Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the New Technology

According to DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), the current generation of radiation equipment, the polyvinyl toulene (PVT) portal monitors currently in use have limitations. Specifically, PVTs can detect radiation but cannot identify the source. To deal with this shortcoming, beginning in 2005, DNDO began developing and testing advanced spectroscopic portals (ASP), a new type of portal monitor designed to both detect radiation and identify the sources.However, concerned about the performance and cost of the new ASP monitors, Congress required the Secretary of Homeland Security to certify that the monitors will provide a "significant increase in operational effectiveness" before DNDO obligated funds for full-scale ASP procurement to replace many of the currently deployed PVTs. However, we found that DNDO had not completed efforts to fine tune PVTs' software and thereby improve sensitivity to nuclear materials. As a result, the criteria that compared ASPs to the current performance of PVTs did not take potential improvements into account, which affected any assessment of "significant" improvement over current technology. Accordingly, in May 2009, we recommended that DHS assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for significant increase in operatioal effectiveness based on a valid comparison of with PVTs' full performance potential, including the potential to furhter develop PVTs' use of energy windowing to provide greater sensitivity to threats. Energy windowing is one of the potential improvements that DNDO and CBP are investigating. DNDO has reported to Congress on several occasions on the PVT radiation portal monitor (RPM) improvement projects that are being pursued. Specifically, DNDO has spent $2.6 million in FY 2010, $1.8 million in FY 2012, and has requested $5 million for FY 2013 for research and development ot improve the capabilities of existing PVTs. Examples of projects include optimizing anomaly detection and background radiation. According to DNDO officials, a DHS Acquisition Review Board (ARB) was held in April 2011 to review the ASP program and an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) was issued recommending to the Secretary of Homeland Security that the department not seek certification of the ASP at that time. Shortly after the issuance of the ADM, the Secretary informed Congress of her decision to cancel the ASP program. In the letter to Congress, the Secretary stated that CBP would continue to rely on currently deployed radiation portal monitors and next-generation hand-held detection devises for secondary scanning for the foreseeable future. Further, according to DNDO offials, DNDO continues to work with CBP to investigate improvements that can be implemented in the currently deployed PVT RPM systems. According to DNDO officials, The John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is also in the process of conducting verification and validation (V&V) on PVT RPM improvement projects. Once the V&V is completed, DNDO will work with CBP to conduct a study to determine the path forward.

The original schedule for ASP testing and certification was revised several times by DHS/DNDO officials and, ultimately, the program was cancelled by Secretary Napalitano in an October 3, 2011 letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security. When this recommendation was made in May 2008 DNDO/DHS officials were intent on completing the ASP testing and certification process by September 30, 2008. In the event, integration testing, injection studies, and field validation testing extended for years; it was the ultimate failure of ASPs to pass field validation testing after three rounds that led to the 2011 decision to terminate the program.

While the ASPs were not certified, and DNDO formally cancelled the ASP program, DNDO implemented the intent of this recommendation by deploying a limited number of ASPs to a few field locations so that, among other things, they could uncover and resolve any additional problems not identified through testing. Specifically, we reported in May 2013 (GAO-13-256) that DNDO is working with state agencies to gather data using five existing ASPs installed at state-operated truck weigh stations in five states. (These ASPs were relocated to state weigh stations after being used in the DNDO testing campaign.) According to a DNDO official, data collected will include information on the trucks and cargo passing through the ASPs, as well as the performance of the ASP in detecting radiation. According to a DNDO official, data collected by the five ASPs will be sent to DNDO's Joint Analysis Center Collaborative Information System, which informs DNDO about nuclear detection and coordinates responses to nuclear detection alarms. This official told us the data will be analyzed to determine the types of cargo transported, and any trends that may be apparent.