Cybercrime: Public and Private Entities Face Challenges in Addressing Cyber Threats
Highlights
Computer interconnectivity has produced enormous benefits but has also enabled criminal activity that exploits this interconnectivity for financial gain and other malicious purposes, such as Internet fraud, child exploitation, identity theft, and terrorism. Efforts to address cybercrime include activities associated with protecting networks and information, detecting criminal activity, investigating crime, and prosecuting criminals. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the impact of cybercrime on our nation's economy and security; (2) describe key federal entities, as well as nonfederal and private sector entities, responsible for addressing cybercrime; and (3) determine challenges being faced in addressing cybercrime. To accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed multiple reports, studies, and surveys and held interviews with public and private officials.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Homeland Security | The Attorney General should direct the FBI Director and the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Director of the Secret Service to assess the impact of the current rotation approach on their respective law enforcement analytical and technical capabilities to investigate and prosecute cybercrime and to modify their approaches, as appropriate. |
In response to this recommendation, the assistant director of the Office of Professional Responsibility within the United States Secret Service (USSS) conducted an analysis to assess the impact of the current rotation approach on their respective law enforcement analytical and technical capabilities to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. Specifically, the Office of Professional Responsibility reviewed the staffing levels from 2006 through 2010 and compared them to the number of Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program (ECSAP) examinations performed, to determine a ratio of agents to examinations. The results of the analysis indicated that there was no downward trend and production in this area of expertise has remained relatively consistent throughout the five year period. Officials stated that the sole anomaly to this trend occurred during fiscal year 2008, and was a direct result of the delay in the rotation of agents due to USSS increased protection efforts during the Presidential Primary and National Elections. Further, since the investigative case load for the USSS is predicated on the volume and complexity of each case referred to the agency for investigation and that the ratio of agents to examinations remained relatively consistent during the five year period, USSS determined that rotating ECSAP agents does not negatively affect the agency's ability to investigate cybercrime.
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| Office of the Attorney General | The Attorney General should direct the FBI Director and the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Director of the Secret Service to assess the impact of the current rotation approach on their respective law enforcement analytical and technical capabilities to investigate and prosecute cybercrime and to modify their approaches, as appropriate. |
In response to this recommendation, the FBI Director and the Special Agents in Charge discussed the mandated rotational policies at quarterly meetings and determined that these policies help to position the FBI to counter cyber threats to national security. Furthermore, reviews of all requests for additional or replacement special agents for the cyber-funded staffing level are handled by the Assistant Director, Cyber Division, and, as a result of the rotational transfer policy, no transfers for special agents have been required. Other non-rotational transfers are reviewed annually. These transfers are based on, among other things, critical needs, and mitigate the imbalance of the rotational policy.
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