Afghanistan: Embassy Construction Cost and Schedule Have Increased, and Further Facilities Planning Is Needed
Highlights
What GAO Found
Cost and schedule have increased for the Kabul embassy construction project, in part due to incomplete cost and risk assessment. Cost for the 2009 and 2010 contracts has increased by about 27 percent, from $625.4 million to $792.9 million, and is likely to increase further. Projected completion has been delayed over 3 years to fall 2017. The Department of State (State) did not follow its cost containment and risk assessment policies, resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks. These risks, such as delays in the sequencing of the two contracts, eventually materialized, increasing cost and extending schedule. Unless State follows its policy, it may be unable to avoid or mitigate risks to cost and schedule on future projects.
Architect's Rendering of Embassy Compound upon Project Completion
Since 2002, State has built over $100 million in temporary buildings (intended for no more than 5 years' use) to meet space needs on-compound but has no security standards tailored to those facilities. On completing the project in 2017, all temporary facilities will be 5 to 10 years old, and their continued use is likely. Without security standards or other guidance to guide temporary facility construction in conflict environments, State inconsistently applied alternative security measures that resulted in insufficient and different levels of security for temporary offices and housing, as well as increased cost and extended schedules. Without temporary facility security standards or guidance, future construction in conflict environments could encounter similar problems.
State's lack of a strategic facilities plan and policies governing such planning has led to coordination challenges in addressing the embassy's future facility needs. Industry standards cite the value of plans that comprehensively assess existing facilities, identify needs, and document decisions on meeting those needs. In Kabul, however, State constructed a guard facility without proper design review or applying for a building permit, leading to fire safety deficiencies that State corrected at extra cost. Finally, State formally assigns responsibility for strategic facilities planning but lacks policy that governs implementation of such planning. State intends to make additional facility investments to address future facility needs. Without a strategic facilities plan and policy to guide its development, coordination to address these needs will continue to be difficult.
Why GAO Did This Study
Since re-opening in 2002, the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, has experienced a dramatic increase in staffing, followed by a gradual drawdown. State has invested or plans to invest a total of $2.17 billion in U.S. facilities to address current and projected space needs. State awarded two contracts in 2009 and 2010 to construct additional on-compound housing and office facilities. State partially terminated one contract for the convenience of the U.S. government, and expanded the construction requirements of the second, affecting cost and schedule. State's Bureau of Overseas Building Operations is responsible for the planning, design, and construction of U.S. embassies. This report updates and expands upon GAO's previous work.
This report examines (1) the extent to which construction cost and schedule have changed and why, (2) State's use of temporary facilities on-compound, and (3) State's planning for projected embassy facility needs. GAO evaluated construction planning and contract documents and interviewed State and contractor officials in Washington, D.C., and Kabul.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that State (1) adhere to its cost containment and risk assessment policies, (2) consider establishing security standards or guidance for temporary buildings in conflict zones, (3) develop a strategic facilities plan for Kabul, and (4) clarify its strategic facilities and master planning policy. State concurred with the first, third, and fourth recommendations and partially concurred with the second.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of State | To maintain State's adherence to construction risk management policy, guide future construction of temporary facilities, strengthen coordination efforts to address facility needs of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, and clarify strategic planning policy, the Secretary of State should ensure existing cost containment and risk assessment policies are followed in future Kabul construction projects. |
State concurred with our recommendation, and in a September 2015 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said it would take steps to address it. State noted that its Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' (OBO) was, at that time, revising current policies to establish compliance requirements and promote project efficiencies, thus ensuring better adherence to State's policies. Specifically, OBO updated its cost containment policy in July 2015, and as of September 2015 was updating its standard operating procedure for risk assessment. According to OBO, funding for its own planned construction has been delayed, therefore it has not yet applied any cost containment studies or risk assessments to its planned Kabul projects. However, OBO did require State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to put its own Kabul construction projects through a cost containment study as per OBO's policy. This study, which was completed in August 2015, proposed a series of 39 improvements in these projects that could potentially save immediate construction costs or minimize long-term life-cycle costs. OBO and DS evaluated these proposals in October 2015 and accepted 15 of them. The estimated potential savings of these accepted proposals, if all were to be implemented, was about $11 million.
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| Department of State | To maintain State's adherence to construction risk management policy, guide future construction of temporary facilities, strengthen coordination efforts to address facility needs of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, and clarify strategic planning policy, the Secretary of State should consider establishing minimum security standards or other guidance for the construction of temporary structures, especially those used in conflict environments. |
State partially concurred with our recommendation to consider establishing minimum security standards or other guidance for the construction of temporary structures, especially those used in conflict environments. Specifically, while State did not support separate standards for temporary structures, it agreed that there was value in documenting standard operating procedures and best practices associated with the deployment and protection of temporary structures in high-threat and conflict environments. In response to our report, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security has posted a variety of information related to temporary facilities on its shared Countermeasures Collaboration site, accessible to all Regional Security Officers (RSO). This information includes standard operating procedures for requesting expeditionary support, web-forms for requesting such support, guidance, countermeasure specifications and instructions for their use. It also contains relevant cables and support documents specifying how to begin the process of requesting temporary or 'expeditionary' facilities. As a result, an RSO needing temporary facilities in a conflict zone can now access the site, do research on potential solutions and associated security measures, find guidance on how to begin the process to acquire those solutions, and can access the forms and memo templates needed to begin that process.
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| Department of State | To maintain State's adherence to construction risk management policy, guide future construction of temporary facilities, strengthen coordination efforts to address facility needs of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, and clarify strategic planning policy, the Secretary of State should develop a Kabul strategic facilities plan. Such a plan should comprehensively outline existing facilities, identify embassy needs, establish gaps between facilities and needs, and document decisions on meeting those needs. |
State concurred with our recommendation to develop a Kabul strategic facilities plan and, in response, State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) developed a strategic coordination document used to coordinate construction and facilities planning for the U.S. embassy in Kabul. According to OBO officials, the document is intended to be a 'living reference document' consulted and discussed when necessary at the periodic coordination meetings between the various Kabul Embassy stakeholders. The document itself outlines State's entire property and facility portfolio, details how embassy needs are being met, lists unmet needs, and provides a basis for documenting decisions on meeting those needs through periodic updates.
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| Department of State | To maintain State's adherence to construction risk management policy, guide future construction of temporary facilities, strengthen coordination efforts to address facility needs of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, and clarify strategic planning policy, the Secretary of State should establish policy and procedure directives governing the definition, content, and conduct of post-wide strategic facilities planning and master planning. |
State concurred with our recommendation, and in response established a new policy and procedures directive (P&PD) on its Master Planning Program establishing guidance for the development of analytical, long-range planning documents to manage the overseas real estate portfolio. This P&PD provides the key elements for on-compound master plan development, advance planning for new construction/major renovations, and for New Embassy Compound alternatives analysis.
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