Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:

DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes

NSIAD-99-33: Published: Aug 30, 1999. Publicly Released: Aug 30, 1999.

Additional Materials:

Contact:

Louis J. Rodrigues
(202) 512-4841
contact@gao.gov

 

Office of Public Affairs
(202) 512-4800
youngc1@gao.gov

GAO reviewed the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) projects to determine whether the Department of Defense's (DOD) strategy of conducting Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) before developing and producing UAVs provides an improved knowledge base for making acquisition decisions.

GAO noted that: (1) the ACTD strategy of focusing on mature technology and proving military utility before committing to a UAV has expanded DOD's knowledge base, allowing it to make some well informed acquisition decisions; (2) for example, when DOD began the Predator ACTD in 1994, the Predator was considered technologically mature because its design was based on an existing UAV, the Gnat 750; (3) nevertheless, DOD still required that the Predator's performance be demonstrated; (4) prototypes of the Predator were deployed in Bosnia in 1995 and 1996, allowing users to determine whether the UAV would meet their needs; (5) only after this performance data was gathered and analyzed in 1997 was DOD willing to formally commit to the UAV's acquisition; (6) in another case, the ACTD for the DarkStar UAV, DOD gained knowledge early on that led to its decision not to acquire that system; (7) likewise, for the same reason, DOD decided not to acquire the joint-service Outrider UAV on a sole-source basis; (8) DOD's ACTD approach to UAV acquisition is consistent with the best practices of leading commercial developers, which require proof of technological maturity and performance before they will develop or produce a product; (9) on the other hand, DOD's formal acquisition process, used during its earlier UAV efforts, allowed programs to proceed with much less knowledge of technologies, design, and potential production problems; (10) problems with development and production, along with the associated cost and schedule increases, were a predictable consequence of proceeding on such limited knowledge; (11) for example, when DOD committed to the Aquila UAV in 1979, the system was not technologically mature; (12) several of Aquila's key planned subsystems--such as a miniaturized jam-resistant data link and a day-night sensor with laser designator--did not even exist at the time; (13) as a result, by 1982, in large part due to numerous problems in developing subsystem technologies, Aquila development costs had almost quintupled, and the schedule had slipped 27 months; and (14) nevertheless, DOD continued the program until 1987, when, after spending more than $1 billion, it terminated Aquila.

Sep 30, 2014

Sep 25, 2014

Sep 23, 2014

Sep 19, 2014

Sep 18, 2014

Sep 10, 2014

Sep 9, 2014

Sep 8, 2014

Looking for more? Browse all our products here