Defense Logistics: Enhanced Policy and Procedures Needed to Improve Management of Sensitive Conventional Ammunition
Highlights
What GAO Found
The military services maintained accountability (i.e., accurate records) of Security Risk Category (SRC) I conventional ammunition at 11 sampled locations within the continental United States; however, GAO identified gaps in some service-level guidance and procedures for how SRC I ammunition is accounted for across locations. GAO identified instances in which the Navy and Army had taken actions to enhance the accountability of the physical inventories of SRC I ammunition, such as the Army evaluating its methodology to ensure contractors with SRC I ammunition in their custody submit documentation to verify completion of inventories. However,
- GAO identified 55 SRC I ammunition items that were in the physical custody of the Air Force—though owned by the Army or Marine Corps—but accountability was not maintained in any service's system of record while at the Air Force location. Department of Defense (DOD) policy requires that the DOD component having physical custody of materiel maintain accountability in its records regardless of the owner, but the Air Force's guidance requires that ammunition owned by other services be tracked only in a “non-accountable” program. If the Air Force does not revise its guidance to require that accountability be maintained regardless of ownership, the Air Force and the owning service will not have complete records of management of the ammunition and the owning service will not have full assurance that accountability was maintained.
- GAO found that Army and Marine Corps guidance does not specify a time frame for receipting shipments of SRC I ammunition. Records showed that 12 of 21 shipments to Army depots and 5 of 30 shipments to Marine Corps locations were receipted more than 2 business days after truck arrival. Until Army and Marine Corps officials finalize and implement guidance on required time frames for receipting SRC I ammunition, officials cannot reasonably assure accountability for all shipped SRC I ammunition.
The military services have not consistently ensured timely, complete, and accurate information to maintain full visibility of SRC I ammunition in the continental United States. For example, 93 of 1,008 shipments GAO examined were not entered in DOD's Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) at the time of departure. Also, 9 of 104 shipments GAO examined in more detail had inaccurate controlled inventory item codes and were not identified in DTTS as SRC I shipments. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command and the military services have not collaboratively determined the specific information required for the military services to ensure timely data entry into DTTS. Further, the military services, with the aid of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have not conducted analysis of the completeness and accuracy of data entered into DTTS by shippers on SRC I ammunition shipments. Until these actions are taken, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command will not have full visibility of shipments of SRC I ammunition and the military services will not be well positioned to improve their oversight of the timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of data entered in DTTS.
Why GAO Did This Study
DOD manages a stockpile of more than 226,000 SRC I missiles and rockets in the continental United States. SRC I conventional ammunition, which refers to nonnuclear, portable missiles and rockets in a ready-to-fire configuration, is managed as a higher risk than other conventional ammunition and serves as a potential threat if it were obtained by unauthorized individuals or groups.
Senate Report 113-176 (2014) included a provision for GAO to review aspects of DOD's management of SRC I ammunition. This report addresses the extent to which the military services have maintained (1) accountability and (2) visibility (i.e., access to accurate information) of SRC I ammunition in the continental United States. GAO reviewed DOD and military service policies, regulations, and guidance on physical inventories and shipping of SRC I ammunition; conducted visits at a non-generalizable sample of 11 military service locations selected based on inventory size and number of shipments of SRC I ammunition; interviewed officials; and analyzed data on SRC I on-hand assets as of April 30, 2015, and on non-generalizable samples of SRC I shipments from November 1, 2013, to April 30, 2015.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that DOD revise and finalize guidance and improve the timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of information to maintain full accountability and visibility of SRC I ammunition. DOD concurred with all six recommendations and identified specific steps it has already taken as well as plans to address them.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | To ensure the accountability and protection of SRC I ammunition, in accordance with DOD policy, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to revise guidance to clarify that accountability for all SRC I ammunition items in the Air Force's custody--regardless of ownership--should be maintained in the Air Force's system of record. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In response to our report, the Air Force issued interim guidance in December 2015 to begin tracking SRC I ammunition owned by the other DOD components in the "accountable" program of its system of record, in accordance with DOD policy. In October 2016, the Air Force reissued Air Force Instruction 21-201, which instructs Air Force munitions personnel to create appropriate account codes for other DOD components to designate ownership in its system of record.
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| Department of Defense | To ensure the Army and Marine Corps record the receipt of shipped SRC I ammunition in their accountability systems, and in accordance with DOD policy, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize and implement guidance that addresses the required time frame for receipting SRC I ammunition at the depot level. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In June 2017, the Army reissued Department of the Army Pamphlet 700-16 to include guidance on the required time frame for receipting Security Risk Category I ammunition at the depot level.
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| Department of Defense | To ensure the Army and Marine Corps record the receipt of shipped SRC I ammunition in their accountability systems, and in accordance with DOD policy, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to finalize and implement guidance that addresses the required time frame for receipting SRC I ammunition at Marine Corps locations. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In November 2016, the Marine Corps reissued Volume 4 "Physical Inventory Control Program" of Marine Corps Order 4400.201 "Management of Property in the Possession of the Marine Corps", to include guidance on the required time frame for receipting Security Risk Category I ammunition.
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| Department of Defense | To ensure the Army retains accountability of SRC I ammunition in an in-transit status, consistent with DOD policy, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to evaluate and identify actions to enable the Army to retain accountability for in-transit items until acknowledgment of receipt. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. The Army implemented a Corrective Action Plan to resolve the issues, which encompassed sensitive conventional ammunition. The Army evaluated and updated the Materials-in-Transit procedures to ensure the balances are complete and the munitions are accurately classified as materials-in-transit.
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| Department of Defense | To help improve visibility and tracking of SRC I ammunition shipments, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the military departments and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, through the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, to collaboratively determine the specific information required for the military services to ensure timely data entry into DTTS, in accordance with the Defense Transportation Regulation. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. According to officials from US Transportation Command, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command hosted a workgroup, in June 2016, with representation from the Military Services, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency and US Transportation Command, aimed at improving the quality and timeliness of data entered into Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS). Participants mapped processes to identify potential system and process shortfalls and identified several possible items for action. In February 2017, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command released a Customer Advisory reminding shippers of the requirement to ensure shipment information is present in DTTS II Intelligent Road & Rail Information Server within 20 minutes of shipment release in the shipper system. In September 2017 and March 2018, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command held training sessions for shippers focusing on the entry of correct, complete, and timely data into DTTS.
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| Department of Defense | To help improve the completeness and accuracy of data provided by the military services to the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command in accordance with federal internal control standards, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the military departments, with the aid of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, to conduct analysis of the completeness and accuracy of the data entered into DTTS. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. According to officials from US Transportation Command, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) hosted a workgroup, in June 2016, with representation from the Military Services, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency and US Transportation Command, aimed at improving the quality and timeliness of data entered into Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS). Participants mapped processes to identify potential system and process shortfalls and identified several possible items for action. The workgroup identified specific tasks, which are in process. Data is entered by the military services, Defense Logistics Agency, and Defense Contract Management Agency through their individually owned systems, which is automatically fed into DTTS. According to US Transportation Comment officials, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command does not own the systems or personnel interacting with those systems and noted that OSD and the military services hold their respective personnel accountable for following regulation and directives to correct data discrepancies. As such, a working group, known as the NIS (not in system) workgroup, was created and is chaired by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, Transportation Policy. Membership includes the military services, Defense Logistics Agency, and Defense Contract Management Agency and their primary focus is to address the most common error known as 'not in system'. As of April 2019, according to US Transportation Comment officials, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command provides reports highlighting end result errors caused by incomplete and inaccurate data entries and are sending a 'not in system' summary report to this workgroup daily.
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