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DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks

NSIAD-00-12 Published: Oct 27, 1999. Publicly Released: Nov 03, 1999.
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Highlights

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security investigative functions, focusing on; (1) the completeness and timeliness of DOD personnel security investigations; (2) what factors, if any, might be hindering the completeness and timeliness of the investigations; and (3) what actions DOD has taken to address any program weaknesses.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense Because of the significant weaknesses in the DOD personnel security investigation program and the program's importance to national security, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to report the personnel security investigation program as a material weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act to ensure that the needed oversight is provided and that actions are taken to correct the systemic problems in the Defense Security Service personnel security investigation program.
Closed – Implemented
DOD included the personnel security program as a material weakness in its Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act report in February 2000. This report includes needed actions and milestones for completion.
Department of Defense Because of the significant weaknesses in the DOD personnel security investigation program and the program's importance to national security, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to improve its oversight of the Defense Security Service personnel security investigation program, including approving a Defense Security Service strategic plan.
Closed – Implemented
OSD/Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) is providing greater oversight of DSS. DSS has developed a strategic plan and is working on metrics to measure progress. The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act plan is tracking progress on noted weaknesses.
Department of Defense Because of the significant weaknesses in the Department of Defense personnel security investigation program and the program's importance to national security, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to identify and prioritize overdue reinvestigations, in coordination with other DOD components, and fund and implement initiatives to conduct these reinvestigations in a timely manner.
Closed – Implemented
OSD/Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) has developed a strategy for addressing the backlog of overdue reinvestigations, which includes using DSS, Office of Personnel and contractor resources. Also a funding plan has been developed but implementation is dependent on DOD components reprogramming and budgeting resources and submitting requests for reinvestigations.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), to develop a corrective action plan as required under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act that incorporates corrective actions and milestones for addressing material weaknesses in the Defense Security Service personnel security investigative program and performance measures for monitoring the progress of corrective actions.
Closed – Implemented
DOD included the personnel security program as a material weakness in its Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act report in February 2000. This report includes needed actions and milestones for completion.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), to establish a strategic plan that includes agency goals, performance measures, and procedures for tracking progress in meeting goals in accordance with sound management practices and the Government Performance and Results Act.
Closed – Implemented
DSS has developed a strategic plan and is working on metrics to measure progress.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), to conduct analyses needed to: (1) determine an appropriate workload that investigators and case analysts can manage while meeting federal standards; and (2) develop an overall strategy and resource plan to improve the quality and timeliness of investigations and reduce the number of overdue reinvestigations.
Closed – Implemented
DSS has developed goals for processing investigations and metrics for measuring progress. These are currently being used to determine needed resources. DSS also established a unit to contract for additional investigative resources to improve timeliness.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), to review and clarify all investigative policy guidance to ensure that investigations comply with federal standards.
Closed – Implemented
DSS has reviewed all of its investigative standards, and updated and distributed its manual to comply with federal standards. DSS is actively addressing several outstanding items, including conducting and paying for local agency checks and pursuing overseas leads.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), to establish a process for identifying and forwarding to the Security Policy Board suggested changes to policy guidance concerning the implementation of the federal standards and other investigative policy issues.
Closed – Implemented
DSS Liaison to the Security Policy Board has been realigned to provide a more effective interface. DSS has taken proposals to the Board for its consideration, which indicates improved collaboration.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), to establish formal quality control mechanisms to ensure that defense Security Service or contracted investigators perform high-quality investigations, including periodic reviews of samples of completed investigations and feedback on problems to senior managers, investigators, and trainers.
Closed – Implemented
DSS established a unit to set standards and review quality. This unit is establishing quality measurement plans, including processes for supervisory review of cases and data collection instruments to track work returned from Central Adjudication Facilities. DSS also established an Operational Standards and Quality Council that meets bi-monthly to address issues relative to national standards and investigations.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), to establish a training infrastructure for basic and continuing investigator and case analyst training that includes formal feedback mechanisms to assess training needs and measure effectiveness, and as a high priority, provide training on complying with federal investigative standards for investigators and case analysts.
Closed – Implemented
DSS established a Training Academy, leased and equipped this facility, designed, piloted and refined new basic agent curriculum, designed and deployed a structured mentoring program for new case analysts, and validated all personnel security courses. The Training Academy also formalized a curriculum development initiative to ensure that courses remain relevant.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), to take steps to correct the case management automation problems to gain short-term capability and develop long-term, cost-effective automation alternatives.
Closed – Implemented
DSS has continued to address the problems with its case control management system, which have greatly affected productivity. Improvements have been noted, however, the system is not yet stable for reliable day-to-day operations due to hardware and software problems. Contractors are in place to address problems as they occur and establish plans for upgrades, configuration management, and documentation. Longer term solutions are being studied.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should direct all DOD adjudication facility officials to: (1) grant clearances only when all essential investigative work has been done; and (2) regularly communicate with the Defense Security Service about continuing investigative weaknesses and needed corrective actions.
Closed – Implemented
The Central Adjudication Facilities are returning incomplete cases to DSS to obtain more information before making adjudicative decisions. DSS has establish periodic meetings to work with the Central Adjudication Facility officials to identify investigative weaknesses and corrective actions.

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Topics

Civilian employeesClassified informationContractor personnelFederal employeesInternal controlsQuality assuranceSecurity clearancesSecurity investigationsStrategic planningNational security personnel system