Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide
Highlights
In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide.
NSC officials have approved a governmentwide strategy for the President's 4-year global nuclear material security initiative that describes the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and identifies the main efforts by U.S. agencies and programs to support the initiative. However, this interagency strategy lacks specific details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the identity of vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. As a result, key details associated with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost, time frame, and scope of planned work. Three NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs GAO reviewed--the MPC&A program, the Materials Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)--have made varying degrees of progress in securing Russian nuclear warheads and materials. While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress securing Russia's nuclear warhead and material facilities, the MCC and GTRI programs have had more limited success achieving their objectives in Russia. Moreover, the future of these efforts in Russia is unclear because of questionable high-level Russian political commitment to nuclear security cooperation with the United States. Each of these three programs also faces implementation challenges. The MPC&A program, in particular, faces challenges in successfully completing upgrades against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities and in transitioning responsibility to Russia for sustaining MPC&A systems. Because of the time required to address these challenges, NNSA is unlikely to meet a deadline under current U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will need to continue in Russia beyond the statutory deadline. In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other countries on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. In two countries believed to have large nuclear material stockpiles--China and India--political sensitivities have limited NNSA's efforts in both nations to the relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices, training, and demonstration projects instead of implementing MPC&A activities directly at nuclear sites. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon-usable nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI program, including key countries that made new commitments at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable nuclear material stockpiles. In particular, NNSA officials reported progress in negotiations with several nations--including Ukraine and South Africa--following the summit for the removal of some highly enriched uranium located in those countries. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program activities in Russia. GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC&A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations
Matter for Congressional Consideration
| Matter | Status | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| Because of the likely need for the MPC&A program to work with Russia past December 31, 2012, Congress may wish to consider amending the current law--as initially laid out in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003--to give the MPC&A program additional time to work toward achievement of an MPC&A system that Russia is prepared for and capable of sustaining on its own. Considering input from the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA as recommended below, Congress may wish to consider such an extension for a fixed period of time. | In section 3119 of the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress amended the law and extended authority for the MPC&A program to continue activities until January 1, 2018 toward achievement of an MPC&A system in Russia sustained solely by the Russian government. |
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| National Nuclear Security Administration | To assist Congress in its decision whether and for how long to extend the current deadline, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA should clarify in a written plan the scope of remaining MPC&A work in Russia beyond the current program deadline, including information on remaining MPC&A activities by site or facility, timelines, and estimated costs of completing MPC&A program work in that country. |
In October 2012, NNSA and the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation signed an updated U.S.-Russian MPC&A Cooperation Joint Action Plan. Among other things, this plan identifies the remaining scope of MPC&A work in Russia through December, 2017, consistent with the new program deadline approved by Congress in the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act. The updated plan describes work scope by site and building and includes information on the status of each project and associated timelines for completing the work by the end of 2017.
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| Department of Energy | To assist Congress in its decision whether and for how long to extend the current deadline, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA should clarify in a written plan the scope of remaining MPC&A work in Russia beyond the current program deadline, including information on remaining MPC&A activities by site or facility, timelines, and estimated costs of completing MPC&A program work in that country. |
In October 2012, NNSA and the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation signed an updated U.S.-Russian MPC&A Cooperation Joint Action Plan. Among other things, this plan identifies the remaining scope of MPC&A work in Russia through December, 2017, consistent with the new program deadline approved by Congress in the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act. The updated plan describes work scope by site and building and includes information on the status of each project and associated timelines for completing the work by the end of 2017.
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| Department of Energy | To enhance NNSA nuclear nonproliferation program planning, and provide a clearer picture of Russia's willingness and ability to support and sustain MPC&A and other nuclear security investments the United States has made in Russia, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA should strengthen cooperation with the Russian government regarding the transparency of its current and future spending plans on nuclear security programs and activities. |
In August 2015, NNSA officials told us that they have made a good faith effort to address this recommendation by regularly discussing with Russian officials the possibility of the Russian government providing greater transparency into its current and future spending plans on nuclear security efforts. However, NNSA officials told us that Russia considers this information to be very sensitive and has been reluctant to share it with NNSA. However, NNSA officials have documented through MPC&A sustainability and transition guidelines--including an updated version of the guidelines issued in February 2013--the plans for transitioning responsibility for specific MPC&A activities from the United States to Russian partner organizations or facilities.
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| National Nuclear Security Administration | To enhance NNSA nuclear nonproliferation program planning, and provide a clearer picture of Russia's willingness and ability to support and sustain MPC&A and other nuclear security investments the United States has made in Russia, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA should strengthen cooperation with the Russian government regarding the transparency of its current and future spending plans on nuclear security programs and activities. |
In August 2015, NNSA officials told us that they have made a good faith effort to address this recommendation by regularly discussing with Russian officials the possibility of the Russian government providing greater transparency into its current and future spending plans on nuclear security efforts. However, NNSA officials told us that Russia considers this information to be very sensitive and has been reluctant to share it with NNSA. However, NNSA officials have documented through MPC&A sustainability and transition guidelines--including an updated version of the guidelines issued in February 2013--the plans for transitioning responsibility for specific MPC&A activities from the United States to Russian partner organizations or facilities.
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| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA should reevaluate NNSA strategies--with an eye toward new incentives, inducements, or other sources of leverage--to persuade Russia to expand its cooperation with the MCC and GTRI programs with the goal of expediting the consolidation of Russian HEU to fewer locations and the conversion of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU)-fueled research reactors and related facilities. |
NNSA officials told GAO in August 2015 that there have been mixed results regarding the implementation of this recommendation and the two NNSA programs it pertains to. Regarding the reactor conversion program, NNSA officials responded that they had achieved a Russian commitment to convert one or two Russian research reactors among the six reactors identified in our report which Russia had agreed to subject to conversion feasibility studies. However, NNSA officials told us that Russia had not agreed to conversion feasibility of its research reactors beyond these 6, and that U.S. assistance to support the conversion of 1-2 Russian research reactors could be limited by congressional restrictions on nuclear security assistance to Russia. Regarding the MCC program and efforts to consolidate HEU to fewer locations, NNSA officials indicated that there had not been further progress beyond what we reported due to the continuing lack of a formal U.S.-Russian government-to-government agreement for the program that was needed to expand program activities.
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| National Nuclear Security Administration | The Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA should reevaluate NNSA strategies--with an eye toward new incentives, inducements, or other sources of leverage--to persuade Russia to expand its cooperation with the MCC and GTRI programs with the goal of expediting the consolidation of Russian HEU to fewer locations and the conversion of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU)-fueled research reactors and related facilities. |
NNSA officials told GAO in August 2015 that there have been mixed results regarding the implementation of this recommendation and the two NNSA programs it pertains to. Regarding the reactor conversion program, NNSA officials responded that they had achieved a Russian commitment to convert one or two Russian research reactors among the six reactors identified in our report which Russia had agreed to subject to conversion feasibility studies. However, NNSA officials told us that Russia had not agreed to conversion feasibility of its research reactors beyond these 6, and that U.S. assistance to support the conversion of 1-2 Russian research reactors could be limited by congressional restrictions on nuclear security assistance to Russia. Regarding the MCC program and efforts to consolidate HEU to fewer locations, NNSA officials indicated that there had not been further progress beyond what we reported due to the continuing lack of a formal U.S.-Russian government-to-government agreement for the program that was needed to expand program activities.
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| National Security Council | To provide a clear sense of the overall scope of work anticipated under the President's initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years, the NSC should lead and coordinate through NNSA, DOD, State, and other relevant agencies, including members of the intelligence community, the development of a comprehensive plan for implementing the initiative. Such a plan should clearly identify the specific foreign countries, sites, and facilities where materials have been determined to be poorly secured, and include information specifying the agencies and programs responsible for addressing each location; planned activities, potential implementation challenges, and steps needed to overcome those challenges at each location; and estimated time frames and costs associated with achievement of the 4-year goal. |
National Security Council Staff have not provided information to GAO indicating that such a comprehensive plan had been developed. The 4-year initiative was completed in 2013.
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