Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force and Army Should Improve Strategic Human Capital Planning for Pilot Workforces

Highlights

What GAO Found

The Air Force and the Army have not fully applied four of the five key principles for effective strategic human capital planning for managing pilots of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that are important for resolving the Air Force's pilot shortages and the Army's training shortfalls (see table below). Consistent with the first principle, the Air Force involved top senior leaders, UAS pilots, and stakeholders to develop a plan to resolve its UAS pilot shortages—including reassigning UAS workload to Air National Guard units and supporting training and operations with contractors. The Air Force partially applied the second principle to tailor its strategy to address gaps, or shortages, in UAS pilots, such as by using temporary personnel. As of March 2016, 37 percent of the personnel filling UAS pilot positions are temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots. Air Force headquarters personnel stated that no other career field in the Air Force relies on temporarily assigned personnel to this extent. Without tailoring its strategy to provide more permanently assigned pilots, the Air Force risks losing the experience that temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots have acquired. The Army partially applied the second principle because its strategy is not fully tailored to address its shortages in unit training. The Army experienced training shortfalls—61 of 73 UAS units flew fewer than half of the 340-flight-hour per unit annual minimum training goal in fiscal year 2015. A Senior Army official acknowledged the continued training shortfalls was a concern for the Army. Without revising its strategy to address the remaining training shortfalls, the Army risks that its UAS units may continue to train at levels below Army goals.

Extent to Which the Air Force and the Army Applied Key Principles of Effective Strategic Human Capital Planning

Key principle	Air Force	Army
Involve Top Senior Leaders, Employees, and Stakeholders	●	◒
Develop Strategies Tailored to Address Gaps in Critical Skills and Competencies	◒	◒
Monitor Progress toward Meeting Human Capital Goals	◒	●
Build Capability to Support Human Capital Strategies by Using Flexibilities	◒	◒
Determine the Critical Skills and Competencies Needed	◒	◒

Legend: Applied ● Partially applied ◒ Not applied ○

Source: GAO key principles (GAO-04-39); GAO analysis of Air Force and Army data. | GAO-17-53

The Air Force and the Army have not evaluated their workforce mix—that is the mix of military, federal civilian, and private sector contractor personnel—to determine the extent to which these personnel sources could be used to fly UAS. Furthermore, although neither the Air Force nor the Army have evaluated how and to what extent federal civilians could be used as UAS pilots, both services are using private sector contractors to fly some UAS. Without evaluating their workforce mix, the Air Force and the Army do not have information on alternatives for meeting UAS pilot personnel requirements to meet mission needs. In addition, although the Air Force and the Army decided to use private sector contractors to meet mission needs, they did not conduct cost analyses to inform this decision. Without such an analysis, the Air Force and the Army may not be using the most cost-effective workforces to achieve UAS missions.

Why GAO Did This Study

The demand for UAS combat operation support has grown dramatically in the last decade. Since 2008, the Air Force has more than quadrupled its requirements for UAS pilots but faced challenges meeting the requirements due to UAS pilot shortages. Meanwhile, a 2015 Army review found that Army UAS units' mishap rate was higher than for other aircraft and Army officials stated that training shortfalls had contributed to the mishaps.

Senate Report 114-49 included a provision that GAO review Air Force and Army UAS personnel strategies. GAO assesses the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have (1) applied key principles of effective strategic human capital planning for managing UAS pilots and (2) evaluated the workforce mix to meet UAS pilot requirements. GAO compared its previously developed key principles of effective strategic human capital planning with Air Force and Army actions. GAO analyzed data on required and actual Air Force UAS pilots and data on Army UAS training.

Recommendations

GAO's 11 recommendations include that the Air Force tailor its strategy to address UAS pilot shortages; the Army revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls; and that both services evaluate their workforce mix for UAS pilot positions and conduct analysis to ensure cost effectiveness of workforce decisions. DOD concurred with 2 recommendations and partially concurred with 9, noting actions that it believed addressed the intent of GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that DOD needs to take actions to fully address the recommendations.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected	Recommendation	Status
Department of Defense	To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help ensure that the Air Force strategies to address UAS pilot shortages are tailored to address remaining issues, such as the significant amount of pilots who are temporarily assigned to the UAS pilot career, the limited amount of cadet interest in the UAS pilot career, and the workload of UAS pilots, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to revise the Get Well Plan to address these issues.	Closed – Implemented The Air Force did not revise its Get Well plan but has addressed the issues we reported or those issues no longer pose problems for the Air Force UAS career field. In particular, the Air Force no longer staffs manned pilots temporarily to serve as UAS pilots, according to 2024 documentation the Air Force provided. In addition, an Air Force written status update states that it is difficult to measure cadet interest in the UAS career field, but the career has been staffed at over 100 percent since 2022. The Air Force provided documentation to support these staffing levels. Finally, while the Air Force does not provide any evidence regarding UAS pilot workload or discuss that issue in its response, it provided evidence that UAS pilots accept Air Force retention bonuses at a higher rate than manned pilots, which the Air Force uses as an indicator of quality of life. In short, these actions meet the intent of our recommendation and enable us to close it as implemented.
Department of Defense	To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help the Air Force ensure that its strategies are having the intended effects, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to monitor the extent to which that achieving the human capital goals in its strategy helps the Air Force achieve its programmatic goals.	Open DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. According to headquarters Air Force officials, the Air Force has three program goals that are related to addressing UAS pilot shortfalls: to (1) meet combat demand, (2) staff enough personnel to UAS units to allow UAS pilots time to train and take part in development activities, and (3) provide surge UAS combat capabilities when needed. As of September 2019, the Air Force does not have enough personnel in UAS units to allow UAS pilots time to train and take part in developmental activities-known as being in "dwell." As of November 2019, Air Force officials stated that they are able to "meet combat demand" but are not able to provide enough manpower to "surge UAS combat capabilities when needed." Further, as of May 2020, the Air Force did not have enough UAS aircrews to implement its Combat-to-Dwell policy that would allow UAS units to break away from combat operations to train and take part in other developmental opportunities and allow pilots and other aircrew members to take leave and reset. The Air Force does not have an overall method to monitor and measure how well it is doing in achieving it human capital goal of having the more UAS pilots and other aircrew members needed to achieve its programmatic goal of implementing the Combat-to-Dwell policy, as discussed in a later GAO report (GAO-20-320). We will continue to monitor the Air Force's progress on implementing this recommendation. In its March 2022 update, DOD stated that the Air Force planned to develop metrics to demonstrate meeting the intent of the recommendation and that it planned to complete this action by June 2023. As of May 2023, we have requested an update on actions taken to address these recommendations and will continue to follow-up on the status. In a May 2024 update, the Air Force stated that it monitors the extent to which achieving the human capital goals in its strategy helps the Air Force achieve its programmatic goals. We asked the Air Force to provide documentation that it takes these actions, and we will update the status of this recommendation when we receive an update from the Air Force.
Department of Defense	To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help the Air Force ensure that it is poised to meet future needs for UAS pilots, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to explore the potential use of additional flexibilities that would enable it to increase the number of UAS pilots in its workforce.	Closed – Implemented DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In a March 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force stated it had developed a deliberate plan to integrate enlisted pilots in the RQ-4 Global Hawk UAS as it provided the ideal environment to expand mission flexibility. Further, as another way to build capability in support of human capital strategies by using flexibilities, an Air Force selection board met in July 2017 to consider total force officer as well as civilian candidates for various test pilot positions to include test UAS pilots. The Air Force also sought legislative changes to allow the Air Reserve Component to perform full time, 24/7, 365 operational missions such as the UAS mission, in Active Guard Reserve status. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 authorized UAS pilots to receive aviation incentive pay up to $1,000 a month and an aviation retention bonus up to $35,000 to those who are willing to extend their service. Further, the Air Force approved a policy that would enable it to provide, by fiscal year 2024, UAS units with "dwell time"-a time during which servicemembers are at their home station during which they are able to take leave, attend training, and recuperate. While the Air Force has taken some financial and non-financial steps in an effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, as of May 2020, UAS pilot shortfalls continue to exist and it is too early to tell whether these steps will result in effective workforce planning outcomes that reduce Air Force UAS pilot shortages. In its March 2022 update, DOD stated that the Air Force planned to report on an assessment of the progress made in this area by June 2023. As of May 2023, we have requested an update on actions taken to address these recommendations and will continue to follow-up on the status. As of May 2024, the Air Force provided evidence that the UAS pilot career field is staffed at over 100 percent and thus the Air Force has implemented this recommendation. The Air Force's exploration of the use of additional flexibilities may have contributed to effective workforce planning outcomes for this career field in the Air Force.
Department of Defense	To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to collect feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units, such as by surveying, or conducting focus groups with them.	Closed – Implemented DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In its initial comments, DOD stated that incorporating feedback from the field is already an element of the Army's strategy for improving the sustainability, maturity, and health of its UAS workforce. DOD stated that our findings will reinforce the importance of using feedback to improve and refine the Army's overall strategy. In September 2019, Army Headquarters officials reiterated previous statements that they made that the Army has multiple agencies and systems that gather feedback to refine and improve UAS programs. However, the Army has not collected feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units via surveys, focus groups, to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training. In September 2020, the Army stated that surveys are sent to all graduates of the Gray Eagle and Shadow operator courses approximately five months after graduation. The USAACE Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DES) and the Forces Command (FORSCOM) Aviation Resource Management Survey (ARMS) teams routinely conduct unit assessments in the field to evaluate operational readiness and to measure training effectiveness. Feedback from these surveys is used to support the Critical Task and Site Selection Boards (CTSSB), with the last one conducted in April 2018 and the next scheduled for March 2021. These boards establish the critical tasks required of the MOSs and the location for the training, either at the institution or within the unit. The Army Aviation Enterprise instituted a Quarterly Aviation Synchronization Meeting (QASM) to integrate and synchronize efforts to identify problems and seek solutions. The QASM includes a working group focused specifically on Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) issues, as required. This working group consists of representatives from TRADOC, HQDA, Human Resources Command, Army National Guard, and FORSCOM Operational Units. Feedback from these working groups influenced improvements to the overall training strategy of UAS in the Army.
Department of Defense	To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to incorporate such feedback into the Army's strategy to address UAS training shortfalls.	Closed – Implemented DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, and in its initial comments, DOD stated that incorporating feedback from the field is already an element of the Army's strategy for improving the sustainability, maturity, and health of its UAS workforce. DOD stated that our findings will reinforce the importance of using feedback to improve and refine the Army's overall strategy. In July 2018, Army Headquarters officials stated that the Army has multiple agencies and systems that gather feedback to incorporate and improve UAS programs. The officials listed a number of the systems in place to gather feedback on UAS units. However, the Army did not describe any efforts to collect feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units such as by surveying them or conducting focus groups with them. In September 2019, Army officials reiterated their 2018 comments and stated that Army has a number of the systems in place to gather feedback on UAS units. However, the Army has not collected feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units such as by surveying them or conducting focus groups with them and incorporated such feedback into an Army strategy to address UAS training shortfalls. In September 2020, the Army stated that surveys are sent to all graduates of the Gray Eagle and Shadow operator courses approximately five months after graduation. The USAACE Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DES) and the Forces Command (FORSCOM) Aviation Resource Management Survey (ARMS) teams routinely conduct unit assessments in the field to evaluate operational readiness and to measure training effectiveness. Feedback from these surveys is used to support the Critical Task and Site Selection Boards (CTSSB), with the last one conducted in April 2018 and the next scheduled for March 2021. These boards establish the critical tasks required of the MOSs and the location for the training, either at the institution or within the unit. The Army Aviation Enterprise instituted a Quarterly Aviation Synchronization Meeting (QASM) to integrate and synchronize efforts to identify problems and seek solutions. The QASM includes a working group focused specifically on Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) issues, as required. This working group consists of representatives from TRADOC, HQDA, Human Resources Command, Army National Guard, and FORSCOM Operational Units. Feedback from these working groups influenced improvements to the overall training strategy of UAS in the Army. Since September 2019, the Aviation Center coordinated a proposal to implement Critical Skills Incentive Pay (CSIP) to UAS operators. This proposal has been forwarded to HQDA for approval and implementation.
Department of Defense	To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help ensure that Army Shadow units meet minimum training requirements, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls to ensure that it is fully tailored to address training issues and address factors such as lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time.	Open DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls to ensure that it is fully tailored to address training issues and address factors such as lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time. DOD stated that the Army has already taken steps to continuously improve its training strategy and that our findings will underline the importance of those initiatives, but that additional direction related to our recommendation is not necessary. In their July 2018 written update, Army officials responded to this recommendation by discussing a regulation regarding readiness reporting; however, the response did not clarify how the regulation might address our recommendation. As of November 2019, the Army has not issued an updated UAS strategy that addresses UAS training shortfalls including a lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time. In September 2020, the Army provided an update on the status of efforts to implement this recommendation and stated that to continue the improvement of personnel management and reduce training shortfalls, the Army modified the overall training strategy for UAS operators. In the past, the Army had one military occupational specialty (MOS) for a UAS operator and additional skill identifiers (ASI) to distinguish Shadow and Gray Eagle operators. Effective 1 October 2020, the Army will implement two distinct MOS for Shadow and Gray Eagle. This will greatly enhance the overall personnel and career management of required UAS operators. The January 2020 version of the Army Aviation Training Strategy included modified Flying Hour Program (FHP) worksheets. The worksheets allow commanders to incorporate unit unique variables (i.e., unit manning, equipment readiness, months available to train) to inform their training plan and to more accurately calculate resource requirements based upon their unit specific individual and collective training requirements. In its March 2022 update, DOD stated that the Army would report on an assessment of the adequacy of existing strategies in meeting the intent of the recommendation by June 2023. As of July 2024, we have requested an update on actions taken to address these recommendations and will continue to follow-up on the status.
Department of Defense	To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to validate that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of UAS pilot candidate performance in UAS pilot training and job performance.	Closed – Not Implemented DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army validate that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of UAS pilot candidate performance in UAS pilot training and job performance. DOD stated that it believes that the current graduation rate of soldiers from its UAS pilot school of 98 percent is an indication that the existing personnel resource predictors and practices are sufficient. It also stated that periodic re-validation is prudent, but specific direction to do so is not necessary. In its July 2018 written update about this recommendation, Army officials stated that the successful graduation rate from UAS Advanced Individual Training and suggested that this graduation rate may indicate that the existing Army approach is adequate. As we stated in our report, Army officials told us that senior Army leaders pressure officials at the Army UAS pilot schoolhouse to ensure that UAS pilot candidates make it through training. As a result, graduation rates may not provide the Army with reliable evidence that its approach to selecting personnel to serve as UAS pilots is providing the Army with personnel who have the aptitude for this career. Validating that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of training and job performance of UAS pilot is an important step that would help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for the UAS pilot career field on sound evidence. As of November 2019, the Army continued to maintain that the successful graduation rate from UAS Advanced Individual Training and suggests that the existing Army approach is adequate. In September 2020, the Army provided an update to the status of its efforts to implement this recommendation and stated that Army Aviation enlisted Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) have some of the most stringent testing and accession requirements of all Army MOSs. When comparing UAS Operator (MOS 15W) to other highly technical aviation enlisted MOSs, UAS ASVAB requirements are consistent with the most technical MOSs within the Aviation career field. The scores indicate that Soldiers who meet the ASVAB requirements have the potential to succeed in the MOS. The performance of Soldiers after becoming MOS qualified also demonstrates the ASVAB score is appropriate. Since GAO made its recommendation in January 2017, the Army has not taken any action in response to this recommendation and it has consistently stated that it does not intend to take any action in response to the recommendation.
Department of Defense	To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to assess existing research that has been performed that identifies UAS pilot competencies.	Closed – Not Implemented DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the Army assess existing research that has been performed that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In its comments, DOD stated that incorporating findings regarding UAS pilot competencies is already an integral part of both workforce and community management and that effective and efficient resource management, as well as force shaping and management processes, will help ensure that the Army's selection of candidates is consistent with the findings of existing research in this area. DOD stated that it does not believe it is necessary to provide additional direction or guidance to the Army to leverage existing research that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In it's July 2018 written update about this recommendation, Army officials indicated that the Army will assess existing research on UAS operator competencies to improve UAS operator selection. As of November 2019, the Army continued to express interest in assessing existing research on UAS operator competencies to improve UAS operator candidate selection. In September 2020, the Army stated that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) score is appropriate. According to the Army, ASVAB scores indicate whether soldiers meet the ASVAB requirements have the potential to succeed in the Military Occupation Specialty. Since GAO made its recommendation in January 2017, the Army has not taken any action in response to this recommendation and it has consistently stated that it does not intend to take any action.
Department of Defense	To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to incorporate relevant findings from such research into the Army's approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates, as appropriate.	Closed – Not Implemented DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the Army incorporate relevant findings from such research into the Army's approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates, as appropriate. DOD stated that incorporating findings regarding UAS pilot competencies is already an integral part of both workforce and community management and that effective and efficient resource management, as well as force shaping and management processes, will help ensure that the Army's selection of candidates is consistent with the findings of existing research in this area. DOD stated that it does not believe it is necessary to provide additional direction or guidance to the Army to leverage existing research that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In its July 2018 written update on this recommendation, Army officials indicated that the Army will consider a cost benefit analysis on techniques that would potentially improve a process, product, or result related to selecting UAS pilot candidates. Officials went on to state that once the assessment is complete, the Army will incorporate relevant findings into the approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates. As of November 2019, the Army expressed interest in incorporating findings from relevant research into processes for selecting UAS pilot candidates. In September 2020, the Army stated that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) score is appropriate. According to the Army, ASVAB scores indicate whether soldiers meet the ASVAB requirements have the potential to succeed in the Military Occupation Specialty. Since GAO made its recommendation in January 2017, the Army has not taken any action in response and it has consistently stated that it does not intend to take any action.
Department of Defense	To help address personnel shortages and meet mission needs cost effectively, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) should direct the Air Force and the Army to evaluate the workforce mix and the use of federal civilians for UAS pilot positions.	Closed – Implemented DOD concurred with this recommendation. In December 2017, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) issued a memo to the Air Force and the Army requesting implementation of actions to meet the recommendations from this GAO report on UAS Human Capital Planning. As part of that memo, the Air Force and the Army were requested to provide an assessment of current UAS workforce mix and plans and of potential modifications to that mix to be included in their program plans for fiscal year 2020. More specifically, they were instructed to include an assessment of the current military manpower allocations for UAS operations, evaluating military essentiality and identifying opportunities for military to civilian conversion when military essentiality does not exist and when such conversions would not compromise desired operational performance. Further, the Air Force and the Army were instructed to provide a detailed assessment of current UAS missions performed by contractors to evaluate if the work is inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, or should otherwise be performed by government personnel consistent with determining workforce mix procedures in accordance with DOD Instruction 1100.22. Because of the direction, the Air Force and the Army submitted their evaluation of their UAS workforce mix in May and June of 2018, respectively, and are in a better position to determine the most efficient combination of resources to meet their mission needs.
Department of Defense	To help address personnel shortages and meet mission needs cost effectively, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) should direct the Air Force and the Army to conduct cost analyses consistent with DOD guidance to inform their workforce decisions and ensure cost effectiveness of the UAS pilot workforce mix.	Closed – Implemented DOD concurred with this recommendation. In December 2017, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) issued a memo to the Air Force and the Army requesting implementation actions to meet the recommendations from this GAO report on UAS Human Capital Planning. As part of that memo, the Air Force and the Army were requested to submit, where military essentiality is proven, consideration of adjusting military manpower mix that is informed by a cost analysis consistent with DOD Instruction 7041.04 and a detailed assessment of current UAS missions performed by contractors to evaluate, among other things, where civilian performance would represent a more cost effective method of accomplishing the work, also consistent with cost analyses procedures in accordance with DOD Instruction 7041.04. Because of this direction, the Air Force and the Army submitted their evaluations of their UAS workforce mix in May and June of 2018, respectively, and are in a better position to determine the most efficient combination of resources to meet their mission needs. This action meets the intention of the GAO recommendation and therefore, the recommendation should be closed as implemented.

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