Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks

Section 522(a) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2005, set forth 10 conditions related to the development and implementation of Secure Flight that the program must successfully meet in order to become operational. Under this act, GAO was required to review the Secure Flight program until it determined that all 10 conditions had been successfully met. Statutory Condition 3 required the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to demonstrate the efficacy and accuracy of the search tools used as part of Secure Flight and perform stress testing on the Secure Flight system. In May 2009, we reported that TSA had generally achieved the part of Condition 3 that requires TSA to demonstrate the efficacy and accuracy of the search tools used as part of Secure Flight. At that time, TSA reported that it was considering conducting periodic reviews of the Secure Flight system's matching capabilities and results (i.e., false positives and false negatives) to determine whether the system was performing as intended, but had not yet made final decisions regarding whether to conduct such reviews. GAO recommended that DHS take action to periodically assess the performance of the Secure Flight system's name-matching capabilities and results. In response, TSA developed performance measures to report and monitor Secure Flight's name matching capabilities. According to TSA, Secure Flight leadership reviews the daily reports, which reflect quality, match rate, false positive rates, and other metrics. Reviews include analysis, discussion with program leadership, and identification of process and data quality improvements to increase efficiency and reduce possible false positive matches to the watchlist. In addition, DHS established a multi-departmental Match Review Board Working Group and a Match Review Board to review the performance measures and watchlist matching system behaviors and recommend system changes to improve system performance. The working group meets every 2 weeks and is co-chaired by the Secure Flight Director of Vetting Analysis and the Deputy Director for Vetting. The Match Review Board is chaired by the Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office General Manager for Operations and co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Intelligence, and consists of management-level individuals who have decision-making authority concerning procedural and system change recommendations. The board meets monthly, or as required, to review working group findings and to make system change recommendations. Based on these actions, we consider this recommendation closed as implemented.