Biological warfare (1 - 10 of 44 items)
Biodefense: The Nation Faces Multiple Challenges in Building and Maintaining Biodefense and Biosurveillance
GAO-16-547T: Published: Apr 14, 2016. Publicly Released: Apr 14, 2016.
The biodefense enterprise is fragmented and does not have strategic oversight to promote efficiency and accountability. Specifically, the biodefense enterprise lacks institutionalized leadership enterprise-wide to provide strategic oversight and coordination. In 2011, GAO reported, there are more than two dozen presidentially appointed individuals with biodefense responsibilities and numerous fede...
Biosurveillance: Nonfederal Capabilities Should Be Considered in Creating a National Biosurveillance Strategy
GAO-12-55: Published: Oct 31, 2011. Publicly Released: Oct 31, 2011.
The nation is at risk for a catastrophic biological event. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act directed GAO to report on biosurveillance--to help detect and respond to such events--at multiple jurisdictional levels. In June 2010, GAO recommended that the National Security Staff lead the development of a national biosurveillance strategy, which is now under development. This...
Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and a Designated Leader
GAO-10-645: Published: Jun 30, 2010. Publicly Released: Jun 30, 2010.
The U.S. government has a history of employing health surveillance to help limit malady, loss of life, and economic impact of diseases. Recent legislation and presidential directives have called for a robust and integrated biosurveillance capability; that is, the ability to provide early detection and situational awareness of potentially catastrophic biological events. The Implementing Recommendat...
Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Plans and Preparedness
GAO-09-927T: Published: Jul 28, 2009. Publicly Released: Jul 28, 2009.
DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This testimony addresses GAO's preliminary observations on DOD's role in CBRNE consequence management efforts and addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's p...
Homeland Security: First Responders' Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas Is Significantly Limited
GAO-08-180: Published: Jun 27, 2008. Publicly Released: Jun 27, 2008.
First responders are responsible for responding to terrorist-related and accidental releases of CBRN materials in urban areas. Two primary tools for identifying agents released and their dispersion and effect are equipment to detect and identify CBRN agents in the environment and plume models to track the dispersion of airborne releases of these agents. GAO reports on the limitations of the CBRN d...
Chemical and Biological Defense: Updated Intelligence, Clear Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to Guide Investments in Collective Protection
GAO-07-113: Published: Jan 19, 2007. Publicly Released: Feb 20, 2007.
For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed collective protection equipment to provide a protected environment for group activities. GAO previously reported persistent problems in providing collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In this report, GAO examined (1) curren...
Bioterrorism: Information on Jurisdictions' Expenditure and Reported Obligation of Program Funds
GAO-05-239: Published: Feb 28, 2005. Publicly Released: Mar 31, 2005.
In 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began funding jurisdictions' efforts to prepare for bioterrorism attacks through the Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism program. After the events of September 11, 2001, and the 2001 anthrax incidents, program funds increased almost twentyfold. Citing jurisdictions' une...
Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies
GAO-04-653: Published: May 24, 2004. Publicly Released: May 24, 2004.
Success in the war against terrorism requires the United States to effectively research, develop, and deploy technologies to detect and respond to the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the ability to use laboratories owned by the Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct research and development (R&D) of t...
Public Health Preparedness: Response Capacity Improving, but Much Remains to Be Accomplished
GAO-04-458T: Published: Feb 12, 2004. Publicly Released: Feb 12, 2004.
The anthrax incidents in the fall of 2001 and the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002-2003 have raised concerns about the nation's ability to respond to a major public health threat, whether naturally occurring or the result of bioterrorism. The anthrax incidents strained the public health system, including laboratory and workforce capacities, at the state and local levels. T...
HHS Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs: States Reported Progress but Fell Short of Program Goals for 2002
GAO-04-360R: Published: Feb 10, 2004. Publicly Released: Feb 10, 2004.
The anthrax incidents during the fall of 2001 raised concerns about the nation's ability to respond to bioterrorist events and other public health threats. The incidents strained the public health system, including surveillance and laboratory workforce capacities, at the state and local levels. Several months after the incidents, the Congress appropriated funds to strengthen state and local bioter...