DOD Business Transformation: Improved Management Oversight of Business System Modernization Efforts Needed

In our October 2010 report, we recommended that the Army develop a reliable integrated master schedule for the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) program that fully incorporated best practices, such as sequencing all activities, assigning resources to all activities, integrating schedule activities horizontally and vertically, establishing the critical path for all activities, identifying float between activities, conducting a schedule risk analysis, and updating schedule using logic and durations to determine dates. GFEBS is the Army's General Fund general ledger and became the Army's system of record at the beginning of Fiscal Year 2013. On July 1, 2012, the Army completed GFEBS deployment to more than 53,000 users at 227 locations. In June 2015, we obtained and reviewed the April 2015 GFEBS integrated master schedule and evaluated the schedule using the criteria described in GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide. We determined the extent to which the schedule was prepared in accordance with the above best practices. The Army's April 2015 GFEBS schedule addressed one best practice, sequencing all activities. However, we continued to identify that the remaining best practices were not yet fully addressed. Therefore, the Army did not fully meet best practices in developing a reliable schedule for the GFEBS program. The GFEBS IMS has an end date of December 2015 and is no longer relevant and we do not reasonably expect DOD to take any further actions to address this recommendations. Therefore we are closing this recommendation not implemented.

In our October 2010 report, we recommended that the Army develop a reliable integrated master schedule for the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army) program that fully incorporated best practices, such as capturing all activities, sequencing all activities, integrating schedule activities horizontally and vertically, establishing the critical path for all activities, and conducting a schedule risk analysis. In our September 2014 report, GAO-14-470, we found that although the Army made some improvements to the schedule that supported the December 2012 full deployment decision, the Army did not fully meet best practices in developing a reliable schedule for the GCSS-Army program. The GCSS-Army's December 2012 schedule addressed several of the best practices that were an issue in our prior report, including capturing all activities, sequencing all activities, and integrating activities horizontally and vertically. However, we continued to identify several best practices that were not yet fully addressed and also identified several new areas where the 2012 schedule did not incorporate best practices, such as activity durations and baseline schedule. Although GCSS-Army is in full deployment, without fully addressing best practices for scheduling, program managers will not have the best information available to make management decisions. It is critical to correct the deficiencies identified with the schedule to help ensure that the projected spending for this program is being used in the most efficient and effective manner. By incorporating best practices for developing a reliable schedule, DOD would increase the probability of GCSS-Army successfully achieving full deployment by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017 to provide needed functionality for financial improvement and audit readiness. We are following up with Army officials to obtain documentation for the GCSS-Army IMS and cost estimate to determine if DOD has taken corrective actions to address this recommendation. As a result, this recommendation is superseded by the recommendations in the GAO-14-470 report and as a result we are closing this recommendation as unimplemented and will continue to track the recommendations made in the GAO-14-470 report.

In our October 2010 report, we recommended that the Air Force develop a reliable integrated master schedule for the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) program that fully incorporated best practices, such as capturing all activities, sequencing all activities, integrating schedule activities horizontally and vertically, establishing the critical path for all activities, identifying float between activities, conducting a schedule risk analysis, and updating schedule using logic and durations to determine dates. In our February 2014 report, we found that the Air Force's schedule that supported the February 2012 Milestone B decision for DEAMS did not fully meet best practices in developing a reliable schedule for the DEAMS program. GAO found that the schedule supporting the Air Force's decision to invest in DEAMS, partially or minimally met the four characteristics for developing a high-quality and reliable schedule. For example, the schedule did not reflect all government and contractor activities, and resources were not assigned to specific activities. The schedule also lacked a valid critical path, preventing management from focusing on the activities most likely to cause critical program delays if they are not completed as planned. In addition, a schedule risk analysis was not conducted to predict a level of confidence in meeting the program's completion date. The results of our analyses of the DEAMS schedule reflected similar weaknesses to those we reported in October 2010. We have reviewed the DEAMS integrated master schedule (IMS) three times since 2012 and the most recent October 2015 IMS. There has not been any significant improvement in the quality of the schedules over this timeframe. Based on the limited amount of improvement on the DEAMS IMS since 2012, we do not reasonably expect DOD to take more actions to address the recommendation. Therefore we are closing this recommendation not implemented.

In our October 2010 report, we recommended that the Army update the cost estimate for the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army) by using actual cost and preparing a sensitivity analysis using best practices. In our September 2014 report, GAO-14-470, we found that while the Army made some improvements to the cost estimate that supported the December 2012 full deployment decision, the Army did not fully meet best practices in developing a reliable cost estimate for the GCSS-Army program. For the 2012 cost estimate, we found that the Army had made progress, but we continued to identify deficiencies in documentation related to the sensitivity analysis, risk and uncertainty analysis, and cross-checking of major cost elements for reasonableness. Therefore, the Army did not provide the information needed to support the full deployment decision for the GCSS-Army program. A reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any program and is updated continually throughout its life cycle. Such an estimate provides the basis for informed investment decision making, realistic budget formulation and program resourcing, meaningful progress measurement, proactive course correction when warranted, and accountability for results. By incorporating best practices for developing a reliable cost estimate, DOD would increase the probability of GCSS-Army successfully achieving full deployment by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017 to provide needed functionality for financial improvement and audit readiness. We are following up with Army officials to obtain documentation for GCSS-Army's IMS and cost estimate to determine if DOD has taken corrective actions to address this recommendation. As a result, this recommendation is superseded by the recommendations in the GAO-14-470 report and as a result we are closing this recommendation as unimplemented and will continue to track the recommendations made in the GAO-14-470 report.

In our October 2010 report, we recommended that the military departments establish performance measures based on quantitative data that will enable the department to assess whether the military service's ERP efforts are providing the intended business capabilities to the system users. DOD concurred with the recommendation and cited that the Department of Defense (DOD) would issue guidance requiring its business systems to include performance measures which can be used to assess expected business benefits. Also, the Department added that these measures would also be incorporated into the Business Enterprise Architecture. The Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) stated that the DCMO has put in place performance measures and metrics through the issuance of Acquisition Decision Memorandums addressed to the Department Secretaries and Chief Management Officers. However, documentation that was provided did not meet the intent of the recommendation because no performance measures were provided that addressed ERP business capabilities. We are closing the recommendation as not implemented.