Defense Acquisitions: Success of Advanced SEAL Delivery System Hinges on Establishing a Sound Contracting Strategy and Performance Criteria
GAO-07-745
Published: May 24, 2007. Publicly Released: May 24, 2007.
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Highlights
The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is a hybrid combatant submersible providing clandestine delivery and extraction of Navy SEALs and equipment in high-threat environments. The first ASDS has had significant performance issues and has cost, to date, over $885 million. In May 2006, Congress requested that GAO review ASDS. This report examines (1) how the Navy managed ASDS risks through its contracts and (2) the status of major technical issues and program restructuring.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | In order to prevent the government from accepting additional undue risks and expense on ASDS, the Secretary of Defense should establish acceptable cost, schedule, and performance criteria, based on fully defined scopes of work, and assess the boat's ability to meet these criteria at the Phase 1 and Phase 2 critical systems reviews and at the management reviews. If, by the time of the program decision in mid-2008, ASDS does not meet acceptable cost, schedule, or performance criteria, the Secretary of Defense should discontinue the effort and not proceed with further tests. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD agreed that the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) program needs acceptable cost, schedule, and performance criteria. The Navy and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) developed an ASDS Management Plan that included evaluation criteria and established management program reviews with off ramps. DOD stated that the ASDS future program status would be determined at these management reviews rather than solely at the completion of the ASDS critical systems reviews. In November 2008 ASDS was damaged by a fire that broke out while the batteries were recharging. On July 24, 2009 SOCOM issued a news release stating that the Navy's estimate to repair was $237 million--$180 million more than SOCOM's ASDS budget--and that competing funding priorities prevent the command from repairing ASDS.
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| Department of Defense | In order to prevent the government from accepting additional undue risks and expense on ASDS, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that, if the review results meet acceptable cost, schedule, and performance criteria, the design changes resulting from the Phase 1 critical systems review essential for demonstrating ASDS reliability and maintainability be incorporated in sufficient time to be tested under operational conditions prior to the planned mid-2008 decision on how to best meet special operations forces' requirements. |
Closed – Not Implemented
DOD partially agreed but noted that there are identified design changes (e.g. hydro-dynamic mitigation) that would not not be completed by the 2008 decision due to the time it takes to develop, build, install, and test. The decision on which critical systems reviews (CSR) design changes are implemented and installed will depend on the relative improvement expected, scope of the effort needed, as well as available time and funding. According to DOD, testing might be accomplished without some recommended improvements being made to gauge progress and acceptability of the vehicle and to support an overall program decision. Additionally, DOD commented unforeseen program issues could result in a decision to discontinue the ASDS effort without any additional operational testing. In November 2008 ASDS was damaged by a fire that began while recharging the batteries. The Navy estimated it would cost $237 million and 32 months to repair. In July 2009, the U.S. Special Operations Command stated that this was $180 million more than its ASDS budget and announced that competing funding priorities prevent the command from repairing ASDS.
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| Department of Defense | In order to prevent the government from accepting additional undue risks and expense on ASDS, the Secretary of Defense should require the Navy to include provisions in the ASDS contracting strategy chosen when the existing basic ordering agreement expires that (1) appropriately balance risk between the government and the contractor through the contract types selected, (2) incentivize the contractor's performance and promote accountability for achieving desired outcomes by properly structuring the award and incentive fees, and (3) provide the kind of management and oversight of the program necessary to hold the contractor accountable for performance. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. A new Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) was put in place for the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) Program on July 23, 2007. The Delivery Order issued to accomplish Phase 2 of the ASDS critical systems reviews was a Cost Plus Incentive Fee effort which balances risk and promotes contractor accountability. The incentive fee structure is similar to the award fee structure that was successfully utilized for Phase 1 of the critical system reviews. The Navy has continued to maximize the use of incentivized contract efforts for the development of Phase 1 recommendations. The execution of the Delivery Orders are managed and overseen by senior personnel in the Program Office.
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AccountabilityContract administrationContract oversightContract performanceContractsCost analysisDefense cost controlDefense procurementDepartment of Defense contractorsNaval procurementOperational testingPerformance managementProgram managementRisk management