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Force Structure: Department of the Navy's Tactical Aviation Integration Plan Is Reasonable, but Some Factors Could Affect Implementation

GAO-04-900 Published: Aug 13, 2004. Publicly Released: Aug 13, 2004.
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Highlights

The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act and the Senate Report for the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO examine the Navy and Marine Corps' Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. In response to these mandates, this report addresses (1) how Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force structure, and procurement costs change; (2) the methodology and assumptions the services used to analyze the potential for integrating the forces; (3) the analytical process the services used to decide which reserve squadrons to decommission; and (4) other factors that might affect implementation of the Plan.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense To enhance the potential that the future Navy and Marine Corps integrated tactical aviation force will meet the mission needs of both services and ensure more transparency when making future decommissioning decisions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to thoroughly assess all of the factors that provide the basis for the number of backup aircraft needed to support a smaller tactical aviation force under the plan to integrate Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation forces.
Closed – Implemented
The Navy completed its review of tactical aircraft in September 2004. The review included E-2C, F/A-18A-F, and EA-18G. The Navy conducted a baseline assessment that validated current aircraft requirements vs. actual inventory. It assessed inventory optimization options to include mission capability, Operation Availability improvements, Fleet Replacement Squadron efficiencies, RDT&E efficiencies, decreased pipeline aircraft inventories, active flight envelope and inventory management, common configuration and divestment options, and reserve integration.
Department of Defense To enhance the potential that the future Navy and Marine Corps integrated tactical aviation force will meet the mission needs of both services and ensure more transparency when making future decommissioning decisions, the Secretary of Defense should develop guidance that (1) identifies the criteria and methodology for analyzing future decisions about which units to decommission and (2) establishes requirements for documenting the process used and analysis conducted.
Closed – Not Implemented
The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness issued a policy memo on September 18, 2006, that establishes new DOD policy and procedures to coordinate personnel reductions, closures of installations, and reductions of contract operations in the United States. The procedures in the memo state that the written request must contain the criteria and methodology used in making this force structure decision and establishes other requirements for documenting the process used and analysis conducted. This memo serves as interim guidance while the Department revises DOD Directive 5410.10. However, as we stated in the report, the new guidance, if followed, would disclose these aspects of the decision-making process; however, it does not appear sufficient to meet the need we identified for consistency and documentation to support force structure decisions. Therefore, we believe that DOD should take additional steps to meet the intent of our recommendation by developing consistent criteria and requiring documentation to ensure transparency for those providing oversight of such decisions in the future. DOD officials stated that the Department does not plan to take any additional steps at this time.
Department of Defense To enhance the potential that the future Navy and Marine Corps integrated tactical aviation force will meet the mission needs of both services and ensure more transparency when making future decommissioning decisions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to analyze future readiness funding requirements to support the tactical aviation integration plan and include required funding in future budget requests.
Closed – Implemented
The Navy has developed and implemented a series of analytical metrics and tools to provide insight into resource expenditure and to provide recommendations for funding readiness accounts to achieve target readiness levels. Four of the metrics and the insight they are expected to provide are described below. Using the Training and Readiness (T&R) metrics, flight hours are funded precisely to support each task making distinct contribution to aircrew readiness levels. Aircrew training is measured and budgeted with a direct and quantifiable output. Using the Measures of Effectiveness/Measures of Performance, each task within the Commander, Naval Air Forces T&R has measures applied to determine successful demonstration of a readiness skill set. This ensures accurate tracking and correlation of funds expended compared to readiness achieved at the aircrew level. Using B-standards, Navy Mission Essential Task Lists-based standards and performance measures for events are applied within major Fleet Response Training Plan milestones. Standardized for each Strike Group and funded to a calculated probability for successful achievement of the standard, the B-standards are the measures and control used to track and correlate funds applied to Strike Group level training. The use of Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program Cross Functional Team 1 Entitlements avoids excess inventory of resources and pairs with flight hour program as the key drivers in readiness predictability.

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Topics

Defense capabilitiesDefense contingency planningInteragency relationsForce structureMilitary aircraftMilitary aviationMilitary cost controlMilitary forcesMilitary procurementProcurement planningTactical air forces