Arleigh Burke Destroyers:
Additional Analysis and Oversight Required to Support the Navy's Future Surface Combatant Plans
GAO-12-113, Jan 24, 2012
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What GAO Found
The Navy relied on its 2009 Radar/Hull Study as the basis to select DDG 51 over DDG 1000 to carry the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) as its preferred future surface combatant—a decision that may result in a procurement of up to 43 destroyers and cost up to $80 billion over the next several decades. The Radar/Hull Study may not provide a sufficient analytical basis for a decision of this magnitude. Specifically, the Radar/Hull Study:
- focuses on the capability of the radars it evaluated, but does not fully evaluate the capabilities of different shipboard combat systems and ship options under consideration,
- does not include a thorough trade-off analysis that would compare the relative costs and benefits of different solutions under consideration or provide robust insight into all cost alternatives, and
- assumes a significantly reduced threat environment from other Navy analyses, which allowed radar performance to seem more effective than it may actually be against more sophisticated threats.
The Navy’s planned production schedules of the restart DDG 51 ships are comparable with past performance and officials told us that hull and mechanical systems changes are modest, but these ships will cost more than previous DDG 51s. A major upgrade to the ship’s combat system software also brings several challenges that could affect the restart ships, due in part to a key component of this upgrade that has already faced delays. Further delays could postpone delivery to the shipyard for the first restart ship, and could also jeopardize the Navy’s plan to install and test the upgrade on an older DDG 51 prior to installation on the restart ships. This first installation would serve to mitigate risk, and if it does not occur on time the Navy will be identifying, analyzing, and resolving any combat system problems on the first restart ship. Further, the Navy does not plan to fully test new capabilities until after certifying the upgrade as combat-ready, and has not planned for realistic operational testing necessary to fully demonstrate its integrated cruise and ballistic missile defense performance.
The Navy faces significant technical risks with its new Flight III DDG 51 ships, and the current level of oversight may not be sufficient given these risks. The Navy is pursuing a reasonable risk mitigation approach to AMDR development, but it will be technically challenging. According to Navy analysis, selecting the DDG 51 hullform to carry AMDR requires significant redesign and reduces the ability of these ships to accommodate future systems. This decision also limits the radar size to one that will be at best marginally effective and incapable of meeting the Navy’s desired capabilities. The Navy may have underestimated the cost of Flight III, and its plan to include the lead ship in a multiyear procurement contract given the limited knowledge about the configuration and the design of the ship creates potential cost risk. Finally, the current level of oversight may not be commensurate with a program of this size, cost, and risk and could result in less information being available to decision makers.
Why GAO Did This Study
After nearly a decade and almost $10 billion in development on Zumwalt class destroyers, the Navy changed its acquisition approach from procuring Zumwalts to restarting production of Arleigh Burke class destroyers (DDG 51) and building a new version, known as Flight III. As requested, GAO reviewed the Navy’s plans for DDG 51 and missile defense capabilities by (1) evaluating how the Navy determined the most appropriate platform to meet surface combatant requirements; (2) identifying and analyzing differences in design, cost, and schedule of the restart ships compared with previous ships; and (3) assessing the feasibility of Navy plans for maturing and integrating new technologies and capabilities. GAO analyzed Navy and contractor documentation and interviewed Navy, contractor, and other officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, including requiring the Navy to conduct thorough analyses of alternatives for its future surface combatant program and conduct realistic operational testing of the integrated missile defense capability of the DDG 51’s upgrade, ensuring that the Navy does not include the lead Flight III ship in a multiyear procurement request, and raising the level of oversight for this program. DOD agreed with the recommendations to varying degrees, but generally did not offer specific actions to address them. GAO believes all recommendations remain valid and has included matters for congressional consideration to ensure the soundness of the Navy’s business case.
For more information, contact Belva Martin at (202) 512-4841 or MartinB@gao.gov.
Status Legend:
- Review Pending
- Open
- Closed - implemented
- Closed - not implemented
Matters for Congressional Consideration
Matter: To help ensure that the department makes a sound investment moving forward, Congress may wish to consider directing the Secretary of Defense to include the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship in a multi-year procurement request only when the Navy has adequate knowledge about ship design, cost, and risk.
Status: Closed - Not Implemented
Comments: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic and Technical Systems) (DASD/ (STS) stated that the DoD is following the certification requirements of section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, regarding requests for multi-year procurement authority. Also, the DoD will make its determination on including or excluding Flight III ships within the certification of the planned multi-year procurement that was due to Congress by March 1, 2012. In addition, the DoD will select an acquisition approach that provides flexibility and minimizes the risk, both cost and technical, to successful procurement across all DDG 51 Class ships
Matter: To help ensure that the department makes a sound investment moving forward, Congress may wish to consider directing the Secretary of Defense to require the Navy to submit a thorough, well-documented AOA for the its future surface combatant program that follows both DOD acquisition guidance and the elements outlined in our first recommendation prior to issuing solicitations for any detail design and construction contracts of DDG 51 Flight III ships.
Status: Open
Comments: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic and Technical Systems) (DASD/(STS) disagreed with the recommendation to conduct another Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) relative to the way ahead for DDG 51 Flight III. The DASD (STS) stated that the Navy is currently conducting additional studies on Flight III and OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation will provide an assessment of the cost estimates in advance of awarding production contracts for the Flight III ships.
Matter: To help ensure that the department makes a sound investment moving forward, Congress may wish to consider directing the Secretary of Defense to elevate the ACAT status of the DDG 51 Flight III to an ACAT ID level if the decision is made to continue pursuing the program.
Status: Open
Comments: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic and Technical Systems) (DASD/ (STS) stated the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) will review the DDG 51 Flight III program and make a determination on the ACAT designation at the appropriate time. If the DAE determines that his oversight is needed, then the program will be designated ACAT 1D. The DASD (STS) stated that DoD plans to make the determination on ACAT designation for the Flight III program once sufficient information on the scope and cost of the modifications to the Flight IIa design are fully characterized, by the fourth quarter of FY 2012. Once the ACAT decision is made, the designated Milestone Decision Authority will select the appropriate milestone entry point and require an Acquisition Program Baseline along with assessments of design and technical risks and maturity to support entering the acquisition system at the selected point.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the planned DDG 51 multiyear procurement request does not include a Flight III ship.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should upgrade the oversight of the Navy's future surface combatant program to ACAT 1D status, and ensure that the appropriate milestone entry point is selected to provide cost baselines and assessments of design and technical risks and maturity.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to, in consultation with MDA and DOD and Navy weapons testers, define an operational testing approach for the Aegis ACB-12 upgrades that includes sufficient simultaneous live-fire testing needed to fully validate IAMD capabilities.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to report to Congress in its annual long-range shipbuilding plan on its plans for a future, larger surface combatant, carrying a more capable version of AMDR and the costs and quantities of this ship.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a thorough AOA in accordance with DOD acquisition guidance for its future surface combatant program to include: (a) a range of representative threat environments developed in concert with the intelligence community; (b) results of its ongoing Flight III studies and full cost estimates in advance of awarding DDG 51 Flight III production contracts; (c) implications of the ability of the preferred ship to accommodate new technologies on future capabilities to determine the most suitable ship to carry AMDR and meet near-term IAMD requirements and provide a path to far-term capabilities; (d) implications on future fleet composition; and (e) an assessment of sensor netting—conducted in consultation with MDA and other cognizant DOD components—to determine the risks inherent in the sensor netting concept, potential current or planned programs that could be leveraged, and how sensor netting could realistically be integrated with the selected future surface combatant to assist in conducting BMD. This AOA should be briefed to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Agency Affected: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.