Military forces (1 - 10 of 482 items)
Defense Intelligence: Additional Steps Could Better Integrate Intelligence Input into DOD's Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems
GAO-17-10: Published: Nov 1, 2016. Publicly Released: Nov 1, 2016.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed certifications and training for acquisition and intelligence personnel, but it does not have certifications for certain personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs. These personnel help integrate threat information on foreign capabilities and intelligence mission data—technical intelligence such as radar signatures and geospati...
Security Assistance: Guidance Needed for Completing Required Impact Assessments Prior to Presidential Drawdowns
GAO-17-26: Published: Oct 20, 2016. Publicly Released: Oct 20, 2016.
In fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the President authorized 13 drawdowns to provide security assistance and build foreign partner capacity to France, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and countries in West and Central Africa (see fig.). According to Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (State) data, the total value of articles and services authorized for these drawdowns was $321.5 millio...
Nuclear Weapons: DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad and Considered Other Reductions to Nuclear Forces
GAO-16-740: Published: Sep 22, 2016. Publicly Released: Sep 22, 2016.
The Department of Defense (DOD) assessed the need for each leg of the strategic triad in support of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and considered other reductions to nuclear forces in subsequent reviews. The department identified advantages of each leg of the triad and concluded that retaining all three would help maintain strategic deterrence and stability. The advantages DOD identified include...
Defense Civil Support: DOD Needs to Identify National Guard's Cyber Capabilities and Address Challenges in Its Exercises
GAO-16-574: Published: Sep 6, 2016. Publicly Released: Sep 6, 2016.
National Guard units have developed capabilities that could be used, if requested and approved, to support civil authorities in a cyber incident; however, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have visibility of all National Guard units' capabilities for this support. GAO found three types of cyber capabilities that exist in National Guard units:Communications directorates : These organization...
Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine If Recent Changes Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight
GAO-16-592R: Published: Jul 27, 2016. Publicly Released: Jul 27, 2016.
National security space leadership responsibilities are fragmented across approximately 60 stakeholder organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Executive Office of the President, the Intelligence Community, and civilian agencies. Officials and experts generally said that no one seems to be in charge of space acquisitions. According to officials and experts, DOD space acquisitions...
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Assessing Data on Worldwide Launch Market to Inform New Acquisition Strategy
GAO-16-661R: Published: Jul 22, 2016. Publicly Released: Jul 22, 2016.
Five countries outside of the United States have operational space launch capabilities: the European Union, Russia, India, Japan, and China. Most of these countries each primarily depend on a single launch provider for launches of a specific capability within their country to meet their civil government and military launch requirements. The United States is unique in that it relies on more than tw...
Military Training: DOD Met Annual Reporting Requirements in Its 2016 Sustainable Ranges Report
GAO-16-627: Published: Jun 15, 2016. Publicly Released: Jun 15, 2016.
The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2016 Sustainable Ranges Report met the annual statutory reporting requirements to describe DOD's progress in implementing its plan to sustain training ranges and any additional actions taken or planned for addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace. DOD's 2016 report provides updates to the plan r...
Rare Earth Materials: Developing a Comprehensive Approach Could Help DOD Better Manage National Security Risks in the Supply Chain
GAO-16-161: Published: Feb 11, 2016. Publicly Released: Feb 11, 2016.
Three Department of Defense (DOD) offices have identified certain rare earth materials (rare earths) as critical for some defense applications, such as lasers, but DOD has not taken a comprehensive, department-wide approach to identifying which rare earths, if any, are critical to national security. Specifically, DOD offices have not yet agreed on what constitutes “critical” rare earths. Using...
National Security Cutter: Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed
GAO-16-148: Published: Jan 12, 2016. Publicly Released: Jan 12, 2016.
The U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard's independent test agent, completed initial testing for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in April 2014 and rated the NSC as operationally effective and suitable. Still, testing revealed 10 major deficiencies (some are shown in figure). Initial testing is an event designed to verify performance of critical systems to ensure assets are capable of meeting mission requ...
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to Adopt an Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable Incorporation of Lessons Learned
GAO-15-623: Published: Aug 11, 2015. Publicly Released: Aug 11, 2015.
The Air Force intends to make significant changes to its acquisition approach for acquiring launch services under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program which will alter its current access and insights into certain cost and performance data. The United Launch Alliance (ULA)—EELV's incumbent provider—currently provides national security space launch services under a cost-reimburse...