T-45 Training System: Navy Should Reduce Risks Before Procuring More Aircraft
NSIAD-91-46
Published: Dec 14, 1990. Publicly Released: Dec 14, 1990.
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Highlights
GAO reviewed the Navy's acquisition of the T-45 Training System to evaluate cost, schedule, and performance risks and to assess whether an additional production commitment in fiscal year (FY) 1991 was warranted.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should withhold authorization for the Navy to proceed with additional production commitments for T-45A aircraft until the service has taken the minimum risk-reduction measures to complete the operational test phase to verify deficiency corrections. |
Closed – Implemented
A-NSIAD-90-59, approved November 19, 1990, reflects on the FY 1991 reduction of $147.8 million. Another accomplishment report, A-NSIAD-91-30, approved July 29, 1991, reflects FY 1992 and 1993 reductions aggregating $543.9 million.
|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should withhold authorization for the Navy to proceed with additional production commitments for T-45A aircraft until the service has taken minimum risk-reduction measures to complete the operational test phase to assess carrier suitability and other critical operational issues. |
Closed – Implemented
The DOD action in restructuring the program will result in commitment to production of 12 more aircraft before this testing is complete in FY 1992, and only 12 will be procured in 1993. In contrast, without the DOD action, 36 more would have been procured before test completion in 1992 and 24 in 1993. Risk reduction should be served about equally well by the alternative action DOD elected.
|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should withhold authorization for the Navy to proceed with additional production commitments for T-45A aircraft until the service has taken minimum risk-reduction measures to complete initial sea trials and high-angle-of-attack and spin testing. |
Closed – Implemented
The DOD action in restructuring the program will result in commitment to production of 12 more aircraft before this testing is complete in FY 1992, and only 12 will be procured in 1993. In contrast, without the DOD action, 36 more would have been procured before test completion in 1992 and 24 in 1993. Risk reduction should be served about equally well by the alternative action DOD elected.
|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should withhold authorization for the Navy to proceed with additional production commitments for T-45A aircraft until the service has taken minimum risk-reduction measures to define aircraft prices in existing contracts and negotiated prices for subsequent production contracts. |
Closed – Implemented
In March 1992, the program office advised GAO that all price negotiations for the FY 1989-1991 lots were complete and award of 12 FY 1991 aircraft should be made following Milestone IIIA approval before the end of April 1992. OPEVAL is scheduled for completion before additional production, i.e. FY 1992 commitment in November 1992.
|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to procure only two T-45 simulators in FY 1991. |
Closed – Implemented
In the restructured program, no new simulators will be procured through FY 1993. This meets the objective of the recommendation, better correlation of aircraft and simulator production rates, and should result more savings than the approach GAO recommended. These savings are an indeterminable portion of the $543.9 million in savings reflected in A-NSIAD-91-30.
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Topics
Aircraft researchContract modificationsCost analysisFlight trainingNaval aircraftNaval procurementProduct evaluationResearch and development costsSystems evaluationTesting