Nuclear Weapons:

DOD and NNSA Need to Better Manage Scope of Future Refurbishments and Risks to Maintaining U.S. Commitments to NATO

GAO-11-387: Published: May 2, 2011. Publicly Released: May 2, 2011.

Additional Materials:

Contact:

John H. Pendleton
(404) 679-1816
contact@gao.gov

 

Office of Public Affairs
(202) 512-4800
youngc1@gao.gov

U.S. nuclear weapons are aging, with key components reaching the end of their service life. In September 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) began a study of military requirements and design options for extending the B61 bomb's service life. The B61 is used to support the U.S. strategic deterrent and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD and NNSA have (1) considered the time available to begin producing refurbished bombs when determining the scope of the study; and (2) taken actions to avoid operational gaps in U.S. nuclear weapons commitments to NATO during the life extension program. To evaluate these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD and NNSA policies, guidance, and reports on life extension programs, and interviewed officials responsible for B61 operations, life extension program planning, management, and oversight. This is the unclassified version of a classified report issued in December 2010.

DOD and NNSA have made progress in studying and updating the military's performance requirements for the B61 bomb and have ruled out some design options, but the broad scope of the study has complicated the effort, given the time available to begin producing refurbished bombs. Key components of the B61 bombs need to be replaced or they will begin reaching the end of their service life. However, the time and effort required to evaluate the broad scope, and other factors identified by DOD and NNSA officials, have prolonged the study by 1 year. Unlike prior life extension programs, the ongoing B61 study was broadly scoped to accomplish a variety of goals--such as considering previously untried design options and concepts--in addition to replacing the bomb's aging components. GAO's prior work on designing evaluative studies has shown that tailoring a study's scope to reflect relevant time constraints is a critical and well-established practice. However, the guidance for conducting life extension programs does not require DOD and NNSA to consider the available time when setting the scope for a life extension study. Because they have until September 2011 to complete the study, DOD and NNSA officials told GAO that it was premature to assess whether the study's broad scope put the life extension program at risk. However, future life extension programs are also likely to occur against the end of the existing warhead's service life. Unless DOD and NNSA clarify their procedures to require that future studies are properly scoped for the available time, they risk setting unrealistic goals and delaying future life extensions. Although DOD and NNSA believe the B61 study will be completed by September 2011, they have not yet prepared a long-term risk management plan to help avoid operational gaps and ensure that the United States will be able to maintain the capability to support its NATO commitments if the B61 life extension program is delayed or canceled. The United States has pledged to support its nuclear weapons commitments to NATO while the B61 life extension program is under way. In light of this pledge, NNSA and DOD plan to perform just-in-time maintenance on the affected bombs to ensure they remain operational until NNSA can deliver refurbished bombs to DOD. However, avoiding an operational capability gap over the long term may prove challenging, as previous nuclear weapons life extension programs have experienced schedule delays for a variety of reasons. GAO's prior work has shown that a risk management plan is a useful tool for identifying and measuring risks, developing and implementing risk handling options, and assessing risk reduction measures. DOD and NNSA have identified potential steps that could be taken to mitigate operational risks if the B61 life extension program is delayed, but they have not prepared a plan to offer options for managing these risks. Developing such a plan would help ensure that DOD and NNSA are prepared to implement necessary measures to preserve U.S. commitments to NATO. Furthermore, without guidance requiring that DOD and NNSA prepare such risk management plans, operational requirements for other weapons could also be at risk as they go through future life extension programs. GAO is making recommendations that address the need to scope future requirements and design studies to reflect the time available to complete the program and prepare risk management plans to address operational concerns caused by potential life extension program delays. DOD and NNSA agreed with the recommendations.

Recommendations for Executive Action

  1. Status: Open

    Comments: DOD and DOE concurred with this recommendation. In January 2015, DOD and DOE officials provided GAO a draft of the revised "Procedural Guideline for the 6.X Process." The draft guideline includes language that if incorporated into the final version would address this recommendation. It states that the Nuclear Weapons Council shall factor in the time available for completing refurbishment activities when establishing the scope of a Phase 6.2 feasibility study of military performance requirements and design options. This recommendation remains open pending the approval and issuance of the revised guideline.

    Recommendation: To reduce the risk that future Phase 6.2 studies for nuclear weapons life extension programs are not properly scoped given available time for completing a life extension, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy should direct the Nuclear Weapons Council to revise the "Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process" to require that the council factor in the time available for completing a life extension program when establishing the scope of a Phase 6.2 feasibility study of military performance requirements and design options.

    Agency Affected: Department of Energy

  2. Status: Closed - Implemented

    Comments: DOD and DOE concurred with this recommendation. The Nuclear Weapons Council tasked the Air Force to provide an operational risk assessment plan and mitigation scenarios ensuring there is no gap in supporting U.S. commitments to NATO. The Air Force completed an initial risk management plan in September 2011 for two early stages of the B61 life extension program and for a first production date in 2017. In March 2013, the Air Force issued a second risk management plan for the third phase of the program and for a revised first production date in 2019. The Air Force plans on issuing risk management plans for each subsequent phase in the B61 life extension program or when program management deems necessary. Based on the Air Force issuance of the two risk mitigation plans and the plans to issue additional risk mitigation plans as the program advances, we are closing this recommendation as implemented.

    Recommendation: To mitigate the risk that U.S. operational commitments will be affected by life extension program schedule delays, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy should direct the Nuclear Weapons Council to direct the appropriate DOD components, in coordination with NNSA, to prepare an operational risk management plan identifying the measures that would be required to ensure that the United States is able to maintain its commitments to NATO with no gaps in operational capability while the B61 life extension program is being carried out.

    Agency Affected: Department of Defense

  3. Status: Open

    Comments: DOD and DOE concurred with this recommendation. In January 2015, DOD and DOE officials provided GAO a draft of the revised "Procedural Guideline for the 6.X Process." The draft guideline includes language that if incorporated into the final version would address this recommendation. It states that the Phase 6.2. study report should document operational risk management plans to ensure U.S. operational commitments are not affected by the refurbishment activity. This recommendation remains open pending the approval and issuance of the revised guideline.

    Recommendation: To mitigate the risk that U.S. operational commitments will be affected by life extension program schedule delays, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy should direct the Nuclear Weapons Council to revise the Procedural "Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process" to require the council to direct the preparation of operational risk management plans during the planning and execution of future life extension programs.

    Agency Affected: Department of Energy

  4. Status: Open

    Comments: DOD and DOE concurred with this recommendation. In January 2015, DOD and DOE officials provided GAO a draft of the revised "Procedural Guideline for the 6.X Process." The draft guideline included language that if incorporated into the final version would address this recommendation. It states that the Nuclear Weapons Council shall factor in the time available for completing refurbishment activities when establishing the scope of a Phase 6.2 feasibility study of military performance requirements and design options. This recommendation remains open pending the approval and issuance of the revised guideline.

    Recommendation: To reduce the risk that future Phase 6.2 studies for nuclear weapons life extension programs are not properly scoped given available time for completing a life extension, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy should direct the Nuclear Weapons Council to revise the "Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process" to require that the council factor in the time available for completing a life extension program when establishing the scope of a Phase 6.2 feasibility study of military performance requirements and design options.

    Agency Affected: Department of Defense

  5. Status: Open

    Comments: DOD and DOE concurred with this recommendation. In January 2015, DOD and DOE officials provided GAO a draft of the revised "Procedural Guideline for the 6.X Process." The draft guideline included language that if incorporated into the final version would address this recommendation. It states that the Phase 6.2. study report should document operational risk management plans to ensure U.S. operational commitments are not affected by the refurbishment activity. This recommendation remains open pending the approval and issuance of the revised guideline.

    Recommendation: To mitigate the risk that U.S. operational commitments will be affected by life extension program schedule delays, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy should direct the Nuclear Weapons Council to revise the Procedural "Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process" to require the council to direct the preparation of operational risk management plans during the planning and execution of future life extension programs.

    Agency Affected: Department of Defense

  6. Status: Closed - Implemented

    Comments: DOD and DOE concurred with this recommendation. The Nuclear Weapons Council tasked the Air Force to provide an operational risk assessment plan and mitigation scenarios ensuring there is no gap in supporting U.S. commitments to NATO. The Air Force completed an initial risk management plan in September 2011 for two early stages of the B61 life extension program and for a first production date in 2017. In March 2013, the Air Force issued a second risk management plan for the third phase of the program and for a revised first production date in 2019. The Air Force plans on issuing risk management plans for each subsequent phase in the B61 life extension program or when program management deems necessary. Based on the Air Force issuance of the two risk mitigation plans, and the plans to issues additional ones as the program advances, we are closing this recommendation as implemented.

    Recommendation: To mitigate the risk that U.S. operational commitments will be affected by life extension program schedule delays, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy should direct the Nuclear Weapons Council to direct the appropriate DOD components, in coordination with NNSA, to prepare an operational risk management plan identifying the measures that would be required to ensure that the United States is able to maintain its commitments to NATO with no gaps in operational capability while the B61 life extension program is being carried out.

    Agency Affected: Department of Energy

 

Explore the full database of GAO's Open Recommendations »

Jul 28, 2015

Jul 27, 2015

Jul 13, 2015

Jul 10, 2015

Jul 8, 2015

Jun 29, 2015

Jun 23, 2015

Jun 17, 2015

Jun 15, 2015

Jun 12, 2015

Looking for more? Browse all our products here