Better Data and Guidance Needed to Improve Pipeline Operator Incident Response
GAO-13-168: Published: Jan 23, 2013. Publicly Released: Jan 23, 2013.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has an opportunity to improve the ability of pipeline operators to respond to incidents by developing a performance-based approach for incident response times. The ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents--such as leaks and ruptures--is affected by numerous variables, some of which are under operators' control. For example, the use of different valve types (manual valves or "automated" valves that can be closed automatically or remotely) and the location of response personnel can affect the amount of time it takes for operators to respond to incidents. Variables outside of operators' control, such as weather conditions, can also influence incident response time, which can range from minutes to days. GAO has previously reported that a performance-based approach--including goals and associated performance measures and targets--can allow those being regulated to determine the most appropriate way to achieve desired outcomes. In addition, several organizations in the pipeline industry have developed methods for quantitatively evaluating response times to incidents, including setting specific, measurable performance goals. While defining performance measures and targets for incident response can be challenging, PHMSA could move toward a performance-based approach by evaluating nationwide data to determine response times for different types of pipeline (based on location, operating pressure, and pipeline diameter, among other factors). However, PHMSA must first improve the data it collects on incident response times. These data are not reliable both because operators are not required to fill out certain time-related fields in the reporting form and because operators told us they interpret these data fields in different ways. Reliable data would improve PHMSA's ability to measure incident response and assist the agency in exploring the feasibility of developing a performance-based approach for improving operator response to pipeline incidents.
The primary advantage of installing automated valves is that operators can respond quickly to isolate the affected pipeline segment and reduce the amount of product released; however, automated valves can have disadvantages, including the potential for accidental closures--which can lead to loss of service to customers or even cause a rupture--and monetary costs. Because the advantages and disadvantages of installing an automated valve are closely related to the specifics of the valve's location, it is appropriate to decide whether to install automated valves on a case-by-case basis. Several operators we spoke with have developed approaches to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of installing automated valves. For example, some operators of hazardous liquid pipelines use spill-modeling software to estimate the amount of product release and extent of damage that would occur in the event of an incident. While PHMSA conducts a variety of information-sharing activities, the agency does not formally collect or share evaluation approaches used by operators to decide whether to install automated valves. Furthermore, not all operators we spoke with were aware of existing PHMSA guidance designed to assist operators in making these decisions. PHMSA could assist operators in making this decision by formally collecting and sharing evaluation approaches and ensuring operators are aware of existing guidance.
Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's 2.5 million mile network of hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines includes more than 400,000 miles of "transmission" pipelines, which transport products from processing facilities to communities and large-volume users. To minimize the risk of leaks and ruptures, PHMSA requires pipeline operators to develop incident response plans. Pipeline operators with pipelines in highly populated and environmentally sensitive areas ("high-consequence areas") are also required to consider installing automated valves.
The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 directed GAO to examine the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to a product release. Accordingly, GAO examined (1) opportunities to improve the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents and (2) the advantages and disadvantages of installing automated valves in high-consequence areas and ways that PHMSA can assist operators in deciding whether to install valves in these areas. GAO examined incident data; conducted a literature review; and interviewed selected operators, industry stakeholders, state pipeline safety offices, and PHMSA officials.
What GAO Recommends
DOT should (1) improve incident response data and use these data to evaluate whether to implement a performance-based framework for incident response times and (2) share guidance and information on evaluation approaches to inform operators decisions. DOT agreed to consider these recommendations.
For more information, contact Susan A. Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or firstname.lastname@example.org.
- Review Pending
- Closed - implemented
- Closed - not implemented
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: To improve operators' incident response times, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the PHMSA Administrator to improve the reliability of incident response data and use these data to evaluate whether to implement a performance-based framework for incident response times.
Agency Affected: Department of Transportation
Comments: PHMSA has looked at the quality and completeness of the existing incident response data that is collected and has determined that there is a need to collect additional data. PHMSA held a workshop from January 7-8, 2013, that examined data issues. Based on these examinations and evaluations, PHMSA will soon propose changes to the gas transmission incident report and hazardous liquid accident report. Among other items, these changes will require the data needed to determine pipeline operator response time and will also include clarification of the times for operator identification and arrival on site (Part A19). PHMSA anticipates these changes will be implemented by December 2013, and anticipated updating the online report collection software to require this specific data by May 2014. Based on improved data quality and analysis, PHMSA will evaluate whether to implement a performance-based framework for incident response times.
Recommendation: To assist operators in determining whether to install automated valves, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the PHMSA Administrator to use PHMSA's existing information-sharing mechanisms to alert all pipeline operators of inspection and enforcement guidance that provides additional information on how to interpret regulations on automated valves, and to share approaches used by operators for making decisions on whether to install automated valves.
Agency Affected: Department of Transportation
Comments: PHMSA plans to alert operators to the publicly available inspection and enforcement guidance by the end of September 2013, to help address the first aspect of this recommendation. As for sharing approaches used by operators, PHMSA plans to reach out to trade associations, such as the American Petroleum Institute or the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, to assess the extent to which operators would be willing to share potential information and approaches. With guidance from PHMSA's Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA plans to work on developing an implementation plan for this aspect of this recommendation by the end of September 2013.