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Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment

GAO-07-1247T Published: Sep 18, 2007. Publicly Released: Sep 18, 2007.
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Highlights

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in our national defenses against such threats. DHS has sponsored testing to develop new monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors. In March 2006, GAO recommended that DNDO conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the new portal monitors were worth the additional cost. In June 2006, DNDO issued its analysis. In October 2006, GAO concluded that DNDO did not provide a sound analytical basis for its decision to purchase and deploy ASP technology and recommended further testing of ASPs. DNDO conducted this ASP testing at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) between February and March 2007. GAO's statement addresses the test methods DNDO used to demonstrate the performance capabilities of the ASPs and whether the NTS test results should be relied upon to make a full-scale production decision.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security should delay Secretarial Certification and full-scale production decisions of the ASPs until all relevant tests and studies have been completed and limitations to these tests and studies have been identified and addressed. Furthermore, results of these tests and studies should be validated and made fully transparent to the Department of Energy (DOE), the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other relevant parties.
Closed – Implemented
DHS did in fact delay Secretarial Certification and, as discussed in GAO-09-655 (May 2009), designed and coordinated a new series of tests, originally scheduled to run from April 2008 through September 2008, to determine whether the new portal monitors meet the certification criteria. The audit work for the 2009 report also showed that DOE and CBP were participating in test design and analysis of test results. Delays to the 2008 round of testing have pushed back DHS' schedule for certification even further. In its May 2009 report, GAO issued an updated recommendation that DHS revise the schedule for ASP testing and certification to allow sufficient time for review and analysis of results from the final phases of testing and completion of all tests, including injection studies.
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security should, once the tests and studies have been completed, evaluated, and validated, determine in cooperation with CBP, DOE, and other stakeholders including independent reviewers, if additional testing is needed.
Closed – Implemented
The audit work for GAO's 2009 report on ASP testing (GAO-09-655) showed that the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has cooperated with CBP and DOE regarding the need for additional testing. For example, CBP added a final requirement to integration testing before proceeding to field validation to demonstrate ASPs' ability to operate for 40 hours without additional problems.
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security should, if additional testing is needed, appoint an independent group within DHS, not aligned with the ASP acquisition process, to conduct objective, comprehensive, and transparent testing that realistically demonstrates the capabilities and limitations of the ASP system. This independent group would be separate from the recently appointed independent review panel.
Closed – Implemented
As GAO reported in May 2009 (GAO-09-655), the involvement of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate provided an independent check, within DHS, of the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's efforts to develop and test ASPs. The Science and Technology Directorate, which is responsible for developing and implementing the department's test and evaluation policies and standards, will have the lead role in the final phase of ASP testing. The Science and Technology Directorate identified two critical questions to be addressed through operational testing: (1) Will the ASP system improve operational effectiveness (i.e., detection and identification of threats) relative to the current-generation system, and (2) is the ASP system suitable for use in the operational environment at land and sea ports of entry?
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security should report the results of the tests and analyses to the appropriate congressional committees before large scale purchases of ASP's are made.
Closed – Implemented
On January 9, 2009 DHS/DNDO officials reported the full, classified results of the ASP testing to the staff of the appropriate committees of Congress. This briefing went into great detail about the capabilities of the ASP and PVT in detecting, among other things, certain nuclear materials. The briefing was based largely on the most recent, 2008 round of field testing, a round that GAO found in GAO-09-655 to be generally valid and much improved over previous rounds of testing. On of July 26, 2011 DNDO's Director, Warren Stern, in testimony before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cyber security, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, announced that he was canceling the ASP program. As a result, there will be no procurement beyond the very small procurement of ASPs done for testing, evaluation, and research purposes. This briefing was accomplished before any large scale purchases of ASPs were made.

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Topics

Cost analysisData collectionHazardous substancesHomeland securityInspectionNuclear materialsOperational testingProduct evaluationRadiation monitoringSmugglingStandardsTestingBenefit-cost tracking