Border Security: Additional Actions Could Strengthen DHS Efforts to Address Subterranean, Aerial, and Maritime Smuggling
Highlights
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data showed that there were 67 discovered cross-border tunnels, 534 detected ultralight aircraft incursions, and 309 detected drug smuggling incidents involving panga boats (a fishing vessel) and recreational vessels along U.S. mainland borders from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. The number of known smuggling events involving these methods generally declined over this period, but they remain threats.
Examples of a Cross-Border Tunnel, Ultralight Aircraft, and Panga Boat
DHS has established various coordination mechanisms and invested in technology to address select smuggling methods in the subterranean, aerial, and maritime domains. For example, DHS established interagency task forces to investigate cross-border tunnels. However, DHS has not established comprehensive standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, and we found that relevant officials were not aware of all DHS systems or offices with tunnel information. By establishing procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, DHS could provide strategic guidance and facilitate information sharing departmentwide, consistent with standards for internal control. DHS has also invested or plans to invest in at least five technology projects to help detect and track ultralight aircraft. However, DHS has not assessed and documented how all of the alternative ultralight aircraft technical solutions it is considering will fully address operational requirements or the costs and benefits associated with these different solutions. This type of analysis could help better position DHS to use its resources effectively and ensure that operational needs are met, consistent with risk management best practices.
DHS has established high-level smuggling performance measures and collects data on smuggling by tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels; however, DHS has not assessed its efforts specific to addressing these smuggling methods to, for example, compare the percent of detected panga boat and recreational smuggling events that are interdicted against targeted performance levels. By establishing measures and regularly monitoring performance against targets, managers could obtain valuable information on successful approaches and areas that could be improved to help ensure that technology investments and operational responses to address these smuggling methods are effective, consistent with standards for internal control. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in February 2017. Information DHS deemed For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive has been redacted.
Why GAO Did This Study
As DHS has increased the security of overland smuggling routes, transnational criminal organizations have adapted their techniques to smuggle drugs and humans through alternative methods. These methods include cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational maritime vessels. While these methods account for a small proportion of known smuggling, they can be used to transport significant quantities of drugs or for terrorist activity. GAO was asked to review DHS's efforts to address subterranean, aerial, and maritime smuggling. This report addresses, among other things, (1) the known prevalence of the aforementioned smuggling methods, (2) efforts to address them, and (3) efforts to assess the results of activities to counter them. GAO analyzed relevant procedures, reports, and data for fiscal years 2011 through 2016. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and conducted site visits to locations in California, Arizona, and Florida, chosen based upon past detection of smuggling by the selected methods, among other things. The information from the site visits is not generalizable, but provided valuable insights.
Recommendations
GAO is making six recommendations, including that DHS establish procedures for addressing tunnels, assess ultralight aircraft technology, and establish performance measures and targets. DHS concurred with four recommendations and disagreed with those to establish tunnel procedures and maritime performance measures, citing other efforts. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Homeland Security | To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should develop standardized, departmentwide definitions for maritime vessels used for smuggling in the DHS Lexicon. |
In May 2017, we reported on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to assess the risks from maritime smuggling. We found that within DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations, CBP U.S. Border Patrol, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations all captured information on the types of maritime vessels used for smuggling drugs and migrants to inform their counter smuggling efforts. However, we also reported that the use of different terminology for vessels in different regions and different data systems impeded DHS's ability to develop a full picture of the risks from maritime smuggling nationwide. Consequently, we recommended that DHS develop standardized, departmentwide definitions for maritime vessels used for smuggling in the DHS Lexicon, a unified controlled vocabulary that DHS and its components can use when communicating and sharing data. In May 2017, DHS issued an updated version of its DHS Lexicon that included new standardized terms and definitions for a number of maritime vessels, including "recreational boat" and "open-hull fishing boat." The newly defined "open-hull fishing boat" term encompasses pangas, yolas, lanchas, and go-fasts and addresses the issue of overlapping definitions and differences in regional parlance we identified. The availability of the standardized maritime vessel definitions for use in future threat assessments will help DHS better leverage the assessments to develop a clearer and more comprehensive picture of the threats posed by these maritime smuggling methods across the nation. As a result, this recommendation is closed as implemented.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess and document how the alternative technological solutions being considered will fully meet operational needs related to ultralight aircraft. |
DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that it plans to assess and document requirements related to ultralight aircraft threats and how technological solutions will address these requirements as part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) air domain awareness efforts. In March 2018, CBP completed an Air Domain Awareness Capability Analysis Report that identifies current capability gaps, including those related to ultralight aircraft. CBP stated that it plans to build upon the Capability Analysis Report to identify mission needs, a concept of operations, and operational requirements to address ultralight aircraft and other threats in the air domain. In January 2021, AMO provided a technology assessment that documented the performance parameters that it will use to determine if different technology solutions will meet operational needs related to ultralight aircraft and other threats in the air domain. These actions should help ensure that CBP has the information it needs to make technology investment decisions. As a result, this recommendation is closed as implemented.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE to jointly establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to cross-border tunnels. |
DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement would review available information and develop performance measures and targets as deemed appropriate. In August 2021, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement reported that it had determined developing performance targets related to cross-border tunnels would not operationally enhance its efforts. We continue to believe that performance targets could help ensure that DHS efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions. However, given the passage of time and that DHS does not intend to implement this recommendation, we are closing it as not implemented.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP to establish and monitor performance targets related to ultralight aircraft. |
DHS concurred and stated that within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Air and Marine Operations and the U.S. Border Patrol were developing a joint performance measure and targets for interdicting ultralight aircraft. However, in December 2019, CBP reported that it would no longer pursue establishing a performance measure because it found that the ultralight aircraft interdiction rate fluctuated year to year, and that the number of ultralight aircraft incidents had been trending downward. Subsequently, in September 2020, CBP officials stated that they had reinitiated efforts to develop a performance measure and target in response to our continued belief that they can be set and would help CBP monitor performance to ensure that technology investments and operational responses to address ultralight aircraft are effective. However, in June 2021 CBP determined that it could not collect reliable performance data. Given the passage of time and the uncertainty about when CBP would be able to address this recommendation, we are closing this recommendation as not implemented.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)-U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) tunnel committee to convene and establish standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, including procedures for sharing information. |
DHS did not concur with this recommendation. However, CBP and ICE agreed that strengthening operational procedures may be beneficial and stated that they would jointly review procedures and discuss revising and/or consolidating the procedures. In May 2018, CBP stated that was looking for opportunities to standardize procedures for the detection, interdiction, mapping, and remediation of cross-border tunnels. To this end, CBP planned to develop a standardized training on tunnel identification and tactics, techniques, and procedures for different types of tunnels. In addition, CBP stated it was working to develop a consistent process to facilitate coordination and collaboration with ICE. In March 2019, CBP reported that CBP and ICE began to routinely meet to collectively develop processes for using tunnel robotics, including processes to enhance communication between CBP and ICE. However, in September 2020, CBP and ICE reported that they do not plan to take any additional steps to address this recommendation. As of February 2021, CBP and ICE had not established standard operating procedures. Given the passage of time since we made the recommendation in 2017, we are closing this recommendation as not implemented.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of ICE to establish and monitor Regional Coordinating Mechanisms performance measures and targets related to panga boat and recreational vessel smuggling. |
DHS did not concur with this recommendation. DHS stated that that it believes that by establishing common terminology to address our first recommendation, the RECOMs will have more reliable, usable analyses to inform their maritime interdiction efforts. However, DHS did not believe that performance measures and targets related to smuggling by panga boats would provide the most useful strategic assessment of operations to prevent all illicit trafficking, regardless of area of operations or mode of transportation. DHS also cited the creation of the DHS Office of Policy, Strategy, and Plans that is to work with U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other components and offices to better evaluate the effectiveness of all operations that work to prevent the illegal entry of goods and people into the country, as appropriate. While DHS reported that the department would not take any further actions to implement this recommendation, we monitored DHS efforts that could be responsive to it. For example, in response to a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DHS issued reports in May 2018, February 2019, and August 2020 that contain metrics and planned metrics to measure the effectiveness of border security in the maritime environment and other domains. As of February 2021, planned metrics that DHS does not yet have a methodology to measure across all components include situational awareness in the maritime environment, illicit drugs removal rate, and DHS maritime threat response rate. Given the passage of time since we made the recommendation in 2017, and the remaining uncertainty about when and how DHS will assess maritime border security, we are closing this recommendation as not implemented.
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