, the services are forced to take leaders from other commands, which must then perform their missions without a full complement of leaders. The steps that DOD has taken to increase coordination between the services and CENTCOM have helped DOD manage challenges related to nonstandard forces, but additional steps are needed to ensure consistency in training and using these forces. Nonstandard forces face more complex relationships than standard forces, making coordination of their training and use more challenging. Specifically, their training requirements are established by both the services and theater commanders and training may be conducted by trainers from another service. In addition, while deployed, these forces often report to commanders from two different services. Furthermore, authorities concerning the training and use of forces do not specifically address the training and use of nonstandard forces. DOD has taken significant steps to coordinate the training of its nonstandard forces through regular conferences at which CENTCOM and service officials develop detailed training plans for some nonstandard forces. However, the training of individual augmentees has not been fully coordinated. As a result, individuals who perform the same types of tasks may receive different levels of training. Also, the services waive training requirements without consistently coordinating with CENTCOM, so CENTCOM lacks full visibility over the extent to which all of its forces have met requirements. To increase support and oversight of the use of nonstandard forces in theater, the services have taken steps to improve coordination, which have reduced instances where nonstandard forces' missions, tasks, or organization are modified. However, the services do not have full visibility over their nonstandard forces and view the authority of ground force commanders differently, which has sometimes led to differences in their use of nonstandard forces. Fri, 30 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08772t.pdf The Defense Base Act (DBA) requires U.S. government contractors and subcontractors to buy workers' compensation insurance for employees working overseas, and the cost of this insurance is then passed on to the government. The Department of Labor oversees the claims process and ensures contractors are aware of DBA insurance requirements. Given the large number of contractor personnel working in Iraq, concerns have been raised over the cost of workers' compensation insurance provided under DBA. Since the Iraq conflict began in March 2003, federal agencies have issued contracts for Iraq reconstruction and to support deployed forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently reported it alone has 163,591 contractor personnel working in Iraq. Based on GAO's 2005 report on DBA insurance, Congress directed DOD to address challenges identified. This testimony is based on the 2005 report and GAO's analysis of recent agency efforts. As requested, it provides an update on (1) DOD's efforts to reduce DBA insurance rates; (2) DOD's ability to calculate its total DBA insurance costs; and (3) the progress toward addressing prior DBA implementation challenges. In preparation for this testimony, GAO reviewed related reports to identify agency efforts to address prior findings and interviewed officials from DOD, State, Labor, and USAID. GAO discussed this testimony with agency officials. While DOD has taken steps to reduce DBA insurance rates through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Army Corps) single-insurer pilot program, it has not yet implemented similar efforts departmentwide. GAO previously reported that eight DOD prime contractors paid from $10 to $21 per $100 of salary cost, a rate that was significantly higher than the rates paid by State and USAID contractors--$2 to $5 per $100 of salary cost--through the agencies' respective single-insurer programs. Since the Army Corps implemented its single-insurer program in December 2005, its insurance rates have decreased from what DOD was previously paying. For example, the Army Corps is now paying from $3.50 to $7.25 per $100 of salary cost for service and construction contracts. DOD continues to lack reliable aggregate data on the total cost of DBA insurance. Based on GAO's 2005 report, Congress directed DOD to identify methods to collect data on DBA insurance costs. While State, USAID, and Army Corps can obtain aggregate DBA cost data for their respective single-insurer programs, DOD reported that it has not collected this data departmentwide. As GAO has previously reported, agencies can analyze financial data to leverage their buying power, reduce costs, and better manage suppliers of goods and services. Labor officials told GAO they have taken steps to address several of the DBA insurance implementation challenges GAO identified in its 2005 report. For example, GAO found there was uncertainty among agency officials regarding when DBA insurance was required as well as problems in processing claims and monitoring compliance. Labor officials told GAO they have been receiving fewer questions after holding seven seminars through 2006 on DBA insurance for contractors, insurance companies, agency officials, and attorneys in order to clarify DBA insurance requirements. While Labor officials also noted improvements in processing insurance claims, they still face challenges in verifying that subcontractors in Iraq have obtained DBA insurance. Thu, 15 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08557r.pdf Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental and annual appropriations for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD's reported annual obligations for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007. To continue GWOT operations, the President requested $189.3 billion in appropriations for DOD in fiscal year 2008. Through December 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $86.8 billion of this request, including $16.8 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. As of February 2008, Congress has not taken action on the remaining $102.5 billion. The United States' commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. The monthly cost reports are typically compiled within the 45 days after the end of the reporting month in which the obligations are incurred. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires GAO to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through December 2007. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's cumulative appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2008 reported obligations through December 2007, the latest data available for GWOT by military service and appropriation account. From fiscal year 2001 through December 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $635.9 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $527 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007 and for fiscal year 2008 through December 2007. The $108.9 billion difference between DOD's GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to certain fiscal year 2008 appropriations and multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated, and obligations for classified and other activities, which are not reported in DOD's cost-of-war reports. Of DOD's total cumulative reported obligations for GWOT through December 2007 (about $527 billion), about $406.2 billion is for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and about $92.9 billion is for operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The remaining about $28 billion is for operations in defense of the homeland as part of Operation Noble Eagle. DOD's reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom have consistently increased each fiscal year since operations began. The increases in reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom are in part because of continued costs for military personnel, such as military pay and allowances for mobilized reservists, and for rising operation and maintenance expenses, such as higher contract costs for housing, food, and services and higher fuel costs. In contrast, DOD's reported obligations for Operation Noble Eagle have consistently decreased since fiscal year 2003, largely because of the completion of repairs to the Pentagon and upgrades in security at military installations that were onetime costs, as well as a reduction in combat air patrols and in the number of reserve personnel guarding government installations. In fiscal year 2008, through December 2007, DOD's total reported obligations of about $34.8 billion are about one quarter of the total amount of obligations it reported for all of fiscal year 2007. Reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom continue to account for the largest portion of total reported GWOT obligations by operation--about $28.1 billion. In contrast, reported obligations associated with Operation Enduring Freedom total about $6.6 billion, and reported obligations associated with Operation Noble Eagle total about $49.6 million. The Army accounts for the largest portion of reported obligations for fiscal year 2008 through December 2007--about $27.2 billion, nearly 11 times higher than the almost $2.5 billion in obligations reported for the Air Force, the military service with the next greatest reported amount. Reported obligations for procurement account for about 27 percent of reported obligations, or about $9.4 billion. Of the $43.6 billion provided to DOD for procurement in fiscal year 2007, approximately 21 percent, or $9.1 billion, has yet to be obligated and remains available in fiscal year 2008. Mon, 17 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08568t.pdf Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. Congressional oversight is crucial to improve performance, ensure accountability, and protect U.S. programs from fraud, waste, and abuse. Since 2003, GAO has issued nearly 130 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. This testimony addresses (1) factors contributing to poor contracting outcomes and accountability, (2) long-standing issues in the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces, and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. GAO reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed officials from State, DOD, and other agencies; the United Nations (UN); and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq. U.S. efforts in Iraq have relied extensively on contractors to undertake reconstruction projects and provide support to U.S. forces. However, a lack of well-defined requirements, poor business arrangements, and inadequate oversight and accountability have negatively affected reconstruction and support efforts. For example, in a July 2007 report, GAO found that DOD completed negotiation for task orders on an oil contract more than 6 months after the work commenced and most costs were incurred. DOD paid nearly all of the $221 million in costs questioned by auditors. Also in July 2007, GAO found that unclear DOD guidance, inadequate staff, and insufficient technology resulted in poor accountability over more than 190,000 weapons provided to Iraqi forces. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation to determine what DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program. However, as of March 2008, DOD had not made a determination. The need to effectively manage and oversee contractors supporting deployed forces is equally important. DOD pays billions of dollars each year for contracted goods and services in locations such as Iraq and elsewhere. However, several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD's management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, including the failure to follow planning guidance, provide an adequate number of contract oversight personnel, systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and provide predeployment training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use and role of contractors. GAO's work has identified instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to negative financial and operational impacts. GAO has made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD's management and oversight of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those recommendations. However, GAO has found that DOD has made limited progress in implementing some key recommendations. The United States has made available nearly $6 billion to rebuild Iraq's energy sector and $300 million to develop its government ministries but lacks integrated strategic plans for both efforts. Building the capacity of the ministries is critical to ensure that Iraq can effectively govern, rebuild, and stabilize the country. Rebuilding Iraq's energy sector is necessary to ensure that Iraq can pay for these tasks and provide essential services to the Iraqi people. However, in the absence of a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan, U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi government have been hindered by multiple U.S. agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching direction. The creation of a plan for the energy sector is also essential for Iraq to meet energy production and export goals. GAO recommended that State work with Iraqi ministries to develop an integrated energy plan. State commented that the Iraqi government, not the U.S. government, should act on GAO's recommendations. Given the billions of dollars provided to rebuild Iraq's energy sector and the limited capacity of Iraqi ministries, GAO believes that its recommendations are still valid. Tue, 11 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08572t.pdf The federal government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), is increasingly relying on contractors to carry out its missions. Governmentwide spending on contractor services has more than doubled in the last 10 years. DOD has used contractors extensively to support troops deployed abroad. The department recently estimated the number of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to be about 196,000. DOD also relies heavily on contractors for various aspects of weapon system logistics support. While contractors, when properly used, can play an important role in helping agencies accomplish their missions, GAO has identified long-standing problems regarding the appropriate role and management of contractors, particularly at DOD. This testimony highlights the challenges federal agencies face related to the increased reliance on contractors and the specific challenges DOD has had in managing its increased reliance on contractors who support deployed troops and who provide logistics support for weapons systems. This testimony also highlights some of the recommendations GAO has made over the past several years to improve DOD's management and oversight of contractors, as well as DOD's actions in response to those recommendations. While there are benefits to using contractors to perform services for the government--such as increased flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs--GAO and others have raised concerns about the increasing reliance on contractors to perform agency missions. GAO's body of work shows that agencies face challenges with increased reliance on contractors to perform core agency missions, and these challenges are accentuated in contingency operations such as Iraq, in emergency situations such as Hurricane Katrina, or in cases where sufficient government personnel are not available. In making the decision to use contractors, agencies have experienced challenges such as: determining which functions and activities should be contracted out and which should not to ensure institutional capacity; developing a total workforce strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the appropriate mix of contractor and government personnel; identifying and distinguishing the roles and responsibilities of contractors and civilian and military personnel; and ensuring appropriate oversight, including addressing risks, ethics concerns, and surveillance needs. DOD's increased reliance on contractors to support forces deployed for military operations and to perform maintenance and other logistic support for weapon systems has highlighted challenges that DOD faces in managing this component of its total force. With regard to contractor support for deployed forces, DOD's primary challenges have been to provide effective management and oversight, including failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate number of contract oversight personnel, failure to systematically capture and distribute lessons learned, and a lack of comprehensive training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel. These challenges have led to negative operational and monetary impacts at deployed locations. For example, several military commanders GAO met with in 2006 said their pre-deployment training did not provide them with sufficient information on the extent of contractor support that they would be relying on in Iraq and were therefore surprised by the substantial number of personnel they had to allocate to provide on-base escorts, convoy security, and other force protection support to contractors. Although DOD has taken some steps to address these issues, many of these issues remain a concern and additional actions are needed. With respect to weapon system support, the challenges have been to resolve questions about how much depot maintenance and other logistics work needs to be performed in-house and to what extent outsourcing for DOD logistics has been cost-effective. While DOD has a process for defining core maintenance capability, GAO has identified shortcomings with this process and found that core maintenance capability has not always been developed. Finally, although increased contractor reliance for maintenance and other logistics activities was justified by DOD based on the assumption that there would be significant cost savings, it is uncertain to what extent cost savings have occurred or will occur. Tue, 11 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08497t.pdf U.S. military forces, and ground forces in particular, have operated at a high pace since the attacks of September 11, 2001, including to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001 and July 2007, approximately 931,000 U.S. Army and Marine Corps servicemembers deployed for overseas military operations, including about 312,000 National Guard or Reserve members. To support ongoing military operations and related activities, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars since 2001, and through September 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported obligating about $492.2 billion to cover these expenses, of which a large portion are related to readiness. In addition, DOD's annual appropriation, now totaling about $480 billion for fiscal year 2008, includes funds to cover readiness needs. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the readiness implications of DOD's efforts to support ongoing operations; and (2) GAO's prior recommendations related to these issues, including specific actions that GAO believes would enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. This statement is based on reports and testimonies published from fiscal years 2003 through 2008. GAO's work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. While DOD has overcome difficult challenges in maintaining a high pace of operations over the past 6 years and U.S. forces have gained considerable combat experience, our work has shown that extended operations in Iraq and elsewhere have had significant consequences for military readiness, particularly with regard to the Army and Marine Corps. To meet mission requirements specific to Iraq and Afghanistan, the department has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and equipment for deploying units, and to refocus their training on assigned missions. For example, to maintain force levels in theater, DOD has increased the length of deployments and frequency of mobilizations, but it is unclear whether these adjustments will affect recruiting and retention. The Army and Marine Corps have also transferred equipment from nondeploying units and prepositioned stocks to support deploying units, affecting the availability of items for nondeployed units to meet other demands. In addition, they have refocused training such that units train extensively for counterinsurgency missions, with little time available to train for a fuller range of missions. Finally, DOD has adopted strategies, such as relying more on Navy and Air Force personnel and contractors to perform some tasks formerly handled by Army or Marine Corps personnel. If current operations continue at the present level of intensity, DOD could face difficulty in balancing these commitments with the need to rebuild and maintain readiness. Over the past several years, GAO has reported on a range of issues related to military readiness and made numerous recommendations to enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. Given the change in the security environment since September 11, 2001, and demands on U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuilding readiness will be a long-term and complex effort. However, GAO believes DOD can take measures that will advance progress in both the short and long terms. A common theme is the need for DOD to take a more strategic decision-making approach to ensure programs and investments are based on plans with measurable goals, validated requirements, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. Overall, GAO recommended that DOD develop a near-term plan for improving the readiness of ground forces that, among other things, establishes specific goals for improving unit readiness, prioritizes actions needed to achieve those goals, and outlines an investment strategy to clearly link resource needs and funding requests. GAO also made recommendations in several specific readiness-related areas, including that DOD develop equipping strategies to target shortages of items required to equip units preparing for deployment, and DOD adjust its training strategies to include a plan to support full-spectrum training. DOD agreed with some recommendations, but has yet to fully implement them. For others, particularly when GAO recommended that DOD develop more robust plans linked to resources, DOD believed its current efforts were sufficient. GAO continues to believe such plans are needed. Thu, 14 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08257r.pdf At various stages throughout the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has withdrawn equipment from its stored, or prepositioned, stock sets around the world, as well as from its afloat stocks, thus depleting a large portion of its prepositioned stocks. The Army prepositions equipment at diverse strategic locations in order to field combat-ready forces in days rather than the weeks it would take if equipment had to be moved from the United States to the location of the conflict. The Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) program supports the National Military Strategy and is an important part of the Department of Defense's (DOD) overall strategic mobility framework. The APS program depends on prepositioned unit sets of equipment and sustainment stocks to enable troops to deploy rapidly and train with prepositioned equipment before beginning combat operations. As we testified in January 2007 and March 2006, however, sustained continuing operations have taken a toll on the condition and readiness of military equipment, and the Army faces a number of ongoing and long-term challenges that will affect both the timing and cost of equipment repair and replacement, particularly to its prepositioned stocks. Over the past several years, GAO and other audit agencies have reported on numerous long-standing problems facing DOD's and the Army's prepositioning programs, including a lack of centralized operational direction; unreliable reporting on the maintenance condition of equipment; equipment excesses at some prepositioned locations; and systemic problems with requirements determination and inventory management. In September 2005, we recommended that DOD develop a coordinated departmentwide plan and joint doctrine for the department's prepositioning programs. In February 2007, we reported that while the Army expected to finalize its implementation plan for prepositioning stocks by December 31, 2006, DOD would not complete its departmentwide strategy before mid-April 2007. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take steps to synchronize the Army's prepositioning strategy with the DOD-wide strategy, to ensure that future investments made for the Army's prepositioning program would align with the anticipated DOD-wide prepositioning strategy. In addition, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 required the department to establish a departmentwide prepositioning strategic policy by April 2007. Army officials stated that its worldwide APS equipment sets, including APS-3, would be reconstituted in synchronization with the Army's overall equipping priorities when properly funded and in accordance with the official Army worldwide APS reconstitution strategy known as Army Prepositioned Strategy 2015 (APS Strategy 2015). According to DOD officials, the Army's equipping priorities will be based on evolving conditions and operations such as the availability of equipment and duration of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example. As of December 2007, the Army had not established its overall equipping priorities. Additionally, the Army's APS reconstitution strategy is not correlated with a DOD-wide APS strategy, because, according to DOD officials, a DOD-wide prepositioning strategy does not exist. DOD officials explained that the services are responsible for equipping strategies and that the Joint Staff, consistent with current policy, conducts assessments of the services' prepositioned programs to determine their relationship within the DOD-wide strategic context. DOD officials do not believe additional synchronization of strategies is required. According to DOD, the War Reserve Materiel Policy provides ample policy guidance on war reserve materiel requirements and war reserve materiel positioning while the allocation process is outlined in the Joint Strategic Capability Plan. DOD officials believe publication of the War Reserve Materiel Policy and Joint Strategic Capability Plan satisfies the congressionally mandated requirement contained in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Nonetheless, as we recommended in our September 2005 and February 2007 reports, a DOD-wide strategy would set direction and a shared foundation for the services' prepositioning programs. Synchronizing a DOD-wide strategy with the Army's prepositioning strategy would ensure that future investments made for the Army's prepositioning program would align with the anticipated DOD-wide strategy. Without a DOD-wide prepositioning strategy, DOD risks inconsistencies between the Army's and the other services' prepositioning strategies, which may result in duplication of efforts and resources. We continue to believe a DOD-wide strategy is needed in addition to broad strategic guidance. Fri, 08 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08276.pdf Traumatic brain injury (TBI) has emerged as a leading injury among servicemembers serving in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) combat theaters. The widespread use of improvised explosive devices, such as roadside bombs, in these combat theaters increases the likelihood that servicemembers will be exposed to incidents that can cause a TBI. TBIs can vary from mild to severe, and in general, mild TBI can be difficult to identify. Because mild TBI can have lasting effects if not identified and treated, concerns have been raised about how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) identifies and treats OEF/OIF veterans with a mild TBI. In this report GAO describes VA's (1) efforts to screen OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI, (2) steps taken so that those OEF/OIF veterans at risk for mild TBI are evaluated and treated, and (3) challenges in screening and evaluating OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI. GAO reviewed VA's policies, interviewed VA officials and TBI experts, and reviewed nine VA medical facilities' efforts to implement TBI screening and evaluation processes. To screen OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI, VA implemented in its medical facilities in April 2007 a computer-based screening tool to identify OEF/OIF veterans who may have a mild TBI. VA's tool consists of questions that VA must ask all OEF/OIF veterans when they come to a VA medical facility for care. VA issued a policy requiring its medical facilities to use the tool to screen all OEF/OIF veterans who present for care in any clinic in the facility, including primary care and specialty care clinics. The policy has guidance on what types of providers may administer the tool and directs providers that a positive screening result requires a further evaluation by a specialist to determine if the veteran has mild TBI. VA's screening efforts depend on its TBI screening tool and VA recognizes the importance of determining the tool's clinical validity and reliability--that is, how effectively the tool identifies those who are and are not at risk for mild TBI and if the tool would yield consistent results if administered to the same veteran more than once. However, VA is planning to but has not yet begun to determine the tool's validity and reliability. VA's screening tool was based largely on a tool developed and validated by the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center (DVBIC)--a medical and educational collaboration among DOD, VA, and two civilian partners--used at selected military bases to screen returning OEF/OIF servicemembers for TBI. However, because VA's tool is a modified version of DVBIC's tool and is used to screen a slightly different population, the results of the validity study of DVBIC's tool are not directly applicable to VA's tool. To help ensure that OEF/OIF veterans identified as at risk for a mild TBI by VA's screening tool are evaluated and treated, VA developed a national protocol for their evaluation and treatment. According to VA's protocol, veterans with a positive screening result should be offered a follow-up evaluation by a specialist to determine if they have a mild TBI. The follow-up evaluation should include a history of the veteran's injury, a physical examination targeted to the veteran's symptoms, and the use of a checklist to assess the presence and severity of symptoms associated with mild TBI. VA has established training for its providers to enhance use of the protocol and help ensure veterans are evaluated and treated for mild TBI. Providers at some VA medical facilities we visited had difficulties fully following the protocol. However, the facilities had taken steps to resolve the difficulties, and VA has put in place measures to help providers follow the protocol. VA faces clinical and cultural challenges in its efforts to screen and evaluate mild TBI in OEF/OIF veterans. Clinical challenges include the lack of existing objective diagnostic tests that can definitively identify mild TBI. Also, many symptoms of mild TBI are similar to those associated with other conditions, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, making a diagnosis of mild TBI harder to reach. Some characteristics of the OEF/OIF veteran population present cultural challenges in that they may affect veterans' willingness to seek care for TBI symptoms. For example, some may believe that being labeled with a TBI could affect their ability to stay in the National Guard or Reserves. Fri, 08 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08423r.pdf Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental and annual appropriations for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD's reported annual obligations for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year 2007, Congress provided DOD with about $161.8 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations3 for GWOT. To continue its GWOT operations, DOD has requested $189. billion in appropriations for fiscal year 2008. As of December 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $86.8 billion for GWOT in fiscal year 2008, including $16.8 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. DOD has reported obligations of about $23.8 billion for GWOT for fiscal year 2008 through November 2007. The United States' commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. The monthly cost reports are typically compiled in the 45 days after the end of the reporting month in which the obligations are incurred. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through September 2007. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through fiscal year 2007 and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2007 reported obligations for GWOT by military service and appropriation account. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $542.9 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $492.2 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal years 2001 through 2007. The $50.7 billion difference between DOD's GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated, and obligations for classified activities, which are not included in DOD's reported obligations. DOD's total reported obligations related to GWOT have demonstrated a steady annual increase each fiscal year through 2007. DOD's reported obligations of about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007 were approximately 1.4 times higher than reported GWOT obligations of about $98.4 billion for fiscal year 2006. The higher reported obligations in fiscal year 2007 are largely due to costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, in part due to the surge strategy announced in January 2007, which provided for the deployment of additional troops. DOD's reported obligations through fiscal year 2007 include about $378.1 billion for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and about $86.2 billion for operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It also includes about $27.9 billion for operations in defense of the homeland as part of Operation Noble Eagle. Reported obligations associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom continue to be far higher than those for other GWOT operations in fiscal year 2007. From fiscal years 2003 through 2007, DOD's reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom consistently increased each fiscal year. In contrast, DOD's reported obligations for Operation Noble Eagle have consistently decreased since fiscal year 2003, while those for Operation Enduring Freedom have remained within a range of $10.3 billion to $20.1 billion each fiscal year. DOD's reported obligations for fiscal year 2007 totaled $139.8 billion. The Army accounts for the largest proportion of reported obligations for fiscal year 2007--about $98.0 billion, nearly eight times higher than the almost $12.9 billion in obligations reported for the Air Force, the military service with the next greatest reported amount. Among appropriation accounts, operation and maintenance, which include items such as support for housing, food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation to move people, supplies, and equipment, accounts for the largest reported obligations--about $74.9 billion. Reported obligations for procurement account for about a quarter of total reported obligations or about $35.8 billion. Of the $43.6 billion provided to DOD for procurement in fiscal year 2007, approximately 34 percent or $14.3 billion, remained available for use in fiscal year 2008. Wed, 30 Jan 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08246t.pdf Longstanding problems in United Nations (UN) management underscore the pressing need to reform and modernize the United Nations in areas ranging from management, oversight, and accountability to operational activities in specific countries. The United States has strongly advocated the reform of UN management practices and has also been critical of the restrictions Burma's military regime has imposed on many international organizations in Burma over the past 3 years. This testimony, based on recent GAO reports, discusses (1) management reform efforts at the UN Secretariat since 2006; (2) oversight and accountability in selected UN organizations; and (3) UN and other international organizations' activities in Burma. GAO's report on UN management reform efforts notes that (1) progress has varied in the five areas GAO examined--ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (mandates)--and (2) various factors, such as disagreements among member states, have slowed the pace of progress. The UN ethics office has taken steps to improve organizational ethics, including implementing a whistleblower protection policy, but GAO identified issues that may limit the impact of the policy. The UN has taken steps to improve oversight, including establishing an Independent Audit Advisory Committee. However, UN funding arrangements continue to constrain the independence of the Secretariat's internal audit office and its ability to audit high-risk areas. The UN has taken steps to improve certain procurement practices, but has not implemented an independent bid protest system or approved a lead agency concept, which could improve procurement services. The UN has taken steps to improve certain management operations of the Secretariat, but has made little or no progress in others. Despite some limited initial actions, the UN's review of mandates has not advanced, due in part to a lack of support by many member states. Finally, the pace of UN management reforms has been slowed by member states' disagreements on reform efforts, lack of comprehensive implementation plans, administrative issues that complicate certain internal processes, and competing UN priorities. GAO's report on oversight and accountability of selected UN organizations notes that, although the six UN internal audit offices GAO reviewed have made progress in implementing international auditing standards, they have not fully implemented key components of the standards. None of these six organizations require their internal oversight staff to disclose their financial interests. However, GAO found that five of the six organizations have made efforts to increase accountability by establishing whistleblower protection policies and one was developing such a policy. GAO also reported that while the six UN evaluation offices GAO reviewed are working toward implementation of UN evaluation standards, they have not fully implemented them. Finally, GAO reported that the governing bodies responsible for oversight of the six organizations lack full access to internal audit reports. GAO's report on Burma notes that Burma's military regime has blocked or significantly impeded UN and other international organizations' efforts to address human rights concerns and to help people living in areas affected by ethnic conflict. The regime frustrated international organizations' efforts to monitor forced labor for years before signing an agreement in early 2007; restricted their efforts to assist populations living in conflict areas; and blocked their efforts to monitor prison conditions and conflict situations. The regime has, to a lesser degree, impeded UN food, development, and health programs. However, several UN and other international organization officials told GAO they are still able to achieve meaningful results in their efforts to mitigate some of Burma's humanitarian, health, and development problems. Thu, 24 Jan 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08436t.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) relies extensively on contractors to support deployed forces for services that range from food and housing services to intelligence analysis. Since 1997, GAO has reported on DOD's shortcomings in managing and overseeing its use of contractor support. Part of the difficulty attributed to these shortcomings is that no one person or entity that made the decision to send 129,000 contractors to Iraq. Rather, numerous DOD activities were involved, thus adding to the complexity of the problems which GAO identified in its past work on this topic. This testimony focuses on (1) the problems that DOD has faced in managing and overseeing its contractor support to deployed forces and (2) future challenges that DOD will need to address to improve its oversight and management of contractors at deployed locations. In addition, as you requested, we have developed several actions Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD to take. This testimony is based on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies on DOD's management and oversight of contractor support to deployed forces that focused primarily on U.S. efforts in Southwest Asia. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. DOD leadership needs to ensure implementation of and compliance with existing guidance to improve the department's oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces. While DOD issued a comprehensive guidance on contractor support to deployed forces in 2005, we found little evidence that DOD components were implementing this and other guidance. As a result, several long-standing problems have hindered DOD's management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, even in cases where DOD and its components have developed guidance related to these problems. These problems include failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate number of contract oversight and management personnel, failure to systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and lack of comprehensive training for contract oversight personnel and military commanders. Our previous work in this area has identified several instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to negative monetary and operational impacts. Based on our past work, several challenges will need to be addressed by DOD to improve the oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces in future operations and ensure warfighters are receiving the support they rely on in an effective and efficient manner. Those challenges include: (1) incorporating contractors as part of the total force, (2) determining the proper balance of contractors and military personnel in future contingencies and operations, (3) clarifying how DOD will work with other government agencies in future contingencies and operations, and (4) addressing the use and role of contractors into its plans to expand and transform the Army and the Marine Corps. Thu, 24 Jan 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08153.pdf The President's New Way Forward in Iraq identified Iraq's inability to spend its resources to rebuild infrastructure and deliver essential services as a critical economic challenge to Iraq's self-reliance. Further, Iraq's ability to spend its $10.1 billion capital projects budget in 2007 was one of the 18 benchmarks used to assess U.S. progress in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. This report (1) examines data the U.S. embassy used to determine the extent to which the government of Iraq spent its 2007 capital projects budget, (2) identifies factors affecting the Iraqi government's ability to spend these funds, and (3) describes U.S. government efforts to assist the Iraqi government in spending its capital projects funds. For this effort, GAO reviewed Iraqi government budget data and information on provincial spending collected by the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams. GAO also interviewed officials from the departments of the Treasury, Defense, State, and other agencies and organizations. U.S. and Iraq reports show widely disparate rates for Iraqi government spending on capital projects. Accordingly, GAO cannot determine the extent to which the Iraqi government is spending its 2007 capital projects budget. In its September 2007 Iraqi benchmark assessment, the administration reported that Iraq's central government ministries had spent 24 percent of their 2007 capital projects budget, as of July 15, 2007. However, this report is not consistent with Iraq's official expenditure reports, which show that the central ministries had spent only 4.4 percent of their investment budget as of August 2007. The discrepancies between the official and unofficial data highlight uncertainties about the sources and use of Iraq's expenditure data. The government of Iraq faces many challenges that limit its ability to spend its capital project budget. Violence and sectarian strife delay capital budget execution by increasing the time and cost needed to implement contracts. Recent refugee flows and the de-Ba'athification process have contributed to the exodus of skilled labor from Iraq. In addition, U.S. and foreign officials also noted that weaknesses in Iraqi procurement, budgeting, and accounting procedures impede completion of capital projects. For example, according to the State Department, Iraq's Contracting Committee requires about a dozen signatures to approve projects exceeding $10 million, which slows the process. U.S. agencies have undertaken a variety of programs to help Iraq execute its capital projects budget, although it is not clear what impact these efforts have had to date. U.S. agencies supported new efforts in 2007 targeting Iraq's ability to spend capital budget funds, including an office to provide procurement assistance to ministries and provinces and a new position in the U.S. Embassy to coordinate with senior Iraqi government officials on budget execution and oversee related U.S. assistance efforts. In addition, improving Iraqi government budget execution is part of a broader U.S. assistance effort to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has trained 500 ministry officials in procurement or budget execution. USAID also led an effort to implement an automated financial management information system for the Iraqi government, although this program was suspended in June 2007 following the kidnapping of five contractors involved in the project. In addition, U.S. advisors work directly with key Iraqi ministries to assist with budget execution and procurement, among other responsibilities. Tue, 15 Jan 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08365r.pdf At an October 30, 2007, hearing before the subcommittee on U.S. efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq, several members requested additional information on international donors' pledges to reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq. This correspondence provides updated information on the amounts of loans and grants pledged by each donor country, as well as the status of those pledges. As of October 2007, international donors have pledged about $16.4 billion in support of Iraq's reconstruction since 2003. Of this amount, about $10.8 billion--or about 66 percent--is in the form of loans. The Iraqi government has entered into agreements to use nearly $2.2 billion of the pledged loans, as of October 2007. Donors also have pledged $5.6 billion in grants, to be provided multilaterally or bilaterally. Donors have provided about $4.8 billion of this amount as of October 2007. Tue, 18 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08143r.pdf Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which operates under Multi-National Forces-Iraq, leads the Coalition effort to train, equip, and organize the ISF. Previously, once Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units were trained and equipped, operational responsibility for their employment was turned over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As of June 2007, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command has assumed operational control of 8 of the 10 extant Iraqi Army divisions, and the Ministry of Interior has assumed operational control of the National Police. Overall, the number of Iraqi military and police personnel the Coalition has trained and equipped increased from over 171,000 in July 2005 to about 359,600 in September 2007. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense forces consist of the Joint Headquarters; the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, which commands the Army and the Iraqi Special Operations Forces; the Air Force; and the Navy (including Marines). The Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and other, smaller forces. According to the September 2007 Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress, as of September 3, 2007, the Coalition has trained approximately 165,400 Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) personnel and 194,200 Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel, although there is currently no reliable data concerning how many of these personnel are still serving with the MOI. Moreover, in 2006 the Iraqi Prime Minister, with Coalition support, decided to expand the size of Iraq's security forces by possibly as much as 62,500 by the end of 2007. This expansion includes an increase in the size of extant Iraqi Army units that will bring them to 120 percent of authorized strength, an initiative to expand the overall size of the Iraqi Army from 10 to 13 divisions, and an initiative to increase the number of Iraqi police. The MOD and MOI face significant challenges in developing their logistic, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. Two factors, in particular, have thwarted their development--the persistence of high levels of violence and sectarianism and a lack of ministerial capacity. As a result, the ability of both ministries to maintain and sustain their forces, provide effective command and control of their forces, and provide their forces with intelligence is undermined and cannot be accomplished without Coalition support. Furthermore, since these support capabilities have yet to be fully developed, DOD claims that ISF units are either "independent" or "fully independent" are confusing and misleading. Although we are not discounting DOD reports that there are some ISF units that are more capable than others from an operational standpoint, we do not find sufficient evidence for an assessment of "independent" or "fully independent" for any ISF unit. Moreover, without clarity regarding the criteria according to which ISF units are assessed as independent, especially with regard to their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities, Congress cannot have clear visibility over DOD's role in assisting the ISF in becoming independent of Coalition support. Fri, 30 Nov 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0868.pdf Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress has provided about $542.9 billion, as of May 2007, to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Prior GAO reports have found DOD's reported GWOT obligation data unreliable and problems with transparency over certain costs. DOD made changes to its reporting procedures, requiring components to perform a monthly variance analysis on obligation data and to include affirmation statements attesting to the accuracy of cost data. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO assessed (1) the outlook of DOD's reported GWOT obligations for fiscal year 2007 and funding requests for fiscal year 2008, (2) the effect of changes in DOD's GWOT funding guidance, and (3) DOD's progress in implementing variance analysis and affirmation statements. For this engagement, GAO analyzed fiscal year 2007 GWOTrelated appropriations and reported obligations, as well as DOD's corrective actions. Through June 2007, DOD's reported obligations for fiscal year 2007 of $95.4 billion were almost equal to its total reported GWOT obligations for fiscal year 2006. After GWOT obligations are reported for the remaining 3 months of fiscal year 2007, which are now averaging $10.6 billion a month, total obligations will significantly exceed those for fiscal year 2006. Further, changes to the President's fiscal year 2008 GWOT request for DOD have been submitted to fund operational requirements that were not included in the original request. These include decisions in January 2007 to increase or "surge" troop levels in Iraq, and in September 2007 to begin to withdraw these troops during fiscal year 2008. These amendments, totaling nearly $47.6 billion, bring the total fiscal year 2008 GWOT funding request for DOD to about $189.3 billion. Changes in DOD's GWOT funding guidance have resulted in billions of dollars being added to GWOT funding requests for what DOD calls the "longer war against terror," making it difficult to distinguish between incremental costs to support specific contingency operations and base costs. Although emergency funding has historically been used to support unexpected costs of contingency operations, in October 2006, DOD revised guidance to allow for additional costs. As a result, the fiscal year 2007 and 2008 requests included funding for items generally requested in DOD's base budget, such as future weapon systems, transformation, and increases to military end strength. GAO believes similarities, in some cases, between DOD's GWOT and base funding requests, along with the duration of GWOT operations, indicate DOD has reached the point where it should build more funding into its base budget. Without clearly defining the "longer war against terror" and increasing the transparency between incremental and base costs, decision makers cannot assess priorities and potential trade-offs. If the administration believes the nation is engaged in a long-term conflict, the implications should be considered during annual budget deliberations. Continuing to fund GWOT through emergency requests reduces transparency and avoids the necessary reexamination of commitments, investment priorities, and trade-offs. DOD has achieved some positive results and GWOT cost reporting continues to evolve. More action is needed to optimize the tools intended to improve GWOT cost reporting. DOD has begun to improve transparency by requiring components to analyze variances in reported obligations and to disclose reasons for significant changes. GAO found that required explanations, in some instances, were not disclosed due to inadequate management oversight, and other types of analysis could help identify obligations omitted from reports, such as about $1.5 billion in Marine Corps obligations. Also, in some cases, components did not provide required affirmation statements to attest to accuracy nor were they required to disclose the basis for statements or note the outcome of variance analyses. Without more complete information and a more robust methodology, DOD does not yet have the data needed to assess reliability or to be confident adequate steps are taken to validate cost data. Tue, 06 Nov 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0839.pdf In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination, planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. GAO was asked to report on State's efforts to improve (1) interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private research centers. The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating the framework's use. However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies' roles and responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners. However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC) comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to international crises and has worked with several agencies to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to State's difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of training available to SRC volunteers, other agencies' inability to secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004, State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers, civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers' compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and management would require congressional action. Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas. Tue, 06 Nov 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08231t.pdf Since 2003, the Congress has obligated nearly $400 billion for U.S. efforts in Iraq, of which about $40 billion has supported reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Congressional oversight of this substantial investment is crucial as the Administration requests additional military and economic funds for Iraq. This testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and proposes three areas for which continued oversight is needed: (1) progress in improving security and national reconciliation, (2) efforts to develop clear U.S. strategies, and (3) Iraqi and international contributions to economic development. We reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed agency officials, including the departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; and the U.S. Agency for International Development; the UN; and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq as part of this work. Since GAO last reported in September 2007, on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial elections. In addition, sectarian influences within Iraqi ministries continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and performance measures. The U.S. strategy for victory in Iraq partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy and does not fully address how the United States would integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministry capability lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqi government's lack of integrated strategic planning in its critical energy sector. The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqis and international community would help finance Iraq's reconstruction. However, the Iraqi government has limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds. For example, Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for capital projects and reconstruction in 2007. However, a large portion of this amount is unlikely to be spent, as ministries had spent only 24 percent of their capital budgets through mid-July 2007. Iraq has proposed spending only $4 billion for capital projects in 2008, a significant reduction from 2007. The international community has pledged $15.6 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but about $11 billion of this is in the form of loans. Tue, 30 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08155r.pdf GAO appeared before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services on September 18, 2007, to discuss the benefits and medical care for federal civilian and U.S. government contract employees deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. This report responds to Congress' request that GAO provide answers to questions for the record from the hearing. The questions are (1) What are the congressional requirements for medical tracking of deployed military servicemembers and civilians? and (2) What work has GAO conducted on this topic? Following GAO's May 1997 report, Congress enacted legislation3 that required the Secretary of Defense to establish a medical tracking system to assess the medical condition of servicemembers before and after deployments to locations outside of the United States. This legislation was amended by a provision in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. The current legislation amends elements of the system and the quality assurance program as well as adds criteria for referral for further evaluations and minimum mental health standards for deployment. Since the 1990s, GAO has highlighted shortcomings with respect to the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to assess the medical condition of servicemembers both before and after their deployments. Following GAO's May 1997 report, Congress enacted legislation that required the Secretary of Defense to establish a medical tracking system for assessing the medical condition of servicemembers before and after deployments. In September 2003, we reported that the Army and Air Force did not comply with DOD's force health protection and surveillance requirements for many servicemembers deploying in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Central Asia and Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo. Our report also raised concerns over a lack of DOD oversight of departmentwide efforts to comply with health surveillance requirements. In September 2004, we reported similar issues related to DOD's ability to effectively manage the health status of its reserve forces. In November 2004, we reported that overall compliance with DOD's force health protection and surveillance policies for servicemembers who deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom varied by service, by installation, and by policy requirement. In October 2005, we reported that evidence suggested that reserve component members have deployed into theater with preexisting medical conditions that could not be adequately addressed in theater, and that DOD had limited visibility over the health status of reserve component members after they are called to duty and is unable to determine the extent of care provided to those members deployed with preexisting medical conditions despite the existence of various sources of medical information. In February 2007, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness published a new instruction on force health protection quality assurance. This policy applies to military servicemembers, as well as applicable DOD and contractor personnel. The new policy requires the military services to implement procedures to monitor key force health protection elements such as pre- and post-deployment health assessments. In our June 2007 report on DOD's compliance with the legislative requirement to perform pre- and post-deployment medical examinations on servicemembers, DOD lacked a comprehensive oversight framework to help ensure effective implementation of its deployment health quality assurance program, which included specific reporting requirements and results-oriented performance measures to evaluate the services' adherence to deployment health requirements. Tue, 16 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08124t.pdf The development of competent and loyal government ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The ministries are Iraq's largest employer, with an estimated 2.2 million government workers. U.S. efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi ministries include programs to advise and help Iraqi government employees develop the skills to plan programs, execute budgets, and effectively deliver services. The administration received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 to fund U.S. capacity-building efforts and requested an additional $255 million for fiscal year 2008. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop ministry capacity, (2) the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an overall integrated strategy. This statement is based on GAO-08-117. To accomplish our report objectives, we reviewed reports from and interviewed officials of U.S. agencies, the Iraqi government, the United Nations, and the World Bank. We conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; New York City; Baghdad, Iraq; and Amman, Jordan. Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading efforts without overarching direction from a lead agency or a strategic plan that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating conditions in Iraq. As of May 2007, six U.S. agencies were implementing about 53 projects at individual ministries and other national Iraqi agencies. Although the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have improved the coordination of their capacity-building efforts, there is no lead agency or strategic plan to provide overarching guidance. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key challenges that pose risks to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi government institutions have significant shortages of personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to provide security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. Second, Iraq's government confronts significant challenges in staffing a nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia infiltration of key ministries. Third, widespread corruption undermines efforts to develop the government's capacity by robbing it of needed resources, some of which are used to fund the insurgency. Finally, violence in Iraq hinders U.S. advisors' access to Iraqi minstries, increases absenteeism among minstry employees, and contributes to the growing number of professional Iraqis leaving the country. The U.S. government is beginning to develop an overall strategy for ministerial capacity development, although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's work in this area shows that an overall strategy for capacity development should include (1) a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) a delineation of U.S. roles and responsibilities and coordination with other donors including the United Nations; (3) goals and objectives linked to Iraqi priorities; (4) performance measures and milestones; and (5) costs, resources needed, and assessment of program risks. U.S. ministry capacity efforts have included some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures, and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state. State and USAID noted concerns over our recommendation to condition further appropriations and cited the appointment of an ambassador to supervise civilian capacity development programs. GAO does not recommend stopping U.S. investment in capacity development. The $140 million in fiscal year 2007 funds remains available to continue efforts while developing an integrated strategy. In addition, the U.S. ambassador arrived in Iraq in July 2007 underscoring our point that U.S. efforts lacked overall leadership and highlighting the need for an overall integrated strategy. Thu, 04 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08117.pdf Iraq's ministries were decimated following years of neglect and centralized control under the former regime. Developing competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The President received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 funds and requested an additional $255 million in fiscal year 2008 to develop the capacity of the Iraq's ministries. This report assesses (1) the nature and extent of U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, (2) the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an overall integrated strategy for these efforts. For this effort, GAO reviewed U.S. project contracts and reports and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad and Washington, D.C. Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts, without overarching direction from a lead entity that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating security and the reorganization of the U.S. mission in Iraq. First, no single agency is in charge of leading the U.S. ministry capacity development efforts, although State took steps to improve coordination in early 2007. State, DOD and USAID have led separate efforts at Iraqi ministries. About $169 million in funds were allocated in 2005 and 2006 for these efforts. As of mid-2007, State and USAID were providing 169 capacity development advisors to 10 key civilian ministries and DOD was providing 215 to the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Second, the focus of U.S. capacity development efforts has shifted from long-term institution-building projects, such as helping the Iraqi government develop its own capacity development strategy, to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital budgets and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. U.S. ministry capacity efforts face four key challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi ministries lack personnel with key skills, such as budgeting and procurement. Second, sectarian influence over ministry leadership and staff complicates efforts to build a professional and non-aligned civil service. Third, pervasive corruption in the Iraqi ministries impedes the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Fourth, poor security limits U.S. advisors' access to their Iraqi counterparts, preventing ministry staff from attending planned training sessions and contributing to the exodus of skilled professionals to other countries. The U.S. government is beginning to develop an integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts in Iraq, although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's previous analyses of U.S. multiagency national strategies demonstrate that such a strategy should integrate the efforts of the involved agencies with the priorities of the Iraqi government, and include a clear purpose and scope; a delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination with other donors, including the United Nations; desired goals and objectives; performance measures; and a description of benefits and costs. Moreover, it should attempt to address and mitigate the risks associated with the four challenges identified above. U.S. ministry capacity efforts to date have included some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures to determine results at civilian ministries, and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state. Mon, 01 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071048r.pdf In January 2007, the President stated that the high levels of violence in Iraq had overwhelmed the political gains that the Iraqis had made and required a new U.S. strategy for stabilizing the country. The new strategy recognized that until the Iraqi people have a basic measure of security, they would not be able to make significant and sustainable political and economic progress. To help Iraqi leaders provide security for their population, the United States deployed about 30,000 additional troops to Iraq during the spring of 2007, bringing the total number of U.S. military personnel up to about 160,000 as of mid-June 2007. Enemy-initiated attacks data are a key indicator of progress in improving Iraq's security situation, an important condition that, according to the administration, must be met before the United States can reduce its military presence in Iraq. While attacks data alone may not provide a complete picture of Iraq's security situation, Department of Defense (DOD) and Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) officials state that the data provide a reasonably sound depiction of general security trends in the country. Since 2004, we have periodically provided this information to Congress in classified and unclassified briefings, reports, and testimonies. In response to GAO's requests, various DOD components--most recently the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)--have assisted GAO in publicly reporting trends in the security situation by declassifying the attacks data on a monthly basis. In our report on the status of the achievement of Iraqi benchmarks, we provided attacks data through July 31, 2007.2 This report provides data through August 31, 2007. Overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, since May 2003, as evidenced by the increased numbers of attacks and the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian strife that followed the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners increased through October 2006 and have remained at high levels since that time. These attacks have increased around major religious and political events, including Ramadan3 and elections. Coalition forces are still the primary target of attacks, but the number of attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians also has increased since 2003. Fri, 28 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07814.pdf Congress has appropriated billions of dollars for equipment repair, replacement, and recapitalization, collectively known as equipment reset. Because of the potential for equipment reset costs to affect the Department of Defense's (DOD) future budget requirements and related readiness concerns, GAO initiated this review under the Comptroller General's authority. GAO's objectives were to determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps (1) track and report equipment reset expenditures in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose and (2) can be assured that their reset strategies will sustain equipment availability while meeting ongoing operational requirements. GAO reviewed equipment reset policies and analyzed related budget data. Although the Army and Marine Corps track and report equipment reset expenditures in the operation and maintenance accounts in detail, they do not report detailed equipment reset expenditures within the procurement accounts in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose because the DOD Financial Management Regulation does not require them to specifically report procurement expenditures for reset in detail. As directed by the Conference Report accompanying DOD's appropriations act for 2007, the Army and Marine Corps report detailed reset obligations and expenditures in their operation and maintenance accounts. While the Army and Marine Corps track reset expenditures and obligations in detail within the procurement accounts, they do not report those expenditures at the same level of detail as with the operation and maintenance accounts because they are not legally required do so. Neither the Army's nor the Marine Corps' monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports identify the types of equipment at the subactivity group level, such as aircraft or vehicles. Until the Army and Marine Corps are required to report the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated for reset in the procurement accounts at a more detailed level, Congress will not have the visibility it needs to exercise effective oversight and to determine if the amount of funding appropriated for equipment reset has been most appropriately used for the purposes intended. The Army and Marine Corps cannot be assured that their reset strategies will sustain equipment availability for deployed units as well as units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan while meeting ongoing operational requirements because neither the Army's nor the Marine Corps' reset implementation strategies target shortages of equipment on hand and prioritize equipment needs of units preparing for deployment over longer-term modernization goals. While the Army's Force Generation implementation strategy and reset implementation guidance state that the goal of reset is to prepare units for deployment and to improve next-to-deploy units' equipment-on-hand levels, the Army's reset strategy is based on resetting equipment that it expects will be returning to the United States in a given fiscal year and not on targeting shortages of equipment for units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the Marine Corps' reset goal is to ensure that the Corps is equipped to perform both ongoing operations and future missions; however, over 80 percent of its reset budget is for procurement of equipment that will not be available for many months. Units can continue to report significant shortages during their training cycles that affect their ability to train. Thus, the services may be sacrificing short-term equipment needs for longer-term modernization goals. Until the services' reset strategies target shortages of equipment needed to equip units preparing for deployment and give priority to those units over longer-term needs, the Army and Marine Corps will be unable to minimize operational risk by ensuring the needs of deploying units can be met. Wed, 19 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071235t.pdf As the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded its involvement in overseas military operations, it has grown increasingly reliant on its federal civilian workforce to support contingency operations. GAO was asked to discuss DOD's (1) force health protection and surveillance policies, (2) medical treatment policies that cover federal civilians while they are deployed to support contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and (3) differences in special pays and benefits provided to DOD's deployed federal civilian and military personnel. For this statement, GAO primarily drew on its September 2006 report that addressed these objectives. For its report, GAO analyzed over 3,400 deployment-related records at eight component locations for deployed federal civilians and policies related to defense health care, reviewed claims filed under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA); and examined major provisions of special pays and disability and death benefits provided to DOD's deployed federal civilians and military personnel. In 2006, GAO reported that DOD had established force health protection and surveillance policies to assess and reduce or prevent health risks for its deployed federal civilians, but it lacked procedures to ensure implementation. GAO's review of over 3,400 deployment records found that components lacked documentation that some federal civilians who deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq had received, among other things, required pre- and post-deployment health assessments and immunizations. Also, DOD lacked centralized data to readily identify its deployed civilians and their movement in theater, thus hindering its efforts to assess the overall effectiveness of its force health protection and surveillance capabilities. GAO noted that until DOD establishes a mechanism to strengthen its oversight of this area, it would not be effectively positioned to ensure compliance with its policies, or the health care of deployed federal civilians. GAO also reported that DOD had established medical treatment policies for its deployed federal civilians, which provide those who require treatment for injuries or diseases sustained during overseas hostilities with care under the DOD military health system. GAO reviewed a sample of seven workers' compensation claims (out of a universe of 83) filed under FECA by DOD federal civilians who deployed to Iraq. GAO found in three cases where care was initiated in theater that the affected civilians had received treatment in accordance with DOD's policies. In all seven cases, DOD civilians who requested care after returning to the United States had, in accordance with DOD's policies, received medical examinations and/or treatment for their deployment-related injuries or diseases. GAO reported that DOD provides certain special pays and benefits to its deployed federal civilians, which generally differ in type and/or amount from those provided to deployed military personnel. For example, in cases where injuries are sustained while deployed, both DOD federal civilian and military personnel are eligible to receive government-provided disability benefits; however, the type and amount of the benefits vary, and some are unique to each group. Importantly, continuing challenges with modernizing federal disability programs have been the basis for GAO's designation of this as a high-risk area since 2003. In addition, while the survivors of deceased DOD federal civilian and military personnel generally receive similar types of cash survivor benefits for Social Security, burial expenses, and death gratuity, the comparative amounts of these benefits differ. However, survivors of DOD federal civilians almost always receive lower noncash benefits than military personnel. GAO does not take a position on the adequacy or appropriateness of the special pays and benefits provided to DOD federal civilian and military personnel. Any deliberations on this topic should include an examination of how such changes would affect ensuring adequate and appropriate benefits for those who serve their country, as well as the long-term fiscal well-being of the nation. Tue, 18 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071230t.pdf This testimony is intended to discuss our report on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act requires GAO to report on the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a "partially met" rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and promote economic well-being. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States. Fri, 07 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071221t.pdf This testimony is intended to discuss our report on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act requires GAO to report on the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a "partially met" rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and promote economic well-being. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States. Wed, 05 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071222t.pdf This testimony is intended to discuss our report on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act requires GAO to report on the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a "partially met" rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and promote economic well-being. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States. Wed, 05 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071195.pdf Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report in July and September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met. To complete our work, we reviewed government documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003. The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our analysis of the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows that as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces. The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government also partially met one other benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitution. Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or militia disarmament. The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these benchmarks but provided little information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of independent operations, or ensured that political authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure the perpetrator's intent and other measures of population security show differing trends. Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark of allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary data indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had been spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration reporting to assist the Congress would be enhanced with adoption of the recommendations we make in this report. Tue, 04 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071220t.pdf This testimony is intended to discuss our report on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act requires GAO to report on the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a "partially met" rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and promote economic well-being. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States. Tue, 04 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07839.pdf The Department of Defense's (DOD) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) awarded the $2.5 billion Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO I) contract to Kellogg Brown & Root in March 2003 in an effort to reestablish Iraq's oil infrastructure. The contract was also used to ensure adequate fuel supplies inside Iraq. RIO I was a cost-plus-award-fee type contract that provided for payment of the contractor's costs, a fixed fee determined at inception of the contract, and a potential award fee. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) reviewed the 10 RIO I task orders and questioned $221 million in contractor costs. We were asked to determine (1) how DOD addressed DCAA's RIO I audit findings and what factors contributed to DOD's decision and (2) the extent to which DOD paid award fees for RIO I and followed the planned process for making that decision. To accomplish this, we reviewed DOD and DCAA documents related to RIO I and interviewed Corps, DCAA, and other officials. DOD considered DCAA's audit findings on the RIO I contract and performed additional analysis before deciding to pay the contractor nearly all of the $221 million in costs that DCAA questioned. DOD did, however, remove about $112 million of the questioned costs from the amount used to establish the contractor's fee pool, which resulted in an effective lowering of the fee received by the contractor by approximately $5.8 million. Lack of timely negotiations contributed significantly to DOD's decision on how to address the questioned costs--all 10 task orders were negotiated more than 180 days after the work commenced. As a result, the contractor had incurred almost all its costs at the time of negotiations, which influenced DOD's decision to pay nearly all of the questioned costs. The negotiation delays were in part caused by changing requirements, funding challenges, and inadequate contractor proposals. In our previous work, we have found that negotiation delays can increase risk to the government. Overall, DCAA considers $26 million of the costs questioned on the RIO I contract to be sustained, which DCAA defines as cost reductions attributable to its audit findings. We compared the sustention rates on DCAA's 11 RIO I contract audits to the sustention rates for 100 DCAA audits of other Iraq contract actions, and found that the sustention rates varied widely for both groups. DOD's Army Corps of Engineers paid $57 million in award fees on the RIO I contract, or 52 percent of the maximum possible, and on individual task orders the fee awarded ranged from 4 to 72 percent of the fee available. While the award fee plan required regular award fee boards during the life of the contract, DOD did not conduct a formal board until nearly all work on the contract was complete. As a result, DOD was not able to provide the contractor with formal award fee feedback while work was ongoing, which federal regulations state should be done in order to motivate a contractor to either improve poor performance or continue good performance. DOD officials told us the workload of RIO staff members and logistical difficulties stemming from the challenging conditions in Iraq hindered efforts to hold evaluation boards during the period of performance. DOD also was unable to give us enough documentation for a full assessment of its compliance with other parts of its plan--it did not, for example, provide the scores the award fee board assigned to the contractor on the individual award fee criteria, so we could not see if the award fee board had followed contract criteria and weighting in evaluating performance. We compared the percentage of award fees earned on the RIO I contract to the fees earned on a group of other selected Iraq reconstruction contracts and found that the percentage of award fees earned on RIO I fell within the lower range of fees earned on the other contracts. Tue, 31 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07711.pdf Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I. As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces. DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents. However, GAO's review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel to maintain the system. Tue, 31 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071056r.pdf Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental and annual appropriations for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD's reported annual costs for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $98.4 billion in fiscal year 2006. In fiscal year 2007, Congress provided DOD with about $161.8 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations for GWOT. To continue its GWOT operations, DOD has requested $141.7 billion in appropriations for fiscal year 2008. The United States' commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. Future cost variables for other U.S. government agencies include the efforts to help form national and provincial governments and build management capacity as well as capable and loyal security forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Reconstruction activities to restore, sustain, and protect critical infrastructure will also impose costs. Also, healthcare costs will likely increase as more servicemembers require treatment from injuries and mental health conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. The monthly cost reports are typically compiled in the 45 days after the end of the reporting month in which the obligations are incurred. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through April 2007. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT to date and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2007 reported obligations for GWOT by military service and appropriation account. From fiscal year 2001 through July 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $542.9 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $429.1 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal years 2001 through 2006 and from the beginning of fiscal year 2007 through April 2007, the latest available data. The $113.8 billion difference between DOD's GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to certain fiscal year 2007 appropriations and multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated, and obligations for classified activities, which are not included in DOD's reported obligations. DOD's total reported obligations related to GWOT have demonstrated a steady annual increase each fiscal year through 2006. Through April 2007, DOD's total reported obligations are already more than three quarters of the total amount of obligations it reported for all of fiscal year 2006. In addition, DOD's reported investment obligations--which include procurement; research, development, test, and evaluation; and military construction, through April 2007--are approximately one and a half times higher than its reported obligations for investments during all of fiscal year 2006. As a result, total reported obligations for fiscal year 2007 may well exceed the amount reported for fiscal year 2006. DOD's reported obligations to date include about $324.9 billion for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and about $76.5 billion for operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It also includes about $27.7 billion for operations in defense of the homeland as part of Operation Noble Eagle. DOD's reported fiscal year 2007 obligations as of April 2007 total $76.6 billion. The Army accounts for the largest proportion of reported obligations--about $55.0 billion, nearly eight times higher than the almost $6.9 billion in obligations reported for the Marine Corps, the service with the next greatest reported amount. Among appropriation accounts, operation and maintenance, which include items such as support for housing, food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation to move people, supplies, and equipment, accounts for the largest reported obligations--about $38.9 billion. Obligations for investment, which include procurement; research, development, test, and evaluation; and military construction, account for more than a quarter of reported obligations or about $21.6 billion. In previous work, we reported that significant amounts of multiyear procurement funding provided in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental appropriation would likely not be obligated by DOD in fiscal year 2006 and would remain available for use in fiscal year 2007. A large amount of these multiyear funds has since been obligated. Thu, 26 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071107t.pdf Rebuilding Iraq's oil sector is crucial to rebuilding Iraq's economy. For example, oil export revenues account for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of government revenues. This testimony addresses (1) the U.S. goals for Iraq's oil sector and progress in achieving these goals, (2) key challenges the U.S. government faces in helping Iraq restore its oil sector, and (3) efforts to enact and implement hydrocarbon legislation. This statement is based on our May 2007 report and updated data, where appropriate. Despite 4 years of effort and $2.7 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, Iraqi oil output has consistently fallen below U.S. program goals. In addition, the State Department's data on Iraq's oil production may be overstated since data from the U.S. Department of Energy show lower production levels--between 100,000 and 300,000 barrels less per day. Inadequate metering, re-injection, corruption, theft, and sabotage account for the discrepancy, which amounts to about $1.8 to $5.5 billion per year. Comprehensive metering of Iraq's oil production has been a long-standing problem and continuing need. Poor security, corruption, and funding constraints continue to impede reconstruction of Iraq's oil sector. The deteriorating security environment places workers and infrastructure at risk while protection efforts have been insufficient. Widespread corruption and smuggling reduce oil revenues. Moreover, Iraq's needs are significant and future funding for the oil sector is uncertain as nearly 80 percent of U.S. funds for the oil sector have been spent. Iraq's contribution has been minimal with the government spending less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion it approved for oil reconstruction projects in 2006. Iraq has yet to enact and implement hydrocarbon legislation that defines the distribution of oil revenues and the rights of foreign investors. Until this legislation is enacted and implemented, it will be difficult for Iraq to attract the billions of dollars in foreign investment it needs to modernize the sector. As of July 13, 2007, Iraq's cabinet has approved only one of four separate but interrelated pieces of legislation--a framework that establishes the structure, management, and oversight. Another part is in draft and two others are not yet drafted. Poor security, corruption, and the lack of national unity will likely impede the implementation of this legislation. Wed, 18 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07807.pdf During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and the Marine Corps experienced problems with the delivery of supplies to the warfighter. Such problems highlight long-standing weaknesses in the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management. DOD has identified joint theater logistics as a key effort aimed at improving distribution and supply support. GAO was asked to examine DOD's efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics departmentwide encompasses sound management principles and (2) the progress DOD has made in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives. GAO reviewed DOD documents and interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, services, agencies, and geographic combatant commands. DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics across the department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components due largely to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance measures--key principles of sound management. Further complicating DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint theater logistics are the diffused organization of DOD's logistics operations, including separate funding and management of resources and systems, and changes in DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy. DOD is currently testing a new approach to managing joint capabilities and is considering a realignment of capabilities in its long-term logistics strategy, which could affect the future of joint theater logistics. Without a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing joint theater logistics, DOD lacks assurance that it is on the right path toward achieving this capability and that individual initiatives will collectively address gaps in logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will have difficulty achieving improvements in theater distribution and asset visibility associated with joint theater logistics. DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply support, but the department faces challenges that hinder its ability to realize the full benefits of these efforts. For example, while Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been established in each geographic combatant command to help manage supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders in Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult because of a lack of interoperability among information technology systems. Initiatives being developed to improve the coordination of surface transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges with issues of command and control, the availability of information technology tools, and potential duplication of responsibilities with other organizations. Unless DOD successfully addresses these and other challenges GAO identified, the initiatives are not likely to significantly improve the ability of a joint force commander to effectively and efficiently direct logistics functions, including distribution and supply support activities, across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some of the same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that have occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Fri, 29 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07759.pdf Active Protection Systems (APS) protect vehicles from attack by detecting and intercepting missiles or munitions. In 2005, the lead systems integrator for the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) program sought proposals for an APS developer and design and to deliver APS prototypes on vehicles by fiscal year 2009. Raytheon was chosen the APS developer. At the same time, the Department of Defense's Office of Force Transformation (OFT) evaluated near-term APS for potential use in Iraq. GAO was asked to review the Army's actions on APS/FCS: (1) the process for selecting the subcontractor to develop an APS for FCS and if potential conflicts of interest were avoided; (2) the timing of the trade study and if it followed a consistent methodology to evaluate alternatives, and the results; (3) the role the Army and Boeing played in selecting the developer; and (4) the process followed to provide a near-term APS solution for current forces. In selecting the APS developer, the Army and Boeing--the FCS lead systems integrator--followed the provisions of the FCS lead systems integrator contract, as well as the Federal Acquisition Regulation, in addressing organizational conflicts of interest. No officials from the offering companies participated in the evaluation and all offerors were evaluated based on the same criteria. Four proposals were evaluated and three were determined to be comparable in terms of cost and schedule. The winner--Raytheon--was chosen on technical merit, as being more likely to meet APS requirements although its design had less mature technology. The APS development contract required the source selection winner to perform a trade study to assess alternatives and select the best design for development, and the Raytheon design was chosen. The trade study applied a consistent methodology to all alternatives before selecting Raytheon's vertical launch design. While the role played by Raytheon in the trade study was in accordance with its contract, the rationale for having the trade study follow the source selection is not entirely clear. The purpose of the trade study was to select the best concept; yet the source selection process that preceded it had, in fact, chosen Raytheon primarily on the technical merits of its vertical launch design concept. Although the vertical launch technology is not mature, the Army estimated that it could be available for prototype delivery to current force vehicles in fiscal year 2009 and tested on a FCS vehicle in 2011. This may be an optimistic estimate, as the FCS vehicle is yet to be fully developed. The Army and Boeing were extensively involved in APS source selection and the trade study. FCS officials actively participated and concurred in the final selection of the APS developer. FCS officials and technical experts from Army research centers took part in the trade study and helped choose the vertical launch design. Boeing officials took part in various ways and, with the Army's concurrence, selected Raytheon as the APS developer, participated in the trade study, and recommended the vertical launch approach. In its pursuit of a different APS concept, OFT was responding to an urgent need statement issued by the Central Command with potential for near-term fielding. This evaluation centered on the results of physical testing of the most technically mature candidate system, the Trophy. Decisions on how to proceed with Trophy involved disagreement between OFT and the Army. While the Trophy tests were successful, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell decided to defer fielding the APS system, based in part on the recommendation of Army officials, who believed that testing had not been realistic and integrating it on the platform would delay fielding other useful capabilities. OFT officials proposed additional testing of Trophy to answer these questions, but funding for further OFT testing of this system was discontinued after the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell's decision. Fri, 08 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07911t.pdf In recent years, a number of reports and newspaper articles have cited concerns regarding the level of protection and the available amounts of body armor to protect deployed service members. As part of GAO's efforts to monitor the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the services' action to protect ground forces, GAO reviewed the Army and Marine Corps's actions to address these concerns. On April 26, 2007, GAO issued a report regarding the Army and the Marine Corps's individual body armor systems. Today's testimony summarizes the report's findings regarding the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps (1) have met the theater requirements for body armor, (2) have the controls in place to assure that the manufacturing and fielding of body armor meet requirements, and (3) have shared information regarding their efforts on body armor ballistic requirements and testing. The report also included additional information concerning whether contractors or non-DOD civilians obtain body armor in the same way as U.S. forces and DOD civilians given the number of contractors and non-DOD civilians in Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of operation. GAO did not make recommendations in the report. DOD officials did not provide written comments on the report but technical comments were incorporated as appropriate. Army and Marine Corps body armor currently meets theater ballistic requirements and the required amount needed for personnel in theater, including the amounts needed for the surge of troops into Iraq. The Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) consists of an outer tactical vest with ballistic inserts or plates that cover the front, back, and sides. The vest and inserts currently meet the theater ballistic requirements. The vest provides protection from 9mm rounds, while the inserts provide protection against 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds. CENTCOM requires that all U.S. military forces and all DOD civilians in the area of operations receive the body armor system. Currently, service members receive all service-specific standard components of the body armor system prior to deploying. The Army and the Marine Corps provide the DOD civilians with components of the armor system. The Army and Marine Corps have controls in place during manufacturing and after fielding to assure that body armor meets requirements. Both services conduct quality and ballistic testing prior to fielding, and lots (a grouping of items varying in number) are rejected if the standards are not met. They also conduct formal testing on every lot of body armor (vests and protective inserts) prior to acceptance and issuance to troops. During production, which is done at several sites, the lots of body armor are sent to a National Institute of Justice-certified laboratory for ballistic testing and to the Defense Contract Management Agency for quality testing (size, weight, stitching) prior to issuance to troops. Although not required to do so, after the systems have been used in the field, the Army does limited ballistic and environmental testing to determine future improvements. The Army and Marine Corps share information regarding ballistic requirements and testing although they are not required to do so. Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows each service to have separate programs, according to Army and Marine Corps officials. Nevertheless, the services are sharing information regarding ongoing research and development for the next generation of body armor. DOD Instruction 3020.41 allows DOD to provide body armor to contractors and non-DOD civilians where permitted by applicable DOD instructions and military department regulations and where specified under the terms of the contract. It is CENTCOM's position that body armor will be provided to contractors if it is part of the terms and conditions of the contract. However, the officials indicated that commanders, at their discretion, can provide body armor to any personnel within their area of operation. Wed, 06 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07906r.pdf As of April 2007, about 26,000 service members had been injured as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), according to the Department of Defense (DOD). Those service members injured in the line of duty are eligible for military disability compensation. When they leave the military, they may also be eligible for compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In fiscal year 2005 alone, the Army, Navy, and Air Force evaluated over 23,000 military disability retirement cases and, in fiscal year 2004, over $1 billion in permanent and temporary military disability retirement benefits were paid to over 90,000 service members. Through the VA disability compensation and pension claims programs, about $34.5 billion in VA cash disability benefits went to more than 3.5 million veterans and their survivors in fiscal year 2006. On April 23, 2007, we briefed the Commission on the results of our recent studies of DOD and VA disability systems. This report presents the information we provided during that briefing. In our 2006 report on the DOD military disability retirement system, we found the services were not achieving the DOD timeliness goals for processing disability cases and DOD was not monitoring achievement of these goals. Our analysis of Army data on military disability benefit decisions also suggests that outcomes for active duty and reserve component members of the military may not be consistent. More specifically, Army reservists judged unfit for duty were somewhat less likely to receive either permanent disability retirement or a lump sum disability payment than their active duty counterparts, although we were unable to take into account all factors that might have legitimately explained this difference. Despite the potential for inconsistent disability decisions within and across the services, neither DOD nor the services systematically evaluated the consistency of these decisions or compiled the data on the characteristics of service members needed to do so. Finally, we found that training for MEB and PEB disability evaluation staff designed to produce timely and consistent decisions was lacking. In recent years we have completed several reviews on various aspects of VA disability compensation that have led to a number of recommendations for improvements in the system. With regard to claims processing between fiscal years 2003 and 2006, the average number of days these claims were pending increased by 16 days, to an average of 127 days. At the same time, appeals resolution remained a lengthy process. In fiscal year 2006, it took an average of 657 days to resolve appeals. Moreover, the accuracy of VA compensation decisions was 88 percent in 2006, well short of its goal of 98 percent. Decisions affecting eligibility for military disability benefits and VA disability compensation have a significant impact on the future of service members dedicated to serving their country. Given the importance of these decisions and the complexity of evaluation processes and rules governing eligibility for these benefits, it is essential that DOD and VA take the necessary steps to ensure that decisions in these cases are accurate, consistent, and timely. Fri, 25 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07801sp.pdf Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion to help secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan. In February 2007, the administration requested $12.3 billion in additional funding to accelerate some of these efforts to prevent the conflict-ridden nation from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and from devolving into a narco-state. More than 50 nations, including the United States, and several multilateral organizations are engaged in securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has been made in areas such as economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan army and police, but after more than 5 years of U.S. and international efforts, the overall security situation in this poor and ethnically diverse country has not improved and, moreover, has deteriorated significantly in the last year. The lack of security limits the success of efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these efforts include a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, inadequate infrastructure, limited government capacity, corruption, a largely illiterate and untrained labor force, a dramatic increase in drug production, and a lack of viable licit economic opportunities. Since 2003, we have issued five reports on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan--one on food and agricultural assistance, two on reconstruction assistance, one on efforts to establish Afghan national security forces, and one on drug control programs. We identified programmatic improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles that limited success and should be taken into consideration in program design and implementation. A key improvement we identified in most of the U.S. efforts was the need for improved planning, including the development of strategic plans with elements such as measurable goals, specific time frames, cost estimates, and identification of external factors that could significantly affect efforts. Some additional needed improvements we identified include better coordination among the United States and other donor nations, more flexible options for program implementation, and timelier project implementation. We also concluded that several obstacles, especially deteriorating security and the limited institutional capacity of the Afghan government, challenge the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Responsiveness to our recommendations for programmatic improvements varied. Progress to date has been mixed in all areas we have reported on, including reform of Afghanistan's security sector. We reported that progress needs to be congruent in all five pillars of the security reform agenda established by the United States and several coalition partners. The United States has been involved to some degree with each of the five pillars and initially was charged with taking the lead in establishing the Afghan army, but has since allocated significant resources to reconstituting the police and countering the illicit drug trade. Although some army and police units have been trained and equipped, Defense reports that none are capable of independent operations, Afghanistan still has no formal national judicial system for the police to rely upon, opium poppy cultivation is at record levels, and the Afghan police often find themselves facing better armed drug traffickers and militias. In the absence of national security forces capable of independently providing security for the country, the International Security Assistance Force is helping to provide security for Afghanistan. Though reconstruction assistance helped Afghanistan elect its first president, return millions of children to school, and repatriate millions of refugees, Afghanistan continues to face reconstruction challenges, which are exacerbated by the security-related concerns. Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development officials have suggested that securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade and require continuing international assistance. Defense revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating security situation and to rapidly increase the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces to operate with less coalition support. These modified plans call for a total of $7.6 billion for the ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold increase compared with fiscal year 2006 and represents more than all of the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in fiscal years 2002 through 2006 combined. The costs of these and other efforts will require difficult trade-offs for decision makers as the United States faces competing demands for its resources, such as securing and stabilizing Iraq, in the years ahead. Thu, 24 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07699.pdf There are a number of ways that the U.S. government provides assistance to Iraqi or Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or suffer property damage as a result of U.S. and coalition forces' actions. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development funds projects to assist Iraqi and Afghan civilians and communities directly impacted by actions of U.S. or coalition forces. Also, the Department of State administers a program that makes payments, in accordance with local custom, to Iraqi civilians who are harmed in incidents involving U.S. protective security details. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) administers a program that provides compensation under the Foreign Claims Act to inhabitants of foreign countries for death, injury, or property damage caused by noncombat activities of U.S. military personnel overseas. Further, DOD provides monetary assistance in the form of solatia and condolence payments to Iraqi and Afghan nationals who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of U.S. or coalition forces' actions during combat. From fiscal years 2003 to 2006, DOD has reported about $1.9 million in solatia payments and more than $29 million in condolence payments to Iraqi and Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of U.S. or coalition forces' actions during combat. These payments are expressions of sympathy or remorse based on local culture and customs, but not an admission of legal liability or fault. Commanders make condolence payments using funds provided by Congress for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), whereas solatia payments are funded from unit operations and maintenance accounts. Pub. L. No. 108-106 (2003) requires DOD to provide quarterly reports on the source, allocation, and use of CERP funds. To administer the CERP, DOD has established 19 project categories for the use of funds, including categories for condolence payments and battle damage payments. At Congress's request, we reviewed DOD's solatia and condolence payment programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, we examined the following questions: (1) To what extent has DOD established guidance for making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan? (2) How are commanders making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan and what factors do commanders consider when determining whether to make payments or payment amounts? (3) To what extent does DOD collect and analyze solatia and condolence payment data? We also are providing information on the other aforementioned programs established by the U.S. government to provide assistance to Iraqi and Afghan civilians who have been affected by U.S. or coalition forces' actions. These programs include (1) DOD's Foreign Claims Act, (2) the Department of State's Claims and Condolence Payment Program, and (3) the U.S. Agency for International Development's Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund and the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program. We found that DOD has established guidance for making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that guidance has changed over time primarily in Iraq in terms of condolence payment amounts, approval levels, and payment eligibility. Within parameters established by guidance, commanders exercise broad discretion for determining whether a payment should be made and the appropriate payment amount. While guidance does not require commanders to make payments, commanders may do so if they choose. When determining whether to make payments and payment amounts, commanders told us they consider the severity of injury, type of damage, and property values based on the local economy as well as any other applicable cultural considerations. According to unit officials with whom we spoke, units generally follow a similar process for making solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Officials told us that they generally make payments to civilians at Civil Military Operations Centers--ad hoc organizations established by military commanders to assist in the coordination of civilian-related activities--or during personal visits. DOD requires units to collect various types of detailed information related to condolence payments and, based on this information, reports certain summary level data to Congress. However, because its current guidance does not clearly distinguish between the types of payments to be reported under certain CERP categories, reporting entities are interpreting the guidance differently, and therefore inconsistent reporting has occurred. When a condolence payment is made, units record, among other data, information on the unit that made the payment, number of civilians killed or injured or whose property was damaged, location of the incident, and dollar value of the payment. Each payment also is assigned a document reference number for tracking purposes. In reporting to Congress on the use of CERP funds, DOD provides summary data on obligations, commitments, and disbursements for each of the 19 project categories, and by major subordinate command5 in Iraq or task force in Afghanistan. The project categories include (1) condolence payments to individual civilians for death, injury, or property damage and (2) repair of damage that results from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations that is not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act, known as battle damage payments. Within the condolence payment category, DOD reports total dollar amounts and does not distinguish between payments made for death, injury, or personal property damage. Because DOD guidance does not clearly define when payments for property damage should be recorded as condolence payments or as payments for battle damage, some units are recording property damage as condolence payments while others record property damage as battle damage payments. Additionally, neither DOD nor the Army--which is the executive agent for CERP--can easily determine that property damage is categorized appropriately because guidance does not require units to report certain detailed information, such as document reference numbers, which would facilitate verification. Wed, 23 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07783r.pdf Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental and annual appropriations for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD's reported annual costs for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $98.4 billion in fiscal year 2006. So far in fiscal year 2007, Congress has provided DOD with $70 billion in annual appropriations for GWOT. To continue its GWOT operations, DOD has requested an additional $93.4 billion in supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2007 and $141.7 billion in appropriations for fiscal year 2008. The United States' commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. The monthly cost reports are typically compiled in the 45 days after the end of the reporting month in which the obligations are incurred. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through February 2007. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT to date and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2007 reported obligations for GWOT by military service and appropriation account. From fiscal year 2001 through April 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $454 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $407.1 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal years 2001 through 2006 and from the beginning of fiscal year 2007 through February 2007, the latest available data. The $46.9 billion difference between DOD's GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to certain fiscal year 2007 appropriations and multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated, and obligations for classified activities, which are not included in DOD's reported obligations. DOD's total reported obligations related to GWOT have demonstrated a steady annual increase each fiscal year through 2006. Fri, 18 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07677.pdf Since 2003, the United States has provided several billion dollars in reconstruction funds to help rebuild Iraq oil and electricity sectors, which are crucial to rebuilding Iraq's economy. For example, oil export revenues account for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of government revenues. The U.S. rebuilding program was predicated on three key assumptions: a permissive security environment, the ability to restore Iraq's essential services to prewar levels, and funding from Iraq and international donors. This report addresses (1) the funding made available to rebuild Iraq's oil and electricity sectors, (2) the U.S. goals for these sectors and progress in achieving these goals, and (3) the key challenges the U.S. government faces in these efforts. Billions have been provided to rebuild Iraq's oil and electricity sectors, but Iraq's future needs are significant and sources of funding uncertain. From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, the United States spent about $5.1 billion to rebuild the oil and electricity sectors. The United States also spent an additional $3.8 billion in Iraqi funds on these sectors. However, Iraq will need billions of additional dollars to rebuild these sectors. The Iraqi government and donors represent important sources of potential funding. However, the oil and electricity ministries have encountered difficulties spending capital improvement budgets because of weaknesses in budgeting and procurement practices and major security challenges. Moreover, Iraq has not made full use of potential international contributions. It is also unclear what additional financial commitments, if any, will be provided to Iraq's oil and electricity sectors as part of a new international compact. Despite 4 years of effort and the substantial resources expended, production in both sectors has consistently fallen below U.S. program goals. In addition, State's estimate of Iraq's oil production levels may be overstated due to inadequate metering that does not allow precise measurement of crude oil production. The Iraqi government projects that it will be able to meet the demand for electricity in 2009. However, these projections assume that the Ministry of Electricity will be assured of the stable supply of the fuel needed for electricity generation, which has been lacking due to poor coordination between the oil and electricity ministries. A variety of security, corruption, legal, and planning challenges have impeded U.S. and Iraqi efforts to restore Iraq's oil and electricity sectors. The challenging security environment and insufficient protection efforts have continued to place workers and infrastructure at risk. Corruption, smuggling, and other illicit activities result in revenue losses and low cost recovery. Furthermore, the Iraqi government has difficulty attracting foreign investment because, according to the World Bank, it lacks an adequate legal framework, including comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would govern distribution of future oil revenues and granting of exploration rights. Finally, although the oil and electricity sectors are mutually dependent, the Iraqi government lacks integrated planning for these sectors, which has led to inefficient management of the country's resources. Tue, 15 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07827t.pdf In March 2003, a U.S.-led multinational force began operations in Iraq. At that time, 48 nations, identified as a "coalition of the willing," offered political, military, and financial support for U.S. efforts in Iraq, with 38 nations other than the United States providing troops. In addition, international donors met in Madrid in October 2003 to pledge funding for the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure, which had deteriorated after multiple wars and decades of neglect under the previous regime. This testimony discusses (1) the troop commitments other countries have made to operations in Iraq, (2) the funding the United States has provided to support other countries' participation in the multinational force, and (3) the financial support international donors have provided to Iraq reconstruction efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's prior work and data collected for this hearing. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents. We completed this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As of May 2007, 25 countries were contributing 12,600 troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with 145,000 U.S. troops, coalition countries represent about 8 percent of multinational forces in Iraq. From December 2003 through May 2007, the number of coalition troops decreased from 24,000 to 12,600; the number of coalition nations contributing troops decreased from 33 to 25. The United Kingdom, Poland, and Republic of Korea are responsible for leading operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq. In addition, coalition troops have performed humanitarian, medical, and reconstruction missions. Some have provided combat capabilities, such as infantry and explosive ordinance capabilities. The United States has spent about $1.5 billion to transport, sustain, and provide other services for military troops from 20 countries other than the United States and Iraq. The United States used about $1 billion of the $1.5 billion to feed, house, and equip these countries. In terms of allocation by country, about $988 million, or 66 percent, was used to support Poland and the countries under its command, and $300 million, or 20 percent, supported Jordan for border operations and other activities. In addition to support for operations in Iraq, the United States, through the State Department, has provided about $1.9 billion in security assistance for military training and equipment to 10 coalition members and Jordan since 2003. As of April 2007, international donors had pledged about $14.9 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Some countries exceeded their pledges by an additional $744 million for a total of $15.6 billion. About $11 billion, or 70 percent, of these pledges are loans, with the remaining $4.6 billion in the form of grants. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about $436 million in loans and $3 billion in grants. Wed, 09 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07662r.pdf Since combat operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have been subjected to frequent and deadly attacks from insurgents using various weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IED), mortars, rocket launchers, and increasingly lethal ballistic threats. Since 2003, to provide protection from ballistic threats, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas, has required service members and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians in its area of operations to be issued the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) system. Used by all U.S. military service members and DOD civilians in the area of operations, the IBA consists of an outer tactical vest with ballistic inserts or plates that cover the front, back, and sides. As the ballistic threat has evolved, ballistic requirements have also changed. The vest currently provides protection from 9mm rounds, while the inserts provide protection against 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds. Additional protection can also be provided for the shoulder, throat, and groin areas. Concerns also regarding the level of protection and amount of IBA needed to protect U.S. forces have occurred in recent years, prompted by a number of reports, newspaper articles, and recalls of issued body armor by both the Army and the Marine Corps. In May 2005, the Marine Corps recalled body armor because it concluded that the fielded body armor failed to meet contract specifications, and in November 2005, the Army and Marine Corps recalled 14 lots of body armor that failed original ballistic testing. Additionally, in April 2005, we reported on shortages of critical force protection items, including individual body armor. Specifically, we found reasons for the shortages in body armor were due to material shortages, production limitations, and in-theater distribution problems. In the report, we did not make specific recommendations regarding body armor, but we did make several recommendations to improve the effectiveness of DOD's supply system in supporting deployed forces for contingencies. DOD agreed with the intent of the recommendations and cited actions it had or was taking to eliminate supply chain deficiencies. Congress has expressed strong interest in assuring that body armor protects ground forces. Additionally, as part of our efforts to monitor DOD's and the services' actions to protect deployed ground forces, we reviewed the Army and Marine Corps's actions to address concerns regarding body armor to determine if they had taken actions to address these concerns. Because of broad congressional interest in the adequacy of body armor for the ground forces, we prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Our objectives for this review were to determine to what extent the Army and Marine Corps (1) are meeting the theater requirements for body armor, (2) have the controls in place to assure that the manufacturing and fielding of body armor meet requirements, and (3) are sharing information regarding their efforts on body armor ballistic requirements and testing. In this review, we found that the Army and Marine Corps have taken several actions to meet theater requirements, assure testing, and share information on body armor. We also found that contractors and non-DOD civilians receive body armor if this provision is included in a negotiated contract. Specifically, we found that the Army and Marine Corps are currently meeting theater ballistic requirements and the required amount needed for personnel in theater, including the amounts needed for the surge of troops into Iraq; have controls in place during manufacturing and after fielding to assure that body armor meets requirements; and share information regarding ballistic requirements and testing, and the development of future body armor systems, although they are not required to do so. Regarding contractors or non-DOD civilians, we found that DOD Instruction 3020.41 allows DOD to provide body armor to contractors where permitted by applicable DOD instructions and military department regulations and where specified under the terms of the contract. CENTCOM's position is that body armor will be provided to contractors if it is part of a negotiated contract. Thu, 26 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07525t.pdf This testimony discusses some of the systemic conditions in Iraq that contribute to the fraud, waste, or abuse of U.S.-provided funds. Since 2003, DOD has reported total costs of about $257.5 billion for military operations in Iraq; these have increased from about $38.8 billion in fiscal year 2003 to about $83.4 billion in fiscal year 2006. The largest increase has been in operation and maintenance expenses, including items such as support for housing, food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation of people, supplies and equipment. Many of the operation and maintenance expenses are for services. Other U.S. government agencies had reported obligations of $29 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization, as of October 2006. These funds have been used for, among other things, infrastructure repair of the electricity, oil, water, and health sectors; training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces; and administrative expenses. Specifically, the testimony focuses on (1) security, (2) management and reporting of the program to train and equip Iraqi security forces, (3) contracting and contract management activities, and (4) Iraqi capacity and commitment to manage and fund reconstruction and security efforts. Despite U.S. and Iraqi efforts to shift a greater share of the country's defense on Iraqi forces, the security situation continues to deteriorate. Poor security conditions have hindered the management of the more than $29 billion that has been obligated for reconstruction and stabilization efforts since 2003. Although the State Department has reported that the number of Iraqi army and police forces that has been trained and equipped has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to about 323,000 in December 2006, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex. These conditions have hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and demonstrate the difficulty in making political and economic progress in the absence of adequate security conditions. GAO's ongoing work has identified weaknesses in the $15.4 billion program to support the development and sustainment of Iraqi security forces. Sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi units, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside the areas where they were recruited. Corruption and infiltration by militias and others loyal to parties other than the Iraqi government have resulted in the Iraqi security forces being part of the problem in many areas instead of the solution. While unit-level transition readiness assessments (TRA) provide important information on Iraqi security force capabilities, the aggregate reports DOD provides to Congress based on these assessments do not provide adequate information to judge the capabilities of Iraqi forces. The DOD reports do not detail the adequacy of Iraqi security forces' manpower, equipment, logistical support, or training and may overstate the number of forces on duty. Congress will need additional information found in the TRAs to assess DOD's supplemental request for funds to train and equip Iraqi security forces. DOD's heavy reliance on contractors in Iraq, its long-standing contract and contract management problems, and poor security conditions provide opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. First, military commanders and senior DOD leaders do not have visibility over the total number of contractors who are supporting deployed forces in Iraq. As we have noted in the past, this limited visibility can unnecessarily increase costs to the government. Second, DOD lacks clear and comprehensive guidance and leadership for managing and overseeing contractors. In October 2005, DOD issued, for the first time, department-wide guidance on the use of contractors that support deployed forces. Although this guidance is a good first step, it does not address a number of problems we have repeatedly raised. Third, key contracting issues have prevented DOD from achieving successful acquisition outcomes. There has been an absence of well-defined requirements, and DOD has often entered into contract arrangements on reconstruction efforts and into contracts to support deployed forces that have posed additional risk to the government. Further, a lack of training hinders the ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight personnel to manage and oversee contracts and contractors in Iraq. Iraqi capacity and commitment to manage and fund reconstruction and security efforts remains limited. Key ministries face challenges in staffing a competent and non-partisan civil service, fighting corruption, and using modern technology. The inability of the Iraqi government to spend its 2006 capital budget also increases the uncertainty that it can sustain the rebuilding effort. Mon, 23 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07503r.pdf In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have undertaken this engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative to provide information on the status and challenges of developing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) support capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and (2) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, during the course of our work Coalition officials provided us with information on the status of coordination and communication between and within the ministries. On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to Congress containing our preliminary observations. This report is the unclassified version of that classified report. Certain specific information and data about the current state of ISF's logistical, command and control and intelligence capabilities was classified as secret. On March 9, 2007, we testified before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on the development of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior's logistical capabilities for the Iraqi army and police. We expect to provide a follow-up report later that will examine in more detail the progress in the development of these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being provided to the ISF, and the linkage between the development of the ISF's support capabilities and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. This report is one of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and Iraqi security forces. Progress has been made in developing the logistics and command and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD). For example, there is a logistical concept in place for the MOD, and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is fielding many of the units required by the concept. Furthermore, the Coalition and MOD have established a training base at Taji, where Iraqi logistical and communications specialists are being trained. However, significant challenges remain in order for the MOD to achieve self-sufficiency. For example, although the ministry has a logistical concept, implementing that concept is hampered by a lag in the development of national and regional logistics centers, impediments to training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics, and maintenance shortfalls. Similarly, the establishment of a command and control capability in the MOD faces training challenges as well as a shortage of military leadership; the lack of a communications doctrine; and the lack of clearly defined policies and procedures at the ministerial level have further undermined efforts to develop this capability. Progress has also been made toward developing the logistics and command and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). For example, a logistics concept for the MOI is being worked on, the ministry has fielded communications technology, and a National Command Center is in operation. However, the MOI also faces challenges, such as supplying its forces and maintaining its vehicles. Furthermore, the logistics concept may not fully include the forces that are based in the provinces. With regard to command and control, maintenance and procedural challenges limit the capabilities of the MOI's communications technology. Wed, 28 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07637t.pdf In November 2005, the President issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. According to the strategy, victory will be achieved when Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terror. To help Iraq achieve this, the U.S. is, among other efforts, helping strengthen the capabilities of the Iraq Ministries of Defense and Interior (police forces) so they can assume greater responsibility for the country's security. The United States has provided about $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi security forces and institutions. In this testimony, GAO discusses preliminary observations on (1) U.S. and Iraqi funding to develop and sustain the Iraqi security forces, and (2) key challenges the United States and Iraq face in improving the security ministries' operations and management. This statement is based on prior GAO reports, recent fieldwork in Iraq and Department of Defense, U.S. Treasury and Embassy budget documents. GAO added information to this statement in response to comments from Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq. We completed the work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In March 2007, DOD reported that Iraq will increase its 2007 security budget from $5.4 billion to $7.3 billion (a 37-percent increase). DOD states this increase provides evidence of the country's growing self-sufficiency and commitment to security. However, our analysis shows that some of this increase is due to the appreciation of the Iraqi dinar against the dollar. Using a constant exchange rate, Iraq's 2007 security budget grows by 15 percent. Also, Iraq faced problems spending its 2006 security budget. As of November 2006, the Iraq Ministry of Defense had spent only about 1 percent of its capital goods budget for weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. DOD has requested $5.8 billion in additional U.S. funds to help purchase these items for Iraq and provide assistance to its security ministries. The United States and Iraq face personnel and logistical challenges in developing ministries that can sustain Iraq's growing security forces. For example, the ministries have inadequate systems to account for personnel and inexperienced staff with limited budgeting and technology skills. Also, both security ministries have difficulties acquiring, distributing, and maintaining weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The U.S.-led coalition has provided significant resources to develop Iraq's security forces and has 215 military and civilian advisors at the ministries. The United States signed a foreign military sales agreement with Iraq that, according to U.S. officials, allows Iraq to bypass its ineffective procurement systems to purchase equipment directly from the United States. Iraq has deposited $1.9 billion into its account for foreign military sales. However, it is unclear whether this program will help improve the ministries' procurement and contracting capacity. Thu, 22 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07639t.pdf GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need for security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. This testimony addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials. The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being 5 times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security." According to an Army lessons learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. According to officials from Multi-National Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. forces and others. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however, DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed by an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites in future operations planning. DOD's actions generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths. For example, potential adversaries are estimated to have a significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that this situation shows both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations. However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and execution. Thu, 22 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07444.pdf Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. Because of the broad interest in this issue, GAO conducted this work under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations. This report examines (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, and intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials. The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security." GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies--such as branch plans as recommended by joint planning doctrine--in case assumptions were proven wrong. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. However, DOD does not appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessment of the current risk unsecured conventional munitions represent to U.S. forces and others. DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, such as setting up the Joint IED Defeat Organization to develop a more strategic approach to countering IEDs, which typically are made using looted munitions. However, our review of DOD doctrine, policy, guidance, and procedures used to guide operational planning and execution found little evidence of guidance on the security of conventional munitions storage sites. DOD's actions generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths. For example, one potential adversary is also estimated to have a significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower to secure or destroy. GAO also concludes that this situation shows both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations. However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and execution. Thu, 22 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07612t.pdf The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. Developing capable Iraqi security forces is a critical component in U.S. efforts to achieve this important goal. Since 2003, the United States has provided $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces. DOD has also asked for an additional $5.8 billion in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request to continue U.S. efforts to develop Iraq forces and transition security responsibilities to them. This testimony discusses the (1) results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces. This testimony is based on GAO's issued reports and ongoing work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents. As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped 327,000 Iraqi security forces--a substantial increase from the 142,000 reported in March 2005. The Iraqi security force level is double that of the 153,000-strong U.S.-led coalition currently in Iraq. While the Iraqi security forces are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable to reduce the levels of violence throughout Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per day have increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in December 2006. Several factors affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces has not decreased violence. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. About 40 percent of the Iraqi security forces have a primary mission of counterinsurgency--specifically, the Iraqi army. The other major component--the Iraqi police--has civilian law enforcement as its primary mission. Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized reports on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition trained and equipped. Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior and the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi army units. Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military, including fuel and ammunition. The extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. While DOD captures this information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), it does not provide this critical information to Congress. These data provide information on capabilities and gaps in Iraqi units' manpower, equipment, and training levels, and as of late 2006, assess each unit's operational effectiveness. Congress needs this information to make informed appropriations decisions and engage in meaningful oversight. Despite repeated attempts over many months, we have yet to be provided the TRA information we are seeking. Tue, 13 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07582t.pdf The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued in November 2005, implies a conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence there. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported to Congress in November 2006 that although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior had about 323,000 trained and equipped forces, there was a serious shortcoming for both Ministries in the planning and executing of their logistics and sustainment requirements. According to DOD, without a developed logistical system the ISF will require continued Coalition support. Today's testimony addresses (1) the current state of the ISF's logistical capabilities, and (2) the challenges the ISF is facing to achieve logistical self-sufficiency. This testimony contains unclassified portions of a classified report that was issued on March 7, 2007. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from January 2006 through March 2007. Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in place, the implementation of that concept has been hampered by numerous challenges. For example, the development of national and regional logistics centers has lagged behind the development of other logistics formations because of manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, poor maintenance, and funding procurement issues. DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot and for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities on Garrison Support Units and Regional Support Units. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of all echelons of logistics units is crucial in order for the Ministry of Defense to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. Furthermore, the policies and procedures intended to guide implementation of the logistics concept have not been effectively distributed. In addition, the training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been hindered by an insufficiency in the supply of Arabic-literate students, of fuel needed to power generators, and of cadre qualified to serve as faculty at the logistics schools. Finally, maintenance of the vehicle fleet poses challenges because of its diversity, the shortage of trained mechanics, and the Ministry's failure to budget for and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment. As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. For instance, in July 2006, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the Ministry, in addition to funding a contractor to run warehouses and transport supplies to the Ministry's facilities. These challenges have continued, and the Ministry remains dependent on the Coalition to operate its warehouse system. In February, the Ministry was supposed to assume responsibility for running its warehouses. However, this has not happened. Moreover, in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental, DOD is requesting approximately $175 million for the construction and sustainment of Ministry warehouses and maintenance depots. Another example of the Ministry's continuing logistical challenges is vehicle maintenance. In August 2006 Ministry personnel were unable to maintain a certain type of American truck supplied to the ministry by the Coalition because its personnel were unable to work with the vehicles' computerized systems. In August 2006, the Ministry had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand. As of December 2006, Iraqi mechanics remained unfamiliar with these computerized systems which are found in most of the ministry's vehicles. Because the Iraqi National Police are not able to maintain their vehicles, the Coalition has let and funded a $130 million Baghdad Area maintenance contract to repair these vehicles. Fri, 09 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07606t.pdf As of March 1, 2007, over 24,000 servicemembers have been wounded in action since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), according to the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO work has shown that servicemembers injured in combat face an array of significant medical and financial challenges as they begin their recovery process in the health care systems of DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). GAO was asked to discuss concerns regarding DOD and VA efforts to provide medical care and rehabilitative services for servicemembers who have been injured during OEF and OIF. This testimony addresses (1) the transition of care for seriously injured servicemembers who are transferred between DOD and VA medical facilities, (2) DOD's and VA's efforts to provide early intervention for rehabilitation for seriously injured servicemembers, (3) DOD's efforts to screen servicemembers at risk for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and whether VA can meet the demand for PTSD services, and (4) the impact of problems related to military pay on injured servicemembers and their families. This testimony is based on GAO work issued from 2004 through 2006 on the conditions facing OEF/OIF servicemembers at the time the audit work was completed. Despite coordinated efforts, DOD and VA have had problems sharing medical records for servicemembers transferred from DOD to VA medical facilities. GAO reported in 2006 that two VA facilities lacked real-time access to electronic medical records at DOD facilities. To obtain additional medical information, facilities exchanged information by means of a time-consuming process resulting in multiple faxes and phone calls. In 2005, GAO reported that VA and DOD collaboration is important for providing early intervention for rehabilitation. VA has taken steps to initiate early intervention efforts, which could facilitate servicemembers' return to duty or to a civilian occupation if the servicemembers were unable to remain in the military. However, according to DOD, VA's outreach process may overlap with DOD's process for evaluating servicemembers for a possible return to duty. DOD was also concerned that VA's efforts may conflict with the military's retention goals. In this regard, DOD and VA face both a challenge and an opportunity to collaborate to provide better outcomes for seriously injured servicemembers. DOD screens servicemembers for PTSD but, as GAO reported in 2006, it cannot ensure that further mental health evaluations occur. DOD health care providers review questionnaires, interview servicemembers, and use clinical judgment in determining the need for further mental health evaluations. However, GAO found that 22 percent of the OEF/OIF servicemembers in GAO's review who may have been at risk for developing PTSD were referred by DOD health care providers for further evaluations. According to DOD officials, not all of the servicemembers at risk will need referrals. However, at the time of GAO's review DOD had not identified the factors its health care providers used to determine which OEF/OIF servicemembers needed referrals. Although OEF/OIF servicemembers may obtain mental health evaluations or treatment for PTSD through VA, VA may face a challenge in meeting the demand for PTSD services. VA officials estimated that follow-up appointments for veterans receiving care for PTSD may be delayed up to 90 days. GAO's 2006 testimony pointed out problems related to military pay have resulted in debt and other hardships for hundreds of sick and injured servicemembers. Some servicemembers were pursued for repayment of military debts through no fault of their own. As a result, servicemembers have been reported to credit bureaus and private collections agencies, been prevented from getting loans, gone months without paychecks, and sent into financial crisis. In a 2005 testimony GAO reported that poorly defined requirements and processes for extending the active duty of injured and ill reserve component servicemembers have caused them to be inappropriately dropped from active duty, leading to significant gaps in pay and health insurance for some servicemembers and their families. Thu, 08 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07589t.pdf As of March 1, 2007, over 24,000 servicemembers have been wounded in action since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), according to the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO work has shown that servicemembers injured in combat face an array of significant medical and financial challenges as they begin their recovery process in the health care systems of DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). GAO was asked to discuss concerns regarding DOD and VA efforts to provide medical care and rehabilitative services for servicemembers who have been injured during OEF and OIF. This testimony addresses (1) the transition of care for seriously injured servicemembers who are transferred between DOD and VA medical facilities, (2) DOD's and VA's efforts to provide early intervention for rehabilitation for seriously injured servicemembers, (3) DOD's efforts to screen servicemembers at risk for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and whether VA can meet the demand for PTSD services, and (4) the impact of problems related to military pay on injured servicemembers and their families. This testimony is based on GAO work issued from 2004 through 2006 on the conditions facing OEF/OIF servicemembers at the time the audit work was completed. Despite coordinated efforts, DOD and VA have had problems sharing medical records for servicemembers transferred from DOD to VA medical facilities. GAO reported in 2006 that two VA facilities lacked real-time access to electronic medical records at DOD facilities. To obtain additional medical information, facilities exchanged information by means of a time-consuming process resulting in multiple faxes and phone calls. In 2005, GAO reported that VA and DOD collaboration is important for providing early intervention for rehabilitation. VA has taken steps to initiate early intervention efforts, which could facilitate servicemembers' return to duty or to a civilian occupation if the servicemembers were unable to remain in the military. However, according to DOD, VA's outreach process may overlap with DOD's process for evaluating servicemembers for a possible return to duty. DOD was also concerned that VA's efforts may conflict with the military's retention goals. In this regard, DOD and VA face both a challenge and an opportunity to collaborate to provide better outcomes for seriously injured servicemembers. DOD screens servicemembers for PTSD but, as GAO reported in 2006, it cannot ensure that further mental health evaluations occur. DOD health care providers review questionnaires, interview servicemembers, and use clinical judgment in determining the need for further mental health evaluations. However, GAO found that 22 percent of the OEF/OIF servicemembers in GAO's review who may have been at risk for developing PTSD were referred by DOD health care providers for further evaluations. According to DOD officials, not all of the servicemembers at risk will need referrals. However, at the time of GAO's review DOD had not identified the factors its health care providers used to determine which OEF/OIF servicemembers needed referrals. Although OEF/OIF servicemembers may obtain mental health evaluations or treatment for PTSD through VA, VA may face a challenge in meeting the demand for PTSD services. VA officials estimated that follow-up appointments for veterans receiving care for PTSD may be delayed up to 90 days. GAO's 2006 testimony pointed out problems related to military pay have resulted in debt and other hardships for hundreds of sick and injured servicemembers. Some servicemembers were pursued for repayment of military debts through no fault of their own. As a result, servicemembers have been reported to credit bureaus and private collections agencies, been prevented from getting loans, gone months without paychecks, and sent into financial crisis. In a 2005 testimony GAO reported that poorly defined requirements and processes for extending the active duty of injured and ill reserve component servicemembers have caused them to be inappropriately dropped from active duty, leading to significant gaps in pay and health insurance for some servicemembers and their families. Mon, 05 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07426t.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied extensively on contractors to undertake major reconstruction projects and provide support to its deployed forces, but these efforts have not always achieved desired outcomes. Further, the Iraqi government must be able to reduce violence, sustain reconstruction progress, improve basic services, and make a positive difference in the daily lives of the Iraqi people. This statement discusses (1) factors affecting DOD's ability to promote successful acquisition outcomes on its contracts for reconstruction and for support to deployed forces in Iraq, (2) the deteriorating security situation and the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, and (3) issues affecting the Iraqi government's ability to support and sustain future reconstruction progress. The testimony is based upon our work on Iraq reconstruction and stabilization efforts, DOD contracting activities, and DOD's use of support contractors spanning several years. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The challenges faced by DOD on its reconstruction and support contracts often reflect systemic and long-standing shortcomings in DOD's capacity to manage contractor efforts. Such shortcomings result from poorly defined or changing requirements, the use of poor business arrangements, the absence of senior leadership and guidance, and an insufficient number of trained contracting, acquisition and other personnel to manage, assess and oversee contractor performance. In turn, these shortcomings manifest themselves in higher costs to taxpayers, schedule delays, unmet objectives, and other undesirable outcomes. For example, because DOD authorized contractors to begin work before reaching agreement on the scope and price of that work, DOD paid millions of dollars in costs that were questioned by the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Similarly, DOD lacks visibility on the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. When senior military leaders began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed and therefore ran the risk of over- or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. U.S. reconstruction efforts also continue to be hampered by a security situation that continues to deteriorate. Although the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces increased to about 323,000 in December 2006 and more Iraqi Army units have taken the lead for counterinsurgency operations, attacks on coalition and Iraqi security forces and civilians have all increased. Aggregate numbers of trained and equipped Iraqi forces, however, do not provide information on the capabilities and needs of individual units. GAO has made repeated attempts to obtain unit-level Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) without success. This information is essential for the Congress to make fully informed decisions in connection with its authorization, appropriations, and oversight responsibilities. As the U.S. attempts to turn over its reconstruction efforts, the capacity of the Iraqi government to continue overall reconstruction progress is undermined by shortfalls in the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, widespread corruption and the inability to fund and execute projects for which funds were previously budgeted. Iraqi government institutions are undeveloped and confront significant challenges in staffing a competent, nonaligned civil service; using modern technology; and managing resources and personnel effectively. For example, according to U.S. officials 20 to 30 percent of the Ministry of Interior staff are "ghost employees" whose salaries are collected by other officials. Further, corruption in Iraq poses a major challenge to building an effective Iraqi government and could jeopardize future flows of needed international assistance. Unclear budgeting and procurement rules have affected Iraq's efforts to spend capital budgets effectively and efficiently, according to U.S. officials. At the Ministry of Oil, for example, less than 1 percent of the $3.5 billion budgeted in 2006 for key enhancements to the country's oil production, distribution, and export facilities, had been spent as of August 2006. Thu, 15 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07439t.pdf Continuing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are taking a heavy toll on the condition and readiness of the Army's equipment. Harsh combat and environmental conditions in theater over sustain periods exacerbates the wear and tear on equipment. Since fiscal year 2002, Congress has appropriated about $38 billion to the Army for the reset (repair, replacement, and modernization) of equipment that has been damaged or lost as a result of combat operations. As operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Army's equipment reset requirements increase, the potential for reset costs to significantly increase in future Department of Defense annual budgets also increases. For example, the Army estimates that it will need about $12 billion to $13 billion per year for equipment reset until operations cease, and up to two years thereafter. Today's testimony addresses (1) the extent to which the Army can track and report equipment reset expenditures in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose, and (2) whether the Army can be assured that its equipment reset strategies will sustain future equipment readiness for deployed as well as non-deployed units while meeting ongoing requirements. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from November 2005 through December 2006. The Army cannot track or report equipment reset expenditures in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose. In order to provide effective oversight of the Army's implementation of its equipment reset strategies and to plan for future reset initiatives, the Congress needs to be assured that the funds appropriated for reset are used as intended. The Army, however, is unable to confirm that the $38 billion that Congress has appropriated to the Army since fiscal year 2002 for equipment reset has been obligated and expended for reset. Because equipment reset had not been identified as a separate program within the budget, it was grouped together with other equipment-related line items in the O&M and Procurement appropriations. With the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2007 Appropriations Act, Congress directed DOD to provide a detailed accounting of obligations and expenditures by program and subactivity group. The Army has established a subactivity group for reset, and, according to Army officials, beginning in fiscal year 2007, the Army has begun to track reset obligations and expenditures by subactivity group. However, based on our analysis, the Army's reset tracking system does not provide sufficient detail to provide Congress with the visibility it needs to provide effective oversight. The Army cannot be assured its reset strategies will sustain equipment availability for deployed as well as non-deployed units while meeting ongoing operational requirements. The Army's primary objective for equipment reset is to equip units preparing for deployment. However, the Army's reset strategy does not specifically target low levels of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment. Although deployed Army units generally report high readiness rates, the Army continues to be faced with increasing levels of operational risk due to low levels of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment. According to the Army's fiscal year 2007 framework for reset and the Army's Force Generation model implementation strategy, the goal of reset is to prepare units for deployment and to improve next-to-deploy unit's equipment on hand levels. However, since the Army's current reset planning process is based on resetting equipment that it expects will be returning to the United States in a given fiscal year, and not based on an aggregate equipment requirement to improve the equipment on hand levels of deploying units, the Army cannot be assured that its reset programs will provide sufficient equipment to train and equip deploying units for ongoing and future requirements for the Global War on Terrorism. The Army has recently begun to track the equipment readiness of returning units and units approaching deployment in an effort to assess the effectiveness of their reset efforts. However, these readiness indicators are of limited value in assessing the effectiveness of reset because they do not measure the equipment on hand levels against the equipment that the units actually require to accomplish their directed missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wed, 31 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07385t.pdf GAO provided a strategic overview of GAO's work related to securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq. In our statement today, as requested, GAO highlighted (1) GAO's scope, authority, and coordination; (2) some of the insights stemming from our work in Iraq; and (3) the rigorous quality assurance framework that GAO uses to ensure relevant, reliable, and consistent results in all of our work. This testimony is based upon extensive work spanning several years. Since 2003, we have issued 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. For example, GAO sent a report to the Congress last week on a range of key issues for congressional oversight of efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq. Although many of our sources are classified, we strive to report information to the Congress in a public format to promote greater transparency and accountability of U.S. government policies, programs, and activities. As provided for in our congressional protocols, most of our work in Iraq has been performed under my authority to conduct evaluations on my own initiative since it is a matter of broad interest to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both chambers. Our work also helped inform the deliberations of the Iraq Study Group; the Comptroller General personally briefed this group on the results of our Iraq work in June 2006. GAO also provided significant additional information to the Iraq Study Group for its use. GAO and the Inspectors General (IG) of individual departments and agencies have different roles and responsibilities. GAO's broad audit authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding. Our work spans the security, political, and economic prongs of the U.S. national strategy in Iraq. The broad, cross-cutting nature of this work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by any individual Inspector General. Based on our work, we have made some unique contributions to Congress. Our past and ongoing work has focused on the U.S. strategy and costs of operating in Iraq, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, governance issues, the readiness of U.S. military forces, and acquisition outcomes. Some highlights from our work follow. Our analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq recommended that the National Security Council improve the strategy by articulating clearer roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In our examination of the cost of U.S. military operations abroad, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense improve the transparency and reliability of Department of Defense's (DOD) Global War on Terror (GWOT) obligation data. We also recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more predictable. In assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, we found that overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated despite increases in the numbers of trained and equipped security forces. A complete assessment of Iraqi security forces' capabilities is dependent on DOD providing GAO with the readiness levels of each Iraqi unit. We found that DOD faces significant challenges in maintaining U.S. military readiness for overseas and homeland missions and in sustaining rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and intensity of current operations continue at the present pace. In assessing the impact of ongoing military operations in Iraq on military equipment, we found that the Army and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or replace) equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the future. In reviewing efforts to secure munitions sites and provide force protection, we recommended that DOD conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment of unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate storage site security into strategic planning efforts. In assessing acquisition outcomes, we found that DOD often entered into contract arrangements with unclear requirements, which posed additional risks to the government. DOD also lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality assurance system a clean opinion--only the second time a national audit institution has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus, the Congress and the American people can have confidence that GAO's work is independent, objective, and reliable. Thu, 18 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07234.pdf Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused attention on the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management. The supply chain can be critical to determining outcomes on the battlefield, and the investment of resources in DOD's supply chain is substantial. In 2005, with the encouragement of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOD prepared an improvement plan to address some of the systemic weaknesses in supply chain management. GAO was asked to monitor implementation of the plan and DOD's progress toward improving supply chain management. GAO reviewed (1) the integration of supply chain management with broader defense business transformation and strategic logistics planning efforts; and (2) the extent DOD is able to demonstrate progress. In addition, GAO developed a baseline of prior supply chain management recommendations. GAO surveyed supply chain-related reports issued since October 2001, identified common themes, and determined the status of the recommendations. DOD's success in improving supply chain management is closely linked with its defense business transformation efforts and completion of a comprehensive, integrated logistics strategy. Based on GAO's prior reviews and recommendations, GAO has concluded that progress in DOD's overall approach to business defense transformation is needed to confront problems in other high-risk areas, including supply chain management. DOD has taken several actions intended to advance business transformation, including the establishment of new governance structures and the issuance of an Enterprise Transition Plan aligned with the department's business enterprise architecture. As a separate effort, DOD has been developing a strategy--called the "To Be" logistics roadmap--to guide logistics programs and initiatives across the department. The strategy would identify the scope of logistics problems and capability gaps to be addressed and include specific performance goals, programs, milestones, and metrics. However, DOD has not identified a target date for completion of this effort. According to DOD officials, its completion is pending the results of the department's ongoing test of new concepts for managing logistic capabilities. Without a comprehensive, integrated strategy, decision makers will lack the means to effectively guide logistics efforts, including supply chain management, and the ability to determine if these efforts are achieving desired results. DOD has taken a number of actions to improve supply chain management, but the department is unable to demonstrate at this time the full extent of its progress that may have resulted from its efforts. In addition to implementing audit recommendations, DOD is implementing initiatives in its supply chain management improvement plan. However, it is unclear how much progress its actions have resulted in because the plan generally lacks outcome-focused performance metrics that track progress in the three focus areas and at the initiative level. DOD's plan includes four high-level performance measures, but these measures do not explicitly relate to the focus areas, and they may be affected by many variables, such as disruptions in the distribution process, other than DOD's supply chain initiatives. Further, the plan does not include overall cost metrics that might show efficiencies gained through the efforts. Therefore, it is unclear whether DOD is meeting its stated goal of improving the provision of supplies to the warfighter and improving readiness of equipment while reducing or avoiding costs. Over the last 5 years, audit organizations have made more than 400 recommendations that focused specifically on improving certain aspects of DOD's supply chain management. About two-thirds of the recommendations had been closed at the time GAO conducted its review, and most of these were considered implemented. Of the total recommendations, 41 percent covered the focus areas in DOD's supply chain management improvement plan: requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. The recommendations addressed five common themes--management oversight, performance tracking, planning, policy, and processes. Wed, 17 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07308sp.pdf As the United States reviews its plans to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq, GAO has enclosed a series of issue papers for Congressional consideration in developing its oversight agenda for the 110th Congress and analyzing the President's revised strategy for Iraq. These papers are based on the continuing work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies we have provided to the Congress since May 2003. Iraq has had three successful elections, adopted a constitution, and installed its first elected government. At the same time, since the initial ground offensive ended in 2003, the costs to secure and stabilize Iraq have grown substantially, as has the level of violence that afflicts Iraqi society. Such violence stems from an insurgency that has grown more complex and lethal over the past 3 and 1/2 years and the Sunni-Shi'a conflict, which escalated dramatically in 2006. This instability complicates meaningful political reconciliation among Iraq's religious and tribal groups, reduces the effectiveness of U.S. and Iraqi reconstruction and capacity-building efforts, and diminishes the hopes and expectations of an Iraqi people without adequate jobs, water, fuel, and electricity. Increasing Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to them have not resulted in reduced violence. Rather, attacks increased throughout 2006. Although more Iraqi troops have been trained and equipped, high absenteeism and divided loyalties have limited their overall effectiveness. At the same time, our service members are working with great courage and diligence to perform the roles the President has asked of them. Notwithstanding their noble efforts, the U.S. military has sustained significant casualties. In addition, wear and tear on military equipment and growing replacement costs have risen substantially. The resulting stress and strain on American forces have reduced troop readiness levels and the availability of reserve personnel. The U.S. rebuilding effort in Iraq has focused on helping the Iraqi government establish a sound economy with the capacity to deliver essential services. Although Iraq's economy has grown and U.S. efforts have helped restore portions of Iraq's infrastructure, the poor security environment and mismanagement have diminished the overall results of U.S. investments. Iraq will need U.S. and international support, including political and economic incentives, to strengthen its fragile government institutions, which have thus far failed to adequately deter corruption, stimulate employment, or deliver essential services. The enclosures discuss these issues and other critical challenges that the United States and its allies face in the ongoing struggle to help the Iraqis stabilize, secure, and rebuild Iraq. Forthright answers to the oversight questions we pose herein are needed from the U.S. agencies responsible for executing the President's strategy. Congress and the American people need complete and transparent information on the progress made toward achieving U.S. security, economic, and diplomatic goals in Iraq to reasonably judge our past efforts and determine future directions. It is also important that the U.S. government account for the funds that it expended on behalf of the Iraqi government through the Development Fund for Iraq. After all, the Coalition Provisional Authority had a fiduciary responsibility to properly safeguard, use, and account for these funds. These enclosures focus on the U.S. strategy and costs of operations in Iraq; security, governance, and reconstruction issues; the readiness of U.S. military forces; and acquisition outcomes. They are based on our completed and ongoing Iraq-related work, and incorporate information from official documents and relevant officials from the various agencies involved in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq, including the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and the Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the Army Corps of Engineers; the multinational force; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. As part of this work, we made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006. Tue, 09 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07145.pdf Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining these problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq and DOD's increasing use of contractors to support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on review under the Comptroller General's statutory authority. Specifically, GAO's objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces since our 2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and interviewed military and contractor officials both at deployed locations and in the United States. DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since the mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces. Also, while DOD's new guidance is a noteworthy step, a number of problems we have previously reported on continue to pose difficulties for military personnel in deployed locations. For example, DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. For example, when Multi-National Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed to bases in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being performed. While a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in more demanding contracting environments in deployed locations presents unique difficulties. Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing procedures to systematically collect and share its institutional knowledge using contractors to support deployed forces. As a result, as new units deploy to Iraq, they run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to build on the efficiencies others have developed during past operations that involved contractor support. Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or professional military education. The lack of training hinders the ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight personnel to manage and oversee contractors in deployed locations. Despite DOD's concurrence with our previous recommendations to improve such training, we found no standard to ensure information about contractor support is incorporated in pre-deployment training. Mon, 18 Dec 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0730r.pdf Of the $18.4 billion that Congress appropriated for Iraq relief and reconstruction in fiscal year 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) received the largest share--$13.5 billion. As of September 30, 2006, DOD had obligated about $13.1 billion and disbursed about $9.7 billion--$5.6 billion for construction, $3.6 billion for nonconstruction (e.g., engineering, procurement, and the delivery of equipment), and about $480 million for related overhead costs. Among the many contracts DOD uses in Iraq, DOD has obligated about $3.7 billion for 12 large-scale, multiple-year design-build contracts for major construction projects. The design-build contracting approach makes one award for both the design and construction of a project, thus eliminating the need for a separate bidding process for the construction phase. To help Congress monitor the current progress and costs of DOD's reconstruction activities in Iraq, this report discusses (1) the status of the current construction work and targeted completion dates and (2) the support costs incurred by the design-build contractors in DOD's construction program. While financial data show that DOD has obligated most (97 percent) of its $13.5 billion in fiscal year 2004 reconstruction funds, work-in-place data show that about 29 percent, or $2.3 billion, of DOD's construction program is incomplete, as of October 8, 2006. Continued congressional oversight of these activities will be needed since DOD estimates that this work will not be completed until mid- to late 2008. The incomplete work varies by sector, with 10 percent of planned construction remaining in the security and justice sector and 38 percent remaining in the communications and transportation sector. Activities in the public works and water sector; the buildings, education, and health sector; and the transportation and communications sector will not be completed until mid- to late 2008. Although the United States has generally not met its goals for reconstruction activities in Iraq, DOD projects that its remaining construction projects will enable Iraq to increase its production of oil, electricity, and clean water and treated sewerage. As GAO's past work has shown, the challenging security environment, persistent attacks on U.S.-funded infrastructure projects, and sustainment challenges could make it difficult for DOD to achieve this progress. DOD's design-build contractors will incur estimated support costs of about $1.2 billion or about 33 percent of projected completion costs of $3.7 billion. The support costs include estimated security costs of about $359.6 million. In response to higher-than-anticipated support costs, DOD officials have pursued alternative contracting strategies. For example, DOD officials have contracted directly with Iraqi firms in the electricity and transportation sectors rather than relying exclusively on U.S. design-build contractors to complete the work. U.S. officials state that the transition to direct contracting with local Iraqi and international contractors could lead to cost reductions. Due to the lack of available information on the costs of direct contracts, we were not able to establish the extent to which support costs could be avoided at the time of our review. The direct contracting approach also has the potential of increasing Iraqi ownership of reconstruction efforts and employing more local Iraqis. Fri, 15 Dec 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0778.pdf The prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan imperils the stability of its government and threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation once again into a safe haven for traffickers and terrorists. To combat the drug trade, the U.S. government developed a counternarcotics strategy consisting of five pillars--alternative livelihoods, elimination and eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and justice, and public information. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2005 directed GAO to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) for Afghan counternarcotics programs. To comply with this mandate, we examined progress under each counternarcotics pillar, challenges faced, and efforts to ensure that funds were used for intended purposes. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent USAID and State documents and met with cognizant U.S. and international officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. USAID, State, Department of Defense, and Department of Justice were provided a draft of this report, but did not provide formal comments. USAID and State received about $532 million fiscal year 2005 funds and initiated a number of projects under each counternarcotics pillar, but delays in implementation limited progress. For example, State's provision of aircraft enhanced the mobility of eradicators, but coordination difficulties between Afghan officials and security forces delayed the eradicators' fielding. Despite increased eradication and other U.S. efforts, the poppy crop grew by 50 percent in 2006 to a record level. However, many projects have not been in place long enough to assess progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. For example, projects to provide rural credit and to field teams to discourage poppy cultivation were not in place prior to the 2005-2006 growing season. The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are tremendous challenges to the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. The security situation continues to decline; during the 2005-2006 growing season, eradicators were attacked several times and alternative livelihoods project personnel were killed. Moreover, due to Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental institutions, significantly reducing poppy cultivation and drug trafficking is expected to take at least a decade. USAID and State have made efforts to oversee the use of funds, including the use of self certifications, contract clauses, and vetting, when applicable. However, a lack of official records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and State have made efforts to monitor ongoing projects, security concerns and poor infrastructure limited site visits. Wed, 15 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0734r.pdf In March 2003, the Department of State (State) awarded a sole-source contract to EmbSEC, a Virginia limited liability corporation, for work at U.S. embassies. The contract currently has a ceiling price of $354 million. The contractor is required to install and maintain technical security equipment, such as alarms, cameras, and controlled-access equipment; establish X-ray capability for special projects; and maintain and repair physical security products. The contractor also procures equipment and materials and operates the warehouse where they are stored. EmbSEC was created as a joint venture, mentor/protege partnership under the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) business development program. A joint venture in the 8(a) program is an agreement between an 8(a) participant and one or more businesses to work together on a specific 8(a) contract. SBA regulations state that the purpose of the mentor/protege relationship is to enhance the capabilities of the protege and to improve its ability to successfully compete for contracts. The EmbSEC joint venture is comprised of RDR, Inc., the mentor, and BP International (BPI), the protege, an 8(a) firm at the time the contract was awarded. The terms of the EmbSEC joint venture state that RDR will perform operations support, database development, and security system design and installation under the contract, in addition to performing administrative services under the joint venture, such as accounting and contract administration. BPI is to provide program management, warehousing, computer resource, and procurement services. EmbSEC's only source of revenue is its contract with State. We received a tip on our fraud hotline regarding the EmbSEC contract. The objectives of our review, conducted under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, were to determine (1) the basis for awarding the contract without competition, (2) the effect of treating travel costs, which comprise a large portion of contract costs, as firm, fixed-price, and (3) whether contract administration is being effectively carried out. We are sending a separate management letter to the Administrator of the Small Business Administration (SBA) regarding this contract. State relied on a waiver of 8(a) competitive thresholds, granted by SBA in 2001, to award the sole-source contract to EmbSEC. An SBA official approved the waiver on behalf of the Associate Administrator for 8(a) Business Development. However, the waiver was improper because SBA was not authorized to grant it. SBA can only authorize sole-source 8(a) awards above the competitive thresholds (1) for specific procurements and (2) if it determines that other 8(a) firms cannot compete for the requirement. In this case, SBA authorized State to make sole-source 8(a) awards in any amount for contracts that "supplement the security of U.S. Government diplomatic posts and protect the lives of Departmental personnel." The waiver was not tied to a specific procurement, but was a blanket waiver that could be applied to any contract pertaining to security at diplomatic posts. According to contracting officials, they have struggled to administer this contract and exercise appropriate oversight. For example, after the contractor notified State of accidental errors it had made in pricing its proposals, the contracting office took initial steps in November 2005 to request an audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency due to concerns about the pricing errors and other aspects of the contract, such as travel costs. However, the office has not followed up to actually get the audit under way because it lacked the staff to do so. Much of the contracting officer's time has been taken up with resolving disagreements with the contractor. In July 2006, EmbSEC complained to State about a large number of outstanding requests for adjustments to task order prices, some of which are more than a year old, and $2.8 million in work completed or partially completed without a corresponding contractual document under which it could submit invoices. State officials told us they have recently taken actions in response, such as permitting partial funding for work begun before final negotiations on all price components are complete. We also found that the contracting office was not monitoring the percentage of the work being performed by the subcontractor as opposed to the 8(a) joint venture. Wed, 08 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0740.pdf Since 2003, Congress has appropriated more than $20 billion through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to support Iraq rebuilding efforts. The majority of these efforts are being carried out through contracts awarded by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). When awarding IRRF-funded contracts for $5 million or more noncompetitively, agencies are required by statute to provide notification and justification to Congress. In June 2004, GAO found that agencies generally complied with laws and regulations governing competition to award new contracts, but did not always comply with competition requirements when issuing task orders under existing contracts. As mandated by Congress, this report (1) describes the extent of competition in Iraq reconstruction contracts awarded by DOD, USAID, and State since October 1, 2003, based on available data, and (2) assesses whether these agencies followed applicable documentation and congressional notification requirements regarding competition for 51 judgmentally selected Iraq reconstruction contract actions. In written comments, State and USAID concurred with the report findings. DOD provided a technical comment. While no single, comprehensive system currently tracks governmentwide Iraq reconstruction contract data, available data showed that from October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2006, DOD, USAID, and State collectively awarded the majority of Iraq reconstruction contracts competitively. Based on competition information we obtained on $10 billion of the total $11.6 billion in IRRF obligations by these agencies during the period of our review, we found that about $9.1 billion--or 91 percent--was for competitively awarded contracts. While our ability to obtain complete competition data for all DOD Iraq reconstruction contract actions was limited because not all DOD components consistently tracked or fully reported this information, we obtained information on approximately $7 billion, or 82 percent, of DOD's total Iraq reconstruction contract obligations, and of this, we found that competition occurred for nearly all of the obligations. Additionally, based on complete data for the period of our review we found that USAID competitively awarded contract actions for 99 percent of its obligations, while State awarded contract actions competitively for only 10 percent of its obligations. GAO reviewed the files for 51 contract actions totaling $1.55 billion--22 of which were awarded noncompetitively and 29 of which were awarded competitively--almost all of which contained proper documentation. One contract file--for a noncompetitively awarded task order issued by State--did not contain justifications or other required documentation. DOD was also unable to provide documentation for 4 of the competitively awarded contract actions. Of the 22 noncompeted contract actions in GAO's review, State should have notified Congress of 2 actions awarded using other than full and open competition in accordance with notification requirements but did not. State officials told GAO that they have taken steps to address the problem. GAO did not identify any DOD or USAID contract actions within the sample that required notification. Fri, 06 Oct 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061085.pdf As the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded its involvement in overseas military operations, it has grown increasingly reliant on its federal civilian workforce to support contingency operations. The Senate Armed Services Committee required GAO to examine DOD's policies concerning the health care for DOD civilians who deploy in support of contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. GAO analyzed over 3,400 deployment-related records for deployed federal civilians and interviewed department officials to determine the extent to which DOD has established and the military services and defense agencies (hereafter referred to as DOD components) have implemented (1) force health protection and surveillance policies and (2) medical treatment policies and procedures for its deployed federal civilians. GAO also examined the differences in special pays and benefits provided to DOD's deployed federal civilians and military personnel. DOD has established force health protection and surveillance policies to assess and reduce or prevent health risks for its deployed federal civilian personnel, but it lacks procedures to ensure implementation. Our review of over 3,400 deployment records at eight component locations found that components lacked documentation that some federal civilian personnel who deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq had received, among other things, required pre- and post-deployment health assessments and immunizations. These deficiencies were most prevalent at Air Force and Navy locations, and one Army location. As a larger issue, DOD lacked complete and centralized data to readily identify its deployed federal civilians and their movement in theater, further hindering its efforts to assess the overall effectiveness of its force health protection and surveillance capabilities. In August 2006, DOD issued a revised policy which outlined procedures that are intended to address these shortcomings. However, these procedures are not comprehensive enough to ensure that DOD will know the extent to which its components are complying with existing health protection requirements. In particular, the procedures do not establish an oversight and quality assurance mechanism for assessing the implementation of its force health protection and surveillance requirements. Until DOD establishes a mechanism to strengthen its force health protection and surveillance oversight, it will not be effectively positioned to ensure compliance with its policies, or the health care and protection of deployed federal civilians. DOD has also established medical treatment policies for its deployed federal civilians which provide those who require treatment for injuries or diseases sustained during overseas hostilities with care that is equivalent in scope to that provided to active duty military personnel under the DOD military health system. GAO reviewed a sample of seven workers' compensation claims (out of a universe of 83) filed under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act by DOD federal civilians who deployed to Iraq. GAO found in three cases where care was initiated in theater, that the affected civilians had received treatment in accordance with DOD's policies. In all seven cases, DOD federal civilians who requested care after returning to the United States had, in accordance with DOD's policies, received medical examinations and/or treatment for their deployment-related injuries or diseases through either military or civilian treatment facilities. DOD provides certain special pays and benefits to its deployed federal civilians, which generally differ in type and/or amount from those provided to deployed military personnel. For example, both civilian and military personnel are eligible to receive disability benefits for deployment-related injuries; however, the type and amount of these benefits vary, and some are unique to each group. Further, while the survivors of deceased federal civilian and military personnel generally receive similar types of cash survivor benefits, the comparative amounts of these benefits differ. Fri, 29 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061130t.pdf The United States, along with its coalition partners and various international organizations, has undertaken a challenging, complex, and costly effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. The Department of Defense (DOD) has responsibility for a significant portion of the reconstruction effort. Amid signs of progress, the coalition faces numerous political, security, and economic challenges in rebuilding Iraq. Within this environment, many reconstruction projects have fallen short of expectations, resulting in increased costs, schedule delays, reduced scopes of work, and in some cases project cancellations. This testimony (1) discusses the overall progress that has been made in rebuilding Iraq and (2) describes challenges faced by DOD in achieving successful outcomes on individual projects. This testimony reflects our reviews of reconstruction and DOD contract management issues, as well as work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. In our previous reports, we have made several recommendations to improve outcomes in Iraq. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations. Overall, the United States generally has not met its goals for reconstruction activities in Iraq with respect to the oil, electricity, and water sectors. As of August 2006, oil production is below the prewar level, and the restoration of electricity and new or restored water treatment capacity remain below stated goals. One-third of DOD's planned construction work still needs to be completed and some work is not planned for completion until late 2008. Continuing violence in the region is one of the reasons that DOD is having difficulty achieving its goals. The contracting challenges encountered in Iraq are emblematic of systemic issues faced by DOD. When setting requirements for work to be done, DOD made assumptions about funding and time frames that later proved to be unfounded. The failure to define realistic requirements has had a cascading effect on contracts and has made it difficult to take subsequent steps to get successful outcomes. For example, in the absence of settled requirements, agencies sometimes rely on what are known as undefinitized contract actions, which can leave the government exposed to increased costs. Further, DOD lacked the capacity to provide effective oversight and manage risks. We also found that DOD, at times, improperly used interagency contracts and was not able to take advantage of full and open competition during the initial stages of reconstruction. Just as multiple factors contribute to success or failure, multiple actors play a role in achieving successful acquisition outcomes, including policy makers, program managers, contracting officers, and the contractors themselves. Thu, 28 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061132.pdf The government has hired private contractors to provide billions of dollars worth of goods and services to support U.S. efforts in Iraq. Faced with the uncertainty as to the full extent of rebuilding Iraq, the government authorized contractors to begin work before key terms and conditions were defined. This approach allows the government to initiate needed work quickly, but can result in additional costs and risks being imposed on the government. Helping to oversee their work is the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), which examined many Iraq contracts and identified costs they consider to be questioned or unsupported. The Conference Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed GAO to report on audit findings regarding contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As agreed with the congressional defense committees, GAO focused on Iraq contract audit findings and determined (1) the costs identified by DCAA as questioned or unsupported; and (2) what actions DOD has taken to address DCAA audit findings, including the extent funds were withheld from contractors. To identify DOD actions in response to the audit findings, GAO selected 18 audit reports representing about 50 percent of DCAA's questioned and unsupported costs on Iraq contracts. GAO requested comments from DOD on a draft of this report, but none were provided. Defense Contract Audit Agency audit reports issued between February 2003 and February 2006 identified $2.1 billion in questioned costs and $1.4 billion in unsupported costs on Iraq contracts. DCAA defines questioned costs as costs that are unacceptable for negotiating reasonable contract prices, and unsupported costs as costs for which the contractor has not provided sufficient documentation. This information is provided to DOD for its negotiations with contractors. Based on information provided by DCAA, DOD contracting officials have taken actions to address $1.4 billion in questioned costs. As a result, DOD contracting officials negotiated contract cost reductions of $386 million according to DCAA. Based on the information provided by DCAA, as of July 2006, the remaining $700 million in questioned costs is still in process. Because unsupported costs indicate a lack of contractor information that is needed to assess costs, DCAA cannot and does not render an opinion on those costs. Therefore, DCAA does not track the resolution of unsupported costs. For the 18 audit reports selected for this review, GAO found that DOD contracting officials took a variety of actions to address DCAA's audit findings, including not allowing some contractor costs. In the contract documentation GAO reviewed, DOD contracting officials generally considered DCAA's questioned and unsupported cost findings when negotiating with the contractor. GAO found DOD contracting officials were more likely to use DCAA's advice when negotiations were timely and occurred before contractors had incurred substantial costs. For example, in three audit reports related to a logistics support task order negotiated prior to the onset of work, DCAA questioned $204 million. According to DCAA's calculations, $120 million of these questioned costs was removed from the contractor's proposal as a result of its audit findings. In contrast, DOD officials were less likely to remove questioned costs from a contract proposal when the contractor had already incurred these costs. For example, in five audit reports comprising about $600 million of questioned costs reviewed, GAO found that the DOD contracting officials determined that the contractor should be paid for all but $38 million of the questioned costs, but reduced the base used to calculate the contractor's fee by $205 million. By reducing the base, the DOD contracting official reduced the contractor's fee by approximately $6 million. In addition to identifying questioned and unsupported costs, DCAA has the option of withholding funds from the contractor and chose to withhold a total of $236 million for eight cases included in this review. Mon, 25 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061010.pdf Almost 6,000 servicemembers died from October 2001 through September 2005. The Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) provide assistance to survivors of servicemembers who die on active duty. This assistance includes but is not limited to making funeral arrangements, applying for federal benefits, providing relocation assistance, and coordinating with other agencies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 required GAO to assess casualty assistance provided to survivors of servicemembers. For this report, GAO reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) an oversight framework and standards to monitor the assistance it provides to survivors of these deceased servicemembers and (2) visibility over the costs of its casualty assistance programs. GAO also reviewed the roles of VA and SSA in providing casualty assistance. In conducting this review, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed program officials, limiting its scope to federal programs. DOD does not have a comprehensive oversight framework and standards that could improve its ability to monitor the casualty assistance it provides to survivors of servicemembers who die while on active duty. The absence of a comprehensive oversight framework exists because DOD has not developed departmentwide program objectives and all the necessary outcome measures to monitor the military services' casualty assistance programs' effectiveness and efficiency. GAO found that while each service gathers information about its casualty assistance program and DOD and the services meet three times a year to share information, program performance comparisons across services are hampered by the lack of common metrics and assessment methods. Moreover, DOD's current policy does not specify key standards for the services' casualty assistance programs that would facilitate more consistent delivery of assistance across the services. Such standards would include processes (1) for consistent delivery of short- and long-term assistance across and within the services and (2) for coordinating with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service about benefit payments to survivors. DOD does not know the total costs of its casualty assistance programs because it has limited visibility over all program costs. This limited visibility exists for two primary reasons: (1) casualty assistance program costs are scattered across many different parts of DOD's budget, including military personnel, operation and maintenance, and defense health program budgets, and (2) costs of benefits provided to survivors of active duty servicemembers and military retirees, such as the annuities, are lumped together. Although casualty assistance program costs and benefits represent a small portion of DOD's overall budget, without visibility over costs, it is difficult for program officials to make informed decisions regarding the costs of any changes to DOD's casualty assistance programs. In GAO's July 2005 report on the transparency of the military compensation system, GAO recommended that DOD compile the total costs to provide military compensation and communicate them to decision makers perhaps as part of its annual budget submission to Congress. Casualty assistance benefits are another type of cost that could be included as part of total compensation costs. Because GAO recommended that DOD compile total compensation costs in its July 2005 report, GAO is not making that recommendation here. VA and SSA primarily provide long-term financial and nonfinancial benefits to support and compensate survivors starting almost immediately after the servicemember's death and possibly extending through the lifetime of the survivor. However, neither agency has visibility over the extent to which these survivors utilize their benefits or the overall costs of their participation. Fri, 22 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06999r.pdf The U.S. military has long relied on contractors to provide a variety of goods and services to U.S. forces around the world, including those located in Iraq and Afghanistan. These services range from maintaining advanced weapon systems and setting up and operating communications networks to providing gate and perimeter security, interpreting foreign languages, preparing meals and doing laundry for the troops. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) uses contractors for a variety of reasons, including a lack of skilled and qualified military personnel and the need to conserve scarce skills to ensure that they will be available for future deployments. DOD estimates that it has more than 50,000 contractor employees in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Depending on the types of services being offered, contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, or third country nationals, and contractors are often encouraged to hire host country nationals to help rebuild local economies and get local nationals back to work. While contractor employees can provide significant benefits to U.S. forces, contractor employees can also pose a risk to U.S. troops. For example, the terrorists who attacked the U.S.S. Cole were suspected to be contractor employees associated with its refueling operations. This attack led military officials to realize the risk that contractors could pose to the safety and security of U.S. installations and military personnel. The risk is increased when U.S. forces are involved in a military operation against an insurgency, as they are in Iraq. Background screenings of contractor employees can provide some insight into the likelihood that the employee may cause harm to U.S. troops and may deter some criminals and terrorists from working at U.S. installations. Although DOD is not required to screen contractor employees, in some situations, such as in Iraq, DOD is using biometrics to screen contractor employees for past criminal activity and security threats. GAO was asked to review the process used to screen contractor employees who support U.S. deployed forces. Specifically, we were asked to determine the ability of DOD and contractors that support deployed forces to conduct comprehensive background screenings of employees and the steps installation commanders have taken to protect their troops. DOD and contractors have difficulty conducting comprehensive background screening for U.S. and foreign nationals because of a lack of resources and inaccurate, missing, or inaccessible data. Because force protection officers, intelligence officers, and other officers have concerns about the comprehensiveness of background screenings and the risks contractors pose, installation commanders take steps to protect their troops. The information available to contractors that screen employees who live in the Unites States is limited to public information from county, state, or federal courts; state databases; or commercial databases, such as those that collect information on incarcerations. None of these types of searches guarantees a comprehensive background screening because these sources may not include all criminal data, among other things. Screening host nation and third country national employees can be difficult because of inaccurate or unavailable records in some countries. Also, officials from the background screening firms we spoke with told us that some foreign laws can restrict access to criminal records. Moreover, DOD's biometric screening programs are not as effective as they could be because the databases used to screen contractor employees include only limited international data, and some systems do not make all data accessible. Recognizing the limitations of data, military officials we interviewed who were responsible for security at installations in Iraq and elsewhere told us that they take steps to mitigate the risks contractors, particularly non-U.S. contractors, pose. For example, officials from most of the units we spoke with told us that contractor employees are routinely searched as they enter and leave the installation, while the majority of the units we spoke with told us that they interviewed some contractor employees before granting them access to the base. Fri, 22 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061109t.pdf Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the deployment of large numbers of Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel. The Department of Defense (DOD) faces the unprecedented challenge of sustaining large-scale, long-duration operations with an all-volunteer military force. In addition, DOD's homeland defense missions have taken on higher priority, and National Guard forces have state responsibilities for homeland security activities as well as their traditional roles in responding to natural disasters. Over the past few years, GAO has examined the effects of ongoing military operations and domestic missions on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. This statement, which draws on prior GAO work, focuses on (1) challenges in sustaining Army reserve component equipment and personnel readiness while supporting ongoing operations and (2) the extent to which the Army's planned transformation initiatives will alleviate equipment and personnel shortages and enhance readiness. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have made significant contributions to ongoing military operations, but equipment shortages and personnel challenges have increased and, if left unattended, may hamper the reserves' preparedness for future overseas and domestic missions. To provide deployable units, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have transferred large quantities of personnel and equipment to deploying units, an approach that has resulted in growing shortages in nondeployed units. Also, reserve units have left significant quantities of equipment overseas and DOD has not yet developed plans to replace it. The Army National Guard reports that its units have less than one-third of their required equipment, and the Army Reserve reports that its units have about half of the modern equipment they need to deploy. These shortages could also adversely affect reserve units' ability to perform homeland defense missions and provide support to civil authorities in the event of natural disasters or terrorist attacks. The Army also faces shortages of personnel trained in some high-demand skills. These readiness challenges have occurred because the Army reserve components' role has shifted from a strategic reserve force to an operational force that is being used on an ongoing basis. However, DOD has not fully reassessed its equipment, personnel, and training needs and developed a new model for the reserves appropriate to the new strategic environment. GAO has made recommendations that DOD conduct a comprehensive reassessment of equipment, personnel, training, and funding requirements given the reserve components' shift to an operational role, but DOD's progress to date in addressing them has been limited. Without a comprehensive reassessment of equipment and personnel policies, the Army's reserve components may not be well prepared to deal with future events at home or abroad. The Army has begun two transformational initiatives intended to enhance reserve units' ability to conduct 21st century operations and plans to spend over $24 billion for equipment over the next 5 years. These initiatives are significant, but the extent to which they will alleviate equipment and personnel challenges is unclear. The Army faces challenges in managing both initiatives' costs and achieving intended capabilities. First, although the Army is making progress in transforming its forces to more flexible modular units, it has not provided detailed information on the capabilities, costs, and risks of its plans, and reserve units are likely to lack some key equipment items well into the future. Second, the Army is implementing a force generation model through which reserve units' readiness will be increased as units move closer to eligibility for deployment. However, the Army has not fully determined the equipment, personnel, and training that units will require at each stage of the cycle or fully identified the resources to implement its plans. Without detailed implementation plans, decision makers will not have sufficient information with which to assess both DOD's progress and performance in transforming the Army reserve components and whether investment decisions are being targeted to the highest priority areas. Thu, 21 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061094t.pdf From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently h