NASA: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Assess Long-Term Affordability of Human Exploration Programs
Highlights
What GAO Found
The scope of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) preliminary cost estimates for the Space Launch System (SLS), Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), and associated ground systems encompasses only the programs' initial capabilities and does not include the long-term, life cycle costs associated with the programs or significant prior costs:
The SLS estimate is based on the funding required to develop and operate the initial 70-metric ton variant through first flight in 2017 but not the costs for its second flight in 2021. NASA is now incurring some costs related to the second flight, but it is not currently tracking those costs for life cycle cost estimating purposes. Furthermore, the estimate does not include costs to incrementally design, develop, and produce future 105- and 130-metric ton SLS variants which NASA expects to use for decades. NASA is now funding concept development and analysis related to these capabilities.
The Orion estimate does not include costs for production, operations, or sustainment of additional crew capsules, despite plans to use and possibly enhance this capsule after 2021. It also does not include $4.7 billion in prior costs incurred during the approximately 4 years when Orion was being developed as part of NASA's now-defunct Constellation program.
The ground systems estimate excludes costs to develop or operate the ground systems infrastructure beyond 2017, although NASA intends to modify ground architecture to accommodate all SLS variants.
NASA expects to use this same limited scope of work to establish the programs' baseline cost estimates in 2014. According to NASA, the agency is developing a tailored definition for the programs' life cycle cost estimates as allowed by NASA requirements. Agency officials stated that NASA chose its approach in part due to uncertainties about the programs' end dates and missions beyond 2021.
GAO recognizes that defining life cycle costs can be difficult when uncertainties exist, and that best practices for cost estimating look favorably on evolutionary development. Even so, best practices expect that a high-quality cost estimate will account for program uncertainties, forecast a minimum and maximum range for all life cycle costs, and clearly define the characteristics of each increment of capability so that a rigorous life cycle cost estimate can be developed. According to these practices as well as NASA's requirements and guidance, life cycle cost estimates should encompass all past, present, and future costs for a program, including costs for operations, support, and disposal. The limited scope that the agency has chosen for constructing preliminary and baseline cost estimates, however, means that the estimates are unlikely to serve as a way to measure progress and track cost growth over the life of the programs. For example, cost growth on the current SLS variant could be masked as the addition of scope associated with work for future variants, and the baseline estimate would no longer be applicable. Insight into program costs helps decision makers understand the long-term affordability of programs—a key goal of the National Space Transportation Policy—and helps NASA assess management of its portfolio to achieve increasing capabilities as directed in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
Why GAO Did This Study
NASA is undertaking a trio of closely-related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit: the SLS vehicle; the Orion capsule, which will launch atop the SLS and carry astronauts; and the supporting ground systems. As a whole, the efforts represent NASA's largest exploration investment over the next decade, potentially as much as $22 billion, to demonstrate initial capabilities. Beyond 2021, NASA plans to incrementally develop progressively more-capable SLS launch vehicles complemented by Orion capsules and ground systems.
GAO was asked to assess the costs of NASA's human exploration program. This report examines the scope of NASA's preliminary cost estimates for the three programs. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed NASA information on cost estimates for the three programs, discussed the estimates with NASA officials, and assessed the estimates against best practices criteria in GAO's cost estimating guidebook as well as NASA's own requirements and guidance.
Recommendations
NASA should establish separate cost baselines that address the life cycle of each SLS increment, as well as for any evolved Orion or ground systems capability, among other actions to enable assessment of affordability and enhance oversight.
In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA partially concurred with GAO's recommendations, citing that actions taken to structure the programs and track costs met their intent. However, GAO believes NASA's responses do not fully address the issues raised in this report.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
Priority Rec.
To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program affordability, ensure its ability to effectively monitor total program costs and execution, and to facilitate investment decisions, the NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to establish a separate cost and schedule baseline for work required to support the SLS Block I Exploration Mission-2 (EM-2) and report this information to the Congress through NASA's annual budget submission. If NASA decides to fly the SLS Block I beyond EM-2, establish separate life cycle cost and schedule baseline estimates for those efforts, to include funding for operations and sustainment, and report this information annually to Congress via the agency's budget submission. |
NASA partially agreed with this recommendation. Officials stated that NASA defined and documented life-cycle costs for SLS to a first demonstrated capability, consistent with cost estimating best practices and NASA project and program management policy. In an August 2021 update to its program and project management policy, NASA changed the requirements for programs with an unspecified end point, like SLS. Specifically, NASA requires programs like SLS to establish a cost estimate for the initial capability and generate a 5-year operational cost estimate, with annual updates. In spring 2022, the SLS program generated the first 5-year operational cost estimate, in accordance with policy. In spring 2024, NASA produced the first annual update, and officials told us the new estimate includes costs for Artemis II. These efforts represent NASA's progress towards providing information on SLS Block 1 operation and sustainment costs. However, in September 2023, we found that the 5-year operational cost estimate did not track costs by Artemis mission, nor by recurring SLS production items, so it was a poor measure of cost performance over time. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA needs to provide additional detail in its cost estimates and take steps to provide this information to Congress. For example, NASA should identify the costs associated with the SLS Block 1, such as by Artemis II or III mission or production item and provide that to Congress. Taking these actions would provide Congress with insight into the program's affordability and facilitate investment decisions.
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| National Aeronautics and Space Administration | To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program affordability, ensure its ability to effectively monitor total program costs and execution, and to facilitate investment decisions, because a significant amount of the original Orion development work occurred under the Constellation program, the NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to include those costs in the baseline cost estimate for the Orion program. |
NASA partially concurred with our recommendation in its comments and letter to the Congress. The agency stated that funds invested in prior programs such as Constellation have been previously reported and are available as a historical record for future program and technical decision-making. NASA stated that it does not include the costs of prior programs in the life-cycle cost of current programs. In September 2015, NASA formally established its committed cost baseline for Orion. The scope of costs for Orion design, development, test, and evaluation did not include funds invested in prior programs. Therefore, we consider this recommendation not implemented.
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| National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
Priority Rec.
To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program affordability, ensure its ability to effectively monitor total program costs and execution, and to facilitate investment decisions, because NASA intends to use the increased capabilities of the SLS, Orion, and Ground Systems Development and Operations efforts well into the future and has chosen to estimate costs associated with achieving the capabilities, the NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to establish separate cost and schedule baselines for each additional capability that encompass all life cycle costs, to include operations and sustainment. When NASA cannot fully specify costs due to lack of well-defined missions or flight manifests, forecast a cost estimate range -- including life cycle costs -- having minimum and maximum boundaries. These baselines or ranges should be reported to Congress annually via the agency's budget submission. |
NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that it had established separate programs for SLS, Orion, and the ground systems and adopted a block upgrade approach for SLS. In August 2021, NASA updated its space flight program and project management requirements to clarify that capability upgrades will be treated as projects, including setting cost and schedule baselines. In August 2021, NASA incorporated a docking capability upgrade into the Orion cost and schedule baseline. In December 2023 NASA established a new baseline for the Space Launch System (SLS) Block 1B capability upgrade. NASA is in the process of finalizing a cost and schedule baseline for the Mobile Launcher 2 and officials told us that, in accordance with the August 2021 space flight program and project management requirements update, they plan to establish a cost and schedule baseline for the SLS Block 2 capability upgrade following a summer 2025 preliminary design review. We believe that these actions meet the intent of our recommendation. Establishing the separate cost and schedule baselines for these capability upgrades will provide decision makers transparency into costs and enable them to assess long-term affordability and progress.
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