Defense Acquisitions: Cost to Deliver Zumwalt-Class Destroyers Likely to Exceed Budget
GAO-08-804
Published: Jul 31, 2008. Publicly Released: Jul 31, 2008.
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Highlights
In October 2008, the U.S. Navy will begin construction of the first of two lead DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers--at an expected cost of $6.3 billion. Given the history of cost growth on shipbuilding programs, as well as the Navy's request for approval of a third ship, GAO was asked to assess the progress of the program. GAO examined (1) whether key systems can be delivered on time and work as intended (2) design maturity (3) shipyard readiness and (4) whether lead and follow-on DDG 1000 ships can be built within budget. To accomplish this, our work included analysis of schedules, ship progress reviews and cost estimates; interviews with Navy and other officials; and our own past work.
Recommendations
Matter for Congressional Consideration
| Matter | Status | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| To provide insight into the potential for cost growth as the program progresses, the Congress may wish to consider requiring the Navy to report on (1) the current production and testing schedule for systems necessary to meet ship light-off, ship delivery, and combat system activation; (2) any changes to this schedule, particularly with the dual band radar and the total ship computing environment; and (3) the cost impact of these changes if the schedule is maintained and if the schedule is stretched out. | This recommendation is being closed as it has been overtaken by events. A report to Congress was triggered by section 2433a of title 10 (Nunn-McCurdy cost breach). The report covers changes in schedule, testing requirements and a decision to remove the volume search radar (a part of the dual band radar) from the ship due to cost concerns. A report was sent to Congress on June 1, 2010. |
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should require the Navy to complete product modeling of the ship's design to the level currently planned before the start of construction. |
The Navy aimed to have 85 percent of product modeling for the ship's design zones essentially complete at the start of construction of the lead ship initially planned for October 2008. However, at the program's production readiness reviews in October 2008, the shipbuilders had completed less than 35 percent of the product model and faced challenges maintaining its design schedule. Rather than proceeding with ship construction, the Navy delayed the start of ship construction by 4 months to February 2009 in order to mature the ship's design. According to the Navy, almost 90 percent of the design zones are complete, emphasizing that no zone will start construction until the design for that zone is done.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should defer contract award for follow-on ships until the Navy has completed a substantial amount of construction on the lead ships. |
At the time of our report, the Navy planned to award a contract for the third ship (DDG 1002) as early as January 2009, when less than 3 months of construction on the first ship was expect to occur. Our report concluded that this would provide too little knowledge to inform cost estimates or retire risks associated with lead ships. The Navy is now planning to award the contract in the fall of 2010. Substantial progress has been made on construction of the lead ship. We reported in March 2010 that 68 percent of the units that make up the ship were in production. By October 2010, the Navy will be 20 months into the construction of the lead ship, providing much greater insight into construction issues and challenges than initially envisioned.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should hold the Milestone C review in advance of awarding a contract for the third ship. |
The DDG 1000 program completed a milestone review in October 2010, following recertification under a Nunn-McCurdy breach. This milestone approval included authorization to proceed with the start of construction of the third ship.
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Topics
Agency missionsBattleshipsBudget activitiesConstruction costsCost analysisCost overrunsDefense budgetsDefense cost controlIntegrated softwareMilitary forcesMilitary systems analysisMilitary vesselsMission critical systemsNaval procurementProgram evaluationRisk managementSchedule slippagesShipbuilding industryShipsShipyardsStrategic planningSystem softwareSystems designSystems testingCost estimatesCost growthProgram costs