Asylum: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and Address Fraud Risks
Highlights
What GAO Found
The total number of asylum applications, including both principal applicants and their eligible dependents, filed in fiscal year 2014 (108,152) is more than double the number filed in fiscal year 2010 (47,118). As of September 2015, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has a backlog of 106,121 principal applicants, of which 64,254 have exceeded required time frames for adjudication. USCIS plans to hire additional staff to address the backlog.
USCIS and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have limited capabilities to detect asylum fraud. First, while both USCIS and EOIR have mechanisms to investigate fraud in individual applications, neither agency has assessed fraud risks across the asylum process, in accordance with leading practices for managing fraud risks. Various cases of fraud illustrate risks that may affect the integrity of the asylum system. For example, an investigation in New York resulted in charges against 30 defendants as of March 2014 for their alleged participation in immigration fraud schemes; 829 applicants associated with the attorneys and preparers charged in the case received asylum from USCIS, and 3,709 received asylum from EOIR. Without regular assessments of fraud risks, USCIS and EOIR lack reasonable assurance that they have implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Second, USCIS's capability to identify patterns of fraud across asylum applications is hindered because USCIS relies on a paper-based system for asylum applications and does not electronically capture some key information that could be used to detect fraud, such as the applicant's written statement. Asylum officers and USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate immigration officers told GAO that they can identify potential fraud by analyzing trends across asylum applications; however, they must rely on labor-intensive methods to do so. Identifying and implementing additional fraud detection tools could enable USCIS to detect fraud more effectively while using resources more efficiently. Third, FDNS has not established clear fraud detection responsibilities for its immigration officers in asylum offices; FDNS officers we spoke with at all eight asylum offices told GAO they have limited guidance with respect to fraud. FDNS standard operating procedures for fraud detection are intended to apply across USCIS, and therefore do not reflect the unique features of the asylum system. Developing asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection, in accordance with federal internal control standards, would better position FDNS officers to understand their roles and responsibilities in the asylum process.
To address identified instances of asylum fraud, USCIS can, in some cases, terminate an individual's asylum status. USCIS terminated the asylum status of 374 people from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for fraud. In August 2015, USCIS adopted a target of 180 days for conducting initial reviews, in which the asylum office reviews evidence and decides whether to begin termination proceedings, when the asylee has applied for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status; however, this goal applies only to a subset of asylees and pertains to initial reviews. Further, asylees with pending termination reviews may be eligible to receive certain federal benefits. Developing timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews would help USCIS better identify the staffing resources needed to address the terminations workload.
Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, tens of thousands of aliens in the United States apply for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been persecuted or fear persecution on protected grounds. Asylum officers in DHS's USCIS and immigration judges in DOJ's EOIR adjudicate asylum applications.
GAO was asked to review the status of the asylum system. This report addresses (1) what DHS and DOJ data indicate about trends in asylum claims, (2) the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect asylum fraud, and (3) the extent to which DHS and DOJ designed and implemented processes to address any asylum fraud that has been identified. GAO analyzed DHS and DOJ data on asylum applications for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, reviewed DHS and DOJ policies and procedures related to asylum fraud, and interviewed DHS and DOJ officials in Washington, D.C., Falls Church, VA, and in asylum offices and immigration courts across the country selected on the basis of application data and other factors.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ conduct regular fraud risk assessments and that DHS, among other things, implement tools for detecting fraud patterns, develop asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection roles and responsibilities, and implement timeliness goals for pending termination reviews. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Justice | To provide reasonable assurance that EOIR's fraud prevention controls are adequate, the Attorney General should direct EOIR to conduct regular fraud risk assessments across asylum claims in the immigration courts. | In December 2015, we reported that the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had not assessed the fraud risks associated with asylum applications across immigration courts. Various cases of fraud illustrated risks that may affect the integrity of the asylum system. Without regular assessments of fraud risks, EOIR lacked reasonable assurance that it had implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Therefore, to help ensure that EOIR's fraud prevention controls are adequate, we recommended that EOIR conduct regular fraud risk assessments across asylum claims in the immigration courts. In response, in August 2019, EOIR reported that its Planning, Analytics, and Statistics Division... completed an asylum fraud risk assessment in conjunction with EOIR's Fraud Program. In particular, EOIR defined specific risks to the asylum adjudication process, as well as the vulnerabilities, indicators, likelihood, impact, and priority to address of each risk. In October 2019, EOIR's Acting Fraud and Abuse Prevention Counsel recommended conducting another risk assessment in 3 years to provide a baseline of risk after current strategies and mitigation activities are implemented, and to repeat the assessment every 3 years thereafter. In December 2019, EOIR's General Counsel agreed with this approach contingent on the availability of future resources. Regularly identifying and assessing fraud risks will help provide EOIR with (1) complete information on the inherent fraud risks that may affect the integrity of the asylum process in the immigration courts and (2) reasonable assurance that it has implemented controls to mitigate those risks.
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| Department of Homeland Security |
Priority Rec.
To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to conduct regular fraud risk assessments across the affirmative asylum application process. |
In 2015, we reported that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had not assessed fraud risks across the affirmative asylum application process. Without regularly assessing fraud risks, we reported that USCIS did not have complete information on the inherent fraud risks that may affect the integrity of the affirmative asylum application process. As a result, we recommended that USCIS conduct regular fraud risk assessments across the affirmative asylum application process. In February 2021, USCIS's Asylum Division, in coordination with its Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate stakeholders, finalized a fraud risk profile for the affirmative asylum process. The...
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| Department of Homeland Security | To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to develop and implement a mechanism to collect reliable data, such as the number of referrals to FDNS from asylum officers, about FDNS's efforts to combat asylum fraud. | We reported that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services's (USCIS) Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) directorate did not have complete or readily available data on fraud referrals and requests for assistance from asylum officers and on its asylum fraud-related investigations and the outcomes of those investigations. Therefore, we recommended that USCIS develop and implement a mechanism to collect reliable data, such as the number of referrals to FDNS from asylum officers, about FDNS's efforts to combat asylum fraud. USCIS concurred with this recommendation. In response, as of January 2016, USCIS reported that FDNS was making improvements to its database for maintaining data...
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| Department of Homeland Security |
Priority Rec.
To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to identify and implement tools that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers can use to detect potential fraud patterns across affirmative asylum applications. |
In December 2015, we reported that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) used various tools to identify fraud in affirmative asylum applications. However, we found that some of those tools were of limited utility and use, and USCIS's capability to identify patterns of fraud across asylum applications was limited. As a result, we recommended that USCIS identify and implement tools that asylum officers and Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) immigration officers can use to detect potential fraud patterns across affirmative asylum applications. In response, USCIS began efforts in fiscal year 2016 to support the development of such tools. In October 2018, USCIS provided...
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| Department of Homeland Security |
Priority Rec.
To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to require FDNS immigration officers to prescreen all asylum applications for indicators of fraud to the extent that it is cost-effective and feasible. |
We reported that some asylum offices had strengthened their capability to detect and prevent fraud by using immigration officers from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services's (USCIS) Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) to prescreen affirmative asylum applications. However, we found that this practice varied across asylum offices. Therefore, we recommended that USCIS require FDNS immigration officers to prescreen all asylum applications for indicators of fraud to the extent that it is cost-effective and feasible. USCIS concurred with our recommendation. In October 2016, USCIS stated that FDNS had completed an initial review of all locally-developed prescreening...
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| Department of Homeland Security |
Priority Rec.
To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to develop asylum-specific guidance on the fraud detection roles and responsibilities of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices. |
In December 2015, we reported that FDNS's standard operating procedures for fraud detection were intended to apply across USCIS, and therefore did not reflect the unique features of the asylum system. On September 27, 2016, the Chiefs of the Asylum Division and RAIO FDNS issued a memorandum delineating the roles and responsibilities of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices. This asylum-specific guidance should better position officers to understand their fraud detection roles and responsibilities, tools that are available to them in carrying out those roles and responsibilities, and features that are unique to the asylum system.
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| Department of Homeland Security | To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to develop and deliver additional training for asylum officers on asylum fraud. | In December 2015, we reported that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had provided basic training for new asylum officers and weekly training for all asylum officers. However, these trainings include limited information on fraud as compared to other topics. Asylum officers' distance and residential training sessions included materials related to asylum fraud, but these materials did not include the same level of detail, depth, or breadth as the written training modules for other Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate (RAIO) and Asylum Division training sessions. Since USCIS redeveloped its asylum officer training in 2012, neither the RAIO Directorate...
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| Department of Homeland Security | To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to develop and implement a mechanism to regularly collect and incorporate feedback on training needs from asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers. | The Asylum Division developed a training needs assessment, which was administered to asylum officers, senior asylum officers, training officers, and supervisory asylum officers in May and June of 2016. In December 2016, the Asylum Division issued a report documenting actions to address training needs, as identified by the training needs assessment. Further, the Chief of the Asylum Division issued a memorandum in May 2016 stating that the Asylum Division Training Branch will administer training needs assessments to collect and evaluate feedback on asylum officer and supervisory asylum officer training needs at least every two years. Conducting regular training needs assessments will...
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| Department of Homeland Security | To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to develop and implement a method to collect reliable data on asylum officer attrition. | In December 2015, we reported that USCIS did not have readily-available data on asylum officer attrition. At the conclusion of our audit work, in September 2015, the Asylum Division provided attrition data that differed significantly from data previously provided. At the time, Asylum Division officials stated that they had compiled these data by manually reviewing all personnel changes in the Asylum Division for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, a process that was labor-intensive and required several weeks to complete. Since then, the Asylum Division has continued to track asylum officer attrition with expanded scope and frequency, updating its data on a bi-weekly basis. In June 2016,...
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| Department of Homeland Security | To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to include a review of potential fraud indicators in future random quality assurance reviews of asylum applications. | In December 2015, we reported that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had implemented some quality assurance procedures for asylum decisions that are designed to ensure asylum officers' decisions are legally sufficient. However, we found that USCIS's random quality assurance reviews of asylum cases did not include an examination of potential indicators of fraud in the case file. Thus, we recommended that USCIS include a review of potential fraud indicators in future random quality assurance reviews of asylum applications. As of January 2016, USCIS's Asylum Division had revised its quality assurance checklist to include a fraud-specific section that will help the reviewers...
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| Department of Homeland Security |
Priority Rec.
To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS's fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct USCIS to develop and implement timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews of affirmative asylum cases. |
In December 2015, we reported that USCIS had not tracked asylum cases pending termination due to fraud and had limited timeliness goals for terminations. In February 2016, DHS reported that the Asylum Division had completed revisions to its case management system--the Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS)--in order to improve its tracking of termination processing. On September 26, 2016, the Chief of the Asylum Division issued a memo establishing timeliness goals for pending termination reviews. Specifically, the memo states that the Asylum Division will review 85 percent of cases received for possible termination of asylum status within 120 days and 90 percent of cases within 180...
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