Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records

In a January 2005 report (Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records, GAO-05-127), we identified a number of potential problems in the procedures that the FBI and applicable state agencies follow when a potential gun purchaser is identified as a valid match with a terrorist watch list record. While being on the watch list does not, in itself, disqualify an applicant from purchasing a gun, it is important that the maximum amount of allowable information from firearm-related background checks be consistently shared with counterterrorism officials. However, our work revealed that federal and state procedures for handling these background checks do not clearly address the specific types of information that can or should be routinely provided to counterterrorism officials or the sources from which such information can be obtained. We recommended that the Attorney General clarify procedures to ensure that the maximum amount of allowable information from firearm-related background checks involving terrorist watch list records is consistently shared with counterterrorism officials. This recommendation has been adopted; the FBI revised its standard operating procedures to explicitly permit the additional information to be shared.

In a January 2005 report (Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records, GAO-05-127), we identified a number of potential problems in the FBI's oversight of the states' handling of firearm-related background checks involving terrorist watch list records. Specifically, we found that the FBI did not have aggregate data on the number of these transactions that had been approved or denied by state agencies to date. Also, the FBI had not assessed the extent to which the states had implemented and followed applicable procedures for handling terrorism-related firearm transactions. Further, we found that more frequent FBI oversight or centralized management of these transactions would help address other types of issues we identified--such as several states' delays in implementing procedures and one state's mishandling of a terrorism-related background check. We recommended that the Attorney General either strengthen the FBI's oversight of state agencies or have the FBI centrally manage all firearm-related background checks involving valid matches with terrorist watch list records. This recommendation has been adopted: the FBI has assumed responsibility for processing all NICS firearm related transactions involving terrorists.