Nuclear Safety: NRC's Oversight of Fire Protection at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Reactor Units Could Be Strengthened

In essence, NRC disagreed with the recommendation and likely will not implement it. As with all the recommendations in this report, NRC initially did not make specific comments, but said the report was accurate and complete and stated it intended to give the findings and recommendations serious consideration. In its 60-day letter, however, NRC stated that while the implementation of long-term interim compensatory measures is less than ideal, that situation does not introduce safety concerns because (1) defense in depth at nuclear plants provides adequate protection, and (2) NRC inspectors periodically inspect a sample of each plants compensatory measures for adequacy. NRC states that as part of its fire protection closure plan, NRC staff would resolve the issues that underlie the need for compensatory measures, and the Commission states that staff will develop "meaningful metrics" to gauge the progress of plan implementation. NRC stated in April 2009 that it considered the recommendation closed.

Initially, as with all the recommendations in this report, NRC initially did not make specific comments, but said the report was accurate and complete and stated it intended to give the findings and conclusions serious consideration. In its 60-day letter, NRC stated it has been working on resolving fire-wrap issues since the early 1990s; specifically, it has reviewed design and test results from vendors, observed fire barrier configurations at selected plants, performed small scale testing itself, and as a result has updated NRC guidance on testing and acceptance criteria. NRC adds it has taken additional steps including periodic safety inspections, issuance of generic communications, and the issuance of confirmatory orders. Importantly NRC states it issued Generic Letter 2006-03 addressing Hemyc and MT fire barrier issues, and based on licensees responses to the GL, NRC staff would complete inspection efforts to close out Hemyc and MT issues for plants that have not committed to adopting NFPA 805 (the risk-informed regulatory approach) by 12/31/08. On April 16, 2009, NRC advised us that it planned no additional tests on the fire wraps, because the fire wrap industry had performed additional qualifying tests in 2005 and 2006 with similar results to NRC testing. NRC informed plants in a memorandum dated 12/17/2008 that those that did not commit to NFPA-805 had resolved the fire barrier issues through approvals for amendments, or exemptions, or by completions of plant modifications to achieve compliance. NRC states it considers the recommendation closed and plans no further actions.