Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) Program Faces Cost, Schedule and Performance Risks
GAO-10-758R
Published: Jul 02, 2010. Publicly Released: Jul 02, 2010.
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Highlights
This letter formally transmits the briefing in response to a congressional request on May 4, 2009, that we review the EFV program. We provided congressional staff a draft copy of this briefing in meeting with them on June 9, 2010. We provided the same draft to the Department of Defense (DOD) for comments. A summary of DOD's comments with our evaluation are also attached, as well as a reprinted copy of DOD's written comments.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | In light of the current EFV schedule and reliability concerns, changing threats, and developments in other capabilities, the Secretary of Defense should reevaluate the EFV business case and confirm that the EFV remains a required asset and is the preferred approach to providing the desired amphibious assault capabilities prior to the start of procurement. |
On Feb 16, 2011 Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) directed that the EFV program be cancelled and not be funded in the FY 2012 budget. The EFV was considered unaffordable. We reported in our July 2010 report that EFV costs could increase due to concurrency, redesign effort, and final procurement quantity. Mr. Carter directed that the Secretary of the Navy prepare an orderly "shut-down" and cancellation plan for my review and approval." The requirement for a ship-to-shore amphibious assault capability, however,was not cancelled. As a result an analysis-of-alternative (AOA) has been started which will evaluate the operational effectiveness, cost, and risks of a proposed Amphibious Combat Vehicle platforms that meets the operational requirements of the Marine Corps. The AOA is to not only identify the most cost effective alternative, but to also make a compelling statement about the military utility of acquiring it.
|
| Department of Defense | If it is determined that the program should continue, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Marine Corps to ensure that knowledge is gained from the following, prior to the start of operational assessment 2 (OA-2): (1) delivery and testing of Mod 100 prototype vehicles; (2) delivery and developmental testing of SDD-2 prototypes and training of OA-2 operational crews; (3) completion of qualification testing and modifications of SDD-2 prototypes; and (4) availability of armor appliqu? for OA-2 testing. |
The cancellation of the EFV achieves the intent of GAO's recommendations for this program, which was that informed decisions be made in the interest of the Department of Defense and the American taxpayer.
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| Department of Defense | If it is determined that the program should continue, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Marine Corps to add another operational assessment to better verify that the EFV effort is in fact progressing along a reliability growth curve that should result in the EFV's demonstrating required reliability during its initial operational test and evaluation. |
The cancellation of the EFV achieves the intent of GAO's recommendations for this program, which was that informed decisions be made in the interest of the Department of Defense and the American taxpayer.
|
| Department of Defense | If it is determined that the program should continue, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Marine Corps to delay the EFV production decision (Milestone C) until the recommended additional operational assessment and a design projected to provide the minimum required reliability are completed. |
The cancellation of the EFV achieves the intent of GAO's recommendations for this program, which was that informed decisions be made in the interest of the Department of Defense and the American taxpayer.
|
| Department of Defense | If it is determined that the program should continue, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Marine Corps to reduce low-rate initial production (LRIP) quantities to the minimum necessary and if in excess of 10 percent of the current total planned buy, have the acquisition executive approve the rationale for the higher LRIP quantity. |
The cancellation of the EFV achieves the intent of GAO's recommendations for this program, which was that informed decisions be made in the interest of the Department of Defense and the American taxpayer.
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Cost analysisDevelopmental testingMilitary land vehiclesMilitary materielMilitary procurementMilitary technologyOperational testingPerformance measuresProcurement planningProgram evaluationRisk factorsSchedule slippagesProgram costs