RECOVER: A Potentially Useful Technology for Nuclear Safeguards, but Greater International Commitment Is Needed
ID-83-9
Published: Jan 25, 1983. Publicly Released: Jan 25, 1983.
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Highlights
GAO reported on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) Remote Continual Verification (RECOVER) system which is being developed to help the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) better use its inspectors. The RECOVER system would remotely monitor the operational status of surveillance cameras and containment devices.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency | The Director, ACDA, should request IAEA to specify criteria for IAEA eventual acceptance of an operational RECOVER system. |
Closed – Not Implemented
The RECOVER project has been phased out and superseded by a POTAS-funded, interagency U.S. project on remote verification in general. IAEA is to be closely involved in the remote verification project which, in contrast to the goals advanced for RECOVER, is at least 2-3 years from entering a test phase.
|
| United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency | The Director, ACDA, should assess the RECOVER program, taking into account the following factors: (1) IAEA criteria; (2) results of any ongoing or completed facility studies and field tests; (3) the nature and importance of the RECOVER unquantifiable benefits at various facility types; (4) RECOVER cost-effectiveness as described by the revised Brookhaven study; (5) the number and significance of facilities at which RECOVER could provide quantifiable and unquantifiable benefits; (6) the suitability of RECOVER for worldwide, regional, and local applications; and (7) legal and political issues bearing on the international acceptance of RECOVER for routine safeguards use. |
Closed – Not Implemented
The RECOVER project has been phased out and superseded by a POTAS-funded, interagency U.S. project on remote verification in general. IAEA is to be closely involved in the remote verification project which, in contrast to the goals advanced for RECOVER, is at least 2-3 years from entering a test phase.
|
| United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency | The Director, ACDA, should present the results of the assessment to IAEA and request its decision regarding acceptance of RECOVER for routine safeguards use. If IAEA, following its review of the ACDA assessment, does not commit itself to eventually accepting the RECOVER system that fulfills its criteria, the Director, ACDA, should terminate all further development of RECOVER for IAEA and examine the feasibility of alternative uses for it. |
Closed – Not Implemented
The RECOVER project has been phased out and superseded by a POTAS-funded, interagency U.S. project on remote verification in general. IAEA is to be closely involved in the remote verification project which, in contrast to the goals advanced for RECOVER, is at least 2-3 years from entering a test phase.
|
| United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency | The Director, ACDA, should request assistance from the Departments of State and Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to determine: (1) the RECOVER priority among all U.S. safeguards equipment development efforts; and (2) the appropriate division of responsibilities among U.S. Government agencies for expeditiously completing RECOVER tests and studies. |
Closed – Implemented
The RECOVER project has been phased out and superseded by a POTAS-funded, interagency U.S. project on remote verification in general. IAEA is to be closely involved in the remote verification project which, in contrast to the goals advanced for RECOVER, is at least 2-3 years from entering a test phase.
|
| United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency | The Director, ACDA, should develop more reliable and up-to-date cost estimates for RECOVER components and use these estimates to make cost projections for an operational RECOVER system. |
Closed – Not Implemented
The RECOVER project has been phased out and superseded by a POTAS-funded, interagency U.S. project on remote verification in general. IAEA is to be closely involved in the remote verification project which, in contrast to the goals advanced for RECOVER, is at least 2-3 years from entering a test phase.
|
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InspectionInternational relationsMonitoringNuclear facility safetyNuclear proliferationNuclear weaponsProgram managementResearch and developmentTelecommunicationsWarning systemsArms control verification